People of the Philippines vs Mahinay

Facts
Appellant Larry Mahinay rape a 12 year old child. After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested. He was brought to the
Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim.
Held
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession, which he, however, claims was executed in violation of his
constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and
explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer:
in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our lawenforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and
which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1.The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and
understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every
other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said
person;
2.He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence
against him;
3.He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and
competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4.He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him;
and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon
petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5.That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any
form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6.The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed),
any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one
from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or
international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is
accomplished;
7.He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8.In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing
AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on
his waiver and chooses to speak;
9.That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process
that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already
begun;
10.The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;

11.He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Miranda vs Arizona
Facts:

The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases,
the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside
world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all
the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by the complaining
witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and
written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years
imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining
the confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days
prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted
the robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an
assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and the
transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The
conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local
police station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated
the night of the arrest and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half
hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one of the agents during the
interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California
robberies and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her
assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also
arrested Stewarts wife and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was
interrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the deceased, but had not
meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of
them with the crime. At trial, Stewarts statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced
to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and his right to
counsel.
Issues:

Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation are admissible against him in a criminal
trial and whether procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to
be compelled to incriminate himself are necessary.

Supreme Court holding:

The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to
protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.

The Court further held that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court of
Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of California in Stewart.
People vs Rodriguez
Facts
Appellant and Wilfredo Rodriguez, employed as construction workers in the upper floors of the bank, were charged with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide for the killing of the bank security guard whose lifeless body was discovered by a messenger in the early morning of October 11,
1991.

Helds
At the time of their arrest in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were not informed of the well known Miranda rights. Worse, they were
not provided with competent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the extrajudical confession. The maong pants
allegedly belonging to appellant stained with blood had no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken for
purposes of comparison.
The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. 19
We find the second requisite lacking. Prosecution witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and appellant were arrested and brought
to the police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991. 20 The records show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was taken
down by Pat. David D. Tuazon at 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991. 21 Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the police investigators called him at
around 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the extrajudicial
confession. 22 Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of
detention when accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant were arrested
and brought to the police station, they were already under custodial investigation.
People v Almanzor
Appelant rape a jollibee employer in a van and a crowded place. While going to her work. He was ordered to drive to the Makati Police Station.
Accused-appellant pleaded to be allowed to go to his office but the policeman said that they had to go straight to the police station. He was
informed that there was a complaint against him. Later in the evening, Sally arrived at the police station. Accused-appellant, together with five
(5) other men, was then made to stand in a line up. Sally singled out accused-appellant as the man who raped her. 17
Held

Accused-appellant's allegation with respect to the conduct of the police line-up is futile. That he was without counsel at the time of the police
line-up does not render the same irregular or invalid. The guarantees of Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. A police line-up is not part of the
custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel cannot yet be invoked at this stage. 32
It appears from the record that accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he was brought to the Makati police station. The
police did not, as yet, interrogate him or elicit incriminating statements from him. He was brought to the police station to be presented, along
with other men, to Sally and to be identified by her. The presence of counsel at that stage was not therefore necessary.
People vs Ordono

Facts
Accused Ordoo and Medina were adjudged guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy. Both accused claimed that
constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial
investigation thereby making their confessions inadmissible in evidence
Held
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that their extrajudicial confessions were inadmissible as evidence, because: there was no counsel during the
custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken; in the absence of a valid waiver, accused's relatives, the Parish
Priest of Santol and Municipal Mayor cannot stand in lieu of counsel's presence in the custodial investigation; and the accused were not
effectively informed of their constitutional rights when they were arrested so that their admissions were obtained in violation of their right
against self-incrimination.
Accused's conviction, however, was upheld based on their taped interview to the news reporter where they voluntarily admitted to the rapeslay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. The radio announcer is not a law enforcement officer, hence, their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any
influence or intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority
ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were around since the interview
was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was
being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.
People vs Bravo
Facts
Appellant is suspected to have raped a child. The testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the victim on the evening
of January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to remember what happened should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of
the policeman's own admission in court that although he informed the accused that he is a suspect in the rape and killing of one Juanita Antolin
he did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights before he asked him of his participation in the crime under investigation.
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of
his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not
yet in custody. 17 The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical
and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused
from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit
although untrue. 18 Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure
that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial of such right. 19 Courts are not allowed to distinguish
between preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given
by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel
should be struck down as inadmissible. 20 It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the
accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule. 21

People vs pavillare
Facts
Accused-appellant Eduardo Pavillare y Varona was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of kidnapping for ransom and was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. he improper identification of the accused-appellant at the police line-up without the
assistance of counsel rendered the said identification, including that made in court, inadmissible in evidence.
Held
The Supreme Court affirmed accused-appellant's conviction. The Court ruled that the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without
the assistance of counsel under Section 12 (1), Art. III of the Constitution does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of
an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. The identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up pointing
to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel because it is still
outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel as it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in
nature. The Court also ruled that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was sufficiently established. The crime of kidnapping is committed by
depriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. Accused-appellant released the
complainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money Pavillare and his companions immediately left the scene.
Said acts clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money was in exchange for the liberty of the private complainant.
People v Maingan
accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall
that she set her employer's house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her
province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. IAaCST
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought
her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity
to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter's detention cell why she did the burning of her employer's house and
accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home to her
province, the wife of her employer Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: "Sige umuwi ka,
pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na"
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by
SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was
able to hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program "True Crime" hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABSCBN Network.
Held
In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecution
witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the media. Accused-appellant Edna contends that being uncounselled
extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having committed the crime charged should have been excluded in evidence against her for being
violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and in
the nature of an uncounselled admission.
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-appellant is of the position that the remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in
the main of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We partly disagree.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1)Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation when the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. 41 Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended
to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 42
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:
(1)it must be voluntary;
(2)it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3)it must be express; and
(4)it must be in writing. 43
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the
morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole
family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of
the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo
was made in response to the "interrogation" made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do
not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply
to those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to
having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the
neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas' house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said
admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional
guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State
(and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual as both
accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. 44 Here, there is no evidence on record to show that said
witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant's uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was
properly admitted by the RTC.
People vs Rapeza
Facts
Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look for
appellant. 13 He found appellant fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make a
confession in the presence of a lawyer. 14Appellant was then brought to the police station after which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad Arnel
Alcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only available
lawyer in the municipality. 15 The typewriter at the police station was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the police
station as he was suffering from rheumatism. 16 At the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two
(2) officials of the Sangguniang Barangay, SPO2 Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellant
who was assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon. EcTI

An interpreter was provided appellant as he was not well versed in Tagalog being a native of Samar. As he is illiterate, appellant affixed only his
thumbmark on the statement above his printed name. Bonifacio Abad, the interpreter, and Atty. Reyes, as the assisting counsel, also signed the
statement. Atty. Reyes signed again as the notary public who notarized the statement.
Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay states that his rights were read to him, there was no showing that his
rights were explained to him in a way that an uneducated person like him could understand. On the assumption that the confession is
admissible, appellant asserts that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not amply proven as the trial court merely relied on
his alleged confession without presenting any other proof that the determination to commit the crime was the result of meditation, calculation,
reflection or persistent attempt.
Held
Appellant was not informed of
his constitutional rights in
custodial investigation.
We note that appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was "invited" by SPO2 Gapas to the police station. There he was detained
from 11 o'clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 up to the morning of 23 October 1995 before his extrajudicial statement was allegedly
taken. At this juncture, appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already considered a suspect, contrary to the
finding of the trial court that the mandatory constitutional guidelines only attached when the investigators started to propound questions to
appellant on 23 October 1995 in the house of Atty. Reyes. 39 In People v. Dueas, Jr., 40 we ruled, to wit:
It is stated in the alleged confession that prior to questioning SPO2 Gapas had informed appellant in Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that
any statement he made could be used in evidence for or against him, that he has a right to counsel of his own choice, and that if he cannot
afford the services of one, the police shall provide one for him. 45 However, there is no showing that appellant had actually understood his
rights. He was not even informed that he may waive such rights only in writing and in the presence of counsel. T
In this case, it was established that at the time of the investigation appellant was illiterate and was not well versed in Tagalog. 48 This fact
should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him, as well as the
contents of his alleged confession.
The prosecution underscores the presence of an interpreter in the person of Abad to buttress its claim that appellant was informed of his rights
in the dialect known to him. However, the presence of an interpreter during the interrogation was not sufficiently established. Although the
confession bears the signature of Abad, it is uncertain whether he was indeed present to assist appellant in making the alleged confession.
SPO2 Gapas could not say for certain if appellant had indeed understood his rights precisely because he did not explain them to appellant. In
any event, SPO2 Gapas would be incompetent to testify thereon because appellant's alleged confession was made through an interpreter as he
did not understand Tagalog. SPO2 Gapas' testimony as regards the contents of appellant's confession would in fact be hearsay.
Confession was not made with
the assistance of competent and
independent counsel of appellant's
choice.
Appellant denies that he was ever assisted by a lawyer from the moment he was arrested until before he was arraigned. On the other hand, the
prosecution admits that appellant was provided with counsel only when he was questioned at the house of Atty. Reyes to which appellant was
allegedly taken from the police station.
SPO2 Gapas testified that he "talked" to appellant when they got to the police station at 11 o'clock in the morning of 22 October 1995 and the
result of their "talk" was that appellant would give his confession in the presence of a lawyer. Appellant was then held in the police station
overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes.
The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions
or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in
writing and in the presence of counsel. 53Appellant did not make any such waiver.
he standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case given the deficiencies of the evidence for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes
signed the confession as appellant's counsel and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how he assisted appellant. The
confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2 Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no indication that Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his

constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appears
that his participation in the proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellant's confession. Such participation is not the kind of legal
assistance that should be accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.
Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant's counsel of choice but was picked out by the police officers allegedly through the barangay
officials. Appellant's failure to interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the prevailing
circumstances. As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his own
choice. SPO2 Gapas testified thus:
Confession is not voluntary.
It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary. 58 The trial court found that appellant's bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us to
hold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility. EHTIDA
First, the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused reflecting
spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. 59 The trial court applied this rule but without basis. On closer examination of the
evidence, the key details in the alleged confession were provided not by appellant but by the police officers themselves.
Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel.
To reiterate, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a
confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements. 67 And in the event the accused desires to give a confession, it is the
duty of his counsel to ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his act and that it is a product of his own free choice.
It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes. He was not
informed of his rights and there is no evidence that he was assisted by counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant having been subjected to
trickery and intimidation at the hands of the police authorities, as he claims, cannot be entirely discounted. A
Confession was not sufficiently
corroborated.
Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless they are corroborated. 68 There must be such
corroboration so that when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 69
As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at the
time the confession was made 70 or by any other evidence. 71
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellant's statement could
have been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However,
they were not presented in court. cCE
No motive could be ascribed
to appellant.
For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the
identity of the perpetrator. 79 In view of the inadmissibility of the confession, there is no other evidence that directly points to appellant as the
culprit. However, the prosecution failed to show any motive on appellant's part to commit the felonies. Appellant consistently denied having
known the victims. Although the confession states that Regino allegedly sought appellant's help in killing the victims as Regino was his nephew,
the fact of their relationship was denied by appellant and was never established by the prosecution. In People v. Aguilar, 80 we held that "the
absence of apparent motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create a presumption of the innocence of the
accused, since, in terms of logic, an action without a motive would be an effect without a cause." 81 CAIHTE
People v. Antonio Lauga

Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting. 38 They asked him to go with
them to discuss some matters. 39 He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape. 40 SEcITC
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision 41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding
appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 It also ordered
him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00. 43
Held
Admissibility in Evidence of an
Extrajudicial Confession before
a "Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence
because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. 54
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male
residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the . . .
PNP." 60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1 (g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace
and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at
the Barangay level." 61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of theLupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of
existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his
community. 62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay
bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.
Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated
to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed
extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 63
Luz vs People
Facts
O2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified
that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and
going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to
come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and
SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like
tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that
upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. 3
Held

In Berkemer v. McCarty, 13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and
the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the
traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered
"under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for
an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to
deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Acquitted
People vs Cabiles
Appellant Panfilo Cabiles was convicted for the crime of Robbery with Rape as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
The following day, November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Marites saw accused-appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station.
The latter admitted his guilt and pointed to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to commit the crime. Marites
further recalled that she saw accused-appellant at Mabingnay's house on November 5, 1989, before the crime took place
Held
As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellant's sworn statement wherein he confessed to the crime charged, and his verbal
confession made before robbery victim, Marites Nas Atienza, we rule against the validity of the written confession but uphold the admissibility
of the verbal confession. cdasia
In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit:
(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel: (3) the
confession must be express: and (4) the confession must be in writing.
Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his confession (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 9). Although
this assertion is uncorroborated, accused-appellant's free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect that it was made
without assistance of counsel. An admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence
(People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1995]). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin, 240
SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence
In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence. The case in point
is People vs. Andan (G.R., No. 116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accused's verbal confession made in a private meeting with the
municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence since it is not covered by the requirements of Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally
admitted having committed the crime as in the case at bar. Cdtai

People vs Deniega
Facts
Police authorities investigating the gruesome crime on August 31, 1989, arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on information that the
victim was last seen with Daniega, 1 a waiter at the Gathering Disco where Canoy used to work. Friends of Canoy volunteered the
information that the former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with Daniega. 2 The latter, it was bruited, 3 desperately tried
to patch up the relationship.
Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession obtained by police authorities from him during custodial
investigation (where he allegedly admitted raping and killing Canoy), 4 appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the investigators for
questioning. A second sworn statement, substantially similar and corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later
extracted from Diaz. In the said statement, Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied that he had something to do
with the victim's death.
In a demurrer submitted to the trial court on December 28, 1990, appellants moved for the dismissal of the information for Rape with Homicide
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, stressing that: 1 ) the confessions obtained by police authorities were acquired without the
assistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional rights and were hence, inadmissible in evidence; 2) the same (confessions) "were
obtained through torture, force, threat and other means which vitiat[ed] (their) free will"; and 3) except for the testimonies of the medico-legal
officer and two IBP lawyers who alleged that they assisted the accused during their custodial investigation, the prosecution presented no other
evidence to warrant a conviction.
Held
Apart from the defects evident on the face of the documents, there exists evidence indicating that the actual custodial investigation was
conducted at the police headquarters in the absence of counsel, as contended by appellants. While we have no dispute with the trial court's
observation that the appellants were brought to the Quezon City IBP office during daytime when other individuals were holding office in the IBP
floor (who may have witnessed the presence of the appellants in the area), 17 it is one thing for appellants to be brought to the IBP office only
for the purpose of signing the confessions in plain view of the other employees of the office, while compliance with the constitutional mandate
requiring the presence of counsel during the actual custodial investigation is quite another.
There is convincing proof 18 that, while Attys. Sansano and Rous may have been present at the signing of the documents, they
were not present at all during the actual custodial investigation of the accused in the police headquarters.
For instance, Atty. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant Deniega at the IBP Quezon City chapter office at "around
11:30 in the morning" of August 31, 1989. 19 However, Deniega's extrajudicial confession taken by Pat. Maniquis gives the time of its
execution as 11:20 A.M. also on August 31, 1989 or earlierthan the time they allegedly arrived at the IBP office.
There would be denial of the right to the assistance of competent and independent counsel if the investigation or, as in the
case before us, during the process of signing. The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the
interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the
interview.
At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. 26
People vs Culala
On March 16, 1982, Juliana Simoy positively identified Elizalde Culala in a police line-up as the person who robbed and killed her son, on the
night of March 14, 1982.15
The prosecution introduced in evidence the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant admitting the commission of the crime, alleged
to have been obtained in the presence and with the assistance of Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional rights. 16 cdasia
Held

On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was
assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula, 26 it was held that a Municipal
Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. 27 As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal
assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance
of peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into
conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial
investigations. 28 Consequently, for being violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible.
People vs Andan
Facts
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation.
Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request
that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin
mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife
and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He
asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that
the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant
hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. 14
Held
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of
his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the
two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a
municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk
to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not
know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters,
not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. 37
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters
acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were
there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the
crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to
its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere
in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
People vs Bacor
On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Victor Bacor was found guilty with the murder of Dionesio Albores. The Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, but from a penalty of reclusion temporal as maximum, it sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to the Rules on

Criminal Procedure, the case was certified to this Court, the main question being whether accused-appellant validly waived his right to remain
silent and, therefore, whether his confession is admissible in evidence against him. cdasia
By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with assistance of counsel and after having been
informed of his constitutional rights, accused effectively waived his right to remain silent.
Both the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused on the basis of the confession since, as they noted, it was corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti which dovetails with the confession.
The Court of Appeals correctly sentenced accused to reclusion perpetua. When the crime of murder was committed on March 17, 1991, the
same was punishable under Art. 284 of the Penal Code by reclusion temporal, in its maximum period to death. Each of the three distinct
penalties covered thereby forms a period and the penalty to be imposed is determined after reasonably offsetting the attending mitigating and
aggravating circumstances. In the instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of the accused was offset by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling considering that latter circumstance is not absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Held
First. Accused-appellant's confession, as quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its voluntariness and spontaneity.
Accused-appellant does not deny that he surrendered to the police on June 6, 1991, almost three months after the fatal shooting of Dionesio
Albores, and confessed to the crime because he "could no longer bear a guilty conscience." In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted
that the signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession (Exh. B) was his without any claim that he was forced, coerced, or threatened to
make the confession. 6 Indeed, the details contained in his confession could have been known to accused-appellant alone.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession without being warned of his constitutional rights. This is not
true. The record shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the right to remain silent, not only once but thrice: first, by his
counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public Attorney's Office (PAO); second, by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took accusedappellant's confession; and lastly, by the branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag,
before whom accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time, he was asked whether he was willing to give a
statement and he said he was. This is sufficient. 7 Contrary to accused-appellant's contention, there is no need for a separate and express
written waiver of his constitutional rights. 8 Accused-appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the authorities to confess to the
crime because, he said, he was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the
presence of and with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively
waived his right to remain silent. 9
Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the assistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was appointed
counsel de officio to assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted her appointment as his counsel before giving his
confession. 10 As this Court has held, a PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the
Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose
interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused-appellant. 11 Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer in the present case satisfies the
constitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused.
Judging from Atty. Anggot's testimony before the trial court, there is no reason not to consider her a competent and
independent counsel. She testified that before the taking of accused-appellant's confession, she requested SPO3 Ydulzura and the other
policemen to step out of the room so that she could privately confer with the accused-appellant, free from pressure or intimidation. She
also testified on the circumstances surrounding her appointment as counsel for accused-appellant. She said:
Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant with the assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him before the branch clerk of
court who, before administering the oath to accused-appellant, read the affidavit of confession to him and informed him of his rights and the
consequences of his confession. Accused-appellant stood pat on his decision to tell it all. As Branch Clerk of Court Montejo-Lumasag testified:
Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is proven and that the burden of
proof is upon the party who claims the contrary.
People vs Base
Facts
However, he never reached his destination because he was picked up by three armed men in civilian clothes who told him to come along with
them as they would ask him some questions. 6 He was brought to Lodlod, Lipa City at the house of Amelia Quizon. 7 Upon their arrival at
Quizon's place, a gun was poked at accused-appellant and he was ordered to lie down facing the ground. 8 As he lay thus, he was trussed up at
the neck, bound hand and foot with abaca rope with his hands tied behind his back. 9 He was then loaded on a top down jeep and brought to
the 217th PC Company Detachment in Rosario, Batangas.

He likewise claimed that although the sworn statement bore the attesting signature of Atty. Romeo Reyes, he neither knew nor saw Atty.
Reyes at the 217th PC Detachment on February 8, 1990. 26 Accused-appellant denied that he knew his co-accused Conrado Guno, Frederick
Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio. 27 He likewise denied knowing Leo Valle and Erlinda Angeles. 28
Held
Furthermore, Atty. Romeo T. Reyes and the interrogator, Sgt. Romulo Mercado, testified to the voluntariness of his confession. In this regard, it
must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to show the commission of
the crime apart from the confession."
People vs Espiritu
Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the crime of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The conviction was based mainly on his confession and the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. His
extra-judicial confession stated that he and Fred Malicdan killed Sato Sanad after being hired by Gerald Alicoy to do so for the sum of
P20,000.00. Aside from describing the details of how he had his cohort killed Sanad, during the ocular inspection, he even pointed out the place
where the killing had been committed. And when he executed his extra-judicial confession before the police and during the preliminary
investigation of the case before the city prosecutor wherein he admitted his participation in the said incident, he was assisted by Atty. Daniel
Mangallay. However, during the trial of the case, the accused denied any participation in the killing of Sanad. He also assailed the admissibility
of his extra-judicial confession. And, he claimed that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by himself and that the said lawyer
was unable to advise or to explain to him the contents of his extra-judicial confession before he signed it. ECDHIc
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that appellant's contention that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is
not proof of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted on behalf of appellant. Besides, appellant did not
object when Atty. Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly
acknowledged Atty. Mangallay as his counsel.
And as a consequence of the confession of the appellant, his conviction became inevitable. Such confession was evidence of a high order, "since
it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted
by truth and his conscience."
The assailed Decision was AFFIRMED. HacADE
People vs Turla
Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2945 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga, Danilo Turla y Bati was charged with
Violation of Rep. Act. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the Receipt for Custody (Exh. B) is inadmissible in evidence, as it was signed by the
accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel of his choice and without having been first informed of his
constitutional right to silence and to counsel. The said Receipt is a declaration against interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged, since
mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as extrajudicial confessions outlawed
by the Constitution.
However, the claim of insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is not tenable. As the trial court correctly found, "even if the documents,
more particularly the Booking and Arrest Report and the Receipt for Custody, are disregarded, there is more than enough evidence to sustain a
judgment of conviction. As already stated, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused in the offense charged.
Lumanog vs People
On June 13, 1996 retired Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla was killed in an ambush along Katipunan Avenue, Project 4, Quezon City. Police
investigation of the slaying incident resulted in the arrest of herein petitioners Lenido L. Lumanog, SPO2 Cesar A. Fortuna, Rameses C: De Jesus,
Augusto G. Santos and their co-accused Joel V. De Jesus, Lorenzo C. Delos Santos and Arturo C. Napolitano. Subsequently, an information for
the crime of murder was filed against all the accused.

Not perfunctory recital of rights

Meaningful transmission of information
Communicative in character