Report

Towards policy-relevant
science and scientifically
informed policy
Political economy of the use of
knowledge and research evidence in
urban resilience interventions in the
Philippines
Arnaldo Pellini (ODI), and Antonio Contreras, Melvin Jabar,
Ma. Teresa de Guzman, Marlon Era, Dennis Erasga and
Robert Javier Jr. (Social Development Research Center, De
La Salle University, Manila)
May 2013

May 2013

Report

Towards policy-relevant science and

scientifically informed policy
Political economy of the use of knowledge and research evidence
in urban resilience interventions in the Philippines
Arnaldo Pellini (ODI), and Antonio Contreras, Melvin Jabar, Ma. Teresa de Guzman, Marlon Era, Dennis
Erasga and Robert Javier Jr. (Social Development Research Center, De La Salle University, Manila)
May 2013

The Philippines are the third most disaster prone country in the world
according to the World Bank.
There is low uptake of research and analysis to inform local decisionmaking on disaster risk management
Demand for research and knowledge on DRM is linked to disasters
happening rather than the risk of disasters
While relocation can be considered an evidence-based and technically
sound solution, it is often not politically feasible.
Some examples exist of positive use of evidence in policy-making,
indicating the possibility to build stronger links between knowledge and
policy for resilient urban communities.

Shaping policy for development

odi.org

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to express their gratitude to AusAID and ODI for generous funding;
the Social Development Research Centre (SDRC) of De La Salle University in Manila for
facilitating the conduct of research; the city government of Navotas for facilitating the pretesting of our instrument; and the cities of Baguio, Tabaco, Marikina, Cebu, Iloilo, Cagayan
de Oro and Davao for their invaluable contribution and cooperation during the collection of
data. We would like to thank the various national, local government and donor agencies
who participated during the validation workshop. We would like to thank Harry Jones, a
Research Fellow at ODI, and Ajoy Datta, a Research Officer at ODI, for their comments on
an early draft of the report. We would like to thank Alice Barling-Gasson Programme
Officer at ODI for the support provided throughout the study and Deirdre Smith for
proofreading the report. The views and findings contained in this report are solely those of
the authors, and not of the institutions mentioned above.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements

iii

Abbreviations

iii

Executive summary

1 Introduction: an overview of the use of knowledge in policy-making

1.1 Evidencebased policy-making
1.2 Rationale of the study, expected outcomes and analytical framework
1.3 Research activities
1.4 Limitations of the research
1.5 Structure of the report

1
2
3
6
7
8

2 Natural disasters and urban resilience in the Philippines: key definitions

and policies
9
2.1 Key definitions used in the study
12
2.2 Main policies and reforms on disaster resilience in the Philippines
13
2.3 Key government institutions involved in natural disaster resilience
17
2.4 NGOs in the Philippines engaged in disaster risk reduction and management 19
2.5 Disaster risk reduction and management programs with financial/technical
assistance from international agencies
20
3 Urban resilience at sub-national level: analysis of the local level
investigation
24
3.1 Policy decision-making, political constituencies, relationships between policy
actors
25
3.2 Dynamics of the use of knowledge in the natural disaster risk reduction
decision-making processes
30
4 Conclusions

35

Figures

Figure 1: Political economy analysis framework

4
Figure 2: Case study areas
7
Figure 3: Occurrence of reported natural disasters in the Philippines 1980 - 2010 10
Figure 4: Ranking of the Philippines on human exposure to natural disasters
12
Figure 5: Volcano Mayon seen from Legazpi City, Province of Albay
26
Figure 6: Floods in Marikina caused by Typhoon Ondoy in 2009
26
Figure 7: Devastation caused by Typhoon Sendong in Cagayan de Oro, December
2011
26

ODI Report i

Figure 8: Barangay Matina Pangi (Davao) measures for preparing a rapid response
to floods include: rainfall measurements station, emergency and rescue material, a
bamboo stick to measure the increase in the river level
28
Figure 9: Davao City 911 Emergency Centre
29
Figure 10: Flood in Manila August 2012
37
Figure A1: Map of the regions and provinces of the Philippines
41
Figure A2: Composite hazard map of the Philippines
42

Tables

Table 1: Data related to human and economic losses from disasters that occurred
between 1980 and 2010
9
Table 2: Number of people affected by major natural disasters in the Philippines
(1980 2010)
10
Table 3: Economic damage caused by major natural disasters 1980 - 2010
11
Table 4: Main differences between NCDD and NDRRMC
14
Table 5: Government agencies with mandate on disaster risk prevention and
mitigation
18
Table 6: Government agencies with mandate on disaster preparedness
18
Table 7: Government agencies with mandate on disaster response
19
Table 8: Government agencies with mandate on disaster rehabilitation and
recovery
19
Table 9: NGOs in the Philippines engaged in disaster management
20
Table 10: International funding agencies and their disaster-related projects in the
Philippines
21
Table 11: International Funding Agencies and LGU Projects
22

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Abbreviations

ADB

Asian Development Bank

AusAID

Australian Government Overseas Aid Program

CDRRMC

City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

CIRCA

Centre for Initiatives and Research on Climate Change Adaptation

CNDR

Corporate Network for Disaster Response

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

DEFRA

Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (United Kingdom)

DENR

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

DILG

Department of Interior and Local Government

DND

Department of National Defence

DOF

Department of Finance

DOH

Department of Health

DOST

Department of Science and Technology

DPWH

Department of Public Works and Highways

DRRM

Disaster Risk Reduction and Management

DRRMO

Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office

DSWD

Department of Social Welfare and Development

ebpdn

Evidence-based Policy in Development Network

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ODI Report iii

LGU

Local Government Unit

MOA

Memorandum of Agreement

NAMRIA

National Mapping and Resource Information Authority

NDCC

National Disaster Coordination Council

NDRRMC

National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

NEDA

National Economic Development Authority

NGO

Non-governmental Organisation

OCD

Office of Civil Defence

ODI

Overseas Development Institute

PAGASA

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration

PEA

Political Economy Analysis

PHILVOCS Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology

PIA

Philippine Information Agency

RA

Republic Act

RAPID

Research and Policy in Development

SDRC

Social Development Research Centre

SNAP

Strategic National Action Plan

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

WTO

World Trade Organisation

ODI Report iv

Executive summary

The United Nations 2009 Global Report on Disaster Risk Reduction ranked the Philippines
as the third most disaster-prone country in the world, and the country with the largest
population exposed and displaced every year due to natural disasters.
When natural disasters such as violent floods, typhoons or earthquakes occur, the damage
has long lasting effects, not only on the economy but more importantly, on peoples lives
and a communitys sense of security and normalcy.
While natural disasters cannot be avoided, it is the duty of governments and civil society in
general to develop initiatives that reduce the negative effects natural disasters have on
peoples lives.
In this study we look at urban resilience polices the tools governments use to make
decisions and implement disaster risk reduction, as well as initiatives aimed at reducing the
negative effects of natural disasters. We define urban resilience as the ability of an urban
system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and
recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the
preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. (UNISDR 2009).
As noted by Ashley (2011)1, we know how good decision-making works. It should be factbased, deliberative and tested by real arguments. This means it needs people who have the
knowledge to engage and the self-confidence to challenge assumptions. To paraphrase
Ashley, we could say that we know how good policy works. It should be fact-based,
deliberative and tested by real arguments.
This study examines whether the processes that govern policy and decision-making on
resilience to natural disasters in urban areas of the Philippines are good, i.e. fact-based and
deliberative, and tested by real arguments.
Seven illustrative Local Government Units (LGUs), (Tabaco City, Baguio City, Marikina
City in Luzon, Iloilo City and Cebu City in Central Visayas and Davao City and Cagayan
de Oro City in Mindanao) were selected as case studies to better understand the factors that
favour or hinder the use of knowledge and research evidence in the design and
implementation of urban resilience policies and practice. The choice of the case study areas
is linked to the occurrence of natural disasters, and the experience of decision-making and
local planning on climate change/urban resilience.
The research was conducted by adopting a political economy analysis to create an analytical
framework that focuses on the specific topic of use of knowledge in policy decision-making
processes. Data collection was conducted through focus group discussions and semistructured interviews.
The key finding of our study is that the Republic Act 10121, which was passed in 2010,
established, among other things, a legislative framework that enables greater use of
scientific evidence in designing disaster risk reduction policies and interventions, both at
national and sub-national level. It is still early days to assess the impact of the new
legislation, and there are delays in the implementation of the Republic Act, such as training

Jackie Ashley, The danger of big-man politics, The Guardian Weekly 9.9.11 p. 21

ODI Report v

line agency staff at sub-national level on preparing against disasters and developing resilient
communities, as well as responding to natural disasters.
Another important finding is that LGUs do not usually demand or procure research and
analysis to inform their policy decision-making process on disaster risk reduction. The
demand for use of scientific knowledge by policy-makers is linked to the occurrence of a
natural disaster rather than the risk of occurrence of a natural disaster.
A topic that is politically loaded is the issue of relocating communities living in areas at
high risk of natural disasters. As well as the economic costs, a decision to relocate
communities is almost certain to encounter strong opposition and protests, which can be
very expensive politically, and end in action being delayed. Therefore, while relocation
can be considered an evidence-based and technically sound solution, it is often not
politically feasible.
We found exceptions to the limited use of evidence in policy decision-making in this area,
with examples of greater engagement between local administrations and academic
institutions. These cases are context specific. In the province of Albay (a high-risk area) the
governor was able to build political will on disaster prevention and establish close links
with the Climate Change Academy at Bicol University. In Cagayan de Oro, following
Typhoon Sendong in 2011, Xavier University collaborated with the local administration. In
Davao, the Davao Association of Colleges and Universities has an explicit objective to
increase the use of research evidence in policy-making.
These examples show it is possible to develop in the Philippines evidence-based decisionmaking processes on disaster risk reduction that can contribute to building more resilient
urban communities.

ODI Report vi

1 Introduction: an
overview of the use of
knowledge in policymaking

British philosopher Bertrand Russell, in the introduction of his The History of Western
Philosophy (1945) writes: All definite knowledge so I should contend belongs to
science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But
between theology and science there is a No Mans Land, exposed to attack by both sides;
this No Mans Land is philosophy.
This study is a walk into that No Mans Land to search for an answer to a specific question
(which you may or may not consider philosophical): What role do knowledge and research
evidence play in policy decision-making processes?
The success of development interventions and their translation into policies depends on
governments and international development agencies recognizing that their interventions
have to adapt to the complexity and uncertainty of development problems. It also requires
seeing their interventions and policy-making in general, as an incremental process of trial
and error through political interaction (Rondinelli 1983). To achieve this there needs to be a
change in attitude, a departure from the conventional methods of analysis, planning and
management that were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, which did not embed the
flexibility, responsiveness and learning required to facilitate social change and reforms
(ibid.).
Rondinellis main point is that, in a complex and uncertain environment, the capacity of
policy-makers and development planners to predict and control the future is limited.
Programs and projects must therefore be seen as experiments. Analysis, planning and
management help detect errors and successes, and generate information that allows for
making better-informed policy decisions. This is particularly relevant to urban resilience
policies and interventions which are at the centre of our study, as they ultimately aim to
change peoples behaviours and perception of the risks associated with climate change and
natural disasters in urban areas.
Central to Rondinellis approach are knowledge generation and flexible management.
Knowledge, in particular, allows for adapting the course of a program or project, and is the
source of evidence that will ultimately provide policy-makers with the information and data
required for designing new policies or improving the implementation of existing ones.

ODI Report 1

What may be new today compared to the 1980s is that in middle income countries like the
Philippines, the generation of policy-relevant knowledge and research evidence by
independent research institutions and universities has increased considerably, creating more
opportunities for policy decision-makers to tap into various types of knowledge, including
scientific knowledge. What is open to scrutiny and what we analyse in this paper is whether,
with regard to urban resilience, knowledge actually reaches policy-makers (both at national
and sub-national level) and is embedded in their decision-making processes.
In the next section we describe the key definitions that we use throughout the paper.

1.1 Evidencebased policy-making

Evidence-based policy-making is not a new concept or idea. If we look at Scandinavian
countries, we see that they are among the richest in the world and have developed welfare
systems based on comprehensive social policies and universal social rights (Kuhnle and
Hort 2004). What is interesting in the Scandinavian experience is that the development of
their welfare systems was preceded, in the second half of the nineteenth century, by a
considerable expansion of the state capacity and apparatus to collect and record social
statistics and social data. The experience from Sweden, highlighted by Kuhnle and Hort
(ibid.), shows the importance of developing capacity and systems to collect relevant data
that would result in social legislation and the definition of legislative priorities. The main
lesson from this experience is that the states capacity to provide statistics (i.e. evidence)
was a key element of the legislative effort required to develop universal welfare systems.
While J. M. Keynes noted that there is nothing government hates more than the wellinformed, as it makes the process of arriving at a decision complicated and difficult,
evidence-based policy-making emerged in the United Kingdom as a political discourse with
the Labour Government led by Tony Blair in 1997 (Davies 2004). The new prime ministers
underlying aim was to modernize the government machine through greater commitment to
evidence-based policy, the assumption being that policies informed by knowledge and
research evidence are better policies. Other countries have followed the trend, therefore
showing a commitment, as noted by Sutcliffe & Court (2006), to place, side-by-side,
ideologically driven politics with more rational policy decision-making.
We define policy in this study as a set of decisions which result in concrete plans for
actions or negotiated agreements (Jones et al., 2012). While all political actions are guided
by some thinking and/or interests, knowledge and evidence generated by scientific research
can contribute to reducing the influence of personal and political interests in decisionmaking processes. As noted by Jones et al. (ibid.), there is not a perfect piece of evidence
that can influence policy. Evidence-based policy-making is therefore the result of an uptake
of various pieces and types of evidence, combined with arguments based on personal
interests and incentives (Jones et al., 2012). Policy-making is usually influenced by lobby
groups, professional expertise, political ideology, resources, values and research-based
knowledge. They all bring some sort of knowledge and influence to the process (Davies
2004). The perennial challenge is therefore, how to make different types of knowledge,
particularly scientific or research-based knowledge, stand out and influence the policy
process.
Pellini et al. (2012) suggest a way to classify different types of knowledge aimed at
influencing policy which shows that different types of knowledge are legitimate sources of
evidence for policy-making. We have chosen for our analysis a purpose-based knowledge
categorisation where different types of knowledge fit different stages of the policy cycle
(Pawson et al., 2003, Jones et al., 2012):

Agenda-setting stage: knowledge is used to assess need, identify new

problems or chart existing practices;

ODI Report 2

 Policy formulation stage: knowledge plays a role in structuring various

alternative policy options, and in suggesting causal links between the policy
and its outcomes;
Policy implementation stage: knowledge functions to monitor processes and
improve the effectiveness of initiatives such as projects, programs and
ongoing policies;
Policy evaluation stage: formal research to discover what works, why, when
and how. Evidence feeds into new agendas and policy formulation.
The advantage of considering a purpose-based classification in terms of evidence-based
policy-making is that it extends beyond scientific evidence-based knowledge, and includes
local or indigenous knowledge, and tacit knowledge, which is important for the purposes of
this study, as we will see later.

1.2 Rationale of the study, expected outcomes and analytical

framework
This study is one of the deliverables of the Research for Policy Change in Southeast Asia
and the Pacific project which is funded by the Australian Government Overseas Aid
Program (AusAID) and is implemented by the Overseas Development Institutes (ODI)
Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) program. 2 The study was conducted in a
collaboration, led by the Social Development Research Centre (SDRC) of De La Salle
University in Manila. It focuses on a relevant area of an AusAID program in the
Philippines: disaster risk management and urban resilience.
The objective of the analysis is to better understand the factors that favour or hinder the use
of scientific knowledge and research evidence in the design and implementation of urban
resilience measures in selected areas of the Philippines. Contemporary academic discussion
of urban resilience focuses on three distinct threats: climate change, natural disasters and
terrorism. Our focus is on challenges and disasters specific to climate change, such as
typhoons (also named tropical storms) and floods, as well as geo-hazards like earthquakes.
The audience of the study is development partners such as AusAID, supporting projects,
programs and policy research on disaster risk reduction and climate change, nongovernment organisations (NGOs), and policy researchers who are interested in exploring
the topic of evidence-based policy-making in the Philippines.
The expected outcomes of the study are:
Constraints and enablers of linking scientific knowledge to policy decisionmaking processes are documented for use by the AusAID urban resilience
team
A methodology to conduct political economy studies of the use of knowledge
in policy-making is tested
A new collaboration between ODI and a local research institute to study the
role of evidence, knowledge and research-evidence in policy processes is
established
Researchers in the Philippines are informed about the evidence-based policy
in development network (ebpdn) and www.ebpdn.org and its potential for
future knowledge sharing and research collaborations
The research was designed adopting the principles of political economy analysis seen
through the lens of the use of knowledge in policy decision-making processes.
2

For almost a decade, ODIs RAPID program has been working to understand the relationship between research,
policy and practice and to promote evidence-informed policy-making. The funding from AusAID runs from July
2011 December 2012 and supports research and lessons learned on the links (or lack thereof) between knowledge
and policy-making.

ODI Report 3

Why political economy analysis? Because there is a growing recognition that politics matter
in development and that technical analysis, which has traditionally been applied to the field
of natural disaster risk management, needs to be complemented by a better understanding of
the politics that are behind it (Eaton et al., 2010, Faustino and Fabella 2011). Furthermore,
influencing policy through knowledge and research evidence must be recognised as a
political process which involves a change in the balance of power between knowledge
producers and users (Jones et al., 2012).
We define political economy analysis using the definition of Collinson (2003):
Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and
economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth
between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create,
sustain and transform these relationships over time (Collinson p. 3).
A political economy framework offers a number of potential benefits (Heider and Rao 2010,
Booth 2012):

It can help identify gaps in knowledge and challenge assumptions

It can reaffirm the centrality of politics in development decision-making
processes

It emphasises the importance of understanding context-specific realities

Focusing on institutions, it helps determine the incentive frameworks that
induce patterns of behaviour

It can provide an analytical approach which helps organise knowledge (tacit

and other) into consistent stories
By systematising knowledge, political economy analysis can also help
facilitate knowledge sharing.
A political economy approach takes the local context as its starting point and focuses on
identifying solutions and policy interventions which are technically sound and politically
possible (Faustino and Fabella 2011).
The main research question of the study is:
Under what conditions are LGUs constrained from taking disaster
mitigation/climate adaptation actions, in the face of evidence of hazards and
risks in urban areas, to protect citizens? Conversely, under what conditions
do LGUs use research evidence and knowledge to take such
mitigation/adaptation measures?

Figure 1: Political economy analysis framework

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The political economy framework developed and applied to the study to answer the main
research question is illustrated in Figure 1.
Step 1 Problem identification: the aim was to identify the specific problem to be
addressed by the study: are LGUs constrained from taking disaster mitigation/climate
adaptation actions in the face of evidence of hazards and risks in urban areas to protect
citizens? Conversely, do LGUs use research evidence and knowledge to take such
mitigation/adaptation measures?
Step 2 Diagnosis of systemic features: the analysis here focuses on the specific systemic
features in place that define the problem identified above. This was done through the
analysis of policy framework on urban resilience and a list of key policy actors in this area.
Guiding questions of our analysis were:

How have recent political and economic histories shaped policy processes at
the local level in relation to urban resilience?
What role do different actors (National Government, LGUs and non-state
actors) play in designing and implementing urban resilience interventions?
Which actors are the most influential in these processes, including at different
stages?
What are the formal and informal relationships between different policy
actors at sub-national level and how do these shape the decision-making
policy process? What kind and level of interaction exist between them?
Step 3 Dynamics for the use of knowledge in the policy process: the aim was to
understand the attitude towards scientific knowledge and the use of evidence in policy- and
decision-making processes. The analysis looked at the incentives and attitudes that favour
or hinder greater use of evidence in designing and implementing urban resilience
interventions. The guiding questions were:

What are the available types of knowledge? Are municipal administrations

able to access/use this evidence? What types of knowledge do they use?

Where are analyses, assessments and information (i.e. knowledge and
evidence) used in decision-making processes on urban resilience? What is the
context in the production and use of these?
Who are the producers of knowledge relevant for urban resilience decisionmaking at sub-national level?

ODI Report 5

 How are decisions framed? What are the ideas which everyone seems to
support? What are the unspeakable topics?
What are the incentives for use of knowledge/information for designing and
implementing urban resilience interventions, and how do they shape decisionmaking dynamics?
How is credibility achieved and wielded? Which actors are perceived to
have expertise on policy issues (e.g. technical, political etc.) and why?
What other factors shape the use (or not) of information and research? (e.g.
capacity, power dynamics, incentives etc.)? What is required to have policy
processes (whether design or implementation) that are more evidencebased?
Step 4 Conclusions: based on the results of the analysis conducted in steps 1 to 3, the aim
here is to draw the main conclusions.

1.3 Research activities

The study began with an inception stage where the approach and analytical framework were
introduced to SDRC and shared with AusAID in the form of a task definition, including the
research plan and the agreed methodology.
A background policy review helped identify definitions of urban resilience, as well as
mapping key policy documents and actors at national and sub-national level. The review
helped identify specific interventions by development partners and NGOs and list examples
of knowledge products that AusAID and other development partners have produced on
urban resilience.
The data collection at sub-national level was conducted through focus group discussions
and semi-structured interviews in seven LGUs: Albay (Bicol), Baguio City, Marikina
(Metro Manila) in Luzon, Iloilo City and Cebu City in Central Visayas and Davao City and
Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao (Figure 2).3

See also the map of the regions and provinces of the Philippines in Annex 1

ODI Report 6

Figure 2: Case study areas

The choice of these case study areas is linked to the occurrence of natural disasters such as
typhoons and volcanic eruptions and the experience of decision-making and local planning
on climate change/urban resilience. Marikina and Cagayan de Oro have traditionally been
considered typhoon-free, but had to suffer the consequences of Typhoons Ondoy in 2009
and Sendong in 2011. Iloilo and Cebu have had experience with disastrous floods brought
about by Typhoon Frank, while Davao has had two episodes of El Nino-related flooding, in
2002 and 2011. Baguio was selected for its unique geographical location which is prone to
landslides, and Tabaco is exposed to the risks of typhoons and volcanic eruptions.
Key informants for focus group discussions and interviews were identified in the LGUs to
represent institutions or agencies involved in disaster risk reduction and management:
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (DRRMO), the Philippine National
Police, Bureau of Fire Protection, City Health Office, Barangay Council, NGOs, civic
organisations, City Administration Office, and City Agriculture Office.
A validation workshop was conducted on 7 May, 2012 at De La Salle University where the
results of the fieldwork and analysis were presented and discussed. As well as study team
members, participants to the validation included AusAID, an LGU and some government
organisations involved in, among other things, disaster risk reduction: the Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical & Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA), the
Department of Environment and National Resources (DENR), the Local Governance
Academy and the Office of Civil Defence, both at the Department of the Interior and Local
Government.

1.4 Limitations of the research

The analysis of this report must be seen in the light of some limitations: the case study
areas, while covering the three main regions of the country, are not representatives of the
whole country and; while research methodology sheds light on why some LGUs in the case
study areas have been more successful than others in making use of various types of

ODI Report 7

knowledge and research evidence to design urban resilience initiatives, these generalisations
and hypotheses should be tested further in other areas of the country, under local
circumstances.
While the report is a synthesis of seven study sites, we decided not to present separated case
studies for each site. The process of data gathering, which relied on focus group discussions
and interviews with key informants, was designed to elicit answers which would not be
substantial enough for a detailed case study of each site, and were intended to develop a
narrative, with examples of the evidence gathered in the different sites.
Contemporary academic discussion of urban resilience focuses on three distinct threats:
climate change, natural disasters and terrorism. Our focus here is on challenges and
disasters specific to climate change (e.g. typhoons or tropical cyclones) as well as geohazards like earthquakes.

1.5 Structure of the report

Section 2 of this report sets out the context of urban resilience in the Philippines and
presents the results of the review, and the definition of urban resilience chosen for this
report. For readers who are not familiar with decentralisation reforms in the Philippines it
provides a short description of the main policy guiding the reform and the structure of
LGUs. The section includes results of the review of the main policies on urban resilience in
the Philippines and the programs which development partners have been supporting.
Section 3 presents results of the analysis of the data collected in the case study areas.
Section 4 presents the main conclusions.

ODI Report 8

2 Natural disasters and

urban resilience in the
Philippines: key
definitions and policies

The Philippines are highly vulnerable to natural disasters and the impacts of climate change.
During the period 1980 2010 the Philippines were hit by 363 disaster events (or 12.1 per
year over the 30-year period). Table 1 is taken from data posted on Prevention Web4 and
shows the extent of human losses, number of people affected, and the economic damage
incurred by the Philippines between 1980 and 2010.5

Table 1: Data related to human and economic losses from

disasters that occurred between 1980 and 2010
No of events:

363

No of people killed:

32,956

Average killed per year:

1,063

No of people affected:

116,212,416

Average affected per year:

3,748,788

Economic Damage (US$ X 1,000):

7,417,145

Economic Damage per year (US$ X 1,000):

Source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

239,263
6

The occurrence of natural disasters over the same period shows that storms and floods
(often associated to storms) are the biggest risks faced by the population (Figure 3).

PreventionWeb Philippines Disaster Statistics: http://bit.ly/Ow7Jlu

PreventionWeb Philippines Disaster Statistics: http://bit.ly/Ow7Jlu
6
The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster
Database, Universit Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. Data version: v11.08 . More information and data
on: www.emdat.be/
5

ODI Report 9

Figure 3: Occurrence of reported natural disasters in the

Philippines 1980 - 2010

Source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

Storms and floods are the natural disasters which occur most in the Philippines, and the
ones that affect the largest number of people when they do occur. More than six million
people were affected by storms that hit the country in 1990. In recent years, the number of
affected people increased to reach more than nine million in 2009 (Table 2).

Table 2: Number of people affected by major natural disasters in

the Philippines (1980 2010)
Disaster

Date

Number of people
affected

Storm

1990

6,159,569

Storm

2009

4,901,763

Storm

2008

4,785,460

Storm

2009

4,478,491

Storm

1998

3,902,424

Storm

2006

3,842,406

Storm

1988

3,250,208

Drought

1998

2,600,000

Storm

2006

2,562,517

Storm

2000

2,436,256

Source: OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

ODI Report 10

We can compare these figures with Japan, a country which has similar exposure to tropical
storms and cyclones. While Japan has a national income per capita of US$ 33,2807, which is
about 9.4 times that of the Philippines at US$ 3,504 (World Bank 2010), Japan has about
1.4 times as many people exposed to tropical cyclones than the Philippines. However, if
affected by a cyclone of the same magnitude, mortality in the Philippines would be 17 times
higher than in Japan (UNISDR 2009).
The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database ranked the economic damages caused by
major natural disasters in the Philippines for the period 1980-2010. Table 3 shows that
damage caused by major storms, floods and earthquakes that hit the country have caused
more than US$ 3 billion economic damage.

Table 3: Economic damage caused by major natural disasters

1980 - 2010
Disaster

Date

Cost (USD)

Flood

1995

700,300,000

Storm

2009

585,379,000

Storm

1990

388,500,000

Earthquake

1990

369,600,000

Storm

2008

284,694,000

Storm

2010

275,745,000

Storm

1995

244,000,000

Storm

1988

240,500,000

Storm

2009

237,489,000

Storm

1984

216,700,000

Total

3,542,907,000

The United Nations 2009 Global Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2009) ranks
the Philippines as the third most disaster-prone country in the world, with the largest
number of people exposed and displaced annually due to natural disasters. Figure 4 below
shows that the Philippines ranks quite high in the world in terms of human exposure to
natural disasters, particularly when it comes to tropical cyclones.

At Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

ODI Report 11

Figure 4: Ranking of the Philippines on human exposure to

natural disasters

Source: UNIRSD 2009 Global Assessment Report

Why is all this relevant for urban resilience?

The data about urbanisation show that the Philippines has one of the most urbanised
populations in Southeast Asia. The estimate varies. UNICEF (2012)8 estimates that 50% of
the population (or 46 million people) live in urban areas, while United Nations figures show
76.7% of the population live in urban centres (UNDESA 2008)9. The percentage of the
urban population in slums in the Philippines is 44% (or 22.8 million) (Homeless
International 2012).10
If a large part of the population is exposed to natural disasters in the Philippines, and a large
percentage of the population lives in urban areas, it can be assumed that the probability of
the urban population living under the risk of natural disaster is high, which makes a
compelling case for developing and strengthening urban resilience measures and policies.
This is in line with the goal of the Disaster Risk Reduction Management program of
AusAID, which is to strengthen community-based preparedness and reduce the
vulnerability of the poor to natural disasters.

2.1 Key definitions used in the study

In this paper we define urban resilience as the The ability of an urban system, community
or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from the effects of
a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration
of its essential basic structures and functions (UNISDR 2009).
We therefore refer to the capacity of a social system to contain the impacts of disasters and
implement rehabilitative measures that reduce social interference (Brenuea et al., 2003).
Under the Philippine Republic Act 10121, the term resilience is defined as:
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb,
accommodate and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner,
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and
functions. (Section 3 ff)
8

UNICEF (2012) The State of the World's Children 2012: Children in an Urban World, Geneva: UNICEF.
Sources: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2008) World
Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, United Nations, New York; UN-Habitat, Urban Info 2008.
10
Homeless International: data accessed on 2 August 2012 at http://bit.ly/ODp9ch
9

ODI Report 12

Resilience calls for social units such as government, communities and organisations to
adapt to climate change, which is at the root of natural disasters, rather than to resist them. It
also requires collective efforts given the different kinds and severities or risk, shock, stress
or environmental change (Twigg 2009:8). This collective effort can be broken down into
five main areas of resilience: (1) governance, (2) risk assessment, (3) knowledge and
education, (4) risk management and vulnerability reduction, (5) disaster preparedness and
response (Twigg 2009).
Related to the disaster discourse are climate change-related hazards and risks. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) refers to climate change as a
statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its variability,
persisting for an extended period. Climate change may be due to natural processes or
external forces or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere
or in land-use (IPCC TAR 2001). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change defines it as a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (UNFCCC 1 Section 2).

2.2 Main policies and reforms on disaster resilience in the

Philippines
Similar to other Southeast Asian countries, governance in the Philippines has traditionally
been highly centralised (Brillantes and Moscare 2002). In 1991, the passage of Republic
Act 7160 (also known as Local Government Code) marked the official start of
decentralisation reforms which resulted in a substantial devolution of powers and functions
to sub-national government units or LGUs. The reform opened up space for the active
engagement of CSOs and citizens in local governance. This contributed to an increase in
demand for locally generated evidence, as citizens look to their elected representatives for
reforms that stimulate local development and accountable governance (Villarin 2004).
Owing to the decentralisation reform, LGUs (i.e. provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays, the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines) are given autonomy in
carrying out specific administrative, economic and political functions (Llanto 2010). One
such administrative function is the management of disasters (Shaw 2009).
Before the 1991 Local Government Code, disaster management was under Presidential
Decree 1566 signed in 1978 by President Ferdinand Marcos. The Decree prescribed a
mainly reactive and centralised management of natural disasters. It contained little in terms
of proactive investments to reduce the damage from natural disasters. Today, on the
contrary, when disasters occur, political and administrative units are mandated to use all
possible resources available at the local level before seeking assistance from external
entities and the central government.
Presidential Decree 1566 stipulated that the National Disaster Coordinating Council
(NDCC) served as the policy-making body for disaster control management in the
Philippines. The task of the NDCC was to advise the President on the status of preparedness
programs, disaster operations and rehabilitation efforts undertaken by the government and
private sectors. The secretary of national defence was the head of the council. Other
members included the secretaries of public works, transportation and communications,
social welfare and development, agriculture, education, finance, labour, justice, trade and
industry, local government, health and natural resources. The Armed Forces chief of staff
and the executive secretary were also NDCC members. The council was represented at
regional, provincial and city/municipal level by local disaster coordinating councils. At
municipality/city level, the mayor was the chairman of the local NDCC, with the Station
Commander of the Integrated National Police as vice-chairperson and action officer.

ODI Report 13

In 2010, 34 years after Presidential Decree 1566, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

introduced new legislation that changed the way natural disasters are managed. Republic
Act 10121, also known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act,
aims at strengthening the capacity of the local government units for disaster reduction and
management through decentralised powers, responsibilities and resources at regional and
local levels (see Section 2 (K) of RA 10121).
RA 10121 represents a major legislative shift. It introduced a different approach to
managing natural disasters which includes more proactive responses and actions than in the
past. One important organisational change to RA 10121 was the replacement of the old
NDCC with the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC).
The new Council includes a total of 36 organisations including public, non-government and
private-sector organisations. This is an increase from 19 under the NDCC. Table 4 below
shows the main differences between the NCDD and the NDRRMC. Unlike the NDCC, the
NDRRMC has a permanent, rather than ad hoc, membership. It also requires the
appointment of DRRM officers at sub-national level and the establishment of a DRRM
office in the LGUs. A major difference between the NDCC and the NDRRMC is the task of
developing a National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework to provide a
comprehensive, all hazards, multi-sectoral, inter-agency and community-based approach to
disaster risk reduction and management.

Table 4: Main differences between NCDD and NDRRMC

National Disaster
Coordinating Council - NDCC

National Disaster Risk Reduction and

Management Council- NDRRMC

Legislation

Presidential Decree 1566

Republic Act 10121

Year

1978

2010

Members

19 11

36 12

Chair

Defence Secretary

Defence Secretary

11

Chairman: National Defence Secretary. Members: Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, Secretary of the Department of Social
Services and Development, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, Secretary of the Department of Finance, Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, Secretary of the Department of Local
Government and Development, Secretary of the Department of Health, Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources, Secretary of the Department of Public Information, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, Secretary of the Department of Justice, Presidential Executive Assistant, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Secretary-General of the Philippine National Red Cross, Administrator of the Office of
Civil Defense.
12
Members: Secretary of the Department of Health, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Secretary of the Department of Education, Secretary of the
Department of Energy, Secretary of the Department of Finance, Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry,
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Secretary of the Department of Justice, Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, Secretary
of the Department of Tourism, the Secretary of the Office Secretary of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process, the Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Chief of the Philippine National Police, the Press Secretary, Secretary-General of the Philippine Red
Cross, Commissioner of the National Anti-Poverty Commission Victims of Disasters and Calamities Sector,
Chairperson of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, Chairman of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council, the Executive Director of the Climate Change Office of the Climate Change
Commission, the President of the Government Service Insurance System, the President of the Social Security
System, the President of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, the President of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines, the President of the League of Provinces in the Philippines, the President of the
League of Municipalities in the Philippines, the President of the League of Cities in the Philippines, the President
of the Ligang Mga Barangay, four representatives from CSOs, one representative from the Private Sector,
Administrator of the Office of Civil Defense

ODI Report 14

Vice-chairs

Interior secretary as vice chairperson for disaster

preparedness;
Social welfare secretary as vice chairperson for
disaster response
Science and technology secretary as vice
chairperson for disaster prevention and mitigation
Socioeconomic planning secretary as vice
chairperson for disaster rehabilitation and recovery

New members

Commissioner of the National Anti-Poverty

Commission Victims of Disasters and Calamities
Sector
National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council
Climate Change Office of the Climate Change
Commission
Government Service Insurance System
Social Security System
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines
League of Provinces in the Philippines
League of Municipalities in the Philippines
League of Cities in the Philippines
Ligang Mga Barangay

Non-government
members

Philippines Red Cross

Philippines Red Cross

Four representatives of NGOs
One representative of the private sector

With regard to the implementation of the directives included in RA 10121 at sub-national

level, a number of LGUs have responded to the mandate of the RA 10121. The City of
Makati (part of Metro Manila), for example, passed a City Ordinance creating its DRRM
office, and allocating 5 million PHP (ca. 119.000 USD)13 for its operations. The creation of
the DRRM office advances the citys effort of championing city resilience. Makati City was
recognised by the UNISDR as a Role Model City and Campaign Champion for Making
Cities Resilient in 2011.14 Another local government unit lauded for its DRRM is Bacolod
City which was nominated for Gawad Kalasag 2012, a prize for excellence in DRRM and
Humanitarian Assistance among highly urbanised cities. In 2009, the city was listed in the
top three Gawad Kalasag Awardees.15
RA 10121 mandates national and local agencies to come up with participatory and proactive
responses to, mitigation of, and preparation for disasters. This legislation reforms the
management of disasters in the country from being reactive to being proactive. The National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan as required by RA 10121 was finalised in
2011. It serves as a national guideline that articulates the goals and objectives of the country
relative to its disaster management. The plan outlines the activities and programs planned
and developed by NDRRMC to increase the capacity of, among other, LGUs and their
partners (e.g. NGOs, CSOs and international organisations) in building disaster resilient
communities. The plan defines the DRRM policy structures, institutions and coordination
mechanisms required to achieve its objectives.
Both RA 10121 and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan introduce
and expand natural disaster risk reduction to areas such as gender, knowledge and
education, the peace process and conflict resolution, climate change measures and
13

Exchange rate: 1 USD = 41.8008 PHP

Reported in Phil Star, 2 July 2012
15
Philippine Information Agency, 16 July 2012
14

ODI Report 15

adaptation, and human rights. Disaster risk reduction management recognises and
strengthens LGUs capacity to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover from the impacts of
disasters.
Under RA 10121, 5% of a calamity fund can be used for the pre-disaster phase, such as
constructing infrastructure for flood mitigation, procurement of equipment and supplies,
training, research, coaching and policy development. Under the new policy, disaster
management involves four thematic sectors: (1) disaster preparedness, (2) response, (3)
prevention and mitigation and (4) recovery and rehabilitation. However, the 5% calamity
fund is not conditional to the establishment of a local DRRM unit.
While cities like Makati and Bacolod responded to RA 10121 by establishing a DRRM
office, other LGUs did not. The delay in the implementation of DRRM at the local level can
be attributed to various factors. One of the challenges of the current DRRM policy is the
absence of incentives for local government units to create a DRRM office. LGUs can access
5% of the calamity fund to invest in disaster-related infrastructure, even without a local
DRRM office. Tagum City in Davao del Norte, for example, passed City Ordinance No.
278 S-2011 which authorises the mayor to use funds from the annual budget for
strengthening infrastructure, including construction and rehabilitation of drainage canals,
preparedness activities and other mitigating measures. However, in the absence of a DRRM
office, the ordinance does not specify who is responsible for managing the funds.
Another difficulty in implementing the RA 10121 in relation to the 5% calamity fund is the
issue of fund appropriation. The Municipality of Corella in the province of Bohol filed a
resolution requesting that its district representative in the national Congress repeal RA
10121. Under the current law, unexpended balance of the 5% calamity fund must be
carried over and can only be used for disaster risk reduction management activities and
programs for the next five years. However, the Corella Municipality considers such a
provision restraining given its limited financial resources.
Importantly for our study, RA 10121 highlights the importance of the use of scientific
knowledge in the form of strengthening and developing information systems and
geographic information systems to build risk maps. The use of early warning systems is
incorporated in RA 10121 and defined as knowledge of the risks, monitoring, analysis and
forecasting of the hazards, communication or dissemination of alerts and warnings, and
local capabilities to respond to the warnings.
Risk assessment, hazard mapping, public information and education, warning and
forecasting capabilities are mandatory to ensure that disaster risks are properly managed. As
defined by the law, risk assessment includes a review of the technical features of hazards in
the area, analysis of exposure and vulnerability, and evaluation of the effectiveness of
existing coping capacities. The law also promotes the use of information systems and
geographic information systems in the creation of a national risk map to be used in policy,
planning and decision-making formulation.
Overall, RA 10121 represents landmark legislation on disaster risk reduction and
management in the Philippines. It institutionalises the countrys system and framework for
disaster risk reduction and management. This legislation seeks to provide holistic,
participatory, institutionalised and proactive responses to abate the impacts of disasters and
climate change. It superimposes the collaborative roles of national government agencies,
LGUs and NGOs in building resilient communities.
Other laws relevant for urban resilience are:

Republic Act 9729 or the Philippine Climate Change Act of 2009: also
known as the Republic Act 9729 of 2009, the Philippine Climate Change Act
mandates the integration of the climate change agenda in government policy

ODI Report 16

formulations and the establishment of a framework strategy and programs

relating to climate change. In relation to disaster risk reduction and
management, the Climate Change Commission, established under this law, is
mandated to coordinate with the National Disaster Risk Reduction
Management Council (NDRRMC) to increase efficiency and effectiveness in
abating peoples susceptibility to climate-related disaster.
Executive Order 832: signed by the then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on 12 October 2009, created the Special National Public-Private
Reconstruction Commission (SNPPRC) tasked with identifying recovery
measures and estimating the cost of reconstruction following typhoons
Ondoy, Pepeng and Frank. Specifically, the commission is mandated to
design a rehabilitation plan for infrastructure, raise funds or grants for
reconstruction, oversee implementation of rehabilitative services, and act as a
clearing house for international assistance.
Executive Order 66: states the rules on the cancellation and suspension of
classes in private and public educational institutions at all levels, and work in
government offices due to disasters. E.O. 66 also stipulates that government
offices directly involved in disaster risk reduction and management shall
maintain their operations to ensure that the needs of those affected are met.
These offices are Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of National
Defence, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, Department of Science and Technology,
Department of Health, Department of Public Works and Highways,
Department of Education, and other offices whose services may be needed in
times of disasters.
Executive Order No. 888: this policy endorses the Strategic National Action
Plan of 2009-2019 (SNAP) on disaster risk reduction. Different social sectors,
including the government, NGOs, civil society groups, professional
associations, academics and scholars were involved in creating the plan. It
serves as a master plan or road map for disaster mitigation and provides a list
of priority areas in disaster management, as well as the government agencies
tasked with carrying out different projects and programs.
There are also a number of memorandum circulars that support the implementation of RA
10121:

OCD Memorandum Circular 079s. 2011 sets out the guidelines and criteria in
reporting disaster incidents;

NDRRMC Memorandum No. 17, s. 2011 creates the NDRRMC Scientific

Research and Risk Assessment Committee Relative to the Flash flood

Disaster in Cagayan de Oro City and Iligan City, brought about by Tropical
Storm Sendong in January 2012 (Washi);
NDRRMC Memorandum No. 03, s. 2012 provides guidelines for the
selection of representatives from Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to the
National and Local DRRM Councils;
NDRRMC Memorandum No. 04, s.2012 includes implementing guidelines
on the use of an Incident Command System (ICS) on an on-scene disaster
response and management mechanism under the Philippine Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management System.

2.3 Key government institutions involved in natural disaster

resilience
As discussed, the NDRRMC serves as the national policy-making and coordinating body of
the Philippine government on disaster risk reduction and management. The council is
mandated to manage existing disaster risk reduction-related programs, services and

ODI Report 17

activities. Specifically, it is responsible for designing risk assessment and early warning
measures, and disaster risk communication, reduction, mitigation, rehabilitation and
preparation.
An important member of the NDRRMC is the Office of Civil Defence (OCD). The OCD is
part of the Department of National Defence (DND) and acts as the administrative
secretariat, advisory and implementing office of the NDRRMC. The other four leading
government bodies that play major roles in the NDRRMC are the Department of Science
and Technology (DOST) which is responsible for prevention and mitigation, the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), responsible for disaster
preparedness, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), responsible for
disaster response, and the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) responsible
for rehabilitation and recovery from natural disasters.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA), the Department of Health (DOH), and the National Housing
Authority (NHA) also support the implementation of DRRM programs, services and
activities (See Tables below for a list of government units/offices and their roles in DRRM).

Table 5: Government agencies with mandate on disaster risk

prevention and mitigation
Prevention and Mitigation
Lead Agency: Department of Science and Technology
OCD

Mainstream DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation in national, sectoral, regional

and local development policies, plans and budgets. Conduct community-based
and scientific-based DRRM and CCA assessment, mapping, analysis and
monitoring

DENR

Develop DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation-sensitive environmental

management

DPWH

Increase disaster resilience of infrastructure system

DOF

Provide access of communities to effective and applicable disaster risk financing

and insurance

DOST

Conduct end-to-end monitoring, forecasting and early warning systems

Source: The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, 2011

Table 6: Government agencies with mandate on disaster

preparedness
Disaster Preparedness
Lead Agency: Department of Interior and Local Government
PIA

Increase level of awareness and enhance capacity of communities to the threats

and impacts of all hazards

DILG and OCD

Equip communities with necessary skills and capability to cope with the impacts
of disaster. Develop and implement comprehensive national and local
preparedness and response policies, plans and systems

DILG

Increase DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation capacity of Local DRRM

Councils and Offices at all levels. Strengthen partnership and coordination among

ODI Report 18

all key players and stakeholders

Source: The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, 2011

Table 7: Government agencies with mandate on disaster

response
Disaster Response
Lead Agency: Department of Social Welfare and Development
DSWD

Establish effective disaster response operations. Provide temporary shelter

needs. Implement coordinated and integrated system for early recovery at
national and local levels

DRRMCs, OCD,
DSWD

Conduct adequate and prompt assessment of needs and damages at all levels

DND, DILG, DOH

Integrate and coordinate search, rescue and retrieval capacity

LGUs

Evacuate affected communities safely and timely

DOH

Attend to basic social needs of affected population. Promote psycho-social

wellbeing and reduce mental health problems and risks

Source: The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, 2011

Table 8: Government agencies with mandate on disaster

rehabilitation and recovery
Rehabilitation and Recovery
Lead Agency: National Economic Development Authority
OCD

Assess damages, losses and needs

NHA

Mainstream DRRM and CCA elements in human settlement

DPWH

Reconstruct disaster and climate change-resilient infrastructure

DOH and DSWD

Restore normal functioning of affected population

Source: The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, 2011

2.4 NGOs in the Philippines engaged in disaster risk reduction

and management
There are several NGOs engaged in disaster risk reduction and management in the
Philippines. Their services include technical support and capacity building, relief response,
disaster preparedness and mitigation and advocacy, among others.

ODI Report 19

Table 9: NGOs in the Philippines engaged in disaster

management
Name

Activities

Aksyon Bayan Kontra

Disaster, Inc (ABKD)

Assistance to barangays and communities in urban centres to manage

disaster risks and to serve as a pressure group for disaster resilient urban
communities

Centre for Disaster

Preparedness

To promote community-based disaster risk management

Centre for Initiatives &

Research on Climate Change
Adaptation
(CIRCA)

To enhance resilience among residents in the province of Albay to climatic

risks, and to strengthen research capacity and project implementation in the
context of climate change adaptation

Christian Aid Philippines

To assist at-risk communities to adapt to disasters and cope with the

impacts of climate change

Corporate Network for

Disaster Response (CNDR)

To institutionalise disaster risk management efforts of the business

community and to implement various community-based disaster
preparedness projects

Earthquake and Megacities

Initiative

To promote urban risk reduction policy, knowledge and practice in

megacities and metropolises
To facilitate scientific and technical knowledge on urban disaster risk
reduction and management

Philippine National Red Cross

To provide relief assistance in times of disasters and to implement

mechanisms for disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness

Philippine Relief and

Development Services

To provide technical assistance to local churches on disaster management

and to respond through relief services such as housing and other basic
needs

PhilDHRRA

To address agrarian reform and rural development including disaster-related

risks

2.5 Disaster risk reduction and management programs with

financial/technical assistance from international agencies
International donor agencies play an imperative role in upgrading disaster risk reduction and
management of the Philippine government. They provide both technical and financial
support to national government agencies. Most of the funded projects focus on disaster
preparedness (e.g. technical assistance, risk/needs assessments, loans, forecasting
capability), rehabilitation (e.g. infrastructure reconstruction) and response (e.g. relief
operations).

ODI Report 20

Table 10: International funding agencies and their disasterrelated projects in the Philippines
Donor

Project

Asian Development
Bank

Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) Process for Typhoons Ondoy and

Pepeng
Southern Leyte Landslide Disaster Assistance Project

AusAID

Safer Communities Project

Technical links for disaster and climate risk management
Emergency and humanitarian response
Multi-Agency Hazard Mapping and Assessment for Effective Community Based
Disaster Risk Management (READY) project

Agencia Espanola de
Cooperacion
Internacional para el
Desarrollo
(AECID)

Temporary housing evacuation of Typhoon Washi survivors

Strengthening local governments in the Philippines on DRRM and CCA

Strengthening the disaster risk reduction capacity of LGUs affected

by Typhoon Parma, to be implemented in San Jose City, the Municipalities of
Carranglan, Pantabangan, Rizal and Llanera, all in the province of Nueva Ecija
European Commission
Humanitarian Aid
Department Disaster
Preparedness
Program

Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Sustainable Development: Land

Use/Physical Planning in the Philippines
Safe Hospitals in Emergencies and Disasters: Philippine Indicators for Level 1 to 4
Hospitals
Disaster Preparedness in the Philippines

IBM International

Emergency Response Network

JICA

Upgrading the Forecasting Capability of the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical

and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) and the Philippine Institute of
Volcanology and Seismology (PHILVOCS)
Project for the Rehabilitation of Flood Forecasting and Warning System in the
Pampanga and Agno River Basins
Project for Flood Disaster Mitigation in Camiguin Island

UN Agencies

Improvement of Methodologies for Assessing the Socio-Economic Impact of HydroMeteorological Disasters

Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Sustainable Development: Land
Use/Physical Planning in the Philippines

USAID

Program for the Enhancement of Emergency Response (PEER) Phase III

World Bank

Disaster Risk Management Policy Loan with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown

Option Program

ODI Report 21

Integrating Flood Risk Management into Local Planning

There are also programs and projects funded by international organisations in coordination
with LGUs. The Earthquake and Megacities Initiative is at the forefront in promoting the
use of science and knowledge in developing resilient urban communities in the Philippines,
in particular, and in South East Asia in general. By and large, most of the projects being
funded by donor agencies at the local level are geared towards disaster preparedness.

Table 11: International Funding Agencies and LGU Projects

Funding Agency

Project

Objectives

Partner
Agency

AusAID

BRACE (Building the

Resilience and
Awareness of Metro
Manila Communities to
Natural Disaster and
Climate Change Impacts)
Pilot Program

To create digital elevation maps for

risk and vulnerability modelling for
flooding, earthquakes and high wind

Taguig City
Government

Cities Development
Initiative for Asia

Urban Renewal,
Drainage, Wastewater
Management

To improve living conditions in lowincome areas along the river through

reduced flooding and cleaner
environment

Naga City

Earthquake and
Megacities Initiative

Resilience to
Earthquakes and Floods
Project

To identity institutional goals and

standards, to evaluate disaster
management plan and to
institutionalise disaster risk
management strategy and action
plan

Pasig City
Government

Physical Risk Cluster of

Makati Risk-Sensitive
Urban Redevelopment
Planning Project

To conduct a comprehensive building

inventory and structural assessment
of buildings and other physical
infrastructures in Barangay Rizal,
Makati City

Makati City
Government

JICA

Iloilo Flood Control

Project II

To improve the living environments

and sanitary conditions of local
residents

Iloilo City

UN-HABITAT

Strengthening Philippine
City Capacities to
Address Climate Change
Impacts

To design and develop appropriate

social and physical infrastructure for
Sorsogon City to become climate
change resilient, through the
implementation of a climate change
responsive city shelter plan

Sorsogon City
Government

UN

Online Local Government

Self-Assessment Tool

To help appraise urban hazards

through identifying planning and
investment gaps for risk reduction
and climate change adaptation

Quezon City
Government

USAID

Emergency Relief, Early

Recovery and
Rehabilitation

To provide funds for the procurement

of classroom furniture and supplies
and restoration of schools

Cagayan de
Oro City

To improve drainage systems to

ensure non-congested canals and
waterways

To provide funds for small-scale

ODI Report 22

infrastructure projects in the affected

barangays

In his third State of the Nation address to the Congress of the Philippines on 23 July 2012,
President Benigno S. Aquino addressed the importance of disaster risk reduction and
management, as well as the results achieved so far. He highlighted four key areas that need
to be addressed by the countrys public and private institutions: (i) continue implementing
the ongoing projects to prepare for typhoons; (ii) continue developing technology and
systems that allow improvements to early warning and monitoring; (iii) improve the
sustainable management of forest land, farmland and livelihoods; and (iv) define the role of
the private sector in planting trees and cash crops that can help protect people and reduce
the effects of flooding.
In his national address President Aquino said, today, even when the storm is still brewing,
we already know how to craft clear plans to avoid catastrophe and before, agencies with
shared responsibilities would work separately, with little coordination or cooperation. Now,
the culture of government is bayanihana coming together for the sake of the people. This
is what we call Convergence.16
In the next section we look at the analysis of the realities at sub-national level, examined
through the lens of the use of knowledge in policy decision-making DRRM.

16

Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, State of the Nation Address of His Excellency Benigno S.
Aquino III, President of the Philippines, to the Congress of the Philippines. Edited at the Office of the President of
the Philippines Under Commonwealth Act No. 638

ODI Report 23

3 Urban resilience at subnational level: analysis of

the local level
investigation

Policy-making in the Philippines must follow a structured process involving several

mechanisms that enable partnerships between and among government agencies, NGOs, the
private sector and grassroots-based organisations.
There is a high level of social capital prevailing vis--vis many policy issues, such as the
environment, and during calamities, where civil society actors have shown themselves able
to act collectively and, when needed, autonomously. However, as shown in this paper, with
regard to DRRM, this somewhat encouraging picture is weakened by a weak link between
scientific knowledge on one hand, and the policy process on the other.
While in recent years, as shown by the words of President Aquino, natural calamities and
disasters have increased their presence in the policy agenda and discourse, the parts of the
country which have been affected by natural disasters have also been affected by man-made
environmental degradation and destruction. The policy discourse, both at the level of public
demand and response from the state, seems to be shaped more in the context of an
environmental solution (i.e. reforestation) to prevent or minimize the occurrence of floods,
than in terms of the broader discourse of resilience.
The passage of RA 10121 in 2010 introduced a more holistic approach to DRRM as well as
a new policy discourse. This change is captured by the change in name of the national
agency tasked to coordinate disaster management efforts, from the National Disaster
Coordinating Council (NDCC) which was tasked simply to coordinate, to the National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), now focusing on reducing
risks and managing both the process of reducing risks, as well as disasters as a whole. So
far however, despite changes in the law and the introduction of new provisions, our research
reveals that the perception by key informants is that the provisions of the law are yet to be
matched by changes on the ground in terms of institutions, plans and actions. This is
indicative of a system that remains centralised, and where national agencies tasked with
implementing the changes are unable to operationalise them at the local level.
RA 10121 is explicitly aligned with the principles of decentralisation and devolution, and
has provisions that mandate LGUs, including urban areas LGUs, to devise their own DRRM
strategies and policies. The policy driver is still located at the national level. Local
initiatives still refer to the adoption (rather than adaptation) of national mechanisms and
processes, although it may still be too early to assess the impact of RA 10121.

ODI Report 24

The result is a not a uniform response at sub-national level, as the rate and quality of the
policy response is dependent on the experience of LGUs in disasters, as well as the quality
of local political leadership. Different interpretations of the law at the local level have
caused delays in the implementation of RA 10121. Local officers are not always
knowledgeable enough of new legislation on disaster risk management. Furthermore,
attempts have been made to create local capacity to respond better to disasters, but most
LGUs are not yet fully equipped with the technical skills required to fully implement it. The
main problems seem to be limited capacity on making use of local data at LGU level, in line
agencies such as the Environment and Rural Development (EnRD). For example, in its
evaluation of its programs in Leyte and Samar, EnRD reports that municipalities do not
have sufficient capacity to deal with natural hazards. They lack expertise, robust local data,
management capacity and the funds to plan and implement well-targeted risk reduction
measures.17
OCD is still conducting orientation seminars at the LGU level and some results can already
be seen. There is limited knowledge and understanding of the efficacy of LGU initiatives to
implement RA 10121 at the sub-national level. Following a training seminar provided by
OCD in Region IX (Zamboanga Peninsula in Mindanao) many mayors realised the full
scope of the NDRRMC. One of the mayors said, I am very happy to learn in the seminar
that the calamity fund can be used even if there are no calamity occurrences. Usually, the
unexpended calamity fund is reverted back to the general fund if it is not being used (in
Corgue 2011). Since 2011, the OCD has been conducting orientation seminars with LGUs
to enhance the capacity of local officials on planning and developing DRRM (PIA, 2012).
It is still too early to assess the impact of RA 10121 at the sub-national level, and that is not
the intention of this study. It appears there is still a view that the national government
represents a super-body that is expected to provide necessary resources. At the same time,
the legislation has introduced mechanisms through which LGUs are expected to lend
assistance and support to lower local government units in the following hierarchical order:
national government to provinces and chartered cities, provinces to municipalities, and
municipalities to barangays.

3.1 Policy decision-making, political constituencies,

relationships between policy actors
Our case studies reveal, not surprisingly, that a history of being a disaster-prone area means
a higher level of awareness among people of the risks associated with natural disasters. This
awareness is an important, but not sufficient, political condition for implementing and
adopting DRRM measures and systems. Even prior to RA 10121, there was a culture of
preparedness/readiness among the people of Tabaco (province of Albay), which has a
history of being exposed to typhoons and eruptions of Volcano Mayon (Figure 5).

17

Source: EnRD Website http://www.enrdph.org/

ODI Report 25

Figure 5: Volcano Mayon seen from Legazpi City, Province of

Albay

Photo: Arnaldo Pellini

However, we found that the presence of these threats to citizens and their economic
interests does not result in concrete policy actions. In the case of Marikina, we found that
being located over the Marikina Fault, and being under considerable threat from
earthquakes, has not led to concrete action, as seen in the aftermath of Typhoon Ondoy
which hit Marikina in 2009 (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Floods in Marikina caused by Typhoon Ondoy in 2009

Photo: http://www.pinoymoneytalk.com

The actual experience of a natural disaster, with significant effects on lives and livelihoods,
seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition for action and reaction.
Perception of low risk could even lead to the absence of policy action. The western part of
Mindanao has been traditionally considered a typhoon-free part of the country, a message
used to attract investment in the province (see map in Annex 2). However, in 2011 the city
and municipality of Cagayan de Oro was hit by Typhoon Sendong (Figure 7) and Davao
City by severe floods. The actual experience of natural disasters served as an impetus
toward a more deliberate effort to craft policies to strengthen local DRRM. We found the
same type of reaction when we talked with officials in Baguio who remember the 1990
earthquake, Marikina in the aftermath of Typhoon Ondoy, and Iloilo and Cebu after
Typhoon Frank.

Figure 7: Devastation caused by Typhoon Sendong in Cagayan

de Oro, December 2011

ODI Report 26

Photo: Mindanews.com, National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP), Nartea/Malacaang

Photo Bureau/PNA)

Our study shows there are political factors that contribute to concrete actions and responses,
compared to situations where legislation is in place but not fully implemented to address
natural disasters and build resilience. For example, in the province of Albay (where the city
of Tabaco is located) Governor Jose Clemente "Joey" Salceda was able to turn disasters,
and the need to prepare for natural disasters as a source of political capital, around, and was
able to create not only a constituency, but develop policy mechanisms that address natural
disaster resilience. Our findings reveal that the element of agency should be decoupled from
the concept of good governance. Urban resilience interventions and policies by LGUs are
not (necessarily) linked to good governance. For example, cities like Marikina, which has
been recognised as a local government unit with remarkable governance mechanisms, did
not develop a resilience system and policies comparable to the one in Albay, and introduced
policies and DRRM plans following the devastation caused by Typhoon Ondoy. The key
difference between the experience in Albay and that of Marikina is not the quality of
governance but rather the leadership role of the Governor, who understood that he could
gain political capital by addressing the issues of natural disasters and resilience.
From our case studies, we found that the experience of Albay is more an exception than the
rule. The mere presence of a natural disaster threat does not necessarily help build political
capital during, for example, election campaigns. There is usually limited disagreement
between candidates in local elections about the need to be prepared against natural disasters.
This, as discussed earlier, does not mean that action and policies are taken, and when
disasters occur, they can be the defining moment of an elected officials political career,
depending on how the public perceives his or her management of the emergency.
Disasters can provide an opportunity for political gain. The exceptions are disaster-prone
areas with strong and aware leadership, as in the case of Albay and, to some extent, Iloilo
City. At these times, it is not a domain for contentious politics, and no rational politician
would ever oppose any policy that would promote resilience to disasters.
Urban LGUs are involved in both the formulation and implementation of policies. While
LGUs usually respond to national directives, they are expected not just to adopt, but to
adapt, national directives to the local context and needs. We found that some mayors have
established City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (CDRRMC) in
response to RA 10121. These initiatives are complemented by city ordinances, as in the case
of Cagayan de Oro, Marikina, Davao and Baguio, that define guidelines for disaster
response but do not develop comprehensive plans as envisioned by RA 10121. In the cities
of Marikina, Tabaco, Davao and Cebu, ordinances to create the CDRRMC are being
developed.
There is evidence of LGUs establishing partnerships with other LGUs and organisations.
For example, faced with the problem of lack of weather predicting equipment, the LGUs of
Cagayan de Oro and Bukidnon entered into an agreement with the national army to collect
rainfall statistics in army camps, especially during times of heavy rain. This early warning
system, while not totally scientific, is evidence of how local organisations improvise with
disaster preparation strategies. In Davao City we visited barangay Matina Pangi which is

ODI Report 27

located on the outskirts of the city towards the hills, and which was affected by flash floods
in 2011. It has developed an early warning system to measure rainfall and the increase in
the water level in the river that cuts across the barangay (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Barangay Matina Pangi (Davao) measures for

preparing a rapid response to floods include: rainfall
measurements station, emergency and rescue material, a
bamboo stick to measure the increase in the river level

Photo: Arnaldo Pellini

Other actors are involved in specific aspects of urban resilience policies and interventions.
The local and national offices of the Philippine National Police are involved, as well as
national government agencies, such as the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), by augmenting
local disaster response capacity. Science-based agencies like DOST, PHILVOCS, and
PAGASA are consulted in the creation of geo-hazard maps by DENRs Geo Sciences
Bureau and NAMRIA. Volunteer communications groups such as Davao Central 911,
Marikina Rescue 161 and Baguio 191 are piloting innovative ways to respond to
emergencies, while NGOs contribute to volunteers work during emergencies.

ODI Report 28

Figure 9: Davao City 911 Emergency Centre

Photo: Arnaldo Pellini

The example above shows that under RA 10121 private sector and civil society
organisations are mostly involved in responses to natural disasters, although their mandate
and skills may be better suited for crafting and implementing policy interventions that aim
to prepare citizens, infrastructures and natural resources for natural disasters.
While RA 10121 encourages local initiatives, the practice reveals that policies are
nationally provided, which is characteristic of a top-down approach. The law already
identifies agencies that need to be involved. It also specifies and defines the relationship
among actors, particularly on who reports to whom, who decides, and who calls the shots.
This is established and well-known, and has been institutionalised as a formalised routine.
Other agencies such as volunteer groups are involved through the institutionalisation of
formal partnerships. In Davao and Baguio, for example, informal relationships involving
volunteers have to be formalised through the signing of Memorandums of Agreement
between LGUs and volunteers. Partnerships among government agencies remain ad hoc
initiatives. In Cagayan de Orothe, the LGU partnered with the military camps located
upstream in the Cagayan River in Bukidnon for weather reporting. There is a natural
tendency for people and institutions to enter into partnerships during times of disaster.
Despite the definition of roles and responsibilities of various actors stipulated in the law,
and the coming together at times of disasters, there are still gaps in the interaction between
agencies. The current legislation does not include provisions to coordinate the support
LGUs can provide to nearby LGUs. This does not mean that help and support is not
provided. When the main access road to the centre of Barangay Matina Pangi, near Davao
City, was cut off by flash floods in 2011, nearby barangays cleared smaller access roads to
bring help and support. However, current legislation is focused on internal response
structures and mechanisms. Experience with actual disasters highlights the need to reexamine the internally-focused response, considering there is a high probability that those
who are tasked to respond at the local level are also affected. There is a need to articulate a
policy in terms of when and how other LGUs can respond automatically, that is, in
institutionalising the externalisation of disaster response when there is a judgment that a
particular area is already seen as isolated and disabled.

ODI Report 29

From among the different actors involved, the national government agencies were seen as
the most influential in the formulation of policies, even as local executive officers were seen
to have influence in all stages of dealing with disasters, from preparation, to response to
rehabilitation, and in the formulation of policies and intervention mechanisms associated
with these tasks.

3.2 Dynamics of the use of knowledge in the natural disaster risk

reduction decision-making processes
Jones at al. (2012) refer to Davies (2004) to argue that poor knowledge of policy links can
give rise to policies and programs that reflect biases of individuals or groups, rely on
untested views and draw selectively on pieces of knowledge to support ideological
standpoints and decisions made behind closed doors.
Until recently the role of knowledge in the policy decision-making process was thought to
be in the form of expert and high quality analysis providing an input to the policy process in
a neutral way (Jones et al., 2012). This neutrality is now being questioned as evidence
shows that policy-makers rely on more than just scientific knowledge to make policy
decisions.
Jones at al. (ibid.) identify three types of knowledge which are used in policy-making (ibid.
p. 86):

Research-based knowledge: knowledge sourced according to the best

protocols of research and the requirements of individual specialisations (i.e.
disciplines)
Practice-informed knowledge: knowledge from experience of implementing
policy and practice. This includes strategic knowledge, forward looking (i.e.
appraisals), current (i.e. monitoring), and backward-looking (i.e. evaluation)
knowledge. Practice-informed knowledge incorporates tacit and experimental
knowledge, ideas around appraising and demonstrating impact, as well as
ideas of value for money and cost-effectiveness.
Citizens knowledge: knowledge held by citizens, both individually and
collectively, drawing on their daily experience.
Davies (2005 in Jones et al., 2012) argues that policy-makers rely on different types of
knowledge, and often a combination of different types. So, even when scientific knowledge
does inform the policy process, it is as one among different types of knowledge, and one of
the many inputs that influence the policy decision-making process.
We refer to scientific knowledge, by which we mean research-based knowledge and
practice-informed knowledge, which is research-based and derived from the use of
rigorous scientific methods, and which may or may not be produced by an academic
institution. Our hypothesis is that academic institutions in the Philippines have the potential
to play an important role in linking knowledge to policy processes through their research.
As local stakeholders whose economic and financial standing would be threatened by the
occurrence of disasters, local academic institutions should have an incentive to be involved
in policy analysis and the appraisals, monitoring and evaluation of policy reforms.
However, our analysis suggests that the engagement of local colleges and universities in
natural disaster and disaster risk management policy research is more of an exception than a
rule.
We found only two academic institutions involved in the policy-making process. In
Cagayan de Oro, following Typhoon Sendong in 2011, Xavier University took the step to
institutionalise research and advocacy on climate change and natural disasters. While LGU
officials have demanded more access to research evidence that would support their
decision-making process, they have not been actively involved in the development of the

ODI Report 30

research agenda. Therefore, the initiative by Xavier University can be defined as an

autonomous academic response influenced by requests for assistance by an LGU.
A second example is from the province of Albay where a Climate Change Academy has
been established at Bicol University. The establishment of the academy was facilitated
through the leadership of the Provincial Governor, who is conscious that his province is
prone to disasters due to the threat posed by typhoons from the Pacific, as well as Volcano
Mayon. While it was not part of the general scope of this research, it would be interesting
for future investigations to look at why there are not more of these examples by other
academic institutions in other areas like Iloilo, Cebu, Davao and Baguio, where there are
reputable academic institutions.
The current legislation, developed as a result of RA 10121, envisions an ideal situation
where scientific information is used in the design of intervention mechanisms and in
crafting policies on disasters at the sub-national level. Our research reveals one particular
instance where scientific information is used: geo-hazard maps are regularly used in the
formulation of City Land Use Plans (CLUP). A second example involves information and
regular updates, which are disseminated by government agencies, such as PAGASA and
PHILVOCS, when natural disaster occurs or to inform people about the arrival of a
typhoon.
Our interviewees expressed an almost uniform negative opinion of the information and
service provided by PAGASA. The agency is perceived as inefficient and inaccurate. The
mistrust in the quality of the scientific information provided by PAGASA means that LGUs
may not take action when information is disseminated. Rightly or wrongly, PAGASA is
perceived to have been wrong in forecasting and informing the citizens of Cagayan De Oro
ahead of the arrival of Typhoon Sendong. Similar experiences and perceptions in the past
have led Cagayan De Oro, Marikina and Cebu, for example, to rely on other websites for
their weather forecasts.
There are several initiatives by national agencies to introduce innovation in the use of
scientific knowledge in selected areas, including those that will increase the capacity of
LGUs to deal with disasters. The development of hazard maps in 27 provinces is being
implemented by PAGASA in collaboration with PHIVOLCS, with funding from UNDP and
AusAID. The effort began in 2006, to conclude in May 2012. It is noteworthy that
community-based early warning systems are now in place in several local communities,
where trained volunteers do their own observations and forecasting. In the event of
typhoons in municipalities within the river basins, communities located in the downstream
coordinate with LGUs in upstream areas. This will help estimate expected rainfall in lowlying areas. PAGASA argues that this project is particularly relevant to test and pilot ways
for developing localised warning systems.
Geo-hazard maps are very useful in identifying urban areas which are exposed to natural
disasters, and where communities live. Relocation, however, is a very difficult topic to
address. According to Dr. Mario Delos Reyes of the University of the Philippines School of
Urban and Regional Planning, the laws and guidelines for using the maps to make decisions
about where people should and should not be allowed to live, are there, but need to be
implemented more rigorously at the local level through local ordinances. As mentioned, a
subdivision or community located beside a river would need to be relocated in accordance
with ordinances to keep it safe from flooding. But any mayor attempting such would run
headlong into a wall of protests and claims of human rights violations, or intense lobbying
from wealthy landowners and their politicians (Llaneta 2012). The issue of relocation
carries a high political risk as it can generate protests. In most cases it certainly creates an
antagonistic constituency which may prove costly to a politician. It would also mean a
reduction in the possible voters in an area during election periods. It seems to be so complex
that concrete actions are often avoided.

ODI Report 31

In addition to scientific information from PAGASA, PHILVOCS and weather websites,

some LGUs rely on community knowledge which may not be scientifically tested but has
been validated by experience. For example, in Cagayan de Oro the change in the colour of
the river passing through the city may indicate heavy rainfall in the upper basins. However,
there are not many examples of LGUs taking their own initiatives to collect and use this
knowledge, as they continue for the most part to rely on national government agencies
information and data. We found an exception in Barangay Matina Pangi near Davao City
(See Figure 8). With help from a volunteer from a local NGO, the barangay established a
simple water level measuring system in the form of a long bamboo stick anchored to a large
concrete block to measure the speed of the rise in the river water level, and therefore have
an early warning system of the possibility of flash floods.
Our interviewees cited lack of funds and capacity as possible reasons for the limited use of
community knowledge. Community knowledge is available, as in the case of the
communities in Tabaco City, living within the danger zone of Volcano Mayon. While there
is potential for community knowledge to become inputs to policy, it does not happen due to
the perception that these forms of knowledge are not scientific enough. The outcome is that
policy-making at the local level, rather than an adaptation of national guidelines and
policies to local context and knowledge, results in the adoption of the national laws. Faced
with funding and capacity limitations, the opportunity created by the law authorizing LGUs
to have their own initiatives, taking into consideration their own contexts, is rarely used.
3.2.1 A missing link between scientific analyses and assessments and the
policy process?
Linking science to policy requires a conscious effort, both from the supply side
(researchers) and the demand side (policy-makers), to use results of scientific analyses and
assessments in the formulation of policy interventions. The RA 10121 provides legislative
support and mandates so that the national agenda for research and technology development
can be used to inform the translated into disaster risk reduction policies. However, it is not
clear how scientific knowledge has been used in the formulation of RA 10121 or in the
crafting of its implementing rules and regulations, although considering that the law lays the
institutional framework, the use of research evidence may not have been a key requirement.
In the context of decision-making at sub-national level, data from the focus group
discussions and key informant interviews reveal that the higher the position in the (public)
bureaucracy, the more credible an actor is. Consultants, although they are usually external
to the bureaucracy, are also perceived as credible.
The role of consultants is interesting. In Davao we met a municipal councillor working with
a colleague on a new ordinance to be presented to the municipal council: Ordinance
Strengthening the Davao City Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, Creating
an Office, Appropriating Funds and For Other Purposes. The idea behind the ordinance is
to address the root causes of vulnerability to disasters, strengthen the citys institutional
capacity for disaster risk reduction and management, and build the resilience of barangays
to disasters, including climate change impacts.
We asked if the councillor was working with researchers on this ordinance, and the answer
was yes, however, it turned out that by researchers she meant a small group of lawyers in
charge of ensuring that the proposed legislation complied with the requirements and
principles set by the Constitution. The councillor had contacted a professor on
environmental planning who is an advocate of legislative change in this area, and who is
working at the University of the Philippines in Los Banos. The councillor gathered direct
knowledge through field visits in her constituency in the hills north of Davao City, and by
contacting the research officer at the Region XI office to DENR. The councillor did not rely
simply on her own expertise, but had access to a circle of experts to whom she referred on
environmental and climate change issues. Her chief of staff also had links to these experts
and the councillors office had a small budget that could be used every year for contracting

ODI Report 32

small studies and expert opinions. The budget is insufficient to procure and fund new
research by, for example, a university institute.
The interview with the councillor in Davao suggests that the use of knowledge and research
evidence to inform the development of new legislation may be done on an ad hoc basis,
determined by the existence of networks and individual initiatives in accessing knowledge.
Unfortunately we do not have sufficient evidence about the existence of similar processes in
the other case study areas. What we noted is that no public office is concerned with the
management of DRRM data. National agencies that are dealing with disasters and risks,
except those that are tasked with providing scientific information such as PAGASA,
PHILVOCS and the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR, are more focused
on institutional arrangements and how to deal with disasters, rather than on
institutionalising the use of scientifically warranted information.
The absence of institutionalisation does not mean that there not are changes in attitude and
perceptions at sub-national level. The interviews in Davao City show that The
Comprehensive Development Planning Office prepares the comprehensive development
plan of the city and is mandated to oversee and approve the barangay development plans.
The office therefore provides technical assistance to the barangay, and there is now a
growing awareness that these plans should include disaster risk reduction. The municipality
organised a barangay administration and planning orientation in which all agencies meet
with the barangay officials, including the disaster risk reduction management council
(DRRMC), to discuss how to include disaster risk reduction in the barangay plan and
establish a barangay-level DRRMC.18
Interviews with the City Planning and Development Office in Davao confirm that the
municipality is not able to conduct research like academic institutions do, however the
office is responsible for gathering primary and secondary information using participatory
resource appraisal, focus group discussion, census and the community-based monitoring
and information system (informant). The City Planning Office has limited personnel to
collect and gather primary data. Data gathering is therefore coordinated with the barangays,
which are in charge of setting up their participatory research teams composed of a purok
leader, barangay health workers and barangay officials. These are trained by the City
Planning Office on basic data gathering and tabulation. Our respondents mentioned that not
all the barangay are cooperative on these initiatives, and these cases, the City Planning
Office will delay approval of the barangay development plan.
The case of Davao shows that links exist between the municipality and academic
institutions and are being established between the municipal agencies (e.g. City Planning
Office) and academic researchers. The Davao Association of Colleges and Universities,
which is spearheaded by the University of Mindanao, was established to enhance the
academe-government partnership for sustainable development in the city. They conduct, in
collaboration with and on behalf of, the municipal authorities, barangay profiling, barangay
development index, project evaluation and database development.19
The example mentioned in this section shows that there are initiatives that aim to establish a
link between various types of knowledge and policy-making. This also applies to scientific
knowledge, so we cannot speak of a missing link. The overall legislative framework,
established through RA 10121, directly impacts the creation of these links. The issues seem
to be on implementation, that is, the translation of research evidence into policy activities at
sub-national level. It seems to be based on ad hoc initiatives, not fully institutionalised, as in
the case of Davao City. Sharing positive experiences does not seem to be used as a way to
expand on positive experiences and experiments.
18

During the interviews we were informed that not all 182 barangays of the municipality of Davao had established
their barangay DRRMC, as this is a council which has just been introduced by the new legislation, i.e. RA 10121.
19
The City Planning and Development Office in Davao is conducting a compendium of researches or theses of the
members of the Davao Association of Colleges and Universities.

ODI Report 33

3.2.2 Incentives and disincentives for using knowledge/information for

designing and implementing urban resilience interventions
We saw earlier that the theory about evidence-based policy-making processes suggests the
use of scientific knowledge is beneficial for the policy process, and complements other
types of knowledge that can also be used to make informed policy decisions (see Jones et
al., 2012). For example, the use of landscape as the basis for disaster risk reduction
management, instead of political units, will lead to a more authentic institutional mechanism
and response.
LGUs relying on more accurate information will lead to better planning and preparation and
a more judicious use of resources. Geo-hazard maps, for example, help determine risk areas,
and therefore enable the appropriate use of the 5% calamity fund for investment that aims to
strengthen response to natural disasters. There is therefore an incentive to access and use
scientific information as it can justify the procurement of equipment for preparedness and
mitigation. It provides credibility or legitimacy to these requests.
There are factors that may impede the use of information and research. The term of office of
local government officials is only three years, which may not be enough to develop strong
resilience polices and initiatives that are informed by scientific information. Furthermore, it
is costly at the local level to develop policies using scientific evidence, considering budget
is required to conduct baseline research, design and implement pilots, reflect on what works
and what does not work, and then expand the resilience initiative.
Another disincentive for using scientific data lies in the political risk associated with the use
of evidence. The hazard risk we were shown in Davao City clearly indicated the areas of the
city that are prone to floods and which have, in the past, suffered high numbers of casualties
due to floods. The maps show that these areas are densely populated. But why are people
allowed to live there? The answer lies in the economic and political costs associated with
relocation.
In Davao City, we asked if the regulation of not having houses built within 3-meters of the
river bank is being implemented. The answer was that the municipality is struggling with
this due to the limited resources available for monitoring the regulation. Moreover, the
number of informal settlers in risk areas has been estimated at around 18,000 families, and
relocation would be expensive, as moving families involves legal proceedings and
assistance, as well as the identification of a suitable new and safe site.
Political risks are also high, as forced relocation would inevitably spur protests and even
riots. Therefore, what may be technically sound (i.e. relocation) may not be politically
feasible. Scientific evidence, even if legitimate, is therefore not used if the political risk is
high.

ODI Report 34

4 Conclusions

The objective of the study was to better understand the factors that favour or hinder the use
of scientific knowledge and research evidence in the design and implementation of urban
resilience measures in seven urban areas in the Philippines. We focused on natural disasters
which are specific to climate change such as typhoons and floods, and geo-hazards such as
earthquakes. The study was conducted by adopting a political economy approach.
The main conclusion of our study is that RA 10121 has established, among other things, a
legislative framework that enables greater use of scientific evidence in designing disaster
risk reduction policies and interventions, both at national and sub-national level.
In terms of urban resilience, which is the focus of our study, the main change introduced by
RA 10121 compared to its predecessor, the Presidential Decree 1566, is that disaster risk
prevention (in addition to response) is highlighted as a key government priority at the
national and local level. This all contributes to building greater resilience to natural
disasters.
RA 10121 was introduced in 2010. The implementation is ongoing and progress has been
made to establish local DRRM offices, although not all LGUs have established one yet.
These are therefore early days to assess the impact that RA 10121 has had on local level
activities, as well as attitudes and perceptions of policy-makers and elected representatives
at the sub-national level.
The results of our study show that the demand for use of scientific knowledge by policymakers is linked to the occurrence of a natural disaster, rather than the risk of a natural
disaster. We found one exception, in the case of a provincial governor who managed to
build political capital by making disaster prevention a key element of his election campaign
in the province of Albay, which is at high risk of natural disasters. Under his leadership,
new links were established between the local administration and an academic institution that
led to greater sharing and exchange to achieve greater evidence-based decision-making on
disaster risk reduction.
While important, local leadership may not lead to sustainable urban resilience. A new
election could easily result in new leaders from different parties being elected who can
overturn decisions made by the previous administration.
To achieve greater stability in the design of policy and programs that strengthen urban
resilience, initiatives that try to link research and policy-making should be initiated by
institutions that are not bound by electoral politics. Hence, the starting point should be
universities and research institutions, as non-partisan catalysts of change.
We found that the demand for scientific evidence to inform disaster risk reduction policies
and programs is not (yet) strong. However, we found some promising examples of
engagement by academic institutions with the policy-making process. The three cases
mentioned in our study, Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro, the Climate Change

ODI Report 35

Academy at Bicol University in the province of Albay and the Davao Association of
Colleges and Universities, are early examples of possibilities for developing greater
engagement with evidence-based decision-making processes on disaster risk reduction.
Our analysis shows that community knowledge is valued and being used to develop early
warning systems. It complements the data which are regularly collected by LGU offices and
units. The examples we found are the result of independent initiatives and leadership,
mainly at the barangay level. While this reflects the nature of decentralised public
administration and decision-making in the Philippines, we also found that LGUs have
limited capacity and infrastructure to collect, store and analyse different types of
knowledge, information and data: community knowledge and data, line agencies data,
scientific knowledge and research. This could be one of the responsibilities of the DRRMO
and would help build trends of natural events from the barangay up to the LGU, which
could then be used to plan and implement policies and programs.
Overall, we found that when the there is demand for scientific evidence from locally elected
officials it takes the form of a request for advice directed to experts and academics. This is
mainly done through personal networks and contacts rather that the procurement of studies
and research. The main limitations for increasing the demand for research evidence are: (1)
limited budgets available at LGUs, and lack of elected representatives to procure new
research, (2) the three year-term between elections, which seems too short to implement
major pieces of research, (3) the capacity to demand and interpret scientific evidence, and
(4) a limited understanding among staff of LGUs and line agencies of the measures and
directives included in RA 10121, although this is being addressed by training programs
managed at the national level.
Where there was a supply of research evidence on disaster risk reduction, we found that it
was generally done by academic institutions. Other than advocacy NGOs, we found no
evidence of independent research institutes in the areas visited for the study. Overall, the
role that local academic institutions play in influencing policy-making or monitoring of
policy implementation is still limited. One constraint is the system of career progression
that, in academic institutions, favours the publication of academic research in international
peer review journals. Policy research and studies are less relevant for ones career. While
there are, as discussed earlier, promising exceptions, this could be one explanation for the
limited engagement of local universities in policy-making processes on disaster risk
reduction and urban resilience, in the case study areas that we visited.
When research is actually presented to policy-makers, there is a risk that it uses language
which is too technical, and targets only the few law makers who happen to have a technical
background. Therefore, it is important for research institutions to translate and package
scientific information into forms that are accessible to policy-makers and the general public
to strengthen demand and interest around the results of the research. One way to achieve
this is for academic institutions to establish collaborative partnerships with, for example,
advocacy NGOs on natural disaster-related topics and urban resilience. We did not find any
examples of this.
While research evidence contributes to better-informed decisions, we should be aware that
knowledge is not politically neutral. Research evidence can provide technically sound
solutions to social problems, but these may not always be politically possible solutions
(Faustino and Fabella 2011). Relocation of families who have settled in risk-prone urban
areas is a clear example of this. The technical solution, that is, relocation due to the danger
that a natural disaster could hit the area, is politically not feasible, due to the political and
economic costs involved in enforcing it. This is the case in Davao, where 18,000 families
live in hazardous areas.

ODI Report 36

In these situations, what is politically feasible is to direct part of the funds available for
relocation into investments in adaptation and defence against natural disasters. While the
risk can never be brought down to zero, they may be feasible solutions.
While finalising this report in August 2012, BBC News Asia reported heavy rains were
causing floods in Manila. So far, 850,000 people have been affected in the metro Manila
area, and at least 16 people have been killed. More than 80,000 people are in emergency
shelters as torrential rain has left low-lying areas of Manila under water. Just a week ago,
more than 50 people died after Typhoon Saola struck in the north of the country. However,
among the grim news, a report by Kate McGeown20 of BBC News mentioned that, this time,
there has been a feeling among the affected population in Manila that the Government's
evacuation procedures are better organised. This is probably helped by modern technology,
as people stranded on roof tops have been texting for help, and the Twitter hashtag
#rescueph has quickly been adopted by those who are stuck, and others trying to find them.
A sign perhaps that communities and local administrations are becoming more ready and
resilient.

Figure 10: Flood in Manila August 2012

Photo: BBC News Asia

Natural disasters do not wait for policies. They will continue to strike and we can assume
that their frequency and intensity may increase as a result of climate change. Strengthening
resilience to these natural disasters must be done by investing in urban programs and
infrastructures that will reduce or limit their impact. Whenever possible, alternative options
should be provided for people who live in disaster-prone urban areas, and early emergency
response and education systems should be in place. Research can contribute to these
processes by providing evidence that can be used by policy-makers and communities to
identify technically sound and politically feasible solutions.
New legislation and the commitment of President Aquinos administration are proving a
unique opportunity to increase the use of research evidence and scientific knowledge in
disaster risk reduction policy decision-making, both at national and local level. This can
contribute to strengthening resilience to natural disasters and this opportunity should not be
missed.

20

Kate McGeown BBC News, Manila http://bbc.in/OVplnH

ODI Report 37

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Figure A1: Map of the regions and provinces of the Philippines

ODI Report 41

Figure A2: Composite hazard map of the Philippines

This map illustrates the Philippines's exposure to seismic, volcanic and tropical storm
hazards. Earthquake intensity zones indicate where there is a 20% probability that degrees
of intensity shown on the map will be exceeded in 50 years; tropical storm intensity zones
indicate where there is a 10% probability of a storm of this intensity striking in the next 10
years.

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Regional Office for Asia and
the Pacific (OCHA-ROAP) 2011, available at http://bit.ly/Owa8N3

ODI Report 42

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