ATTY. VIC BYRON T.

FERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law II

Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
It contains a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital
of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
Imposes that aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue
their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of
term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal
protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between
an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

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TIU vs Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts: Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National
Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board is
not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to
its execution, enforcement, and implementation. The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law.

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Osmena vs Orbos
Facts: October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a
Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude
oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from
increases in the world market prices of crude oil. Subsequently, the OPSF was
reclassified into a "trust liability account,". President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E.
O. 137 expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under
recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.
The petitioner argues inter alia that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956,
as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust
fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated
therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated,
and not channeled to another government objective." Petitioner further points out that
since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State,
such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created."
ISSUE: WoN the monies collected are to be classified as trust fund or special fund
under article VI sec 29(3)
HELD: it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they
are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is
a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated
from the general fund

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Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is
also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the
lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.
Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are
deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the
sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently
treated.
Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police
power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore
it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

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PRC vs. De Guzman

Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City,
Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by
the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then
released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.
The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College
examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure
Examination.
On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians
of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February
1993 Physician Licensure Examination.
ISSUE: WoN the refusal of administering the physicians oath in pursuance to RA 2382 in the
exercise of Police Power is valid
HELD: It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be
so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by
the government.

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Chavez vs Romulo
Facts: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the
members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the
rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR)
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the
present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives
Division.
WoN: The assailed guideline are a valid exercise of Police power
HELD:Police Power
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1)
The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and
(2)
The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional
guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.

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MMDA vs Garin
Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who
was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995.
The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon
noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers
granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition
of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature;
the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued
that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of
government in administrative agencies.
ISSUE: WoN the MMDA may exercise Police power
HELD: the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state
for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve
the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger,
their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first
appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but
a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare.

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Carlos Super Drug Corporation vs DSWD

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in
the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257,
otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of
RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens.
Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation
of
private
property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

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FRANCISCO VS. FERNANDO

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition
and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F.
Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA
(respondents) from further implementing its wet flag scheme (Flag Scheme).
Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing
body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because
it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against
cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes
pedestrians to various potential hazards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMDA may exercise the Flag scheme or anti-jaywalking scheme.
HELD:
On the Flag Schemes alleged lack of legal basis, we note that all the cities and
municipalities within the MMDAs jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted
anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian
regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents implementation of schemes,
or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After
all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and
regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance
in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents
implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

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MMDA vs Viron Transportation

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for
the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System,
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
ISSUE: WoN The E.O 179 is unconstitutional for being an unreasonable exercise of police
power
HELD:

MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must
be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes and the means.

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Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to
operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to
vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553,
seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier
models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy
and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
If respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No.
101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate
the petitioners constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

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Lozano vs Martinez
Facts: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly
known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense
is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less
than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to
exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
ISSUE: WoN B.P. 22 is a valid exercise of police power for violating the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be imprisoned for a debt
Held: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum
in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the
exercise of its police power.

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Lim vs Pacquing

Facts:
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a JaiAlai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked
Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC
assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, the government contends
that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.

Issues: WON P.D. No. 771 is unconstitutional

HELD:
On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple
contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are
within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the
police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police
power for the public welfare.
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree
revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception.
ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the
only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC
was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in
the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it
could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago.

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Miners Association of the Philippines vs Factoran

Facts: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly
contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in
excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption
that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III,
Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly preterminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing
agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No.
82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within
two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9,
all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those
pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less,
shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of
these guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990,
laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) through Negotiation." 7
Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or
entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July
17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining,
quarry and sand and gravel claims.

Issue: WoN administrative order nos. 57 and 82 are unconstitutional for being violative
of the non-impairment of contracts clause
HELD: Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause,
mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power,
being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest;
extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to
carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

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Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.

FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and

dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task
of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or
violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably
forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other
hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into
the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that
Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
HELD: It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed
Solar's petition for certiorari.

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Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626).
To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his
right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling
that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from
one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they
can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions
and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

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City Government of Quezon City vs Judge Ericta

Facts: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically
provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC
justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

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JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs CA

Facts: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the
introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to
POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal
POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an
Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it
violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their
individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in
favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very
least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational
and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared
for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this
scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

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PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694;
22 May 1995]
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for
the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall
be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue
and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by
the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of
newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General
claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a
fair,
impartial
and
credible
election.

Issue:
Whether

or

not

Comelec

Resolution

No.

2772

is

unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held

that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to
taking of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution,
but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

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LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, minibuses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are
hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their
passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable
starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and
buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance
as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of
police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e.
lawful subject and lawful means.
Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed
are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method

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Cabrera vs Lapid
Facts: petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a
tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner, she had spent
approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in August
1995. A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her
fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the
fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from destroying her property.
Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The property
was demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting.
Issue: WoN the respondents are liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or of
Article 324
Held: A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's
criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they
effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance
per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) 21 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 32422 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the
words of the Ombudsman, "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only
impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good."

21 | P a g e

MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino
followed by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also attack gambling
as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this
Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State
policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.
HELD:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

22 | P a g e

City of manila vs Judge Laguio

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation

engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon.
Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is
entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

23 | P a g e

Didipio Earth-Savers vs Gozun

Police Power Eminent Domain
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos
signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA
with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to
explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage
of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the
RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In
seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40
which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose
in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and
allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;
(1)

the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2)

the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3)

the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved
but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as
section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,

24 | P a g e

Napocor vs Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation

Facts: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, commenced its 350 KV LeyteLuzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. The project aims to transmit the
excess electrical generating capacity coming from Leyte Geothermal Plant to
Luzon and various load centers in its vision to interconnect the entire country into
a single power grid. Apparently, the project is for a public purpose.
In order to carry out this project, it is imperative for the [petitioners] transmission
lines to cross over certain lands owned by private individuals and entities. One of
these lands, [where] only a portion will be traversed by the transmission lines, is
owned by [respondent] MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION.

Issue: WoN the payment of just compensation is proper

Held: Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial
court and affirmed by the CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere
aerial right of way, because respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway.
Petitioner argues that in a strict sense, there is no taking of property, but merely an imposition
of an encumbrance or a personal easement/servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Such
encumbrance will not result in ousting or depriving respondent of the beneficial enjoyment of the
property. And even if there was a taking, petitioner points out that the loss is limited only to a
portion of the aerial domain above the property of respondent. Hence, the latter should be
compensated only for what it would actually los

25 | P a g e

Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili

Facts:
- Brgy Masili in Calamba Laguna wanted a lot on which a multi-purpose hall will be constructed,
so it offered to buy Bardillon's 144 sq. m. lot for Php 200,000.
- No agreement was reached.
- Feb. 23, 1998: The first complaint for eminent domain was filed before the Calamba MTC by
Brgy. Masili against Bardillon.
- MTC dismissed for Bardillon and counsel's failure to appear at pre-trial. MTC denied Masili's
Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
- Oct 18, 1999: The second complaint for eminent domain was filed with the Calamba RTC by
Masili.
- Bardillon opposed the complaint thru Motion to Dismiss, alleging res judicata.
- RTC denied motion to dismiss, saying that MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint.
- July 10, 2000: Municipal Ordinance authorizing Masili to initiate exprop proceedings was
approved and submitted.
- Aug 16, 2000: RTC issued writ of possession.
- Bardillon appealed to the CA. CA affirned RTC.
- No res judicata. MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint.
Issue # 1:
Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first exprop case:
Held: No. Expropriation suit does not involve sum of money. It is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691).
- The primary consideration of exprop proceedings is whether the gov't has complied with
the requisites for the taking or property.
- An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land.

26 | P a g e

Napocor vs Gutierrez (1991)

Facts: Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for
the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and
maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the
construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the
lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia
Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit
Issue: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR
FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES.

Held: In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation

27 | P a g e

Republic vs Castelvi

Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into
a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the
AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced theexpropriation proceedings for the land in
question.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and t hat
just compensation should not bedetermined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for
more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property
must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

28 | P a g e

Velarma vs CA
Facts: This case arose from an ejectment suit2 filed by private respondent against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Mauban, Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1)
that sometime in May 1981, petitioner surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at
Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban, Quezon,
The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove his house therefrom
Petitioner insists that private respondent has no cause of action against him because the land
on which his house stands belongs to the government.
According to petitioner, while it is conceded that the premises [occupied by him] is still within
the area covered by [private respondents] title, nonetheless, x x x [the subject premises] x x x
already belong to the government by virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and bridge.
Issue: Will the lot owners agreement to sell the property to the government as evidenced by
the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a
sufficient ground to defeat a forcible entry suit?
Held: As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do
not mention the execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to
survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the
abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the land
traversed by the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced by petitioner to show that
the survey was actually undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned
and conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the property
was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer had yet been made. Unless
and until the transfer is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the
government, private respondent continues to retain ownership of the land subject of this case.

29 | P a g e

Moday vs CA
Facts: Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan
passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of
Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved
the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the
said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by
Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation
nonetheless.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution
which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case,
is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate,
in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government
to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon
which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the
same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands
for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the
expropriation case is valid.

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Equal Protection of the Laws

PEOPLE VS CAYAT
[68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]

Facts:
Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any
intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue:
Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.
Held:
No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law
must rest on real or substantial distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members
of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and
culture. The term non-Christian tribes' refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the
Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The
distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian
tribes

31 | P a g e

Tolentino vs Board of Accountancy

Facts: Plaintiff brought this action for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 342 because, according to the complaint, it constitutes class legislation
for "by its term it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions from adopting,
acquiring or using a trade name in connection with such calling or profession." His main
objection centers on the exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those
engaged in the profession of accountancy.
Issue: whether or not said Act is constitutional.
Held: Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend against the equal protection clause of our
Constitution on the ground of class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to all
persons pursuing the same calling or profession under the same conditions or requirements.
Said Acts gives the right or affords the same privileges to all accountants without distinction or
discrimination. This benefit is extended to the defendants as well as to the plaintiff.

32 | P a g e

Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways.
Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of
the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the
Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

Issue: WoN all motorized vehicles created equal?

Held: We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable
classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The
first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be
reasonably differentiated from newer models.

33 | P a g e

PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with
the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional

Held: The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the
law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they
are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class.

34 | P a g e

Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA

Facts: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of
licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which
hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipownerprincipals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No.
05, series of 1994, on the grounds that:
(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the
equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
Issue: WoN it violate the equal protection clause
Held: There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum
circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its
contention of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and
principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas
Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

35 | P a g e

Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder
of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant
to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides
that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court
shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject
to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of
over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It
gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit
the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case
is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

36 | P a g e

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC

[289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization
of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in
this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury
as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring
the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within
the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC
free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the
radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air
time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and
without just compensation.

Held:
Petitioner's argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises,
do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide
is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not
do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair
exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

37 | P a g e

INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING

[333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000]

Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent
School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues
in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work
of equal value.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its
standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or
other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same
into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary
rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
Issue:

Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of
their constitutional
right to
the
equal protection
clause.
Held:
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal
pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international
character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of
foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by
logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee
to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.

38 | P a g e

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY

[22 SCRA 603; L-23794; 17 FEB 1968]

Facts:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March
20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of
a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal
Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection
clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI,
Constitution).
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under
the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial
and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a
decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered
city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its
charter.
Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution
Held:
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons
or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is
set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

39 | P a g e

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSO. VS. PRADO

[227 SCRA 703; G.R. NO. 105371; 11 NOV 1993]
Facts:
The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing
the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with
certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the
franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines,
Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the
general public. The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Held:
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA
7354 is declared
unconstitutional.

40 | P a g e

Tiu vs CA
Facts: Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled
"An Act Accelerating the Conversion of MilitaryReservations Into Other Productive Uses,
Creating the BasesConversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special
Economic Zone and granted there to special privileges. President Ramos
issued Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application of the tax and
duty incentives. The President issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the area
within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. The petitioners challenged
before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right
to equal protection ofthe laws. This Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals.
Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact metes and
bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA
7227. Respondent Court held that "there is no substantial difference between the
provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise
and well-defined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous
extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'"
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution
Held: No. The Court found real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances
obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and
reasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal protection of the lawsis not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. Classification,
to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class. The Supreme Court believed it was reasonable for the President to have
delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military
base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from
its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and
commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational
bases for their businesses and industries.

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107 Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan [GR 118533, 4 October 1995]

Second Division, Regalado (J): 3 concur, 1 on leave.
Facts: On 15 December 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger
de Leon, charged Paraaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups
to implement Paraaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 744, (series of 1992) which Olivarez
himself approved on 6 October 1992. Resolution 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's
fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from 11 November 1992 to 15
February 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard. Allegedly,
BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue
the same unless BCCI gives money to the latter. Attached to BCCI's Reply-Affidavit was a copy of
Executive Order dated 23 November 1992 issued by Olivarez granting a group of Baclaran-based
organizations/associations of vendors the holding of "Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair Sa Baclaran" from 28
November 1992 to 28 February 1993 using certain portions of the National and Local Government
Roads/Streets in Baclaran for fund raising. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) III Ringpis conducted a
preliminary investigation and issued on 22 September 1993 a resolution recommending the
prosecution of Olivarez for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, as amended. On 16
February 1994, the information was filed against Olivares (Criminal Case 20226). On 17 January 1994,
Olivarez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation allegedly to rectify error of law and on
ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion was granted on 24 January 1994. On 9 February
1993, Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation to withdraw the information as Olivarez does not
refute the allegation and that bad faith is evident with his persistent refusal to issue permit. On 18
February 1994, Olivarez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bail bond with the Sandiganbayan for
his temporary release. On 21 February 1994, Olivarez filed an Omnibus Motion for a re-examination
and re- assessment of the prosecution's report and documentary evidence with a view to set aside the
determination of the existence of probable cause and ultimately the dismissal of the case; which
was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 3 March 1994 in Open Court. In view of Olivarez's refusal to
enter any plea, the court ordered a plea of "not guilty" entered into his record. On 8 March 1994, the
prosecution filed a Motion to suspend Accused Pendente Lite. On March 9, 14 and 15, 1994, Olivarez
filed a Motion to Set Aside Plea and To Reduce Denial Order Into Writing (With Entry of Appearance),
Supplemental Motion to Set Aside Plea and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused and
Supplemental Pleading with Additional Opposition to Motion to Suspend Accused; which were denied by
the Sandiganbayan on 4 April 1994. The Sandiganbayan, however, set aside the proceedings
conducted on 3 March 1994 including Olivarez's arraignment thus revoking the plea of "not guilty"
entered in his record in the interest of justice and to avoid further delay in the prompt adjudication of the
case due to technicalities. On 20 April 1994, Olivarez filed a motion for reconsideration which was
granted on 15 May 1994. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
another reinvestigation to be terminated within 30 days from notice. The reinvestigation was reassigned to
SPO III Angel C. Mayoralgo who on 3 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case. On 9
December 1994, DSP Jose de G. Ferrer reversed the recommendation, finding Olivarez liable by giving
unwarranted benefit thru manifest partiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant
failed to apply for a business permit. The Ombudsman approved the reversal and on 27 December
1994 directed the prosecution to proceed under the existing information. On 13 January 1995,
Olivarez filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum to DSP Jose de
G. Ferrer, SPO III Roger Berbano, Sr., and SPO III Angel Mayoralgo, Jr. and on 16 January 1995,
Olivarez filed a Motion to Strike Out and/or Review Result of Reinvestigation. The latter motion was
denied by Sandiganbayan. Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial of / inaction over BCCI's application for
license.

42 | P a g e

Held: Olivarez's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of
the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order,
whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse,
Olivarez failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the
unidentified Baclaran- based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a
semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that
if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of Olivarez. As the mayor of the
municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse
to take appropriate action on the letter- application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in
accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letterapplication to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether
Olivarez was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond the Court for the
moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient
to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable,
absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is
expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any
charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letterapplication of BCCI.

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Searches and Seizures Scope of Protection

Waterous Drugs vs NLRC
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per
unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a refund for
the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened
the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of
the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the
SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

44 | P a g e

People vs. Damaso, GR No. 9351

Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of violation of PD 1866 in connection with the
crime of subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure conducted at his house at night time
when he was not around, on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person without the owners presence is valid.
Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-appellant without his knowledge is a violation of
the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.

45 | P a g e

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super
Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to
dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger
Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the
culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search
for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the
accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back
to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then
escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a
Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the
matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They
also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation
of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to
such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid
HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988
September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

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FACTSOn 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed
to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?
Held: NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and
a peaceful community.

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Manlavi vs Gacoot
Facts: Complainant, a senior police officer, charged respondent with partiality, miscarriage of justice
and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
9210 (Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended for Illegal Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of
Illegally Caught Fish). The cases were consolidated for trial.
The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence of the
prosecution was the product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure.
Issue: WoN the seizure of the fish was in violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures
Held. Respondent granted the motion in the Order dated July 9, 1992, citing the admission of the
prosecution that the search and seizure was not covered by a search warrant, and that the search
warrant presented in court was issued after the fact.

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People vs Cahola
Facts: Jessie was about to leave their house to watch cartoons in his uncles house next door
when two armed men suddenly entered the front door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to
drop to the floor, and then hit him in the back with the butt of a long gun. Without much ado, the
intruders shot to death Jessies uncle, Victorino V. Lolarga, who was then in the living room.
Jessie forthwith crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third man who
had also entered the house. The men entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the
rampage was over and after the malefactors had already departed, Jessie came out of his
hiding place and proceeded to the kitchen. There he saw his mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his
brother Felix Barnachea, Jr.; and his cousin Rubenson Abance - all slaughtered.
The incident was immediately reported to the police, and the description of the El Shaddai jeep
used by the malefactors was relayed through radio to the police stations in the province of La
Union.[6] At around7:45 p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by
the police force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants.
Issue: WoN the arrest was illegal
Held: Neither can the question of the legality of the warrantless arrest of the appellants be
raised for the first time before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise by the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the question should have been
raised prior to their arraignment. That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the
arraignment[29] is unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested an extension of time to file a
motion to quash the information or to dismiss the case,[30] which the trial court allegedly denied,
cannot save the day for them. The fact remains that before arraignment, no such motion was
filed. Even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their
arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their arrest.

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Procedural Rules
People vs Del Rosario
Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the
side of Nitas Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged
him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle
driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman
grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a
gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked
the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought
to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man
then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped
away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the
incident.
It must be recalled that Del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the
place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996.
Issue: WoN the illegality of the arrest of Del Rosario will affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo
Held: the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case.

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Malaloan v. CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)

FACTS: The crime alleged is a violation of PD 1866. The officers applied for a search warrant in Kalookan
City. However, the place to be searched was in Quezon City. The officers executed the search and seized
several firearms. After the search and seizurewas conducted, the accused are now assailing the validity
of the search warrant since they claim that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The accused buttresses
their claim arguing that the criminal case was filed in the Quezon City RTC, not in Kalookan City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
HELD: Yes, the search warrant was valid. A warrant merely constitutes criminal process. It is not a
criminal action. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. Moreover, no law or rule
imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided
for warrants of arrest.
NOTE: Policy guidelines: 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction
to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the
applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with
primary jurisdiction thereover.

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Ilano vs CA
Facts: The present controversy arose when the PNP-NARCOM, National Capital Region,
through 1Lt. Josephus Angan, applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Kalookan City, Br.
131, to search petitioner Ilano's house and parlor at No. 7 and 9 Masigasig Street, Barangay
Piahan, Quezon City, Metro Manila. After personally examining 1Lt. Angan and his witness,
Presiding Judge Antonio J. Fineza issued Search Warrants Nos. 1-017-91 (NCR) and 1-018-91
(NCR). As manifested in the Return of Search Warrant filed by 1Lt. Angan, the following were
seized during the raid: (a) one (1) stick of suspected marijuana cigarette; (b) two (2) tablets of
suspected mogadon; (c) one (1) aluminum foil containing shabu residue; (d) one (1) improvised
tooter used in administering shabu; and, (e) approximately fifteen (15) grams of suspected
shabu wrapped in three (3) separate transparent plastic bags.
Issue: WoN the search warrant issued is proper

Held: It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court
wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search
warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall
have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place
to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is
necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. 5

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People vs Chui
Facts: Sometime in September 1998, the Central Police District Criminal Investigation Unit,
Special Operations Group, headed by SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez and PO1 Jose R. Salazar,
conducted surveillance operations on a suspected shabu dealer, Daniel Henares. In a test-buy
operation held on October 5, 1998, Salazar, with the assistance of a civilian informant, bought a
sachet of shabu worth P2,000.00 from Henares at his residence in San Juan, Metro Manila. A
few days later, on October 11, 1998,[6] Henares was apprehended for the said sale
At about 8:00 p.m. of October 19, 1998, Fernandez and Salazar, together with the female
informant, proceeded to the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao,
Quezon City. When the guard on duty saw the female informant, he opened the gate and led
her, Salazar and Fernandez to the house, which was approximately fifteen meters from the
road. The informant introduced Fernandez and Salazar to the appellant as buyers of shabu.
Salazar was able to purchase P3,000.00 worth of the prohibited drug from the appellant.
On October 26, 1998, Fernandez filed with the RTC of Pasay City an application for a search
warrant for the search of the house
Issue: WoN the Search warrant issued was valid.

Held: Urgent means pressing; calling for immediate attention.[41] The court must

take into account and consider not only the subject but the time and place of
the enforcement of the search warrant as well. The determination of the
existence of compelling considerations of urgency, and the subject, time and
place necessitating and justifying the filing of an application for a search warrant
with a court other than the court having territorial jurisdiction over the place to
be searched and things to be seized or where the materials are found is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court where the application is filed,
subject to review by the appellate court in case of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, Fernandez filed the application for a search warrant with the
Pasay City RTC instead of the Quezon City RTC because of the possibility that
the shabu would be removed by the appellant from No. 29 North Road,
Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. Indeed, as shown by the
evidence, the appellant had a residence other than No. 29 North Road where
he sold shabu. There was also the pervading concern of the police officers that
if they filed the application in Quezon City where the appellant plied his illicit
activities, it may somehow come to the knowledge of Molina and the appellant,
thus, rendering the enforcement of any search warrant issued by the court to
be a useless effort. We find and so hold that Judge Lopez did not err in taking
cognizance of and granting the questioned application for a search warrant.

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Authority to issue a Warrant

Salazar vs. Achacoso and Marquez

G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990

FACTS:
A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the complainants PECC Card, it was
further alleged that Salazar did not posses a license to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through its
Director on Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and seizure against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure is valid?

HELD:

Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may
issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be
done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.

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Republic vs Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to
effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before
this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions and the
filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this Court referred the
cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition, [1] where SIPALAYs petition
was docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED as S.B. 0100.
Concerning SIPALAY (S.B. 0095), its 360, 875, 513 shares of stock in Maranaw Hotels and
Resort Corporation which owns the Century Park Sheraton Hotel are, according to the PCGG,
part of Lucio C. Tans ill-gotten wealth.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
Gentlemen:
By virtue of the powers vested in this Commission by the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
you are hereby directed to submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the abovementioned
premises which our representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted
by this Commission.

Issue: WoN the PCGG is empowered to issue a search warrant

Held: Not only is the order captioned as SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER, the body thereof
clearly enjoined the branch manager to make available to the PCGG team all bank documents
precisely for the purpose. It is unauthorized because nowhere in the same Executive Order No.
1[66] (particularly Section 3) invoked by the PCGG to justify the search and seizure order was the
PCGG expressly empowered to issue such specie of a process in pursuit of its mandated
purpose of recovering ill-gotten/unexplained wealth.

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Morano vs Vivo

Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in
the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in
mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her
was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11,
1957.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a
temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00.
On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen.
Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.
the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave
the country
Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband
Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila
for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien
Certificates of Registration
Issue: WoN A person other than a Judge may issue an Arrest Warrant
Held: Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions.
Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a
final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an
order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceeding for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a
valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

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WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, PETITIONER,

VS.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts: On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and sought
admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However,
the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of
Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of William
Gatchalian.

Issue: WoN the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner is Valid

Held: No its wording suggests that the arrest is sought to be carried out for the purpose of
carrying out a preliminary investigation or custodial interrogation rather than for the purpose of
enforcing a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

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