Who has the authority to create LGUS?

1. PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR GENERAL

Facts: In 1964, the president, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 for the creation
of 33 municipalities. Vice president Pelaez instituted a special civil action for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction to restraint the auditor general as well as his representatives and
agents from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive
order and for any disbursement by said municipality by alleging that the executive order is null
and void for it was impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and constitute undue delegation of power.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of RA 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of
Congress. Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3: All barrios existing at
the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof. Upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an
existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of
the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least
two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio
may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
The petitioner argues that if the president cannot create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipality.
Respondent on the other hand argue that a municipality can be created without creating a new
barrios by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of municipality.
Issue (1): Whether or not the President has the power to create municipalities. NO
Held: Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power. Such claim is untenable.
When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council
of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory
denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power
to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it
does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities
the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language
of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power".
Issue (2): Whether or not the executive orders are valid. NO

Held: According to the SC, under RA 2370, barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names be changed except by act of congress or of the corresponding provincial
board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of
the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. The SC
further said that the authority to create municipal corporation is legislative in nature.
WHEREFORE, the EOs in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
2. SEMA vs. COMELEC
Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created underRepublic Act
(R.A.) No. 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of
ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the
plebiscite in November 1989. There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao.
The first legislative district of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power
to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy
Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff
Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the
first legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). Sema, who was a candidate in the 2007
elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes
cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress.
Issue: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional. NO
Held: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by
Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However,
pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be
validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff
Kabunsuan is invalid.
In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power
to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution.

ALVAREZ V GUINGONA (1996)

When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the
Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM
Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is
another matter.
The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district. This is clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
theConstitution (Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than twohundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the
power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to
create a legislative district.
However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power
to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a
law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress.
The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national
legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress
can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or
reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be
incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of
national funds. It is a self- evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or
regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can
never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is
to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional
Assemblys legislative powers within its territorial jurisdiction.
3. IRA

Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the municipality of Santiago Isabela into
an independent component city to be known as the city of Santiago. The law was challenged
mainly because the act did not allegedly originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. Also, petitioner claims that the
Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under
Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a component city. Apparently, RA 7330
originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was
transmitted to the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed
on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. The committee
recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that the
house bill was identical to the senate bill.
Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an independent component city
Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because
its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices
falls below the required annual income of P20,000,000 for its conversion into a city. After
deducting the IRA, ti appears that the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not
actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they
fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the
income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a
component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty
Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income
must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. A Local Government Unit is a political
subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its
own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not
intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in
the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The practical
side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the
matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local
government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in
every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources
to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is
effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and
broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes,
such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given
its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if
any, within its territorial boundaries. For purposes of budget preparation, which budget should
reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the
share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it
should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts
collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need
of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 11 They thus constitute income
which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the

same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own
as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government,
its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
Contiguity requirement
4. MARIANO V. COMELEC
Facts:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The
municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the
legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of
every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands to only
450,000.
Issue:
Whether or not the addition of another legislative district
in Makati is unconstitutional
Held:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of anew city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than 250 members,unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing itsmembership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854
and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to holdthat
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislativedistricts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a newcity or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.Petitioner cannot insist that the
addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Saidsection provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Evengranting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at
450,000, its legislative district may still beincreased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of 250,000.
Is the plebescite requirement absolute?
5. Tan vs. comelec
G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986

NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The issue in this
case, however, is a bit on the technical side.
- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than one unit
affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the alteration

FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec.
3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso,
Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3,
1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the
territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be about
2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the plebiscite
sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.
ISSUE:
W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Sec.
3 of the Consititution, which states that -"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected."
HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would
be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte."
The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable
Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which
the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the
aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:

"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the plebiscite shall
be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the
approval of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an
unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas
affected." The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state that the new
province constitutes the area affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous, and
far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse
economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners."
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3, 1986 has no
legal effect for being a patent nullity.

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the material change in the political
and economic rights of the LGU directly affected. The consent of the people is required to serve
as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial. The
city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The
resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of
Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There
would be a reduction in their IRA.
When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent
component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose.
There is no reason why the same should not be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of
their city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward so long as they result in
a material change in the LGU directly affected. Thus, R.A. No. 8528, which fails to provide that
the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city
should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite, is unconstitutional.

"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of
the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are also
declared null and void.
SO ORDERED."

MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. BENITO

6. MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE

Facts: On May 5, 1994, RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an
independent component city. On Feb 1998, RA 8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It changed
the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of this RA since it lacked a provision submitting the law for
ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised the defense of
standing and the political question doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA merely reclassified
Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not
involve any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units.
Issue: Whether or not a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a
component city requires a plebiscite.
Held: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while
the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the
councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. The municipality of Balabagan
was created by EO 386 of President Garcia out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. The petitioners
seek to nullify the EO. Petitioners relied on the Pelaez ruling that the Presidents power to create
municipalities under Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional. Respondents argued
that the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because Balabagan is a de facto corporation, having been
organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having
been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a
de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired
into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual
like the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation, as it was organized
before the promulgation of the SC's decision in Pelaez. NO
Held: The following principles may be deduced. (1) The color of authority requisite to a de facto
municipal corporation may be an unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either: (a)
Been upheld for a time by the courts; or (b) Not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant
for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential

existence in the general constitution of the state; (2) there can be no de facto municipal
corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some
legislative fiat; (3) there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the
invalidity of which is apparent on its face; (4) there can be no de facto corporation created to
take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that
the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the
consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization.
Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the
statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as,
independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to
give color of authority to its creation.
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the
executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
The Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that the actual existence of a statute, prior to such
a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive
order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon
the validity of the creation of that municipality. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive
Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from
performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.

CAMID vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipalityof Andong in Lanao
Del Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of
Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null and
void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO
107 creating Andong.
The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as aprivate citizen and
taxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full
blown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks
and services, it has its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17 baranggays with
chairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and
DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong.
In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the
33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and

unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in
Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto
municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order. Thus, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal
corporation. NO
Held: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by
the municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by
the other instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislatures action.
May any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to Camids prayer? NO. The
Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality.
Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following
reasons:
(1) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1)
The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The
municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was
classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the House
of Representatives apportionment.
(2) Andong did not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442 (d) regarding
municipalities created by executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of
the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
(3) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the
municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence
of the municipality.
(4) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House
of Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various
municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong.
Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated municipalities are now considered
existing? NONE. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validates
them. The fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the legislation recreating these
municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong.
SC DISMISSED petition for lack of Merit. Note the following Sections with regards to juridical
personality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatment
with Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an
artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers,

attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence; Section 4.
Corporations created by special laws or charters. Corporations created by special laws or
charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them
or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are
applicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil
Code, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions and
Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. These two are
governed by the law creating them. Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not a
recognized olitical subdivision, it is not also considered a juridical person.
What happened with the people from Andong?-The constituent barrios of the voided town returns
to its original municipalities (Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are recognized and still
existing. The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not judicial
confirmation of void title

must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations.
Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan,37 Justice Moreland said:
"An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is
against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of
common right." In De la Cruz vs. Paraz,38 we laid the general rule "that ordinances passed by
virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State."
The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436
insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in
the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. As earlier
discussed, the fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs
exclusive domain.

BATANGAS CATV vs. CA

Facts: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 2107
granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City.
Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject
to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod."
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 2107 granting
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of
the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates
specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod."
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction docketed as
Civil Case No. 4254. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to
regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No.
205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the
CATV operation in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution no. 210 section 8 of BATANGAS CITY which provides that
any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is valid.
Held: Section 8 of the Resolution is invalid. The right of plaintiff in fixing its service rates needs
no prior approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City.
While Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the
general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents, nonetheless, it does not
authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the
authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature.
Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we

In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for
the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully
covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the
same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the
charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are
specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to
regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be
rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has
appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A
reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the
municipal corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be
exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of
the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to
the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid.42 The principle is frequently expressed in the
declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances
which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.43 In every
power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the
ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
Resolution No. 210 violated the States deregulation policy. Deregulation is the reduction of
government regulation of business to permit freer markets and competition.50 Oftentimes, the
State, through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of deregulation to attain certain
objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of telecommunications, it is recognized
that many areas in the Philippines are still "unserved" or "underserved." Thus, to encourage
private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the government in stimulating the
growth and development of telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation.

There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system.
Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1512 "terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV
system previously granted by local governments." Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436,
"only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional
Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable
television system or render cable television service within a service area." It is clear that in the
absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant
franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the
obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a
municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED.