G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994Cruz, J.

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the
LocalGovernment Code
1
. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a t a x p a ye r )
declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for
n o n - compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certainprovisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution
and sustained the ordinance. It declaredSec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it
vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the proceduralrequirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local GovernmentCode had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the
decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187
of the LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in whichthe subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section5 ( 2 ) , o f
the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
f i n a l judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.In the exercise of this jurisdiction,
lower courts are advised to act with the utmostcircumspection, bearing in mind th e
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionalityupon the stability of laws, no
less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court,
including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposefulhesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was firstcarefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by themto be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is tosustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showingthat there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice
t o r e v i e w o n l y t h e constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either orboth of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets
aside a tax ordinance, he is not
1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local taxordinances and revenue measures
shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for thepurpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,

further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measuresmay be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) daysfrom the date of receipt of
the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and theaccrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of
thesixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party
may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
thatenacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he didnot
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was thatit was
illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners wereperforming
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure forthe enactment of
tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under theLocal Government Code.
As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.A n o f f i c e r i n c o n t r o l
l a ys d o w n t h e r u l e s i n t h e d o i n g o f a n a c t . I f t h e y a r e n o t followed, he may, in
his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or hemay even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisoror superintendent merely sees
to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not laydown such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them.Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the
Local Autonomy Act. Thatsection allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of
a tax ordinance if, inh i s o p i n i o n , t h e t a x o r f e e l e v i e d w a s u n j u s t , e x c e s s i v e ,
o p p r e s s i v e o r c o n f i s c a t o r y. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of
judgment or discretion and notmerely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control
rather than mere supervision. That powerwas never questioned before this Court but, at any rate,
the Secretary of Justice is not givent h e s a m e l a t i t u d e u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 8 7 .
A l l h e i s p e r m i t t e d t o d o i s a s c e r t a i n t h e constitutionality or
legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in hisopinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In
fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, towith, the
inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non -compliance with
theprescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdomor
reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of theManila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices
of public hearing,no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no
translation into Tagalog) J u d g e P a l a t t a o h o w e v e r f o u n d t h a t a l l t h e p r o c e d u r a l
r e q u i r e m e n t s h a d b e e n observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the
City of Manila had notbeen able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he
had given it onlyf i v e d a ys w i t h i n w h i c h t o g a t h e r a n d p r e s e n t t o h i m a l l t h e
e v i d e n c e ( c o n s i s t i n g o f 2 5 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the
trial court that the proceduralrequirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
public hearings were sent tointerested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are
found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances

were published in the Balitaand the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and
the approved ordinancewas published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and
in the July 6, 1993issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. The only
exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omissiondoes not affect its
validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that thetext of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies tot h e a p p r o v a l
of local development plans and public investment programs of the
l o c a l government unit and not to tax ordinances