[AM No.

90-4-1545-0 : April 17, 1990]

COLUMN OF MR. RAMON TULFO IN THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ISSUES OF
13 AND 16 OCTOBER 1989
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated April
17, 1990
AM No. 90-4-1545-0 (Column of Mr. Ramon Tulfo in the Philippine Daily Inquirer issues of
13 and 16 October 1989)
On 13 October 1989, respondent Ramon Tulfo (Tulfo, for short) wrote an article entitled
"Idiotic Decision" in his column "On Target" in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating therein
that the Supreme Court rendered an "idiotic decision" in legalizing the checkpoints. This was
followed by another article in the same column on 16 October 1989, entitled "Sangkatutak
na Bobo," Tulfo referring therein to the members of the Supreme Court as "stupid" for
having rendered such decision on checkpoints, and calling them "sangkatutak na bobo
justices of the Philippine Supreme Court."
In a resolution dated 19 October 1989, the Court required Tulfo to show cause in writing
why he should not be punished for contempt of court, for making such derogatory
statements in his column against the Supreme Court and its members.
Without denying the writing and publication of the questioned articles, Tulfo raised the
following defenses in his "Explanation:" (1) that he was just reacting emotionally to said
decision of the Court because he had been a victim of harassment, abuse and oppression by
checkpoints; (2) that the use of the adjective "idiotic" was meant and intended in the sense
of the decision being "illogical, irrational, unwarranted and unwise;" (3) that the words
"stupid justices" and "sangkatutak na bobo" in the 16 October 1989 article are not his own
words but that he was merely quoting the words of some lawyers in reaction to the
decision, without any intention on his part to degrade, ridicule, insult and bring disrepute to
the Court; (4) that the case having been decided and terminated, the comments made in
said articles as to the soundness of the Court's decision do not constitute contempt of court;
(5) that said articles did not pose any clear and present danger or serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice.
Citing press freedom, a Motion for Intervention was filed by the National Press Club, Union
of Journalists of the Philippines, Press Photographers of the Philippines, and the People's
Movement for Press Freedom, in connection with the resolution of the Court requiring Tulfo
to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court. Movants alleged that such
resolution is an unwarranted assault and undue restriction on freedom of speech and press.
Said motion was considered by the Court in its deliberations leading to this resolution.
We find Tulfo's "explanation" to be fatally devoid of merit.
At the outset, it should be stated that, contrary to Tulfo's pretense, the Court's decision on
the issue of checkpoints had not become final at the time he wrote the questioned articles.
In fact, the Court has yet to act on the motion for reconsideration of said decision, filed by
the petitioner therein, to which the Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, has
filed an opposition. Consequently, at the time Tulfo wrote and published the questioned
articles, the case had not been closed and terminated but was sub judice.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, as it is essential to their right of
self-preservation.[1] Courts are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence and
submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollary to this proposition, to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution.[2] Any improper
conduct which tends, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice is punishable for indirect contempt.[3]
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; it is such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties or their witnesses during litigation. Contempt of court is
defined as disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders but is
such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.[4] It may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, in and out of court.[5]
There are two (2) types of publication of newspaper comments on proceedings in court,
which have been considered in contempt proceedings, namely: (1) those in which the object
of the publication is to affect the decision in a pending case or action, and (2) those which
have for their purpose the bringing of courts or judges or other court officers into
discredit.[6] Tulfo's articles comprise both types of publication. As already pointed out, at the
time his articles were written and published, the case on the checkpoints was sub judice as
the Court's decision therein had not became final. As to why and how said articles have for
their purpose to bring the Supreme Court and its members into discredit, will be shown
presently.
It has been settled that mere criticism or comment on the correctness; or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of a decision of the court in a pending case, made in good faith,
may be tolerated, for if it is well founded, it may enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error, if any has been committed.[7]
The Court, needless to state, as a human institution, does not assume a posture of
infallibility or perfection in its decisions or rulings. In fact, its decisions are open to
criticisms for as long as they are couched in respectful language and, above all directed at
the merits of the case. Where, however, comment in the guise of a critique is intended
merely to degrade and ridicule the Court, as well as toinsult its members, thereby causing
or conditioning the public to lose its respect for the Court and its members, the comment
becomes clearly an obstruction or affront to the administration of justice; hence, it is
contemptous. To cast doubt before the public eye as to the integrity of the judicial
institution by malicious imputations of disrepute and incompetence to the Supreme Court
and its members, does not fall under the category of fair criticism. The right to criticize is
not absolute or unlimited. Above all, it must be bona fide and should not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. Any intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of one's
duty of respect to the courts.[8]
Coming to Tulfo's specific language employed in the questioned articles, a man in his right
senses would find no social; value, or intellectual significance or even literary delight in its
use. In fact, nothing constructive can be attained by an attempt to downgrade, damage and
even destroy the authority of the Court which is a focal institution of democracy in this
country. Most prudent observers believe (whether or not Tulfo subscribes to it) that any act

which tends to destroy the authority of the Court is in itself an attempt to destroy that
democracy xxxxxxxxx
"What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the
country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions
might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts
like those of respondent Gonzales are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of
trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is
not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is
critical for the stability of democratic goverment.[9]
xxxxxxxxx
It is thus imperative that the Court should preserve its authority, dignity and the respect
due it from litigants, lawyers and the public, for the reason that "The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this court and believe that they can not expect justice
there-from, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would result."[10]
If this Court were to allow insults hurled against it and its members to go unpunished, then
it becomesremiss in its own duty to maintain its authority, integrity, and dignity.
Tulfo's claim that he was "emotional" when he wrote the questioned articles can in no way
serve as an excuse for insulting and demeaning the highest court of the land and its
members. In fact, it has been held that not even good faith is a ground for exoneration in a
contempt charge.[11]
Being of age and presumably gifted with reason, Tulfo must have been fully aware of the
seriousness of his undertaking to insult the Court and its members. For such conduct, he
must assume responsibility for its consequences, without hiding behind the cloak of
"emotionalism" or the convenient anonymity of his alleged "reaction" sources. A writer
worth his guts should know that a pre-condition to credibility is honesty, not cowardice.
The Court does not deny Tulfo's right to be emotional about certain issues; however, as a
responsible member of the press, he should first rationalize and tackle issues with
objectivity. The fact that the issue of checkpoints had become a "highly emotional issue" for
him is not a logical reason to insult the Court and its members, for, if Tulfo strongly felt that
the Court had erred in its decision, he was free to criticize the decision on its merits. But to
maliciously demean the Court and the intelligence of its members achieved really nothing in
pointing out the errors, if any, in the decision objected to.
Reading through the two (2) articles written by Tulfo, respectively entitled "Idiotic decision"
and "Sangkatutak na Bobo", it is plain that Tulfo intended to ridicule and degrade the Court
and its members before the public, not merely to criticize its decision on the merits, as he
would now like to make this Court believe. The general tone and language used in Tulfo's

articles belie his belated allegation that the word "idiotic" was used in the sense of the
decision being merely "illogical, irrational, unwarranted and unwise."
Reprehensible language may take various forms and in all cases its general tone should be
considered. Whether or not the meaning and intent of a certain article constitute contempt
is to be determined by the Court as a matter of law upon a fair consideration of the
language used. Disclaimer by the author of intentional disrespect to the Court, just like
disclaimer by a publisher of any knowledge of the article prior to its publication is not a
defense.[12]
As Tulfo well knows, in ordinary parlance, "idiotic" is defined as "devoid of intellect, utterly
stupid, sense-less or foolish";[13] while legally, it is defined as "a person who has been
without understanding from his nativity, and whom the law, therefore, presumes never
likely to attain an"[14] or "the lowest level of feeblemindedness in which an individual is
possessed of a maximum mental age of two years or an IQ of 25"[15] while the word "stupid"
is defined as "wanting in or slow of mental perception; lacking ordinary activity of mind;
slow-witted; dull."[16]
Had Tulfo honestly meant to express only to the public his personal opinion that the
questioned decision is "illogical, irrational, unwarranted and unwise," then, he could have
said so without resort to the use of words which are derogatory, and thereafter claim that
he did not mean the way they were written or understood by his readers. Such turnabout
only shows how grossly irresponsible, or in bad faith or mentally dishonest Tulfo was in
writing said articles and causing the same to be published.
In fine, the intent clearly manifested by Tulfo in the questioned articles is to give an image
of a Supreme Court composed of members who are ignorant or devoid of intelligence, thus,
incapable of carrying out the proper dispensation of justice which they are tasked to
perform under the Constitution. And, while it has been said that those who have great
proficiency at hurling insults at others usually fit such insults so well, the Court will not pass
this judgment on Tulfo but will simply hold him as having insulted, without any rational
justification, the institution of the Supreme Court and its members.
Likewise, there is no merit in Tulfo's defense that he was merely quoting the reactions of
some lawyers to the decision when he referred to the Supreme Court justices as
"sangkatutak na bobo". While it is true that in his opening statement in the 16 October
1989 article, Tulfo stated that many lawyers he had talked to describe the present
complement of justices as "sangkatutak na bobo", yet, his parting shot and personal
statement at the end of the article, which says "(T)o the sangkatutak na bobo justices of
the Philip-pine Supreme Court, please take note!", runs counter to his very claim that such
assessment of the Court and its members was not his personal opinion. Thus, he is not only
an inventive expert; he is totally in bad faith. At the very least, he cannot be exculpated
from full and sole responsibility for the publication of such derogatory statement.
Moreover, in a later (6 November 1989) article, Tulfo declared that he was not sorry at all
that he wrote the way he did in his two (2) questioned articles, and he claimed that he was
"merely expressing his honest opinion." He stood firm with his original indictment of the
Court and its members as "sangkatutak na bobo" and "stupid justices", and never truly
apologized for making such statements. It is thus clear that all that he claimed to be sorry
for was that he cannot take back what he had said in his earlier articles, and that he was
sorry for those who have been allegedly affected by the ruling on checkpoints, like the
motorists, consumers and end-users.

Freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute, and
freedom of expression has, on appropriate occasions, to be adjusted and accommodated to
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the authority, integrity and orderly functioning of the courts.
For, the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the framework of a functioning and orderly system of justice.[17] Freedom of
expression is not license to insult the Court and its members and to impair the authority,
integrity and dignity of the Court.
The inherent power of courts to punish any publication calculated to interfere with the
administration of justice is not restricted by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the
press, for freedom of the press is subordinate to the authority, integrity and independence
of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. Freedom of the press must not be
confounded with license or abuse of that freedom. Writers and publishers of newspapers
have the right, but no greater than the right of others, to bring to public notice the conduct
and acts of courts, provided the publications are true and fair in spirit; in short, there is no
law to restrain or punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what is done in or by the
courts,[18] provided that free expression is not used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members.
Consequently, Tulfo's as well as intervenors' claim to press freedom, is not well taken in this
instance.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds and adjudges respondent Ramon Tulfo in CONTEMPT OF
COURT, and he is hereby GRAVELY CENSURED, with the STRONGEST WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with MORE SEVERELY.

[4 LR 19]
EN BANC
AM NO 90-5-2373

JULY 12, 1990

IN RE: ATTY. EMILIANO P. JURADO, JR. a.k.a. EMIL JURADO

Gentlemen,

Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated July 12, 1990.

Adm Matter No. 90-5-2373 (In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr. a.k.a. Emil Jurado).

The front page of the Sunday, May 27, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, a national daily, carried the banner
headline: Rebellion complex does not exist SC. And below it in smaller type, State back to Square One in cases
vs. Enrile, et. al. The lead article appeared in the following page under the sub-head High Tribunal reaffirms
Hernandez Doctrine with 14-1 vote and the by-line of Emil Jurado, Manila Standard Columnist and reported,
pertinently, that according to well-placed sources at the Supreme Court, in a decision penned by Associate
Justice Narvasa ** to be announced tomorrow for immediate promulgation ** the court had ** upheld a long
standing precedent known as the Hernandez Doctrine ** (and) reaffirmed that the crime of rebellion complexed
with murder and other common offenses does not exist ** (and) * (b)y a vote of 14 to one ** denied the
governments motion (sic) to repeal the doctrine. It added that said majority included Chief Justice Marcelo
Fernan and that the lone opposition vote was Justice Leo Medialeas.

Mr. Jurados regular column on page 10 of the same issue which was titled SC decision knocks out govt lawyers.
And began with the word SCOOP in bold, reiterated the above-quoted highlights of his page 2 report. If those
details and the photographs accompanying the report were not indication enough, mention therein of the names
of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, ex-Assemblyman Homobono Adaza and lawyer Rafael Recto, among others, made
clear what the main subject of those news items was: a supposed decision awaiting immediate promulgation on
one or another of the cases then pending in this Court that challenged the validity of criminal informations
charging various persons with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder in connection with the failed
coup attempt of December, 1989.

The Monday, May 28, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard was headlined High Cort ruling hailed. The lead Article
by Amante E. Bigornia on page 2 reported that the ruling had been hailed by unnamed legal luminaries and
added further supposed details about its adoption which the writer attributed to the papers equally anonymous
sources. In his column on page 9 of the same issue, Mr. Jurado elaborated in his earlier report as follows:

The Supreme Court is expected to promulgate today or tomorrow its decision upholding the Hernandez doctrine
that the complex crime of rebellion with murder or frustrated murder does not exist. The decision will be released
as soon as it is signed by Justice Manuel (sic) Gancayco and Justice Irene Cortes, who were expected to arrive from
abroad over the weekend. The two had earlier signified their intention to uphold the Hernandez doctrine.

I must however, make certain clarifications about the Standard exclusive yesterday on the Supreme Court decision.
The High Court voted 14-0 (not 14-1, as reported yesterday). As explained by my unimpeachable source, who is not
connected in any way with the Supreme Court, Associate Justice Leo Medialea, who was reported to have cast the
dissenting vote, had in fact inhibited himself from the process. Medialeas son is a junior partner of the PECABAR
Law Office, the firm of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, who is charged with this complex crime.

One Justice, who concurred in the decision abstained in the case of the Panlilios because he is related to them
and was their lawyer at one time.

The decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa, whose father the late Judge Gregorio Narvasa,
decided in the 50s that the complex crime of rebellion does not exist.

While headlines and news about the matter continued to greet Manila Standard readers on Tuesday, May 29,
1990, the tenor of these had materially changed. The headlines now proclaimed that Cory (referring to the
President) awaits SC ruling and Tribunal still deliberating rebellion complex issue. The news inside was no longer
about a decision already reached or a ruling made. It reported a statement of the Chief Justice, made through
Assistance Clerk of Court Luz Puno, that there was no such decision and that the matter was still under
deliberation. For the first time in three days, Mr. Jurados subject was silent on the subject.

The sequence of events is revealing. Having stood by their news story of two days, Mr. Jurado and his newspaper
had already began to backtrack, as it were, by the third, confronted, no doubt, with the hard fact that it was not
and could not be, substantiated.

On that same Tuesday, the Court en banc issued a Resolution branding as false the news reports of May 27, 1990,
declaring that as of that day, no decision or resolution on the subject of said reports have been signed, either by
the supposed ponente or any other member of the Court, and requiring Mr. Emil Jurado (full name Emiliano P.
Jurado, Jr: hereafter, respondent only), a member of the bar as well as a journalist, to explain within five (5) days
why he should not be dealt with administratively ** for publishing obviously false statements relative to the
Courts action on a pending proceeding or otherwise indulging in speculation or conjecture, or airing illicit
information about the same.

By the fourth day, nothing was left but excuses. In his column in the Wednesday, May 30, 1990 issue of the Manila
Standard, respondent acknowledge having received the show-cause Resolution and sought to justify the
questioned news items as legitimate reporting duly verified [4 LR 20] by both himself and his editor-in-chief and
approved for publication of the latter. The same issued featured an editorial which relevantly:

a)
Admitted that breaking the story of the alleged decision before its promulgation went against the usual
practice of awaiting the Courts pronouncement thereof;
b)
Admitted, also, awareness of the principle underlying such practice: ** that premature disclosure and
discussion may affect the Supreme Courts deliberation on the matter;
c)
Sought to justify such action on the peoples right to know about decisions with ** momentous effect on
many prominent people ** (and) important implications for the political process o this country;
d)
Expressed the editors feeling that no violation of such principle against premature disclosure of the
Courts decisions had been committed; and

e)
Clearly implied that the decision to publish the report as a news story under respondents by-line, instead
of as an item in his column, had meant to evoke a reaction from the Court which would have ignored a column
item as opinion or gossip.

It is now of public knowledge that respondents claimed reliance on unimpeachable sources had been totally
misplaced. At the time of publication of the reports in question, no ruling or decision on any of what have become
widely known by the misnomer rebellion complex cases had issued or was about to issue. No action or
pronouncement of the Court had given any intimation that a ruling on the merits on any of them was in the offing.
As a matter of fact, said cases were still under deliberation, and the members of the Court had yet to reach that
agreement or consensus upon which alone a formal ruling or judgment could follow. Quite apart from the
consideration that a decision or resolution of the Court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, only from
the moment of its promulgation and none had to that time been promulgated, it was also a fact that no decision
or resolution of the tenor and character reported had been signed, either by the supposed writer thereof, or by
any other member of the Court.

Only on July 5, 1990 did the Court promulgate its Decision in G.R. Nos. 92163 (Enrile vs. Salazar, et. al.) and 92164
(Sps. Panlilio vs. De Leon, et. al.) upholding the Hernandez ruling in the rebellion cases filed against the petitioners
herein. Its contents, by showing up the many inaccuracies in Mr. Jurados earlier accounts, attest to the falsity of
his report of its existence on or before May 27, 1990. Thus, insofar as concerned the question of wheter or not the
Hernandez ruling remains binding precedent, it was not a 14-0 nor a 14-1, but a 12-1 decision, two members of the
Court being on leave. The member first reported as having dissented (Medialea, J.) did not in fact do so. He
concurred with the majority in G.R. No. 92164 and abstained from voting in G.R. 92163. It was the Chief Justice
who filed a dissent on that principal issue. No member abstained in G.R. No. 92164 by reason of either blood or
past professional relationship with the petitioners therein. Of the 12 member majority, six (6) issued or concurred
in separate opinions which, without affecting their concurrence on the main ruling upholding Hernandez,
expressed dissent on, or reservations about, some points raised and discussed in the majority opinion. The fact
that so many members of the court found need to express their own views underscores, independently of any
disavowals on the part of the Court or its officers, the improbability of any consensus having been reached much
more, of a decision having been written or signed at the time of the news reports in question.

Under date of June 1, 1990, respondent filed a Compliance with the show-cause Resolution which, while
assuming responsibility for the publication of the news reports of May 27, 1990 above referred to and offering his
apologies to the Court ** if ** (he had) in some way, actually hampered the administration of justice, or
obstructed the orderly workings of the Court, ** pleads in justification freedom of the press as well as the right of
the public to information on matters of public concern, both he avers, being guaranteed by the Constitution.

What said Compliance makes immediately apparent is the wide variance between the plain import of the news
reports in question and that the of the information upon which respondent admittedly based the same. Said
reports which according to respondent were drafted, in part at least and in for inclusion in his column, two days
before they were actually published - invariably advert to the supposed ruling in the past tense, i.e., as a fait

accompli, a decision already reached, putting into writing and signed, thus (t)he Supreme Court has upheld a
long standing legal precedent known as the Hernandez doctrine **; (b)y a vote of 14 to one, the Tribunal already
denied the governments motion to repeal the doctrine **; and (t)he ** decision was penned by Associate Justice
Andres Narvasa and concurred in by 13 other justices.: Bit, also by his own account, the information upon which he
based those reports was merely to the effect that ** the Supreme Court deliberations clearly pointed to an
overwhelming majority for upholding the Hernandez doctrine ** and indicated ** the existence of a trend towards
(such) a consensus among the members of the Court. While such information might have inspired speculation
about a possible ruling, it simply did not warrant making, much less publishing as news, a conclusion that a
decision on the matter had already been written and signed.

Thus, said reports, insofar as they assumed to chronicle an actual state of facts, were not only objectively false,
even in the context of what respondent claimed had come to his knowledge, they were also grossly exaggerated
and, at best, speculative. If all that respondent had obtained from his unidentified sources was information had
reached a consensus, or that there was a trend towards a consensus, for upholding the Hernandez ruling and it is
notable that even as he claims that his editors had checked out said information prior to publication and obtained
further details confirming its accuracy, he neglects to mention any of those detains its evolution into straight
news that a ruling had in fact been written and signed [4 LR 21] and was about to be promulgated cannot be
defended on the ground of either truth or honest error.

Neither does it merit belief that respondents editors had seriously applied themselves to checking independently
the capacity of information about a supposed ruling before proposing to respondent and/or authorizing its
publication. The implicit admission in the editorial of May 30, 1990 that the reports were published as straight
news, not as comment or gossip, in order to provoke a reaction from the Court clearly suggests that it was the
Court that was expected to confirm or verify the story, that expectation itself providing the justification for its
publication; there would otherwise be no reason for such action had respondents editors attempted more than a
desultory check or verification of said story. It further suggests that the Court, ** jealous of its inner workings **,
has to be prodded into announcing or promulgating its decisions already made, however important, far-reaching
or urgent, the questions resolved and unmindful of the right of the people to be informed thereof. The notion
must be speedily rejected and laid to rest, being wholly false and denigrative of the collective sense of duty of the
members of this Court.

Nothing so far stated, however, should be taken as in any manner implying that objective truth or good faith will
exonerate respondent here. The really relevant question being whether the report and comments in questions,
regardless of their truth and of the motives or purposes behind their publication, are protected by the
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. There is no dispute of the existence and fundamental character of these guarantees. But equally
fundamental, needing no express statement or sanction in statute or charter because inherent in the very nature
of the judicial power and indispensable to the free and untrammeled exercise by the courts of their traditional
functions, is the principle of confidentiality of all actuations of, or records or proceedings before, a Court in a
pending action which are not essentially public in character. Such principal the Court holds to be equally firmly
established by immemorial tradition and to inhere in the judicial power that is vested by the Constitution in this
Court and in the lower courts established by law. Awareness of such principle is in fact acknowledge, expressly by

respondents editors in their May 30, 1990 editorial as already pointed out, and at least implicitly by respondent
himself, if indeed he is not chargeable with such knowledge as a lawyers. As far as the proceedings in this Court
are concerned, these confidential matters include, among others, raffling of cases, deliberation and discussions of
the en banc or the divisions, drafts of decisions and resolutions embodying conclusions reached and dispositions
agreed upon by the members in consultation.

Nor is the tension or confrontation resulting from the interplay of these adversarial principles a new or recent
development. It is as old as their common history, a long-standing subject of judicial inquiry, and the weight of
jurisprudence thereby developed clearly supports the view that a publication relating to judicial action in a pending
case which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable as contempt.

In American Law, it is regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which should
be kept private, as, for example, the secrets of the jury room.

A person charged with contempt of court in making utterances or publishing writings which clearly constitute a
contempt may not ordinarily escape liability therefor by invoking the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and the press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with the abuse of such liberties.
Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been
described as abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will subject the abuse to punishment for
contempt of court

As a general rule, a publication tending to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass or obstruct the courts in the
administration of justice in matters pending before them constitutes contempt. This rule applies to any publication
which has a tendency to prejudice or prevent fair and impartial action in a cause under judicial investigation,
whether by threats or other forms of intimidation, or by reflections on the court, counsel, parties, or witnesses,
with respect to the cause. To constitute contempt, the publication need not be made in the place where the court
is held; circulation in or about such place is sufficient.

Except as otherwise provided by statute, it is not necessary to show that the publication actually obstructed,
impeded, or embarrassed the administration of justice, although it must appear that its tendency was of that
character. However, neither inherent tendency or reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly
administration of justice in an action then before a court for consideration is enough to justify a restriction of free
expression; the publication must have been made under such circumstances as would be calculated to imperil the
fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process, not remotely or probably, but immediately, and it must
constitute a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, which danger must be serious and
substantial.
* * *

A cause is pending within the rule relating to contempt from the moment an indictment is returned to the court, or
from the beginning of the action. A cause remains pending so long as there is still something for the court to do
therein, the doing of which may be embarrassed, impeded, or obstructed by the complained of publication. This a
cause is pending when it is still open to modification, appeal, or rehearing and until the judgment is rendered and
the remittur issued, and a cause is still pending within the meaning of the rule, although an order has been made
dismissing the action on the payment of the fees.
[4 LR 22]
* * *
Divulging judicial secrets constitutes an interference with the proper functioning of the courts and the
administration of justice.
In US vs. Sullens where the editor of a newspaper published an article commenting adversely to the prosecution
upon certain criminal proceedings pending in court at the time of publication, forecast an acquittal of the
defendants, it was held:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and
neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have corrective rights and duties and should
cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative
and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and taken care of at
all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business
unhampered by publications which tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt **
* * *
This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. But such a case as this has never before occurred in the history of the state
so far as I know, and it is hoped will never occur again.
And in Burns vs. State :
Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper
administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press. It is not infrequent
that proceedings in courts of England in an important criminal case are highly commended by the press of this
country and comparison with procedure in the latter unjustly made unfavorable thereto, without appreciating the
very things which attract favorite mention are promoted by restrictions upon personal liberty which do not exist
here at all, or are sparingly enforce. Such an occurrence during an important criminal trial after retirement of the
jury to deliberate upon their verdict, as publication in a newspaper of the secrets of the jury room would, in the
mother country, be visited by prompt and severe punishment as contempt of court. That incidents of like
treatment of offenders may be found in the decisions of courts in this country, is well illustrated by State vs.
Howell. Here, the duty to abstain from such abuses is just as great as elsewhere. Here, the sense of duty incident
to good citizenship and public condemnation of such abuses ought to be sufficient to prevent such occurrences.

Moreover, trial courts should be alive to the importance of protecting jurors from such interference during the
course of a trial particularly after the retirement to deliberate upon their verdict, in important criminal cases.

Closer to home, in In Re: Lozano and Quevedo, which involved contempt proceedings against the editor and writer
of a newspaper which published an inaccurate account of a closed-door investigation of a Judge of First Instance,
this Court, after surveying earlier American cases and quoting with approval from some, notably Sullen and Burns,
supra, held the respondents in contempt, saying:

The rule is well established than newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in the administration of justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt
which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as
an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept
private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera (6 R.C.L.) pp. 508-515).
* * *
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the
Liberal Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the
citizen must be preserved in all its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen
should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of the unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect
for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.

Upon similar considerations, contempt rulings were handed down by the Court in In Re: Parazo , where a reporter
had refused to divulge the sources of a published account written by his of alleged leakage in the bar
examinations, and in In Re: Sotto , where the respondent in a published article criticizing the Courts decision in
Parazo, not only called said decision erroneous, but portrayed its members, or the majority of them, as
incompetent, narrow-minded blunderers capable of deliberate injustice, and threatened to present a bill in the
next Congress reorganizing the Court and reducing its membership.

And, more recently, in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Raul M. Gonzalez , Respondent Gonzalez is entitled [4 LR 23]
to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that the freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public fundamental public interests
is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. For the protection and

maintenance of the freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for the
delivery of justice, which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frank further put it:

*** A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press.
Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press.
Concurring in Pennekamp vs. Florida.

It is quite evident that in the particular circumstances of this case and upon authority of the cited
precedents, respondent cannot shield himself from culpability by invoking the freedoms of the press and of
information. There can be no doubt that his published report and comments on a non-existent decision tended
directly to embarrass the court and obstruct its proper functioning, putting it to what should have been the
unnecessary task of defending or proving the integrity of its proceedings. Even assuming that he had learned,
correctly but surreptitiously through unauthorized leaks, of a voting trend in favor of upholding the Hernandez
doctrine, or of deliberations pointing to such a trend, or even of a draft decision or resolution of the terms and
tenor reported, premature revelation thereof placed the Court in disrepute as an inept and incompetent guardian
of its own confidential proceedings or, worse, offered the temptation to rewrite the decision in order to avoid such
odium. These, considering that as the highest tribunal in the land, the Court is and should serve as the model and
exemplar for all lower courts to emulate, constituted a clear and present danger to the orderly and impartial
administration of justice.

While he and his editors concede that it is the right and the duty of the Court to protect the integrity of its
proceedings, respondent would plead what he mistakenly perceives to be a higher duly on his part, as a member of
the press, to inform the public on matters of general interest. This hoary argument finds its answer in the
authorities already cited and what has been stated about press freedom giving no license to breach the
confidentiality of pending judicial proceedings. No useful purpose is promoted, no professional or civic obligation is
served, by publishing information that is of its very character confidential and should be kept so, before it is
announced by the appropriate authority. Another simpler answer is that there is no duty to publish false
information. A newsman owes the public no duty that he does not owe first to the truth.

Respondent cannot even pretend that he acted in good faith. He lays claim to having been a full-time journalist for
the last forty years. With that wealth of journalistic experience, to say nothing of his legal education, and the
conceded necessity of checking the accuracy of his sources, he was inexcusably remiss in neglecting the most
obvious and direct way of verifying whether or not there was already a ruling or decision such as the information
given him may, in his belief, have portended a simple inquiry with the Clerk of the Court which, as the Court stated
in its show-cause Resolution, would have yielded the information that none had yet issued or been promulgated.

Respondent expresses perplexity at being called to account for the publications in his capacity as a member of the
bar, not as a journalist. This distinction is meaningless, since as the matter stands, he has failed to justify his
actuations in either capacity, and there is no question of the Courts authority to call him to task either as a
newsman or as a lawyer. What respondent proposes is that in considering his actions, the Court judges them only
as those of a member of the press and disregard the fact that he is also a lawyer. But his actions cannot be put into
such neat compartments. In the natural order of things, a persons acts are determined by and reflect, the sum
total of his knowledge, training and experience. In the case of the respondent in particular, the Court will take
judicial notice of the frequent appearance in his regular columns of comments and observations utilizing legal
language and argument, bearing witness to the fact that in pursuing his craft as a journalist, be calls upon his
knowledge as a lawyer to help inform and influence his readers and enhance his credibility. Even absent this
circumstance, respondent cannot honestly assert that in exercising his profession as a journalist, he does not
somehow, consciously or unconsciously, draw upon his legal knowledge and training. It is thus not realistic, nor
perhaps even possible to come to any fair, informed, and intelligent judgment of respondents actuations by
divorcing from consideration the fact that he is a lawyer as well as a newspaperman, even supposing which is not
the case that he may thereby be found without accountability in this matter.

To repeat, respondent cannot claim absolution even where the Court to lend ear to his plea that his actions be
judged solely as those of a newspaperman unburdened by the duties and responsibilities peculiar to the law
profession of which he is also a member. Withal, it has not escaped the attention of the Court that his Compliance,
despite its strong, even passionate, plea for exculpation does not hesitate to own and beg indulgence for fault on
his own part, if any be found, and in his own words, to place him at the Courts mercy. And while the objectionable
may, by implication, have cast doubt on the integrity of the Courts proceed- [4 LR 24] -ings, they attribute no
official or personal impropriety to any member of the Court. These should be considered in mitigation of the
imposable discipline or penalty.
WHEREFORE, and upon all of the forgoing considerations, respondent is imposed a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00), upon payment of which within a period of FIVE (5) DAYS, from notice thereof, the matter will be
considered CLOSED. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into his personal record with the office of the Bar
Confidant.

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar
Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City],
under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers,
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using
the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal
Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos,
Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July
7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles
as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
2
aforementioned articles. ..." With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this
Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
3
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues
raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
4
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on
the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning
the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
5
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with
the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the
petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long
to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies.
The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country,
from release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a
matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And
after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and
Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to
hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp.
123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to
punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession
of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from
challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them,
within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect
the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision
6
as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . This objection, however, may properly be considered
moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an
examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address
on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the
crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and
concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for
and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd

and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place.
Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application,
and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the
ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact
is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
7
warrant. Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant
No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the
warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on
whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may
look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
8
searched."
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under
a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of
the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of
the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the
warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed
warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in
a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works"
9
are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo where this legal provision was
invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N.
10
Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement
in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree
885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our
unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were
used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the
objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and
April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this
Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets
the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that
they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized
in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and
the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any
and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote
the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking
"Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703
or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era
of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice
of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to

express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where
a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have
been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against
the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and
regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President
Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the
WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister
Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon
City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the
reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM "
20
case. In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
21
materials it uses.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer
for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles
seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON.
REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon
City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents,
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.

RELOVA, J.:
On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon
application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service,
issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines,
video machines and tapes
which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to
sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1835 ...
(p. 24, Rollo)
On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:
2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and
tape recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate
or mute things as they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been
rendered moot and academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military
conspiracy was responsible for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on
August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board which has the
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had
virtually affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed
Benigno Aquino, Jr.
4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said case
against the accused on all documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered
moot and academic by the recent Agrava Report. (p. 27, Rollo)
On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions of
which state:
... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are
not under the control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these
circumstances, the proper forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should
be addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of the
Court. It is to be further noted that it is not even with this Branch of the Court that the
offense of inciting to sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and restraining
order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 98 from proceeding with
the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q-29243, praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by

respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and that a mandatory injunction
be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt.
Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized
from herein petitioner and that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in
Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt.
Godofredo Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610
Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea for
temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from introducing as evidence for the state the
documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage No. Q-29243
(Sedition case against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action is
premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Lising's
order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search warrant; (3) the
articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was conducted in an
orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife; (6)
the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the search warrant; (7) press
freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by laches.
There is merit in the petition.
Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order in
question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the questions raised before the Supreme
Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the lower court, the filing
of the motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is
no longer a pre-requisite. As held in Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring
the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained
was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where,
the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the
court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil.
905 and in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when questions
are raised for the first time before the high court in a certiorari case that the writ shall not issue, unless the
lower court had first been given an opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the case of Matute vs.
Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration in
the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari,
this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent nullity or where 'the
deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the proceeding against him in the
court below not only with irregularity but with nullity (Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbella et al., L-16038, Sept.
30, 1960), or when special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of
this petition clearly disclose that the issues herein raised have already been presented to and passed
upon by the court a quo.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the
judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant
a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and
proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus,
an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials published
or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We
have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere
generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches
and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs,
Ruiz, supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:
... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the
government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized
by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835;
(p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite
distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted
authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of
probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the items confiscated from the
premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw,
Ermita, Manila were the following:
1. One bundle of assorted negative;
2. One bundle of assorted lay out;
3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other
paraphernalias;
4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino and a
speech of one various artist;
5. One bundle Dummies;
6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos. 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15):

7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373;

8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;
9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo)
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the seizure of
books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit comment of the Bill of Rights that
the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating
general warrants. In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of
printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies,
subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and
tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable
records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant
under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which petitioner
was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing and publication of
said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual
denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to
a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."
Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983 and was
executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1) month and six
(6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the warrant and the return of the
documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that petitioner is guilty
of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).
In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the military
operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the Director-General
PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the crime of inciting to sedition
before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a preventive detention action was
served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November 8,
1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing
Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and
Edilberto Balce, In the same month, November 1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to
return the seized documents. When respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us.
Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the possession
of the seized properties is incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29, 1983 is
declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.

The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further, respondents Lt. Col.
Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises
of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila.
SO ORDERED.

ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI

TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL, CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA,
SHEILA S. CORONEL, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2, BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO
ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO FERNANDO, COL.
BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:
This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the
amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March
3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to
petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of
inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different
dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have
subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs,
associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent
NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20,1982, which reads:
Madam:
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before
this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro
Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential
matters being looked into by this Committee.
Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on
your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO C.
ESTRADA
Brig. General, AFP

(Ret.)
Chairman
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on
February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez,
editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the
March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by respondents. The
complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.)
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of
the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive
guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of
petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of
information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public
concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute intrusions into
spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce
the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the
matters inquired into by respondents in previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.
In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to
exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither
subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without
any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit
information and exchange Ideas and that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by
members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be
followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of
action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board
and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending before any of the
respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that this case has been rendered moot and academic
because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have
already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and
Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated.
The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent
NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the
aforementioned libel suit.
Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted.
The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of
letters of invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering
the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some
questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated
interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation
which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially
where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall
be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law."

Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and
the unwelcome interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of the
petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel
cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of
expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel
cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as
evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by
respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained.
Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party,
and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has
been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case
against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of
respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to
complain of libel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

MANUEL ELIZALDE, FRED J. ELIZALDE, PRUDENCIO R. EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge, CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented in this instance by JESUS F. GUERRERO, Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos
Sur,respondents.

FERNANDO, J:
1

It was the refusal of respondent Judge Mario J. Gutierrez to grant motion to quash of petitioners, who
were the accused in a prosecution for libel, notwithstanding the invocation of their constitutional right to
2
freedom of expression that led to this suit for certiorari and prohibition. All that could be alleged in the
information against them was the publication in the Evening News, a newspaper of general circulation, of
an item reproducing in full a dispatch from the Philippine News Service, a reputable news-gathering
agency. It summarized the testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein the name of Vincent
Crisologo, the offended party in the information for libel, was mentioned. This excerpt from the recent
3
case of Bocobo v. Estanislao comes to mind: "This is contrary to the legal tradition of the Philippines
dating back to the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, where Justice Malcolm emphasized that to
prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free press, every libel prosecution should be
tested by the rigorous and exacting standard of whether or not it could be violative of such fundamental
4
guarantee. It is easily understandable then why in the motion to quash, the main reliance was on the

Bustos doctrine, although other grounds were alleged as warranting the dismissal of the
5
information. When respondent Judge ignored such a fundamental constitutional principle, the proper
basis for a certiorari and prohibition proceeding was laid. Petitioners are entitled to the remedies sought.
The alleged offending news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the Philippine News
Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde and Fred J. Elizalde were the
Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa was the Editor-in-Chief. It reads thus: "Jaime
Jose implicated Tuesday Vincent Crisologo, son of Rep. Floro Crisologo ( N, Ilocos Sur ) as among his
four companions the night of the alleged rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. Jose, one of four
principal accused in the celebrated Maggie de la Riva rape case, denied, however, the charges of forcible
abduction with rape and robbery filed against him and his companions by Zenaida de la Cruz, 28, and
Araceli Sy, both nightclub hostesses. Jose mentioned Vincent Crisologo as among his companions while
testifying in his defense before Judge Francisco de la Rosa of the local court of first instance. Jose
claimed that both Zenaida and Araceli went voluntarily with his group to the Queen's Court motel here in
the early morning of July 4, 1966. Jose said Zenaida and Crisologo went to a room together. However,
Jose said, the two girls complained when he and his companions failed to give the girls any money.
6
... This was the continuation of such news item: "The girls charged that they were robbed by Jose and
his friends of cash and jewelry inside the hotel. In their original complaint filed with the fiscal's office, the
two girls named Vincent Crisologo as among the accused. The taxi driver, whose vehicle was used by
Miss de la Cruz, also Identified Vincent Crisologo among the five youths in the incident. But the girls later
executed an affidavit saying that they were mistaken in Identifying Crisologo as among the five men who
allegedly abused them. Jose testified that he and Tillman were about to go to a party in Mandaluyong,
Rizal, on the night of July 3, 1966, when Crisologo with three companions arrived. Jose said that young
Crisologo wanted to borrow his car since his car would be used by his congressman father. Jose said that
after the party they proceeded to Pasay City where Crisologo and a companion went to Bayside nightclub
to look for Crisologo's girl friend. Minutes later, Crisologo and his friend went out of the club and they all
proceeded to the Barbecue Plaza where they drank liquor. Shortly before 2 a.m., July 4, the group
allegedly started for home in Jose's two-toned Mercedez Benz car. On the way, a taxicab overtook them.
The cab allegedly carried Zenaida and Araceli. Jose said that Zenaida called Vincent and shouted for
7
them to stop. They then proceeded to Queen's Court motel, Jose said. The alleged offended party,
according to the information filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal, Jesus F. Guerrero, is Vincent
Crisologo. The information is dated February 5, 1970. Thereafter, there was a motion to quash filed by
petitioners on August 14, 1970. An opposition was then filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on
September 25, 1970. The order by respondent Judge denying the motion to quash came on December
17, 1970. An extensive motion for reconsideration submitted on February 23, 1971 having proved futile in
view of an order of denial a month later from respondent Judge, this petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed with this Court.
As noted at the outset, certiorari and prohibition lie.
1. Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News carried in its issue of September 1,
1967 a news item furnished it by the Philippine News Service. It was a faithful and accurate summary of
what was testified to by a witness in a pending rape case. That was all. The name of the alleged offended
party, Vincent Crisologo, was repeatedly mentioned in such testimony. It would have been a plain and
simple distortion thereof if such a fact were omitted by the Philippine News Service. The Evening News in
turn published such item. This is a case therefore that falls squarely within the protection of the free press
provision found in the Constitution. That such news item possessed a defamatory aspect is beside the
point. It cannot justify a prosecution for libel. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, under the previous
organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which contained a similar provision mandating a free
8
press, this Court, in the epochal Malcolm opinion in United States v. Bustos decided almost sixty years
ago, to be precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the principle that the freedom of the press is
"so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be protected and
9
carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself." Thus it is clear that a
prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free
10
press guarantee. This Court has since then been committed to such an authoritative doctrine. The

11

opinion of Chief Justice Paras in Quisumbing v. Lopez, a 1955 decision, is even more explicit on the
matter. Thus: "The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories,
press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
12
imperfection in the choice of words. At the beginning of this decade, this Court in Lopez v. Court of
13
Appeals expressed its commitment to such a principle in these words: "No inroads on press freedom
should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel
whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of
respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. ... If the cases mean
anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part
of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic
account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public attendant on the
14
business of publishing cannot be ignored.
2. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication
without doing violence to the concept of privileged communication implicit in freedom of the press. As was
so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
15
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. He then
quoted this excerpt from an American Supreme Court decision,Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce:
"The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though as incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the
16
evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Considering how ample is the protection afforded a person
alleged to have injured another's reputation, it appears quite obvious that respondent Judge did infringe
on the constitutional right of petitioners to press freedom when it denied the motion to quash. He
apparently was equally unaware of this relevant paragraph in the Malcolm opinion: "A privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or
falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
17
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. By no stretch of the imagination then could it be
said that the Philippine News Service and the Evening News exhibited mala fides by the mere fact of
narrating in a news item the testimony of a witness in a rape case just because it did cast a reflection on
the conduct of a third party. The prosecution in its pleadings before the lower court could not deny the
accuracy of what was reported. Petitioners then ought not to have been subjected to the annoyance,
inconvenience, and trouble of going to a distant province and defend themselves against a charge
unwarrant under well-settled norms of constitutional dimension. The doctrine of privileged communication
moreover is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to the general principle
that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true in the absence of "good
intention" and "justifiable motive" thus: "A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
18
officers in the exercise of their functions.
3. There being a denial of a constitutional right, a jurisdictional issue was raised. It has been a well-settled
19
doctrine since Conde v. Rivera, that under such circumstances, the competence of a court to continue
20
with a pending case ceases. Nor is it to indulge merely in general propositions. In People v.
21
Andres, this Court precisely sustained a court of first instance when it quashed an information for libel,
the accused, respondent Andres, relying on press freedom to show that the fact charged do not constitute
an offense. As pointed out in the opinion of Justice Barrera, it was argued by the prosecution "that the trial
court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion
on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a
fact to he proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's publication is a matter of
22
defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel ... ." That contention was
rejected in this wise: "While there is some point to this contention, yet when in the information itself it
appears, as it does in the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an

appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need
not wait until the trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if added to
this, the questioned imputations appear, as they seem in this case, to be really pertinent and relevant to
defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from
which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's
court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an
23
24
offense of libel. Similarly, a motion to quash was sustained in the later case of People v. Alvarez, In
the opinion of Justice Regala, it was pointed out: "As heretofore stated, this Court has adopted a liberal
attitude in favor of the writer in matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in judicial
pleadings. In U.S. v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found occasion to express ills opinion on
privileged communications, to wit: ... A privileged communication should not be subjected to miscroscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrunity would defeat the protection
which the law throws over privileged communication. ... It is worthy to mention here that in the information
for libel, there is no allegation of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned statements to the
cause. Considering the above, We are of the opinion and so hold that no error was committed by the
lower court in considering the questioned remarks of the appellee as privileged and in consequently
25
26
dismissing the information for lack of cause of action. In a third case, People v. Aquino, reference
was made toPeople v. Andres to demonstrate that it is fitting and appropriate for a court of first instance
to dismiss an information on a motion to quash where the privileged character of the, alleged offending
publication is apparent. Respondent Judge ought not to have betrayed lack of sensitivity to the
categorical pronouncements of this Court in the above three decisions that call for application,
4. Nor is a different conclusion called for just because the heading of the news item arising from the
testimony of Jaime Jose was worded thus: "LINK CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY RAPE CASE." How else
could it have been expressed? That was to portray with accuracy what was contained in the news item.
What was testified to was to that effect. It succinctly set forth the facts. There was no attempt to
sensationalize. The tone is both neutral and objective. Again there is relevance to the following excerpt
from Quisumbing v. Lopez: "The Court of Appeals found 'that the context of the article in question, is a
fair, impartial and true report of official or public proceeding authorized by law. The news item was the
result of a press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N. B. I., and
was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate
report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The article merely reported a raid on
the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders;' and related the steps actually taken or to be taken
by the proper officials relative to the investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official
actuations. The theory of the petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the news item
may be considered as being fair, impartial and accurate report of an official investigation of the Anti-Usury
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation and therefore privileged, its headline NBI MEN RAID
OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS, admittedly not forming part of the basic press release but merely added
by the respondents, is libelous per se, because the petitioner had thereby been branded and condemned
as a 4 usurer' when as a matter of fact no criminal charge was even filed against him for the crime of
27
usury in any court of justice. Nonetheless, the newspaper publisher was not held liable. The Chief
Justice then explained why: "We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct. The petitioner,
while assuming that the article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per se) added
by the respondents rendered the same actionable, because said headline is not borne out by the facts
recited in the context. We believe that nobody reading the whole news item would come to the conclusion
that the petitioner had been accused or convicted of usury. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
headline complained of may fairly be said to contain a correct description of the news story. The fact that
the raid was conducted by anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint against the petitioner and
two others, coupled with the announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-Usury Division that criminal
action would be filed in the city fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to think that the persons involved
were usurers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested the Idea that the petitioner
28
was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of respondent Judge denying the
motion to quash of December 17, 1970 as well as the order of respondent Judge of March 25, 1971

denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners are set aside and nullified. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted and the restraining order issued on June 10, 1971 made permanent,
respondent Judge or any person who may have taken his place being prohibited from taking any action in
Criminal Case No. 11-V for Libel except for the purpose of dismissing the same. No costs.

LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE MANILA TIMES PUB. CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN,
MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE, defendant-appellees.
Mario Bengzon for plaintiff-appellant.
Alfredo Gonzales and Rafael M. Delfin for defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiff's complaint and
defendants' counterclaim, without special pronouncement as to costs. Originally certified to the Court of
Appeals, the record on appeal was subsequently forwarded to us in view of the amount involved in the
complaint (P300,000.00).
Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as moral
damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from
the costs, by reason of the publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror
of August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous
and false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and
official transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and
physical anguish and incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages. The defendants
are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror,
which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. VillaReal, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first article and the managing
editor, the associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of said newspapers.
After its motion to dismiss the complaint had been denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
which the present action was initiated, the defendants filed a joint answer admitting the formal allegations
of the complaint, denying the other allegations thereof, alleging special defenses and setting up a
counterclaim for P10,000, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. In due course, later on, said court
rendered the aforementioned decision, upon the ground that plaintiff had not proven that defendants had
acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or
false.
Plaintiff is a member of the Philippine bar. On August 11 and 13, 1956, and for sometime prior thereto,
she was executive secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. As such officer, she had
preferred charges against Herminia D. Reyes, one of her subordinates in said Commission, and caused
her to be separated from the service. Miss Reyes, in turn, preferred counter-charges which were referred
to Col. Crisanto V. Alba, a Special Investigator in the Office of the President. Pending completion of the
administrative investigation, which began in June, 1956, Miss Reyes filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, on August 8, 1956, a complaint against the plaintiff for alleged malversation of public funds and
another complaint for alleged estafa thru falsification of public documents, which were scheduled for
investigation by said office on August 22, 1956, at 2:00 p.m. Meanwhile, or on August 11, 1956, the
following appeared, with a picture of the plaintiff, in the front page of The Saturday Mirror:

WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED

PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS
Unesco Official Head Accused on
Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague
By Constante C. Roldan
Lumen Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco national commission here, was charged with
malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission today.
The criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation against the Unesco
official being conducted by Col. Crisanto V. Alba, Malacaan technical assistant, on charges filed by
Herminia D. Reyes, a Unesco confidential assistant. The Unesco commission functions under the Office
of the President.
Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, to whom the cases were assigned, immediately scheduled preliminary
investigation of the charges on August 22 at 2 p.m. Colonel Alba, in turn, indicated that the administrative
phase of the inquiry will continue Monday and then resume on August 21 at Malacaan Park. The Palace
Investigator said there are other charges, but would not specify these.
Alba said Miss Reyes had testified on circumstances supposedly substantiating the malversation charge.
Testimony had allegedly indicated that the accused had used Unesco stencils for private and personal
purposes. Specification reputedly said that Miss Policarpio had taken stencils from the Unesco storeroom
and used these for French lessons not at all connected with Unesco work; for the preparation of contracts
of sale of pianos in her business establishment; for preparation of invitations sent to members of the
League of Women Voters of which she is one of the officers.
Cited as witnesses on this charge are Miss Reyes, Francisco Manalo of Barrio Salabat, Taal, Batangas,
Federico Vergara and Pablo Armesto both of the Unesco.1wph1.t
Regarding the charge of estafa through falsification of public documents allegedly also committed
sometime in 1955, Miss Policarpio was accused of having collected expenses for supposed trips. The
accusation said the Unesco official had sought reimbursement of expenses for a trip to Baler, Quezon, on
Aug. 19, last year, representing expenses of her car when in fact she supposedly rode in an army plane.
Testimony indicated that a newspaper woman who was a supposed co-passenger had even written about
the plane trip in her newspaper column. The same voucher also allegedly collected expenses for going to
a Unesco Bayambang (Pangasinan) project, although records reputedly showed that she was absent in
that conferences.
Witnesses cited on the charge include Aurelio Savalbaro, a Philippine Air Force pilot, Lt. Clemente
Antonio and others, also of the PAF.
Miss Policarpio becomes the second high-ranking woman government official to face charges involving
financial disbursements in their office. The first was Sen. Pacita M. Gonzales who is still under charge
mis-spending funds of the Social Welfare Administration and the UNAC while she had charge of these.
The complainant, Miss Reyes, was earlier ordered relieved from her Unesco post by Miss Policarpio on
charges including conduct "unbecoming a lady", and as a result had not been paid her salary. She
appealed to Malacaan which dismissed her suit and later she sued before Judge Rafael Amparo to
compel payment of her salary. The court also rejected her plea on the ground that she had not exhausted
all administrative remedies, the Palace not having made a clearcut decision on her case.

The Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, likewise, carried on its first page with a picture of plaintiff and of
Miss Reyes, taken during the administrative investigation being conducted by Col. Alba another news
item, reading:
"PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO
Alba Probes Administrative Phase of
Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman
Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz
Of Criminal Suit on Aug. 22.
The administrative phase of two-pronged investigation Miss Lumen Policarpio, head of the Unesco
national commission here, opened in Malacaan before Col. Crisanto V. Alba.
The judicial inquiry of charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, also the complainant in the Malacaan case
before the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, will be conducted by Fiscal Manases G.
Reyes on Aug. 22 at 2 p.m.
Miss Policarpio stands accused by Reyes of having malversed public property and of having fraudulently
sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses.
Colonel Alba, at the start of his investigation at the Malacaan Park, clarified that neither he nor the
PCAC had initiated the criminal action before the city fiscal's office. The complaint before the fiscal was
started by an information she naming Herminia D. Reyes as complainant and citing other persons as
witnesses. Fiscal Reyes set preliminary investigation of these charges for Aug. 22.
Miss Reyes, technical assistant of the Unesco, stated at the Palace inquiry that during 1955 Miss
Policarpio allegedly used several sheets of government stencils for her private and personal use, such as
for French lessons, contracts of sale of pianos and for invitations of the League of Women Voters of
which she (Miss Policarpio) is an officer. The Unesco commission here functions under the Office of the
President.
The charge was filed with the PCAC, and the PCAC endorsed it to Colonel Alba for investigation.
Miss Policarpio this morning was not represented by an lawyer. Federico Diaz, lawyer representing
complainant Miss Reyes, petitioned for the suspension of Miss Policarpio, executive secretary of the
Unesco.
Alba did not act immediately on the petition. He said he was holding a hearing on the petition on August
15.
During this morning's investigation three witness appeared. The first witness was Atty. Antonio Lopez of
the PCAC who brought with him 18 sheets of stencil which were allegedly used by Miss Policarpio for her
personal use. These sheets were admitted as temporary exhibits.
The second witness was Federico Vergara of the Unesco who said that he received four of the 18 sheets,
but he could not identify which of the sheets he had received.
The third witness was Francisco Manalo who certified on the charge of oppression in office against Miss
Policarpio.
The other charge of Miss Reyes corresponded to supposed reimbursements sought by Miss Policarpio
for a trip to Quezon Province and to Pangasinan. On the first, Miss Reyes' complaint alleged the Unesco

official had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when, Miss Reyes claimed she had actually
made the trip aboard an army plane.
Miss Reyes also said Miss Policarpio was absent from the Bayambang conference for which she also
sought allegedly refund of expenses.
The complainant had previously been ordered relieved of her Unesco post by Miss Policarpio and had
later sued at the Palace and before the Court for payment of her salary.
The title of the article of August 11, 1956 "WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED" was given prominence with a
6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types. Admittedly, its sub-title "PCAC RAPS
L. POLICARPIO PIO ON FRAUD" printed in bold one-centimeter types, is not true. Similarly, the
statement in the first paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with malversation
and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission" otherwise known as PCAC is untrue, the complaints for said offenses having been
filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was initiated as a result of current
administrative, investigation", as stated in the second paragraph of the same article.
Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the general impression that said
investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff was guilty, or, at least, probably guilty of the crimes
aforementioned, and that, as a consequence, the PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints with the
city fiscal's office. She alleges, also, that although said article indicates that the charges for malversation
and for estafa through falsification against her referred, respectively, to the use by her of Unesco stencils
allegedly for private and personal purposes, and to the collection of transportation expenses, it did not
mention the fact that the number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20, that the sum
allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was said to have
been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought and secured reimbursement
were incurred in trips during the period from July 1, 1955 to September 30, 1955, although the trips
actually were made, according to Miss Reyes, from July 8 to August 31, 1955. By omitting these details,
plaintiff avers, the article of August 11, 1956, had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses
imputed to her were more serious than they really were. Plaintiff, likewise, claims that there are other
inaccuracies in the news item of August 13, 1956, but, we do not deem it necessary to dwell upon the
same for the determination of this case.
Upon the other hand, defendants contend that, although the complaints in the city fiscal's office were filed,
not by the PCAC, but by Miss Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant and immaterial to the case, for the
fact is that said complaints were filed with said office. As regards the number of sheets of stencil allegedly
misused and the amount said to have been misappropriated by plaintiff, as well as the nature of the
falsification imputed to her, defendants argue that these "details" do not affect the truthfulness of the
article as a whole, and that, in any event, the insignificant value of said sheets of stencil and the small
amount allegedly misappropriated, would have had, if set forth in said article, a greater derogatory effect
upon the plaintiff, aside from the circumstance that defendants had no means of knowing such "details". It
appears, however, that prior to August 11, 1956, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of Antonio P.
Lopez, Francisco Manalo and Federico Vergara, as witnesses for Miss Reyes. Hence, defendants could
have ascertained the "details" aforementioned, had they wanted to. Indeed, some of the defendants
and/or their representatives had made appropriate inquiries from Col. Alba before said date, and some
"details" though not those adverted to above appear in the article then published, whereas the
number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused was mentioned in the news item of August 13, 1956.
Moreover, the penalty prescribed by law for the crime either of estafa or of embezzlement depends partly
upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party (Articles 315 to 318, Revised Penal Code).
Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said offense.

Again, it is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints with the city fiscal's office by another agency of
the Government, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation conducted by the same, imparts the
ideal that the probability of guilty on the part of the accused is greater than when the complaints are filed
by a private individual, specially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was
responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her employment. It is only too apparent that the
article published on August 11, 1956, presented the plaintiff in a more unfavorable light than she actually
was.
It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the
manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached
thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper
may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings,
which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a
publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in
good faith and without any comments or remarks.
Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in publishing the news items in question had not been
established by the plaintiff. However, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of other functions.
In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on
August 11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other
words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its
sub-title "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" is a comment or remark, besides being false.
Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious".
Then too, how could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or justifiable motive in falsely
stating that the complaints had been filed with the Office of the City Fiscal by the PCAC as a result of the
administrative investigation of Col. Alba? Either they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they
did, then the publication would be actually malicious. If they did not or if they acted under a
misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement, for the
consequences of which they are liable solidarily (Articles 2176, 2194, 2208 and 2219 [I], Civil Code of the
Philippines; 17 R.C.L. sec. 95, p. 349).
We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the
first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with
the city fiscal's office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints.
But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the
first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we
feel that the interest of justice and of all parties concerned would be served if the defendants indemnify
the plaintiff in the sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendants herein to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the aforementioned sums of
P3,000, as moral damages, and P2,000, by way of attorney's fees, in addition to the costs. It is so
ordered.

EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the "MANILA, CHRONICLE and JUAN T.
GATBONTON,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

FERNANDO, J.:
There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of respondent Court of Appeals
holding petitioners, the then publisher and editor of This Week Magazine, liable in damages to the tune of
eleven thousand pesos arising from the publication of a picture of respondent, Fidel G. Cruz, as being
responsible for the hoax of the year. The absence of any connection either fanciful or remote with such
event is admitted. The view is pressed by petitioners, invoking a liberal construction of the implications of
press freedom, owning up to the mistake, unfortunately not discovered until it was too late, and publishing
a correction as an earnest of its good faith, that they should not be made to pay at all. This Court, without
discounting the elements of plausibility of their contention, cannot, however, close its eyes to the injury
inflicted on respondent and indulge them in such a plea. It is not disposed though to affirm respondent
Court's decision in its entirety. Considering all the circumstances, the damages awarded to private
respondent appear to be far too generous. A reduction is in order. The sum of one thousand pesos would
be enough. So we decide.
The antecedents of the case follow: In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page
of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies,
a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a
distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He
was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance
kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that
the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955.
Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led
by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however,
Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who
merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded
as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the
other newspapers when referring to the above-mentioned incident.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a
pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned
out to be false if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick,
only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in the January 29, 1956
issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in what
was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the
government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year

End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was made to a health inspector who
suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was given the appellation of "Hoax of the
Year."
The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz.
Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that of private respondent Fidel
G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of
respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila
Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the
news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched.
As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of petitioners, the following
correction was immediately published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were
rushing to meet: the deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the picture
of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's
Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was
connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express our profound
regrets that such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing correction, petitioners published the
picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four lines the type
used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the
1
attention of the readers to such amends being made.
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of
damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he
was awarded five thousand pesos as actual damages, another five thousand pesos as moral damages,
and one thousand pesos for attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to respondent Court.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with the result, as already announced at the opening of this opinion, that
while respondent Cruz is entitled to Prevail, the damages awarded him should be reduced.
1. It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate that no action
for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture of respondent Cruz identified as responsible
for the hoax of the year, when such was not the case at all. It is easily understandable why. No liability
would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the well-nigh all embracing scope of
freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the
light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the requirement as
to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications
being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing could be plausibly made, however, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of such quasi-delict. It was held
2
in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, that "the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the
3
civil action for libel." A libel was defined in that Act as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead
or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is
4
alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule," There was an express provision in
5
such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view
in the new Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of
6
defamation.
There has been no time then in our judicial history when civil actions for libel did not form a staple part of
7
litigations which had reached this Court. Such is the case in a far greater measure in the United States.
According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph
in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published,
8
where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person." In support of the above statement, he
9
made reference to several cases. Other decisions to the same effect have been promulgated since the
1
fourth edition of Newell published in 1924. 0 Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is

explained by Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving
him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches
, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money damages are awarded to
the injured person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce
breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the guardian
of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or
1
imprisonment." 1
The first decision cited by Newell is a decision of Justice Holmes. The case is Peck v. Tribune
1
Co. 2 Plaintiff there complained of her picture being published in an advertisement in defendant's
newspaper. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, with certain words of commendation for a brand of liquor
attributed to her when in fact she did not make such a statement at all and could not have made it, as she
was a total abstainer. The defendant was held liable, for as Justice Holmes pointed out: "There was some
suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without knowledge that it was the
plaintiff's portrait, or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. If the
publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield,
'Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.' ... The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face.
If a man sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other
justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of tort will make him
1
liable if the statements are false, or are true only of someone else." 3
Learned Hand, in holding that an action for libel would lie arising from a publication in an advertisement of
plaintiff's photograph yielding a "grotesque monstrous and obscene impression" and that he was
"substantially enough ridiculed" to complain reached the conclusion "that because the picture taken with
the legends was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima
facie actionable; that the fact that it did not assume to state a fact or an opinion is irrelevant; and that in
1
consequence the publication is actionable." 4 It is likewise an accepted fact that such publications do
occasion greater injury to reputation than would mere words alone. Cardozo so aptly put the matter thus:
"'It has its genesis in evils which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said
with impunity through the medium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and
transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the writing is its permanence of form. The spoken word
dissolves, but the written one abide and Perpetuates the scandal.' ... When one speaks of a writing in this
connection, one does not limit oneself to writings in manuscripts or books. Any symbol suffices
1
Pictures, hieroglyphics shorthand notes if only what is written is intelligible to him who reads." 5
2. That is only one side of the picture, however. There is an impressive recognition in our decisions of the
curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized
to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right Thus, in the
1
first leading case, United States v. Bustos, 6 Justice Malcolm could correctly stress: "The interest of
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile
and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common
1
good." 7 On this aspect of the question which, as answered by him, would require that a criminal suit for
libel should not be utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he categorically declared: "Public policy,
the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public
opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
1
privilege." 8
In another civil action for libel, such a thought is expressed differently in this wise: "So long as it is done in
good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and express opinions on legal questions. To deny
1
them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press." 9 The last word on the subject, up to now

at least, came fromQuisumbing v. Lopez. 0 In the language of the then Chief Justice Paras, who penned
the opinion: "The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record to prove that
the publication of the news item under Consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that
there was intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty
to serve the best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every
citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the
press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in
2
the choice of words." 1
It was not until 1964 that the United States Supreme Court had occasion to speak its mind on the subject.
2
In the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sulivan, 2 the nature of the question presented was set
forth by Justice Brennan for the Court in the opening paragraph of his opinion: "We are required in this
case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press
limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his
2
official conduct." 3 This is the Court's approach to such an issue: "In deciding the question now, we are
compelled by neither precedent nor Policy to give any more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to
other 'mere labels' of state law. ... Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the
peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of
expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
2
Amendment." 4 Continuing the same trend, the opinion stressed further: "Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... The present advertisement,
as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem
2
clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection." 5
For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional
guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
2
2
or not." 6 The United States Supreme Court went further in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 7 where
such immunity, was held as covering statements concerning public figures regardless of whether or not
they are government officials. Why there should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the
broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues.
What can be more logical and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the principle. As noted by a
commentator: "Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without reference to the men
involved on both sides of such issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public officials, one
2
cannot but agree that the Court was right in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public figures." 8
The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive for their consistency is quite obvious. No
inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise
could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting
from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of.
This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil
suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value
the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the
press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases moan anything at all then,
to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to
assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended a realistic account of the obligation
of a news media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the

conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. To single out one
decision, Quisumbing v. Lopez so speaks in tones loud and clear.
3. It is to the haven thus afforded by such a highly sympathetic ruling to press freedom that petitioners
would seek refuge. The defamatory matter complained of in the Quisumbing case appeared in the
headline. It was without basis, as shown by the text of the news item itself. Nonetheless, for the reasons
expressed with vigor and clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no liability was deemed incurred by the
then publisher of the Manila Chronicle A newspaper, it is stressed, "should not be held to account to a
point of suppression for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words." The above ruling,
coupled with the requirement in the New York Times decision of the United States Supreme Court, would
for the writer of this opinion, furnish a sufficient basis for the success of this appeal. The Court, however,
is not inclined to view matters thus. Obviously Quisumbing v. Lopezis not squarely in point. Here there
was no pressure of a daily deadline to meet no occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent
was published in a weekly magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of reasonable care
imposed by such decision which from the facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be
concluded then that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of press freedom is not
ignored, but here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does not
have a controlling significance. So we hold.
4. Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their correction, which has all the force of a retraction, as a
basis from being absolved from any pecuniary responsibility. The present Chief Justice in Policarpio v.
2
Manila Times 9restated the controlling principle: "We note that the news item published on August 13,
1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It, likewise, indicated the
number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe
out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it
3
(Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52)." 0
The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It
should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary logs arising from the above publication. It
is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate
courts on this score, the usual practice being "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase
3
them." 1
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 25, 1966 affirming the lower court
decision of March 22, 1958 is hereby modified, petitioners Eugenio Lopez and Juan T. Gatbonton being
ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 as moral damages and the additional amount of
P500.00 for attorney's fees. Costs against petitioners.

New York Times vs. Sullivan

Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant, the New York Times Co. (Defendant), for
printing an advertisement about the civil rights movement in the south that defamed the Plaintiff.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.

Facts. The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was defamed
in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The advertisement was entitled, Heed Their Rising Voices and
it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had been directed against those who participated in the
civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the advertisement were false. Although the
advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred to him indirectly because he had
oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement
because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents were false. There was no independent effort to
check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was
puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad
libelous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a public officials
official conduct?

Held. No. Reversed and remanded.

* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to
bring him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words were published of and concerning the plaintiff.
Once libel per se has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the
jury that they were true in all their particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the breathing space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual
malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
* The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution delimits a States power to
award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. In this case,
the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.
* The Defendants failure to retract the advertisement upon the Plaintiffs demand is not adequate evidence of
malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence of malice that the Defendant failed to
check the advertisements accuracy against the news stories in the Defendants own files. Also, the evidence was
constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting the jurys finding that the allegedly
libelous statements were made of and concerning the Plaintiff.
Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
do not merely delimit a States power to award damages, but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a

power. The Defendant had an absolute, unconditional right to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and
officials.
Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official conduct, malice must
be proved. Without the showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this case would
severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech and expression that are guaranteed in the First Amendment of
the Constitution and applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. AND U.S. AUTOMOTIVE CO., INC., petitioners,

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, HON. RAMON A. DIAZ, DEPUTY
MINISTER, HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA COMMISSIONER, respondents.
G.R. No. 79126 April 15, 1988
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION (BULLETIN), petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) SECRETARY RAMON A. DIAZ
AND COMMISSIONER MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
These two cases are jointly resolved because of the common identity of and related issues by the parties,
without prejudice to the writing of an extended opinion.
G.R. 77422 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
filed on February 24, 1987 by Liwayway Publishing, Inc. (Liwayway hereafter) and U.S. automotive Co.,
Inc. (US Automotive hereafter) seeking to annul and set aside two writs of sequestration issued by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (Commission hereafter) on February 12, 1987 on the
shares of stocks of U.S. Automotive in Liwayway, as well as the implementing directive addressed to the
Central Bank Governor of even date and to prohibit the Commission from conducting proceedings in
connection with the said sequestration.
G.R. 79126 is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction and urgent ex-parte restraining order filed on July 27, 1987 by Bulletin Publishing Corporation
(Bulletin hereafter) to set aside the April 14, 1987 order issued by the Commission which declared their
intent to vote the "sequestered shares" in Bulletin; to prohibit the voting of Bulletin shares by respondents,
their successors, on their representatives, to enjoin respondents, their successors, or their
representatives from taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts, in the management of
Bulletin; and to direct the immediate acceptance by the Commission of Bulletin's offer to debosit in cash,
under escrow, so as to protect the interest of the government, if any, a specific amount for the value of
sequestered shares in the Bulletin pursuant to the restrictions on their transferability as provided in its
Articles of Incorporation, with any banking institution as may be designated by this Court, pending and
subject to final determination/adjudication of the ownership of said shares and to lift the sequestration
order of April 11, 1986.

Liwayway and Bulletin are domestic corporations engaged in the business of publication of newspapers
and magazines. The former publishes a daily newspaper, the "Balita," and three weekly vernacular
magazines, namely, "Liwayway," "Bisaya" and "Bannawag," while the latter publishes the "Manila
Bulletin" a daily newspaper and its weekly magazines, The "Philippine Panorama," all of general and
national circulation. In both corporations, Mr. Emiho T. Yap is the biggest stockholder and Chairman of
the Board of Directors. As of February 21, 1986, he held 2,617 Bulletin shares, while, U.S.
1
Automotive, a corporation wholly owned and controlled by him and his family, held 318,084 shares out
of the total outstanding Bulletin shares of 567,808.5 with 198,052.5 thereof as treasury shares and
2
765,861 subscribed shares. In Liwayway, "(B)y April, 1986, ... U.S. Automotive Co. owned almost 70%
3
of total Liwayway issued shares ...
I. LIWAYWAY CASE
In G.R. 77422, the Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one
addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the
President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other addressed to
the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S.
Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986.
On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or remittances from funds or assets
under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements, including safety
deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may
pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc.
(hereafter HMH&M).
Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being
limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission against denying Liwayway
the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the
Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway, considering the
Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any
withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which
would virtually shut down its publications.
The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordoez, as well as the Commission's then
Vice-Chairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not be
choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene in the management or
operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its
freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that
in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on
the merits or a showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention.
On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him, submitting a
copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor, Jose Fernandez,
modifying its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to instruct all banks to honor all
checks of Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention is made in the letter of the naming of a
fiscal agent, respondent Commission is not naming anyone at this time.
On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted with commendation the Solicitor General's pledge
at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as to impinge upon the freedom
of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court gave due faith and credence thereto and
the above-cited undertakings of the Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order
which has been rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the Court
enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned.

This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of
press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's
plea to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance
of an injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the composition of
the Commission or of other public officials concerned.
As to the sequestration orders, the Commission claims that Emilio Yap, founder of U.S. Automotive Co.,
organized long before martial law, is a "crony" if not downright "dummy" of the deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos. Mr. Yap, in turn, has strongly countered the Commission's allegations as to his
alleged business association with Mr. Marcos and their prima facie sufficiently in this wise:
On March 2, 1987, petitioners filed its manifestation and reply to the opposition alleging the following:
1. Mr. Yap admits that he owns 2,508 shares of stocks of BASECO which constitute less
than 2% of the total 218,819 outstanding shares of stocks of the company. He acquired
the original 240 shares by subscription at the time of incorporation and augmented by
stock dividends to the present stockholding of 2,508 shares.
2. Regarding the BASECO certificates of shares of stocks purportedly belonging to Yap
and endorsed to "someone" whose name was left in blank this Court should require
the respondents to produce the originals of said stock certificates in order to verify the
claim that they have been endorsed in blank.
3. He had resigned from the chairmanship of BASECO since October 20, 1983. Out of
his duly paid investment of P60,000, he never received any cash dividend nor profited
from BASECO.
4. He has never been a stockholder nor an officer of the Jai-Alai Corporation.
5. He owned only one qualifying share in the Manila International Port Terminals,
Inc.(MIPTI) which he later endorsed to the new MIPTI Chairman. He resigned as
chairman of the Board before the Aquino administration.
6. He invested in the Bulletin in 1961, as second biggest stockholder on the invitation of
Gen. Menzi long before Mr. Marcos became president.
7. All original stock certificates issued to U.S. Automotive and treasury shares are all in
the respective possession of the registered owners and have not been endorsed to
anyone.
But as the Court has consistently held and reiterated in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, decided also
this month, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the parties' conflicting factual contentions have
to be threshed out and adjudged in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over
the case.
II. BULLETIN CASE
In G.R. 79126, the Commission issued on April 22, 1986 an order sequestering the shares of former
President Marcos, Emilio Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., their nominees or agents in the Bulletin
Publishing Corporation. In an order dated April 14, 1987, the Commission declared their intent to vote the
sequestered shares. Thus, on July 27, 1987, the instant petition was filed seeking the nullification of the
above mentioned order. It is petitioner's contention that what is at stake here is the freedom of our press
institutions to independently manage their own affairs and effectively preserve editorial policies and

objectives, without the shadow of government participation in the same, that governmental presence in
petitioner's board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press as an
institution of mass media protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court issued a temporary
retraining order on July 28, 1987 ordering the respondents, their successors, agents or representatives to
cease and desist from voting Bulletin shares, or otherwise from taking part or intervening, directly or
indirectly, in any acts in the management of the Bulletin daily newspaper.
Respondents' comment alleged that the Commission will vote only the shares of Cesar Zalamea (121,178
shares), Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (46,626 shares), and Jose Y. Campos (46,620.5 shares) for a total of
214,424.5 shares which were the subject of the sequestration order and that the shares of Emilio Yap
were excluded by virtue of the Commission's order dated March 16, 1987.
4

Subsequently, however, petitioner alleged in its memorandum of January 2, 1988 that on July 31, 1987,
the Commission sold to it 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y. Campos for a total price of
P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and voucher and 121,178 Bulletin shares of Cesar Zalamea
for a total price of P21,244,926.96 per PTC Check No. 607887 and voucher issued on October 15, 1987.
As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., under sequestration, the petitioner has
offered to deposit in cash the value of the shares with the Commission, in the amount of P8,174,470.32
per PTC Check No. 607590, issued on October 15, 1987 which awaits the Commission's acceptance.
Respondents' memorandum of January 26, 1988, however, stated that only Mr. Campos' shares were
voluntarily surrendered, hence, they were accepted by the Commission. On the matter of the shares of
Cojuangco and Zalamea, it contended that unless there is a confession or admission that the said shares
are "ill-gotten assets" of Mr. Marcos and/or his cronies, the true ownership of the shares has still to be
determined by the Sandiganbayan where Civil Case No. 0022 entitled "Republic ... vs. Emilio T. Yap, et
al." is pending. Petitioner, however, denies being a party therein. Subject to said admission, the
Commission considers it premature to enter into any transaction affecting those shares pending
determination of their ownership.
In their Memorandum, respondents Commission and members expressly have declared that the
Commission no longer intends to exercise its right to vote the sequestered shares, that the Commission's
present role is confined largely to monitoring Bulletin's activities in terms of preventing any dissipation and
disposition of funds and assets and does not extend to the exercise of the voting of the shares, unless
subsequent events or circumstances call for such exercise pursuant to law. Thus, respondents urge the
dismissal of the petition "for want of factual basis." As in the Liwayway case, the Commission concedes
that it may not lawfully intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass
media such as Bulletin for the purpose of maintaining its freedom and independence as guaranteed by
the Constitution and therefore the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987 ordering
the Commission or its representative to "cease and desist from voting the shares or otherwise from
intervening directly or indirectly in the management of petitioner Bulletin" will be made permanent. The
issue left for resolution is whether the Commission may continue to refuse to accept the cash deposit
offered for the present balance of 46,626 minority sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco as prayed for in the petition.
It is admitted of record that the Sequestration Order of April 22, 1986 is limited to a minority of 214,424.5
shares in the name of Messrs. Cesar Zalamea, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Jose Y. Campos at the time
of its issuance, as follows:
Cesar Zalamea 121,178 shares
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. 46,626 shares
Jose Y. Campos 46,620.5 shares

Total 214,424.5 shares

and that the Bulletin shares of Emilio Yap owned by him since 1961 were excluded from the said
sequestration, by virtue of the Commission's order of March 16, 1987.
Likewise, in consonance with the Commission's very purpose and objective of preserving the assets and
ill-gotten wealth that may be recovered, pertaining to the deposed President Marcos, and converting them
into cash to be returned to the people in government projects such as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), it has acknowledged the recognized vested right of the Bulletin to purchase
Bulletin shares that may be put up for sale, since the government is barred anyway from acquiring
ownership and management of private mass media such as the Bulletin Publishing, Inc. under Art. XVI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 11(1). The ownership and management of mass media
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, whollyowned and managed by such citizens."
In the letter dated July 8, 1987 of Commission Chairman Diaz to Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa
Media ng Pilipinas (KAMMP), he recognized the restrictions on the transferability of Bulletin shares
accruing in favor of petitioner Bulletin when he wrote.
In view of the foregoing, when and if we dispose of those shares, the first step to take is
to offer the same to the corporation, and the corporation may offer it to the other
stockholders if it so desires. But we cannot avoid the circumstance that the corporation
itself will desire to buy the stocks and therefore, the transaction will end here.
(1) Thus, on July 31, 1987, PCGG sold to petitioner Bulletin 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y.
Campos for a total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and Voucher (pp. 11-12,
Petitioner's Addendum).
(2) The PCGG also sold to petitioner Bulletin 121,178 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cesar C. Zalamea for a total
price of P21,244,926.96 and accepted PTC Check No. 607887 and Voucher issued on October 15, 1987
(pp. 12-13, Petitioner's Addendum), now as (Annex 'A'). As already noted hereinabove, there is a counterallegation on the part of the Commission that it had not sold the Zalamea shares but there are indications
that it had accepted the check and voucher therefor as stated herein. Whatever be the case, this is
immaterial in the light of the resolution of the case providing for the exercise of petitioner Bulletin's right of
preemption over such shares.
(3) As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. under sequestration,
petitioner Bulletin has consistently offered to deposit in cash the value of the shares with respondent
PCGG, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC check No. 607590, issued on October 15, 1987, and
which awaits PCGG acceptance. (pp. 13-14, Petitioner's Addendum).
Petitioner correctly maintains that its offer in good faith to PCGG of the cash deposit for the sequestered
shares will protect the interest of the government, if any, pending final determination/adjudication of the
matter.
The offer of cash deposit is in line with the government program on privatization and in keeping with
constitutional guarantee of press freedom and to maintain private mass media free from government
intervention in its management directly or indirectly.
The Commission has nothing to lose and everything to gain by accepting the cash deposit offered by
petitioner for the shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.

The cash deposit being offered by petitioner is similar in nature and purpose to a cash bond put up for a
litigant during the pendency of the case. In both situations, the rights of the parties and of the
government, are adequately protected.
This cash deposit including interest earning is to be applied on the said 46,626 shares under any of the
following two (2) alternatives specifically proposed by petitioner:
Alternative "A" To standby as full payment plus whatever interest earnings thereon
upon final judgment of the Court declaring the Republic of the Philippines as owners of
the 46,626 shares, accompanied by the corresponding original stock certificates, issued
in the name of the government, duly endorsed in favor of the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation, free from liens and encumbrances; or
Alternative "B" To immediately return to Bulletin Publishing Corporation the cash
deposit in the amount of P8,174,470.32 plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon
final judgment by the Court declaring that Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is the true owner of
the 46,626 shares.
This Resolution is issued to uphold the freedom of our press institutions to independently manage their
affairs and effectively preserve their editorial policies and objectives, without the shadow of government
participation and intervention. The Commission itself has recognized that government presence in
petitioner's Board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press which
is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, and hence had given up its initial Idea to vote the
sequestered shares in petitioner Bulletin.
ACCORDINGLY, in the Liwayway case, G.R. No. 77422, judgment is rendered.
1. As per agreement of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining the
Commission from any act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the management or
operations or afffirms of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and
2. Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondents from enforcing in any manner the
writs of sequestration heretofore issued over the questioned Liwayway shares whose ownership will have
to be tried and determined in the Sandiganbayan.
In the Bulletin case, G.R. No. 79126, judgment is likewise rendered.
1. Making permanent the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987;
2. Directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit of P8,174,470.32 offered by petitions; for the
46,626 sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. expressly subject to the
alternative conditions (A and B) hereinabove set forth, and likewise directing the Commission to accept
the cash deposit, if it has not actually sold the Cesar C. Zalamea Bulletin shares to petitioner (supra, p.
13, par. [2]) of P21,244,926.96 for the sequestered shares of Bulletin in the name of Mr. Cesar Zalamea
under the same alternatives already mentioned; and
3. Remanding the case regarding the issue of ownership of the said sequestered Bulletin shares for
determination and adjudication to the Sandiganbayan.

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN, Petitioner,

vs.
PRIMA JESUSA B. QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO, DENNIS AYON, NENITA OQUENDO,
ESMAEL MANGUDADATU, JOSE PAVIA, MELINDA QUINTOS DE JESUS, REYNALDO HULOG,
REDMOND BATARIO, MALOU MANGAHAS, DANILO GOZO, GMA NETWORK INC., through its new
editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, SOPHIA DEDACE, ABS-CBN CORPORATION, through
the Head of its News Group, Maria Ressa, CECILIA VICTORIA OREA-DRILON, PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, INC. represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, TETCH TORRES,
PHILIPPINE STAR represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and EDU
PUNAY, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun (petitioner) against Atty.
Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma Oquendo (Gemma), Dennis Ayon (Ayon),
Nenita Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose Pavia (Pavia), Melinda Quintos De
Jesus (De Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas (Mangahas),
and Danilo Gozo (Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas and the other respondents, who are not from the media, are
referred to in this case as Atty. Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner also named as respondents GMA Network,
Inc. (GMA Network) through its news editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace
(Dedace), ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of its News Group Maria Ressa (Ressa),
Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) represented by its Editor-inChief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres), Philippine Star (PhilStar) represented by its Editorin-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu Punay (Punay). Respondents Atty. Quinsayas, et al. and respondent
media groups and personalities are collectively referred to in this case as respondents.
The Antecedent Facts
On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vicemayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and journalists, was on their way to the
1
Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatus Certificate of Candidacy when
they were accosted by a group of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan
2
town, some four to ten kilometers from their destination. The group was taken hostage and brought to a
3
hilly and sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao. The
gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later discovered and shocked the world. The hostages
were systematically killed by shooting them at close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and
vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a backhoe.4 These gruesome killings
became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists.
Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and
Q-10- 163766. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal
accused in the murder cases.
In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner before this
Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still pending.
Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted an article, written by
Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed a 33 page
complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in every conceivable
5
chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies available."
On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by Torres, which
according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as follows:
"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct, impede and degrade the
administration of justice by filing countless causes of action, all in the hope of burying the principal issue
of his clients participation or guilt in the murder of 57 people that ill-fated day of November 23, 2009," the
6
petitioners said.
Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article, written by Punay,
which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:
"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under the rules, muddled
the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the cases, read the complaint.
***** ***** *****
"Respondent Attorney Fortuns act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a dishonest/deceitful
conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read the complaint.
"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession, rendering him unfit
7
to be called a member of the Bar."
Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national television a program
entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon, the programs host,
asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case against petitioner, including
its principal points. Petitioner was allegedly singled out and identified in the program as the lead counsel
of the Ampatuan family.
Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment
complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that respondent media groups and personalities
conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective media
platforms. Petitioner pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a
television program viewed nationwide
Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him exposed this Court
and its investigators to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged that opinion writers
wrote about and commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his professional and personal
reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint
was to malign his personal and professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the
charges were not new but were based on incidents that supposedly took place in January 2010; (2) it was
timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Maguindanao Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn
for Ampatuan, Jr. and his counsel and violated the accuseds right to presumption of innocence and due
process; (3) it was published following articles written about petitioners advocacy for the rights of an
accused and negated the impact of these articles on the public; and (4) respondents knew that the
charges were baseless as petitioner always opted for speedy trial and protection of the accuseds rights
at trial. Petitioner further alleged that in announcing their "causes of action" in the disbarment case,
respondents were only seeking the approval and sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication where it could have
printed the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint on its television station.
GMA Network alleged that the publication had already been done and completed when Atty. Quinsayas
distributed copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the members of the media who reported the
news and the media groups that published it on their website, including GMA Network, did not violate the
confidentiality rule. GMA Network further alleged that Dedace, a field reporter for the judiciary, acted in
good faith and without malice when she forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in
good faith in posting the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it conspired with the other
respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it posted the disbarment complaint,
without any unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only after it was "published" by Atty. Quinsayas,
et al. who furnished copies of the disbarment complaint to the media reporters. GMA Network alleged that
it had no intention to malign petitioners personal and professional reputation in posting the news about
the disbarment complaint on its website.
In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network and not a writer of the
GMA News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Department
of Justice. Dedace alleged that on 22 November 2010, she received an advice from fellow field reporter
Mark Merueas that the lawyer of Mangudadatu would be filing a disbarment case against petitioner. She
waited at the Supreme Court. At around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas arrived. Atty. Quinsayas gave copies
of the petition to news reporters and Dedace received one. Dedace prepared and sent her news story to
GMA Network where it went to the editor. Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint against petitioner. She alleged that she acted in good faith and without malice in forwarding her
news story to the news desk and that she had no intention to, and could not, influence or interfere in the
proceedings of the disbarment case. She further alleged that she honestly believed that the filing of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner was newsworthy and should be reported as news.
PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website through a syndication but
the latter has its own editors and publish materials that are not found on the broadsheet. It alleged that
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two different corporations, with separate
legal personalities, and one may not be held responsible for the acts of the other.
8

Torres alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told her and several
other reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against petitioner. The disbarment case was
actually filed on 22 November 2010 when Torres received a copy of the complaint. Since the lead of the
story came from a lawyer, Torres did not consider that writing a story about the filing of the disbarment
complaint might amount to contempt of court. Torres alleged that the writing of the story was an
independent act and she did not conspire with any of the other respondents. Torres maintained that she
acted in good faith in writing the news report because the Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public
concern and the allegations in the disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioners handling of
the case. Torres further asserted that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in
his doings, affairs and character.
In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBNs News and Current Affairs
Group and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she was on terminal leave beginning 30
October 2010 in advance to the expiration of her contract on 3 January 2011. Ressa alleged that she had
no participation in the production and showing of the broadcast on 23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the
answer of her co-respondents ABS-CBN and Drilon insofar as it was applicable to her case.
ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN News Channel, commonly
known as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok Network News (SNN) and not by ABS-CBN.
SNN, which produced the program "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," is a
subsidiary of ABS-CBN but it has its own juridical personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have
interlocking directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon alleged that the presentation and hosting of the program were
not malicious as there was no criminal intent to violate the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings.

They alleged that the program was a commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a
report solely on the disbarment complaint against petitioner which took only a few minutes of the onehour program. They alleged that the program was not a publication intended to embarrass petitioner who
was not even identified as the respondent in the disbarment complaint. Drilon even cautioned against the
revelation of petitioners name in the program. ABS-CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the
broadcast of the program on 23 November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner
was already the subject of widespread news and already of public knowledge. They denied petitioners
allegation that they conspired with the other respondents in violating the confidentiality rule in disbarment
proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt charge violates their right to equal protection
because there were other reports and publications of the disbarment complaint but the publishers were
not included in the charge. They also assailed the penalty of imprisonment prayed for by petitioner as too
harsh.
In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma alleged that petitioner
failed to prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of the disbarment complaint against
him. They alleged that while they were the ones who filed the disbarment complaint against petitioner, it
does not follow that they were also the ones who caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged
that petitioner did not provide the name of any particular person, dates, days or places to show the
alleged confederation in the dissemination of the disbarment complaint.
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members of the Board of
Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and Atty. Quinsayas, former counsel for
FFFJ, also filed a joint Comment claiming that the alleged posting and publication of the articles were not
established as a fact. Respondents alleged that petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the
articles and he only offered to submit a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised program where Atty.
Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by Drilon. Respondents alleged that, assuming the articles were
published, petitioner failed to support his allegations that they actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint.
In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al.
9
went to this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were not able to file it on that day. Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. were able to file the disbarment complaint the following day, or on 23 November 2010.
PhilStar and Punay alleged that their news article, which was about the plan to file a disbarment
complaint against petitioner, was published on 23 November 2010. It came out before the disbarment
complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article on the disbarment complaint is a qualified
privileged communication. They alleged that the article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the
disbarment complaint. The article was straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without any comments from
the author. They alleged that Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the disbarment
complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he perceived it to be a newsworthy subject.
They further alleged that assuming the news article is not a privileged communication, it is covered by the
protection of the freedom of expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution. They also
alleged that the case is a criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit contempt of court must be
shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further alleged that they did not commit any contemptible
act. They maintained that the news article did not impede, interfere with, or embarrass the administration
of justice. They further claimed that it is improbable, if not impossible, for the article to influence the
outcome of the case or sway this Court in making its decision. The article also did not violate petitioners
right to privacy because petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his doings,
affairs, and character.
10

Pavia died during the pendency of this case and was no longer included in the Comment filed for the
FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees and was no longer represented by the
11
FFFJ counsel in filing its comment. Gozo did not file a separate comment.
The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment
proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.
The Ruling of this Court
First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt. In People v.
12
Godoy, this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to
be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an
offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against
organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an
issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other
hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of
the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but
a power of the court.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be
punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On the
contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the
defendants intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
13
violate the courts order is not a defense in civil contempt.
The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner had been
published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent media groups and personalities.
We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.
GMA Network, Inc.
GMA Networks defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article could be printed;
it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station; and that the publication was already
completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to the media.
GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its website. It merely
said that it has no publication where the article could be printed and that the news was not televised.
Online posting, however, is already publication considering that it was done on GMA Networks online
news website.
Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.
PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication. PDI attached a
photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements between PDI and
14
Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net."
A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
the Philippines most widely circulated broadsheet, and a member of the Inquirer Group of
15
Companies." PDI was not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.

ABS-CBN Corporation
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking directors, SNN has its
own juridical personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls the lineup of shows of ANC.
We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an independent and separate
juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company and that any suit against the the latter does
16
not bind the former and vice-versa. A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality
17
separate and distinct from that of other corporations to which it may be connected. Hence, SNN, not
ABS-CBN, should have been made respondent in this case.
Maria Ressa
Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the Maguindanao
Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. Ressas defense was supported
by a certification from the Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN, stating that Ressa went on
18
terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010. This was not disputed by petitioner.
Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Orea-Drilon,
and Edu Punay
Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the disbarment
complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and without malice; that petitioner is a public
figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest; and that there was no conspiracy on
their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news reports were part of
privileged communication.
In Drilons case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner. Even as
the disbarment complaint was briefly discussed in her program, petitioners name was not mentioned at
all in the program.
Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups and Personalities
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:
x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable.
Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment
19
or both at the discretion of the Court. x x x

20

In People v. Castelo, the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of privileged
communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both
constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution.
So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard
should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression.
21
Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of appellant.
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by
22
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." As a general rule, disbarment proceedings are
confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however,
the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it
arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the
Maguindanao Massacre case.
The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the massacre, 30 were
journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre is considered a
matter of public interest and that the personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as public
figure. The Court explained it, thus:
But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily follow that he
could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance, if and when he would be
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus
is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the
23
participants prior anonymity or notoriety. (Boldface in the original)
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish such
fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and
personalities merely acted on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to
absolve the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a
public figure or has become a public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and
because the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news. It would
have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media
would then be bound to respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press.1wphi1 If
there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news
report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint,
members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and confidential until their final
24
25
determination. Only the final order of this Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and personalities acted in
bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their postings and publications of the filing of a

disbarment complaint against him. Respondent media groups and personalities reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as it was a news item. Petitioner
failed to prove that respondent media groups and personalities acted with malicious intent. Respondent
media groups and personalities made a fair and true news report and appeared to have acted in good
faith in publishing and posting the details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was briefly discussed but
petitioner was not named. There was also no proof that respondent media groups and personalities
posted and published the news to influence this Court on its action on the disbarment case or to
deliberately destroy petitioners reputation. It should also be remembered that the filing of the disbarment
case against petitioner entered the public domain without any act on the part of the media. As we will
discuss later, the members of the media were given copies of the disbarment complaint by one of the
complainants.
Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon, Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo
Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the disbarment complaint
against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they were the ones who disseminated the
disbarment complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Mangudadatu, Ayon,
Nenita, and Gemma were the ones who caused the publication of the disbarment complaint against him.
There was nothing in the records that would show that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma
distributed or had a hand in the distribution of the disbarment complaint against petitioner.
Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog, Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas, and Atty. Prima
Jesusa B. Quinsayas
Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that petitioner was not
able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint, and that
assuming the posting and publication had been established, petitioner failed to support his allegation that
they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint. They further alleged that they did not
cause the publication of the news articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy and
confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.
Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other respondents, namely De
Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did not file his separate comment, had a hand in
the dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that only Atty.
Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint. In its Comment,
GMA Network stated that the publication "had already been done and completed when copies of the
complaint for disbarment were distributed by one of the disbarment complainants, Atty. Prima
26
Quinsayas x x x." Dedace also stated in her Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the
27
disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun and she received one."
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the
disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty.
Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of
preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against
28
petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon, the
Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment
29
proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule. In that case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a
disbarment case, caused the publication in newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency
of the disbarment proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.
Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a
30
fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both. Atty. Quinsayas acted

wrongly in setting aside the confidentiality rule which every lawyer and member of the legal profession
should know. Hence, we deem it proper to impose on her a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing
copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we
order her to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).
SO ORDERED.

BLO UMPAR ADIONG, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit
the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other
written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and
fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areasprovided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate
or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or
one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis
supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election
Code on lawful election propaganda which provides:
Lawful election propaganda. Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a
size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular
candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not
exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public
meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not
exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers
may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it
shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission
may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the
interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the
Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation
throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been
granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 which provides:
Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster
areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's
own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political
party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two
(2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the
occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding
three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the
meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or
rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like
cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes
that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of
politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and
stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22,
1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the
entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."

The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
"mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself
is null and void on constitutional grounds.
First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in this case.
There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part
and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free speech
the status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945]; Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937];
Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or
persuade is denied and taken away.
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the
concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132
SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open
debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra)
The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of his
basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always a difficult
and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial
public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free,
honest, and orderly elections.
We recognize the fact that under the Constitution, the COMELEC during the election period is granted
regulatory powers vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of elections, to wit:
Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable equal rates therefore, for public information
campaigns and forms among candidates in connection with the object of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. (Article IX(c) section 4)
The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National Press Club
v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion cases underscores

how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of election campaign activities and
indefensible repression committed in the name of free and honest elections. In the National Press
Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it
validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather
wide and we have to go on a case to case basis.
There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly
limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may
prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.
For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem inequitable
or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by its very nature,
requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-jerk impulse. By the
time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of the essence to a candidate
may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to
know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free
elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate
analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be
no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know
are unduly curtailed.
There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections
(supra) case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has its limits. We examine
the limits of regulation and not the limits of free speech. The carefully worded opinion of the Court,
through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of
validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's
expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of
media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
constitutionally sanctioned objective.
Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather strong dissents,
inNational Press Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a different category. The promotion of
a substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City
Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or
a writing instrument to be stilled:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where
the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now
as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting
legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the

indispensable democratic freedom secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the
character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the
choice . . .
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The
rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in
other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not
suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have
clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses,
endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V.
Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]). (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in
the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspapers or
radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for
advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or
decal on his private property.
Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.
In Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444, 82 L ed 949, 58 S Ct 666, the Court invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting all distribution of literature at any time or place in Griffin, Georgia,
without a license, pointing out that so broad an interference was unnecessary to
accomplish legitimate municipal aims. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L ed
155, 60 S Ct. 146, the Court dealt with ordinances of four different municipalities which
either banned or imposed prior restraints upon the distribution of handbills. In holding the
ordinances invalid, the court noted that where legislative abridgment of fundamental
personal rights and liberties is asserted, "the courts should be astute to examine the
effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to
the maintenance of democratic institutions," 308 US, at 161. In Cantwell v Connecticut,
310 US 296, 84 L ed 1213, 60 S Ct. 900, 128 ALR 1352, the Court said that "[c]onduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society," but pointed out that in each
case "the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end,

unduly to infringe the protected freedom." (310 US at 304) (Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US
479 [1960]
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches
in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private
except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers
should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is
a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the
Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to
acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects
these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it
includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these
essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790,
18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a
person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley's
Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])
As earlier stated, we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the
prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the
use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free
speech and information:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so
clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and
health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The
danger of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods leaving to
each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that
stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, the
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas." (Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319
U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943])
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a
"liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of
election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas
sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared
personal poster on his own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never
require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy
of the statute or regulation, may do.
The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or
stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom. This is delegation running riot. As stated by
Justice Cardozo in his concurrence in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (293 U.S. 388; 79 L. Ed. 446 [1935),
"The delegated power is unconfined and vagrant . . . This is delegation running riot. No such plentitude of
power is susceptible of transfer."

Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to
inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and
stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in
guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance.
Under section 26 Article II of the Constitution, "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, . . . while under section 1, Article XIII thereof "The Congress shall give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, andpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good." (Emphasis supplied)
It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other
moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether
the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without
the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers is not as important as the right of the
owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his
own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is
impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution:
. . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be
on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, either substantive or formal, be
transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law.
Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate
branches in the course of adjudication is a logical. corollary of this basic principle that the
Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to
its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, supra)
The unusual circumstances of this year's national and local elections call for a more liberal interpretation
of the freedom to speak and the right to know. It is not alone the widest possible dissemination of
information on platforms and programs which concern us. Nor are we limiting ourselves to protecting the
unfettered interchange of ideas to bring about political change. (Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, supra)
The big number of candidates and elective positions involved has resulted in the peculiar situation where
almost all voters cannot name half or even two-thirds of the candidates running for Senator. The public
does not know who are aspiring to be elected to public office.
There are many candidates whose names alone evoke qualifications, platforms, programs and ideologies
which the voter may accept or reject. When a person attaches a sticker with such a candidate's name on
his car bumper, he is expressing more than the name; he is espousing ideas. Our review of the validity of

the challenged regulation includes its effects in today's particular circumstances. We are constrained to
rule against the COMELEC prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of
the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 102925 March 5, 1992
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO, JR., as its Past Chairman and
President, and FRAULIN A. PEASALES as its Corporate Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, its Chairman; HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents.
G.R. No. 102983 March 5, 1992
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTERS SA PILIPINAS; MAKATI BROADCASTING NETWORK;
MOLAVE BROADCASTING NETWORK; MASBATE COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.,
RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC.; ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP.; FILIPINAS
BROADCASTING; RADIO PILIPINO CORP.; RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.; EAGLE
BROADCASTING CORP.; MAGILIW COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC.; for themselves and
in behalf of the mass media owners as a class; ANDRE S. KHAN; ARCADIO M. CARANDANG, JR.;
MALOU ESPINOSA MANALASTAS; MIGUEL C. ENRIQUEZ; JOSE ANTONIO K. VELOSO; DIANA G.
DE GUZMAN; JOSE E. ESCANER, JR.; RAY G. PEDROCHE; PETER A. LAGUSAY; ROBERT
ESTRELLA; ROLANDO RAMIREZ; for themselves as voters and in behalf of the Philippine
electorate as a class; ORLANDO S. MERCADO and ALEJANDRO de G. RODRIGUEZ; for
themselves as prospective candidates and in behalf of all candidates in the May 1992 election as a
class, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:
In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is the
constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling
or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office
(one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and

voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is
being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition
imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election
or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and
public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the
freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of
voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office
shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P. Blg.
881, known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the
absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical
in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates
can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which
the newspaper is circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign. (Emphasis supplied)

The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich
and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge
campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for
campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other
hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec
space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and
television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and
"Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area
served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by
Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election
Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized
by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the
prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty line." It is supremely
important, however, to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate one; it has also been given
constitutional status by the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor,for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection
with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public
1
information campaigns and forums among candidates."
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific
limited period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the special importance of
the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in particular when they
relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify
those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a
preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of
polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the
basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian
demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit
2
political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of
invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec
for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For

supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such
accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one that a statute is
presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the
3
burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic principles
relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that power.
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and
information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of the
limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of
the press are essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of
speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another
specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January
1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section
11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale
4
disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section
11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion
by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not
in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read
as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by
candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not restrict either the
reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs and
activities of any and all candidates for office constitutes the critical distinction which must be made
5
between the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. In Sanidad, the Court
declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite mandated
by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of
petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said:

. . . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods.Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are
no candidates involved in the plebiscite.Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
6
2167 has no statutory basis." (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11 (b) exempts from its
prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time
Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the
individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or
television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate
"Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such
apprehensions materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected
by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such
time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being
regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral
7
Commission that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority
involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused.
Should it be objected that the Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec
space," much the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is
commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it
must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to
do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their
disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of
media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and
promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their
regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any
intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal
operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual
candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space.
There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or ideas
reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens. There
is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact
does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to for a other than modern mass media, and to
"Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely
in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of
the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that
Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism
which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote
equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about
themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial disparity among the
candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of their
respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the
rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to spend his funds

on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True enough Section 11 (b) does not,
by itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, place political
candidates on complete and perfect equality inter se without regard to their financial affluence or lack
thereof. But a regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which does not completely
obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone constitutionally infirm. The
Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental regulation. All it requires, in accepted
doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a reasonable nexus with the constitutionally
sanctioned objective. That the supervision or regulation of communication and information media is not, in
itself, a forbidden modality is made clear by the Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of
the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable. For, once again,
there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting of and commentary on pronouncements,
activities, written statements of the candidates themselves. All other fora remain accessible to candidates,
even for political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal opportunity are, after all, designed
to benefit the candidates themselves.
Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be
totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the
right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in
the mass mediaad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the
electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be
supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. But it is
rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if
not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or
channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense, listeners
and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind-deadening
frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and
manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or
programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of
the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at
least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media
and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged"
candidates.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Romero and Nocon, JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J.: concurring:

I fully concur with the majority opinion. I wish, however, to express my thoughts on some material points.
The constitutional issue raised in these cases must be decided in the light of the provisions of our own
Constitution and not on orthodox principles or classical definitions of certain rights which have, in the
course of time and as a result of the interplay of societal forces requiring the balancing of interests and
values, been unchained from their absolutist moorings.
It is now settled that the freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression, which the Bill of Rights
guarantees, is not an absolute right.
Indeed, even in American jurisprudence, the overwhelming weight of authority maintains that "the right or
privilege of free speech and publication, guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the
several states, has its limitations; the right is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances,
although limitations are recognized only in exceptional cases. Freedom of speech does not comprehend
the right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and the manner, and place, or time of
1
public discussion can be constitutionally controlled."
The foregoing rule proceeds from the principle that every right or freedom carries with it the correlative
duty to exercise it responsibly and with due regard for the right and freedoms of others. In short, freedom
is not freedom from responsibility, but with responsibility.
I respectfully submit that there can be no higher form of limitation to a right than what the Constitution
itself authorizes. On this, both the lettered and the unlettered cannot quarrel. In respect to freedom of
speech or expression and of the press vis-a-vis the electoral process, the present Constitution lays downs
certain principles authorizing allowable restraints thereon. I refer to the. following provisions of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
(1) Section 26 of Article II. (Declaration of Principle and other Policies) which reads:
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(emphasis supplied)
(2) Section 1 of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human rights) which reads:
The congress shall give highiest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, andpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth andpolitical power for the
common good. (emphasis supplied)
(3) Section 4 of Article IX-C which provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or

concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary.Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (emphasis supplied)
There can be no doubt that the first two (2) provisions contemplate measures that would bridge the gap
between the rich and the poor in our society. In the past, the equilibrium sought to be achieved was only
in the economic and social fields. Thus, before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was
defined as:
Social Justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
2
greatest good to the greatest number."
Aware of the lamentable fact that in the Philippines, no gap between these two unavoidable extremes of
society is more pronounced than in the field of politics, and ever mindful of the dire consequences
thereof, the framers of the present Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice
provisions. Ours has been a politics of the elite, the rich, the powerful and the pedigreed. The victory of a
poor candidate in an election is almost always an exception. Arrayed against the vast resources of a
wealthy opponent, the former, even if he is the most qualified and competent, does not stand a fighting
chance. Of course, there have been isolated instances but yet so few and far between when poor
candidates made it.
Forgetting first the evil use of gold, guns and goons which only the rich have access to, and focusing
strictly on the legitimate aspect of the electoral struggle, propaganda, through the various forms of media,
provides the most sophisticated and effective means of reaching the electorate and convincing voters to
vote for a particular candidate. It is in this area, particularly in the use of television, radio and newspaper,
that a poor candidate will not be able to compete with his opulent opponents who have all the resources
to buy prime television and radio time and full pages of leading newspapers. With radio and television
propaganda, the wealthy candidates, even as they leisurely relax in their homes, offices or hotel suites,
can reach every nook and cranny of their municipality, city, province, district or even the entire Philippines
and be seen or heard at any time of the day and night. During the contracted hours, their paid hacks can
concentrate on dishonoring the poor and hapless opponent by hurling innuendoes of defects or vice. With
newspaper advertisements, the wealthy candidates can reach thousands of readers daily. A worse
scenario obtains where the rich candidates themselves fully or substantially own or operate a television or
radio station, or publish newspapers. On the other hand, to a poor candidate, the campaign period would
sadly prove to be insufficient for him to campaign in every barangay, even if he is running for a municipal

position. Thus, not only would he already be at a disadvantage insofar as visibility and presentation of his
issues or program of government are concerned, he would have no opportunity to rebut whatever lies his
opponents may spread nor the chance to clear himself of false accusations.
Accordingly, in response to the urgent mandate of Section 1 of Article XIII aforequoted, Congress passed
3
a measure, R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, introducing
additional reforms to the electoral system which, inter alia, not only seeks to enhance the purity of the
electoral process, but also aspires to ensure even just an approximation of equality among all candidates
in their use of media for propaganda purposes. The latter is best evidenced by the provision challenged in
this case, Section 11 (b), which reads:
Section 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. In addition to the forms of
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcement (sic) or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
This provision, understood in the light of Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is a reasonable
regulation enacted to accomplish the desired objectives and purposes earlier mentioned. It neither
constitutes proscribed abridgment of the freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely
provides the rules as to the manner, time and place for its exercise during a very limited period. It makes
reference to Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on "COMELEC time" and "COMELEC
space." Said sections read in full as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the
absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical
in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates
can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and
impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
Obviously then, the airing and printing of a candidate's political advertisements can be done and is
even encouraged to be done during the "COMELEC time" and within the "COMELEC space." This
authority of the COMELEC is no longer purely statutory. It is now constitutional pursuant to the clear
mandate of Section 4 of Article IX-C, which is quoted above. This constitutional grant removes whatever

doubt one may have on the split verdict of this Court in Badoy vs. Ferrer, et al., Interpreting a related
provision, Section 12(f) of R.A. No. 6132, reading:
The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers,
magazines and periodicals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate
this space equally and impartially among all candidates within the area in which the
newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment or paid
article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person for delegate, or
mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless all the names
of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also mentioned
with equal prominence.
this Court ruled:
Against the background of such facilities accorded by the law for all candidates, rich and
poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal sanctions to insure the sanctity of the
ballot against desecration and the equality or chances among the candidates, the
restriction on the freedom of expression of the candidate or any other individual
prescribed in par. F of Sec. 12 is so narrow as not to affect the substance and vitality of
his freedom of expression itself.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, consistent with out opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs. Comelec and
Gonzales vs. Comelec [35 SCRA 28], this slight limitation of the freedom of expression of
the individual, whether candidate or not, as expressed in par. F Sec. 12, it only one of the
many devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and present danger of the
perversion or prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
The fears and apprehensions of petitioner concerning his liberty of expression in these
two cases, applying the less stringent balancing -of-interests criterion, are far outweighed
by the all important substantive interests of the State to preserve the purity of the ballot
and to render more meaningful and real the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
5

In the fairly recent case of Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, this Court sustained, in effect, the
validity of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. Thus:
However, it is clear from Act. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities,
media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented
by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is
also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a
candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work
during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11 (b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid
that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the
voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression
during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality
of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein
that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the
perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection
of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that
case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some
special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific
persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against
issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Even granting for the sake of argument that a doubt exists as to the constitutionality of the challenged
provision, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. As this Court stated in Paredes, et al. vs.
Executive Secretary,
6
et al.:
. . . it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions,
one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the
former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends
itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The
onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional
provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded,
7
does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: "To doubt is to sustain."
The reason for this is that an act of the legislature approved by the executive is presumed to be within
constitutional bounds. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not only on the courts, but
also on the legislature and the executive as well.
For the Court to strike our their acts as unconstitutional, nothing less than clear and convincing evidence
of such breach of the Constitution must be shown.
Petitioners have not acquitted themselves of that duty. The petitions then must be dismissed for lack of
merit.

PADILLA, J.: concurring:

I will state in language as simple as I can muster why I believe the challenged law is constitutional.
Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the "Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," challenged
in these petitions, states that:

Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcement (sic) or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
Petitioners contend that the provision is void because it is violative of the freedoms of the press, speech
and expression as guaranteed by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
But it is fundamental that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate
exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
xxx xxx xxx
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
and individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." Significantly, the Bill of rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty
of individual rights and liberties. "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding
1
demands and requirements of the greater number.
Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to selfprotection. For this reason, it is co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public
2
interest.
In Section 11 of R.A. No. 6646, the legislature aims to uphold the State's policy of guaranteeing equal
3
access to opportunities for public service. Opportunity to hold a public office for public service,
particularly elective public offices must be equally accessible to qualified and deserving citizens. Corollary
to this, the legislature also recognizes the power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication or information granted by the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof. "Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
4
elections."

In Pablito V. Sanidad vs. The Commission on Elections, we held that the evil sought to be prevented by
Art. IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.
In line with the objective of providing equal opportunity to all candidates, the questioned provision is
intended to act as an equalizer between the rich and poor candidates. As it is, the moneyed candidate
has the funds to engage in a myriad of campaign activities. To allow the rich candidates to have free reign
over the use of media for their campaign would result in an unfair advantage over the poor candidates
who have no funds or have meager funds to secure print space and air time, and yet, they may be equally
qualified and deserving candidates. In Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. vs. Jaime N. Ferrer, et al., G.R. NO.
L-32546, October 17, 1970, 35 SCRA 285, this Court declared Section 12(F) of R.A. No. 6132 valid and
constitutional, recognizing that the purpose of the limitation, on the freedom of the candidate or his
sympathizer to spend his own money for his candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the candidacy
of his opponents, is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. In the same manner,
Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6646 aims to maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances among the various
candidates for elective public office.
Petitioners aver that by restoring to the print and broadcast media industry the right to sell print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes, access to print space and air time would be given
equally to all candidates. Nevertheless, as opined by the COMELEC, the means to gain access to said
time and space would be unequal among all candidates. Hence, there would be in the final analysis,
inequality.
Furthermore, to tolerate even indirectly over-spending in print space or air time for campaign purposes
will open the floodgates to corruption in public office because a winning candidate who overspends during
the election period must necessarily recover his campaign expenses by "hook or crook". Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6646 would indirectly constitute a positive and effective measure against corruption in public
office.
Petitioners also contend that the challenged provision is "violative of the people's right to information
particularly about the conduct of public officials including the character and qualifications of candidates
seeking public office."
I do not adhere to the proposition that "the electorate will not have the opportunity for quality decision in
expressing its mandate no sufficient fora to detect and decide for themselves who, among the
6
candidates truly deserve their votes.
Aside from Sec. 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 providing for Comelec space and Comelec time, Sections 9 and
10 of the same law afford a candidate several venues by which the can fully exercise his freedom of
expression, including freedom of assembly. The electorate, in turn, are given opportunities to know the
candidates and be informed of their qualifications and platforms.
As provided in Section 9 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC shall encourage non-political, non-partisan
private or civic organizations to initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public fora at which all
registered candidates for the same office may simultaneously and personally participate to present,
explain, and/or debate on their campaign platforms and programs and other like issues. Section 10, on
the other hand, allows the candidates the use of the designated common poster areas to post, display
and exhibit election propaganda to announce or further their candidacy; not to mentioned the right to hold
political caucuses. conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other assemblies for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for a candidate; publishing or distributing
campaign literature or materials designed to support the election of any candidate; and directly or
7
indirectly solicit votes, pledges or support for a candidate.

In short, the law in question (Sec. 11, Rep. Act No. 6646) has been enacted for a legitimate public
purpose and the means it employs to achieve such purpose are reasonable and even timely.
Based on all the foregoing consideration, I vote to sustain the validity and constitutionality of Section II of
R.A. No. 6646.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am saddened by the readiness with which Congress, Comelec, and the members of this Court are
willing to sacrifice not only that most precious clause of the Bill of Rights freedom of speech and of the
press but also the right of every citizen to be informed in every way possible about the qualifications
and programs of those running for public office.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 will certainly achieve one result keep the voters ignorant of who the
candidates are and what they stand for.
With elections fast approaching, the surveys show that almost half of the nation's voters are undecided as
to the Presidency. Certainly, they do not know who are running for the Senate.
The implementation of Section 11 (b) will result in gross inequality. A cabinet member, an incumbent
official, a movie star, a basketball player, or a conspicuous clown enjoys an unfair advantage over a
candidate many times better qualified but lesser known.
I am shocked to find out that even the most knowledgeable people do not know that Antonio Carpio,
former NBI Director; Estelito P. Mendoza, former Solicitor General and Governor; and Florangel Rosario
Braid, member of the Constitutional Commission and distinguished mass communication personality (to
name only three) are also running for the Senate. We owe it to the masses to open all forms of
communication to them during this limited campaign period. A candidate to whom columnists and radiotelevision commentators owe past favors or who share their personal biases and convictions will get an
undue amount of publicity. Those who incur the ire of opinion makers cannot counteract negative
reporting by buying his own newspaper space or airtime for the airing of his refutations.
Comelec is already overburdened with the conduct of elections. Only recently it proved unequal to the
task keeping registration lists clean and had to repeat the exercise in critical areas. It should now
husband its resources for its real function insuring the integrity of the voting process and safeguarding
the true results of the elections.
Why Comelec should also supervise the publicity campaigns of almost 100,00 candidates running for
17,000 national and local positions is beyond my poor power to comprehend.
I reject the idea that canned publicity in a so-called Comelec hour or Comelec corner can replace the
fresh, imaginative, and personal appeal of advertisements espousing a cause or reaching a particular
audience.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is censorship pure and simple. It is particularly reprehensible because it is
imposed during the limited period of the election campaign when information is most needed. Moreover,
the mere thought that published materials are supervised by a government office is enough to turn the
reader off. Only faithful followers who already know for whom they are voting will bother to read the
statements of their chosen candidate in the Comelec corner of the newspapers.
The existing restrictions are more than sufficient. Political campaigns are allowed only within a limited
period. The amount which a political party or candidate may spend is restricted. Added to the confines

of the limited periodand restricted expenses, the law now imposes a violation of the candidates' freedom
of speech and the voters' freedom to know.
I concur fully in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his usual eloquently brilliant style.
We should not allow the basic freedom of expression to be sacrificed at the alter of infinitely lesser fears
and concerns. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or, a writing instrument to be stilled.
In the precedent setting case of Gonzales v. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), seven (7) Justices (one
short of the 2/3 majority needed to invalidate the law) deemed a less restrictive statute as
unconstitutional. The four (4) Justices who allowed the law to remain did so only because there were
various safeguards and provisos. Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 now removes one of those safeguards.
The then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stated:
What of the social value and importance of the freedoms impaired by Section 50-B? The
legislation strikes at the most basic political right of the citizens in a republican system,
which is the right actively to participate in the establishment or administration of
government. This right finds expression in multiple forms but it certainly embraces that
right to influence the shape of policy and law directly by the use of ballot. It has been said
so many times it scarcely needs to be said again, that the realization of the democratic
ideal of self-government depends upon an informed and committed electorate. This can
be accomplished only by allowing the fullest measure of freedom in the public discussion
of candidates and the issues behind which they rally; to this end, all avenues of
persuasion speech, press, assembly, organization must be kept always open. It is
in the context of the electoral process that these fundamental rights secured by the
Constitution assume the highest social importance. (at page 904; Emphasis supplied)
I, therefore, vote for the right to have the widest possible expression of ideas preparatory to the choice of
the nation's leaders. I vote to declare the challenged legislation unconstitutional.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
It has become increasingly clear that the grandiose description of this Court as the bulwark of individual
liberty is nothing more than an ironic euphemism. In the decision it makes today, the majority has exalted
authority over liberty in another obeisance to the police state, which we so despised during the days of
martial law. I cannot share in the excuses of the Court because I firmly believe that the highest function of
authority is to insure liberty.
In sustaining the challenged law, the majority invokes the legislative goal, about which there can be no
cavil. May quarrel is with the way the objective is being pursued for I find the method a most indefensible
repression. It does little good, I should think, to invoke the regularity authority of the Commission on
Elections, for that power is not a license to violate the Bill of Rights. The respondent, no less than the
legislature that enacted Section 11(b), is subject to the requirements of the police power which
the ponencia seems to disdain.
It is true that a declaration of constitutionality must be reached only after the most careful deliberation as
the challenged at is presumed to be valid in deference to the political departments. But not and this
represents a singular exception where the act is claimed to violate individual liberty, most importantly
the freedom of expression. In such a vital and exceptional case, as in the case now before us, I
respectfully submit that the presumption must be reversed in favor of the challenge.

Milton defined freedom of speech as "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties." In this context, the definition is understood to embrace all the other
cognate rights involved in the communication of ideas and falling under the more comprehensive concept
of freedom of expression. These rights include the equally important freedom of the press, the right of
assembly and petition, the right to information on matters of public concern, the freedom of religion
insofar as it affects the right to form associations as an instrument for the ventilation of views bearing on
the public welfare.
Wendell Philips offered his own reverence for freedom of expression when he called it "at once the
instrument and the quaranty and the bright consummate flower of all liberty." Like Milton, he was
according it an honored place in the hierarchy of fundamental liberties recognized in the Bill of Rights.
And well they might, for this is truly the most cherished and vital of all individual liberties in the democratic
milieu. It is no happenstance that it is this freedom that is first curtailed when the free society falls under a
repressive regime, as demonstrated by the government take-over of the press, radio and television when
martial law was declared in this country on that tragic day of September 21, 1972. The reason for this
precaution is that freedom
of expression is the sharpest and handiest weapon to blunt the edge of oppression. No less significantly,
it may be wielded by every citizen in the
land, be he peasant or poet and, regrettably, including the demagogue and the dolt who has the will
and the heart to use it.
As an individual particle of sovereignty, to use Justice Laurel's words, every citizen has a right to offer his
opinion and suggestions in the discussion of the problems confronting the community or the nation. This
is not only a right but a duty. From the mass of various and disparate ideas proposed, the people can, in
their collective wisdom and after full deliberation, choose what they may consider the best remedies to
the difficulties they face. These may not turn out to be the best solutions, as we have learned often
enough from past bitter experience. But the scope alone of the options, let alone the latitude with which
they are considered, can insure a far better choice than that made by the heedless dictator in the narrow
confines of his mind and the loneliness of his pinnacle of power.
The citizen can articulate his views, for whatever they may be worth, through the many methods by which
ideas are communicated from mind to mind. Thus, he may speak or write or sing or dance, for all these
are forms of expression protected by the Constitution. So is silence, which "persuades when speaking
fails." Symbolisms can also signify meanings without words, like the open hand of friendship or the
clenched fist of defiance or the red flag of belligerence. The individual can convey his message in a poem
or a novel or a tract or in a public speech or through a moving picture or a stage play. In such diverse
ways may he be heard. There is of course no guaranty that he will be heeded, for a acceptability will
depend on the quilty of his thoughts and of his persona, as well as the mood and motivation of his
audience. But whatever form he employs, he is entitled to the protection of the Constitution against any
attempt to muzzle his thoughts.
There is one especially significant way by which the citizen can express his views, and that is through the
ballot. By the votes he casts, he is able to participate in the selection of the persons who shall serve as
his representatives in the various elective offices in the government, from the highest position of
President of the Philippines to that of the lowly member of the Sangguniang Barangay. In the exercise of
this right, he is free to choose whoever appeals to his intelligence (or lack of it), whether it be a
professional comedian or a pretentious moron or an unrepentant thief or any other candidate with no
known distinction except the presumptuousness to seek elective office. Fortunately, there are also other
candidates deserving of the support of the circumspect and thinking citizens who will use their suffrages
conscientiously with only the public interest as their criterion and guide.
It is for the purpose of properly informing the electorate of the credentials and platforms of the candidates
that they are allowed to campaign during the election period. Such campaign includes their personally
visiting the voters in house-to-house sorties, calling on the telephone for their support, sending them
letters of appeal, distributing self-serving leaflets extolling their virtues, giving away buttons and stickers

and sample ballots and other compaign materials, and holding caucuses, rallies, parades, public
meetings and similar gatherings. All these they are allowed to do in the specified places and at the proper
time provided only that they do not exceed the maximum limit of election expenses prescribed by the
Election Code at the rate of P1.50 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where they filed
1
their certificate of candidacy.
It is curious, however, that such allowable campaign activities do not include the use of the mass media
because of the prohibition in Section 11(b) of Rep. Act. No. 6646. The candidate may employ letters or
leaflets or billboards or placards or posters or meetings to reach the electorate, incurring for this purposes
a not inconsiderable amount of his or his supporters' money. But he may not utilize for the same purpose
periodicals, radio, television or other forms of mass communications, even for free. Employment of these
facilities is allowed only through the respondent Commission on Elections, which is directed by the
Election Code to procure newspaper space and radio and television time to be distributed among the
thousands of candidates vying throughout the land for the thousands of public offices to be filled in the
coming elections.
There are some students of the Constitution who believe that unlike the other liberties guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, the freedom of speech and of the press is absolute and not subject to any kind of regulation
whatsoever. Their reason is the language of Article III, Section 4, of the Constitution, which provides
without qualification:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
This Court does not accept this extreme theory for the liberty we recognize is not liberty untamed but
liberty regulated by law. The concept of absolute rights must be approached with utmost caution if not
rejected outright. The better policy is to assume that every right, including even the freedom of
expression, must be exercised in accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others.
In fact, laws punishing crimes like slander and libel and inciting to sedition have never been seriously or
successfully questioned. Contemptuous language is not allowed in judicial proceedings. Obscenity is
proscribed, as so are acts that wound religious sensibilities. This Court has regulated the exercise of the
right to hold rallies and meetings, limiting them to certain places and hours and under specified
conditions, in the interest of peace and security, public convenience, and in one case, even to prevent
2
disturbance of the rites in a nearby church. Under the Public Assembly Act, a permit from the mayor shall
be necessary for the holding of a public meeting except where the gathering is to be held in a private
place or the campus of a government-owned or controlled educational institution or a freedom park.
All this is not meant to suggest that every government regulation is a valid regulation. On the contrary,
any attempt to restrict the exercise of a right must be tested by the strict requisites of the valid exercise of
the police power as established by this Court in a long line of decisions. These requisites are:
1) the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the
exercise of the police power; and 2) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
3
accomplishment of the purpose sough to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
simpler terms, the police measure, to be valid, must have a lawful objective and a lawful method of
achieving it.
The lawful objective of Section 11(b) may be readily conceded. The announced purpose of the law is to
prevent disparity between the rich and the poor candidates by denying both of them access to the mass
media and thus preventing the former from enjoying an undue advantage over the latter. There is no
question that this is a laudable goal. Equality among the candidates in this regard should be assiduously
pursued by the government if the aspirant with limited resources is to have any chance at all against an
opulent opponent who will not hesitate to use his wealth to make up for his lack of competence.

But in constitutional law, the end does not justify the means. To pursue a lawful objective, only a lawful
method may be employed even if it may not be the best among the suggested options. In my own view,
the method here applied falls far short of the constitutional criterion. I believe that the necessary
reasonable link between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved has not been
proved and that the method employed is unduly oppressive.
The financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except
only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition
under challenge is that while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it
nevertheless allows him to spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his
straitened rival. Thus, the rich candidate may hold as many rallies and meetings as he may desire or can
afford, using for the purpose the funds he would have spent for the prohibited mass media time and
space. The number of these rallies and meetings, which also require tremendous expense, cannot be
matched by the poor candidate, but the advantage of the rich candidate in this case is not similarly
prohibited. By the same token, the rich candidates may visit more houses, send more letters, make more
telephone appeals, distribute more campaign materials, incurring for all these more expenses than the
poor candidates can afford. But these advantages are allowed by the law because they do not involve the
use of mass media space and time.
And what if the rich candidate pays P25,000 from his own funds to buy media advertising and the same
amount is raised for the same purpose by 250 supporters of the poor candidate contributing P100 each?
Both transactions would be prohibited under the law although the rich candidates clearly has in this case
no advantage over his adversary.
And what if a candidate is endorsed not in a paid advertisement or commercial but by a columnist or a
radio commentator who is apparently expressing his own opinion without financial consideration or
inducement? This is not prohibited by Section 11(b) simply because the endorsement does not appear to
have been purchased by the candidates or given to him for free.
The proposed distribution of COMELEC time and space is hardly workable, considering the tremendous
number of candidates running all over the country for the offices of President of the Philippines, VicePresident, senators, representatives, provincial governors, vice-governors, provincial board members, city
mayors, vice-mayors and councilors, and municipal mayors, vice-mayors and councilors. Allocation of
equal time and space among the candidates would involve administrative work of unmanageable
proportions, and the possibility as well of unequal distribution, whether deliberate or unintentional, that
might create more serious problems than the problem at hand.
It is indeed the settled rule that questions regarding the necessity or wisdom of the law are for the
legislature to resolve and its resolution may not be reviewed by the courts of justice. In the case of the
police power, however, it is required that there be a plausible nexus between the method employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved, and determination of this link involves a judicial inquiry into the
reasonableness of the challenged measure. It is true, as remarked by Justice Holmes, that a law has
done all it can if it has done all it should, but this is on the assumption that what the law has done was
valid to begin with. The trouble with the challenged law is that it has exceeded what it should have done,
thereby becoming both inefficacious and arbitrary. As such, it must be slain.
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination
of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells
the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted
to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his "Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing," Milton deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office
of censor and at the same time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in
our midst today, smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.

One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is screened
during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified matters that might
prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person is prohibited from shouting
"Fire!" in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster the rule that there should be
no prior restraint upon a person's right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule
applies whether the censorship be in the form of outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more
subtle forms like the imposition of tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of
4
copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus
5
reducing the reading tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v.
6
Sullivan that "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its validity." That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the
contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its
undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean
elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to suppress
free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of
public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for
7
the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the Constitution.
The law is no less oppressive on the candidates themselves who want and have the right to address the
greatest number of voters through the modern facilities of the press, radio and television. Equally injured
are the ordinary citizens, who are also entitled to be informed, through these mass media, of the
qualifications and platforms of the various candidates aspiring for public office, that they may be guided in
the choice they must make when they cast they ballots. 8
I am as deeply concerned as the rest of the nation over the unabated if not aggravated influence of
material persuasions on the choice of our elective officials. It is truly alarming that elections in a growing
number of cases have become no more than auction sales, where the public office is awarded to the
highest bidder as if it were an article of commerce. The offer of cash in exchange for his vote would be
virtually irresistible to a person mired in poverty and in the throes of the elemental struggle for survival.
That there are millions of such persons can only compound this terrible situation. But what makes it
especially revolting is the way these helpless persons are manipulated and imposed upon and tantalized
to surrender their birthright for a mess of pottage. The unscrupulous candidates who do not hesitate to
use their wealth to buy themselves into elective office these are the real saboteurs of democracy.
These are the scoundrels who would stain the pristine ballot in their cynical scheme to usurp public office
by falsifying the will of the people. Section 11(b) aims to minimize this malignancy, it is true, but
unfortunately by a method not allowed by the Constitution.
In the Comment it submitted after the Solicitor General expressed support for the petitioners, the
9
Commission on Elections relies heavily on Badoy v. Commission on Elections to sustain the exercise of
its authority to regulate and supervise the mass media during the election period as conferred upon it by
what is now Section 4 of Article IX in the present Constitution. However, that case is not in point for what
was upheld there was Section 12(f) of Rep. Act No. 6132 providing as follows:
The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers,
magazines and periodicals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate
this space equally and impartially among all candidates within the areas in which the
newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment or paid
article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person for delegate, or
mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless all the names
of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also mentioned
with equal prominence.

The Court, through Justice Makasiar (but over strong dissents from Justices Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo), declared:
Considering the foregoing limitation in paragraph F, Sec. 12 in the light of the other
provisions of R.A. No. 6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality of
chances among the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on the
freedom of expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the
individual's liberty of expression.
What is challenged in the case at bar is not that law but Section 11(b), which does not merely require
mention of the candidate's rivals in the paid advertisement or commercial, an innocuous enough
requirement, to be sure. What Section 11(b) does is prohibit the advertisement or commercial itself in
what is unmistakably an act of censorship that finds no justification in the circumstances here presented.
Surely, that blanket and absolute prohibition to use the mass media as a vehicle for the articulation of
ideas cannot, by the standards of Badoy, be considered "too insignificant to create any appreciable dent
on the individual's liberty of expression."
10

What is in point is Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, where this Court, through Mr. Justice
Medialdea, unanimously declared unconstitutional a regulation of the Commission on Elections providing
as follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcer. During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
On the argument that the said persons could still express their views through the air time and newspaper
space to be allocated by the respondent, the Court declared:
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec resolution 2167 does
not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec
space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still restriction on
his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgment. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount
to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. (Emphasis
supplied)
This decision was promulgated without a single dissent, even from the incumbent members then who are
now sustaining Section 11(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. Contrary to Justice Davide's contention, there is not a
single word in this decision upholding the prohibition in question.
The respondent also paints a distressing picture of the current political scene and expresses its despair
over the plight of the poor candidate thus:
Respondent Commission invites appreciation of the realities of present-day political
campaigns. In today's election competitions the success of one's candidacy rests to a
great extent on the candidate's ability to match the financial and material resources of the
other. Where a candidate is given limitless opportunity to take his campaign to areas of
persuasion through the media, what is left of a winning chance for a poor, if deserving,
candidate? But for the regulatory power of Sec. 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, a
wealthy candidate could block off an opponent of lesser means from the public view by
buying all print space in newspapers and air time in radio and television.

I am certain the Court shares the apprehensions of the sober elements of our society over the acute
disadvantage of the poor candidates vis-a-vis a wealthy opponent determined to win at all cost (which he
can afford). However, for all its anxiety to solve this disturbingly widespread difficulty, it is inhibited, as all
of us must be, by the mandate of the Constitution to give untrammeled rein to the dissemination and
exchange of ideas concerning the elections.
The problem is not really as bad as the respondent would imagine it, for it is unlikely that the rich
candidate would or could buy "all print space in newspapers and air time in radio and television" to "block
off" his opponents. Let us not be carried away by hyperbolic speculations. After all, as the respondent
itself points out, it is empowered by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the operations of the mass
media in connection with election matters, and we may expect that it will use this power to prevent the
monopoly it fears, which conceivably will consume all the funds the candidate is allowed to spend for his
campaign. It should be pointed out that the rich candidate violates no law as long as he does not exceed
the maximum amount prescribed by the Election Code for campaign expenses. The mere fact that the
poor candidate can spend only a small fraction of that amount does not prevent the rich candidate from
spending all of it if he is so minded. This may be a heartless way of putting it, but that is in fact how the
law should be interpreted. The Election Code fixes a maximum limit for all candidates, rich or poor alike; it
does not say that the rich candidate shall spend only the same amount as the poor candidates can afford.
I realize only too well that the ideas that may be conveyed by the prohibited media advertisements will
mostly be exaggerations or distortions or plain poppycock and may intrude upon our leisure hours if not
also offend our intelligence and exhaust our patience. We may indeed be opening a Pandora's box. But
these are unavoidable in the free society. As part of the larger picture, these impositions are only minor
irritations that, placed in proper perspective, should not justify the withdrawal of the great an inalienable
liberty that is the bedrock of this Republic. It is best to remember in this regard that freedom of expression
exists not only for the though that agrees with us, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, but a also for the
thought that we abhor.
I submit that all the channels of communication should be kept open to insure the widest dissemination of
information bearing on the forthcoming elections. An uninformed electorate is not likely to be circumspect
in the choice of the officials who will represent them in the councils of government. That they may
exercise their suffrages wisely, it is important that they be apprised of the election issues, including the
credentials, if any, of the various aspirants for public office. This is especially necessary now in view of
the dismaying number of mediocrities who, by an incredible aberration of ego, are relying on their money,
or their tinsel popularity, or their private armies, to give them the plume of victory.
For violating the "liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties,"
the challenged law must be struck down. For blandly sustaining it instead, the majority has inflicted a
deep cut on the Constitution that will ruthlessly bleed it white, and with it this most cherished of our
freedoms.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
In a ghastly blow against our cherished liberties, the Supreme Court, with insensate, guillotine-like
efficiency, rendered a decision which in the interest of accuracy and candidness, I would like to turn
the serious attack on our freedom of expression. It is sad but I have no choice except to say that I dissent.
The freedom to advertise one's political candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant
part of our freedom of expression and of our right of access to information. Freedom of expression in turn
in includes among other things, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Restrict these freedoms
without rhyme or reason, and you violate the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
The majority says that the purpose of the political advertisement provision is to prevent those who have
much money from completely overwhelming those who have little. This is gross errors because should

the campaign for votes be carried out in other fora (for example, rallies and meetings) the rich candidate
can always be at a great advantage over his less fortunate opponent. And so the disparity feared will
likewise appear in campaigns other than through media. It is alleged also that the candidate with money
can purchase for himself several full page advertisements, making his poor opponents really poor in more
ways than one. This is not realistic for the poor opponents may, for certain reasons be given or favored
with advertisements free of charge, and money will not be needed in this case. And yet under the statute
in question, even free or gratuitous advertisements in print, in radio or in television are included in the
prohibition. And then again, it is contended by the majority that a poor candidate can still make use of
media by consenting to interviews and news reports about this campaign, which interviews and reports
are, according to the majority still allowable. But then these interviews and news reports are still subtle
advertisements and they can be had if a candidate deliberately looks for media practitioners to inner view
him or to write about him. If the majority is to be consistent, these interviews and news reports should also
be disallowed. A case in point is the senatorial candidate who was interviewed on television last Tuesday
(March 3, 1992). Portions of the interview follow:
Q In 19___, were you not the Secretary of _____________?
A Yes, I was.
Q When you were Secretary, did you not accomplish the following?
A (Interviewer then enumerated various accomplishments.)
Q Yes, I did.
There can be no doubt that this interview is disguised propaganda, and yet, if we follow the majority
opinion, this is allowable. Is this not
illogical that is , if the ban stays?
And then again, if we were to consider the ban as constitutional, the "unknown" or "lesser known"
candidates would be at a distinct disadvantage. They will have to hold numerous rallies (spending oodles
and oodles of money). And only those who had previously received public exposure by dint of
government service or by prominence in the movies, in music, in sports, etc. will be the ones "recalled" by
the voters. This will indeed be unfortunate for our country.
It is true that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not absolute, and that they have their own
limitations. But I do not see how these limitations can make the disputed prohibition valid and
constitutional.
I therefore reiterate my opinion that this political ads prohibition is grossly unfair, politically inept and
eminently unconstitutional.

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I fully concur with the majority opinion. I wish, however, to express my thoughts on some material points.
The constitutional issue raised in these cases must be decided in the light of the provisions of our own
Constitution and not on orthodox principles or classical definitions of certain rights which have, in the

course of time and as a result of the interplay of societal forces requiring the balancing of interests and
values, been unchained from their absolutist moorings.
It is now settled that the freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression, which the Bill of Rights
guarantees, is not an absolute right.
Indeed, even in American jurisprudence, the overwhelming weight of authority maintains that "the right or
privilege of free speech and publication, guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and of the
several states, has its limitations; the right is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances,
although limitations are recognized only in exceptional cases. Freedom of speech does not comprehend
the right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, and the manner, and place, or time of
1
public discussion can be constitutionally controlled."
The foregoing rule proceeds from the principle that every right or freedom carries with it the correlative
duty to exercise it responsibly and with due regard for the right and freedoms of others. In short, freedom
is not freedom from responsibility, but with responsibility.
I respectfully submit that there can be no higher form of limitation to a right than what the Constitution
itself authorizes. On this, both the lettered and the unlettered cannot quarrel. In respect to freedom of
speech or expression and of the press vis-a-vis the electoral process, the present Constitution lays downs
certain principles authorizing allowable restraints thereon. I refer to the. following provisions of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
(1) Section 26 of Article II. (Declaration of Principle and other Policies) which reads:
The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(emphasis supplied)
(2) Sec 1 of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human rights) which reads:
The congress shall give highiest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, andpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth andpolitical power for the
common good. (emphasis supplied)
(3) Section 4 of Article IX-C which provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary.Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (emphasis supplied)

There can be no doubt that the first two (2) provisions contemplate measures that would bridge the gap
between the rich and the poor in our society. In the past, the equilibrium sought to be achieved was only
in the economic and social fields. Thus, before the advent of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was
defined as:
Social Justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
2
greatest good to the greatest number."
Aware of the lamentable fact that in the Philippines, no gap between these two unavoidable extremes of
society is more pronounced than in the field of politics, and ever mindful of the dire consequences
thereof, the framers of the present Constitution saw it fit to diffuse political power in the social justice
provisions. Ours has been a politics of the elite, the rich, the powerful and the pedigreed. The victory of a
poor candidate in an election is almost always an exception. Arrayed against the vast resources of a
wealthy opponent, the former, even if he is the most qualified and competent, does not stand a fighting
chance. Of course, there have been isolated instances but yet so few and far between when poor
candidates made it.
Forgetting first the evil use of gold, guns and goons which only the rich have access to, and focusing
strictly on the legitimate aspect of the electoral struggle, propaganda, through the various forms of media,
provides the most sophisticated and effective means of reaching the electorate and convincing voters to
vote for a particular candidate. It is in this area, particularly in the use of television, radio and newspaper,
that a poor candidate will not be able to compete with his opulent opponents who have all the resources
to buy prime television and radio time and full pages of leading newspapers. With radio and television
propaganda, the wealthy candidates, even as they leisurely relax in their homes, offices or hotel suites,
can reach every nook and cranny of their municipality, city, province, district or even the entire Philippines
and be seen or heard at any time of the day and night. During the contracted hours, their paid hacks can
concentrate on dishonoring the poor and hapless opponent by hurling innuendoes of defects or vice. With
newspaper advertisements, the wealthy candidates can reach thousands of readers daily. A worse
scenario obtains where the rich candidates themselves fully or substantially own or operate a television or
radio station, or publish newspapers. On the other hand, to a poor candidate, the campaign period would
sadly prove to be insufficient for him to campaign in every barangay, even if he is running for a municipal
position. Thus, not only would he already be at a disadvantage insofar as visibility and presentation of his
issues or program of government are concerned, he would have no opportunity to rebut whatever lies his
opponents may spread nor the chance to clear himself of false accusations.
Accordingly, in response to the urgent mandate of Section 1 of Article XIII aforequoted, Congress passed
3
a measure, R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, introducing
additional reforms to the electoral system which, inter alia, not only seeks to enhance the purity of the
electoral process, but also aspires to ensure even just an approximation of equality among all candidates

in their use of media for propaganda purposes. The latter is best evidenced by the provision challenged in
this case, Section 11 (b), which reads:
Section 11. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. In addition to the forms of
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcement (sic) or personality who is a candidate for any
elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
This provision, understood in the light of Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is a reasonable
regulation enacted to accomplish the desired objectives and purposes earlier mentioned. It neither
constitutes proscribed abridgment of the freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely
provides the rules as to the manner, time and place for its exercise during a very limited period. It makes
reference to Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 on "COMELEC time" and "COMELEC
space." Said sections read in full as follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in the
absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical
in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates
can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally and
impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978 EC)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the
campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
Obviously then, the airing and printing of a candidate's political advertisements can be done and is
even encouraged to be done during the "COMELEC time" and within the "COMELEC space." This
authority of the COMELEC is no longer purely statutory. It is now constitutional pursuant to the clear
mandate of Section 4 of Article IX-C, which is quoted above. This constitutional grant removes whatever
4
doubt one may have on the split verdict of this Court in Badoy vs. Ferrer, et al., Interpreting a related
provision, Section 12(f) of R.A. No. 6132, reading:
The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers,
magazines and periodicals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate
this space equally and impartially among all candidates within the area in which the
newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment or paid
article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person for delegate, or

mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless all the names
of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also mentioned
with equal prominence.
this Court ruled:
Against the background of such facilities accorded by the law for all candidates, rich and
poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal sanctions to insure the sanctity of the
ballot against desecration and the equality or chances among the candidates, the
restriction on the freedom of expression of the candidate or any other individual
prescribed in par. F of Sec. 12 is so narrow as not to affect the substance and vitality of
his freedom of expression itself.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, consistent with out opinion expressed in the cases of Imbong vs. Comelec and
Gonzales vs. Comelec [35 SCRA 28], this slight limitation of the freedom of expression of
the individual, whether candidate or not, as expressed in par. F Sec. 12, it only one of the
many devices employed by the law to prevent a clear and present danger of the
perversion or prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
The fears and apprehensions of petitioner concerning his liberty of expression in these
two cases, applying the less stringent balancing -of-interests criterion, are far outweighed
by the all important substantive interests of the State to preserve the purity of the ballot
and to render more meaningful and real the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
5

In the fairly recent case of Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections, this Court sustained, in effect, the
validity of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646. Thus:
However, it is clear from Act. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities,
media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented
by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is
also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a
candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work
during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11 (b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid
that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the
voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression
during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the constitutionality
of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein

that the prohibition is a valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the
perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial of equal protection
of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an election which led to Our ruling in that
case does not obtain in a plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some
special political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of specific
persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against
issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Even granting for the sake of argument that a doubt exists as to the constitutionality of the challenged
provision, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. As this Court stated in Paredes, et al. vs.
Executive Secretary,
6
et al.:
. . . it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions,
one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the
former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends
itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The
onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional
provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded,
7
does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: "To doubt is to sustain."
The reason for this is that an act of the legislature approved by the executive is presumed to be within
constitutional bounds. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not only on the courts, but
also on the legislature and the executive as well.
For the Court to strike our their acts as unconstitutional, nothing less than clear and convincing evidence
of such breach of the Constitution must be shown.
Petitioners have not acquitted themselves of that duty. The petitions then must be dismissed for lack of
merit.

PADILLA, J.: concurring:

I will state in language as simple as I can muster why I believe the challenged law is constitutional.
Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the "Electoral Reforms Law of 1987," challenged
in these petitions, states that:
Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) for any newspaper, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcement (sic) or personality who is a candidate for any

elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
Petitioners contend that the provision is void because it is violative of the freedoms of the press, speech
and expression as guaranteed by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
But it is fundamental that these freedoms are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate
exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as
the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
xxx xxx xxx
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
and individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." Significantly, the Bill of rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty
of individual rights and liberties. "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding
1
demands and requirements of the greater number.
Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to selfprotection. For this reason, it is co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public
2
interest.
In Section 11 of R.A. No. 6646, the legislature aims to uphold the State's policy of guaranteeing equal
3
access to opportunities for public service. Opportunity to hold a public office for public service,
particularly elective public offices must be equally accessible to qualified and deserving citizens. Corollary
to this, the legislature also recognizes the power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication or information granted by the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof. "Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
4
elections."
5

In Pablito V. Sanidad vs. The Commission on Elections, we held that the evil sought to be prevented by
Art. IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time.
In line with the objective of providing equal opportunity to all candidates, the questioned provision is
intended to act as an equalizer between the rich and poor candidates. As it is, the moneyed candidate
has the funds to engage in a myriad of campaign activities. To allow the rich candidates to have free reign
over the use of media for their campaign would result in an unfair advantage over the poor candidates
who have no funds or have meager funds to secure print space and air time, and yet, they may be equally
qualified and deserving candidates. In Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. vs. Jaime N. Ferrer, et al., G.R. NO.
L-32546, October 17, 1970, 35 SCRA 285, this Court declared Section 12(F) of R.A. No. 6132 valid and
constitutional, recognizing that the purpose of the limitation, on the freedom of the candidate or his
sympathizer to spend his own money for his candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the candidacy

of his opponents, is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. In the same manner,
Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6646 aims to maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances among the various
candidates for elective public office.
Petitioners aver that by restoring to the print and broadcast media industry the right to sell print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes, access to print space and air time would be given
equally to all candidates. Nevertheless, as opined by the COMELEC, the means to gain access to said
time and space would be unequal among all candidates. Hence, there would be in the final analysis,
inequality.
Furthermore, to tolerate even indirectly over-spending in print space or air time for campaign purposes
will open the floodgates to corruption in public office because a winning candidate who overspends during
the election period must necessarily recover his campaign expenses by "hook or crook". Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6646 would indirectly constitute a positive and effective measure against corruption in public
office.
Petitioners also contend that the challenged provision is "violative of the people's right to information
particularly about the conduct of public officials including the character and qualifications of candidates
seeking public office."
I do not adhere to the proposition that "the electorate will not have the opportunity for quality decision in
expressing its mandate no sufficient fora to detect and decide for themselves who, among the
6
candidates truly deserve their votes.
Aside from Sec. 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 providing for Comelec space and Comelec time, Sections 9 and
10 of the same law afford a candidate several venues by which the can fully exercise his freedom of
expression, including freedom of assembly. The electorate, in turn, are given opportunities to know the
candidates and be informed of their qualifications and platforms.
As provided in Section 9 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC shall encourage non-political, non-partisan
private or civic organizations to initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public fora at which all
registered candidates for the same office may simultaneously and personally participate to present,
explain, and/or debate on their campaign platforms and programs and other like issues. Section 10, on
the other hand, allows the candidates the use of the designated common poster areas to post, display
and exhibit election propaganda to announce or further their candidacy; not to mentioned the right to hold
political caucuses. conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other assemblies for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for a candidate; publishing or distributing
campaign literature or materials designed to support the election of any candidate; and directly or
7
indirectly solicit votes, pledges or support for a candidate.
In short, the law in question (Sec. 11, Rep. Act No. 6646) has been enacted for a legitimate public
purpose and the means it employs to achieve such purpose are reasonable and even timely.
Based on all the foregoing consideration, I vote to sustain the validity and constitutionality of Section II of
R.A. No. 6646.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am saddened by the readiness with which Congress, Comelec, and the members of this Court are
willing to sacrifice not only that most precious clause of the Bill of Rights freedom of speech and of the
press but also the right of every citizen to be informed in every way possible about the qualifications
and programs of those running for public office.

Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 will certainly achieve one result keep the voters ignorant of who the
candidates are and what they stand for.
With elections fast approaching, the surveys show that almost half of the nation's voters are undecided as
to the Presidency. Certainly, they do not know who are running for the Senate.
The implementation of Section 11 (b) will result in gross inequality. A cabinet member, an incumbent
official, a movie star, a basketball player, or a conspicuous clown enjoys an unfair advantage over a
candidate many times better qualified but lesser known.
I am shocked to find out that even the most knowledgeable people do not know that Antonio Carpio,
former NBI Director; Estelito P. Mendoza, former Solicitor General and Governor; and Florangel Rosario
Braid, member of the Constitutional Commission and distinguished mass communication personality (to
name only three) are also running for the Senate. We owe it to the masses to open all forms of
communication to them during this limited campaign period. A candidate to whom columnists and radiotelevision commentators owe past favors or who share their personal biases and convictions will get an
undue amount of publicity. Those who incur the ire of opinion makers cannot counteract negative
reporting by buying his own newspaper space or airtime for the airing of his refutations.
Comelec is already overburdened with the conduct of elections. Only recently it proved unequal to the
task keeping registration lists clean and had to repeat the exercise in critical areas. It should now
husband its resources for its real function insuring the integrity of the voting process and safeguarding
the true results of the elections.
Why Comelec should also supervise the publicity campaigns of almost 100,00 candidates running for
17,000 national and local positions is beyond my poor power to comprehend.
I reject the idea that canned publicity in a so-called Comelec hour or Comelec corner can replace the
fresh, imaginative, and personal appeal of advertisements espousing a cause or reaching a particular
audience.
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is censorship pure and simple. It is particularly reprehensible because it is
imposed during the limited period of the election campaign when information is most needed. Moreover,
the mere thought that published materials are supervised by a government office is enough to turn the
reader off. Only faithful followers who already know for whom they are voting will bother to read the
statements of their chosen candidate in the Comelec corner of the newspapers.
The existing restrictions are more than sufficient. Political campaigns are allowed only within a limited
period. The amount which a political party or candidate may spend is restricted. Added to the confines
of the limited periodand restricted expenses, the law now imposes a violation of the candidates' freedom
of speech and the voters' freedom to know.
I concur fully in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his usual eloquently brilliant style.
We should not allow the basic freedom of expression to be sacrificed at the alter of infinitely lesser fears
and concerns. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or, a writing instrument to be stilled.
In the precedent setting case of Gonzales v. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), seven (7) Justices (one
short of the 2/3 majority needed to invalidate the law) deemed a less restrictive statute as
unconstitutional. The four (4) Justices who allowed the law to remain did so only because there were
various safeguards and provisos. Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 now removes one of those safeguards.

The then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stated:

What of the social value and importance of the freedoms impaired by Section 50-B? The
legislation strikes at the most basic political right of the citizens in a republican system,
which is the right actively to participate in the establishment or administration of
government. This right finds expression in multiple forms but it certainly embraces that
right to influence the shape of policy and law directly by the use of ballot. It has been said
so many times it scarcely needs to be said again, that the realization of the democratic
ideal of self-government depends upon an informed and committed electorate. This can
be accomplished only by allowing the fullest measure of freedom in the public discussion
of candidates
and the issues behind which they rally; to this end, all avenues of persuasion speech,
press, assembly, organization must be kept always open. It is in the context of the
electoral process that these fundamental rights secured by the Constitution assume the
highest social importance. (at page 904; Emphasis supplied)
I, therefore, vote for the right to have the widest possible expression of ideas preparatory to the choice of
the nation's leaders. I vote to declare the challenged legislation unconstitutional.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
It has become increasingly clear that the grandiose description of this Court as the bulwark of individual
liberty is nothing more than an ironic euphemism. In the decision it makes today, the majority has exalted
authority over liberty in another obeisance to the police state, which we so despised during the days of
martial law. I cannot share in the excuses of the Court because I firmly believe that the highest function of
authority is to insure liberty.
In sustaining the challenged law, the majority invokes the legislative goal, about which there can be no
cavil. May quarrel is with the way the objective is being pursued for I find the method a most indefensible
repression. It does little good, I should think, to invoke the regularity authority of the Commission on
Elections, for that power is not a license to violate the Bill of Rights. The respondent, no less than the
legislature that enacted Section 11(b), is subject to the requirements of the police power which
the ponencia seems to disdain.
It is true that a declaration of constitutionality must be reached only after the most careful deliberation as
the challenged at is presumed to be valid in deference to the political departments. But not and this
represents a singular exception where the act is claimed to violate individual liberty, most importantly
the freedom of expression. In such a vital and exceptional case, as in the case now before us, I
respectfully submit that the presumption must be reversed in favor of the challenge.
Milton defined freedom of speech as "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties." In this context, the definition is understood to embrace all the other
cognate rights involved in the communication of ideas and falling under the more comprehensive concept
of freedom of expression. These rights include the equally important freedom of the press, the right of
assembly and petition, the right to information on matters of public concern, the freedom of religion
insofar as it affects the right to form associations as an instrument for the ventilation of views bearing on
the public welfare.
Wendell Philips offered his own reverence for freedom of expression when he called it "at once the
instrument and the quaranty and the bright consummate flower of all liberty." Like Milton, he was
according it an honored place in the hierarchy of fundamental liberties recognized in the Bill of Rights.
And well they might, for this is truly the most cherished and vital of all individual liberties in the democratic
milieu. It is no happenstance that it is this freedom that is first curtailed when the free society falls under a
repressive regime, as demonstrated by the government take-over of the press, radio and television when

martial law was declared in this country on that tragic day of September 21, 1972. The reason for this
precaution is that freedom
of expression is the sharpest and handiest weapon to blunt the edge of oppression. No less significantly,
it may be wielded by every citizen in the
land, be he peasant or poet and, regrettably, including the demagogue and the dolt who has the will
and the heart to use it.
As an individual particle of sovereignty, to use Justice Laurel's words, every citizen has a right to offer his
opinion and suggestions in the discussion of the problems confronting the community or the nation. This
is not only a right but a duty. From the mass of various and disparate ideas proposed, the people can, in
their collective wisdom and after full deliberation, choose what they may consider the best remedies to
the difficulties they face. These may not turn out to be the best solutions, as we have learned often
enough from past bitter experience. But the scope alone of the options, let alone the latitude with which
they are considered, can insure a far better choice than that made by the heedless dictator in the narrow
confines of his mind and the loneliness of his pinnacle of power.
The citizen can articulate his views, for whatever they may be worth, through the many methods by which
ideas are communicated from mind to mind. Thus, he may speak or write or sing or dance, for all these
are forms of expression protected by the Constitution. So is silence, which "persuades when speaking
fails." Symbolisms can also signify meanings without words, like the open hand of friendship or the
clenched fist of defiance or the red flag of belligerence. The individual can convey his message in a poem
or a novel or a tract or in a public speech or through a moving picture or a stage play. In such diverse
ways may he be heard. There is of course no guaranty that he will be heeded, for a acceptability will
depend on the quilty of his thoughts and of his persona, as well as the mood and motivation of his
audience. But whatever form he employs, he is entitled to the protection of the Constitution against any
attempt to muzzle his thoughts.
There is one especially significant way by which the citizen can express his views, and that is through the
ballot. By the votes he casts, he is able to participate in the selection of the persons who shall serve as
his representatives in the various elective offices in the government, from the highest position of
President of the Philippines to that of the lowly member of the Sangguniang Barangay. In the exercise of
this right, he is free to choose whoever appeals to his intelligence (or lack of it), whether it be a
professional comedian or a pretentious moron or an unrepentant thief or any other candidate with no
known distinction except the presumptuousness to seek elective office. Fortunately, there are also other
candidates deserving of the support of the circumspect and thinking citizens who will use their suffrages
conscientiously with only the public interest as their criterion and guide.
It is for the purpose of properly informing the electorate of the credentials and platforms of the candidates
that they are allowed to campaign during the election period. Such campaign includes their personally
visiting the voters in house-to-house sorties, calling on the telephone for their support, sending them
letters of appeal, distributing self-serving leaflets extolling their virtues, giving away buttons and stickers
and sample ballots and other compaign materials, and holding caucuses, rallies, parades, public
meetings and similar gatherings. All these they are allowed to do in the specified places and at the proper
time provided only that they do not exceed the maximum limit of election expenses prescribed by the
Election Code at the rate of P1.50 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where they filed
1
their certificate of candidacy.
It is curious, however, that such allowable campaign activities do not include the use of the mass media
because of the prohibition in Section 11(b) of Rep. Act. No. 6646. The candidate may employ letters or
leaflets or billboards or placards or posters or meetings to reach the electorate, incurring for this purposes
a not inconsiderable amount of his or his supporters' money. But he may not utilize for the same purpose
periodicals, radio, television or other forms of mass communications, even for free. Employment of these
facilities is allowed only through the respondent Commission on Elections, which is directed by the
Election Code to procure newspaper space and radio and television time to be distributed among the

thousands of candidates vying throughout the land for the thousands of public offices to be filled in the
coming elections.
There are some students of the Constitution who believe that unlike the other liberties guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, the freedom of speech and of the press is absolute and not subject to any kind of regulation
whatsoever. Their reason is the language of Article III, Section 4, of the Constitution, which provides
without qualification:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
This Court does not accept this extreme theory for the liberty we recognize is not liberty untamed but
liberty regulated by law. The concept of absolute rights must be approached with utmost caution if not
rejected outright. The better policy is to assume that every right, including even the freedom of
expression, must be exercised in accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others.
In fact, laws punishing crimes like slander and libel and inciting to sedition have never been seriously or
successfully questioned. Contemptuous language is not allowed in judicial proceedings. Obscenity is
proscribed, as so are acts that wound religious sensibilities. This Court has regulated the exercise of the
right to hold rallies and meetings, limiting them to certain places and hours and under specified
conditions, in the interest of peace and security, public convenience, and in one case, even to prevent
2
disturbance of the rites in a nearby church. Under the Public Assembly Act, a permit from the mayor shall
be necessary for the holding of a public meeting except where the gathering is to be held in a private
place or the campus of a government-owned or controlled educational institution or a freedom park.
All this is not meant to suggest that every government regulation is a valid regulation. On the contrary,
any attempt to restrict the exercise of a right must be tested by the strict requisites of the valid exercise of
the police power as established by this Court in a long line of decisions. These requisites are:
1) the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the
exercise of the police power; and 2) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
3
accomplishment of the purpose sough to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
simpler terms, the police measure, to be valid, must have a lawful objective and a lawful method of
achieving it.
The lawful objective of Section 11(b) may be readily conceded. The announced purpose of the law is to
prevent disparity between the rich and the poor candidates by denying both of them access to the mass
media and thus preventing the former from enjoying an undue advantage over the latter. There is no
question that this is a laudable goal. Equality among the candidates in this regard should be assiduously
pursued by the government if the aspirant with limited resources is to have any chance at all against an
opulent opponent who will not hesitate to use his wealth to make up for his lack of competence.
But in constitutional law, the end does not justify the means. To pursue a lawful objective, only a lawful
method may be employed even if it may not be the best among the suggested options. In my own view,
the method here applied falls far short of the constitutional criterion. I believe that the necessary
reasonable link between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved has not been
proved and that the method employed is unduly oppressive.
The financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except
only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition
under challenge is that while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it
nevertheless allows him to spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his
straitened rival. Thus, the rich candidate may hold as many rallies and meetings as he may desire or can
afford, using for the purpose the funds he would have spent for the prohibited mass media time and

space. The number of these rallies and meetings, which also require tremendous expense, cannot be
matched by the poor candidate, but the advantage of the rich candidate in this case is not similarly
prohibited. By the same token, the rich candidates may visit more houses, send more letters, make more
telephone appeals, distribute more campaign materials, incurring for all these more expenses than the
poor candidates can afford. But these advantages are allowed by the law because they do not involve the
use of mass media space and time.
And what if the rich candidate pays P25,000 from his own funds to buy media advertising and the same
amount is raised for the same purpose by 250 supporters of the poor candidate contributing P100 each?
Both transactions would be prohibited under the law although the rich candidates clearly has in this case
no advantage over his adversary.
And what if a candidate is endorsed not in a paid advertisement or commercial but by a columnist or a
radio commentator who is apparently expressing his own opinion without financial consideration or
inducement? This is not prohibited by Section 11(b) simply because the endorsement does not appear to
have been purchased by the candidates or given to him for free.
The proposed distribution of COMELEC time and space is hardly workable, considering the tremendous
number of candidates running all over the country for the offices of President of the Philippines, VicePresident, senators, representatives, provincial governors, vice-governors, provincial board members, city
mayors, vice-mayors and councilors, and municipal mayors, vice-mayors and councilors. Allocation of
equal time and space among the candidates would involve administrative work of unmanageable
proportions, and the possibility as well of unequal distribution, whether deliberate or unintentional, that
might create more serious problems than the problem at hand.
It is indeed the settled rule that questions regarding the necessity or wisdom of the law are for the
legislature to resolve and its resolution may not be reviewed by the courts of justice. In the case of the
police power, however, it is required that there be a plausible nexus between the method employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved, and determination of this link involves a judicial inquiry into the
reasonableness of the challenged measure. It is true, as remarked by Justice Holmes, that a law has
done all it can if it has done all it should, but this is on the assumption that what the law has done was
valid to begin with. The trouble with the challenged law is that it has exceeded what it should have done,
thereby becoming both inefficacious and arbitrary. As such, it must be slain.
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the dissemination
of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells
the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted
to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. In his "Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing," Milton deplored the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office
of censor and at the same time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in
our midst today, smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is screened
during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified matters that might
prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person is prohibited from shouting
"Fire!" in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and bolster the rule that there should be
no prior restraint upon a person's right to express his ideas on any subject of public interest. The rule
applies whether the censorship be in the form of outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more
subtle forms like the imposition of tax upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of
4
copies per issue or allowing the circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus
5
reducing the reading tastes of adults to the level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v.
6
Sullivan that "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy

presumption against its validity." That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the
contrary, the challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its
undisguised attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean
elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to suppress
free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for the molding of
public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for
7
the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the Constitution.
The law is no less oppressive on the candidates themselves who want and have the right to address the
greatest number of voters through the modern facilities of the press, radio and television. Equally injured
are the ordinary citizens, who are also entitled to be informed, through these mass media, of the
qualifications and platforms of the various candidates aspiring for public office, that they may be guided in
the choice they must make when they cast they ballots. 8
I am as deeply concerned as the rest of the nation over the unabated if not aggravated influence of
material persuasions on the choice of our elective officials. It is truly alarming that elections in a growing
number of cases have become no more than auction sales, where the public office is awarded to the
highest bidder as if it were an article of commerce. The offer of cash in exchange for his vote would be
virtually irresistible to a person mired in poverty and in the throes of the elemental struggle for survival.
That there are millions of such persons can only compound this terrible situation. But what makes it
especially revolting is the way these helpless persons are manipulated and imposed upon and tantalized
to surrender their birthright for a mess of pottage. The unscrupulous candidates who do not hesitate to
use their wealth to buy themselves into elective office these are the real saboteurs of democracy.
These are the scoundrels who would stain the pristine ballot in their cynical scheme to usurp public office
by falsifying the will of the people. Section 11(b) aims to minimize this malignancy, it is true, but
unfortunately by a method not allowed by the Constitution.
In the Comment it submitted after the Solicitor General expressed support for the petitioners, the
9
Commission on Elections relies heavily on Badoy v. Commission on Elections to sustain the exercise of
its authority to regulate and supervise the mass media during the election period as conferred upon it by
what is now Section 4 of Article IX in the present Constitution. However, that case is not in point for what
was upheld there was Section 12(f) of Rep. Act No. 6132 providing as follows:
The Commission on Elections shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers,
magazines and periodicals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate
this space equally and impartially among all candidates within the areas in which the
newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment or paid
article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person for delegate, or
mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candidacy, unless all the names
of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also mentioned
with equal prominence.
The Court, through Justice Makasiar (but over strong dissents from Justices Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo), declared:
Considering the foregoing limitation in paragraph F, Sec. 12 in the light of the other
provisions of R.A. No. 6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality of
chances among the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on the
freedom of expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the
individual's liberty of expression.
What is challenged in the case at bar is not that law but Section 11(b), which does not merely require
mention of the candidate's rivals in the paid advertisement or commercial, an innocuous enough

requirement, to be sure. What Section 11(b) does is prohibit the advertisement or commercial itself in
what is unmistakably an act of censorship that finds no justification in the circumstances here presented.
Surely, that blanket and absolute prohibition to use the mass media as a vehicle for the articulation of
ideas cannot, by the standards of Badoy, be considered "too insignificant to create any appreciable dent
on the individual's liberty of expression."
10

What is in point is Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, where this Court, through Mr. Justice
Medialdea, unanimously declared unconstitutional a regulation of the Commission on Elections providing
as follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcer. During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
On the argument that the said persons could still express their views through the air time and newspaper
space to be allocated by the respondent, the Court declared:
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec resolution 2167 does
not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the Comelec
space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still restriction on
his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgment. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount
to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. (Emphasis
supplied)
This decision was promulgated without a single dissent, even from the incumbent members then who are
now sustaining Section 11(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. Contrary to Justice Davide's contention, there is not a
single word in this decision upholding the prohibition in question.
The respondent also paints a distressing picture of the current political scene and expresses its despair
over the plight of the poor candidate thus:
Respondent Commission invites appreciation of the realities of present-day political
campaigns. In today's election competitions the success of one's candidacy rests to a
great extent on the candidate's ability to match the financial and material resources of the
other. Where a candidate is given limitless opportunity to take his campaign to areas of
persuasion through the media, what is left of a winning chance for a poor, if deserving,
candidate? But for the regulatory power of Sec. 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, a
wealthy candidate could block off an opponent of lesser means from the public view by
buying all print space in newspapers and air time in radio and television.
I am certain the Court shares the apprehensions of the sober elements of our society over the acute
disadvantage of the poor candidates vis-a-vis a wealthy opponent determined to win at all cost (which he
can afford). However, for all its anxiety to solve this disturbingly widespread difficulty, it is inhibited, as all
of us must be, by the mandate of the Constitution to give untrammeled rein to the dissemination and
exchange of ideas concerning the elections.
The problem is not really as bad as the respondent would imagine it, for it is unlikely that the rich
candidate would or could buy "all print space in newspapers and air time in radio and television" to "block
off" his opponents. Let us not be carried away by hyperbolic speculations. After all, as the respondent
itself points out, it is empowered by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the operations of the mass

media in connection with election matters, and we may expect that it will use this power to prevent the
monopoly it fears, which conceivably will consume all the funds the candidate is allowed to spend for his
campaign. It should be pointed out that the rich candidate violates no law as long as he does not exceed
the maximum amount prescribed by the Election Code for campaign expenses. The mere fact that the
poor candidate can spend only a small fraction of that amount does not prevent the rich candidate from
spending all of it if he is so minded. This may be a heartless way of putting it, but that is in fact how the
law should be interpreted. The Election Code fixes a maximum limit for all candidates, rich or poor alike; it
does not say that the rich candidate shall spend only the same amount as the poor candidates can afford.
I realize only too well that the ideas that may be conveyed by the prohibited media advertisements will
mostly be exaggerations or distortions or plain poppycock and may intrude upon our leisure hours if not
also offend our intelligence and exhaust our patience. We may indeed be opening a Pandora's box. But
these are unavoidable in the free society. As part of the larger picture, these impositions are only minor
irritations that, placed in proper perspective, should not justify the withdrawal of the great an inalienable
liberty that is the bedrock of this Republic. It is best to remember in this regard that freedom of expression
exists not only for the though that agrees with us, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, but a also for the
thought that we abhor.
I submit that all the channels of communication should be kept open to insure the widest dissemination of
information bearing on the forthcoming elections. An uninformed electorate is not likely to be circumspect
in the choice of the officials who will represent them in the councils of government. That they may
exercise their suffrages wisely, it is important that they be apprised of the election issues, including the
credentials, if any, of the various aspirants for public office. This is especially necessary now in view of
the dismaying number of mediocrities who, by an incredible aberration of ego, are relying on their money,
or their tinsel popularity, or their private armies, to give them the plume of victory.
For violating the "liberty to know, to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties,"
the challenged law must be struck down. For blandly sustaining it instead, the majority has inflicted a
deep cut on the Constitution that will ruthlessly bleed it white, and with it this most cherished of our
freedoms.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
In a ghastly blow against our cherished liberties, the Supreme Court, with insensate, guillotine-like
efficiency, rendered a decision which in the interest of accuracy and candidness, I would like to turn
the serious attack on our freedom of expression. It is sad but I have no choice except to say that I dissent.
The freedom to advertise one's political candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a significant
part of our freedom of expression and of our right of access to information. Freedom of expression in turn
in includes among other things, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Restrict these freedoms
without rhyme or reason, and you violate the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
The majority says that the purpose of the political advertisement provision is to prevent those who have
much money from completely overwhelming those who have little. This is gross errors because should
the campaign for votes be carried out in other fora (for example, rallies and meetings) the rich candidate
can always be at a great advantage over his less fortunate opponent. And so the disparity feared will
likewise appear in campaigns other than through media. It is alleged also that the candidate with money
can purchase for himself several full page advertisements, making his poor opponents really poor in more
ways than one. This is not realistic for the poor opponents may, for certain reasons be given or favored
with advertisements free of charge, and money will not be needed in this case. And yet under the statute
in question, even free or gratuitous advertisements in print, in radio or in television are included in the
prohibition. And then again, it is contended by the majority that a poor candidate can still make use of
media by consenting to interviews and news reports about this campaign, which interviews and reports
are, according to the majority still allowable. But then these interviews and news reports are still subtle

advertisements and they can be had if a candidate deliberately looks for media practitioners to inner view
him or to write about him. If the majority is to be consistent, these interviews and news reports should also
be disallowed. A case in point is the senatorial candidate who was interviewed on television last Tuesday
(March 3, 1992). Portions of the interview follow:
Q In 19___, were you not the Secretary of _____________?
A Yes, I was.
Q When you were Secretary, did you not accomplish the following?
A (Interviewer then enumerated various accomplishments.)
Q Yes, I did.
There can be no doubt that this interview is disguised propaganda, and yet, if we follow the majority
opinion, this is allowable. Is this not
illogical that is , if the ban stays?
And then again, if we were to consider the ban as constitutional, the "unknown" or "lesser known"
candidates would be at a distinct disadvantage. They will have to hold numerous rallies (spending oodles
and oodles of money). And only those who had previously received public exposure by dint of
government service or by prominence in the movies, in music, in sports, etc. will be the ones "recalled" by
the voters. This will indeed be unfortunate for our country.
It is true that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are not absolute, and that they have their own
limitations. But I do not see how these limitations can make the disputed prohibition valid and
constitutional.
I therefore reiterate my opinion that this political ads prohibition is grossly unfair, politically inept and
eminently unconstitutional.

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, CLAIMING TO BE
AND ACTING AS TANODBAYAN-OMBUDSMAN UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-80578 April 27, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
Francisco Carreon and Nestor C. Lumba for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In G.R. Nos. 79690-707 "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65," petitioner
Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases Nos.
12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground thatsaid cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without
legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,
1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file
cases with the Sandiganbayan. The complete prayer of the petition reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this petition or
until further orders of the Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue upon the
filing of a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the Honorable Court, restraining the
Honorable Sandiganbayan from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161,
and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar is concerned and from
hearing and resolving the special prosecutor's motion to suspend (Annex J) and
thereafter, final judgment be rendered:
(1) ordering that the amended informations in the above-mentioned crimininal cases be
or issuing a writ of mandamus commanding and ordering the respondent Sandiganbayan
to do so and, in consequence, prohibiting and restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from proceeding to hear and try the abovementioned criminal cases or making the
temporary preliminary injunction permanent;
(2) declaring the acts of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan-Ombudsman" after 2
February 1987 relating to these cases as anullity and without legal effect, particularly, the
promulgation of Tanodbayan resolution of 5 February 1987, the filing of the original
informations on 3 March 1987 and the amended ones on 4 June 1987, and the filing of
the Motion for Suspension Pendente Lite.
PETITIONER prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed proper in the
premises, with costs against the respondents.
Manila, Philippines, September 9, 1987.
(pp. 45-47, Rollo)
In G.R. No. 80578, petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the first petition,
prays that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary investigations and similar
cases with the Sandiganbayan. The prayer reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the final disposition of this petition or
until further orders of this Honorable court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue
restraining the respondent from further acting in TBP CASE NO. 87-01304 and,
particularly, from filing the criminal Information consequent thereof-, and from conducting
preliminary investigations in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/
cases now pending or which may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of
the respondent.
It is likewise prayed that the present petition be consolidated with G.R.L-Nos. 7969079707.

After proper proceedings, it is prayed that final judgment be rendered annulling the acts
of respondent Gonzalez as "Tanodbayan- Ombudsman" after 2 February 1987 relating to
the investigation of complaints against petitioner, particularly:
(1) Annulling, for absolute want of jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation conducted,
and the Resolution rendered, by respondent in TBP CASE NO. 87-01304;
(2) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from filing any criminal Information as a
consequence of the void preliminary investigation he conducted in TBP CASE NO. 8701304, or annulling the criminal Information in the said case which may, in the meantime,
have already been filed;
(3) Prohibiting and restraining the respondent from conducting preliminary investigations
in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/cases now pending or which
may hereafter be filed against petitioner with the Office of the respondent.
PETITIONER further prays for such other and further reliefs as may be deemed proper in
the proper with costs against the respondent.
Manila, Philippines, November 18,1987
(pp. 24-25, Rollo)
We issued the restraining orders prayed for.
After a study of the petitions, We have decided to give due course to the same; to consider the comments
of the Solicitor-General and of Tanodbayan Gonzalez as their Answers thereto; and to forthwith decide
the petitions.
We find the petitions impressed with merit.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from theincumbent Tanodbayan) is
charged with the duty to:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or commission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient (Sec. 13, par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
be provided by law, contemptexcept those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7) (Emphasis ours).
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan
(caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties
NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This
right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or

orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims
under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however,
retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
It is not correct either to suppose that the Special Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long as he has
not been replaced, for the fact is that he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman
is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created
under PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are Identical or similar. The
Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of Ombudsman as he has
never held it in the first place.
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the
criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising
the powers and function of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated October
18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the
Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution,
in the light of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for
Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever
else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the conclusions reached in
the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for
Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to charge
respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt,"
though we are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of
"direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it
regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the Court
and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts
flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and,
through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in
its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most
ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it
could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to charge
respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out
that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court,
especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of this case
either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise,
there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under
the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was
not the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled
"Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in
writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the
procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another
person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own
motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprioproceedings for which it did
not find probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the
Solicitor General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to
proceed with the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a
particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per
curiamResolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the
present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote
certain statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those

statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech.
The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not
any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is from
1
a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. It may be pointed out that the majority
in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do
not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts
are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that
contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious
manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of
the United States the constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the
intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a
power on the federal courts in the very act of their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of
the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five member
including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates
to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb
Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no
less than nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously introduced the
Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under this
power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more explicitly the summary power
vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence of the power but merely
defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout its
existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of
decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted
2
without question. ...
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who
finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a
wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity
of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears
before it, and most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the
"visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation
which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of
claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is

invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an
accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad
3
v. Vda. de Gonzales, this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the
"hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without
limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right
is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to
insist that all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is
the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights,
1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission
4
on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied)
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner
and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was
implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive
evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to
5
threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake
is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of
the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of
the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved,
in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less
deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to hold that
intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point
was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and
plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that the respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as
pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court. Human
intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and statements. Thus,
what the Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the

Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the
clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind incompatible
with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot
successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between
the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to punish
respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends in the United
Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the
texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document
the state of our case law on this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances
of this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a
century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court
finds it difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of
the respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to
purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging
such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness
and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The
denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the
Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON.
CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which
had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.

The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that
the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of
proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed
beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was
taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The
petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents'
general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards
what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues
raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or
dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting
station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station
DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment;
2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness
to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to
operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said
station DYRE;
3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new
owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further.
The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed
1
or its operations curtailed.
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it
furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation
of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear
and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a
right to prevent, In hisConstitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil.
71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila[101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera
v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v.
Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer[48 SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the
clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v.
Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A
broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726),
confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio
broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the
free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in
the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion
picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the same
selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and
out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos,
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who
find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food
and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal.
Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including
the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials
broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to
persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or
offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate
analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast
media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation
by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of
widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly
entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying
views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In
the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public

officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only
thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or
dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON,
ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO
YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for private respondents.

FERIA, J.:
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this special
action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First Instance of
Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private
respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion
for Reconsideration.
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case
No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred
Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel
against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of
petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of
Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with
imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and
malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them
(sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the
Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural
workers and of the public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual
and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the

court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the
article was attached to the complaint.
On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued
upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much
less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to
dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.
On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the
motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of
action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of
evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.
On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No. 14406)
seeking the annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such a grave
abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December 17,
1982 and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains
allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65 cannot
be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time. Subsequently, on March
10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision,
hence this petition.
The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within fifteen days
from notice of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the same as a petition
for review on certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether or not the private
respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) whether or not the petition for certiorari
and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane
planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only
against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group,
there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do
damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel
suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962),
although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared
that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is
cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the
personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of
persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity,
the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70
ALR 2d. 1384).

In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are
not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are
sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie where the body is
composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom
the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to
pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd
to condemn all because of the actions of a part. (supra p. 628).
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group
or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters
of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable basis in the
complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
(Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class
interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual
party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a
separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous
never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been
arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of
Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public
official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
press.
The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The Court
takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is
available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion for reconsideration
were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not
the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave

abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary
remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to
the general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction
over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from
further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the
case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute
of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to
quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further
action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set
aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of the
exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated,
necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against
it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial in view of the
conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific allegation in the complaint,
to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane
workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the
sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the
benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and
exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be unreasonable
and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the welfare of their
workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such as the one in question may also
serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those who do
not have.
On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they
should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the press,
like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES, DEMETRIO RAMOS and ANANIAS

ASTURIAS,petitioners,
vs.
CAMARA SHOES AND HEIRS OF SANTOS CAMARA, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND MINISTER OF LABOR, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of Labor Arbiter Sofronio A. Ona dated February 19, 1976,
which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission in a resolution dated April 14, 1977 and
by the Minister of Labor in an order dated February 19, 1979, so as to include backwages.
The petitioner Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Camara Shoes; and the heirs of Santos Camara are the surviving heirs of
the late Santos Camara, the proprietor of Camara shoes. Petitioners Demetrio Ramos and Ananias
Asturias are members of the petitioner Union.
It appears that on October 23, 1969, the Acting Assistant Chief Prosecutor of the defunct Court of
Industrial Relations, in behalf of herein petitioners, Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes,
Demetrio Ramos, and Ananias Asturias, members of said labor union, charged Camara Shoes and its
owner, Santos Camara, with unfair labor practice for deducting P1.00 a day from Ramos' salary, and later
suspending him from his work, and dismissing Asturias because of union activities. The case was
docketed as Case No. 5355-ULP (pp. 14-16, rec.).
In their answer dated November 18, 1969, private respondents claim that petitioner Demetrio Ramos was
deducted the amount of P1.00 from his wages to pay his indebtedness of P50.00 which he incurred for
medical expenses when he fell off a horse and that after the full payment thereof, the deduction was
stopped; that he was suspended because he dirtied the payroll by unnecessarily writing "under protest"
on the payroll, and that after serving his penalty he was reinstated; and that petitioner Asturias was
dismissed because as supply purchaser, he altered the figures in the receipts and pocketed the
difference (p. 17, rec.).
On February 19, 1976, Labor Arbiter Sofronio A. Ona rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Camara Shoes and Santos Camara are hereby declared not
guilty of committing unfair labor practices against the complainants. Respondents are
hereby directed to reinstate Ananias Asturias to his former position without backwages.
The complaint of Demetrio Ramos, having become moot and academic by his
subsequent reinstatement is hereby DISMISSED (pp. 20-21, rec.).

The petitioners filed an appeal dated March 23, 1976 (pp. 2 223, rec.) to the National Labor Relations
Commission, Manila, which, however, in a resolution dated April 14, 1977, dismissed the appeal for
having been filed out of time (p. 33, rec.).
Appeal was then taken to the Minister of Labor, who likewise dismissed the appeal in an order dated
February 19, 1979 (pp. 49-51, rec.).
Hence, the instant petition.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, the following are the antecedent facts of the case:
ANANIAS ASTURIAS
It appears that complaint Ananias Asturias, while employed as mechanic of the
respondent on May 20, 1969, was directed to buy needles costing P13.00. The amount
as stated in the receipt was tampered and changed to P18.00 (Annex E). The following
day, two other employees were sent to buy the same size and quality of needles from the
same store, J.B.Y. Tanlimco Sons, Inc., and it was discovered that the needles still cost
P13.00 (Annex E-1). For overpricing in the amount of P6.00, complainant was justifiably
dismissed from the service on May 22, 1969. While it is shown that the complainant
Asturias was engaged in union activities since 1966, union membership and/or activities
are not absolute insurance for his continued employment with the company. Disciplinary
action against erring employee remains a management prerogative. Considering,
however, the offense complainant Asturias committed, an act of overpricing amounting to
only five pesos, and considering further that his main work is as a mechanic and not as a
buyer, reinstatement without backwages should be expected under our Compassionate
Society (PAL vs. PALEA Case, G.R. L-24626).
DEMETRIO RAMOS
It appears that complainant Ramos was being deducted the amount of P1.00 by the
respondent in partial payment of his loan of P50.00 for medical expense, and P500.00 for
two (2) cartloads of second hand lumber and building materials taken from the
demolished store at Nueva Street. Compelainant agreed to the deduction as partial
payment of his obligations but later on spoiled the payroll of the company by placing
therein "under protest". For this act of dirtying the official copy of the payroll, he was
justifiably suspended indefinitely on May 28, 1969, hence, the complaint for
reinstatement. Clearly the suspension of the complainant is for cause and could not be
attributed to unfair labor practice. On July 1, 1969, complainant was reinstated (Exh. "B")
after one month suspension, rendering this case moot and academic (pp. 19-20, rec.).
It may be well to state that while it is true that findings of fact of the Ministry of Labor and the National
Labor Relations Commission are entitled to great respect, however, such rule finds exception where the
findings of fact, or conclusions made therefrom, are not supported by substantial evidence, or when there
is grave abuse of discretion committed by said public officials, as in the case at bar.
As to petitioner Asturias, a close examination of the records shows that said petitioner was unjustifiably
dismissed by respondent company on May 22, 1969, WE cannot lend credence to the contention of
herein respondents that petitioner Asturias was shown to have overpriced the cost of needles he was
ordered to buy by tampering and changing the amount of P13.00 appearing in the receipt to P18.00, thus
overpricing in the amount of P5.00. Such contention, to OUR mind, is too naive to be worthy of belief. The
records show, and this was not disputed by private respondents herein, that petitioner Asturias was given
the amount of P13.40 by the cashier of respondent company Camaras Shoes to buy needles; P13.00 for
the needles and P.40 for transportation expenses. With the foregoing as backdrop, there would have

been no basis to charge petitioner Asturias with overpricing because nowhere in the records was it amply
shown that petitioner Asturias attempted to collect the difference or asked for and was given
reimbursement in the amount of P5.00 by the respondent company, if it were true that Asturias tampered
and changed the amount appearing in the receipt.
Moreover, neither the cashier of the respondent company who is in charge of disbursement of company
funds nor the representative of the store where the needles were bought, were presented as witnesses to
corroborate and substantiate the self-serving testimony of the late Santos Camara that petitioner Asturias
overpriced the cost of needles.
Obviously, it is highly implausible and far-fetched to dramatize petitioner's dismissal as being based on a
justifiable cause. Rather, what is more apparent here is the arbitrariness and high-handedness to which
petitioner Asturias was subjected by said respondent Camara whose relations with herein petitioner was
particularly strained by the union activities of the latter. The act of the respondent company in thus
dismissing petitioner from his job is, therefore, unjustified, arbitrary, and without just cause. True it is that
to dismiss or lay off an employee is management's prerogative; but it must be done without abuse of
discretion, for what is at stake is not only petitioner's position but also as means of livelihood (Bachiller vs.
NLRC, 98 SCRA 393, 396).
With respect to petitioner Demetrio Ramos, petitioner alleges that the deduction of P1.00 a day from his
salary without his consent was unlawful; and that when he wrote "under protest" on the company payroll,
he was merely exercising his right to air his grievances on the unauthorized deductions made by
respondent company. Petitioner denied that he incurred a loan from the respondent company in the
amount of P50.00, and P500.00 for two cartloads of second hand lumber and building materials taken
from the demolished store at Nueva Street. Petitioner asserts that his suspension was due primarily to his
union activities. He contends that his suspension was discriminatory and constitutes an unfair labor
practice.
There is merit in this contention. The records amply show that petitioner Ramos has been an active
member of the union since he joined the same in July 1966 and participated in the strike on November
14-23, 1966 (p. 8, rec.). Thereafter, it is not disputed that private respondent herein began to discriminate
against and even dismissed active union members, which discriminations and dismissals were the subject
of the following unfair labor practice cases filed against the respondent company.
August 16, 1967 Case No. 5013-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes. et al. versus Santos Camara" for dismissal of G. Antonio and 5 others and
reduction of working days of the workers.
January 15, 1968 Case No. 4949-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes, et al. versus Santos Camara", for suspension/dismissal of Demetrio Ramos,
Agripino Andanar, Ananias Asturias, Lydia Liboon and Rosita San Jose.
February 15, 1968 Case No. 4999-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes and Leon Quinsaat versus Santos Camara", for suspension of Leon Quinsaat.
September 25, 1968 Case No. 5215-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes and Marcos G. Basilio versus Santos Camaras and Camara Shoes", for dismissal
of Union President Marcos G. Basilio.
July 1, 1969 Case No. 5363-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes and
Juan Labastida versus Camaras Shoes and Santos Camara", for dismissal of Juan
Labastida.

July 1, 1969 Case No. 6376-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes and
Virgilio Santos versus Santos Camara", for dismissal of Virgilio Santos.
July 8, 1970 Case No. 5487-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes,
Antonio Ignacio and Pedro Valentin versus Santos Camara", for dismissal of Pedro
Valentin and harassment of Antonio Ignacio.
October 29, 1970 Case No. 5724-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes and Ricardo dela Pena versus Camara Shoes and Santos Camara", for dismissal
of Ricardo dela Pena.
February 12, 1974 Case No. 5822-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes and Federico Banawa versus Santos Camara and Camara Shoes", for dismissal
of Federico Banawa.
January 26, 1973 Case No. 5986-ULP, "Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara
Shoes and Magno Murphy versus Santos Camara", for dismissal of Magno Murphy (p.
104, rec.).
Except Case No. 5362-ULP which was dismissed and Case No. 5487-ULP which was also dismissed
with respect to the complaint of Antonio Ignacio, all the other cases were decided in favor of the union
and its members.
As to the allegation of private respondents that the amount of P1.00 was deducted from Ramos' wages to
pay his indebtedness to the company, the following pertinent observations in the decision of Judge
Salome A. Montoya of the Municipal Court of Makati, dismissing Civil Case No. 8982 entitled "Santos
Camara vs. Demetrio Ramos" are in point:
DECISION
The plaintiff Santos Camara seeks to collect from the defendant Demetrio Ramos an
alleged indebtedness of P450.00. ...
It appears from the evidence in this case that there is a labor dispute in the background
of this suit. The defendant Ramos testified that he had been pin active member of their
labor union and had been among those who brought labor cases against the plaintiff
Camara in the Court of Industrial Relations. One of the principal grounds for their filing of
the unfair labor practices against the plaintiff was precisely the fact that the latter had
been making illegal and unauthorized deductions from his pay which are the P1.00
deductions allegedly in payment for the lumber he took in 1964. The Court notes that
while plaintiff claims that defendant took the lumber in 1964 and should therefore have
started paying for the same, he started making deductions of P1.00 from the defendant's
pay only beginning April 1969 when there had already been strained labor relations
between the plaintiff and his employees among whom is the defendant. In fact plaintiff
made a demand for the payment of P500.00 only on January 17, 1969 (Exh. "C" for
plaintiff, Exhibit "I" for defendant), after cases for unfair labor practices were filed against
him by the defendant, and the labor union to which the latter belonged.
The defendant pointed as exhibits copies of the complaints in the following cases before
the Court of Industrial Relations:
l. Case No. 2327 V entitled Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes, et al., (including Demetrio
Ramos) vs. Santos Camara dated June 26, 1967 [Exhibit 3-A].

2. Case No. 4949-ULP entitled Kapisanang Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes et al.

(including Demetrio Ramos) vs. Santos Camara dated December 11, 1968 [Exhibit d-B]
and
3. Case No. 5355-ULP entitled Kapisanang Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes. Demetrio
Ramos and Ananias Asturias vs. Camara Shoes and Santos Camara dated October 23,
1969 [Exhibit 3].
The existence of the afore-dismissed facts raises a doubt in the mind of the court as to
the merit of plaintiff's complaint. Other than his personal testimony to the effect that
defendant had agreed to pay P500.00 for the lumber received by the latter, no further
evidence supported the existence of the alleged obligation. Upon the other hand, the
status of the defendant ... could not afford to buy wood worth P500.00; the fact that
plaintiff made no demands for payment of the supposed obligation until after five (5)
years later when labor disputes between the parties were presumably at their peak; and
the fact that defendant appeared to have been an active member of the union and was in
fact an individual complainant against the plaintiff in all the labor cases pending in the
CIR, lend credence to the claim of the defendant that he had in fact no obligation to the
plaintiff and that the present action is only for harassment purposes. Indeed, it could be
that plaintiff filed this case to justify or support his having made deductions from the
defendant's salary which deductions are among the subject of the labor cases he faced
with the CIR. ... (pp. 27-28, rec.).
It is thus an too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances
against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest"
on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of
expression as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue harassment
amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer herein.
Accordingly, herein petitioner Ananias Asturias is therefore entitled to reinstatement with back wages
pursuant to the policy to decree back wages not exceeding three (3) years without requiring the parties to
submit or show proof of compensation received from other sources at the time of illegal dismissal until
actual reinstatement, in order that judgment in favor of an employee or laborers can be executed without
delay. (Union of Supervisors [R.B.] NATU vs. The Secretary of Labor and Republic Bank, G.R. No.L39889, November 12, 1981). Petitioner Demetrio Ramos, who was Legally suspended for one (1) month,
is entitled to one month back wages.
WHEREFORE, THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 19,1979 OF RESPONDENT MINISTER
OF LABOR AFFIRMING THE FEBRUARY 19, 1976 DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER IS HEREBY
MODIFIED, AND THE RESPONDENT CAMARA SHOES AND HEIRS OF SANTOS CAMARA ARE
HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER ANANIAS ASTURIAS BACK WAGES EQUIVALENT TO
THREE (3) YEARS WITHOUT QUALIFICATION AND TO PAY PETITIONER DEMETRIO RAMOS ONE
(1) MONTH BACK WAGES.
THIS DECISION IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

IN RE ATTY. EMMANUEL S. TIPON respondent.

RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:t.hqw
The Postmaster General in a first indorsement to the Chief Justice dated May 17, 1965 transmitted
certain papers purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel S. Tipon (admitted to the bar in 1956) might have
violated the lawyer's oath for having imported the magazine Playboy, which was considered as nonmailable matter.
In this Court's resolution of May 31, 1965 action on the complaint of the Postmaster General was deferred
until after Civil Case No. 3898-111 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte entitled "Emmanuel S.
Tipon vs. Belarmino P. Navarro and Enrico Palomar" (Assistant Postmaster General and Postmaster
General, respectively) is decided.
That case was a mandamus action filed by Atty. Tipon in 1964 in Ilocos Norte against the Postmaster
General and his assistant. In a decision dated March 19, 1966 the court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue. So that decision is not determinative of the question of whether or not the
complaint of the Postmaster General should be given due course.
What is decisive is the second indorsement dated July 5, 1967 of Hon. Antonio V. Raquiza, Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, who, as Department Head, exercised direct control, direction, and
supervision over the Bureau of Posts.
In that indorsement Secretary Raquiza rendered the opinion that Playboy magazine cannot be character
as obscene and that it can be carried and deposited in Philippine mails.
The Secretary said that he scrutinized the background of Atty. Tipon, a 1955 law graduate of the
University of the Philippines who placed third in the bar examinations, a Fullbright Smith-Mundt scholar,
and a holder of the Master of Laws degree from the Yale Law School. The Secretary concluded that
"there is absolutely no to show that Atty. Tipon had violated or intended to violate the postal laws, the
lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics."
Secretary Raquiza requested that the Postmaster General's t of May 17, 1965 be considered withdrawn.
WHEREFORE, this case is considered closed for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.

PEDRO S. LACSA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
San Jose, Enriquez, Lacsa, Santos & Borje for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
Convicted on July 9, 1982 by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of libel and sentenced to
1
pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, the accused-petitioner, Pedro S. Lacsa, appealed to the
2
former Intermediate Appellate Court. The respondent appellate court, however, in its decision claw
March 12,1986, affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. Still unsatisfied, the petitioner is now
before us through a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
respondent court's decision and his acquittal from the crime charged.
We deny the petition. The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
The petitioner is a Certified Public Accountant by profession. Being a representative of an institutional
member of the Philippine Columbian Association and as a former member of the latter's Board of
Directors, the petitioner volunteered to act as auditor and offered his services free in connection with the
association's move to offer pre-emptive rights to its members. In his capacity as auditor, the petitioner had
access to the records of the association's members including the personal folder of the private
complainant, Ponciano C. Marquez, who was then the President. According to the petitioner, he
discovered in the course of his work that Marquez was a mere associate member of the association. As
such, the petitioner questioned the qualification of Marquez to hold the presidency of the association
inasmuch as only proprietary members thereof can be voted to the said position. Thus, purporting to
espouse the interest and welfare of the association and its members, the petitioner, on December 21,
1978, wrote a letter to the Board of Directors impugning the status of Marquez as a proprietary member
and as president of the association. In that letter, the petitioner contended that the issuance of Certificate
No. D-44 (for proprietary membership) to Marquez, without the prior knowledge and authority of the
association's Board of Directors, was erroneous. On January 2, 1979, the petitioner likewise sent a letter
to the private complainant asking the latter to yield the presidency for having failed to show that he was
entitled to a proprietary certificate membership which is one of the qualifications for the position. The
petitioner, through his letter, likewise branded the private complainant as a "de facto president." The
letter, which the petitioner eventually caused to be published and circulated among the members of the
association, reads:
January
2, 1979
Mr. Ponciano C. Marquez
Philippine Columbian Association
350 Taft Avenue, Manila
Subject: Erroneous issuance of Membership
Certificate No. D-44 in
your name.
Dear Sir:
In connection with my 21 December 1978 letter to the PCA Board of Directors, I strongly
urge you to yield the Presidency. This has become necessary in view of the following: (1)
your as associate membership status has been definitely established, (2) with more than
enough time, you failed to show that you are entitled to a proprietary certificate, (3) only

propriety member can hold and occupy the position you have been holding and
occupying for three years (as de facto president), and (4) to afford the Board a chance to
decide the manner of rectifying the unauthorized and erroneous issuance of Membership
Certificate No. D-44 in your name.
Your cooperation on this matter will go a long way towards the attairmenthe of true
camaraderie and understanding among members of the Club.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) PEDRO S.
LACSA
PSL/egl
cc: Dr. Jose N. Villanueva,
Jr. Atty. Antonio de las Alas, Jr.
Atty. Alfonso C. Roldan
Justice Claudio Teehankee
Director Victor Buencamino, Jr.
Director Oscar J. Hilado
Dr. Vicente D. Limoso
Director Angel Dayao
Don Carlos T. Fernandez
Mr. Baldomero T. Olivero
Mr. Ramon Ordoveza
Mr. Jorge Vargas
Atty. Lino Patajo
Dr. Jose M. Barcelona Prof. Renato Constantino.

Not content with what he had already done, the petitioner, on January 9, 1978, again caused the
publication in a newsletter circulated to the association's members, of an item entitled "Doubt As To the
Legitimacy Of The Incumbent President."
Due to these imputations of the petitioner, the private complainant, Ponciano C. Marquez, instituted
separate criminal complaint and civil action against the former, Marquez claimed that he was maligned,
defamed, and exposed to public ridicule by the petitionees actions.

The basic question to be answered is whether or not, under the instances related, the petitioner is guilty
of the crime of libel.
The petitioner insists that the term "de facto president," which he used to describe the private
complainant, is not libelous per se. The petitioner asserts that even assuming that the said term is indeed
libelous, the letter and newsletter in which it appeared nevertheless constitute privileged communication
and cannot give rise to a libel conviction. Besides, he claims that the letter and newsletter which caused
the present discord were written by him pursuant to his moral, social, and legal responsibility as a
member of the Philippine Columbian Association. These being so, the petitioner argues, he should be
exonerated from the criminal charge.
We disagree.
Six decades ago, in the case of U.S. vs. O' Connell, the Court laid down the test for libelous meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant has imputed nothing wrong to the complainants in certain and express terms.
But this is not necessary. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical
language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to
impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public
ridicule. Said Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:"The rule is a
sound one that the law cannot shut its eyes to what all the rest of the world can see; and
let the slanderer his language, and wrap up his meaning in ambiguous givings out, as he
will, and it shall not avail him, because courts will understand language, in whatever form
it is used, as all mandkind understands it." (Carter vs. Andrews [1834], 16 Pick. [Mass.],
1.)
Said another court much more recently:
The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases
with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed by the
entirety of the language to the ordinary reader." (Mller vs. O' Connell, City Ct., 57 L. J.,
4
1768, Sept. 12, 1917.)
xxx xxx xxx
The rule was further elucidated in U.S. vs. Sotto where we stated:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Jimenez vs. Reyes (27 Phil. Rep., 52), at Page 59, Justice Trent, writing
the opinion of the court, laid down the rule that for the purpose of determining the
meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous "that construction must be adopted
which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and
ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. The
published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these
rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious
explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question
being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having

been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have
5
the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication.
xxx xxx xxx
1. Considering that there are two classes of membership in the Philippine Columbian Association
associate and proprietary and it is only those of the latter who are qualified to be voted as president of
the association, the act of the petitioner in branding complainant Marquez as a mere de facto president
and insinuating imperfection in the latter's status as a proprietary member, most certainly exposed
Marquez to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of subtlety designed to camouflage the ill-effect of
the petitioner's misdeed would erase the impression already created in the minds of the readers of the
libelous materials. The Solicitor General is correct in stating that calling Marquez a de facto president "is
equivalent to saying that he is a pretender, a fraud, and impostor and he is arrogating unto himself certain
6
powers, rights, and privileges to which he is not entitled.
2. We cannot likewise subscribe to the assertion of the petitioner that the letter and newsletter article
complained of partake of privileged communication. To be classified as a privileged communication, the
disputed letter and article must be absolutely free from any taint of malice which, unfortunately, is not the
case here.
xxx xxx xxx
... Granting that, under Section 9, private communication is made and published, in good
faith, with sole purpose of the protection mentioned in said section, but is false and
malicious, is it entitled to the privilege mentioned in said section, and is the party relieved
from liability when the communication was made "with good motives" and 'for justifiable
ends" or "with justifiable motives?" Malicious motives are inconsistent with "good
motives" for "justifiable ends" and "with justifiable motives." It was not the intention of the
Legislature to make the "privileged communication" in Section 9, absolutely privileged.
7
Such communication must also be free from malice.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, even before he embarked on his crusade against Marquez, knew that the latter was
already a proprietary member of the association. He (the petitioner) had personal knowledge of the
issuance and existence of Certificate of Membership, Series B, No. 44, for proprietary membership in the
name of Marquez. This fact finds support in the respondent court's decision:
xxx xxx xxx
... And to show further that the accused had knowledge of the conversion of the associate
membership of Ponciano Marquez into proprietary as contained in the minutes of April
22, 1968, Exh. A-16, the prosecution called attention to the fact that the accused placed
his initials "PSL" and dated "9/28/78" on the left hand bottom comer of said Exhibit "A-1
6" and marked the Pages on which the Id document may be found with encircled number
"63." The accused admits that the initials and dates and the paging were made by him
when he examined said document, but claims that said document is not an authentic
document, because it is unsigned and he did not bother to inquire from Atty. Reynoso
about it because it was unsigned. However, Atty. Reynoso, who had been the secretary
of the club from 1941 to 1942 and from 1951 to 1971, testified that the minutes were
prepared under his instruction and supervision at the club office, the original was
contained in book form but was lost at the office sometime in 1975-76. The accused,
therefore, should have inquired from Mr. Reynoso as to the authenticity of said copy of
the minutes before making his claim that there is doubt as to the legitimacy of the

presidency. Apparently, Justice Lino Patajo, in stating that the minutes were still in the
club custody until April 10, 1980, was referring to the copy of the minutes and not the
original minutes which were lost sometime in 1975 or 1976. There was, therefore, no
sufficient ground to claim that there was no basis for the conversion of the associate
8
membership of Ponciano Marquez into proprietary membership.
xxx xxx xxx
In any case, even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the petitioner's letter dated January 2, 1979 is
privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the newsletter
and circulated among the general membership of the Philippine Columbian Association. When he
undertook to be the auditor of the association, the petitioner was under the obligation to keep his findings
in strict confidence between him and the association's Board of Directors. The fact that the petitioner
rendered his services gratis can not justify the violation of that confidence. His contention that he
reviewed the records of the association exercising his right as a member thereof and thus not bound by
any confidentiality is untenable. He stated in his petition that he undertook the job as a service to the
association. For this reason, he was duty bound to report his discoveries first to the Board of Directors
which represents the association and is the only body that can make the necessary correction in case
there was really a mistake in the membership records. The petitioner's precipitate act of immediately
going public with his alleged findings is unpardonable.
The petitioner further contests the authenticity and propriety of the unsigned minutes of the meeting of the
association's Board of Directors which showed the approval of the private complainant's application for
conversion of membership status from associate to proprietary. Upon review of the records of this case,
we however find the said minutes to be proper evidence. Their authenticity has been sufficiently
9
established by the testimony of the association's former secretary, Atty. Jose Reynoso.
Another circumstance which militates against the petitioner's pretensions of good faith and performance
of a moral and social duty was his irresponsible act of letter writing to expose his alleged discovery of
what he perceived to be an anomaly. When he saw the unsigned minutes of the association's Board of
Directors, he immediately sent out the assailed letters eventually culminating in the publication of the
subject newsletter sans the verification which ordinary prudence demands.
Finally, the petitioner maintains that the actions against him are pure harassment. This accusation finds
no support in the records of this case. On the other hand, we accept the finding of the respondent court
that the motive of the petitioner in maligning the reputation of the Marquez has been amply established.
Said that court:
xxx xxx xxx
... .It is apparent from the circumstances brought out in the case that because the
accused was not extended appointment to his position as member of the steering
committee of the club, which committee is very important because it was created to
implement the terms and conditions of their memorandum of agreement with Permaline,
Inc. for the construction of the Philippine Columbian Sports Complex, which, at that time,
is worth P30,000,000.00 but merely to the chairmanship of the finance committee which
Mr. Lacsa rejected and which rejection Mr. Marquez accepted, the accused felt aggrieved
and then began taking steps to find cause criticizing Marquez' actuations as president of
10
the association.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED; and the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby AFFIRMED Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LT. COL. EDUARDO KAPUNAN, JR., PAF, and LT. COL. NELSON ESLAO, PAF, petitioners,
vs.
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. MANUEL CASACLANG, AFP,
COMMODORE VIRGILIO Q. MARCELO, AFP, PMA SUPERINTENDENT COMMODORE ROGELIO
DAYAN, AFP, GENERAL COURT MARTIAL NO. 8, MAJ. PEDRO ROSAL, JAGS, MAJ. FELIX V.
BALDONADO, JAGS, LT. COL. RODULFO MUNAR, JAGS and AFP BOARD OF
OFFICERS, respondents.
Roco, Bunag & Kapunan Law Offices for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or habeas corpus, petitioners, who were implicated in the
unsuccessful coup d'etat of August 28, 1987 and relieved of their duties in the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), seek the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition (1) to set aside, as null and
void, the "pre-trial investigation" report finding a prima facie case against them and recommending their
trial for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer and the denial of their motion for reconsideration, and
(2) to enjoin respondent General Court Martial No. 8 from further proceeding in the case of "People v. Lt.
Col. Eduardo Kapunan, et al." Further, petitioner Kapunan seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus to procure his release from confinement.
On May 19, 1988, the Court issued an order restraining respondent General Court Martial No. 8 from
proceeding with the arraignment of petitioners scheduled for that date [Rollo, pp. 124-125].
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the respondents, to which petitioners filed a reply. After
petitioners moved for the early resolution of the case and respondents filed the required rejoinder, the
Court considered the case ripe for resolution.
In brief, the pertinent facts are as follows:
In the aftermath of the failed August 28, 1987 coup d'etat where cadets of the Philippine Military Academy
reportedly openly supported the plotters and issued statements to that effect, respondent PMA
Superintendent Dayan created on August 31, 1987 a PMA Board of Officers to investigate the alleged
involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA [Rollo, p. 187]. A fact-finding investigation was conducted
by the PMA Board from September 1 to 11, 1987 and on September 23, 1987 it submitted its findings to
the AFP Chief of Staff [Rollo, p. 195]. On the basis of the findings of the PMA Board, respondent AFP
Board of Officers recommended on October 8, 1987 the filing of charges against Maj. Doromal and Lts.
Catapang and Baltazar and the reprimand of cadets Paredes, Tutaan, D. Macasaet, F. Macasaet,
Lenterio, Rulloda and Balisi [Rollo, pp. 34-36].

A few days later, respondent PMA Superintendent Dayan verbally instructed the PMA Board of Officers to
take the testimonies of certain witnesses, which it did from October 12 to 16,1987 [Rollo, p. 195]. These
statements were submitted to the Chief of Staff [Rollo, p. 37] and became the basis for the
recommendation of the AFP Board, dated October 30, 1987, for the filing of charges against petitioners
[Rollo, pp. 38-40]. Charge sheets (and amended charge sheets) were filed against petitioners for mutiny
and conduct unbecoming an officer (Arts. 67 and 96 of the Articles of War) [Rollo, pp. 42-45; 72-75] and a
"pre-trial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado.
Petitioners were subpoenaed and required by Maj. Baldonado to file their counter-affidavits or testify in
the "pre-trial investigation" [Rollo, p. 41], but instead of doing so, petitioners filed an untitled pleading
seeking the dismissal of the charges against them [Rollo, pp. 46-68]. In a "pre-trial investigation" report
dated February 1, 1988, a prima facie case was found against petitioners and the case was
recommended for trial by a general court martial [Rollo, pp. 76-80]. Petitioners' motion to dismiss was
also denied.
Thereafter, petitioners were served subpoenas to appear before respondent General Court Martial No. 8
for arraignment. The first scheduled hearing for petitioners' arraignment was reset after three (3)
members of the general court martial inhibited themselves. Petitioners, in the meantime, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the "pre-trial investigation" report. In the next hearing, petitioners objected to their
arraignment and moved for a deferment thereof. When this was denied, petitioners' civilian counsel (their
counsel in this case) moved to be excused from the proceedings. The general court martial granted the
motion and postponed the hearing to May 19, 1988, directing petitioners to secure the services of new
counsel. It was at this point that the instant petition was filed before the Court.
In the meantime, petitioner Kapunan was allegedly summoned to the General Headquarters of the AFP
for a dialogue, but upon his arrival thereat on September 4, 1987 he was ordered confined under "house
arrest" by then Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos. On February 19, 1988, the arrest of petitioner Kapunan,
together with three (3) others, was ordered by respondent Chief of Staff De Villa in connection with the
killing of Atty. Rolando Olalia and Leonore Alay-ay [Rollo, p. 69]. On May 19, 1988, Gen. De Villa ordered
the release of Kapunan in connection with the Olalia case since no charges had been filed therein, but
ordered that he remain under confinement as an accused in the case before respondent General Court
Martial No. 8 [Rollo, p. 200]. He has been so detained since then. Likewise, petitioners Kapunan and
Eslao were relieved of their duties and functions as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Assistant
Commandant of Cadets of the PMA, respectively.
After the instant petition was filed, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the "pre-trial investigation"
report was denied by Gen. De Villa [Rollo, pp 128-129].
The issues raised in the petition are three-fold: (1) whether or not petitioners have been denied due
process of law in the investigation of the charges against them; (2) whether or not respondent Maj.
Baldonado gravely abused his discretion in finding a prima facie case and recommending the trial of
petitioners before a court martial; and (3) whether or not the continued confinement of petitioner Kapunan
is legal.
These issues shall be discussed ad seriatim.
1. Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process primarily because the procedure followed
in the investigation of the charges against them was not in compliance with the requirements of the
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) and the law on preliminary investigations
(Presidential Decree No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911).
Under military law, the conduct of investigations is primarily governed by Art. 71 of the Articles of War, to
wit:

Art. 71 Charges; Action upon.Charges and specifications must be signed by a person

subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or
has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the
best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include
inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what
disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such
investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf,
either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such
investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the
testimony taken on both sides.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, which respondent Maj. Baldonado applied
suppletorily to the Articles of War by requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits [Rollo, p. 41],
provides:
Sec. 1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an
investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, city or municipal judge or
other officer in accordance with law and the Rules of Court of the Philippines, no
information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the
provincial or city fiscal or his assistants or by a state prosecutor, without first conducting a
preliminary investigation in the following manner:
a. All complaints shall be accompanied by statements of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents. The statements of the complainant and
his witnesses shall be sworn to before any fiscal or state prosecutor or before any
government official authorized to administer oath. The officer administering the oath must
certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
b. If on the basis of the complainant's sworn statements and documents submitted, the
investigating fiscal or state prosecutor finds no probable cause to conduct a preliminary
investigation, he shall dismiss the case. If probable cause is established by complainant's
evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena requiring him to submit
his counter-affidavit and the affidavit of his witnesses, if any, and other supporting
documents, within ten (10) days from receipt of such subpoena. If respondent cannot be
subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the investigating fiscal or state
prosecutor, the preliminary investigation shall proceed without him. To such subpoena
shall be attached a copy of the complaint, the sworn statements and other documents
submitted. Other evidence submitted shall be made available for examination of the
respondent or his counsel. The statements of the respondent and his witnesses shall be
sworn to before any fiscal or state prosecutor or before any government official
authorized to administer oath and with the same certification as above-mentioned. The
respondent shall furnish the complainant copies of his counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents.
c. If a prima-facie case is established by the evidence, the investigating fiscal or state
prosecutor shall immediately file the corresponding information in court. If he finds that

there is no prima faciecase, he shall dismiss the case unless he believes there are
matters to be clarified in which case he may propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses affording both parties opportunity to be present but without right
to examine or cross-examine. If the parties or their counsel so desire, they may submit
questions to the fiscal which the latter may in his discretion propound to the parties
concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct
unbecoming an officer [Rollo, pp. 42-45; 72-75], were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to
military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including
the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers [Rollo, pp. 34-36; 38-40], and was convinced of the truth
of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser", in accordance
with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War [Rollo, pp. 45, 75]. Considering that
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge
sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering
the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood his affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
Thereafter, a "pre-trial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counteraffidavits [Rollo, p. 41]. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal
of the charges against them [Rollo, pp. 46-68]. That petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses
against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses
so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P.D. No. 77, as amended
by P. D. No. 911.
Further, petitioners cannot complain that they were denied the opportunity to be heard, considering that
the arguments in their pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges were considered in Maj. Baldonado's
"pre-trial investigation" report, as can be clearly seen from the text of the report itself [Rollo, pp. 76-80].
Anent petitioners' contention that they were denied due process when they were not given the opportunity
to be heard in the inquiry conducted by the PMA Board of Officers, it must be stressed that such was in
the nature of afact-finding inquiry, as distinguished from the "pre-trial investigation" conducted by Maj.
Baldonado which corresponds to the preliminary investigation under P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911, where the object is to determine the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of the accused. Viewed from another angle, the investigations conducted by the PMA Board
were akin to the investigations conducted by the police and other investigative agencies to gather facts to
support the subsequent filing of the appropriate charges against suspects.
Collaterally, petitioners argue that they were denied due process because the investigators, Chief of Staff
de Villa, who denied the motion to reconsider the "pre-trial investigation" report, and PMA Superintendent
Dayan, who constituted the PMA Board of Officers and ordered the inquiry, were themselves culpable for
the acts of the PMA cadets and officers on the basis of the doctrine of command responsibility. This
argument must however fail as the doctrine finds no application to the facts of the case. The acts imputed
to petitioners were allegedly in furtherance of the failed coup d'etat of August 28, 1987, which constituted
a breach of and was directed against the chain of command of the AFP, which De Villa and Dayan
formed part of. The fallacy in petitioners' reliance on the doctrine of command responsibility becomes
apparent when their argument is pursued to its logical end. Under their theory, even the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, can ultimately be held culpable for the unsuccessful August 28, 1987 coup d' etat.

2. The next issue raised by petitioners is the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to establish a prima
facie case to warrant their prosecution. They argue that the factual findings of Maj. Baldonado in his "pretrial investigation" report are insufficient to support a prima facie case for mutiny and conduct unbecoming
an officer under Arts. 67 and 96 of the Articles of War and, therefore, he gravely abused his discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in finding a prima facie case and recommending the trial of
petitioners by court martial.
The Court finds the contention unmeritorious. No grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction can be attributed to Maj. Baldonado for finding a prima facie case, for such is supported by
the evidence on record. Thus, the "pre-trial investigation" report states:
xxx xxx xxx
5. On or about 2400H 28 Aug 87, CAPT ALFREDO BAMBICO JR. PA a member of the
Tactics Group briefed PMA Cadets at the Officer's Lounge about the camp defense plan
and the movements of cadets from PMA to Baguio City. Present at the briefing were
respondents LT. COL. EDUARDO KAPUNAN and LT. COL. NELSON ESLAO and about
thirty (30) junior officers. On or about 0200H 29 Aug 87, CAPT CELSO DEL ROSARIO
CO Transportation Maintenance Company, PMA received a call from LT. COL.
KAPUNAN J-3, PMA to dispatch two (2) 6 x 6 trucks and one (1) bus to proceed near the
vicinity of the J-3 Office. On or about 0200H - 0300H 29 Aug 87 said vehicles moved out
with cadets on board, and led by respondent l LT. CATAPANG who was on board a jeep.
CADET (1 C) JOHN BULALACAO stated that LT. BALTAZAR was with them in the bus.
This movement of cadets and officers was not sanctioned by the PMA Superintendent.
According to SGT. MARBI RIMANDO, driver of one of the 6 x 6 trucks, the cadets were in
fatigue uniform, wore black bonnets, had blackened their faces, and were armed.
6. SGT. RICARDO LAGMAY, Truck Driver, Motor Pool, TMC PMA averred that he was
the driver of the other 6 x 6 truck with about forty (40) cadets on board, which moved out
on that occasion. The column was, however, stopped at the checkpoint by an MP officer
and they halted and parked thereat for about thirty (30) minutes, after which they returned
to the mess hall. CADET (1C) BULALACAO stated that the cadets were met at the mess
hall by LT. COL. KAPUNAN and were informed by the latter that the cause or coup was
already finished. CADET (1C) NEMESIO GACAL stated that he heard LT. COL.
KAPUNAN say, that "we are a hell of a corps". [Rollo, pp. 77].
Maj. Baldonado's findings are also supported by those of the AFP Board of Officers, which considered the
testimonies of witnesses taken by the PMA Board of Officers pursuant to the order of PMA
Superintendent Dayan [see Rollo, pp. 38-40].
3. Finally, petitioner Kapunan questions the legality of his confinement under "house arrest" and seeks
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to procure his release.
The Court finds that petitioner Kapunan's continued confinement is not tainted with illegality.
Among the grounds for the disallowance of the writ of habeas corpus is that the applicant has been
charged with or convicted of in offense [Sec. 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court]. In the instant case, petitioner
Kapunan had been charged with mutiny, a serious offense punishable by death or such other punishment
as a court-martial may direct [Art. 67, Articles of War], for which he may be arrested or confined under Art.
70 of the Articles of War, to wit:
Art. 70. Arrest or confinement.Any person subject to military law charged with crime or
with a serious offense under these Articles shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as
circumstances may require; but when charged with a minor offense only, such person

shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. Any person placed in arrest under the
provisions of this article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent,
unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper authority. ...
Thus, at the time petitioner Kapunan applied to this Court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
there was legal cause for his confinement. On this score, the writ prayed for will not issue.
On the matter of the restriction imposed on petitioner Kapunan as conditions for his "house arrest",
particularly that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of
his detention at his quarters in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City [Rollo, p. 70], the Court is of the view that
such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of
persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military
discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the
military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline
within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully
complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the
restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on May 19, 1988 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.