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Administrative Law

DOCTRINES OF CASES:

its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular


fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government.

Assignment No. 1
1. ISA v. CA
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or
attributed normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No.
272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the
Government of the Philippines. It is common
knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of
the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate
form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or
instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the
Republic.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the
first instance, in the charters and, by way of
supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation
Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a nonincorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities
are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been
shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic.
2.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative


agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose.
4.

CGA claims that since the respondents cannot comply


with their obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver
the property free from all liens and encumbrances,
CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund
of the payments already made. This cause of action
clearly falls under the actions
contemplated by
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads:
Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman
5.

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the


panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be
considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or
commission, still both he and the panel are
comprehended within the concept of a quasi-judicial
instrumentality.

3.

Solid Homes v. Payawal


As a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and
more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of

Ang Tibay v. CIR


Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of CA 103.

Luzon Development Bank v. Assoc of LDB

An instrumentality is anything used as a means or


agency. Thus, the terms governmental agency or
instrumentality are synonymous in the sense that
either of them is a means by which a government acts,
or by which a certain government act or function is
performed. The word instrumentality, with respect to
a state, contemplates an authority to which the state
delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function. An individual person, like an
administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality
in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that a
sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an
instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy
of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the
state.

Christian General v. Ignacio

CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of


procedure, and CA 103 requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable
6.

Lianga Bay v. Enage


Judge Enage erred in taking cognizance of the
complaint filed by Ago for the same issue had already
been determined by the Director of Forestry, the
Secretary of DANR and the Office of the President,
administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the
matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised
Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry the
jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation and use
of all public forests and forest reserves. The Secretary

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of DANR, as department head, may repeal or modify


the decision of said Director when advisable in the
public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to
the Office of the President.

defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no


valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is
done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the
existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed that by
predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good
faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause"
for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a
reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for
cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or
conditions that call for disciplinary action. Good faith,
as a component of a reorganization under a
constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each
case

Assignment No. 2
1. Larin v. Executive Secretary
The reorganization of BIR was made in bad faith.
In Dario v. Mison, the SC clarified that as a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. Also, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists
down the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the
removal of employees as a result of the reorganization
to wit - a) Where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the
same functions is created; c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; d) Where there is
a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation
provided in Section 3 hereof." Section 1.1.2 of EO 132.
is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in
Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office is
abolished and another one performing substantially the
same function is created. Another circumstance is the
creation of services and divisions in the BIR resulting
to a significant increase in the number of positions in
the said bureau as contemplated in paragraph (a) of
section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O.
No. 132, the Information Systems Group has two newly
created Systems Services. Aside from this, six new
divisions are also created. Under Section 1.2.1, three
more divisions of the Assessment Service are formed.
With this newly created offices, there is no doubt that a
significant increase of positions will correspondingly
follow. Furthermore, it is perceivable that the nonreappointment of the petitioner as Assistant
Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656.
Under said provision, officers holding permanent
appointments are given preference for appointment to
the new positions in the approved staffing pattern
comparable to their former position or in case there are
not enough comparable positions to positions next
lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career
executive officer who is holding a permanent position.
Hence, he should have given preference for
appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner.

2.

Dario v. Mison
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to

3.

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Exec Secretary


General rule: The power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the LEGISLATURE. This proceeds from
the legal precept that the power to create includes the
power to destroy. A public office is either created by
the (1) Constitution, (2) by statute, or (3) by authority
of law. Thus, except where the office was created by
the constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.
Exception: As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the Presidents
power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of an office or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
Reorganization is valid provided they are pursued in
good faith (if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient). RA 6656 provides
for the circumstances which may be evidence of bad
faith in the removal of civil service employees as a
result of reorganization. Petitioners claim the
deactiviation was done in bad faith because four days
after deactivation, Estrada crearted TF Aduana.
An examination of the pertinent EOs shows that the
reorg and creation of TF Aduana were done in good
faith. Purpose was not to remove EIIB employees but to
achieve economy. The creation of TF Aduana does not
entail expense to the government.

4.

Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration


Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines
of control, authority and responsibility between them.
The President has the authority to carry out
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive
department, what is left for the SC to resolve is whether
or not the reorganization is valid.
Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is

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carried our in good faith if it is for the purpose of


economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
RA 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of
civil service employees made as a result of
reorganization:
a. where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency
concerned;
b. where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same
functions is created;
c. where incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance, and merit;
d. where there is a classification of offices in
the department or agency concerned and
the
reclassified
offices
perform
substantially the same functions as the
original offices; and
e. where the removal violates the order of
separation.

5.

statute has been cited to uphold this power. It is not


found in sec. 28 (of the Securities Act), which is
entitled "Powers (of the Commission) with respect to
Exchanges and Securities".
According to many court precedents, the general power
to "regulate" which the Commission has (Sec. 33) does
not imply authority to prohibit.
2.

The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with


jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the
election of officers of the FABC. It is a well-settled
principle of administrative law that unless expressly
empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasijudicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative
authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of
the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer
it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give
validity to their determinations. There is neither a
statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even
by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary
of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction
over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by
the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision
"to ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law." The general supervision is exercised by the
President through the Secretary of Local Government.

Crisostomo v. CA
PD 1341did not abolish, but only changed, the former
PCC into what is now the PUP, in the same way that
earlier in 1952, RA 778 had converted what was then
the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine
College of Commerce. What took place was a change
in academic status of the educational institution, not in
its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the
expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in
its structure and organization. When the purpose is to
abolish a department or an office or an organization and
to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority
says so. SC cited EO 709 (creating Ministry of Trade
and Industry), EO 710 (creating Ministry of Public
Works and Highways), RA 6975 (creating National
Police Commission and abolishing the existing
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police), all
of which explicitly provides the creation of a new office
and the abolition of the old one. In contrast, PD1341
expressly provides that PCC is hereby converted into a
university to be known as Polytechnic University of the
Philippines.

Moreover, although the Department is given the power


to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
"monitoring compliance" by local government units of
such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or
check. This is compatible with the power of supervision
of the Secretary over local governments which as
earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the
local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Even the Local Government Code which
grants the Secretary power to issue implementing
circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these
issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent
Secretary exercises only supervision and not control
over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could
enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any doubt
therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere
with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the
greater autonomy of the local government.

Assignment No. 3
1. Makati Stock Exchange Inc v. SEC
It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only
such powers as are expressly granted to him by the
statute, and these necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof.
Commission's argument is that: (a) it was approved by
the Department Head before the War; and (b) it is
not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act.
In our opinion, the approval of the Department, by
itself, adds no weight in a judicial litigation; and the test
is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from
imposing a prohibition; but whether it empowers the
Commission to prohibit. No specific portion of the

Taule v. Santos

3.
4.

Solid Homes v. Payawal


Cario v. CHR
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual

Administrative Law

conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by


the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

5546. These acts constitute dishonesty and grave


misconduct, and furnish legal basis for dismissal from
the public service.
7.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien ,


and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is
so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals
are confronted with situation in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to


investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the
merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim
that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed.
5.

Villaluz v. Zaldivar
The Commissioner of Civil Service is without
jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
charges filed against petitioner because the authority of
said Commissioner to pass upon questions of
suspension, separation, or removal can only be
exercised with reference to permanent officials and
employees in the classified service to which
classification petitioner does not belong.

Where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to


be made between a rule of international law and a
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and
are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by


respondents insofar as the investigation and disciplinary
action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he
is under the control and supervision of the Department
of Public Works, in view of the reason we have already
stated that he is a presidential appointee who comes
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President.
6.

AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis


of which petitioner was removed from office. Those
findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated
the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new
academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects
resulting in wastage of university property, all without
the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; (b) he
directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of
chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes
from a firm owned by him; (c) he executed, on behalf
of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a
company where he was holding a directorship; and (d)
he collected financial contributions from the faculty and
students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No.

The fact that international law has been made part of


the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal
law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that
rules of international law are given equal standing with,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

Ruiz v. Drillon

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings


and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to an administrative decision that is based
on substantial evidence made of record and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made
against him and the evidence presented against him
during
the
hearings
of
the
investigating
committees. 17 There is no doubt that he has been
accorded his rights.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion

8.

Pefianco v. Moral

The challenged Order of the trial court falls short of the


requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely
discussed the general concept of mandamus and the
trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of
administrative agencies without stating the basis why
petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied. We are
reproducing hereunder for reference the assailed Order Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance
of the discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis the
ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to
dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of action, and the dispositive
portion of the order. The order only confused petitioner
and left her unable to determine the errors which would
be the proper subject of her motion for reconsideration.
Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating
therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for

Administrative Law

their issuance, which are necessary for the full


understanding of the action taken. Where the court
itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very
strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration
before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had,
would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself
was not precise and specific in his order, a certain
degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict
compliance with the rules was justified.
9.

Camara v. Municipal Court

In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the


kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such
searches when authorized and conducted without a
warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which
the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual.
The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause."
Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation,
the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at
securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical
standards for private property. The primary
governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the
unintentional development of conditions which are
hazardous to public health and safety.
There is unanimous agreement among those most
familiar with this field that the only effective way to
seek universal compliance with the minimum standards
required by municipal codes is through routine
periodic inspections of all structures. [12] It is here that
the probable cause debate is focused.
There can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.
But we think that a number of persuasive factors
combine to support the reasonableness of area codeenforcement inspections. First, such programs have a
long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second,
the public interest demands that all dangerous
conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that
any other canvassing technique would achieve
acceptable results. Finally, because the inspections are
neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.
Even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally
upheld in emergency situations. On the other hand, in
the case of most routine area inspections, there is no
compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on
a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow
inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as
a practical matter and in light of the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the
property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants
should normally be sought only after entry is refused
unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is
other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry

10. Zalazar v. Achacoso


Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who
may issue warrants of search and arrest." Mayors may
not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not
being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the
judicial process.
11. Catura v. CIR
The power to investigate, to be conscientious and
rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into
existing facts and conditions. The documents required
to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid
character as to whether or not there was a failure to
comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this
Court to whittle down the authority conferred on
administrative agencies to assure the effective
administration of a statute, in this case intended to
protect the rights of union members against its officers.
The matter was properly within its cognizance and the
means necessary to give it force and effectiveness
should be deemed implied unless the power sought to
be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private
rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such
showing has been made; no such showing can be made.
12. Carbonnel v. CA
13. Santiago v. Morales
14. In re contempt: Armando Ramos
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When
authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred
upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial
person, committee, or other body, such authority shall
be understood to comprehend the right to administer
oaths and summons witnesses and shall include
authority to require the production of documents under
a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two
of this Act, any one who, without lawful excuse, fails to
appear upon summons issued under the authority of the
preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any
individual or body exercising the power therein defined,
refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce
documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully
required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of
contempt of court and upon application of the
individual or body exercising the power in question
shall be dealt with by the judge of first instance having
jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
15. Masangcay v. COMELEC

Administrative Law

The COMELEC has the duty to enforce and administer


all laws to the conduct of elections, and also the power
to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this
sense, the Commission, although it cannot be classified
a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution
(Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by
express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The
difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between
the duty which inherently is administrative in character
and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasijudicial function of the Commission. The Commission
exercises a ministerial function, it cannot exercise the
power to punish contempt because such power is
inherently judicial in nature. 'The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts... The exercise of this
power has always been regarded as a necessary incident
and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative
bodies has been invariably limited to making effective
the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.
16. Bedol v. COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct
investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of
the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred
upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election
laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasilegislative power refers to the issuance of rules and
regulations to implement the election laws and to
exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function
refers to the enforcement and administration of election
laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution
(Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election
Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.

respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an


officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to
allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by
the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the abovequoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the
Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure
and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.
17. Gaoiran v. Alcala
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo was not concededly verified,
appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint
that he filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn
statements of his witnesses. These documents could
very well be considered as constituting the complaint
against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the
Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance
of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous
complaints filed against court employees or officials for
violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct.12 Indeed, it
is not totally uncommon that a government agency is
given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its
investigative powers. After all, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied
Nevertheless, during the formal investigation of the
case, respondent [referring to the petitioner] failed to
submit his written counter-affidavit/answer to the
charges filed against him by the complainant so he was
declared in default. This notwithstanding, the oral
testimony given during the fact-finding investigation
was considered in his (respondent's) favor to enable this
office to determine the veracity of the allegations
imputed against the respondent.
Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that
he was denied procedural due process. What is
repugnant to due process is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. The petitioner was undoubtedly
afforded the opportunity to present his side as he was
directed to file his written answer to the formal charge
against him. He opted not to do so. He cannot now
feign denial of due process.
18. Ang Tibay v. CIR

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power


is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and
the performance of and administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of
judicial functions. It may be said generally that the
exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the
law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with