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Administrative Law

Atty. Gallant Soriano

De Leon
Assignment #1

Define Admin Law (5 legal scholars)

WIDEST SENSE entire system of laws under which the machinery of the
State works and by which the State performs all government acts.
Embrace all the laws that regulate or control the administrative
organization and operations of the government including the legislative
and judicial branches.
VERY BROAD the law which controls or is intended to control the
administrative operations of the government or the law of governmental
LESS COMPREHENSIVE part of public law which fixes the organization
and determines the competence of the administrative authorities, and
indicates to the individual, remedies for the violation of his rights.
Branch of modern law under which the executive department of
government acting in quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity,
interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of
promoting the well-being of the community, as under laws
regulating public corporations, business affected with a public
interest, professions, trades and calling, rates and prices, laws
for the protection of the public health and safety and the
promotion of the public convenience and advantage.
System of legal principles to settle the conflicting claims of
executive and administrative authority on the one hand of the
individual or private rights on the other.
Law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative
agencies including specially the law governing judicial review of
administrative action.
GENERALLY part of the law which governs the organization, functions,
and procedures of administrative agencies of the government to which
(quasi)legislative powers are delegated and judicial powers are granted,
and the extent and manner to which such agencies are subject to control
by the courts.


5 elements

Iron & Steel v. CA

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA

FACTS: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry.

PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August
9, 1973. When ISAs original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term
was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31,
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the
National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by
the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing,
among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and
major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion
program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of
the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement
a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for
the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a nonoperational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November
16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view
of the expiration of ISAs term.
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally
associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD
No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in
fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the
Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate
form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly
vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of
the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested
with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously
described as legal personality.

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers,

duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency
revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution
or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other
identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such
expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way
of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the
instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once
again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to
have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the
In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its
capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the
Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate
user of the properties involved.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be
substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory
term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs
statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.

Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Employees

October 6, 1995
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the LDB and the Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to
resolve the following issue:
Whether or not the company has violated the CBA provision and the MOA
on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective
Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator,
received ALDBEs Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit


its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding
them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by
Without LDBs Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the
CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the
ISSUE: WON a voluntary arbiters decision is appealable to the CA and not
the SC
HELD: The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.
YES. The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel
of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter.
The (d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission Hence, while there is
an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic
Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator
is, more often than not, elevated to the SC itself on a petition for
certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the
CA. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary
burden upon it.
In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise
that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that
the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence,
their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that a
voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity. Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator,
whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasijudicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

decisions are not appealable to the latter.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides
that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the
Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary
arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board
or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the
concept of a quasi-judicial instrumentality.

the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act
No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award
of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the CA, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic
Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a
special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or
submission, or if none be specified, the RTC for the province or city in
which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the
arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction.
In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator
with that of the RTC. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that
award or decision, the CA must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction
with the SC. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to
the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

An instrumentality is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the

terms governmental agency or instrumentality are synonymous in the
sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by
which a certain government act or function is performed. The word
instrumentality, with respect to a state, contemplates an authority to
which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function. An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a
judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that
a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the
court, and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an
instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a
governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the
Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
instrumentality in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his
functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place
him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated therein.
It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is
also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the
forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid
down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the CA under

1. In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an

impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and
arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to
accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding. Arbitration may
be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either
compulsory or voluntary.
Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are
compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are
compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a
third party. 1 The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a
dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision
is final and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a
third party is normally appointed by the government.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the
parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their
collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding
resolution. 2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with
by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered
by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply
with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen
arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear
and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by
said arbitrators decision.

involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless

of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

Fixes the administrative organization and structure of the government

Execution or enforcement of which is entrusted to administrative
Governs public officers including their competence to act, rights, duties,
liabilities, election, etc.
Creates administrative agencies. Defines their powers and functions,
prescribes their procedures, including the adjudication or settlement by
them of contested matters involving private interests.
Provides the remedies, administrative or judicial, available to those
aggrieved by administrative actions or decisions
Judicial review of or relief against, administrative actions or decisions
Rules, regulations, orders and decisions made by administrative authorities
dealing with the interpretation and enforcement of the laws entrusted to
their administrator
Body of judicial decisions and doctrines dealing with any of the above.

2. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original
jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over
(1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and
(2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to
exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has
jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:
. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties
for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes,
the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:


3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers

may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare
and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,


2 concerns of Admin Law

PRIVATE RIGHTS - protection of rights, nature and the mode of exercise
of administrative power and the system of relief against administrative
action; impact of administrative process on private rights
officers and agencies exercising delegated powers and not with the
exercise of the constitutional powers of the President. FUSION of different
types of governmental powers in certain public officers.

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

Different scopes of admin law (Examples each)


Origin and development

traditionally recognized parts of the law. The rapid expansion of
administrative agencies and increased functions that a substantial body of
jurisprudence has developed in the field and general recognition has been
given to administrative law as distinct category of law.
complex, subjects of government regulations increased, which caused a
multiplication of government functions, necessitating an enormous
expansion of public administration. Legislature had to create more and
more admin bodies specialized in the particular fields assigned to them.
Courts were found not to be equipped to administer properly and
to the needs of changing society. Combination of forces in order to
respond to the complexities of a modern age which cannot be dealt with
directly in an effective manner by the legislature or the judiciary. Issues

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

ought to be decided by experts and not by a judge, or at least not in the

first instance.
AGENCIES resulted from the increased functions of government.
Extensive investigation, rule-making, and adjudicating powers
Vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
better carry out some legislative policies
(a) Laws which created them, (b) ruels and regulations created
by them and (c) body of decision that they have from time to
time redered in the adjudication cases brought before them, now
constitute the bulk of administrative law.
LAW IN THE MAKING still in its formative stages and being developed as
part of our traditional system of law.
PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW American and English jurisprudence
has persuasive, though not controlling, force in our jurisdiction.

Solid Homes v. Payawal

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989







On August 31, 1982, a complaint was filed by Teresita Payawal against
Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
plaintiff alleged that Solid Homes contracted to sell to her a subdivision
lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and
that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid Solid Homes the total
amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid
Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to
deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated
demands because the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith
to a financing company. Payawal asked for delivery of the title to the lot
or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest.
She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the
National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.
The RTC ruled in favor of Payawal and ordered Solid Homes to deliver to
her the title or failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus
interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also
awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P
10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit. The CA affirmed
the decision.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: the RTC of QC has no jurisdiction. It is settled that any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at
any time, even on appeal before the Court. The only exception is where
the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel, which does not appear
in the case before the Court.
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled
"Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution
in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no
room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the
petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial
Court but in the National Housing Authority.
The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129,
which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost
or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than
twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).
This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail
regardless of the dates of their enactment. The fact that one law is
special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a
general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case.
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the
general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later,
it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior
general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be
construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication. It is obvious that the general law
in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law. Also, the RTC
and NHA does not have a concurrent jurisdiction over the case.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is
part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear
and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman."
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help
in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular
fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or
the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be
liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in
accordance with the legislative purpose.

CGA v. Ignacio


Brion, 2009
Christian General Assembly entered into a contract to sell a subdivision
lot with the the Spouses Ignacioregistered owners and developers of a
housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla subdivision located in
Barangay Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Under the contract to sell, CGA would
pay P2M for the subject property on instalment basis. According to CGA,
it religiously paid the monthly instalments until its pastor discovered that
the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal flaws and
defects. CGA learned that the subject property was actually part of two
consolidated lots which had been placed under PD 27s operation land
transfer. The DAR authorized Purificacion Imperial, former landowner, to
retain the farm lots.
CGA filed a complaint before the RTC claiming that the respondents
fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a
property under litigation. Thus, the contract was rescissible. Respondents
filed an action claiming that the cas falls within the jurisdiction of HLURB
since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. RTC ruled in favour of CGA.
CA reversed. CGA says cases falling within the HLURB is limited to those
involving specific performance and does not cover actions for rescission.
Which of the tworegular court or the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction
over CGAs action for rescission
From these allegations, the main thrust of the CGA complaint is clear to
compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the
subject property because the respondents were selling a property that
they apparently did not own.
In other words, CGA claims that since the respondents cannot comply
with their obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver the property
free from all liens and encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the
contract and get a refund of the payments already made. This cause of
action clearly falls under the actions contemplated by Paragraph (b),
Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads: Claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;
We view CGAs contention that the CA erred in applying Article 1191
of the Civil Code as basis for the contracts rescission to be a

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

negligible point. Regardless of whether the rescission of contract is based

on Article 1191 or 1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that what
CGA principally wants is a refund of all payments it already made to the

What are the criticisms in admin action

Tendency towards ARBITRARINESS
Lack of knowledge and aptitude in sound JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE
Susceptibility to POLITICAL BIAS or pressure, often brought about by
uncertainty of tenure
Disregard for the safeguards that insure a FULL and FAIR hearing
Absence of standards RULES AND PROCEDURE suitable of each agency
Dangerous COMBINATION of legislative, executive, and judicial functions.

Ang Tibay v. CIR

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
GR NO. L-46496. FEBRUARY 27, 1940
FACTS: The SolGen, in behalf of CIR in the above-entitled case, has filed
an MR. NLU, on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the SC and the remanding of the case to the CIR for a new
trial and avers, among others, that:






Teodoros claim that, on September 26, 1938, that there was shortage
of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily
lay off 89 members of the NLU is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Account of native
dealers in leather and was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of a bond despite the breach of Teodoros contract with the
Philippine Army;
the National Workers Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or
employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal;
in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining,
majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
the provisions of the Civil Code which had been the principal source of
dissenssions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be
made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has
always been the rule;


employer Teodoro is guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating

against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB.
ANG TIBAY filed an opposition for both motions of reconsideration and
new trial.
ISSUE: The SC deemed it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure
in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize
certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial
of cases brought before it.
HELD: YES. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA103). It is
more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of
the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. (Sec.
1) It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration,
decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy
or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farmlaborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of
labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing
and proper to be dealt with by the Court for the sake of public interest. It
shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute
by amicable agreement. (Sec. 4) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to

be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Sec. 5) In
fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur
to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory
arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor
and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling
of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.


CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of

procedure, and CA 103 requires it to act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable. (Sec. 20) It
shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by
the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the
award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes (Sec. 13)





The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to
be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play;
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish his rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented, otherwise
such rights is vain - such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration;
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded i.e. that of
having something to support it is a nullity, aplce when directly
attached this emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere since law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power;
The evidence must be substantial i.e. such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion to free


administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the

mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order which,
however, does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence
having rational probative force mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence;
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected - It should not, however, detract from their
duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing
itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the
facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Sec. 9) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement
to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official
such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the
Court itself of any of its powers. (Sec. 10);
The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision;
The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations
and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by
the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth


Advantages of admin process vis-a-vis court proceedings

EXECUTIVE ACTION insures greater uniformity and impersonality of

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Atty. Gallant Soriano


and regulations of general applicability, fixing of rates or prices or the
grantors refusal of radio broadcasting licenses, involve discretion with
respect to future conduct and hence, will NOT BE UNDERTAKEN by the
courts. Judicial process is NOT an alternative to the administrative
deterrent effect of laws can do nothing but impose punishment after the
crime has been committed. Administrative process is more flexible and
has preventive remedies.
functions could not be directly performed by Congress. Instead of
delagting the rule-making power, they incorporate REGULATORY DETAILS
into the statutes. The need for time, specialized knowledge, lack of staff
for securing experts information, complexity of problems are reasons why
admin process is more efficient. Otherwise, it would be a detriment to the
functions of the Congress in basic policy.
would vary in their application of the law. There is NO UNIFORMITY. This
would be a burden and expense to the policy of modern government. A
single admin agency can assume the responsibility for enforcement and
can develop, subject to judicial review, uniform policies.
RESPONSIBILITY they have the time and facilities to become and to
remain continuously informed in effectuating broad policies laid down by
the Congress.
PROVIDE THE NECESSARY RECORDS have specialized staff and
machinery to keep and make available records upon which judgment on
thousand of claims and applications must be based. TIME IS OF THE

Lianga Bay v. Enage

FACTS: Lianga Bay Logging and Ago Timber are both forest
concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other.
Liangas concession is located in the municipalities of Tago, Cagwait,
Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting of
110,406 hectares, while that of Ago is located at Los Arcos and San
Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000
hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally
licensed to one Narciso Lansang. Their common boundary is the AgusanSurigao Provincial boundary whereby the eastern boundary of Ago's
concession is Liangas western boundary. Due to alleged encroachment
of both parties, the Director of Forest Industry ordered a survey to


establish the correct common boundary. Ago alleged that "its eastern
boundary should be the provincial boundary line of Agusan-Surigao as
indicated in the green pencil in the attached sketch of the areas as
prepared by the Bureau of Forestry. As per the findings of Forester
Feliciano Cipriano, the claim of Ago would increase the area of Lansang
to 12, 360 hectares and would reduce the area of Lianga to 107,046
hectares instead of the area granted which is 110,406 hectares. Such
being the case, it is reiterated that distance and bearings control the
description where an imaginary line exists. The decision fixed the
common boundary as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached.
Ago appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural
(DANR) and its Acting Secretary, Jose ruled that the common boundary
line should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch. Lianga
appealed to this decision before the Office of the President. The then
Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., affirmed the decision of
the Secretary of DANR. On motion for reconsideration, the then Assistant
Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit overturned the decision of the then
Acting Secretary and affirmed in toto the decision of the Director of
Forestry. Ago filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
Office of the President.
Thus, Ago filed a case before the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, against Lianga, Leido, Duavit and Director of Forestry, for
"Determination of Correct Boundary Line of License Timber Areas and
Damages with Preliminary Injunction" and insisting that "a judicial review of
such divergent administrative decisions is necessary to determine such
question. Judge Enage of said court issued a TRO enjoining defendants
from carrying out the order of the Office of the President. Lianga moved
for dismissal of the case alleging the there is no cause of action and that
the court has no jurisdiction over the public officials and Lianga. Its motion
for dismissal and subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied.
Hence, this appeal was made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of Forestry has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the common boundary and that the decision of
the Office of the President is final and executory?
HELD: YES. Judge Enage erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed
by Ago for the same issue had already been determined by the Director of
Forestry, the Secretary of DANR and the Office of the President,
administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly
belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the
Bureau of Forestry the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation and
use of all public forests and forest reserves. The Secretary of DANR, as
department head, may repeal or modify the decision of said Director when

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the

Office of the President.
In giving due course to the complaint, the Court would necessarily
have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the
administrative proceedings, which is beyond its competence and
jurisdiction. It would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of
said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in
the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. The only
exception to this rule is when the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion or when there is an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The need for specialized administrative boards or commissions
with special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters has
become indispensable in this era of clogged court dockets.
Assignment #2


How admin bodies are: organized (4 ways):


Creation bring into existence


Constitutional provision (Art 9) Self executing [COC, COA,

Legislative enactments
Authority of law or Delegated presidential power
Reorganization already existing, alteration, merge 2 offices


PURPOSES: check Larin case

Abolition terminate the existence


Follow the hierarchy of laws. Can only be abolished by the same

or weightier authority.
Constitutionally created agencies CANNOT be abolished by
authority of law, and so on.
Deactivation EIIB case, continues to exist but agency is dormant


Admin agency an agency exercising some significant combination of


executive, legislative and judicial powers. Charged with administering and

implementing particular legislation. An official governmental body
empowered with the authority to direct and supervise the implementation
of particular legislative acts.
Fourth power of government quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
Cover (i) boards (ii) commissions, (iii) divisions (iv) bureaus (v)


departments (vi) office (vii) instrumentality (viii) GOCC

6 types of admin bodies
Those created to function in situations wherein the government
Veterans, GSIS, SSS, POA, PH Medical Care Commission)
The government seeking to carry on certain FUNCTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT (BIR, Bureau of Customs, Immigration, LRA)
The government is performing some BUSINESS SERVICE for the
public. (PH Postal Corp, MWSS, Government Telephone System,
National Food Authority, National Housing Authority)
The government is seeking to regulate BUSINESS AFFECTED
WITH PUBLIC INTEREST (Insurance Commission, LTFRB, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
The government is seeking under the POLICE POWER to regulate
private businesses and individuals (SEC, MTRCB, GAB, Dangerous
Drugs Board, BTRCP)


CONTROVERSIES because of some strong social policy involved.
(NLRC, Employees Compensation Commission, SEC, DAR, COA)

Larin v. Executive Secretary

Larin v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 112745. October 16, 1997
On September 18, 1992, [1] a decision was rendered by the
Sandiganbayan convicting herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue
Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commisioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and his co-accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of
the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal
Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos.
14208-14209, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs.
Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and
Potenciana N. Evangelista, Accused. The fact of petitioners
conviction was reported to the President of the Philippines by the
then Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a memorandum dated
June 4, 1993. Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy
Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing issued Memorandum
Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993 which provides for the
creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the administrative
charge against herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. Consequently, the
Committee directed Larin to respond to the administrative charge
leveled against him through a letter dated September 17, 1993. In
compliance, Larin submitted a letter dated September 30, 1993
which was addressed to Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan , the Chairman

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

of the Investigating Committee saying that he cannot comment on

the merits of the issues against him for fear of being cited in
contempt of Court.
Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive order No.
132 dated October 26, 1993 which mandates for the streamlining of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, the Excise Tax
Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which petitioner was the
Assistant Commissioner, was abolished. On October 27, 1993, or one
day after the promulgation of Executive Order No.132, the President
appointed certain persons as BIR Assistant Commissioners.
Consequently, the president, in the assailed Administrative Order No.
101 dated December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement
benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the
government service.




WON the dismissal of Larin from office is valid.
Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?,
Were the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164
in accord with due process?,
What is the effect of petitioners acquittal in the criminal case to his
administrative charge?
Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue
the questioned E.O. NO. 132?,
Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad
No, the dismissal of Larin from office is NOT valid.
The President has the power to discipline Larin.
The proceedings taken pursuant to MO 164 are in accord with due
The position of the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the
Career Executive Service. Under the law, Career Executive Service
officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent
rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are
all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed
as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President
Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to
career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he
comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is
in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by


Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear

that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to
investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued
pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of
removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no
reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service
officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is
characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-terminus
with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a
period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer,
petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the
1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the
employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No.
807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees
who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the
causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the
petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing
authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is
an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under
the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be
removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
The administrative case against Larin must be dismissed.
The criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged
violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code
and of section 3(e) of R.A. No.3019 as a consequence of his act of
favorably recommending the grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery,
Inc. However, the conviction of petitioner by the Sandiganbayan was
set aside by this court in our decision promulgated on April 17, 1996
in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. Significantly, the acts which
the SC categorically declared to be not unlawful and improper in G.R.
Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same acts
for which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. Any
charge of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is
clearly belied by SCs conclusion in said cases. In the light of this
decisive pronouncement, SC sees no reason for the administrative
charge to continue - it must, thus, be dismissed
The SC is not unaware of the rule that since administrative
cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or
omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not
foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the
relief from administrative liability. However, the circumstantial
setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule
and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very

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Atty. Gallant Soriano




basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in

the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a
categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was
administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal
of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal
of the administrative action against him, because in such a case,
there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative
Yes, the President has the power to issue EO 132 or to reorganize
the BIR.
Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645 evidently show that the
President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the
creation of offices in the department or agency concerned. Another
legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states: "Sec.20. Residual Powers. -- Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are
not delegated by the President in accordance with law.". Presidential
Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416
expressly grants the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Yes, the reorganization of BIR was made in bad faith.
In Dario v. Mison, the SC clarified that as a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Also, Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances evidencing bad faith in
the removal of employees as a result of the reorganization to wit - a)
Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the
new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; b)
Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the
same functions is created; c) Where incumbents are replaced by
those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit; d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices; e) Where the
removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3
hereof." Section 1.1.2 of EO 132. is a clear illustration of the
circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an
office is abolished and another one performing substantially the same
function is created. Another circumstance is the creation of services
and divisions in the BIR resulting to a significant increase in the
number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated in paragraph
(a) of section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132,

the Information Systems Group has two newly created Systems

Services. Aside from this, six new divisions are also created. Under
Section 1.2.1, three more divisions of the Assessment Service are
formed. With this newly created offices, there is no doubt that a
significant increase of positions will correspondingly follow.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the
petitioner as Assistant Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No.
6656. Under said provision, officers holding permanent appointments
are given preference for appointment to the new positions in the
approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position or in
case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next
lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career executive
officer who is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have
given preference for appointment in the position of Assistant

Dario v. Mison
FACTS: On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated
CONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve
the mandate of the people to:

Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and

oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime;

The reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986,

when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all
appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations
beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she
abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister
and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution. The President has issued a
number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various other
government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected local
officials, has been challenged in this Court, and two of which, with
respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise been questioned
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17,

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Atty. Gallant Soriano


17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among
the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government
reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel.
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No.
offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of
the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern
therefor. On February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador
Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. On the same date, Commissioner
Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with
adjudicating appeals from removals under the aforementioned
Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed
several notices to 394 Customs officials about the implementation of
the reorganization program under EO No. 127 and their termination.
A number sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals
Board, others went to the Civil Service Commission and some came
directly to the Court.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT
REORGANIZATION," ordering the reinstatement of those separated
from their offices in violation of said act.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its
ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279
private respondents in G.R. No. 85310. Commissioner Misons motion
for reconsideration before the Commission was denied. Another
resolution was executed by the Commission reinstating other 5
employees of the Bureau. As a result, a petition for certiorari before
the Court was filed by Mison, with G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241,
respectively. Mison points out that claims of violation of security of
tenure are allegedly no defense. In Jose vs. Arroyo:


The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative

of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil
service employees security of tenure overlooks the provisions of
Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly
authorize the removal of career civil service employees "not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No.
127 may continue even after the ratification of the Constitution, and
career civil service employees may be separated from the service
without cause as a result of such reorganization.
Mison also argues that EO No. 1, which was meant to implement the
Provisional Constitution ceased to be effective upon the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution.
G.R. No 83737 was filed by the customs examiners, Benedicto Amasa
and William Dionisio, appointed by Mison pursuant to the
G.R. No. 85335 was filed by 35 Customs officials whom the Civil
Service Commission has ordered reinstated. They want the
Commissioner of Customs to comply with said resolution.
G.R. No. 81954 was filed by Cezar Dario, G.R. No. 81967 by Vicente
Feria, both Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of customs. they
questioned the legality of their dismiss pursuant to EO No. 17, and
their enjoyment of the security of tenure provisions under the 1987
Constitution. They also allege that they were appointed by the
President and therefore beyond the control of Mison for purposes of
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous
ports of the Philippines, say, on the other hand, that the purpose of
reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of Customs and
that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they
cannot be validly dismissed from the service.
ISSUE: What is








HELD: There is no question that the administration may validly carry

out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are
concerned, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

mandate not only of the Provisional Constitution, but also of the

various Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her
capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-1987
revolutionary government. It should also be noted that under the
present Constitution, there is an implied recognition that a
government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject
to certain conditions.

valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is

void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely
a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed that
by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we
are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring.
Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith is still
removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or
conditions that call for disciplinary action. Good faith, as a component
of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the
facts of each case.

As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been

characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the
silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon
the Government to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter
envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer
terms, as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated. The
constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The
Constitution meant to continue the reorganization under the prior
Charter (of the Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the
latter provides for "automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a
stop to those 'automatic" vacancies. By itself, however, it is
ambiguous, referring as it does to two stages of reorganization the
first, to its conferment or authorization under Proclamation No. 3
(Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation on its
effectivity date (February 2, 1987) But as we asserted, if the intent
of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution were to
extend the effects of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution,
it should have said so in clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of
two phases of reorganization when it could have simply acknowledged
the continuing effect of the first reorganization. It Can only mean,
then, that whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the
authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the mantle of
its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legitimately stated
that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of
the Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with
reorganization under the Freedom Constitution the first stage. We
are on the second stage that inferred from the provisions of
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid

provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing
else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no


Lack of good faith of Mison. There is no showing that legitimate

structural changes have been made or a reorganization actually
undertaken, for that matter at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison
assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and
fire employees. There can therefore be no actual reorganization to
speak of or reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions,
but a revamp of personnel pure and simple. The records indeed show
that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel
but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a
clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs.
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to
sue, and other technical objections, for two reasons, "because of
the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the
public service," and because of the serious implications of these
cases on the administration of the Philippine civil service and the
rights of public servants. The complaint was filed seasonably, within
30 days from September 23, 1988.
Can the judgements of the Civil Service Commission be brought
before the Supreme Court thorugh certiorari? YES. Affirming the
ruling in Aratuc and comparing the CSC with COMELEC, as under the
1973 charter, any order, decision, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the SC on certiorari. The jurisdiction is limited to
complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Who has the power to organize?

President (Executive)

Sec 7, Art 14
Sec 14, Book 3 Chap 10, Admin Code 1987 ! Sec. 31. Continuing
Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. - The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to

reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For
this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
Restructure the internal organization of the
Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to
Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer functions to the Office of
the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
Transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of
the President from other departments or

Petitioners Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, Cesar Posada, Remedios

Princesa, Benjamin Kho, Benigno Manga, Lulu Mendoza thus filed a
petition for the judicial review of EOs 191 and 223. Petitioners argue
that said EOs are unconstitutional as they:
(a) violate their right to security of tenure,
(b) are tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make
the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to TF Aduana, the
functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that
of EIIB, and
(c) constitute an usurpation of the power of Congress decide EIIBs
abolition (in short, President has no authority to abolish EIIB).
Arguing in behalf of the respondents, the SolGen maintains that:
(a) President enjoys the totality of executive power as provided under
Secs 1 and 7 Article 7 of the Constitution and therefore has the
authority to issue said EOs
(b) Said EOs were issued in the interest of national economy, to avoid
duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy,
(c) the EIIB was not abolished, it was only deactivated

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora

*SC first notes procedural flaws: Disregard of hierarchy of courts,
non-exhaustion of admin remedies, but deems it necessary to address
the issues because it is in the interest of the State that questions re:
status and existence of a public office be settled without delay


Sandoval-Guitierrez, 2001
On June 30, 1987, President Cory Aquino issued EO 127 which
established the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)
under the Ministry of Finance. EIIB was designated, among others, to
gather intel reports on illegal activities that affect the national
economy such as economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, and
dollar-salting. To prevent possible conflicts among agencies in the
course of their anti-smuggling operations, Aquino issued
Memorandum Order No. 225 in March 17, 1989, providing that EIIB
shall be the agency of PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY for anti-smuggling
operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways OUTSIDE



Eleven years after (January 7, 2000), President Estrada issued EO No.
191 which deactivated the EIIB on the ground that the functions of
the EIIB are also being performed by other agencies. Meanwhile, Erap
issued EO 196 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Taskforce
Aduana.On March 29, 2000, Estrada issued EO 223 which provided
that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be
deemed SEPARATED FROM SERVICE effective April 30, 2000 pursuant
to the said reorganization.

Does the president have the authority to reorganize the executive
How should the reorganization be carried out?



Organization and abolition are both reorganization measures, but
there are distinctions:
Deactivate- to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by
discharging or reassigning personnel; the office continues to exists,
albeit remaining dormant or inoperative
Abolish- to do away with, to annul, to abrogate or destroy
completely; denotes an intention to do away with the office WHOLLY
and PERMANENTLY; the office ceases to exist
General rule: The power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
LEGISLATURE. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created

by the (1) Constitution, (2) by statute, or (3) by authority of law.
Thus, except where the office was created by the constitution itself,
it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into
Exception: As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may
justify him to inactivate the functions of an office or certain laws may
grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.






An examination of the pertinent EOs shows that the reorg and

creation of TF Aduana were done in good faith. Purpose was not to
remove EIIB employees but to achieve economy. The creation of TF
Aduana does not entail expense to the government.

Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration

FACTS: On September 30, 1998, President Joseph Estrada issued
TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (NTA), a government agency under the
Department of Agriculture.

Legal bases:
Section 77 of RA 8745 or the General Appropriations Act (budget)
for the fiscal year 1999. Section 77 of the said law provides that
UNLESS otherwise provided by law or DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, no changes in key positions or organizational
units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their
respective organizational structures in their respective organizational
structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act. This
provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect
organizational changes in the department or agency under the
executive structure.
Section 78, RA 8760: the actual streamlining and productivity
improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected
pursuant to circulas or orders issued for the purpose by the Office of
the President.
Section 31, Book III of EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987): the president,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency shall have the continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
Canonizado v. Aguirre: reorganization involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundanchy of functions. It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the department of
Finance. It falls under the OP.Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize.

On October 27, 1998, Pres. Estrada issued EO 36, amending EO 29,

insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by increasing from
400 to not exceeding 750 the positions affected thereby.
In compliance therewith, the NTA prepared and adopted a new
Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP) which, on October
29, 1998, was submitted to the Office of the President.
On November 11, 1998, the rank and file employees of NTA Batac,
among whom included herein petitioners, filed a letter-appeal with the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) and sought its assistance in recalling
the OSSP.
On December 04, 1998, the OSSP was approved by the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) subject to certain revision. NTA
created a placement committee to assist the appointing authority in
the selection and placement of permanent personnel in the revised
OSSP. The results of the evaluation by the committee on the
individual qualifications of applicants to the positions in the new OSSP
were then disseminated and posted at the central and provincial
offices of the NTA.

Validity of reorganization
Reorganization is valid provided they are pursued in good faith (if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient).
RA 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be evidence of
bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of
reorganization. Petitioners claim the deactiviation was done in bad


faith because four days after deactivation, Estrada crearted TF



On June 10, 1996, petitioners, all occupying different positions at

NTA Batac, Ilocos Norte, received individual notices of
termination of their employment with NTA effective 30 days
from receipt thereof. Without immediate relief from their dismissal
from service, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or TRO, with RTC Batac and prayed that~
a restraining order be immediately issued enjoining NTA from
enforcing the notice of termination and/or from further acts of


Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano


respondent pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 3, of the 1997 Revised Rules of

Civil Procedure, the SC resolved to rule on the merits of the petition.

dispossession and/or ousting the petitioners from their respective

a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against NTA to maintain
status quo; and
the notice of termination of petitioners be declared illegal and the
reorganization null and void and their reinstatement with backwages,
if applicable, be ordered commanding to desist from further
terminating their services and making the injunction permanent.

HELD: YES. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,

consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between

On September 09, 2000, RTC ordered NTA to appoint petitioners in

the new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their respective
former assignments. On February 28, 2001, NTAs MR was denied. On
February 20, 2002, CA reversed the decision. Petitioners went to the
SC, which on September 23, 2002, denied their petition for failure to
sufficiently show any reversible error on the CAs decision so as to
warrant the exercise of the SCs discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed an MR but was denied on January 20, 2002.

The President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any

branch or agency of the executive department, what is left for the SC
to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid.
Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried our in good faith if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

On February 21, 2003, petitioners submitted a Motion to Admit

Petition for En Banc Resolution of the case allegedly to address the
legal and constitutional issue~ based on the following grounds:
1. a mere EO issued by the Office of the President and procured by a
government functionary would have the effect of a blanket
authority to reorganize a bureau, office, or agency attached to
various executive departments thereby granting the President of the
PH plenary power to reorganize the entire government bureaucracy
without the benefit of due deliberation, debate, and discussion of
members of the Congress, defeating the right of security of tenure to
a career position created by law/statute, and thus allowing an EO to
abolish an office created by law;



RA 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as

evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made
as a result of reorganization:
where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the
new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the
same functions is created;
where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
status of appointment, performance, and merit;
where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices; and
where the removal violates the order of separation.

2. Sec. 4 of EO 245, dated July 24, 1987 issued by the

revolutionary government of Pres. Aquino, the law creating the NTA,
which provides that the governing body of NTA is the Board of
Directors, would be rendered meaningless, ineffective and a dead
letter law, thus, reorganization is an ultra vires act of the
NTA Administrator;

The CA found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the NTA~

3. a mere EO would amend,

ineffective a law or statute.

Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices

were abolished and the new ones that were created performing
substantially the same functions.




ISSUE: Whether the NTA may be reorganized by an executive fiat,

not by legislative action.

Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not
increase. Rather, it decreased from 1,125 positions to 750. It is thus
natural that ones position may be lost through the removal or
abolition of an office.

Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified

employees were appointed to the positions to which they applied.

NOTE: Notwithstanding the apparent procedural lapse on the part of

the petitioners to implead the Office of the President as party


Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only

means that old employees should be considered first, but it does not
necessarily follow that they should then automatically be appointed.
This is because the law does not preclude the infusion of new blood,
younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service,
provided that the acts of the appointing power are bonafide for the
best interest of the public service and the person chosen has the
needed qualifications.

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the
Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office
of the President from other departments and agencies.
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding
numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly
limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to
reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section
31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the
Presidents power to restructure the internal organization of the
Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while
Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of
the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
and vice- versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency and vice- versa.

Eos 29 and 36 have not abolished the NTA but merely

mandated its reorganization through the streamlining or
reduction of its personnel. Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution expressly grants the President control of all
executive departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices
which may justify an executive action to inactivate the
of a
particular office
or to
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
Sec. 78 of the General Provisions of RA 8522 (General
Appropriations Act of FY 1998) has decreed that the
President may direct changes in the organization and key
positions in any department, bureau, or agency pursuant to
Art. VI, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, which grants to the
Executive Department the authority to recommend the
budget necessary for its operation. Evidently, this grant of
power includes the authority to evaluate each and every
government agency, including the determination of the
most economical and efficient staffing pattern under the
Executive Department.

In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of

offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under
the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of
streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy
and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of
President motivated and carried out in good faith.

Sec. 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of EO 292 (Administrative

Code of 1987) grants the President the power to reorganize the
Office of the President and the Office of the President Proper:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his
Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:

Relative to petitioners Motion for an En Banc Resolution of the

Case, the Court En Banc is not an appellate tribunal to which
appeals from a Division of the Court may be taken. A Division of the
Court is the Supreme Court as fully and veritably as the Court En
Banc itself and a decision of its Division is as authoritative and final as
a decision of the Court En Banc. Referrals of cases from a Division to
the Court En Banc do not take place as just a matter of routine but
only on such specified grounds as the Court in its discretion may

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the

President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution

and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of


Crisostomo v. CA


Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine

College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed on July 17, 1974.
2 administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of
government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials
belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. These were filed with the
Office of the President, and referred to the Solicitor General for
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e) and R.A. No. 992,
20-21 and R.A. No. 733, 14 were likewise filed against him with the
Office of Tanodbayan. 3 Informations for violation of Sec 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) were filed against
him. It alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which
was intended for the College, and construction materials worth
P250,000.00, more or less. He was also accused of using a driver of
the College as his personal and family driver. He was preventively
suspended from office pursuant to R.A. 3019. In his place, Dr. Pablo
T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by President Marcos
converting PCC into a Polytechnic University. On April 3, 1979, Mateo
was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President
for a term of six years. However, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila
rendered judgment acquitting Crisostomo of the charges against him
and ordering his reinstatement. He was also entitled to receive the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during the suspension.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan were also dismissed on the
ground that they had become moot and academic. On the other
hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for failure of the
complainants to prosecute them. He filed with RTC a motion to
execute the judgment of reinstatement and payment of salaries,
which was subsequently granted. However, on March 26, 1992,
President Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the
PUP, following the expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio
Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Crisostomo was one of the
five nominees considered by the Aquino for the position.
RTC issued another order reiterating said order but when the sheriff
executed such, Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to
consult with the President first. Gellor and the DECS Secretary Isidro
Carino were cited in contempt of court. Crisostomo then assumed the
office of president of PUP. Thereafter, People of the Philippines filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders. The CA
issued a TRO enjoining Crisostomo to cease and desist from acting as
president. The CAs decision set aside the orders and writ of
reinstatement issued by RTC and the payment of salaries and benefits
was limited to those accruing from his suspension until the

conversion of PCC to PUP. The case was then remanded to the RTC
for determination of the amounts due.
In this petition, Crisostomo argues that PD 1341, which converted
the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if
the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have
specified that the PCC was being abolished rather than converted
and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law
would have said it was being created. He claims that PUP is merely
a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be
reinstated to his former position as president.
On ruling that PUP and the PCC are not one and the same
institution but two different entities and that since Crisostomos
term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC, his term
expired upon the abolition of the PCC, CA took into account the
a) After Crisostomos suspension, P.D. No. 1341 was issued
providing that PUP covers not only PCCs offering of programs
in the field of commerce and business administration but also
programs in other polytechnic areas. Being a university, PUP
was conceived as a bigger institution absorbing the entire PCC.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university
head is substantially different from that provided by the PCC
Charter. PUP President shall be appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Secretary of DECS after
consultation with the University Board of Regents. The
President of PCC was appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees.
c) The composition of the new universitys Board of Regents is
likewise different from that of the PCC Board of Trustees. The
NEDA Director-General, the Secretary of Industry and the
Secretary of Labor are members of the PUP Board of Regents.
d) That all the properties
transferred to PUP.






(1)Whether or not PD 1341 abolished PCC
(2)Whether or not Crisostomo may be reinstated to his position as
HELD: (1) NO. PD 1341did not abolish, but only changed, the former
PCC into what is now the PUP, in the same way that earlier in 1952,
RA 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of
Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in

its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the expansion of its
curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking
authority says so. SC cited EO 709 (creating Ministry of Trade and
Industry), EO 710 (creating Ministry of Public Works and Highways),
RA 6975 (creating National Police Commission and abolishing the
existing Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police), all of
which explicitly provides the creation of a new office and the abolition
of the old one. In contrast, PD1341 expressly provides that PCC is
hereby converted into a university to be known as Polytechnic
University of the Philippines.
The grounds provided by CA are hardly indicia of intent to abolish an
existing institution and to create a new one. New course offerings
can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal
existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization
bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an
express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will. In
example, PD 1341 does not state that properties of PCC were being
transferred to PUP but only that they stand transferred to it.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC
were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of
the institution.
(2) NO. Be that as it may, the reinstatement of Crisostomo cannot be
ordered because on June 10, 1978, PD 1437 had been promulgated
fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and
colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years,
and authorizing the President to terminate the terms of incumbents
who were not reappointed. In this case, Dr. Mateo who had been
acting president of the university since April 3, 1979, was appointed
president of PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28, 1980, with
the result that Crisostomos term was cut short. Pursuant to said
law, Crisostomo became entitled only to retirement benefits or the
payment of separation pay. He must have recognized this fact, which
is why in 1992 he asked President Aquino to consider him for
appointment to the same position after it had become vacant due to
the retirement of Dr. Prudente.
Assignment #3

a. Powers which is bound or which it is ones business to do.


Sources of powers


Function means by which a function is fulfilled

Do not always come from a single source



Provision of Constitution and its source of powers lies in statutes under

which they claim to act.
Failure to exercise powers granted to them DOES NOT forfeit or
extinguish them
Scope of powers
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED POWERS powers are limited by the Constitution or law
creating them or granting their powers to those conferred expressly by or
necessary or fair implication.
Liberally construed in order to enable them to discharge their
assigned duties in accordance with legislative purpose
GR: Has only powers as are expressly granted to it by law
RULE: also such powers as are NECESSARILY IMPLIED in the
exercise of its express powers.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA:
Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was
created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy
towards environmental protection and sustainable development
so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of
the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and
towns.PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since
water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate
further if steps are not taken to check the same.EO 927 further
defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and
enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by
the term Laguna de Bay Region.Upon implementation of RA
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof
provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to
grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose
rental fees or charges thereforeBig fishpen operators took
advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to
the consternation of the LLDA.The implementation of separate
independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore
municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological
stress of Laguna Lake.The LLDA then served notice to the
general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993
are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be
criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.A month later, the LLDA sent notices
advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to

grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating &
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake
control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and
most demanding of all state powers including the power
of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which
embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over
the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to

dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall
be effected.


1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns

and municipalities comprising the region should exercise
jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasijudicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue
a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aquaculture structures in Laguna de Bay.

2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?


1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions

of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the
LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA
7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the
LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over
Laguna de Bay and the lake region.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a

special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as
much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended
or altered by a subsequent general law by mere

Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the

charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise
such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
INHERENT POWERS agency has NO INHERENT powers, although IMPLIED
powers may sometimes be spoken of as inherent.
In the absence of any provision admin agency DO NOT
POSSESS the inherent power to punish for contempt which has
always been regarded as necessary incident and attribute of the
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS official powers CANNOT be merely assumed by
administrative officers, nor created by courts.
Unless expressed, admin agencies are BEREFT of quasi-judicial
That the exercise of power will most effectively prevent or stop
specific violations of law is NOT EXCUSE for a deviation from this
Limited to jurisdiction as such can exercise only those powers
which are SPECIFICALLY granted t them by their enabling
PRESUMPTION ! regulary performed their official functions.


The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for


Makati Stock Exchange v. SEC


Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

The Securities and Exchange Commission passed a resolution which prohibited

double listing. In essence, this would deny the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.,
permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading
on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange. Objecting
to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., contends that the
Commission has no power to impose it and that, anyway, it is illegal,
discriminatory and unjust.
The objection of Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., to this rule is understandable.
There is actually only one securities exchange The Manila Stock Exchange,
that has been operating alone for the past 25 years; and all or
presumably all available or worthwhile securities for trading in the market
are now listed there. In effect, the Commission permits the Makati Exchange,
Inc., to deal only with other securities. Which is tantamount to permitting a
store to open provided it sells only those goods not sold in other stores. And if
there's only one existing store, the result is a monopoly.
It is not far-fetched to assert as petitioner does that for all practical
purposes, the Commission's order or resolution, would make it impossible for
the Makati Stock Exchange to operate. So, its "permission" amounted to a
ISSUE: Whether the Commission has the authority to promulgate the rule in
HELD: No. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and these necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof.
In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no
provision expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the
power is "necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it"; but it
makes no explanation, perhaps relying on the reasons advanced in support of
its position that trading of the same securities in two or more stock
exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides contravening
public interest.
On the legality of its rule, the Commission's argument is that: (a) it was
approved by the Department Head before the War; and (b) it is not in
conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. In our opinion, the approval
of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in a judicial litigation; and the
test is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from imposing a
prohibition; but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. No specific
portion of the statute has been cited to uphold this power. It is not found in
sec. 28 (of the Securities Act), which is entitled "Powers (of the Commission)
with respect to Exchanges and Securities".

According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which

the Commission has (Sec. 33) does not imply authority to prohibit.

Taule v. Santos
Ruperto Taule vs. Secretary Luis Santos and Governor Leandro
August 12,1991 Gancayco, J.
FACTS: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay
Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their
capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their
respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members
in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.
Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga,
Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran
and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants
was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer (PGOO) Alberto P.
Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and
Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5)
of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO
Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as members of the Board of
Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales. Thereafter, the
following were elected officers of the FABC:

President Ruperto Taule

Vice-President Allan Aquino

Secretary Vicente Avila

Treasurer Fidel Jacob

Auditor Leo Sales

On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of

Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of
Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and
seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner
it was conducted. In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary,
petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the
letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities and
denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the
election of FABC officers which is a purely non- partisan affair and at the
same time requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the
election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided

by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
August 4, 1989 but it was denied by respondent Secretary in his resolution
of September 5, 1989.

goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new
elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and
direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the
barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments.
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local
governments. This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code
wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." To deny the Secretary
of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of
officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of
promoting the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority
to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such
issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. This is compatible
with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which
as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which grants the
Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is
silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent
Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local governments,
it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular. Any
doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local
affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest
filed by respondent Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the
FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent Secretary acted in
excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the
jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the
recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an

election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils
HELD: No, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction
to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. It is a
well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,
administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. The jurisdiction
of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the
statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.
Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. There is
neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by
necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government
the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers
of the katipunan ng mga barangay.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to
the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the
President through the Secretary of Local Government.
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local government or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the
same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision
of the President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary
has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the
officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give
him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give
him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere
in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the
barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate


Solid Homes v. Payawal (Refer to the case above)

Classification of power


Investigatory powers
Quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory powers

Degree of subjective choice


Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

Discretionary persons exercising it may choose, in the exercise of

discretion, which of several courses will be followed.
DEFINED: when applied to public functionaries, as the
power or right conferred upon them by law of acting
officially under certain circumstances, according to the
dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and not
controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.
Ministerial nothing is left to discretion.
DEFINED one performed in response to a duty which
has been positively imposed by law and its performance
required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions
specifically designated, the duty to perform under the
conditions specified not being dependent upon the
officers judgment or discretion.

matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the
constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a
quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the
power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of

adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Investigatory powers power to carry out systematic of formal inquiry.


Judicial function adjudicate rights


Test of judicial function authenticity to adjudicate rights and the powers of

the other party.
Adjudication signifies the exercise of power to adjudicate upon
the rights and obligations of parties before it.
Judicial discretion decide from evidence presented

Cario v. CHR
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800
public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who
were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA)
and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted
actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and
again been brought to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of
Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say,
determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues
which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education
and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned,
declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said


Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot
and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to
do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.

Scope and extent (Villaluz v. Zaldavar)

G.R. No. L-22754
December 31, 1965
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office
with payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two
days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath of office as such after
having been informed of his nomination by then Acting Assistant Executive
Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed
to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman
of the Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the
latter informed the former of the findings made by his Committee concerning
alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the
Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up in the letter, as follows: (1)
malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government; (2) failure to
correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating
thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy
unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings. Congressman Roces
recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio de
Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor
Vehicles Office by the new chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having
been officially informed of the content of said letter, then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a copy thereof requiring him
to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should be
taken against him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner
answered the letter as required wherein he explained and refuted in detail each
and everyone of the charges contained in the letter of Congressman Roces; that
on February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended
petitioner as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon created
an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the charges
against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to undertake the
investigation a prosecution panel was created headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio
A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said committee submitted its report to
the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No.
332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of
petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting
administrator; and that, after having been officially notified of his removal,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this
was denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court.
Respondent averred that the President of the Philippines, contrary to petitioner's
claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.

The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against petitioner because the authority of said
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can
only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the
classified service to which classification petitioner does not belong.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as
the investigation and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned,
even if he is under the control and supervision of the Department of Public Works,
in view of the reason we have already stated that he is a presidential appointee
who comes exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President.
With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against
petitioner which led to his separation are illegal simply because the charges
preferred against him by Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by
Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say: said proceedings
having been commenced against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief
Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be
commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to
Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or
employee by the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or
upon complaint of any person which shall be subscribed under oath by the
complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the
complainant, the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his
discretion, take action thereon if the public interest or the special circumstances
of the case, so warrant.

Initiation of investigation
HOW: (a) complaint (b) own motion
Examine, inquire, explore
Power of control of President = investigate


Conduct of investigation
Allegations or suspicion
Harmful publicity will not be used in lieu of sanctions provided by

Whether the Commissioner of Civil Service is with jurisdiction to hear and decide
the administrative charges filed against petitioner.


Ruiz v. Drilon


Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

FACTS: The Court NOTED the sixth motion for extension of time to
submit a comment to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, (G.R.
No. 101666) filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public
respondents Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the DECS, and
Resolved to DISPENSE with the comment required of the public
respondents, considering that the pleadings and other papers already
filed by the other parties in this case are adequate to enable the Court to
act upon the present petition.
On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued AO No. 218
dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as
President of the Central Luzon State University (CLSU). 1
In 2 orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive
Secretary, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first
and second MR therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for
being pro forma. Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and
executory. 2
On 1 October 1991, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a TRO with the CA. Petitioner there sought to annul
President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr.
Fortunato Battad as the new CLSU President, as well as DECS
Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991
directing petitioner to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr.
Battad. CA issued the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 4
On 9 October 1991, petitioner filed with SC the present petition (G.R.
No. 101666) for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
TRO for the purpose of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion,
the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of the orders of the Executive
Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom. 5 The
Court did not issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner. 6 This
petition made no mention of the petition for prohibition with prayer for
TRO filed 8 days earlier with CA.
On 9 January 1992, the Court's Circular No. 28-91 dated 3 September
1991 having gone into effect on 1 January 1992, petitioner filed a
manifestation and compliance dated 6 January 1992, where for the first
time, he disclosed to this Court the other judicial proceedings which he
had commenced in connection with the issuance of AO No. 210. 7
On 29 January 1992, after due proceedings, the CA promulgated its
decision in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165, dismissing the petition for
lack of merit and finding the same to be a case of forum

shopping. 8 Petitioner sought review of this decision by way of a

petition for review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court, which petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 103570 and assigned to the Second
Division. 9 This case was consolidated with G.R. No. 101666, by this
time pending with the Court En Banc, by a resolution dated 2 April
Meanwhile, on 28 January 1992, the Court issued a resolution requiring
petitioner to show cause why the petition in G.R. No. 101666 should not
be dismissed as an apparent case of forum shopping, considering that
the parties involved, issues raised and the reliefs sought therein are
substantially identical with those in CA-G.R. No. SP-26165. 1 0
Petitioner submitted a manifestation and compliance dated 6 January
1992 obviously in anticipation of the 29 January 1992 Resolution of the
Court, as well as an undated compliance filed on 2 March 1992 in
response to the same resolution. He denies having engaged in forum
shopping and contends: (1) his cause of action in CA-G.R. No. SP-26156
consists of the illegality of the actions taken by the Office of the
President and by the DECS in implementing AO No. 218, which may
render moot the Court's review of the intrinsic merits of AO No. 218, an
entirely different cause of action in itself; and (2) he never attempted to
hide the fact, either before this Court or the Court of Appeals, that he
had instituted both actions "for separate reasons, apart though related
from each other," such candor being "an elementary consideration in the
determination of the issue whether he committed forum shopping or
not." 1 1
ISSUE: Whether petitioner committed forum shopping or not.
HELD: The Court finds the explanations proffered by petitioner
and his counsel as justifications for the procedural maneuvers
undertaken in this case to be completely unsatisfactory and
considers the Petitions to be clear cases of deliberate forum
The Court views with considerable disfavor the legal maneuvers
undertaken by petitioner and his counsel of record, Atty. Crispulo S.
Esguerra, to defeat his removal from office. It is evident that
petitioner, in violation of Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, had split a single cause of action consisting of the alleged
illegality of his removal from office by the President through AO No. 218,
by seeking judicial review of (1) AO 218 with the Court and at the same
time (2) having the enforcement aspect of the President's action and the
filling up of the resulting vacancy reviewed by CA. It also appears that
petitioner carried out these acts in order to obtain a TRO (albeit with a

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

limited twenty-day lifetime) from CA, issued as a matter of course, in

order to stop the execution and implementation of AO No. 218, and
afterwards, to try to get a TRO with an indefinite lifetime from this Court
for the same purpose, in case his petition in the main action of CA-G.R.
No. SP-26165 would be dismissed on the merits by CA.

Petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or

any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondents in rendering the assailed administrative
Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision
that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence
presented against him during the hearings of the investigating
committees. 1 7 There is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.

Moreover, during the period when the proceedings in G.R. No. 101666
and CA-G.R. No. SP-26165 were simultaneously pending action before
two (2) different for a petitioner created for himself a situation where he
could hope to get (after the 20-day life of the Court of Appeals TRO) a
judicial order from either forum which could stop the execution of AO No.
218 with more permanency (i.e., either a TRO with an indefinite lifetime
from the Supreme Court or the grant of his petition for prohibition by the
Court of Appeals). Thus CA, aware of the institution of G.R. No.
101666, 1 2 committed no reversible error in considering the
action before it as another, independent case and as an
instance of forum shopping.

AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner
was removed from office. Those findings included the facts that (a)
petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new
academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in
wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the
Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of
chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned
by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales
agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship;
and (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students
in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. 1 8 These acts
constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal
basis for dismissal from the public service.

Forum shopping effected by a party litigant through the

deliberate splitting of causes of actions and appeals in the
hope that even as one case (in which a particular remedy is
sought) is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open, is a deplorable practice because it results
in the unnecessary clogging of the already heavily burdened
dockets of the courts. 1 3
Section 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on 11
January 1983, relative to the implementation of section 9 of BP 129,
granting the IAC (now CA) equal original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, etc., whether or not in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, provides that if such a petition is filed before
CA and is still pending therein, a similar petition cannot be filed in SC. A
violation of this rule has also been considered a clear case of
forum shopping, an act of malpractice proscribed as trifling
with the courts and abusing their processes. The Rule itself
provides that a violation thereof constitutes: (1) cause for the summary
dismissal of both petitions; and (2) contempt of court for which the
party or counsel concerned may be held accountable. 1 4
The pretended candor of petitioner and his counsel here does not
persuade. Petitioner never informed the Court of the existence of CA-G.R.
No. SP-26165 when he filed his petition in G.R. No. 101666, the first
opportunity available to him to be completely candid with the Court. It is
obvious that petitioner filed his subsequent manifestation because he
was no longer able to deny the existence of the proceeding before the

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 101666, as

well as the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 103570, are
DISMISSED as clear cases of forum shopping and for lack of
merit. CA decision in C.A,-G.R, No. SP-26165 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra. is hereby ADMONISHED
and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts of forum
shopping will be more severely punished. A copy of this Resolution shall
be attached to the personal record of Atty. Crispulo S. Esguerra in the
office of the Bar Confidant.

SOJ v. Lantion
FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said
Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a

request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a
panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez
through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of
the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for
the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of
the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for

between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution

or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect

to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice

has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal
law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or

the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.The human rights of person, whether citizen

or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties
as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of
the land.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez

copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant
him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part

of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make
such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are

confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

Pefianco v. Moral
Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against
respondent Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of
the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some
historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division
(FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and
supervision as Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal
authority and justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical
documents which were missing from the FAD vaults of the National
The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the
complaint. Atty. Jose M. Diaz, Special Prosecutor from the Department of

Administrative Law
Atty. Gallant Soriano

Justice, represented the DECS Secretary in the administrative case while

respondent was represented by her own private counsel.
Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent "guilty of the
administrative offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for the commission of
pilferage of historical documents of the national library, to the prejudice
of the national library in particular, and the country in general." She was
ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to
reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other
Moral received a copy of the resolution. Thereafter, she received another
resolution correcting the typographical errors found on the first
resolution. Moral did not appeal the judgment.
Moral filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report purportedly to "guide her on whatever action would
be most appropriate to take under the circumstances. Her petition was,
however, denied. Man-ikx

Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco

who was thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration
of the order denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
We grant the petition. Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to
dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor

After hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion
or order the amendment of the pleading.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS
Resolution, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied in his Order. Moral
moved for reconsideration but the motion was merely "noted" in view of
the warning Order that the denial of the request for the production of
the Investigation Committee Report was final.
As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dismissing
for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against
Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined
from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the
said report.
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for
lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the trial court.
In its assailed Decision the appellate court sustained the trial court and
dismissed Secretary Glorias petition for lack of merit.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of
Appeals on 13 January 1998, Secretary Gloria filed the instant petition
for review.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that
the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily
denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier disposition
often creates difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher
court called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari.
The challenged Order of the trial court falls short of the requirements
prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of
mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions
of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioners
motion to dismiss was being denied. We are reproducing hereunder for
reference the assailed Order Indeed, we cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the
discussion therein on mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by
petitioner in her motion to dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of action, and the
dispositive portion of the order. The order only confused petitioner and
left her unable to determine the errors which would be the proper subject
of her motion for reconsideration. Judges should take pains in crafting

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for
their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the
action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any basis for its
order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration
before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would be to
expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in
his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict
compliance with the rules was justified.
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion
for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the
imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not absolute and
is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the act or order of
the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory
provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration may
be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of
the lower court directly on certiorari.
In fine, the trial courts Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is
not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held, but a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because,
to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the
provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss
should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent
is clearly not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the
DECS resolution dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule
which imposes a ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with
a copy of the investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a
cause of action. In such instance, while the trial courts order is merely
interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to
annul the same since it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Inspection and examination enter premises and inspect or examine such

premises or things or operation therein, particularly books and records.
(Reports of field agents)
Fact-finding judicial body
Search warrant? YES. Invoke your right. (Atty. Gallant)

Camara v. Municipal Court

CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
FACTS: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing
Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an
apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible
violations of the city's Housing Code. [1] The building's manager


informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was
using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the
building's occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground
floor, the inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit
an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection
because the inspector lacked a search warrant.
The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and
appellant again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed
ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's office. When
appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on
November 22. They informed appellant that he was required by law to
permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code:
"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the City
departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the
performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building,
structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon
them by the Municipal Code."
Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment
without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him
with refusing to permit a lawful inspection. [2] Appellant was arrested on
December 2 and released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal
complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of
Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal
officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without
probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists
therein. Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted for
refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by 503.
The District Court of Appeal held that 503 does not violate Fourth
Amendment rights because it "is part of a regulatory scheme which is
essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section
creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be
exercised under unreasonable conditions."
ISSUE: Whether administrative inspection programs violate Fourth
Amendment rights.

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his
refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold
without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding
immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to
the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to
search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was
unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits
of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the public
portion of the building with the consent of the landlord,
through the building's manager, We therefore conclude that
appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the
inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may
not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to
the inspection.

without a warrant. First, it is argued that these inspections are "designed

to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant." The
ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with safeguards, and at
any rate the inspector's particular decision to enter must comply with
the constitutional standard of reasonableness even if he may enter
without a warrant. In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the
purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment. Under the present system, when the inspector demands
entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the
municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of
knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and no way
of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper
authorization. Yet, only by refusing entry and risking a criminal conviction
can the occupant at present challenge the inspector's decision to search.

The Fourth Amendment provides that, "The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." The basic purpose of this Amendment is
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials.

The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches

is that the public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued
that the health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon
enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that
the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine
systematized inspection of all physical structures. But we think this
argument misses the mark. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health,
and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals
within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement.

One governing principle has consistently been followed: except in

certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it
has been authorized by a valid search warrant.
(In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who
refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the
purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance). The
Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional
exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of
private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's
search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. It is surely anomalous
to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by
the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other
justifications for permitting administrative health and safety inspections

In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind

at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack
the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment
guarantees to the individual.
The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause."
Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection
programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with
minimum physical standards for private property. The primary
governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional
development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and
There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field
that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the
minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

periodic inspections of all structures.

cause debate is focused.


It is here that the probable

There can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than

by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails. But we think that a number of persuasive factors combine to
support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First,
such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance.
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing
technique would achieve acceptable results. Finally, because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban
citizen's privacy.
Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable"
search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a
warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.
Even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in
emergency situations. On the other hand, in the case of most routine
area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular
time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of
their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in
light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant
specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that
warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused
unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other
satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry.

Salazar v. Achacoso
A complaint against the petitioner Salazar was filed for withholding the
complainants PECC Card, it was further alleged that Salazar did not
posses a license to operate as a recruitment agency. POEA through its
Director on Licensing and Regulation, issued a warrant of arrest and
seizure against the petitioner.
Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure is valid?


Under the new Constitution, "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
arrest." Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process.

Accounts, records, reports, statements at all reasonable time, have access to, for
the purpose of examination and the right to copy, any documentary
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against.

Cartura v. CIR
37 SCRA 303
FERNANDO: January 30. 1971
NATURE: Petition for review

- On December 27, 1966, a complaint against Pablo Catura and Luz
Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a legitimate
labor organization duly registered was filed by the prosecution division of
the respondent Court, the principal complainants being now respondent
Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than
ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization.
- In the complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of
petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were
responsible for "unauthorized disbursement of union funds" with
complainants on various occasions during the latter part of 1966
demanding from them "a full and detailed report of all financial
transaction of the union and to make the book of accounts and other
records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the
members," only to be met with a refusal on their part to comply.
- It was further asserted that the executive board of such labor
organization passed a resolution calling for a general membership
meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about the status of
union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as President, cancelled such

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

- There was thereafter a general membership resolution reiterating

previous demands "for a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union," but again there was no response, thus
compelling the members to refer the matter to the Department of Labor
which duly issued subpoenas for the presentation of such book of
accounts to petitioners without any success. After setting forth that
complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's
constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought,
after due hearing and judgement, to declare present petitioners, as
respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice under the above provision of
the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease and desist from further
committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to render a full
and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to
make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities
open to inspection by the members
- On December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other
members, as petitioners in the above complaint before respondents
Court, sought an injunction to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who,
it turned out, was again elected as President in an election on November
15, 1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence
in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well
as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union
- Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited itself
to requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and
Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and
deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank
accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing
of this petition on January 3, 1967.
- There was a motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now
petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were
not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion
was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge
Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution
by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967.
- The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution of April
13, 1967 with a preliminary injunction
WON respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to
assure compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under
Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, can require a labor organization's
"books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts,
vouchers and other documents related to [its] finances" be delivered and

deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation in

accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such labor
organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us,
being heard prior to the issuance of such order.
- The controlling provisions of law to the specific situation before this
Court concerning the power of investigation of respondent Court to
assure compliance with internal labor organization procedures with the
corresponding authority to investigate to substantiate alleged violations
may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the
Industrial Peace Act. Thus: "The members shall be entitled to full and
detailed reports from their officers and representatives of all financial
transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the
organization." ... "The funds of the organization shall not be applied for
any purpose or object other than those expressly stated in its
constitution or by-laws or those expressly authorized by a resolution of
the majority of the member." ... "The books of accounts and other
records of the financial activities of a legitimate labor organization shall
be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof."
- The complaint before respondent Court against petitioners as President
and Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized
disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and
detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the
book of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to
inspection by the members. Clearly, the matter was deemed serious
enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of
the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation
so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. On its
face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory
power conferred.
- The power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very
least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The
documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most
solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with
the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the
authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective
administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of
union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its
cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness
should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so
arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to
priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made.


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Atty. Gallant Soriano


Attendance of witnesses admin officers do not have inherent power to require

the attendance of witnesses before them, put witnesses UNDER OATH and
REQUIRE them to testify, this power and the power to require the
production of books, papers and documents or other evidence are BASIC to
the power of investigation.


Carbonell v. CA

Hearing GR: hearing is NOT a necessary part of investigation by an admin

agency r official.
Requirement that there be an investigation carries with NO
COMMAN that a quasi-judicial hearing be conducted.
Hearing on investigation
Person under investigation NOT ENTITLED TO REPORT
This is NOT necessary


Santiago v. Morales

Contempt proceedings Persons failing to attend, give testimony and procure

records at an investigative proceeding may be PUNISHED FOR CONTEMPT.
Person failing to appear in answer to a subpoena issued by an
investigative body or refusing to produce records pursuant to
subpoena duces tecum and to explain his inability to do so ! MAY
Admin bodies CANNOT exercise its power to punish a person for
contempt, in the absence of any statutory grant.

Carmelo v. Ramos
JESUS L. CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe
Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitionerappellant,
ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.
The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies
involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License
Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License
and Permits Division of the said office. He named Jesus Carmelo as
The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen
working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear


before it on June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in

connection with an administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but
that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to
Claiming that Ramos refusal tended to impede or obstruct the
administrative proceedings, petitioner filed with the CFI of Manila a
petition to declare Ramos in contempt.
The Trial court dismissed the petition. CFI of Manile held there is NO law
empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue
subpoenas and demand witnesses to testify under oath and that
to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against selfincrimination.
It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the
Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on several occasions,
sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the
payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not
been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in
the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a
bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to compel Ramos
to confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain
employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to
give testimony that could be used against him in a criminal case for
estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party.
Hence, petitioners appeal.
Whether the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and
ask for their punishment in case of refusal.
Held: No.
The rule is the Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only
to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt
committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this
case. Unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly define as
contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Carmelo invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take
testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon
any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be
understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and
summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the
production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.


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Atty. Gallant Soriano

Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any
one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued
under the authority of the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before
any individual or body exercising the power therein defined, refuses to
make oath, give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when
thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of
contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body
exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first
instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law.
First and foremost, , it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580
of the Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these
pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.
Also, one who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he
has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply
to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor
creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that
the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies
involving certain city employees.
Carmelo contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to
investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end that
the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials
of employees may be justly and fairly exercised.
SC held that the Mayor of Manila has such power to investigate, however,
a delegation of such power to investigation does not imply a delegation
of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose
appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Thus, the mayor (of Manila) cannot delegate or confer the
powers to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas."
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power
to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted
earlier, is that the Mayor cannot delegate this power to a body like the
committee of the petitioner

Masangcay v. Comelec
G.R. No. L-13827; September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent
In 1957, Benjamin Masangcay, then the provincial treasurer of Aklan, with
several others, was charged before the COMELEC with contempt for
having opened three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of Aklan, in violation of two resolution, inasmuch as he
opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of


schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized

representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the
Citizens' Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the
Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the ROC.
He is in-charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election
forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different
municipalities of the province. Masangcay and his co-respondents entered
a plea of not guilty. The Commission found him and Melo guilty as
charged and sentenced them to suffer three months imprisonment and
pay a fine of P500. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue
the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which
grants the COMELEC as well as its members the power to punish acts of
contempt against said body, as similar in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
He alleged that it is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle of
separation of powers.
Whether the COMELEC has authority to punish Masangcay for contempt.
NO. In Guevara v. COMELEC, the COMELEC has the duty to enforce and
administer all laws to the conduct of elections, and also the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. In this sense, the Commission, although it
cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative
body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction.
The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which
inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the
exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. The
Commission exercises a ministerial function, it cannot exercise the power
to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts... The exercise
of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And
the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to
enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or

ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed
in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the
different municipalities. In this sense, the Commission has exceeded its
jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and

Bedol v. Comelec
G.R. No. 179830/ December 3, 2009

fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an
excuse was given by the respondent [petitioner] and no written report
was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative
proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit a written
explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a
contempt charge by COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine
National Police on the basis of an Order of Arrest issued on June 29,
2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during
the fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.

As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the
province of Maguindanao, the respondent [petitioner] discharged his
official functions and was able to ensure the PBOCs performance of its
ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the
twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the
burdensome and gargantuan duty of being the concurrent Provincial
Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring
province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled
canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass (PCOC) of
Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was
slated on May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission,
en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) for the
election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for
Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor
and chair of the PBOC for Maguindanao. Due to certain observations on
the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties, canvassing of the
certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the
alleged fraud which attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for
May 30, 2007, but failed to appear despite prior knowledge.
Respondents [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007
fact finding activity that, while in his custody and possession, the
election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some

Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the

warrant of arrest and its assumption of jurisdiction over the contempt
charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the COMELEC in the other assailed Resolution dated August
31, 2007.
Whether or not the initiation and issuance of
contempt order is within the constitutional powers of the
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as
an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election
laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by
the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified
into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies
arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge
of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to

the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and
to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it
by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the
Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code.

Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election

documents, which were lost while in his possession, and consequently
failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d)
Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the
authority of the COMELEC through the media (interviews on national
television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory
of long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of
a national broadsheet, with a shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation
of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the

power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance
of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of and
administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to
determine those questions, he acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is broad enough to allow the initiation of indirect
contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the
above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus
Election Code explicitly adopts the procedure and penalties provided by
the Rules of Court.
Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the
indirect contempt proceedings which were initiated by its Task Force
Maguindanao, through a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order,
notwithstanding the absence of any complaint filed by a private party.
Findings of guilt of indirect contempt
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4)
First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the
scheduled[12] canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass, the
hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his
explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in
violation of paragraphs (b) and (f) of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer

for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby DENIED. No costs.

Rules of procedure and evidence technical rules of procedure and evidence NOT
strictly applied
Not governed by technical rules

Gaoiran v. Alcala
Retired Chairman, Commission on Higher Education, ESTER
ALBANO GARCIA, now Chairman, Commission on Higher
Education, FELIPE S. AMMUGAUAN, SR., Vocation School
Superintendent I, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College, EDMOND
M. CASTILLEJO, Administrative Officer I, Angadanan AgroIndustrial College, and DIOSDADO TELAN, Instructor I & Head
Teacher III, OIC Designate, Angadanan Agro-Industrial College,
Angadanan, Isabela, Respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by Florian R. Gaoiran, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61477. In
the assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the Decision dated
February 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan, Isabela,
Branch 20, nullifying the Resolution dated June 3, 1999 of Hon. Angel C.
Alcala, then Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
dismissing petitioner Gaoiran from the service for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the CHED against
petitioner Gaoiran, Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the
Angadanan Agro-Industrial College (AAIC),2 a state-supervised school in
Angadanan, Isabela. In his letter-complaint, respondent Edmond M.
Castillejo, Administrative Officer II, also of the same school, charged the
petitioner with mauling him while he was performing his duties therein.
The incident allegedly took place on August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside
the school premises. Appended to the letter-complaint were the verified
criminal complaint filed by respondent Castillejo against the petitioner
and the sworn statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint for
assault to a person in authority was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Angadanan-San Guillermo and docketed as Criminal Case No. 9742.
The letter-complaint was referred to the Legal Affairs Service of the
CHED. Thereafter, Atty. Felina S. Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of the Director III, Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding
investigation on the mauling incident to determine the existence of a
prima facie case against the petitioner.
During the fact-finding investigation, respondent Castillejo averred that
at 2:30 p.m. on August 15, 1997, while he was performing his usual
duties as Administrative Officer II, the petitioner suddenly barged into his
(Castillejo's) office and, then and there, assaulted and boxed him. The
petitioner delivered blows on respondent Castillejo's head, left eye, left
eyebrow and lower lip. Not content with the injuries he inflicted on
respondent Castillejo, the petitioner tried to throw him down the stairs
but was prevented by the timely intervention of Mr. Ismael Bautista,
Accountant I of the same school. Bautista and other employees of the
AAIC corroborated respondent Castillejo's statements. Moreover, the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Belinda L. Miguel showed that on August
15, 1997, she treated respondent Castillejo for the wounds he sustained
on his left eye, left eyebrow and lower lip.
For his part, the petitioner averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August
15, 1997, he was about to leave the school premises. Suddenly,
respondent Castillejo shouted to the security guard to "punch out" the
petitioner's attendance card. This irked the petitioner because there were
students and other teachers in the vicinity. The petitioner confronted
respondent Castillejo and asked the latter why he had to embarrass him
(petitioner) in front of the students. Respondent Castillejo just turned his
back and proceeded to his office. The petitioner followed him and later
saw that respondent Castillejo was already holding a wrench. Inside
respondent Castillejo's office, the petitioner made a side step and just
then, respondent Castillejo slipped and fell flat on the floor. The

petitioner noticed that respondent Castillejo's left eyebrow was bleeding

and he was putting up a struggle (nagpupumiglas), so the petitioner held
his feet. While going down the stairs, the petitioner met Bautista and
Henry Rupac, Watchman I of the school.
After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding of a
prima facie case against the petitioner for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the
Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension dated July 27, 1998
stating in part:
WHEREFORE, you are hereby directed to answer in writing and under oath
the above charges against you within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
submitting therewith sworn statements of your witnesses and other
pertinent documents, if any. In your answer, you are directed to state
whether or not you elect a formal hearing of the charges against you or
you waive your rights to such hearing. You are, likewise, advised of your
right to counsel.
Considering the gravity of the instant charge against you, pursuant to
the provisions of P.D. 807, as amended, you are hereby PREVENTIVELY
SUSPENDED FOR NINETY (90) DAYS WITHOUT PAY effective upon receipt
The petitioner did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to
the charges against him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan,
Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain the
enforcement of the said preventive suspension order. However,
considering that the petitioner had already served the suspension, the
case was dismissed for being moot and academic.
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the formal charge and
preventive suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was
not under oath and that he was not informed nor apprised of the
complaint against him before, during and after the preliminary factfinding investigation.
Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later appointed Director of
the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED, issued the Resolution dated
February 20, 1999, dismissing the administrative complaint against the
petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint of respondent
Castillejo was not under oath.
However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of the CHED,
apparently unaware of the existence of Director Mayo's resolution, issued
another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding the petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

service and dismissing him therefrom. The dispositive portion of

respondent Alcala's resolution states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, respondent FLORIAN R.
GAOIRAN is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE
for unlawfully attacking a person in authority while in the active
performance of his duties and responsibilities and, then and there,
inflicted physical injuries on his person. This is without prejudice to the
complainant's right to institute the proper criminal and civil actions
against the respondent relative thereto.
The Vocational Schools Superintendent of Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College, Angadanan, Isabela, is hereby directed to effectively implement
this Order and to submit a report thereon within three (3) days upon
The petitioner received a copy of the above resolution on July 12, 1999,
which was served on him by respondent Felipe P. Ammugauan, Sr.,
School Superintendent I of AAIC.
The petitioner then filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a
petition for certiorari , prohibition and injunction. He alleged that
respondent Alcala committed grave abuse of discretion when, in the
Resolution dated June 3, 1999, he dismissed the petitioner from the
service despite the fact that the administrative complaint against him
had already been dismissed per the Resolution of February 20, 1999 of
Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service.
In its Decision dated February 15, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner as it declared the June 3, 1999 Resolution of
respondent Alcala null and void. The RTC found that after the formal
charge was filed against the petitioner and he chose not to file an answer
thereto, a formal investigation was still required to be conducted under
the Civil Service Rules. When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service,
in his February 20, 1999 Resolution, dismissed the administrative
complaint against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint
was not under oath, the formal investigation had not, as yet, been
terminated. Such dismissal, according to the RTC, put an end to the
litigation. Thus, respondent Alcala acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing his June 3, 1999 Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the
service, for the reason that the administrative complaint against him had
already been dismissed.
On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals (CA), in the assailed
Decision of September 10, 2001, reversed and set aside the decision of

the RTC. The CA declared as valid respondent Alcala's June 3, 1999

Resolution, dismissing the petitioner from the service. On the other hand,
it declared as "without legal effect" Director Mayo's February 20, 1999
Resolution, dismissing the administrative complaint against the petitioner.
In so ruling, the CA noted an apparent irregularity in Director Mayo's
February 20, 1999 Resolution. The CA pointed out that while the said
resolution was ostensibly dated February 20, 1999, a copy thereof was
mailed to respondent Castillejo only on July 6, 1999 and received by the
latter only on July 14, 1999. The petitioner, for his part, received a copy
thereof only on July 1, 1999. Prior to these dates, the existence of the
said resolution had not been established; hence, the date of its actual
issuance remained doubtful. The CA ruled that between the two
conflicting resolutions, Director Mayo's February 20, 1999 Resolution and
respondent Alcala's June 3, 1999 Resolution, the latter was entitled to
the presumption of regularity. Moreover, respondent Alcala, as then
Chairman of the CHED, had the authority to reverse and set aside the
acts or issuances of his subordinates, including that of Director Mayo.
The CA further ratiocinated that, even granting that the February 20,
1999 Resolution was regularly issued, Director Mayo nonetheless
overstepped his authority because Atty. Dasig, then OIC of the Legal
Affairs Service, had filed the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension against the petitioner as early as July 27, 1998. The CA also
held that, contrary to Director Mayo's ruling, the fact that the lettercomplaint was not under oath was not fatal. Even an anonymous
complaint may be acted upon by the authority concerned provided that
the same is verifiable, since under Section 485 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292,6 administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of
equivalent rank, or head of local government or chiefs of agencies, or
regional directors.
The CA, likewise, opined that in administrative proceedings, a formal or
trial-type hearing is not, at all times, necessary. In this case, the
petitioner was not denied procedural due process as he was afforded a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side. On the other hand,
the CA declared that respondent Ester Albano Garcia, who replaced
respondent Alcala as Chairman of the CHED, was denied procedural due
process by the RTC when it rendered its decision without awaiting her
answer to the petition. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Resolution dated June 3,
1999 of then Chairman of CHED, Angel C. Alcala is hereby declared valid
while the Resolution dated February 20, 1999 of Director Joel Voltaire

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

Mayo is hereby declared to be without legal effect.

certification of non-forum shopping.


Since respondent Castillejo's letter-complaint failed to comply with the

formal requirements of the law, the petitioner maintains that Director
Mayo rightfully dismissed the same and that respondent Alcala abused his
discretion when he dismissed the petitioner from the service.

Aggrieved, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:


The Court is not persuaded.

The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or employees are provided in
Book V of E.O. No. 292. Sections 46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6,
Subtitle A thereof read:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.'
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint
against a civil service official or employee shall be given due course
unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the


As the petitioner himself submits, the foregoing issues are interrelated;
hence, they shall be resolved jointly.
The petitioner vigorously contends that the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo should be deemed inexistent as it was not made
under oath. Consequently, the formal charge and order of preventive
suspension filed against him, which stemmed from the said lettercomplaint, was, likewise, null and void. The petitioner cites Section 2,9
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,
which requires that an administrative complaint against a civil service
official or employee be in writing and under oath. Moreover, the lettercomplaint did not allegedly comply with Section 4(d)10 of Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 94-0521,11 also known as the Uniform
Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation, and
the law then in force at the time, because it did not contain a

Sec. 48. Procedures in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential

Appointees. - (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced against
a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or head of office of
equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or
regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant
shall submit sworn statements covering his testimony and those of his
witnesses together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis of
such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall
notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against the latter, to
which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements and
other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less
than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the
charges in writing under oath together with supporting sworn statements
and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a
formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the
answer is found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the
On the other hand, Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, cited by the petitioner, reads:

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

Sec. 2. Any person may file an administrative complaint with the

Commission or any of its proper office. Said complaint shall be in writing
and under oath, otherwise, the same shall not be given due course.
Further, Section 4(d) of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, likewise, invoked
by the petitioner, states:
Sec. 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. - No complaint against a
civil servant shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing and
under oath.
The complaint should be written in a clear manner, simple and concise
language and in a systematic manner as to apprise the civil servant
concerned of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to
enable him to intelligently prepare his defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following:
(d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against
the same party involving the same acts or omissions and issues has been
filed before another agency or administrative tribunal.
In the absence of any one of the above-mentioned requirements, the
complaints shall be dismissed.
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent
Castillejo was not concededly verified, appended thereto were the
verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as well as
the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well
be considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In
fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes
cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints
filed against court employees or officials for violations of the Code of
Ethical Conduct.12 Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government
agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its
investigative powers.13 After all, in administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.14
In any case, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the letter-complaint of
respondent Castillejo is not a "complaint" within the purview of the
provisions mentioned above. In the fairly recent case of Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held that the "complaint"
under E.O. No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases "both refer to
the actual charge to which the person complained of is required to
answer and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation

should his answer be deemed not satisfactory."

In this case, respondent Castillejo's letter-complaint contained the
following averments:
The undersigned wish to file his complaint against Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran,
Head Teacher III of Angadanan Agro-Industrial College for mauling him
last August 15, 1997 at around 2:30 in the afternoon for the accused to
be disciplined. The case is now filed in the Court of Justice docketed
under Criminal Case No. 97-42 for "Assault to Person in Authority".
I am Mr. Edmond M. Castillejo, Administrative Officer II of Angadanan
Agro-Industrial College, Angadanan, Isabela, furnishing you a copy of my
complaint filed in court, all under oath, for you to determine the gravity
of the case administratively. Mr. Florian R. Gaoiran is now intimidating two
of the witnesses against him that's why may I request for an immediate
investigation of the case, by the commission, for him to be suspended or
probably removed from the service to avoid him from threatening the
Your preferential attention and favorable action in this request are
earnestly requested and will be highly appreciated.16
Acting thereon, the CHED referred the matter to its Office of Legal
Affairs Service and Atty. Dasig, as OIC Director thereof, conducted a
fact-finding investigation on the incident. The said letter-complaint did
not, by itself, commence the administrative proceedings against the
petitioner, requiring an answer from him, but, as already mentioned,
merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
The Court cannot, therefore, uphold the petitioner's contention that
respondent Castillejo's letter-complaint was "inexistent" and could not be
acted upon by the CHED for to do so, would result in an absurd and
restrictive interpretation of E.O. No. 292 and effectively deprive the
Government of its disciplining power over people who hold a public
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension
filed by Atty. Dasig against the petitioner charging him with grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and directing him to submit his answer in writing and under oath that
constituted the complaint.18 Notably, Atty. Dasig signed the formal
charge and order of preventive suspension "for the Commission" in her
capacity as then OIC of the CHED's Legal Affairs Service. As the
complaint against the petitioner was initiated by the appropriate
disciplining authority, under Sections 46(c)19 and 48(1),20 Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292, the same need not be subscribed and

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Atty. Gallant Soriano

sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a verification of

non-forum shopping.
Section 47(2), Chapter 7 of E.O. No. 292 provides, in part, that "the
Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction." Since it was the CHED,21 as the disciplining authority,
through Atty. Dasig, which filed the formal charge or complaint against
the petitioner, jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case.
Anent the issue on which of the two conflicting resolutions is valid, the
Court agrees with the CA that respondent Alcala's June 3, 1999
Resolution dismissing the petitioner from the service prevails over that of
Director Mayo's February 20, 1999 Resolution dismissing the
administrative complaint.
First, the basis for the dismissal of the administrative complaint stated in
Director Mayo's resolution, i.e., that the letter-complaint was not verified,
is, as earlier discussed, patently erroneous. Second, it was issued by
Director Mayo in excess of his authority. It is borne by the records that
Atty. Dasig already filed the formal charge against the petitioner after a
fact-finding investigation had been conducted on the mauling incident
and a prima facie case had been established against him. The formal
charge was filed as early as July 27, 1998 and, on September 21, 1998,
Atty. Dasig submitted her memorandum to respondent Alcala
recommending the petitioner's dismissal. It was, thus, highly irregular for
Director Mayo to dismiss the administrative complaint against the
petitioner long after the formal charge had already been filed against him
and the matter was already for respondent Alcala's resolution. Third,
respondent Alcala, by reason of his position as then Chairman of the
CHED, had the authority to reverse and set aside the acts or issuances of
his subordinates. His June 3, 1999 Resolution dismissing the petitioner
from the service, in effect, reversed and set aside the Resolution dated
February 20, 1999 of Director Mayo, his subordinate.
Finally, the petitioner insists that no formal investigation was conducted
after the formal charge had been filed against him in violation of Section
22 of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 which reads:
Section 22. Conduct of Formal Investigation. - A formal investigation
shall be held after the respondent has filed his answer or after the period
for filing an answer has expired. It shall be completed within thirty (30)
days from the date of the service of the formal charge, unless the period
is extended by the Commission in meritorious cases.

nevertheless be conducted if upon evaluation of the complaint, the

answer, and the documents in support thereof, the merits of the case
cannot be judiciously resolved without conducting such formal
The petitioner's allegation is, however, belied by respondent Alcala's
statement in his resolution, to wit:
Nevertheless, during the formal investigation of the case, respondent
[referring to the petitioner] failed to submit his written counteraffidavit/answer to the charges filed against him by the complainant so
he was declared in default. This notwithstanding, the oral testimony
given during the fact-finding investigation was considered in his
(respondent's) favor to enable this office to determine the veracity of
the allegations imputed against the respondent.
After weighing all the evidences [sic] submitted and the testimonies
given by the witnesses for both complainant and the respondent, this
office finds substantial evidence to hold the respondent administratively
liable for violation of subparagraphs (2) and (27) of Section 46(b),
Chapter 7, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known
as the "Administrative Code of 1987."'22
Significantly, the petitioner cannot rightfully claim that he was denied
procedural due process. What is repugnant to due process is the denial
of the opportunity to be heard.23 The petitioner was undoubtedly
afforded the opportunity to present his side as he was directed to file his
written answer to the formal charge against him. He opted not to do so.
He cannot now feign denial of due process.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292, grave misconduct on first offense is punishable by
dismissal. On the other hand, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service on first offense is punishable by suspension for six
months and one day to one year.
In fine, the appellate court committed no reversible error in upholding
respondent Alcala's Resolution of June 3, 1999 finding the petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and dismissing him therefrom.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated September 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
61477 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Although the respondent did not elect a formal investigation, one shall