PALE CASE LIST

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Cayetano v. Monsod
In Re: Cunanan
In Re: Edillon
In Re: Argosinio
In Re: Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling
In Re: Telesforo Diao
In Re: Juan Publico
In Re: Petition to allow sharia lawyers to exercise their profession at the
regular courts
9. PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co.
10.Ramos v. Manalac
11.In Re: David
12.Marcos v. Chief of State
13.Office of Court Administrator v. Ladaga
14.Olazo v. Justice Dante O. Tinga
15.In Re: Dacanay
16.Catu v. Atty. Vicente Rellosa
17.In Re: Maquera
18.Zaguirre v. Castillo
19.Zari v. Flores
20.Nunez v. Astorga
21.Guevarra v. Eala
22.UI v. Bonifacio
23.Toleda v. Abalos
24.Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro
25.Chua v. Mesina
26.Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
27.ULEP v. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
28.Lim v. Barcelona
29.PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
30.In Re: Edillon *
31.Camacho v. Pangulayan *
32.Tolentino v. Baylosis *
33.In Re: Laureta *
34.Villaflor v. Sarita *
35.Maligaya v. Doronilla *
36.Occena v. Marquez *
37.In Re: Bagabuyo*
38.Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer *
39.Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel *
40.Corleto v. Arro *
41.Lacurom v. Jacoba *
42.Balaoing v. Judge Maliwanag *
43.Baja v. Macandog *
44.Rudecon Management Corporation v. Tacorda *
45.Roxas v. CA *
46.Sambajon v. Suing *

47.In Re: Brillantes *

48. Hadjula v. Atty. Roceles F. Madianda *
49.Baldwin v. CIR *
50.Elesio C. Pormento, Sr. v. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra
51.Ruthie Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
52.Josefina M. Aninon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr.
53.Hilado v. David
54.Nakpil v. Hernandez
55.Trenas v. PP
56.Nevada v. Casuga
57.Metrobak v. CA
58.Linsangan v. Tolentino
59.Solidon v. Macalakad
60.Sarraga v. Banco Filipino
61.Abiero v. Juanino
62.Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
63.Quilban v. Robinol
64.Camacho v. CA
65.Orcino v. Gaspar *
66.Ong Ching v. Ramolete *
67.In Re: Allegation Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado Macasaet *
68.In Re: Charges of Plagiarism Against Justice Del Castillo *
69.OCA v. Judge Floro *
70.Gacad v. Judge Clapis *
71.Judge Alumbres v. Judge Caoibes *
72.Pimentel v. Salonga *
73.Judge Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4354-M *
74.Liwanag v. Judge Lustre *
75.Hilado v. Reyes *

Cayetano vs. Monsod

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement
of law as having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsods past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, the practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings and other similar work
which involves the determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act
of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There
are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed
the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act
No. 972.
Issue:Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in
the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
IN RE: EDILLON
Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership
dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee
and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to
practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and
void.
Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of
the respondent.
Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar
associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is
voluntary.
The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are
subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment
of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of
regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional
rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its
existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the
rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.
IN RE: ARGOSINO
FACTS: Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the
Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by
the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character
he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2)
senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he,

together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of
their hazing victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls
of Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD:. Petition granted.
RATIO: Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the
required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls
of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral
fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath
is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community
assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of
the society.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar
examinations and for disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar, Melendrez.
FACTS:
1. MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him
the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
1. Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral
Defamation and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people.
ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to
the latter.
2. Alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member
of the Bar.
2. MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.
2 Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge
has moral ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from a
single incident as closed and terminated.
i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.
2. Use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were typed by the office clerk.
3. Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
2 Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending.
3 Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the
same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.
ISSUE: WON Melings act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD: PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the
Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron
S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not
pass the bar).
1.

Rule 7.01: A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing
a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
i. Unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect
contempt of court.
2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning.
3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver
that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused
or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.
1 Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
In the matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez
FACTS:
1. DIAO was admitted to the Bar.
1. 2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications.
2. Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:
1. Did not complete his high school training
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.
2. DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third
year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test
given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma
1. Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
2. No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
charge is clearly meritorious:

i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949
1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.
ISSUE: WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not
completing pre-law requirements? NO.
HELD: STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO
RETURN HIS LAWYERS DIPLOMA WITHIN 30 DAYS.
1. Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
1. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
2. He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:
i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations
iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.
2.

Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;

taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

In RE: Petition for Reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys, JUAN T. PUBLICO

FACTS:
1. THREE PETITIONS (from Publico, faculty of Polytechnic University, Civic Association in
Manila):
1. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
2. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person
of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he
was 16 years old, that he was eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the
school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico.
i. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
ii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for
falsification of school records or credentials.
2. PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
3. Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his
witnesses had turned hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
2. Recommended PUBLICOs name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127
of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the
prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the
practice of law.

4. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never
received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of
the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
1. He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
2. He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to
Manila.
3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary
conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the
numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court
for lack of merit.
4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through
the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and
enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his
demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle;
that being merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still
under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
ISSUE: WON PUBLICO can be reinstated, for being in exemplary moral character despite not
completing pre-law requirements? YES.
HELD: Petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
1.
REINSTATEMENT CRITERIA:
1. WON the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the court,
2. Court action will depend WON it decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation
therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law.
3. Applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a
person of good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law.
4. Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and Victoriano
Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of Industrial Relations and
Quintin Muning
FACTS:
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT WITH
BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
1. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
i. Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their nonobjection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages

ii. Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services

Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
1. Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
a. Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
i. Cipriano
10%
ii. Quintin Muning
10%
iii. Atanacio Pacis
5%
iii. CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the division
of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers
1. Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that No justification for a ruling, that the person representing the partylitigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
a. Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
b. Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
2. The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to compensation
for such representation.
1.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
i. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services.
a. Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
b. His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good
moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that
he was eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and namesake, Juan M. Publico.
ii. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
iii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school
records or credentials.
3. PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
4. Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
1. September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his
witnesses had turned hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
2. Recommended PUBLICOs name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which
require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary,
high, pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
5. 11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never
received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of
the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
1. He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
2. He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to
Manila.
3. Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary
conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the
numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.

ii.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of merit.
4. 5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through
the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and
enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his
demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle;
that being merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still
under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.
WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of
some of its members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in
the present petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
HELD: ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED 10% OF
BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEYS FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS AGAINST MUNING.
1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is
not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for the ethics of the profession
and for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated:
1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law
3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures.
4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from
the backpay of some of its members:
1 YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action
in the industrial court on behalf of its members
2 If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
i. Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.
Ramos vs. Maalac

FACTS: Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners question the validity of
the CFI ruling that they will be held in contempt for refusing to vacate the land. The said
property, being collateral for a loan to a Mr. Rivera, was foreclosed due to non-payment of loan
amount and its interest within the prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera later sold the property to Ms.
Lopez, who later filed petition that she be placed in possession of the land. The petitioners
question the ruling of the court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
(1) The decision of the lower court (CFI) is valid;
(2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid; and,
(3) (Possible Legal Ethics Issue) the term appearance would include only presence in courts.
HELD: YES on first two issues. NO on the third issue. Petition was dismissed. Cost against the
petitioners.
RATIO: Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be sustained for the
reason that it is in a nature of collateral attack to judgment which on its face is valid and regular
for a long time. It is a well known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can
only be attacked in separate action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion,
47 Phil. 717).
The second issue was also not taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of
possession in foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of
Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is merely ministerial and complementary duty of the
court.
In the third issue, the word or term appearance includes not only arguing a case before any
such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as by simply filing a formal motion, plea
or answer.
IN RE: DAVID
FACTS: Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a
lawyer for a period of five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this
suspension in `his written report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the
profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.
On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as
an agent. (For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty
Felix David filed a motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill,
Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.
In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the
suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even
myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the
appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm
name under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent

amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being

originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or
administrative body in violation of the constitutional restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the
Constitution prohibits directly.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in
Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon
City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of
Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like
a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On
top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence.
He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of
the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by
law.
Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice?
NO
Held:Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their
profession.
THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE:
In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice
of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services
(State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion,
is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as
pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private
practice of the law profession contemplated by law.
DECISION: Reprimanded
Petition for Leave to Reclaim Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay

FACTS: In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for him
to take advantage of Canadas free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004.
In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he returned to the
Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved
and limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay
reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to
have never been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after
reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of law,
to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

CATU VS. RELLOSA

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District
of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned
for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a
complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel
for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between
the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay,
he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the

case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to
discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of
RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a
breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then
recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well
as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of
Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and
in connection to former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment
in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at
bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the
purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the
practice of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to
all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA
6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that
they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice
his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The
failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party
without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of
the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oathand/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.
IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera
B.M. No. 793
July 30, 2004
Facts: In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the
suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property
as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably
high fee for handling his client's case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an
attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign
court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's oath.
The case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation report and recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that
Maquera was the counsel of a certain Castro. Benavente the creditor Castro, obtained a
judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s property was to be sold at a public auction in
satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. However, Castro retains the right of redemption.
In consideration of Maqueras legal services, Castro entered into an oral agreement with
Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988,
Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction
of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his
name.And after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty
Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying
that Maquera be sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed
that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged
that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the
Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing

the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully
disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in writing.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that
although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish
that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."However, the IBP still resolved to
suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since
1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be
suspended as member of the Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.
Ruling: The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed
in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is
a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension
In the case at bar such transaction made by Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492 in
relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article
1491 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject
of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in
legal redemption. This is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney
may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client 30 and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients.
They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and
confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to
maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf
regarding the charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did
receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus,
there is a need to ascertain Maquera's current and correct address in Guam in order that
another notice, this time specifically informing him of the charges against him and requiring him
to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through
this Resolution), may be sent to him.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the
practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the
present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of
membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and
default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.

CARMELITA ZAGUIRRE VS. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO

A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003

FACTS:
Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita
Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and
before the release of its results. Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillos daughter. The
latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her
support which did not materialize after the birth of the child. The Court found him guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her. In
his defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving
his good moral character. His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a
husband and father despite the affair. More than a year since the original decision rendered by the
Court, Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of
post-dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of
Php2,000.00 each.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross immoral conduct, making him punishable of
Indefinite Suspension.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, Atty. Alfredo Castillo, is guilty of gross immoral
conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. The attempt of respondent
to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita
demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member
of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.

This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards." While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with
complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous,"
and that what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire." The Court is not
convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.

The Court found that Castillos show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and
reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of
two years. Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirres further claim for the support of her child
should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

NUNEZ VS. ASTORGA (Administrative Liability of Respondent)

The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither shall they, whether in public or in
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms of disciplinary action and
must be imposed with great caution. The allegations in the Complaint were not substantiated by clear
evidence; they were bereft of convincing proof of respondents deceit and gross misconduct.
The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him does not
ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His contention that the pending cases against him pose a
prejudicial question that will bar the instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of
merit, however, is the finding of the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the
same pending cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of respondent.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of course, upon a finding
that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such conviction, such

lawyer has become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good
moral character. In the present case, however, while respondent has been charged with several
criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them.
Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted serious
misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through
the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the IBP investigating
commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation. As borne by the records, Investigating
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted hearings on the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during
which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares, appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as
well as his Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the December 11, 2002 hearing
when the parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed submitted
for resolution. Records show that respondent filed his Memorandum on January 29, 2003. Hence, he
cannot claim that he was not given ample opportunity to rebut the charges filed against him.
While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and convincingly proven the charges
of serious misconduct, we do, however, note the use of offensive language in respondents pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
In his Memorandum dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego, points
out the manner and tenor of the language in the Answer and the Rejoinder of respondent. The latter
suggested that complainants and their counsel had caused the filing of several baseless suits, including
the present charge, merely to harass and place him in a bad light. He hurled insulting language in
describing the opposing counsel and cast doubts on the latters integrity by implying that the lawyer
had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on non-forum shopping and
committed malpractice.
Indeed, these statements, particularly the words who he is despite x xx his shortness not only in
size but in arrogance, constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession and cannot be
countenanced by this Court.
A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic, but respectful as
befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should use such language as may be properly addressed by one gentleperson to
another.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious misconduct, but is held
liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand pesos.

GUEVARRA VS. EALA

FACTS:JoselanoGuevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. NoliEala
(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who
was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at
Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning
of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with
her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I
Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000,
the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.

In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene is
neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a
ground for disbarment.

ISSUE:Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.

HELD:YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who
is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations
are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected
by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law."

As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect
for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

UI VS. BONIFACIO

FACTS: LesliUi filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the
ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli)
husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy of a marriage
certificate that said that she and Carlos got married in 1985 but according to the certificate of
marriage obtained from the Hawaii StateDepartment of Health, they were married in 1987.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she
deserves to be barred from the practice of law.

HELD: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he must also have a continued possession of

good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct , which has been defined
as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened
with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great
caution.

Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, it must be grossly immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Her act
of distancing herself on her discovery that Carlos was married proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.

On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience and highly
improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to check that the information
on the document she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.

TOLEDO VS. ABALOS

Non-professional conduct

FACTS:This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back.

On 9 July 1981, Atty. ErlindaAbalos obtained a loan of 200k from Priscila Toledo, payable within 6
months at 5% interest. As a guarantee, Atty. Abalos executed a promissory note. After 6 months and
despite repeated demands, Abalos didnt pay.

Toledo sought help from IBP. Commission on Bar Discipline directed Abalos to answer but she didnt
respond. The complaint was heard and despite non-appearance, the commission suspended Abalos from
practice for 6 months.

Decision said that this is due to her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrating
despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer
The commission, however, declined to discipline her for failing to meet her financial obligation since
this was incurred in her personal capacity.

ISSUE: WON the sanction was correct

HELD: No. Abalos was only suspended for 1 month. Suspension was found to be grossly disproportionate
to the act complained (failure to appear before the commission). With her legal expertise and
knowledge, Abalos would know that the commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint. The remedy
for Toledo was to file a collection case before a regular court of justice against Abalos. asAbalos is
legally liable to pay her obligations in her personal capacity.

However, it is still necessary for Abalos to acknowledge the authority of the commission over her as a
member of the IBP.

BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. ALEJANDRO & ATTY. VILLARIN

FACTS:Complainant is the wife of the respondent Atty. Alejandro. Respondent abandoned her and their
children live with his mistress, respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina ArrietaVillarin. Since then, respondents
have been publicly representing themselves as husband and wife. They consequently had a child named
Paolo Villarin Alejandro. Complainant filed this administrative complaint when she learned that her
husband has been nominated as a regional trial court judge. She insists that he is not fit to be a judge
considering that he, and co-respondent Atty. Villarin, do not even possess the basic integrity to remain
as members of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alejandro may be disbarred.

HELD:YES. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Thus we have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a
condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership
therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent,
honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing
so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role
being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part
so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

CHUA VS. MESINA (GROSS MISCONDUCT)

FACTS:
Complainants Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged respondent Atty. Simeon
M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable
malpractice.

Complainants were lessees of the property of respondent's mother. Respondent's mother defaulted in
paying a loan that she obtained in a bank, thus respondent convinced complainants to help her mother
if paying the said obligation, to which the complainants acceded. It was agreed among that that in
consideration for the act of complainants, the property which they are leasing will be transferred to
their name. The complainants complied with the terms of the agreement. A deed of sale concerning
such property was executed.

However, to evade liability for paying capital gains tax, respondent instructed complainants to execute
another deed of sale which will be antedated 1979, wherein the capital gains tax was not yet in
effective.

Subsequently, after the execution of the deed of sale, respondents instructed his clients [complainants]
to execute a simulated deed of sale which will reflect that the property was re-conveyed to his mother.

The cunning acts of respondent did not end there. Respondent went to the house of complainants and
got the owners certificate of title of the said property which is still under the name of her mother. he
promised to the complainants that he will process the transfer of the property to their name. Years
passed, but respondent never returned the said title to the complainants.

Meanwhile, another lessee file a criminal case against the complainants and respondents for
falsification. He claims that was also given the promise that the property will be offered to him before
it will be sold to another, but respondents sold it to complainants without offering to him. Because of
the foregoing circumstances, complainants filed an administrative case against respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

HELD:
Yes, said the Court- "This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to 1979 to evade
payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes,
and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he did defraud
not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another document, a simulated Deed of
Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his
mother, he committed dishonesty.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into turning over
to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four
months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise committed
dishonesty.

That the signature of Felicisima M. Melencio in the 1985 document and that in the 1979 document
are markedly different is in fact is a badge of falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or
even both.

A propos is this Courts following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is
required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business
dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his
client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on
public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor.

Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of the Melencio property to
complainants, consideration of whether he should be ordered to honor such promise should be taken up
in the civil case filed for the purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while that in the case at
bar is moral fitness.

Respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct, hereby DISBARRED.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
FACTS: Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975
and by the surviving partners of Atty. HerminioOzaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that
they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed
away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception
is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partners name in a professional firms name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines,
or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
ISSUE: WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners
who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

HELD: In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make
a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially
ride on that old firms reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:A partnership for the
practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose.
It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.
11 Thus, it has been stated that the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

MAURICIO C. ULEP VS. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease
and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The advertisements complained of
by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa.Declaration of Absence.Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen
vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of practice of law is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is nonadvisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of
action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and
for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of
authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal
advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising

his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on
the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us
that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.

PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET. AL.

GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.)
Matter is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving
a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The act
of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS:
On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C.
Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents
Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies
of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division).
In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of
sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the
cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition.
In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza,
who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President
Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil

Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
The petition is denied.
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the
rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer
on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation
and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Beyond doubt, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case
at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. We hold that this advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot
disqualify.
It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812
is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act
which can be considered as innocuous such as x xx drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by
respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the
actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in
interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose
not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence
The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by
the latter
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the
official independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the position of
Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that
the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this
independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this
independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office.
Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the
rule of law.

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr.
Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and
rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General,
Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify
respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify
as reasonable.

PORMENTO V. PONTEVEDRA(A.C. No. 5128) 31 March 2005The Case

: Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with
prayer for disbarment
Facts:
Respondent was the Pormento familys legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The
familys relationship with the respondentextends beyond the mere lawyer-client
relations.The rift between complainant and respondent began when the
complainants counterclaim in a civil case filed with the RTCof Bacolod City was
dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his
counterclaim whichresulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. In
order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento wasforced to hire a
new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the subject
property.In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at
Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was
prepared and notarized by respondent. Since there was another person who claims
ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he heeded respondents advice to build a
small house on the property and to allow his(complainants) nephew and his family to
occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said
property.Subsequently, complainants nephew refused to vacate the property
prompting the former to file an ejectment case with theMunicipal Trial Court of
Escalante, Negros Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainants
nephew

Held/Ruling:Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of thefacts.

Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the

acceptance of the new retainer will requirethe attorney to do anything which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether hewill be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another testto determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent anattorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness ordouble dealing in the performance
thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client
when the subject matter of the presentcontroversy is related, directly or indirectly,
to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the
formerclient. Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client, with full
disclosure to the latter, against a former client in amatter wholly unrelated to that of
the previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of interests.
Where, however,the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyers new
client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former
clients action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he
previously opposed as counsel for theformer client or to use against the latter
information confided to him as his counsel.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO

Atty. Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
industries,Inc. until his appointment as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.Employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint, they
alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of
Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages
without valid cause. Complainant now charges respondent with the violationsRule
15.03 of CPR and engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
govt prosecutor.

ISSUE:
WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of CPR. WON being a former lawyer of
Taggatconflicts with his role as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor

HELD:

The Supreme Court finds no conflict of interests when respondent handled

preliminaryinvestigation of criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in
1997. The issue in the criminalcomplaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from April 1 1996 to July 15, 1997.Clearly, respondent was no longer
connected with Taggat during that period since he resignedsometime in 1992. In
order to change respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidencemust be
presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired thru his previous employment. It does
not necessarily followthat respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment withcomplainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal
complaint.As the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he
resolved asgovt prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representingconflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactionsthat occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to imposeupon the lawyer the duty to protect the
clients interests only on matters that he previouslyhandled for the former client and not
for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationshiphas terminated.
Thus, respondent is NOT guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
As to the second issue, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in Ra 6718 which
constitutes aviolation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.. The respondent
here performed acts that are usuallyrendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of theterm practice of law. Respondents admission
that he received from Taggat fees for legalservices while serving as a govt prosecutor is
unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

JOSEFINA M. ANION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA,

JR.,RESPONDENT.
Facts:Josefina M. Anion (
complainant
) had previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsanain the preparation and execution in her
favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned byher late common-law husband, Brigido
Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated herconfidence when he subsequently filed a civil case
against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of
Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainantaccused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he
obtained from her in filing thecivil case.Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in
the preparation and execution of theDeed of Sale. However, he denied having received any
confidential information. Atty. Sabitsanaasserted that the present disbarment complaint was

instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez,Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court
case against him (Atty. Sabitsana)and had instigated the complaint for this reason.
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report andRecommendation of the IBP Commissioner after
finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record andRespondent was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.Atty. Sabitsana moved
to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his
motion.

The Issue
Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.
The Courts Ruling

The SC agreed with the findings and recommendations of the IBP

Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. The SC rules that t
he relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
withthe highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality
that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/he
r lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyerbased on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his
part, is duty-bound toobserve candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings
and transactions with the client.
Part of the lawyers duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the

above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time,to oppose that claim for the other client.

Thus, if a lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.Another test of
inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
that duty.
Still another test is whether the lawyer wouldbe called upon in the new relation to
use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
theirconnection or previous employmentOn the basis of the attendant facts of the
case, substantial evidence proved
to support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of
the above rule:
first , he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete;
second , he impleaded thecomplainant as the defendant in the case; and
third , the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale thathe had
previously prepared and executed for the complainant.By his acts, not only did Atty.
Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action;
healso accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the
interest of his other client in a propertyin which his legal services had been
previously retained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of theCommission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from
the practice of law.

HILADO vs. DAVID

Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against
Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the
Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's deceasedhusband.2. Attorneys

Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita file an answer on behalf of the defendant; and
Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo
registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff.These attorneys filed
an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.3.
Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant
in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, et al. who had withdrawn from the
case.4.Attorney Dizon (counsel for plaintiff)
, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue
representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him
about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to
Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion
.5. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Dizon et al, filed a formal
motion with the court TO DISQUALIFY Francisco
.6. In his answer, Attorney Francisco alleged that, a real estate broker told him that
there was apending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the
sale of a real estate andthat this woman asked him if he was willing to accept the
case if the Syrian should give it the casehim.
7.Atty. Francisco accepted the case.8.

One month after, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about the suit, he wanted to take it
away fromAttys. Dizon et al. ;
that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate totell her
frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker.
9.Assad requested Atty. Francisco to handle his case stating that his American
lawyer left for theUS leaving the case in the hands of other attorneys.10
Atty. Francisco accepted the retainer and entered his appearance.11.The judge
trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, dismissed the complaint. He
believedand concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the
respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.

ISSUE:
Is Atty Francisco guilty of representing conflicting interest?
YES.

HELD:

That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his
signature onthe merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of
papers she had submitted at hisoffice; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting
those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional services.
SC agrees with petitioner's counsel that
THE RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT BETWEEN ATTORNEY FRANCISCO AND
MRS. HILADO ENSUED .In order to constitute attorney and client relation a
professional one and not merely one of principal and agent , the attorneys must be
employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend anaction
in court of Justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills,
contracts andthe like." (Atkinson vs. Howlett) To constitute professional employment
it is NOT essential that the client should have employed theattorney professionally
on any previous occasion . . . It is NOT necessary that any retainer should havebeen
paid, promised, or charged for; NEITHER IS IT MATERIAL that the attorney consulted
did notafterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a
person, in respect to his businessaffairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view toobtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in suchconsultation,
then the professional employment must be regarded as established
. . ." (JonesCommentaries on Evidence)
FORMALITY IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN ATTORNEY
. Thecontract may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of the attorney issought and received, in matters pertinent to
his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter ."
(HirachBros. & Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party, in litigation, had
formerly represented theadverse party with respect to the same matter involved in
the litigation, THE COURT NEED
NOT INQUIRE AS TO HOW MUCH KNOWLEDGE THE ATTORNEY ACQUIRED FROM HIS
FORMERCLIENT
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the
adverse party.(

Brown vs. Miller )

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
terminating hisemployment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in
the same general matter, even though,while acting for his former client, he
acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client'sdisadvantage in the
subsequent adverse employment
. (P ierce vs. Palmer ) Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of litigations, a complicated affair,consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what issaid in the
course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice thecomplainant's cause
. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results.
SC nevertheless CANNOT SANCTION
his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who hadsought and obtained
legal advice from his firm SC believes that upon the admitted facts it is highly
inexpedient . It had the tendency to bring theprofession, of which he is a
distinguished member, " into public disrepute and suspicion and underminethe
integrity of justice. " The fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, asheretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of
attorney and client. THIS LETTER BINDS AND STOPS HIM IN THE SAME MANNER AND
TO THE SAME DEGREE AS IF HE PERSONALLY HAD WRITTEN IT. An information
obtained by a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted
to the firm.

DEE vs. CA [1989]NAKPIL vs. VALDES [1998]

Facts:

1965 Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in

Baguio(Moran property). For lack of funds, he requested Valdes to purchase
theproperty for him. They agreed that Valdes would keep the property in trust
for the Nakpils until they could buy it back. Valdes obtained 2 loans from a
bankwhich he used to purchase and renovate the property and the title was issued
inthe name of Valdes.


July 8, 1973 Nakpil died and Valdes acted as legal counsel and accountant of the
Imelda Nakpil (widow)

Ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate

proceedingsbecause Valdes excluded the Moran property from the inventory of the
estate.

February 13, 1979 Nakpil sought to recover the property by filing an action
for reconveyance with damages. During the pendency of the action she filed acase
in order to disbar Valdes She charged that Valdes violated theprofessional ethics
when:
o
Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property which belongedto the estate
he was settling as its lawyer and auditor
o
Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of real estateproperties" he
prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time,charged the loan secured to
purchase the said excluded property as aliability of the estate, all for the purpose of
transferring the title to thesaid property to his family corporation.
o
Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate thatretained him as its
counsel and auditor

Defense of Valdes
o
He claims that he did not hold the property in trust
o
He denied preparing the list of claims against the estate whichincluded his loans of
65,000 and 75,000 for the purchase andrenovation of the Moran property. He
stressed that the list drawn upby his accounting firm merely stated that the loan
was in the name of Valdes were applied probably for the purchase of the Moran

property.He claims that probably for purchase did not imply

consummatedtransaction but a projected acquisition. He adds that he has
resignedfrom law and accounting firm as early as 1974 and that it Atty.Cendana who
filed the intestate proceedings in court.
o
He denied that there was a conflict of interest when his law firmrepresented the
estate in the intestate proceedings while hisaccounting firm served as accountant of
the estate and prepared theclaims of creditors of Nakpil and Enorn.

1963 CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. Lower Court heldthat
the Moran property was held in trust but found that Nakpil waived her rightover it.

CA reversed the ruling of the court.

February 18, 1986 (during the pendency of the complaint) OSG found thatthere
was no trust agreement over the property and that Valdes was theabsolute
owner. OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.Issue: WON the
demeanor of Valdes would warrant his disbarment from the profession?NO, Valdes is
suspended from the practice of law for one year with a warning that asimilar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.Ratio:

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the
businesstransaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good
faith. Themeasure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his
dealingswith his client is a much higher standard than is required in business
dealingswhere the parties trade at "arms length. Business transactions between
anattorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the
law.Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage
istaken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, byvirtue
of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of thecredulity and
ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's favour.

In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose
Nakpil. Valdes initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of theMoran

property. His bad faith in transferring the property to his familycorporation is well
discussed in this Court's Decision.

Respondent's act of excluding the Moran property from the estate which his lawfirm
was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent
truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he shouldhave at least
informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agreeon its ownership,
respondent should have formally presented his claim in theintestate proceedings
instead of transferring the property to his own corporationand concealing it from
complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.Respondent's misuse of his
legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moranproperty is clearly unethical.

Respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00and
P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained byrespondent
for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaimingknowledge or
privity in the preparation of the list of the estate's liabilities.Respondent violated
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility whichprovides that a lawyer
owes fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins him to bemindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.

Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the

rule,based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent
adverseinterests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an
issue. Theproscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
applicationwhere the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general
matter andis applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies
althoughthe attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where
theparties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts.
Disclosurealone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to
suchrepresentation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent
of the conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood byhis
clients.

HECTOR TREAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES[G.R. No. 195002. January 25,
2012.]

FACTS:Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja wanted to buy a house-andlot in Iloilo CitY. It was thenmortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito
Palma recommended Atty. Hector Treas toElizabeth, who was an employee and
niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title inthe latter's name.
Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her
auntMargarita, expenses would be incurred.Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00
to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt but the lattermisappropriated and
converted it to his own personal use.RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of Estafa. CA affirmed.ISSUE: jurisdiction of RTC.RULING:There
being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city
has no jurisdiction over the case.Court sees it fit to note that the Code of
Professional Responsibility strongly militates against thepetitioner's conduct in
handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides
such.When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose, he should promptlyaccount to the client how the money was spent. His
failure either to render an accounting or to returnthe money constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Moreover, a lawyer
has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or
upondemand. His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he hasmisappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by theclient.The case is thus referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinaryproceedings
against petitioner.

NEVADA v. CASUGA
In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo Casuga.
Nevada alleged the following:
1.

That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries
include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex
gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but
despite repeated demands, Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return
said jewelries.

2.

That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada
(they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel
administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was

able to enter into a contract of lease with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an
office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said
agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never
remitted the P90k to Nevada.
In his defense, Casuga said:
1.

That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later
advised Casugas wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casugas wife; that
Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still
has possession of said jewelries.

2.

That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain

Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said
contract of lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casugas defense.
HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following:
1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized
representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence
showing that he was duly authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to
adduce evidence proving that he never received the P90k from Chul. On the
contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga did receive the money. His
misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere denial does not
overcome the evidence presented against him.
2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty
as a lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to
his possession. This is still applicable even though said property/money did not
come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client relationship. He failed to adduce
evidence to prove his claim that Nevada pawned said jewelries. He never presented
receipts. Further, even assuming that Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still
duty bound to return said jewelries upon demand by Nevada.
3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in
behalf of another person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual
party to the contract. In effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in
violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV).
4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is
guilty of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule

138 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is
too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was suspended for 4 years from the
practice of law. His notarial commission was likewise revoked and he is disqualified
to be a notary public while serving his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized:
the penalty of disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyers misconduct
borders on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.

METROBANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 86100-03 [1990]

FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari as appellate court
affirms the decision of the trial court expressing its view that petitioner should pay
the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which result into a dismissal.
Based upon subsequent dismissal of the said case, private respondents filed a
motion to fix its attorneys fees based on quantum meruit, resulting to an exchange
between the parties. Petitioners aver that they have paid services of its lawyers in
full but the latter contends that partial amounts forwarded to them did not consist
of payment. To avoid adverse confrontation, petitioners offered to pay P600,000 in
which case respondents refused. Both trial court and appellate court commanded
petitioner to pay the amount of P936,000 based on the charging liens of the
dismissed civil case against them.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging
lien to satisfy attorneys fees;
(2) Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such
lien;
(3) Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit
basis.
HELD:
Court holds that respondent cannot charge a lien due to the dismissal of the civil
case. Such enforceability is only applicable to money claims and only to dismissed
judgments if there is an applicable law or pre-existing agreement between the
parties (7A CJS 756). In addition, the fixing of attorneys fees are determined in a
separate civl action. Accordingly, in fixing compensation based on quantum meruit,
three conditions are to be considered: (1) the importance of the subject matter in
controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer.
Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal professions manifest mandate for public
service instead of capital gain. Its aim is to uphold public interest and not
profiteering.
Court grants petition on a review for certiorari and reverses the decision of inferior

courts. Appropriate proceedings may be commenced by respondent to establish

attorneys fees.
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentinofor solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services. Complaint alleged thatrespondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them fi nancial assistance and expeditious collection on their
claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called themand sent
them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented
the sworn affidavit of James Grogorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon
him to sever hislawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents
services instead, inexchange for a loan of P50, 000.00. Complainant also
attached respondents calling card. Respondent, in his defence, denied
knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing andcirculation of the said calling
card.Issue
:
Whether the respondent encroached the professional practice
of complainant.Held:Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer
shall not do or permit to be done any actdesigned primarily to solicit
legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Suchactuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read
inconnection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall
not for any corruptmotive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any mans cause. This ruleproscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by anattorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment) as a measure toprotect the community from
barratry and champerty. In the case at bar, complainantpresented
substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
samepersons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents offi ce) to
prove that respondentindeed solicited legal business as well as profi ted
from referrals suits. Through Labianosactions, respondents law
practice was benefi ted. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could
produce a morefavourable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly
solicited employment violatingRule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise of theCourts disciplinary powers.
Violation of anti-solicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for

initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.
Thusin this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellianmachinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
legal profession.Canon 2 : A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an
efficient and convenientmanner compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to
be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business

ATTY.

ELMER

C.

SOLIDON, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMIL E. MACALALAD, respondent.
[A.C.8158. February 24, 2010]
FACTS:
Complainant, through a mutual acquaintance asked respondent to handle the
judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by complainants relatives. Respondent
accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8) months and received
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining balance of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was to be paid when complainant received the
certificate of title to the property. Respondent has not filed any petition for
registration over the property sought to be titled up to the filing of this case. In the
Complaint, Position Papers and documentary evidence submitted, complainant
claimed that he tried to contact respondent to follow-up on the status of the case
six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through phone calls
and text messages to their known acquaintances and relatives, and, finally, through
a letter sent by courier to the respondent. However, he did not receive any return
communication. Complainant sought the disbarment of respondent for violations of
Rule 16.01, Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involving negligence in handling a case. Complainant argued that he had no
intention of reneging from his obligation, as he already had prepared the draft
petition, and he failed to file it because it lacked the needed documentary
requirements that his clients should have furnished him.

The Investigating

Commissioner of IBP made a finding negligence on the part of the respondent. This
was affirmed by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.

ISSUE:
Legal Ethics
(1) Whether or not the respondents excuse is exculpatory.
RULING:
Legal Ethics
(1) No. Respondents excuse is not exculpatory. He was imposed the (modified)
penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law and was ordered to
return to the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of the
Decision until the full amount is returned.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge. We
fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the
complainants evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of
proof in proving respondents negligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the
lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a
violation. (underscoring provided)
In addition to the above finding of negligence, [Court] also [found] respondent
guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires a lawyer to account for all the money received from the client. In this case,
respondent did not immediately account for and promptly return the money he
received from complainant even after he failed to render any legal service within
the contracted time of the engagement.

ABIERO vs. JUANINO

Facts: abiero engaged the services of the respondent as counsel de parte in NLRC
NCR OCWcase by ordering the respondents to pay his unpaid wages.
( employer).Complainant tried to follow up the status of the case but Juanino
advised him to call later. Thelawyer filed with CA a motion for extension of time to file Petition
for Review but Abiero foundout that his lawyer never filed a petition for Review.The respondent
delayed the filing of the comment for more than 2 yrs. and despite
numerousextensions which were all granted, the 12th extension was even filed one
day late.Held: yes, Canons 17&18 and 18.03 which states that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable. A lawyersduty is to exert best judgement & exercise reasonable & ordinary care or
defense on his case. Heis not required to seek prior approval from the labor arbiter before he could
file a motion for execution. Failure to appeal in CA despite instructions by the client
constitutes inexcusablenegligence. Once he consents to defend the cause of his client, he owes
fidelity to such cause andmust at all times be mindful to the trust and confidence
reposed in him. It is not enough that alawyer possess the qualification, he must also give
adequate attention to his legal work.

ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.

CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006

FACTS : 1 9 7 7 , t h e N a t i o n a l H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y ( N H A ) fi l
e d e x p r o p r i a t i o n p roce edin gs again st the Zuzu arre gui s f or p
a r c e l s o f l a n d b e l o n g i n g t o them situated in Antipolo, Rizal with a total land
area of 1, 790, 570.36- The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys.
Romeo G. Roxasand Santiago N. Pastor- They executed a Letter-Agreement dated April
22, 1983 which indicatedthat the contingent fees that the lawyers will
receive at P11 or more per square meter is thirty percent of the just
compensation- The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and on October 29,
1984,a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid tothe
Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square
meter- T h e N H A fi l e d a M o t i o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e l
o w e r i n g o f t h e amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable
laws- Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint special powerof
attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas
andPastor- O n D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 5 , a L e t t e r - A g r e e m e n t w a s
e x e c u t e d b y a n d between the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which fixed the
justcompensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in excess of thats h a l l
b e t h e c o n t i n g e n t f e e s o f At t y s . Rox a s a n d Pa s t o r f o r t h e i r
l e g a l services- R e s o l u t i o n N o . 1 1 7 4 d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 8 5 ,
i s s u e d b y t h e N H A , stated that the property would be acquired at a cost of

P19.50 per squarem e t e r a n d t h a t i t w i l l b e p a i d i n N H A B o n d s w h i c h

t h e y i e l d w o u l d b e based on the Central Bank rate at the time of the
payment- A s a r e s u l t o f t h e N H A R e s o l u t i o n , a C o m p r o m i s e
A g r e e m e n t w a s executed and it was approved by the Court in a Decision
dated December20, 1985.- Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of
the Zuzuarreguisw a s e x p r o p r i a t e d a t a t o t a l p r i c e o f P 3 4 , 9 1 6 ,
1 2 2 . T h e t o t a l a m o u n t released by the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference
of P19, 583, 878 is,undoubtedly, the yield of the bonds.- The amount turned over to the
Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted toP30, 520, 000 in NHA bonds- On August 25,
1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new
counselt o A t t y s . R o x a s a n d P a s t o r d e m a n d i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e
r d e l i v e r t o t h e Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid
by the NHA within aperiod of 10 days from receipt, under pain of
administrative, civil and/or criminal action- Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered
stating that the amount that they goseems huge from the surface but it just actually
passed their hands.- O n S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 1 9 8 7 , a l e t t e r w a s a g a i n
s e n t t o A t t y s . R o x a s a n d Pastor formally terminating
their services- T h e Z u z u a r r e g u i s t h e n fi l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n
f o r S u m o f M o n e y a n d Damages, they demanded that the yield on the
NHA bonds be turned over
to them- The RTC dismissed the complaint- The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of AppealThe Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and Pastor to return to
theplaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting the
reasonableattorneys fees in the amount of P4,4 76,426.275- Attys. Roxas and Pastor
filed a MFR- The Zuzuarreguis also filed a MFR- The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a MFR- All
MFRs were denied for lack of merit- Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a petition for certiorari
ISSUES
1. WON the letter-agreement executed by the parties should stand as lawbetween
them2. WON the contingent fees were reasonable
HELD
1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons wherebyo n e b i n d s
hi mself , with re sp ect to the oth er, to give some th ing or
tore nd er some servi ce . The Zuzu arre gui s, in en te ring in to
t h e L e t t e r- Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them who
sentthe said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming
allmatters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely
noevidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the
Letter-Agreement. It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties.

2 . N o. U n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t i n q u e s t i o n , At t y s . Rox a s a n d
P a s t o r a r e t o receive contingent fees for their professional services.
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states: a contract
for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject t o the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonablenessCanon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
statest h e g u i d e l i n e s b y w h i c h a l a w y e r s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e h
i s f e e s ( s e e original)
- Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only
reasonablefees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of
attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable (Section 24, Rule
138, Rules of Court). Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense
of justice, decency or reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determinethe
reasonableness of attorneys fees stipulated by the parties is a matterfalling within
the regulatory prerogative of the courts.- In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and
Pastor received an amount which
ise q u a l t o 4 4 % o f t h e j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n p a i
d b y t h e N H A t o t h e Zuzuarreguis. Considering that there
was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a
Compromise Agreement, the 44%is undeniably excessive. In the opinion of the
Court, 87.17% of the yieldsof the bond should go to the Zuzuarreguis
computing from the amounts
stipulated in the Letter-Agreement. The remaining amount is what is duet o
A t t y s . R o x a s a n d P a s t o r . T h e S C a ffi r m s t h e d e c i s i o n
o f C A w i t h modification in the computation of the attorneys contingent fees.

QUILBAN V ROBINOL
PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989 (sarah cabrera)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
FACTS
- The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold a
land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General
Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development
site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. In 1970, the
Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to

build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the
Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman
Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to
the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an
organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler.
Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio
Bathala", with Bernabe Martin asPresident.
- But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo
Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the
other Samaban members. The land was ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of
PI5 per square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The prevailing price of
the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to P1 20 per square meter. Father Escaler
had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property.
- In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against Rivera,
et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case. - To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the
Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the
latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given
by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion
that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the
land sharing was confirmed in writing.
- On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs. - To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court
of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property,
conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan
collected, little by
little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the
proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. - On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00
was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of
P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or
a total of P75,000.00.
- After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made
to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in
the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not yet been issued by the CFI of
Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already
been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.
- On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change
their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty.
AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the
document containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty.

Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty.
Robinol a letter informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and
demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned
deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor was similarly
disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
- On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in a civil
case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority
given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor
then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants
and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested
that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty.
Montemayor.
- Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus, another
document labelled the a second consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a
meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had
decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for
their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.
- Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this
Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of Atty.
Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its
power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law.
- Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without
his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there
was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
- Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended: 1. That
Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the
funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty
will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to
return to the plaintiffs, the sum of P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct
imputed to him by Atty. Robinol.
ISSUES
1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended 2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be
disbarred
HELD

1. YES Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and
grave misconduct that make him unworthy to
continue in the practice of the profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision
favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a
change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of
land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to
be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to
unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written
agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him
to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an
existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per
family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who,
after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
- Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his
clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there
was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in
him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect. Secondly, even if there were no
valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a
specific purpose-the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.
- The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this is
the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P75,000-00.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit
to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any
man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has
also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full
faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life- time ambition to acquire a homelot
they could call their own.
2. NO Reasoning In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the
findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible
charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to
serve as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are free to change
their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this
case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty.
Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative.
In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty.
Montemayor is concerned, therefore, the same is absolutely without merit.
Disposition - Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his
lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between

lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law.
By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his
rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the
plaintiffs. - Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ORCINO v. GASPAR

Orcinos husband was murdered and she was zealous in prosecuting the
suspects. She hired Atty. Gaspar as her counsel and they agreed to a
P20,000.00 attorneys fee which Orcino paid. Atty. Gaspar did his duty
religiously from interviewing witnesses to attending hearings and the
preliminary investigation. But on the day bail is to be heard, Atty. Gaspar
failed to appear. Bail was granted in favor of the suspects and this enraged
Orcino. She then went to Gaspars residence where Gaspar reasoned out that
he did not receive a notice of hearing hence his absence. Finding his reason
to be insufficient, Orcino demanded the records of the case and advised
Gaspar that shell be hiring another lawyer. Gaspar complied and thereafter
he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The court did not grant his motion
because the same was without Orcinos written consent. Perhaps changing
her mind, Orcino refused to give her consent. Gaspar, however, did not
attend the subsequent hearings. Orcino then filed an administrative
complaint against Gaspar for abandoning the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gaspar violated his duties to his client.
HELD: Yes. The belligerence of Orcino towards Gaspar is understandable and
is attributed to her over zealousness to bring justice to the death of her
husband. When she uttered that shes terminating Gaspars services, she did
so in a burst of passion. She did not really mean to terminate Gaspar at all as
evidenced by her refusal to give consent to Gaspars motion.
At any rate, a lawyer cannot unilaterally terminate his legal services to his
client. Unlike the other way around where a client has the absolute right to
terminate the attorney-client relationship with or without just cause. Atty.
Gaspar has no reason to presume that his motion shall be granted by the
court. He should have not left Orcino in the cold and should have continued
appearing for her until there is a withdrawal of record and a successor placed
in his stead. Gaspar was admonished accordingly. He was also directed to
return half of what was paid him.