TENEBRO VS CA

Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes
in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter
filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage
with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further
argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due
to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a
second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void
ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and
gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to
spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separatedin-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony,
that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General

Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as
psychological incapacity
HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family
rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause
the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at
the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the
time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed
decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997
FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros,
Manila as evidenced by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a
reception and then proceeded to the house of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There
they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went to bed, slept on one side and
then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between
them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But
they did so together with Chings mother, uncle and nephew as they were all invited
by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for four days in
Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988
(day of their marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Gina claims that she did
not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag. Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings
examination was kept confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She also said her husband only
married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage
annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on
his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still
be reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact
between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that

everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of
Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May
22, 1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If
a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate
children basedon the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observer mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the
spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a
partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting
against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their
grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted
by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the lower courts decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older
brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were
the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were
entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and
that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between
their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a
police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is
the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents
marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from
1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and
Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina herself
testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr.
Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino
and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga
who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should
have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889
because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was
celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be
proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the
books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned
in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered,
provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate
children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in
rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and
Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not
take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines
shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54
never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the
existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related
to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and
wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to
present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be
presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses
was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they
have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are
recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of
Gavino.
Balogbog vs. CAG.R.No. 83598 March 7, 1997
Facts:Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio
Balogbog andGenoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively.
They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died
in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, privaterespondents Ramonito and Gen
eroso Balogbog brought an action for partition andaccounting against petitioners,
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavinoby Catalina Ubas and that,
as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavinoin the estate of their
grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing privaterespondents. They
alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue intheir parents'
residence at Tag- amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City
rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render
anaccounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and
deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and
to payattorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Issue:Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in
the absenceof marriage certificate
Ruling:Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conductingthemselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption
may be rebuttedonly by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim
that the certificationpresented by private respondents, to the effect that the record
of the marriage had beenlost or destroyed during the war, was belied by the
production of the Book of Marriagesby the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias.
Petitioners argue that this book doesnot contain any entry pertaining to the alleged

marriage of private respondents' parents.This contention has no merit.

Although a marriage contract is considered primaryevidence of marriage the failure
to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved,through
testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had
three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until
1935when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognizedby Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Hence, themarriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid.
SANTOS VS SANTOS
FACTS: Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage,
however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple
also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living
independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels
opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She
never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training.
During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least
have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity.
Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with
all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is
Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two.
Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term
psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC
did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term
psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68),
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious

cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give

meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the
alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do
not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church
on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later.
Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him
so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her
behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after
their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage
null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of
evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and
clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes

is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's

behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must
be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as
to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically
or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly
explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove
that her psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of
marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave
that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their
consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that
the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile
with her but her behavior remains unchanged.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate
the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never
respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but
did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him
remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave
to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the
summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond
after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the
case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual
medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical
illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON

Facts:
Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage
in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years, Bailon filed before the then
Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead which was
granted. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead
Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent). Bailon, who was a
member of the Social Security System and a retiree pensioner thereof, died.
Respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits. Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who
claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the
SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second
with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she,
together with her siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all
the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are
spurious. SSS stopped the release of pension to respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Bailon to respondent is bigamous?
Ruling:
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in
a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties
and their of fspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. In
the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and
respondents marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully
the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage
had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been
generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon
as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph
2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any
conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar Encelan, Respondent

G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013

Facts:
Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children. To support the family,
Cesar went abroad and worked as an OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of
working abroad, Cesar learned that Lolita is having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez,
and thereafter, left the conjugal dwelling together with the two children. But even
with such circumstances, Cesar never failed to send financial support for the family.
On June 1995, Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of
his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity. Cesar, during a hearing
even presented a psychological evaluation report on Lolita with the finding that
Lolita was not suffering from any form of psychiatric illness, but had been unable to
provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship.... and her transferring from one job to another depicts some
interpersonal problem with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions .... and her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance
to work out a good marital and family relationship... Cesar found ally in RTC as it
gave him a favourable decision which declared his marriage to Lolita null and void.
The court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC, and thereafter, the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is indeed present in the person
of Lolita as to nullify a valid marriage.
Ruling: No. Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State and
any doubt should be resolved in favour of its existence and continuation against its
dissolution and nullity. In this case, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are
simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that actually prevented the erring spouse from discharging
the essential marital obligations, which the court found not present in the person of
Lolita.
AGRAVIADOR V. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 170729,

[December 8, 2010]

FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (Enrique)challenges the resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the resolution of the Regional Trial
Court(RTC) MuntinlupaCity, declaring the marriage of the petitioner
and respondentErlinda Amparo-Agraviador (Erlinda) null and void on the ground of
the latters psychological incapacity.
In 1971, Enrique, then a security guard, first met Erlinda at a beerhouse where the
latter worked, and later on became sweethearts after courtship. They soon entered
into a common-law relationship, but later contracted marriage in 1973, whereby
they begot four children. Enriques family, however, expressed their apprehensions
because Erlinda came from a broken family and because of the nature of her work.
In 2001, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
basis of respondents psychological incapacity, alleging that she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed
away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
take care of their sick child to the point of his death; consulted a witch doctor in
order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her
activities. He also claimed that she refused to have sex with him because she
became very close to a male border of their house, and even caught their love
notes and trysts. However, because the root cause of her psychological incapacity
was not medically identified and alleged in the petition, motion was denied. The
petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate
his claims through the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac, who
claimed that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality
Disorder). She was said to been having this disorder since her adolescence, with no
definite treatment for her disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the
ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD:
No, the totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity.
The court held that both Enriques court testimony,as well as Dr. Patacs Psychiatric
Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. First, petitioners claims
should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in
theperformance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages to
thelevel of psychological incapacity that the law requires. He merely showed that

Erlinda had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that
therespondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. His claims that
Erlinda does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused to
reform areinsufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious,
grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
Second, Dr. Patac failed to clarify the circumstances that led the respondent to act
the way she did in her attempt to establish the juridical antecedence of
the respondents condition. The report that he submit likewise failed to prove the
gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition, as his enumeration of
therespondents purported behavioural defects (as related to him by third persons),
and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed
personality disorder deemed insufficient. There was no other statement regarding
the degree of severity of the respondents condition, why and to what extent the
disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in
marriage. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain
how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had
no definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder,
i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to
what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary
inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is incurable.
Toring v. Toring, August 2010, G.R. No. 165321
FACTS: A and B were husband and wife. B filed a petition for annulment before the
RTC. He claimed that A was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage.
Ricardo offered; the psychological evaluation of his expert witness, psychiatrist. Dr
Albaran testified A had Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations based on the
information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on B and the couples
son, C. The doctor did not personally examine A. B alleged that A was an adulteress
and a squanderer.
The RTC annulled the marriage. The CA reversed saying that RTC failed to
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused As psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the
time of celebration of marriage. The CA found that the conclusions from Dr.
Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from wellrounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors.
Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos allegations on As overspending and infidelity

do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in declaring the nullity of the marriage.
RULING: No, the RTC was wrong. CA decision affirmed.
According to Molina case, the definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of this article are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
The intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to
the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result
in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she contracted.

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the
petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that A was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife.
Though the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. However, it is still
essential although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show his or
her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause
of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity,
permanence and incurability of the condition.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked
to give statements for purposes of As psychological evaluation was C, the spouses
eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness because he could not
have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected
to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans
psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when,
where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr.
Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged
personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she
failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her
psychological evaluation how grave and incurable was As psychological disorder.
B failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that TA suffered from
psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail.
We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a
persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is
not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code
addresses.
B also failed to show the adverse integral element and link to As allegedly
disordered personality. Moreover, B failed to prove that As alleged character traits
already existed at the inception of their marriage.
Finally, the root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code. What is not required is

the expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. CA
decision affirmed.
NAVALES VS NAVALES

FACTS: In 1986, Nilda and Reynaldo met in a local bar where Nilda was a waitress. Because of his
fear that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got married in
1988. Reynaldo is aware that Nilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock. The 1st year of their
marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglected some of her duties as a wife. She
later worked as a gym instructor and according to Reynaldos allegations; her job makes her flirt with
her male clients. She also drives home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to
fetch her. She also projected herself as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo
because that would only destroy her figure. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be
annulled. He presented her cousin as a witness that attested that Nilda was flirting with other guys
even with Reynaldos presence. Reynaldo also presented the findings of a psychologist who
concluded that based on Nildas acts, Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a
social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which
illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital
role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda on her part attacked Reynaldos allegations. She said that it is
actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case of concubinage against
him which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to support herself
because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she projected herself as a
married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females only. The RTC
and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nildas
psychological incapacity.
HELD: The petition must be granted because the States participation in this case is wanting. There
were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no
controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. And even if the SC
would consider the case based on the merits, the petition would still be granted. The acts presented
by Reynaldo by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is
serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will
on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the psychological expert to be insufficient
to prove the PI of Nilda. The testimonies presented by people the expert interviewed were not
concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up with their respective information
was not as well shown. There is no proof as well that Nilda had had sex with different guys a
condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as to Nildas PI the SC ruled that this case be resolved
in favor of the validity of marriage.

PARAS VS PARAS
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,Negros Oriental. They begot
four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose(deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years
thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosafiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a
complaint forannulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as CivilCase
No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise theessential obligations of
marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipatedher business assets and forged her
signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with aconcubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give
financial support to his children; and (d)he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She
met Justo in 1961in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courtedher,
frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he lovedher, she agreed to marry him.
Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated"marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their
daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia.It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984,
their son Raoul was electrocutedwhile Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her
earlier advice tobring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with
thedeath of the children, the entire family went to the United States. However, after three months,Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she wasshocked to find her
"Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without herconsent a conjugal piece of land. At
other times, he permitted the municipal government to takegasoline from their gas station free of charge.
His act of maintaining a mistress and siring anillegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file
the present case. She found thatafter leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitationresulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and
Justos
deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained thathe did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal ofa
sugar crop loan before the
banks
authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in theUnited States. For his part, he was granted only three
(3) months leave as municipal mayor ofBindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his
childrens
education.At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though thatthere were times he
failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. Whatcaused the inevitable family breakout was
Rosas
act of embarrassing him during his birthdaycelebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests.
When confronted, she retorted thatshe has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of
concern. This wasfurther aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in
amountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that JocelynChing is not his
mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by herboyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a
Decision upholding the validity ofthe marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he
was forced toleave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets weresufficient
to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limitedsalary; and

(c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed thatthe relationship between the parties started
well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. And lastly, it ruled thatthere appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of
nullity of the irmarriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas
signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He wassuspended from the practice of
law, thus: the respondent is suspended from the practice of lawfor SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents andother related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR
from the practice of law on the chargesof immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties
to be served simultaneously. Letnotice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney,
and notice of the sameserved on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
forcirculation to all the courts concerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed theRTC Decision
in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short ofthe standards required by law to
decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged efects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by
the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts ctual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on
the presentcase. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, sheargues
that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the presentcase;
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the rootcause of
Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part ofJusto
Held:
1) A reading of the Court of
Appeals
Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an
ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void
due toan incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was
truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not
necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not
necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents
him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,(b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained inthe decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were
mentally or psychically ill to such anextent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them,could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and

itsincapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified

psychiatristsand clinical psychologist
3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability
REPUBLIC VS IYOY
Facts:The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on
certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment
of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based
on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In
1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce
papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the
Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich
she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus
submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment,
by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Kalawv.Fernandez,G.R.No.166357,September19,2011
FACTS: Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone
had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with
Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three more children. In 1990, Tyrone
went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de
facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply
with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1)
She leaves the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2)
She leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked in the
hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law
expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates
explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu Disorder and that it may have been evident
even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing. Fr. Healy
concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He explained that
her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs
became secondary.
ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity
HELD: No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Malyns sexual
infidelity was also not proven because she wa
s only dating other men. Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual
infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.