The problem question identifies 3 defendants which Celia (C) has a probable

course of action against. I will examine them in turn.

Daphne (D)
To succeed in a suit for defamation, three elements of the tort must be satisfied.
That:

1) The statement made must be defamatory.

2) The statement must refer to the claimant.
3) The statement must be published, where publishing means that it is made
known to a third party.

Statutorily, the Defamation Act 2013 s1(1) states that:

A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is

likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.

The definition of serious harm was left to case law. The latest case which
established this definition is from Sim v Stretch 1. Lord Atkin provided that the
test should be whether the words would lower the plaintiff in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society generally. The phrase right thinking
members is important, because a claim so flagrantly phrased as to be
fantastical cannot be actionable, even if it is defamatory, because no rightthinking members would believe them (Loukas v Young) 2. However, in this case,
seeing that Ds comment was made in her capacity as a lecturer of medicine,
right thinking members of society would reasonably believe that Ds comments
hold competency, and thus lower their estimation of C as a result.

In particular, the phrase whether Celias real expertise is in science or in media

manipulation implies not only that C is inept, but possibly fraudulent and
dishonest, in that her good reputation comes from under-table dealings with the
media than by her own work. This imputation must thus be differentiated from
the other two imputations (at any rate, Celias best scientific work - on this
showing is now behind her, which is a comment about the quality of her future
work, and Celias paper is poorly assembled which is a comment about the
quality of the paper in question) as a matter of substance, because the first
statement is a defamation as to Cs character, and the second and third
1 [1936] 2 All ER 1237
2 [1968] 2 NSWR 549

statements are defamations as to Cs current and potential skill. The former is

indefensible (especially since it is untrue and cannot be vitiated by the truth
defence), while the latter may be. Cs damage to reputation can also be proven
using the second test identified in Berkoff v Burchill 3 (that a statement was made
to Cs financial discredit). To claim that a professor is both intellectually deficient
and academically corrupt can only make her less employable.

There is no difficulty in proving that the statement is made about C, because her
name was appointed, and her article referenced. It is thus impossible to mistake
Celia for any other Celia, because people with identical jobs publishing identical
papers is impossible.

With regards to the requirement of publication, Ds comments were published in

a current affairs magazine. This meant that it was readily available and easy for
other people to learn about it.

Since all three elements of defamation are present, C has a right in tort against
D.

Slander or Libel

The main difference between slander and libel is in its form of publication. This
was established in Monson v Tussauds4. Publications of transience, such as
conversations, are generally slander, whereas publications of permanence are
considered libel. Since Ds comments of C were published in a magazine, and this
constitutes permanent media, Ds comments constitute libel.

Defences

Under common law, D has three defences that can render an action of tort
defeasible.

1) Truth
2) Honest Opinion
3) Privilege (in this case, qualified privilege)
3 [1996] 4 ALL ER 1008
4 [1894] 1 QB 671

Under the defence of truth, intent is unimportant. Ds maliciousness thus does

not factor into account as long as she is able to prove the veracity of all her
imputations. The facts of the case gives us three imputations, two as identified
above, regarding Cs moral conduct and the quality of her future work. The first
regarding Cs moral conduct is a question of fact i.e. it could be provable to be
true or false. One simply has to enquire into Cs life to discover whether she has
or has not any fraudulent dealings with the media. The second imputation is a
question of opinion i.e. whether Cs best work was behind her is highly
subjective. The facts of the case did not provide whether C did consort
fraudulently with the media. Nevertheless, it would be up to D to prove the
veracity of this statement. If she can adduce evidence as to its veracity, she can
be acquitted since truth is an absolute defence to defamation.

The defence of honest opinion applies only applies to statements of opinion.

Thus, this defence more appropriately deals with D imputation regarding the
quality of Cs future work (since such an assessment is not of a scientific nature).
Statutorily, this defence is governed by Defamation Act 2013 s(3). Here, Ds
defence will most likely fail because it does not conform to requirements s3(5)
that D actually believes in what she is saying. From the facts, we know that Ds
opinion of Cs best work being behind her was made purely out of spite to lower
the reputation of a perceived competitor. Thus, if C can prove that D did not
believe in her own statements, she can abolish this defence. It also confirms that
honesty, not malice, is the right test. A point of contention can arise under s3(4)
- some commentators may argue that Ds defence fails on this count well. I argue
this is not so. S4(a) states that a honest person could hold the opinion on the
basis of any fact which existed at the time the statement was published. It is not
inconceivable for other academics to disagree with Cs findings on her paper and
come to the same conclusion that Cs career as an academic is doomed albeit
that their opinion was not made in malice.

Ds last hope that her imputation regarding Cs current paper can stand under s6
of the Defamation Act fails as well. Firstly, the statement must be published in an
academic or scientific journal. Ds publication was in a current affairs journal.
Secondly, the publication must be reviewed independently by the editor of the
journal and one or more persons with relevant expertise in the academic matter
concerned. We do not know from the facts whether any independent reviews
were garnered from the academic community. Even if it did, there is still the
inescapable necessity that the paper be published in an academic journal. Thus,
Ds statement that Celias paper is poorly assembled can only amount to mere
opinion. I believe that whether this statement can apply for the honest opinion
defence fails on the same reasoning as above.

Therefore, since all of the imputations are defensible, C has an actionable case
against D.

Eric (E)

Erics responsibility as a publisher derives from Defamation Act 1996 S1(1),

which laid out the defence of innocent dissemination. Specifically, it requires that
E not be an editor of the published material. Since E was the editor, he cannot
apply to this defence. Rather, he has to look towards section 4 of the Defamation
Act 2013 for recourse. Under Section 4 of the Defamation Act, provisions were
made for the publication of matters of public concern. In Stuart v Bell, it was
established that the matter need not be of legal concern; it can likewise be of
social or moral concern. It can be argued that since Cs work pertains to
important scientific discoveries, Ds review of it can ferment discussion about it,
and as a matter of principle, having open and free commentary about scientific
breakthroughs is a matter of public concern. However, the arbiter of this lies
solely in the discretion of the judge; he has the ultimate say in whether or not
the matter is of public concern.
C thus do not have a course of action against E.

Frances (F)

C has two main courses of action against F. One with regards to an invasion of
privacy, the other regarding defamatory comments about her personal life. With
regards to privacy, Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights decree
that Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence. Traditionally, common law has no remedy for a breach
of privacy. It was only after HRA had entrenched ECHR into law that privacy was
given effect. The most persuasive case regarding Frances taking covert pictures
of C comes from Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd 5. Here, the two stage
test was applied:
1) Does the claimant have a reasonable expectation of privacy?
2) If yes, are there any countervailing factors that mean that the
defendants right to freedom of expression should prevail?
I think C has a right to privacy because the two cases are comparable.

5 [2004] UKHL 22