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MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE V. ROJAS G.R. NO.

9069

Facts:
The municipal council of Cavite by Resolution No. 10, leased to Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of
Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance according to the schedule fixed in
Ordinance No. 43, series of 1903 and that she obligate herself to vacate said land within 60 days
subsequent to notification to that effect. Upon such notification, however, she refused to vacate the
land, forcing the municipality to file a complaint before the CFI to order her to vacate the land. After a
hearing of the case, the CFI dismissed the complaint.
Issues:
(1) Is the contract valid?
(2) If in the negative, what are the obligations of the parties?
Held: (1) No. Article 1271 of the Old Civil Code, prescribes that everything which is not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this
commerce. Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of
commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc.
(2) Rojas must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality
of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to her all the sums it may have received from her in the nature
of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased.

Government of the Phil Islands vs Cabangis


Government of the Phil Islands vs Cabangis
53 Phil 112
Facts:

Certain lots were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein
claimants and appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to the action of the
waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became completely submerged in water in
ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of
Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the sand and silt taken from the bed of the
estuary on the low lands which were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the
Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of
this proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the lots in question are of the public domain the
same having been gained from the sea by accession, by fillings made by the Bureau of Public Works and
by the construction of the break-water.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the lots in question having disappeared on account of the gradual
erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a state until they were reclaimed
from the sea by the filling in done by the Government, they are public land in the sense that neither the
here in claimants-appellees nor their predecessors did anything to prevent their destruction. By virtue
whereof, the judgment appealed from the lower court is reversed.

City of Manila vs Garcia


Facts:

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, covered
byTorrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to
1947,defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They
builthouses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and
withoutthe necessary building permits from the city.In November, 1947, the presence of
defendants having previously been discovered, were
given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits

each labeled "lease contract"

to occupyspecific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy,
defendantswere charged nominal rentals.Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School which is
close, though not contiguous, to the property,were in need of expansion. On September 14, 1961,
plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to theMayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city
property, gave each of defendants thirty (30)days to vacate and remove his construction or
improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's
demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount d
ue by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days.Defendants refused. Hence, this
suit to recover possession.
2

The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Hence, the defendants appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the squatters may be ejected
Held: Yes
... Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they
have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty
days'notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background
thatwe say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw
defendants

City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et.al

FACTS:
1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants
occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant
written permits, each labeled as lease contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were
charged nominal rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and
vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools expansion.4.Despite the demand, defendants
refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled in
favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction of additional
building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes
HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff
Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of
P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of additional building of the said school.
But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that there was a need for
defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document. Because of the courts
contradictory stance, defendants brought this case on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as
evidence would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because he
was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for
the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city
mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits issued are null and void.

VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.


VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was
beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a
conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and
conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by
the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the
subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking
Resolution No. 218.

Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.

Ruling: Petition Dismissed.


It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and
that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no
right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the
strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the
resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to
petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong damnum absque injuria.

Villanueva vs castanueda

There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a
strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together
forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The
petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a
previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and
justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners
behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties
pending our decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was
protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this
case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 29, which
declared the subject area as the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby
impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968,
Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the
petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.
HELD
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained
away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an

act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount
police power.
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition
for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the
mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed area and clear it of all the structures illegally
constructed therein.

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