URBAN BANK VS.

PENA [2001]
FACTS:

UNION BANK BOUGHT A PARCEL OF LAND FROM ISABELA SUGAR

COMPANY (ISC)

AGREEMENT INCLUDED A CONDITION THAT ISC WILL CAUSE THE

EVICTION OF ALL THEOCCUPANTS OF THE PROPERTY

UNION BANK ALLEGES THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

O
ISC CONTRACTED THE SERVICES OF ATTY. MAGDALENO PEA FOR
THE PURPOSE OF EVICTING THE OCCUPANTS
O
ATTY. PEA THEN ASKED FOR A LETTER OF AUTHORITY GRANTING
HIM AUTHORITY TOREPRESENT COMPLAINANT IN MAINTAINING
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AND INANY COURT ACTION THAT
MAY ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SAID DUTY
O
UNION BANK ISSUED A LETTER OF AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO A
CLARIFICATION THAT ITWAS ISC THAT CONTRACTED HIS SERVICES
O
ATTY. PEA REQUESTED SOME MODIFICATIONS, THUS A NEW
LETTER OF AUTHORITYWAS ISSUED
O
LETTERS OF CORRESPONDENCE WERE PRESENTED TO PROVE THAT
IT WAS ISC WHOENGAGED THE LAWYERS SERVICES

13 MONTHS AFTER THE EVICTION OF ALL THE APPLICANTS, ATTY.

PEA FILED A COLLECTIONSUIT AGAINST UNION BANK FOR
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEES, EXPENSES, DAMAGESAND
AGENTS COMPENSATION ON THE BASIS OF THE LETTER OF
AUTHORITY ISSUED BYUNION BANKS OFFICERS ATTY. BEJASA AND
MR. MANUEL, JR.

UNION BANK FILED THIS CASE FOR DISBARMENT ALLEGING THAT

ATTY. PEA IS GUILTY OF
DECEIT, MALPRACTICE AND GROSS MISCONDUCT
WHEN IT INSTITUTED A COLLECTION SUIT
ON THE BASIS OF THE LETTER OF AUTHORITY WHILE KNOWING
FULLY WELL THE REASONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SAID LETTER OF
AUTHORITY

ATTY. PEA INTERPOSED THE FOLLOWING COUNTERCLAIMS:

1.
CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FORUM SHOPPING BECAUSE
THERE IS ANOTHER CASE INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES PENDING
IN THE RTC OF BAGO CITY

2.
THAT HIS SERVICES WERE ENGAGED BY DULY AUTHORIZED
OFFICERS OF UNIONBANK
3.
THERE IS NO REASON FOR HIM TO DECEIVE UNION BANK INTO
WRITING THE LETTER OF AUTHORITY BECAUSE HE KNEW FULLY
WELL THAT A VERBAL AGREEMENT ISSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; SUCH WAS ONLY DONEAS A
FORMALITY
4.
UNION BANK ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS OF HIS SERVICESREPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION BY THE IBP

NO FORUM SHOPPING BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT PARTY IN ONE

CASE IS THECOMPLAINANT IN THE OTHER AND VICE VERSA

IT IS NOT WITHIN THE IBPS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHO

SHOULD PAY; IT SHOULDBE LEFT TO THE PROPER COURT

THE ONLY
ISSUE IS: WON RESPONDENT COMMITTED MALPRACTICE,DECEIT
AND GROSS MISCONDUCT IN THE PRACTICE OF HISPROFESSION AS
A MEMBER OF THE BAR. NO. BECAUSE THERE WASREFUSAL TO PAY
JUST COMPENSATION, ATTY. PEA MERELY INSTITUTED THEPROPER
ACTION.

RECOMMENDED DISMISSALSC AGREED WITH THE IBPS FINDINGS

AND RECOMMENDATION, SAYING THATCOMPLAINANT FAILED TO
MEET THE REQUIRED BURDEN OF PROOF IN ORDER FOR THE COURT
TOEXERCISE ITS DISCIPLINARY POWER:

COMPLAINANT HAS NOT PROFFERED ANY PROOF THAT THE LETTER

OF AUTHORITY WASOBTAINED THROUGH MACHINATION OR OTHER
DECEITFUL MEANS

THOSE WHO ISSUED THE LETTER WAS NEVER PRESENTED AS

WITNESSES, NOR WERETHEIR SWORN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED

THE LETTERS PRESENTED CANNOT BY THEMSELVES BE ACCORDED

STRONG PROBATIVEWEIGHT IN THE FACE OF (1) ATTY. PEAS
EMPHATIC ASSERTION THAT HE HAS NEVER SEEN ANY OF THEM; (2)
THE LACK OF INDICATION THAT COPIES WERE RECEIVED BYHIM;
AND (3) THE ABSENCE OF HIS SIGNATURE OR THE DATE OR TIME HE
TOOKPOSSESSION OF THEM

FURTHERMORE, THE BASIS FOR THE ACTION WAS NOT THE LETTER
OF AUTHORITY BUT ANORAL CONTRACT OF AGENCY PURPORTEDLY
ENTERED INTO BY ATTY. PEA WITH THE DULYAUTHORIZED
OFFICERS OF UNION BANK (PROVED BY AVERMENTS IN THE
COMPLAINT INTHE OTHER CASE IN BAGO CITY RTC).


WITH OR WITHOUT THE LETTER, ATTY. PEA COULD HAVE
INSTITUTED A COLLECTION SUIT.

THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION (10% OF THE MARKET VALUE OF

THE PROPERTY) WASNOT EVEN MENTIONED IN THE LETTER BUT
WAS APPARENTLY SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF THE ORAL
CONVERSATION.HOLDING:DISMISSED DISBARMENT COMPLAINT. HE
WAS IN THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT:INVOKING THE AID OF
THE COURT IN RECOVERING RECOMPENSE FOR LEGAL SERVICES
WHICHHE CLAIMS HE UNDERTOOK FOR THE COMPLAINANT, AND
WHICH THE LATTER DOES NOT DENYTO HAVE BENEFITED
FROMURBAN BANK V. PENA
FACTS:

In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to

Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI).

The land was sold forP240 million.

As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCIs

lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Pea had to negotiate with them for them
to relocate.

But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already
transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Pea.

ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize
Pea to negotiate with the tenants.

Pea also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or (P24
million) for his efforts.

Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Pea

should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said
10% fee.

Pea also asked that said authorization be put into writing.

The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made
as regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the
written authorization released by UBI).

Pea was able to settle and relocate the tenants.

After everything was settled and the property is now formally

under the possession of UBI, Pea began sending demands to UBI
for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his
expenses for the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of
security guards or an additional P3 million.

But UBI refused to make payment hence Pea filed a complaint for
recovery against UBI.

The trial court ruled in favor of Pea as it found there indeed was a
contract of agency created between and UBI and that Pea is
entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he incurred including
litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28
million.

Pea had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the

tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so that the
local cops are now sympathetic to them.

The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court.
It ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Pea
is entitled to payment but applying the principle of unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit, Pea should only be paid P3
million.

Pea then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan,

president of UBI, where Pea explained to him the situation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Pea is entitled to receive the P28
million.

In said conversation, Pea asked authorization from Borlongan to

negotiate with the tenants.

HELD: No.

The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable.

Pea is entitled to payment for compensation for services

rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles
of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony of Pea,

there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that
Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone.

the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as

payment for his appearance fees.
The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:

The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power

granted him to negotiate with the tenants.

The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not

the existence of any agreement as to how much Pea should be
paid.

Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit

should be applied.

In this case, Pea is entitled to receive what he merit for his

services, or as much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants,
Pea didnt have to perform any extraordinary acts or legal
maneuvering.

Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services.

He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing

the property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security guards he had to
hire and another P1.5 million for settling and relocating the 23
tenants.

Total of P4.5 million.

The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it

is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.

FEDERICO N. RAMOS, vs. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the
Civil Code by demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos,

Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty.

Patricio Ngaseos Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a
case[1] involving a piece of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent
agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance
fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals, transportation and
other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to
pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees.[2]
On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondents office to
inquire about the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the
decision was adverse to them because a congressman exerted pressure
upon the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still
appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of
P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for
research made.[3]
Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent
of purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the
assailed decision. Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent
filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period.
On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the
respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which
he allegedly promised as payment for respondents appearance fee. In the
same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the
complainant would not confer with him and settle the matter within 30
days.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client,
Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to
engage his professional services in connection with a 2-hectare parcel of
land situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainants family lost
7 years earlier through an execution sale in favor of one Alfredo T. Castro.
Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog
haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from
Pangasinan because no lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the
case. Complainant, through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local
lawyers but did not engage their services because they were demanding

exorbitant fees. One local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least
one-half of the land involved as his attorneys fee, plus cash expenses,
while the other asked for of the land in addition to a large sum of money.
Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P60,000.00
plus an appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him
that he would consult his siblings on the matter.
Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose
Castillo, went to respondents office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant,
through Castillo, told respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance
fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and
the remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after their treasure hunt operations in
Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of
P3,000.00 per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject
matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of property, if they
lose. In addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for
transportation, meals and other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted
the complainants offer.
Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC
2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be
discharged as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now
assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling
the case, with an offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier
promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny
Ramos made a written commitment and gave respondents secretary
P2,000.00 of the P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellants
brief.
On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision
ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and
his siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18,
2002. Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which
compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29, 2003.
On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP
charging his former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq.
m. parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.
In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of

law for 1 year.[4]
On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI2003-47 the full text of which reads:[5]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP
Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction.[6]
Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code
because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which
was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case
has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2hectare parcel of land to the family of the complainant.
Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee
even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum
meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable
because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an
acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from
acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved
which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of
their profession.[7] The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include
not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The
rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the
transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation
of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons.
[8] It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.[9] However,

the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property
takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the clients
property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
Civil Code attaches.
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal
transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated
property either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited
individual. In Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious
misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he
registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title
over the part of the estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No.
98037 involving the subject property.[10] In the consolidated administrative
cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[11] the Court suspended respondent Atty.
Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law when he
purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending
certiorari proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in
litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery
which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the
litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even
assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical,
respondents act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter
of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in
Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly
specify which acts of the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We
find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and
not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power
to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or
suspension be imposed as a penalty.[12] All considered, a reprimand is
deemed sufficient and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in

violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely.
HILADO V DAVID
FACTS:

HIlado brought against Assad to annul the sales of several houses

and corresponding lots which were executed during the Japanese
occupation.

These sales were executed Hilados late husband, allegedly

without her knowledge. Counsel for Hilado: Delgado, Dizon, Flores,
Rodrigo.

Counsel for Assad Ohnic, Velilla and Balonkita, they were replaced
by Francisco. (in case youre wondering David is the judge who
tried the case)

Dizon in the name of his firm, wrote to Francisco, urging him to

cease representing Assad on the ground that HILADO had
consulted with FRANCISCO regarding her case.

It was alleged that she turned over papers to Francisco and that he
sent her a written opinion.

When they did not receive an answer to this suggestion, counsel

for Hilado filed a motion in court to disqualify Francisco. T

he letter to Hilado from Francisco was presented as evidence.

In the letter Francisco described the basic facts which brought

about the controversy, gave his opinion that the action would not
prosper because of the circumstances (title was already
transferred, price was not grossly inadequate, the allegation that
Assad is not the real purchaser is difficult to prove and that Mr
Hilado is dead)

He therefore declined to appear as counsel and returned the

records. The letter was dated July 13, 1945.

Francisco alleges that in May 1945, a real estate broker, came to

his office to approach him about representing a Syrian national
embroiled in real estate case (Assad).

He alleges that he accepted this case and that it was only a month
later that Hilado appeared and brought her case to him.

It was however only in 1946 that Assad formally requested him to

handle the case because Assads American lawyer had gone to the
states.

Judge David dismissed the case because the interchange between

Francisco and Hilado had not created a attorney-client relation.
Issue: was there an attorney-client relationshio between Francisco and
Hilado? If so, was there a breach?
Held:

In order to constitute professional employment it is not

essential the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. Nor, that any retainer

paid, promised, charged, nor that the attorney did not

undertake the case after the consultation.
An attorney is employed in his professional capacity when he
is giving advice thereon, just as if he were writing a pleading
or litigating in open court.
Precedent supports the doctrine that mere relation of
attorney and client should preclude the attorney from
accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same
litigation regardless of what information was received.
While it cannot be said that Francisco was acting in bad faith,
his action of taking up the cause of an adverse party, cannot
be sanctioned. In any case he has retainer fee
YAO VS. AURELIO

FACTS:

Bun Siong Yao is a majority stockholder of Solar Farms & Livelihood

Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation and since 1987,
he retained the services of another stockholder, Atty. Leonardo
Aurelio, as his personal lawyer and also the brother-in-law of Yaos
wife.

In 1999, they had a disagreement.

Aurelio then filed cases against Yao and his wife.

Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife
constitute an abuse of the confidential information which Aurelio
obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel.

Aurelio, on the other hand, claimed that he filed those which he

obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder of Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation.

The investigating commissioner found that Yao discontinued

paying dividends to Aurelio which compelled the latter to file
multiple criminal and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a
stockholder.

He recommended that Aurelio be suspended from practice of law.

The IBP approved and adopted the said recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not Aurelio violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Held: Yes.

Atty. Leonardo Aurelio is ordered suspended from the practice of

law for a period of six months.

He took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at

Yao and in doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has
obtained from his dealings with Yao and his companies for his own
end.

It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney

and his client is a fiduciary one.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that

a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
An attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to
him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents.
It is to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arise at the
inception of their relationship.
It does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them.
It even survives the death of the client.
GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN

Facts:

Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genatos building.

Atty. Silapan handled some of Genatos cases.
After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a
car.

Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to

Genato.

The check was dishonored.

Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22.

In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in the business of

buying a selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and
other shady deals and that he was also involved in bribery cases.

Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their

confidential lawyer-client relationship.
Issue: Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held: No.

While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust

and confidence reposed on him, especially with privileged
communication the protection is only limited to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment of a lawyer.

It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or

perpetration of a fraud.

Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there

being no professional employment in the strictest sense.

However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty.

Silapans rights as they were not pertinent to the case.

It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were

not the subject matter of litigation at hand.

His professional competence and legal advice were not being

attacked in the said case.

A lawyer must conduct himself with integrity.

He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

JUNIO V GRUPO
Facts:

Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be

used in the redemption of a property in Bohol.

For no reason at all, Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property so
the property was forfeited.

Because of this, Junio wanted the money back but Grupo refused
to refund.

Instead, Grupo requested that he use the money to help defray his
childrens educational expenses.

It was a personal request to which Grupo executed a PN.

He maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were very
close since Junios sisters served as Grupos household helpers for
many years.

Grupo also stated that the basis of his rendering legal services was
purely gratuitous or an act of a friend for a friend with
consideration involved.

He concluded that there was no atty-client relationship existing

between them.

The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for
violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal Responsibility
which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended

indefinitely from the practice of law. Grupo filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.
Held: Yes.

If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults with an

attorney in his professional capacity and the attorney voluntarily
permits in such consultation, then the professional employment
must be regarded as established.

Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long relation

of master and servant, Grupo took advantage of his influence by
not returning the money.

Grupo has committed an act which falls short of the standard

conduct of an attorney.

If an ordinary borrower of money is required by law to repay his

loan, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as
an example.

*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a month
and to pay Junio within 30 days with interest at the legal rate.

Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.

WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES

FACTS:

Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to

prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of
title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances
surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs,
respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to
be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to

complainants office demanding a certain amount other than what
was previously agreed upon.

Respondent left his office after reasoning with him.

Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find

out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of
Public Documents.

The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining

to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the
petition which respondent was supposed to have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter

telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared
and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the petition
thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant; that there was no longer any professional
relationship between the two of them when he filed the lettercomplaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and
allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were
culled from public documents procured from the Office of the
Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility and recommended for his
suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?
HELD: No.

Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through

Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against
complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal
dealings with complainant.

Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the

certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant.
Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant.

The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only
incidental to their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were

not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a

redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son

and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa
against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging
facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way,
violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint
against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting
a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary
interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
DOMINGO V AQUINO
TEEHANKEE; April 29, 1971

FACTS

NATURE: An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of

the Court of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly
entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were
appointed co-special administrators of the estate of Luis Domingo,
Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a money claim on the estate.
CFI approved the money claim of Aquino. Both parties appealed to
the CA.
CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in favor of Aquino
(allowed compounded interest).
The estate's counsel in the CA, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive
the notice and copy of the judgment sent to him by registered
mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings
pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and
Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the
judgment.
Consuelo Domingo de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA
an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served
with a copy of the Judgment," stating that Asuncion Domingo Sta.
Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with the
permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who
had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his
trust by the intestate court, for having squandered cash funds of
the estate, that, as a consequence, she was appointed judicial
administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone;
that as judicial administratrix, she wished to file a motion for
reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed to serve
copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson
and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be

substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her

counsel be served with copy of the CAs decision.

CA denied motion for reconsideration.

After almost 5 mos. and after respondent had filed in the intestate
court a motion for execution of the judgment, petitioner filed this
petition alleging that CA decision was entered in excess of
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

This was opposed by Aquino on the ground of finality.

ISSUE: WON CAs decision has become final
HELD: YES

CA decision has become final and executory in accordance with

the Rules of Court and since no appeal was filed.

Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and delay was
without legal basis.

Petitioners motion for substitution filed with the appellate court

after its decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had
already duly handed down its adverse decision and petitioner
merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for
reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate.

She was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such

motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court's decision
for such motion was never filed. She cannot use as an excuse the
substitution of administrators/counsels.

The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the
counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court
and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel.

He was representing the estate and not the administrator, Luis

Domingo, Jr., so that even after latters removal, the former
remains to be counsel of estate.

No withdrawal as counsel or petition for change of counsel was

filed in accordance with the Rules of

Court.

Notice and copy of the CA's decision were duly served by

registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of
record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court.

And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the

appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record
was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure
to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the
postmaster.

The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to

her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the
latter's removal or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in
the appellate court.

Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioners counsel shall pay treble

costs for falsely representing to the SC that the CA had granted
new and further relief to Aquino when, in fact, he had duly

prayed for the relief awarded and for filing unmeritorious cases
that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction issued on
Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved.
FELICISIMO MONTANO VS. IBP
FACTS:

Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services

for his client upon the latter's failure to comply with their retainer
agreement.
HELD:

We find Atty Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the

legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good
cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

Although he may withdraw his services when client deliberately

fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of
the present case, Atty. Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as
complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attys fees.
Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant (P
3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the
demands of the Code.

But, only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the

standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar will disbarment be imposed a s penalty.
VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME
Facts:

Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title
dispute.

The court rule against Venterez and friends.

They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme

failed or refused to do so.

Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another

lawyer to prepare the MR.

Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants

informed him that he was withdrawing the case from him because
he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the
case.

Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the records of the
case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any longer.
Issue: Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?
Held: Yes.

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes

fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and

confidence reposed on him. An attorney who undertakes an action

impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination that is, until the
case becomes final and executory. Any dereliction of duty affects
the client.
The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosmes defense that he had
already withdrawn from the case. A lawyer may retire at any time
with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy
thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to
give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the
court. The application must be based on a good case.
What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22.
There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3
months.

In Re: ATTY. DAVID BRIONES

FACTS:

Atty. Briones is the counsel of the accused-appellant Restituto

Cabacan in the case: People of the Philippines vs. Restituto
Cabacan

Atty. Briones was given notice through mail to file appellants brief
but failed in different occasions:

: He was given 30 days to file the brief but failed (August 6, 1998).

: Submit brief within 10 days and show cause order why Atty.
Briones should not be disciplined by the Court failed (April 28,
1999).

The Court referred the matter of the repeated failure of Atty.

Briones to file appellant's brief to the IBP for evaluation, report and
recommendation (August9, 1999).

IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzales-De Los Reyes informed Atty.

Briones of the Court's referral of the matter to the IBP and required
him to file his Comment within 5 days from receipt of the letter
again, he did not file any Comment (October 7, 1999).

COMMISSIONER DE LOS REYES FINDINGS:

People vs. Cabacan has remained pending in view of the

negligence of Atty. Briones to file the required appellant's brief.

It is evident that he violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR.

She recommends that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law

profession for a period of six (6) months.

IBP: Adopted and Approved the Report and Recommendation.

May 26, 2000, Atty. Briones filed with the IBP a Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation.

He contended:

He filed a Comment on the administrative case but the same was

not considered by the investigating commissioner.

Neither did the IBP conduct a formal investigation.

IBP: Motion is DENIED.

On October 5, 2000, Atty. Briones filed with the Court a

Manifestation praying that his Comment submitted to the IBP on
October 13, 2000 be considered by the Court.

He failed to file an appellants brief in the said case because he

never received a copy of the resolution requiring him to file said
brief.

If ever a copy was received by his secretary, the latter was not
able to give it to him because he had already ceased practicing
law failing health.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Briones properly withdrew his services as
counsel.
HELD: NO.

He is still the counsel of record.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The cessation of his law practice is not an excuse for his failure to
file the required brief.

Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law,
he still could not ignore the directives coming from the Court.

It does not appear from the records of the said case that Atty.
Briones has withdrawn his appearance.

Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the case, the Court

would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and
he is expected to comply with all its orders and directives. RULING:

Atty. David P. Briones is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for

six (6)months
OBANDO V FIGUERAS
NARVASA; 1990
FACTS

NATURE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, seeking to

annul a
Decision of the CA which affirmed dismissal, without prejudice, of
Petitioner Felizardo Obandos action for annulment of contract and
reconveyance earlier ordered by the RTC of QC.
Alegria Figueras and her stepsons Eduardo and Francisco filed a
Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased
husband Jose Figueras.
pending settlement of the estate, Alegria died. Eduardo assumed
administration of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria.
Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be
Alegrias Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo Obando,
Alegrias nephew (herein petitioner)
the alleged Will bequeathed to Obando properties left by the
Figueras couple, including 2 parcels of land in Quezon City.
Probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, and
Obando was appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint
estates.

upon investigation, the NBI found the Will was a forgery, which led
to the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a
public document

probate court denied Eduardos Motion for authority to sell the

parcels of land. Despite denial, he sold the lots to Amigo Realty
Corporation, on the strength of an Order issued by the probate
court in 1991. New titles were issued in the name of Amigo Realty.

Petitioner Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir of

Alegria, filed Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty
(respondents), for the nullification of the sale.

the probate court removed Obando from his office as

coadministrator.

Consequently, respondents filed Motion to Dismiss, based on

Obandos loss of his legal standing to pursue the case.

Trial Court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case

Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied.

CA dismissed Obandos Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus

rejected Obandos contention: that he did not lose his legal
personality to prosecute the civil case, since there was no
categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery, and its
probate was still pending

affirmed the dismissal of the action because the probate courts

Order alluded to the fact that the Will was a forgery.

that the probate of the Will had not been decided on the merits did
not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner
Obando as coadministrator.
Petitioners' Claim

Assignment of Errors:

Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners:

(1) whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer
who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record;
(2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive
pleadings were already made can still be granted;
(3) whether the conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa
through falsification and the revocation of his appointment as
administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute
sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case; and
(4) whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing
the civil case and the previous actions of the trial court.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was
allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record
2. WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were
already made can still be granted. YES
3. WON that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case
because Obando's conviction for estafa through falsification was still on
appeal. NO

4. WON trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous
rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted
Eduardo's later Motion to Dismiss. NO
HELD
1.

the lawyer was still Eduardos counsel of record.

Representation continues until the court dispenses with the

services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of
RoC.

Counsel may be substituted only with the ff requisites:

(1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution;
(2) the clients written consent is obtained;
(3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured

Eduardo did not dismiss his Atty (Yuseco). The

Motion to Dismiss was beneficial to respondent Eduardo, he had
no reason to complain.
At the discretion of the court, an atty. who has been dismissed by
a client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the
clients rights.
In this case, any irregularity should have been raised by
respondent Eduardo, and not the petitioners.

3.

2.

if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the
case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be
allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even
after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading.
The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the
circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed
within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has
allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds:
(1) lack of jurisdiction,22
(2) litis pendentia,23
(3) lack of cause of action,24 and
(4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a
ground for dismissal.25 Except for lack of cause of action or
lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section1 of Rule 16
may be waived.
If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to
dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally
considered waived under

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.26

the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal
of the civil case based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal capacity.
It was only after he had been convicted of estafa through
falsification that the probate court divested him of his
representation of the Figueras estates.
It was only then that this ground became available to the
respondents.
Hence, it could notmbe said that they waived it by raising it in a
Motion to Dismissfiled after their Answer was submitted.
Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency
of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should
be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.

4.

When an appointment as co-administrator of an estate is revoked

by a probate court, a final conviction in a criminal case has
nothing to do with such revocation.
This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil
case.
Petitioner Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the
deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator.27
When the probate court removed him from office, he lost that
authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of
the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil
case.28
Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this
ground.29
Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is
necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper
issue in this Petition.
He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision removing
him from administration of the Figueras estates.

There is no conflict between these court rulings.

they were based on different grounds.
The first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time,
Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue as coadministrator of the Figueras estates.
The second Motion was granted because the probate court had
already removed him from his office as coadministrator.
The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the
adjudication of the trial court.
Disposition the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.