Aristotle's Theory of The Unity of Science

MALCOLM WILSON
Aristotle's Theory
of the
Unity of Science
Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science
Aristotle was the first philosopher to provide a theory of autonomous scientific disciplines and the systematic connections between those disciplines.
This book presents the first comprehensive treatment of these systematic
connections: analogy, focality, and cumulation.
Wilson appeals to these systematic connections in order to reconcile
Aristotle's narrow theory of the subject-genus (described in the Posterior
Analytics in terms of essential definitional connections among terms) with
the more expansive conception found in Aristotle's scientific practice. These
connections, all variations on the notion of abstraction, allow for the more
expansive subject-genus, and in turn are based on concepts fundamental to
the Posterior Analytics. Wilson thus treats the connections in their relation
to Aristotle's theory of science and shows how they arise from his doctrine
of abstraction. The effect of the argument is to place the connections, which
are traditionally viewed as marginal, at the centre of Aristotle's theory of
science.
The scholarly work of the last decade has argued that the Posterior
Analytics is essential for an understanding of Aristotle's scientific practice .
Wilson's book, while grounded in this research, extends its discoveries to
the problems of the conditions for the unity of scientific disciplines.
MALCOLM WILSON is an assistant professor in the Classics Department
at the University of Oregon.
PHOENIX
Journal of the Classical Association of Canada
Revue de la Societe canadienne des etudes classiques
Supplementary Volume xxxvrn
Tome supplementaire XXXVIII
MALCOLM WILSON
Aristotle's Theory of
the Unity of Science
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

Toronto Buffalo London
@ University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2000

Toronto Buffalo London
Printed in Canada
ISBN 0-8020-4796-3
Printed on acid-free paper
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Wilson, Malcolm Cameron
Aristotle's theory of the unity of science
(Phoenix. Supplementary volume ; 38 = Phoenix. Tome supplementaire,
ISSN 0079-1784; 38)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8020-4796-3
1. Aristotle - Contributions in methodology.
2. Aristotle - Contributions in ontology.
Science - Philosophy. 1. Title.
II. Series: Phoenix. Supplementary volume (Toronto, Ont.) ; 38.
B48SWS4 2000
185
C99-932973-1
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing

program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing
activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing
Industry Development Program (BPIOP).
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
vii
ix
CHAPTER 1: GENUS, ABSTRACTION, AND

COMMENSURABILITY 14
Demarcating the Genus 15
Abstraction 29
I. Speed of Change 39
2. Value 41
3. Animal Locomotion 47
CHAPTER 2: ANALOGY IN ARISTOTLE'S BIOLOGY
Problems with Analogy 53
I. Fixity of Analogy 60
2. Difficult Cases 67
3. Analogues and the More and Less 69
4. An~logues and Position 69
5. Analogy of Function 72
6. Genus as Matter 74
A Solution 77
A Challenging Case 83
Analogy and Abstraction 86
53
vi Contents
CHAPTER 3, ANALOGY AND DEMONSTRATION
89
Analogy in APo; Passages and Discussion 91

Analogy in the Biology 99
Analogy and the Scala Naturae 109
CHAPTER 4, THE STRUCTURE OF FOCALITY
116
Focality and Pcr Se Predication 122

The Limits of Focality in the Biological Works 129
CHAPTER 5, METAPHYSICAL FOCALITY
134
The Genus of Being 136

Categorial Focality in Metaphysics Z 144
Demonstration in the Science of Being 158
The Wider Focal Science ?f Being 165
CHAPTER 6, MIXED USES OF ANALOGY AND FOCALITY
Matter and Potentiality 177

The Good 194
CHAPTER 7, CUMULATION
207
Souls 208
1. The Analogical Account 210
2. The Cumulative Account 214
Friendship 224
1. Eudemian Ethics and the Problems of Focal Friendship 225
2. The Nicomachean Version 231
The Place of Theology in the Science of Being 235
Conclusion: Analogy, Focality, and Cumulation 239
BIB L lOG RAP H Y

I N D E X L 0 COR U M
GENERAL
INDEX
243
255
265
175
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
My first thanks go to my teachers at Berkeley, T any Long, John Ferrari, and Alan
Code, who supervised the dissertation from which this book arose. Mary Louise Gill
and James Lennox also kindly read my entire dissertation and provided encouragement and advice. Friends and colleagues have read and commented on various parts
in various stages of completion: Andrew Coles, William Keith, John Nicols, Scott
Pratt; and my wife, Mary Jaeger, who conquered 'philosophy-induced narcolepsy'
to read the entire manuscript more than once. Two anonymous reviewers for the
University of Toronto Press provided much detailed and general comment useful in
improvement. Finally, I should also like to thank Ancient Philosophy for permission
to use ma terial published in 'Anal ogy in Aristotle's Biology: Ancient Philosophy
17 (1997) .
......................------
ABBREVIA nONS
Works of Aristotle
APo
APr
Cat.
DA
DC
DI
EE
EN
GA
GC
HA
IA
Juv.
Long.
MA
Met.
Mete.
MM
PA
Phys.
PN
Pol.
Resp.
SE
Sens.
Somn.
Top.
Posterior Analytics
Prior Analytics
Categories
de Anima
de Caelo
de Interpretatione
Eudemian Ethics
Nicomachean Ethics
Generation of Animals
Generation and Corruption
History of Animals
Progression of Animals
On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death
On Length and Shortness of Life
Movement of Animals
Metaphysics
Meteorologica
Magna Moralia
Parts of Animals
Physics
Parva Naturalia
Politics
Respiration
Sophistical Refutations
Sense and Sensibilia
de Somno
Topics
x Abbreviations
Other Works
LSj H.G. Liddell and R. Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon. Revised and
augmented by H. jones. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
ROT j. Barnes. The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford
Translation (Bollingen Series LXXI.2). Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984.
Acronyms and Summary of Per Se Relations
IPO
SGA
WP
is predicated of
species-genus-analogy
wholes-parts
per se (1) predicate: is contained in the definition of its subject, e.g., linear
is predicated of triangle.
per se (2) predicate: contains its subject in its definition, e.g., female is
predicated of animal.
per se (3) is self-subsistent subject, e.g., man.
per se (4) predicate: is predicated of something on account of itself, e.g.,
dying is predicated of being slaughtered.
Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science
INTRODUCTION
Aristotle is renowned for having been the first to create autonomous
sciences and independent disciplines. By distinguishing physics, political

science, and many other areas of study, he circumscribed and identified
some of the most important modern scientific fields. His reasons for separating such sciences and their subject matters were not the social and
practical reasons familiar today. He did not worry about the limitations of
the individual human mind faced with the explosive growth of knowledge
and the consequent drive towards ever-increasing specialization . Quite the
contrary, he thought humans were naturally capable of fulfilling their desire for understanding and he did not view the sheer amount of knowledge
as an impediment to this end. His concern lay instead with the form that
that understanding takes. He denied that all of our knowledge falls into a
single undifferentiated domain, a single universal science, and he developed
a solution, the subject-genus, which served to separate and isolate each
subject matter.
But his solution created problems of its own. J shall contend that the
isolating force of the subject-genus was so powerful that additional techniques were required to provide for the legitimate causal and explanatory
links between sciences and subject-genera. To effect the happy compromise
between universal science and genus-isolation, Aristotle developed four
techniques of connection: subordination, analogy, foeality, and cumulation,
of which the last three are the special concern of this book.
J intend to study these techniques both at a specific and a general level.
J am first of all interested in the use Aristotle makes of them. The specific
passages in which he explicitly puts these techniques to work are among
the most controversial in the Aristotelian corpus. They concern such fun-
damental questions as the unity of the science of Being and metaphysics,
4 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

the definition of the soul, the organization and nature of goods, and the
kinds of friendship. In treating each technique in turn and with an eye

to the larger picture, I shall offer new interpretations of specific areas of
Aristotelian philosophy.
At a more general level, I gather these techniques together and provide
a single comprehensive theory for them. This theory arises out of my
reflections on recent developments in Aristotelian scholarship. One of the
most important trends of the last several decades has been the realization
that Aristotle's theory of science contained in the Posterior Analytics is
not an abstract ideal without practical application, but in fact is used in
important ways in the special sciences, especially in the biological works.
Many of the basic concepts of Aristotle's formal scientific methodology, like

demonstration and definition, have been found to inform the practice and
presentation of specific sciences. This research has been very fruitfuL but
it has focused primarily on the single isolated genus. There is good reason
for this focus. While the APo does discuss the subordination technique at
some length, it only briefly notes analogy and never mentions focality or
cumulation at all. And yet these are important organizational tools in the
several sciences. In view of the success in applying the APo's single-genus
theory to Aristotle's scientific practice, I want to reverse the hermeneutic
process, as it were, and ask whether the widespread use of analogy, focality,
and cumulation in the special sciences can be given any theoretical account
within the terms of the APo. I believe that this is possible, and shall adduce
evidence and argument to show that Aristotle had the APo in mind when
he formulated these techniques. I shall also argue that this fact yields
important results. Not only do we obtain a theoretical account of these
techniques, but we also discover that, far from being a random assortment
of tools of various vintages scattered haphazardly throughout the corpus,

they perfonn interlocking and complementary functions. Moreover, they
are all logical developments of the most important concepts in the APo, per
se and qua predication. This fact both confirms our belief in the relevance
of the APo for these techniques and also allows us to provide a general and
unified account of them, for they are variations on a Single logical theme.
Finally, by describing these techniques in terms of the central concepts of

the APo, we can provide a richer and more powerful account of Aristotle's
theory of science, one that is more funy integrated into all aspects of his
scientific practice.
Such an interpretation is founded on an assumption hermeneutically
confirmed that Aristotle's philosophy forms a basically consistent unity,

and that there are few radical changes in his views. The unsuccessful
attempts of this century to impose a chronology on Aristotle similar to
5 Introduction
the one that 5,0 successfully applies to Plato lead me to view the historical
question as less interesting than the philosophical question concerning
the logical organization of concepts. It would be absurd to deny that
. any philosopher underwent intellectual ' development, but I am inclined
to believe that Aristotle's development is more like the articulation of
basic ideas than the repeated creation and destruction of whole systems of
thought.
The story begins with Aristotle's objections to a single universal science. These objections arose out of the historical context of debates with
his older contemporaries Plato and Speusippus, heads of the Academy. It
was a common supposition of ancient Greek epistemology that we know
something when we know how it is related to other things we know. This
relational view of knowledge manifests itself in two patterns. First, Plato
held that we know the particulars best (to the extent that we actually can
know them ) when we understand how they imitate the Forms, and since
we understand the particular in virtue of the universaL Plato exalted the
Form or universal and depreciated the sensible particulars. Since we can
understand only what is common and universal among the particulars, the
variations among them are relegated to the shadowy realm of opinion.
With the quip that Meno was providing a whole swarm of virtues, Plato's
Socrates compelled him to avoid examples, like manly virtue and womanly
virtue, and state instead the single definition of virtue that covers all these
cases. For virtue, Socrates claimed, must be the same whether it is present
in a man or a woman (Meno 71e-73a) . Likewise, in the Republic he supposed tha t justice will have the same nature wherever it is found, and as a
result, he argued, justice in the soul will be the same as justice in the state
(368c-369a).
In the drive for the universal definition, Plato often overlooked genuine
ambiguities in terms. For Aristotle, detecting and disarming these ambiguities became something of a philosophical obsession. He faults Plato on
the grounds that justice exists properly as a relation between two people,
and exists between the parts of the soul only by a metaphorical extension
(EN V.111138a4-b14). Similarly, Plato's universalization of virtue, which
is manifested in the Republic's inclusion of women in the leadership of
the state (4S1d-e), prompts Aristotle to distinguish between men's and
women's tasks and therefore between their virtues (Pol. II.S 1264b4-6). For
Plato, then, the possession of any common characteristic among particulars
was a sufficient condition for positing a Form and universal, and as a
result he failed to detect other more subtle relationships. The preference
for the universal over the particular is recapitulated in the preference for
the more general Form over more specific Forms, as is clear in the example

of Meno's virtues, in which man's virtue, even though a universal itself,
was rejected as too particular. As a result, important demarcations between
fields and sciences were blurred, and in the Republic all knowledge became
an articulation of the unified politico-philosophical super-science of the
Good, in which the Form of the Good made all other Forms intelligible.
[n his later work, plato studied a second form of relational knowledge.
[n the Sophist the Forms themselves are known through a process of division by their participation in Sameness and Difference with respect to other
Forms. Here, the relations among the Fanns themselves are the source
and ground of knowledge. Plato's nephew, Speusippus, while rejecting the

Forms, elaborated this system of division and used it to drive even harder
in the direction of scientific unification. He argued that all knowledge is
relational, and that everything is known in virtue of its sameness and
difference from all other things. [n order to know anything, therefore,
one must know everything l Knowledge is articulated through a universal
scheme of division, and a thing just is its relational position within this
universal scheme.
As a member of Plato's Academy and as a philosopher in the Platonic

tradition, Aristotle was engaged in this common quest for systematic understanding, but he was suspicious of both the generalizing and unifying
tendencies he found there. On several grounds he argued the inadequacy
of the Academic project. He claimed that there was no universal subject
matter to provide an object for a universal science; there was, that is, no
one genus of Being. And even if there were, he claimed, this general science
would tell us nothing about the manifold nature of reality. Nor would it
be useful, since we do not even need it in order to know about specific
pieces of reality.
As Aristotle presented it, plato identified Being and Unity as the highest genera of things, under which all Forms fall. He also identified Being
and Unity as the elements of things, since he supposed that the Forms
were somehow constituted out of them. Being and Unity, then, were at
the same time both principles and the highest genera (Met. B.3 998b9-21).
For Plato, the more universal a thing was, the more of a principle it was
and the greater its generative and explanatory power. Aristotle, by contrast,
argued that there was a limit to the degree of universalization attainable
among all objects . Neither Being nor Unity, he thought, form a genus with
a Single unambiguous definition, and therefore neither can be a principle
for a universal science (998b22-28).
1 According to Aristotle (APo II,13 97a6-19). See my 1997a.
7 Introduction
Aristotle was also concerned about the epistemological etiolation that
attends increasing universalization. The more one grasps at what is com
man, the less one retains of the particular kinds. And yet what a thing is
spe"cifically is as much a part of its Being as what it is at a high level of
generalization. For being biped is as much, if not more, part of the Being
of a man as being a substantial unity, the actuality of a potentiality. This is
not to say that Aristotle rejected general understanding altogether, but he
did not think that we know something solely in virtue of its membership
in a genus. Nor did he believe that the genus always provides the cause
and explanation for a thing. He preferred instead the constitutive element
and the various kinds of cause as explanatory principles, and in his theory
of science the genus comes to denote the extension of the explanation,
rather than the explanation itself.
Aristotle also took issue with the Academic doctrine that all knowledge forms a single science. He made the observation - hardly original
conSidering Socrates' frequent appeal to it - that there were experts who
understood their own field but not others. It was clearly not necessary
to know everything in order to have expertise in a single field.' Nor was
it necessary to know the most general science. Plato, for his part, had
been scandalized that the mathematicians simply accepted the principles of
their science without investigating its foundations. He supposed that their
hypothetical principles could be perfected by an unhypothetical science,
philosophical dialectic, which would remedy the deficiency of mathematics
and indeed all hypothetical sciences. Only the philosopher, then, could
legitimately lay claim to true knowledge of the special sciences. Aristotle,
though he recognized a first philosophy that examined the first principles
of the special sciences, thought it right and proper that the special sciences
should merely presuppose and not examine their own first principles.
Accordingly, Aristotle sought to redress the imbalance apparent in the
Academic prejudice towards the universal. He attended more equally to
both the specific and the general levels of inquiry and studied the causes of
things in addition to their similarities and differences. These new concerns
found logical expression in his theory of scientific understanding, whose
foundation is the demonstrative syllogism. A syllogism is composed of at
least three terms, a major (e.g., having wings), a middle (e.g., fliers), and
a minor (e.g., birds), arranged in at least two premisses and a conclusion;
for example,
2 See PA I.l, where Aristotle draws the distinction between the specialized expert and
the generaUy educated layman. Also Balme 1972, 70, on the connection with Plato and
Speusippus.

having wings is predicated of (henceforth, IPO) fliers
fliers IPO birds
therefore, having wings IPO birds J
In order for a syllogism to be demonstrative, the relationship between the
terms of its premisses (e.g., 'having wings' and 'fliers') must be necessary.4
This necessity is understood in terms of essential, definitional relationships:
in order for 'having wings' and 'fliers' to be terms in the same demonstrative premiss, 'having wings' must appear in the definition of 'flier' or vice
versa, e.g., wings are by definition the instrumental part for flying. s When
terms are so related, they are said to be per se (Ka8' aim5) or essentially
related. Only essentially related terms may be joined in a demonstrative
premiss, and a string of such premisses wi1l form a string of essential
relations. Terms that are not essentially related are said to be accidentally
related, and cannot be connected in a demonstrative premiss.
In addition to this per se requirement Aristotle introduces the rule that
terms in a demonstrative syllogism must be proved of the subject as such
and universally, indicating this criterion by the use of the relative pronoun
Ti (qua). The effect of this requirement is to restrict further the terms
admissible to a demonstration and therefore to a science. A triangle, for
example, can be demonstrated as having interior angles equal to two right

angles (following the custom, I shall call this the 2R theorem), because it
possesses this property as or qua triangle. By contrast, a demonstration that
proves this attribute of isosceles triangle is defective because the property
does not belong to isosceles triangle qua isosceles, but qua triangle. Such
a proof is said to be an accidental proof, because 2R does not belong to

isosceles triangle qua isosceles. The term 2R, then, belongs in the science
of triangle and not in the science of isosceles triangle.
These two restrictions on the admission of terms to a demonstration
constitute the identity conditions of a science and provide the foundations
for the autonomy of disciplines. Since not all terms are per se related to
one another, and since they are different in their qua designations, they
3 This syllogism is frequently presented differently by modem commentators:
birds are fliers
fliers have wings
birds have wings.
This is not, however, Aristotle's presentation, and it will be most convenient for our
purposes to adhere to his chara([eristic fonn.
4 These issues will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 1 below.
S In relating tenns within definitions Aristotle allows for some paronymy, Le., flying for
flier.
9 Introduction
cannot all be included in one universal science. Each science has a subject or
a subject-genus. This is what the science is about and the subject of which
the predicates are predicated. A science is the sum of the demonstrative
syllogisms that concern the same subject.' The subject of the science is
indicated by the qua expression, and the per se criterion for including
other terms in a science implies that each science is autonomous and has
its own and unique set of principles.
When these restrictions are violated, when there is an attempt to
introduce a term that is not per se and qua related to the other terms
into a demonstrative syllogism, the result is an error, which Aristotle calls
I'ETa/3arJ'lS or kind-crossing, and this will destroy the demonstrative power
of the syllogism and the cogency of the science.
In contrast to Plato's and Speusippus' universalizing and inclusive
tendencies, Aristotle's theory of demonstration is a powerfully isolating
force. The qua requirement especially entails that understanding occurs
within a single subject-genus, and not in relation to other genera through
an analysis of sameness and difference.' Each science will be specialized
and isolated from every other except by incidental connections, and there
will be no communication between disciplines. Each subject-genus, bound
by necessity solely to its own principles and predicates, will form an island
in the sea of Being. The view of the world that this theory of science
represents will be that of a heap of subjects, in which one genus is only
incidentally related to another.
It is clear, however, that Aristotle never advocated such a degree of
isolation. In fact there are a multitude of ways in which sciences are connected with one another and share principles. The axioms, like the principle
of non-contradiction, are common to all sciences, and are the precondition
for any understanding at all. More elaborately developed within the APo
is the connection between a more abstract, superordinate science and a less
abstract, subordinate science. A superordinate science, usually a branch of
mathematics, supplies principles and explanations for a fact or conclusion
found in a distinct and subordinate natural science, for instance, harmonics
or optics. Since this technique and its place in the APo has been well studied
6 I am deliberate in avoiding the claim that a science is the sum of demonstrations which
have the same minor term for reasons which will be discussed in chapter 4.
7 No doubt, division remains an important part of Aristotle's epistemology, but it plays a
preliminary role in establishing the extent of the subject-genera and the attributes that
are coextensive with them. It is not the primary form of understanding. See Ferejohn
1991, who places division in the 'framing' or pre-demonstrative stage of science. See
also chapter 2 below.

by the secondary literature, I shall not treat it in the same depth as the three
other techniques It will proVide, however, a useful stepping-stone to those
techniques . In the first chapter of this book I shall begin by laying out in
more detail the conditions for a unified subject-genus and what makes two
subject-genera different. I shall then consider subject-genera that are related to one another through abstraction, but that nevertheless are separate
and autonomous. Abstraction is a feature of Aristotle's philosophy familiar from his theory of mathematics. According to Aristotle, mathematical
objects are ontologically dependent on their physical substrate, but can be
mentally abstracted from that substrate so that they maintain absolutely
no conceptual connections (Le., per se relations) to it. Mathematics and
physics, then, are a pair of subject-genera related by pure abstraction. I
shall argue that abstraction has a much broader application than merely
to mathematics and, more importantly, that there are several degrees of
abstractability, depending on the nature of the subject matter. I shall focus
on several pairs of subject-genera in which the conceptual abstraction is not
absolute, cases in which there are per se relations between the abstracted
genus and its substrate. I call this situation 'semi-abstraction.' The superordination technique will proVide us with the first step along this road.
It is precisely in the realm of abstraction and semi-abstraction, in which
two subject-genera can be treated as autonomous and yet maintain per se
connections to one another, that analogy, foeality, and cumulation operate.
Analogy, strictly speaking, is a proportional relationship between four
terms (A is to B as C is to 0), that expresses a common relation between
each of the two pairs. The formal structure of the relationship does not
dictate the content, and an analogy can express any commonality from an
exuberant metaphor of poetry to a trivial numerical identity. Nevertheless,
I argue that Aristotle has a more specific function in mind for analogy, one
closely related to demonstration. Analogy arises between subject-genera.
Where genera are different, their qua designations are different, and there
are no per se connections between them. As a result they cannot be treated
by a common science. In the face of the injunction against metabasis or
kind-crossing, analogy provides us with the means of treating subjects
that are generically different in a parallel way. In the Parts of Animals, for
example, Aristotle discusses the analogous parts, wing and fin. These parts
are predicated respectively of bird and fish in virtue of the final causes
or functions, flying and swimming. Bird, wing, and flying have obvious
universal and per se connections; so also do fish, fin, and swimming. We
8 See e.g., Lear 1982, McKirahan 1978, CartWright and Mendell 1984, and Lennox 1986.
11 Introduction
can prove that wing is predicated of bird by using the proper principles
of the subject genus, bird; similarly with the fish's fin' In spite of the
independence and autonomy of the demonstrations, there is a parallel in
the proofs, an analogical identity of relation: as wing is to bird, so fin is to
fish. This identity, however, cannot be abstracted from, and must always be
per se related to, the subject-genera in which the demonstrations take place.
This is a result of the fact that the subjects, bird and fish, determine the
qua level at which the attributes and causes are treated. At the same time,
behind the generic difference there is the intimation of a more abstract
subject-genus to which both bird and fish are related. This subject-genus
arises from the fact that flying and swimming are forms of locomotion,
and that wing and fin are instrumental parts of locomotion. The second
and third chapters of this book will be devoted to explaining how analogy
facilitates this limited degree of unity among different scientific subjects.
The second object of our investigation, the focal relationship, is a
method for drawing together in a single subject matter objects that are
of different genera lO According to Aristotle's favourite example, the term
'medical' applies to many different kinds of objects. For instance, we call
an operation medical, a doctor medical, a scalpel medical, not because they
possess the same attribute, medical, but because they are all related to the
thing that is called medical in the primary sense, the medical art. The other
medical things are so called because they are the work of the medical art,
the possessor of the medical art, or the instrument of the medical art. The
definitions of these derivatively medical things contain in themselves the
primary term or its definition. Chapter 4 will be devoted to analysing the
focal relationship in terms of -Aristotle's theory of science and showing
that medical is predicated of the derivative medical things in virtue of a
variety of per se relations. Although all the medical objects do not form a
single genus, in the sense that they are not of the same kind or similar to
one another, the definitional relations among them show how they form
a genus in another important sense of the term, objects related by per se
connections to a single subject-genus.
9 This is Aristotle's standard pattern of demonstration in the PA . We perceive that a bird

has wings from obseJVation, but to know in the fullest sense we must know why, and
this knowledge comes from relating the cause to the fact in a demonstration. We cannot
prove that a bird has wings from observation, because only demonstration provides
proof.
10 G.E.L. Owen (1960) first provided the current English translation of 7rpor tV A.EyOP.EVOV
as 'focal meaning.' It is also known as 'relational equivocity.' Most recently Shields
1999 has called this (as well as cumulation) 'core dependent homonymy.'

The most important consequence of this interpretation of the focal
relationship in terms of the APo theory is a reassessment of Aristotle's
famous application of focality, the science of Being (ov). This will be the
task of chapter 5. Though they do not form a single genus, Beings can
be treated under a single science because they are all per se related to a
single primary term, substance (ovcria). The focal relation has traditionally
been treated as a very special case, found only in exceptionally difficult
circumstances like the science of Being. But the fact that the focal relation
is basically a per se relation suggests that focality should be viewed instead as a simple application of the logical and causal relations of normal
Aristotelian demonstrative science. The terms (subjects, attributes, causes)
of demonstrative premisses are bound together by necessary, definitional
relations, whereby one tenn (or its definition) is included in the definition
of another. This is the structure of any ordinary Aristotelian science, and
the binding relations found in ordinary or normal science are of the same
kind as those by which focal science, including the focal science of Being,
is constituted.
In the sixth chapter I shall consider groups of objects that Aristotle treats both analogically and focally. These cases have a long history
of controversy. Aquinas, for example, made analogy invariably into a
relation between prior and posterior, assimilating it to focal and serial
schemes, which he called 'analogy of attribution.,ll More recently, G.E.L.
Owen sharply distinguished analogy and focality and tried to set them in
a chronological sequence within Aristotle's philosophical development. 12
Neither, however, studied analogy and focality in terms of per se relations
and demonstrative science. And though Owen was right to reject the terms
of Aquinas's assimilation of the techniques, there are other and deeper
structural connections that have escaped the notice both of Aquinas and
the moderns. In this chapter I shall argue that, far from being independent
or even incompatible means for the unification of a subject-genus, focality
is logically prior to analogy and a necessary precondition for it.
Analogy and focality are two basic ways in which Aristotle treats
different genera in conjunction with one another. But there is another
11 Summa thcologiac 1.13.6c: 'In the case of all names which are predicated analogously of
several things, it is necessary that all be predicated with respect to one, and therefore
that that one be placed in the definition of all. Because "the intelligibility which a name
means is its definition," as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics, a name must
be antecedently predicated of that which is put in the definitions of the others, and
consequently of the others, according to the order in which they approach, more or
less, that first analogate.' For passages and discussion see Klubertanz 1960, 68-9.
12 Owen 1960.
13 Introduction
important means that employs elements of focality and analogy to create
a series of similar objects. I call this method 'cumulation,' and it will be
the subject of the final chapter. l3 It is a special form of a series, which is
arranged in order of priority and posteriority, and is used in Aristotle's
discussions of souls and friendships. It is also important for determining
the place of theology within metaphysics. The prior members of the series
are logically and ontologically contained in the posterior members, as for
example the nutritive soul is contained in the sensitive soul. The latter
cannot exist without the former, and the latter contains the former in its
definition potentially. Members of cumulative series do not form standard
genera, but they all share some essential attributes with one another, as
analogues do; they are also per se related among themselves, since the
definition of a later member contains the definition of a prior member, just
as focally related objects do. In spite of the features of cumulation that are
common with foeality, cumulative objects cannot form a focal genus. The
reasons for this will emerge in my interpretation of the soul series. The
chapter will be filled out with an examination of Aristotle's two discussions
of friendship and an argument that he abandoned the focal analysis of
friendship he provided in the Eudemian Ethics for a cumulative view in
the Nicomachean Ethics because of the intractible difficulties in applying
focality in this context. Finally, I shall use the lesson of cumulation and
focality to shed light on the problem of the place of theology in the science
of Being.
Together, analogy, focality, and cumulation provide Aristotle with the
means to balance the claims of the universal science advocated by the
Academy and the isolation of the subject-genera, which arises within the
logic of his own theory of science. This solution, by preserving the autonomy of sciences without creating a chaotic heap of subject matters, allows
each subject to be treated separately while still maintaining its place in the
intelligible architecture of the world.
13 Grice 1988, 190--2, has called this 'recursive unification.'
Genus, Abstraction,
and Commensurability
In this chapter I shall first discuss two issues preliminary to 'semi-abstraction.' I shall begin by presenting in more detail the per se and qua relations, and show how they make a subject-genus a single subject-genus
distinct from other subject-genera. Aristotle illustrates these relations by
the familiar 2R example and the proof for alternating proportionality. In
both cases the per se and qua relations provide an adequate set of criteria
for identifying and demarcating subject-genera. Next, I shall introduce

abstraction (&'</>aipfCH<) through Aristotle's theory of mathematics, and
analyse this concept in terms of per se and qua relations. Abstraction will
provide a means of moving or shifting between qua levels and between
subject-genera, not just among mathematical and physical objects, but
wherever two subject-genera are related.
These preliminary discussions provide the background for semi-abstraction, and allow for a distinction between semi-abstraction and pure abstraction. In pure abstraction, such as the abstraction of mathematicals
from their physical substrates, the abstracted subject-genus maintains no
per se connections to the substrate from which it was abstracted. In semiabstraction, by contrast, the abstracted subject-genus does maintain some
per se connections to its substrate. I shall argue that, precisely because
these per se connections are maintained, the lines of demarcation between
a semi-abstracted subject-genus and its substrate cannot be sharply drawn.
As a result ambigUity arises in determining which subject-genus is under
consideration, the semi-abstract or its substrate. We shall see this problem
first arising with the proof for alternating proportionality, and then more
acutely in the 'mixed' or subordinate sciences, like harmonics and optics.
In these latter cases more than one subject-genus is involved in the same
proof, and therefore proofs in such sciences do not occur clearly within
one or the other subject-genus, but rather occur in both.
15 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

There are different degrees of semi-abstraction. By enlisting commensurability as a sign of generic unity (i.e., objects in the same genus can be
compared directly with one another, while objects from different genera
cannot) I shall examine abstraction and resistance to abstraction in several
graduated cases. While mathematicals can easily be abstracted from their
physical substrate and be compared as quantities, some other objects resist
abstraction to a greater or lesser extent. I shall consider three such objects . .
First, kinds of change cannot be abstracted from their substrate and cannot
be compared one with another. Next, the exchange value of manufactured
goods can be abstracted from the proper function of the goods sufficiently
to allow commensuration for the purpose of exchange and trade. Finally,
causes of animal locomotion can be abstracted from the instrumental parts
of locomotion to the extent that at the upper reaches of abstraction there
remain no per se connections with the specific -instruments. But each
level of abstraction from the pans allows for commensuration within that
level. By establishing the possibility of semi-abstraction and degrees of
abstractability and by describing them in the theoretical terms of the
Posterior Analytics, I shall have identified the fundamental concepts in
Aristotle's theory of relations among subject-genera.
Demarcating the Genus

A demonstrative science is constructed out of demonstrative syllogisms.
A demonstrative syllogism, in turn, is constructed out of terms that are
organized into premisses and a conclusion. The terms of the premisses
are related to one another by necessity. In order to explicate the notion
of necessity, Aristotle introduces three relationships between terms in a
demonstrative syllogism:
Demonstration, therefore, is deduction from what is necessary. We must therefore
grasp what things and what sort of things demonstrations depend 00. And first let
us define what we mean by holding in every case (Kanl 7TaVn:lS') and what by in
itself (peT se; Ka8' a;'To) and what by universally (Ka80Aov) . (APo 1.4 73.24-27;
modified Revised Oxford Translation [ROT])

Necessity, then, is explicated in terms of the relations holding in every
case, holding in itself, and holding universally. It is not clear from this
passage whether each of these relations by itself is a sufficient condition
of necessity, or whether they are sufficient only as a group. However,
they appear to be arranged in order of increasing stringency and, to some
extent, inclusion. We may, therefore, leave at least the holding-in-everycase relation (KarCz. 1TavTo~) safely aside, on the grounds that it is subsumed

under the other forms of necessity. OUf main interest lies with the in itself
(or per se as I shall refer to it; <ae' aUTo) and universal aeor-ov) relation,
and since the in itself /per se relation is logically prior to the universal
relation, let us follow Aristotle and consider it first .
In a controversial passage (1.4 73a34-b16), Aristotle distinguishes four
kind s of in itself or per se relationships, which in accordance with the recent
convention I shall call per se (1)_(4)' Three of the four describe a relation
between the terms of a demonstrative syllogism, and in these three cases
the terms are related by definition. Indeed, it is precisely because these per
se predicates are definitionally related that they are necessary and so useful
in demonstrations. In the first form (73a34-37) B is predicated per se of
A, if B appears in the account that makes clear the essence or th e 'what is
it' of A (EV T(~ .\oy~ T0 Ayovn Ti EaTL), as, for example, line is present
in the definition of triangle, since triangle is a figure bounded by three
straight lines. The proposition, 'triangle is linear' or 'line is predicated of
triangle,' then, passes the per se test as a demonstrative premiss. In the
second form (73a37-b3), B is predicated per se of A, if A is present in the
account of B, as curved is predicated of line, because line appears in the
definit ion of curved,2 In this case, the proposition 'line is curved' passes the
per se test as a demonstrative premiss. A third thing (73b5-10), that which
is not predicated of a substrate, is called per se, but this hardly provides
us with a description of a predication at all, and so cannot be relevant to
demonstrative premisses. But the fourth use of per se, that which belongs
to each thing on account of itself (Ilt' aUTO, 73b10-16), clearly involves
predication. Aristotle cites as an example death (cinoaau"u ) belonging per
se to slaughter (<TcpaTT<TeaL). Accordingly, 'to be slaughtered is to die'
passes the per se test as a demonstrative premiss.
Though there is no small amount of controversy surrounding these
relationships, we can reasonably maintain that to the extent that they are
relevant to predication, all involve definitional relations. Only the fourth

case is problematic in this respect, since it has, sometimes been taken to
refer to a causal rather than a definitional relationship. According to the

causal interpretation, something dies because it is slaughtered or sacrificed.
1 This list may be compared to Met. 6 .18, which arguably covers all the four kinds of
APo 104. For detailed discussions of these relationships, see Ferejohn 1991, 75-130, and
McKirahan 1992, 80-102.
2 Aristotle later qualifies this form (1.6 74b8-l 0) by saying that these predicates are
opposites. There is some controversy whether so restricted a relation is useful. I agree
with McKirahan (1992, 90) that the more general formulation of 1.4 captures the
important aspects of this relation.

But since ()(p(hUCTea~ can simply mean 'to be killed,' and since a:7To8avlV
also admits of that meaning, they may be synonyms or close synonyms,
and one may be implied in the definition of the other. 3 Moreover, even
if 0"</JaTTHT8at means to sacrifice, there is clearly a definitional connection
between sacrificing and killing, since to sacrifice means to kill an animal
dedicated to a god. In general, then, the per se relations make definitional
inclusion of one term in another a necessary condition for joining those
terms in a demonstrative premiss.
The next and most important relation of necessity for the purposes of
abstraction is the universal or Ka8oAov relation. The universal predicate is
described as belonging in evety case, per se, and qua its subject (i1 avro).'
As such, it includes the first two forms of necessaty predication, and adds
something new. Aristotle makes clear what this is by his favourite example.
A triangle has interior angles equal to rwo right angles (2R) qua triangle,
because all and only triangles have 2R. By contrast, an isosceles triangle
does not have 2R qua isosceles, because other triangles also have 2R. In
general, an attribute belongs qua its subject when it belongs to all and
only that subject. This is an extensional condition, and such attributes are
said to be coextensive or commensurate with their subjects. In addition,
an attribute also belongs qua its subject when it belongs to that thing in
3 This fourth per se relation has sometimes been interpreted as providing for external
cause (McKirahan 1992, 95): 'The point is that in one case an event (the animal's dying)
happened on account of or because of another event (the cutting of its throat) ... Since
there is no suggestion that any of these events happened on account of or because of
itself, what is the point of calling any of them "per se" 7' McKirahan has misinterpreted
the passage. Careful attention to the parallel examples in the text reveals that they
are not events predicated of a single subject, but one event predicated of another, and
they are not related as external cause and internal effect. Barnes 1994, 117, is succinct
and correct. On my in terpretation we must suppose that u</Kt:tTf.(r'Oat and a1foOalltill are
synonyms, which they certainly can be (LSI t1lJ>&.(w 1I.2 and 3; a1foOzryiO'Kw II, as passive
of a1fo/CTdvw). See also Goldin 1996, 1-14, for an overview of some of the problems
involved in definitional inclusion.
4 Aristotle adds that /Cae' aim, and VaUTO are the same, and supplies examples (73b26-32):
point and straight belong to line /Cae' airr~v (for they belong to it Vline) . McKirahan
1992, 97-8, argues that the VaUTO requirement does nOt add the distinctive feature of
universality. This feature is instead described in 73b32-3: 'something holds universally
(Ka80>..ov) whenever it is proved of a chance case and primitively.' Although Aristotle
does not identify this feature with the Va1iro requirement here, they are identified at
1.5 74a12-13: 'I say a demonstration is of this primitively and as such when it is of it
primitively and universally .' It is also Aristotle's practice everywhere to indicate this
feature by the V expression. See Mignucci's thorough discussion (1975, 81-4), which
attenuates the force of the identification . Barnes 1994, 118-19, argues briefly for the
identification.

virtue of the definition or the account in accordance with the subject's
name (in the language of the Categories, h6yo< KOro. rovvoJ.W.). This is an
intensional condition and provides an imr0rtant restriction, since it is not
identical with the extensional condition. For as Aristotle points out (1.5
74al6--17), if there were no other kind of triangle besides isosceles, the
2R predicate would seem to belong to isosceles qua isosceles, because all
and only isosceles triangles would have interior angles equal to 2R. But, in
fact, it would not, since the definition of isosceles triangle includes having
two sides equal, and it is not in virtue of this fact that the 2R predicate
holds. The distinctive differentia of isosceles triangle is irrelevant to the
predicate. That two of those sides are equal in length is not the part of the
definition in yirtue of which 2R holds. As a result, even if 2R, triangle,
and isosce les triangle were coextensive with one another, nevertheless 2R
would not belong to isosceles qua isosceles

So far, then, the terms of demoflstrative premisses must be both per
se and qua related. But as yet I have made no comment about the relation
between the terms of a demonstrative conclusion. Whereas the terms of a

premiss are related by definitional inclusion, the terms of a conclusion
are not. For the conclusion is what is proved from the definitions of
things. For example, 2R is predicated of triangle as a conclusion, but 2R
is not present in the definition of triangle (APo 1.9 76a4-7; Met. Ll..30
1025a30-32). In the strict sense of definitional inclusion, then, 2R cannot
be predicated per se of triangle. However, as the same 2R example makes
clear, the predicate in the conclusion of a demonstration is predicated
qua the subject, and so is commensurately universal with the subject?
5 On this issue I side with Lennox 1987a and McKirahan 1992 against Ferejohn 1991
that the qlfa requirement has an intensional aspect. There are variations on these
positions. Ferejohn (70-1; 149n9) claims that qlfa itself is an 'essentially extensional
requirement: While he grants that it is not always purely extensional, he claims it is
in APo IA. He cites as evidence the bronze isosceles triangle example, which shows that
commensurate universals are the only concern. Lennox (92) claims that both per se
and qua requirements are intensional. McKirahan (102) agrees, claiming that the qua
requirement derives its intensionality from its connection with per se.
6 Compare a similar passage at Met. Z.l1 1036a26-b3 using as an example a bronze
circle. Here the abstraction must be made between the circular fonn and the bronze
material, rather than between two mathematical fonns.
7 The examples cited by Bonitz 1961 all point in this direction. There are no cases to
my knowledge in which 2R is said to be a per se accident of isosceles triangle. Met.
6. .30 1025a30-32 cites 2R predicated of triangle as an example. APo 1.7 75a42-bl
strongly suggests that the per sc accidents must be within the same genus as the
subject. Most clear is Met. B .2 997a21-22: 'to investigate the per Sf accidents of one
subject-genus, starting from one set of beliefs, is the business of one science' (modified

We have a situation, then, in which the tenns of a legitimate scientific
proposition are qua related, but not per se related . Aristotle seems to
recognize such a class of connections called per se accidents (Ka8' aUTO.
rrop./3</37J.om), which follow from strict per se premisses and belong qua
the subject:'
2R IPO (per se / qua) having angles around the apex of the triangle = 180
having angles around apex of triangle = 180 IPO (per se / qua) triangle
2R IPO (per se accident / qua) triangle
So long as we keep the distinction between premiss and conclusion in
mind, these qualifications to the theory present little difficulty. But there
is another form of argument, important for analogy, called an 'application
argument,' in which certain tensions arise between the per se and qua
criteria. 9 In such an argument a predicate can be proved to belong to the
ROT); explicitly too in the context of qua, Me t. M.3 1078a5-8 (d . PA I.1 639a15-19).
Phys. II.2 193b26-32 clearly mentions mixed sciences as dealing with per se accidents.
APo 1.22 83bl9-20 comes the closest to extending the formulae to all necessary
concomitants, but it is unclear, and even if it does, it seems to connect only a string of
genus tenns.
8 Per se accidents (/Cae' aiml OlJf'j3lj3'1Kora) such as 2R predicated of triangle are not
under consideration in APo 1.4, where Aristotle is only concerned with immediate
connections (73a24-25), which indeed must be either per se or accidental. He is not
talking about conclusions, though, admittedly, 2R, which is not an immediate predicate,
is discussed in this context. At Met. 6..18 Aristotle seems to grant a per se accidental
conne(:tion an unqualified per se status: a man is alive per se, because the soul is a part
of the man, and in it primarHy is life (1022a31-32). This example, however, is fou nd
together with a dear case of per se (2) predication. A stronger claim is made at APo II.4
91al8-21: 'if A belongs to every B in what it is (Ell T~ Ti EOTl), and B is said universally
of every C in what it is, necessarily A is said of C in what it is.' The question of
the status of per se accidents and how they are to be fit into Aristotle's classification
of per se is fraught with difficulty. Tiles 1983, 13-14, and Ferejohn 1991, 123, for
example, place th em among per se (4) predicates, on the grounds that they cannOt
be placed under per se (1) or (2) fonns, since the per se accident is not de6nitionally
included in a direct way with its subject. McKirahan 1992, 169-71, by contrast, argues
that conclusions are per se (1) predications, supposing' that definitional inclusion is a
transitive feature. He tends to minimize the importance of all per se relations except
(1) and (2) (164).
9 For application arguments, see McKirahan 1992, 177-87, who coined the term. Lennox
1987a, 92-3, earlier identified the application argument as Type A (I have modified
his fonn somewhat), and the argument proving the predicate universally of the
subject-genus as Type B. For an in-depth treatmem of the problem of syllogizing the
2R theorem, see McKirahan 1992, 151-5.

subject through per se premisses, although it does not belong qua the
subject:
2R IPO (per se I qua) having angles around apex of the triangle ~ 180"
having angles around apex of triangle ~ 180" IPO (per sel qua) triangle
triangle IPO (per se) isosceles triangle
2R IPO isosceles triangle
The peculiarity of this demonstration lies in its third premiss. Triangle is
predicated of isosceles triangle by the per se (1) connection, since triangle
is present in the definition of the isosceles triangle. Indeed, in general, the
per se (1) connection admits predicates that extend further than the subject,
for example, the genus of the subject. And since other predicates, like the
essence and properties of the genus, belong to the genus per se and qua
the genus, these also can be proved to belong to its species in the same
manner as the example above. 2R clearly belongs necessarily to isosceles
triangle in the sense that all isosceles triangles have 2R, but it does not
belong to isosceles qua isosceles. Such proofs apply wherever there are
invariably concomitant features of a subject whether coextensive or not.
Now, Aristotle did not seem to have a name for these kinds of predication.
He clearly denies that they are predicates of the subject qua the subject.
Nor can they be per se predications in the strict sense, since per se is
an immediate definitional relationship. We might, therefore, characterize
them as non-coextensive (non-qua) perse accidents. lO As we shall see, they
form an important class of predication in th e context of abstraction.
A demonstrative science is constructed out of demonstrative syllogisms,
and the terms of a demonstrative syllogism are per se and qua related
in the manner described above. When the terms of the science are so
related, the science is unified with respect to its genus or subject-genus. ll
The subject-genus is the underlying subject matter of a demonstration,

that which is identified by the qua expression. It is the subject of which
the attributes are proved (APo 1.7 7Sa39- b2), the minor term of the
demonstrative syllogism. But it may also be extended to include all those
predicates that are immediately predicable of the subject matter per se and
universally, and ultimately to all those predicates that can be proved of
th e subject qua what it is through immediate premisses, since, as Aristotle
10 Cf. Met. ~.2 1014al-3, where Aristotle says that classes that include (711 7r~PtXOV1'o. ) the
accidental causes are causes, e.g., animal is the cause of the sta tue, because Polyditus is
a man, and man is an animal.
11 For an excellent discussion of the significance of the genus, see McKirahan 1992, 50--63.

says, 'it is necessary for the extreme and the middle terms to come from
the same genus' (APo I.7 7SblO-ll). Aristotle explains in more detailhow
the identity of a science is determined by the genus:
A science (f7TLUT~,U:1J) is one if it is of one genus (EVO~ yivov!O) - of whatever things
are composed from the primitives and are parts or attributes of these in themselves
(.!Cae' aimi). One science is different from another if their principles depend neither
on the same things nor the ones on the others. There is evidence for this when
one comes to the non-demonstrables; for these must be in the same genus as the
things demonstrated. And there is evidence for this when the things that are proved
through them are in the same genus and of a kind. (APo 1.28)
It is an important point made clear in this passage that this sense of 'genus/
the identity condition of a science, is not the same as the sense in which a
group is divided into species by differentiae. This' genus' includes a subject,
its principles, its parts, and its attributes. Many of these will not be in the
same divisionary genus, and will not even be in the same category as the
subject itself. Whereas members of a divisionary genus like animal are all
similar and share some characteristics, members of a scientific genus are
related to one another by per se relations. 12
The terms of a single science, then, all belong in the same genus,
because they are related per se and qua the subject. Conversely, terms that
are not related per se and qua the subject do not belong in the genus.
What is not related per se is incidental (APo 1.4 73b4-S), and since it is
impossible to demonstrate anything with incidental premisses, one can only
demonstrate with terms from the same genus. Each thing must be proved
from its own principles (A Po 1.9 7Sb37-38), and the principles used must
be coextensive with the subject. Aristotle repeatedly warns about breaking
this rule: what is proved must not be proved of a subject narrower in
extension than the predicate:
One cannot, therefore, prove anything by crossing from another genus (E~ aAAOV
yivovS' flETaj3a.vTa) - e.g. something geometrical by arithmetic ... For this reason
one cannot prove by geometry that there is a single science of opposites, nor even
12 For further comments, see McKirahan 1992, 61-2. The senses of the tenn are hardly
exclusive, and as Andrew Coles has pointed out to me they are central to two moments
of a single inquiry. The first, the divisionary moment in which subjects are connected
with attributes at various levels of generality, requires that a genus be divisible into
species. After this stage each level becomes a genus-subject of demonstration. See
especially Lennox 1987a.

that two cubes make a cube, nor can one prove by any other science the theorems
of a different one, except such as are related to one another that the one is under
the other - e.g. optics to geometry and harmonics to arithmetic. Nor can one prove
by geometry anything that belongs to lines not as lines and as from their proper
principles - e.g. whether the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or whether
it is contrarily related to the circumference; for that belongs to them not as their
proper genus but as something common. (APa 1.7 75a38-39; 75b12-20)
Aristotle calls this error metabasis. Further elucidation of the problem

involved comes later:
Since it is evident that one cannot demonstrate anything except from its own
principles if what is being proved belongs to it as that thing, understanding is not
this - if a thing is proved from what is true and non-demonstrable and immediate .
(For one can conduct a proof in this way - as Bryson proved the squaring of the
circle.) For such arguments prove in virtue of a common feature which will also
belong to something else; that is why the arguments also apply (i.cpapiJ.OTTOvUW)
to other things not of the same kind. So you do not understand it as that thing
but accidentally. (APa 1.9 75b37-76a2)13
Again, if we use a general proof for a specific subject and suppose that
we are proving the attribute of that subject as such, we commit metabasis
and prove the attribute only inCidentally. The per se and qua requirements
for predicates demand that attributes and proofs be adapted to their appropriate genus (icpap!lOTTEW hr' TO YEVO,) and not cross to another kind
(y.,m/3aiv,w Ei, ail.il.o yEVO,). It is clear from the examples Aristotle provides that, practically speaking, metabasis does not usually occur between
unrelated genera, since it is unlikely that we would look for principles
among irrelevant objects. Instead the danger of metabasis is most acute
between closely related genera, like a sub-group and a more extensive
genus (e.g., straight lines and beautiful things). Although they are closely
related, the sub-group forms a different genus from that of the larger
13 There is a long-standing difficulty with the case of Bryson. Heath (1949, 47-50)
discusses the possibilities and despairs of a solution. More recently, Mueller 1982
supports Proclus' interpretation that Aristotle's objection stems from Bryson's not
providing a constructive proof to correspond to the intuition that the circle has the
same area as a certain polygon intermediate between the i.nscribed and circumscribed
polygons. In short, Bryson moved from premisses to conclusion without using the
immediate premisses. But it is not clear on this explanation how Bryson then is proving
in virtue of a common feature. Mueller admits that this is a weakness in Prod us'
interpretation (160-4).

group. The suh-group may be a species of the more extensive genus, as
isosceles is a species of triangle, or it may not, as straight lines are beautiful
things, but are not species of beauty. In either case the genera must be
kept separate, and metabasis is forbidden.

This is not to say that we cannot prove that straight lines are the most
beautiful or that the isosceles triangle has 2R. We can prove that straight
lines are the most beautifuL but not qua lines.14 Beauty, even if it is an
inva riable concomitant of straight lines, does not belong to lines qua lines
nor qua geometrical entities. Beauty belongs to straight lines because they
are a particular set of beautiful things. Beauty is common to many other
things besides, namely to beautiful things qua beautiful, a genus with its
own principles. In order to prove that straight lines are beautiful, we need
an application argument. As we saw, this applies a predicate that is proved
of a gen us to a species or instance of that genus. It must have one more
premiss than the argument that proves the attribute of the genus qua the
genus. The application argument for straight lines being beautiful might
be something like the following:
.
beauty IPO intelligibility
intelligibility IPO symmetry
symmetty IPO straight line
beauty IPO straight line
The first two premisses are sufficient to prove that symmetrica l things
generally are beautiful and the third premiss merely applies the general
conclusion to the species. This is a perfectly legitimate proof. But if we tty
to prove straight lines beautiful without the intermediaty of symmetty,
we shall have committed metabasis. 15
14 The contrary relation of straight line and circumference may be an allusion to DC 1.2
268h17-19, which sta tes that they are the only simple motion s. This, then, will be a
physical rather than a geometrical proposition.
15 Aristotle provides an interestingly different analysis of thi s situation at Met. M.3
l 078a31-b5: 'Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the fonner
always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless
things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful
or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a very great deal about
them; for if they do not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are
their results or their formulae, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about
them. The chief fonns of beauty are order and symmetry and defin iteness, which
the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e .g. order
and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, eVidently these sciences must
treat this so rt of cause also (Le. the beautiful) as in some sense a cause.' Mathematics

Aristotle recognized that errors frequently occur because the appropri-
ate steps of proof are not followed, and this happens when we misidentify
the appropriate qua-level for demonstration and produce a mismatch between the subject and the property proved of it. Sometimes these errors
occur through carelessness, sometimes because of the difficulty of the
problem involved. Aristotle discusses one especially difficult case:
And it might seem that proportion alternates for things as (i1) numbers and as lines
and as solids and as times - as once it used to be proved separately, though it is
possible for it to be proved of all cases by a single demonstration. But because all
these things - numbers, lengths, times, solids - do not constitute a single named
item and differ in sort from one another, it used to be taken separately. But now
it is proved universally; for it did not belong to things as lines or as numbers, but
as (n) this which they suppose to belong universally. (APo 1.5 74a17-25)
Aristotle introduces this case as a parallel to the triangle / isosceles-2R case,

but one in which there was no obvious universal corresponding to triangle
over the particulars kinds of triangle. Formerly the law of alternating

proportion (if A:B::C:D, then AC::B:D) had to be proved separately for
each of the species to which it applied, because these species did not appear
to constitute a single universal genus. This general kind escaped notice,
Aristotle says, because it did not have a single name. The definitions and
proofs for alternating proportionality had to be couched in terms of the
specific magnitude, length a or time b or volume c. Because of the lack of
a common name the laws of proportionality masqueraded as a problem re-
quiring multiple parallel solutions, though in fact it was a generic problem

and required a general solution. For, as Aristotle says, the general proof
was subsequently discovered. 16
Aristotle was familiar with the general proof that had been developed
by Eudoxus, a friend of Plato and member of the Academy.l7 Subsequently, Euclid incorporated Eudoxus' di?coveries along with the earlier,
seems to provide some of the causal material for the science of beauty. It explains
why a straight line is symmetrical. Other principles will be necessary to show why
symmetry is beautiful, i.e., what symmetry, order, and definiteness have in common,
say, intelligibility, which makes them all beautiful. This passage also makes clear
that one science may say a lot about another science without being the same as that
science.
16 But even for Aristotle the general kind, though constituting a common nature, does
not have a general name. By the time Euclid composed the fifth book, however, the
general teon JlfYf.8os was in use.
17 For the professional activities of Eudoxus, see Heath 1981, I, 322- 7.
less-developed work on proportion into two books of the Elements, book V

on general magnitude and book VII specifically on number.18 As a result
we can compare the general treatment of alternating proportion with one
of the specific treatments, and make observations regarding the appropriate
per se and qua predications.
We find that the error in proving a theorem on the specific level rather
than the general is not so clearly an error in this case as it was in the case
of 2R proved of isosceles rather than of triangle. This is because there are
legitimate proofs both on the general and the specific levels, and as a result
the predicate, proportionals alternate, belongs at both qua-levels, though
in different ways. This case provides a good introduction to situations in
which qua-levels of predicates are not perfectly demarcated.
In his introductory definitions to the two books Euclid provides both a
general and a specific definition for 'part':
V. def. 1: A magnitude is a part of a magnitude, the less of the greater,
when it measures the greater.
VII. def. 3: A number is a part of a number, the less of the greater, when
it measures the greater.
The term 'part' is defined in different ways in each case. If we apply
Aristotle's language of necessity to these definitions, the terms in the
definition are related to the definiendum, part, by the per se (1) relationship.
As a result, in V def. 1 a part is magnitudinal, and in VII def. 3 a part is
numerical. 19 It is dear, then, that the per se relationships of the general
and the specific sciences are different, and although Euclid has preserved
for us the specific science governing only discrete quantity, it is easy to see
how the definition can be modified to be appropriate for time and so on:
A time is a part of a time, the less of the greater, when it measures the
greater.
The subject-genus is different in each of the specific sciences, and the

terms that enter into the demonstrations concerning the subject-genus
18 See Heath 1956, II, 112-13; Mueller 1970a. For the general proofs of Eudoxus, see
Produs, In primum Ellclidis 67, 3- 5: 7rPWTM TWV Ka86.\ov Ka.\ov}J.EvWV 8wpruuiTwv TO
7J'.\i180S' 'YJU{'YJfTv.
19 So also V. def. 2: 'The greater is -a multiple of the less when it is measured by the
less,' and VII. def. 5: 'The greater number is a multiple of the less when it is measured
by the less.' Translations from Heath 1956.

must be defined in a correspondingly restricted way. Since the term 'part'
has different definitions, it is ambiguous, and yet the ambiguity is far
from random . The meanings of part correspond to one another: the role
that a part-number plays in the genus of number corresponds to that of
a part-time in the genus of time, and so on. This arrangement in which
terms are adapted to a specific subject-genus is comparable to Aristotle's
remarks about another class of scientific principles, the axioms:
Of the things they use in the demonstrative sciences some are proper to each
science and others common - but common by analogy, since things are useful in
so far as they bear on the genus under the science. Proper: e.g. that a line is such
and such, and straight so and SOi common: e.g. that jf equals are taken from equals,
the remainders are equal. But each of these is sufficient in so far as it bears on
the genus; for it will produce the same result even if it is not assumed as holding
of everything but only for the case of magnitudes - or, for the arithmetician, for
numbers. (APo 1.10 76a37-b2)
Comparison with a passage at APo 1.11 77a26-35 shows that the common
items discussed here are axioms, one of the three kinds of principles in
demonstrations, and that without which no learning is possible (1.2 72aI617). Though these axioms, such as the 'equals taken from equals' axiom,
are common to many genera (or common to all genera in the case of the
principle of non-contradiction), they are not used in their common form
within a specific genus. Instead they are adapted to the genus in which
they operate.'o When there is a multiplicity of such adaptations in many
different genera, the axioms are analogically the same, since they perform
corresponding functions in each genus. The issue is similar in the case
of alternating proportion. Each proof is conducted within its own proper
genus, but each part of one proof corresponds to that of another. Prior to
Eudoxus analogy was the nearest one could come to a general proof among
this group of subject matters .
The substitution of the appropriate terms in order to adapt the definienda of one specific-genus to another specific genus seems to be fairly
trivial. The general science of proportionality, however, accomplishes far
more than merely introdUCing a general term that will adequately cover all
the specific cases. Eudoxus developed a science that holds good for irrational
20 Ross 1949, 538: 'other {principles are} common, but common in virtue of an analogy,
since they are useful just in so far as they faU within the genus studied.' Cf. Met. r .3
1oo5a26--27: 'men use [common axioms} JUSt so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is,
as far as the genus whose attributes they are proving extends.'

quantities as well as rational, and in order to accomplish this he had to
modify some definitions fundamentally. Take, for example,
V. def. 6: Let magnitudes which have the same ratio be called proportional,
where being in the same ratio is defined as
V. def. 5: Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the
second and the third to the fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever
be taken of the first and third, and any equimultiples whatever of the
second and fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, are alike equal
to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimultiples respectively taken in
corresponding order.
We are instructed to multiply the first and third quantity by any equal
factor, and multiply the second and the fourth quantity by any other equal
factor. If the quantities stand in proportion, then, no matter what factors
we use, the first and third will always be likewise smaller than, equal
to, or larger than the second and the fourth respectively. This definition
is expressly formulated in terms of equimultiples in order to overcome
the challenge of incommensurability, which arises in the environment
of irrational quantities. For this reason the definition requires neither a
rational relationship between the first and the second term, and the third
and the fourth, nor between the two pairs of magnitudes. Compare this
with
VII. def. 20: numbers are proportional when the first is the same multiple
or the same part, or the same parts of the second that the third is of the
fourth,
which assumes that all the members of the proportion are commensurable
rational numbers.
For the single theorem Aristotle is referring to, that if A:B::C:D, then
A:C::B:D, Euclid's proofs are parallel in broad outline, both depending on
finding some means of measuring the first quantity by the third. They
accomplish this in different ways: V. prop. 16, the general proof, uses
equimultiples to establish the proportion between A and C, and Band 0,
while the theorem for discrete number, VII. prop. 9, can show this more
directly, since A is the same part of B that C is of 0 , and wholes with the
same number of parts have their parts proportional with their wholes.

Euclid's presentation tells us a great deal about the relationship between the gene ral and the specific science, but not about the relationship
between specific sciences. Unfortunately we are prevented from comparing
two special definitions or proofs, because we only have the special science of
numbers. But there is nothing in VII prop. 9 that would prevent a simple
substitution of number for time, area, and so on, so long as irrational
quantities are avoided. This theorem is the same by analogy for all genera
of quantity.
This passage teaches that the law of alternating proportion appeared
at one time to be capable of only analogical proof. In fact, this was never
so, it only appeared so. If, however, there had not been the more general
genus, magnitude, the legitimate proofs would have been analogical. As
it is, the legitimate proof for alternating proportion is to be found at
the general level, since alternating proportion belongs to magnitude qua
magnitude. This does not, however, make the specific proof, such as we find
in Euclid VII, illegitimate, since it is specifically adapted to discrete quantity
and depends upon the nature of discrete quantity to make its proof. But
it would be illegitimate to prove the general theorem in the context of
discrete quantity qua discrete quantity or to prove the specific theorem in
the context of magnitude generally. For discrete quantiry, there are now
two legitimate proofs for alternating proportion, the original specific proof,
and a proof through an application of the general proof. Though Aristotle
does not recognize the possibility of two legitimate proofs in the passage
from APo 1.5, he does later:
Why do proportionals alternate? For the explanation in the cases of lines and of
numbers is different - and the same: as lines it is different, as having such and
such an increase it is the same . (APo 11.17 99a8-10)
Furthermore, just because one theorem is the same by analogy does

not mean that all the theorems in a genus will have analogous proofs
in the other ge nera. Most of the definitions in Euclid's two books on
proportion are peculiar to their own science. For example, VII. def. 6:
I An even number is that which is divisible into two equal parts' is true
and relevant only on the supposition that we are dea ling with discrete
numbers. It has an analogue neither in the general science nor in the
specific sciences of continuous quantity. Likewise VII . prop. 2, 'Given two
numbers not prime to one another, to find their greatest common measure,'
which depends upon commensurability of quantities, has no analogue in
the general science. Eudoxus' discove ry of the general science of proportion
did not, therefore, completely eliminate the need for the specific sciences.

Only certain theorems could be proved at the general level. Others still had
to be treated specifically. Still others, as we just observed, could be treated
both ways. The question 'In what genus is the theorem of alternating
proportion proved 7' does not have a single unambiguous answer. Rather
it is proved in two genera in two different ways. As a result, numerical
proportion, for example, cannot be treated within a single genus, but instead some theorems must be proved in a more general genus, others in a
more specific. This is a very frequent occurrence in Aristotelian science as
well.
Abstraction
Confusion in determining the correct qua-level for a demonstration arises
most frequently among qua-levels that are related to one another by abstraction (acpatpftTls). We can move from one qua-level to a more general
qua-leve l when we abstract certain features of the object under consideration . For example, to move from isosceles triangle to triangle we abstract
the general triangular nature and ignore the fact that it has two sides equal.
Similarly, from the straight line we may eliminate all of its geometrical
nature, including its genus, line, and leave only a necessary accident, its
beauty. As this last example makes clear, the process of abstraction occurs
not just among the qua-levels of mathematics, but among objects more
distantly related as wel l. In fact, Aristotle's most famous application of the
process abstracts mathematical entities from their physical substrates:
Just as the universal part of mathematics deals not with objects which exist
separately, apart from magnitudes and from numbers, but with magnitudes and
numbers, not however qua such as to have magnitude or to be divisible, clearly
it is possible that there should also be both formulae and demonstrations about
sensible magnitudes, not however qua sensible but qua possessed of certain definite
qualities. For as there are many formulae about things merely considered as in
motion, apart from the essence of each such thing and from their accidents, and
as it is not therefore necessary that there should be either something in motion
separate from sensibles, or a separate substance in the se nsibles, so too in the case
of moving things there will be formulae and sciences which treat them not qua
moving but only qua bodies, or again only qua planes, or only qua lines, or qua
divisibles, or qua indivisibles having position, or only qua indivisibles. (Met. M.3
l077b17-30j
According to Aristotle mathematical objects are ontologically dependent on

natura l substances. We abstract the quantitative nature of substance and
en
treat it as if it were separate

XWPLtJ'Tov) from substance, even though
it is not (Phys. II .2 193b22-194a12; Met. M.3)21 Although quantity is
dependent on substance, we can mentally separate it (Tn VO~<T<L, Phys.
II.2 193b34), take no account of the natural attributes, and treat it as the
subject for further predications. So the sun may be a material circle, but
for geometrical purposes we abstract just th e circle; and we then begin
to prove certain predicates of the circle. We necessarily study natural or
substantial objects, but we do not study them qua natural or substantial.
The premisses of demonstrations of mathematics have no per se connection
to naturaL substantial objects. 22 In this passage Aristotle identifies a number of levels of objects, sensible substances, moving things, geometrical
extensions of various degrees of abstraction, and universal mathematicals,
each related to its neighbour by the same kind of rel ation. This fact
suggests that Aristotle intended abstraction to be applicable throughout
the sciences, and not just between branches of mathematics or between
natural science and mathematics. When we add this passage to the one
describing the process of abstraction necessary to arrive at the appropriate
subject for the predication 2R, we see that it is the same process in every
case:
Does it [2RJ belong as triang le or as isosceles? And when does it belong in virtue
of this as primitive? And of what does the demonstration hold universally? Clearly
whenever after abstraction (acpatpovfJ.ivwv) it belongs primitively - e.g. two right
angles will belong to bronze isosceles triangle, but also when being bronze and
being isosceles have been abstracted. But not when figure or limit have been. But
th ey are not the first. Then what is first? If triangle, it is in virtue of this that it also
belongs to the others, and it is of this that the demonstration holds universally.
(APa 1.5 74a35-b4)
'Since in each genus what belongs to something per se and qua the genus
belongs to it necessarily' (modified ROT 1.6 75a28-29), it follows that not
only is mathematics a different genus from natural science, but triangle is
21 Aristotelian mathematical theory has recently received a great deal of attention. See
e.g., Mueller 1970b; Annas 1976; Lear 1982; Cleary 1985 and 1995; and Graeser 1987.
I take the per se view, that all per se connections to natural substance are ignored or
abstracted away from. That the imperfection of natura~ things cannot be at issue in
mathematical abstraction is shown by the fact that mathematics provides the causes
in mixed sciences, such as optics, and the mathematics in these sciences is laid out in
strictly mathematical fonn.
22 So Phys. n.2 193b32-33: 'nor does [the mathematicianI consider the attributes indicated
as the attributes of such [narural1 bodies.'

a different genus from isosceles triangle. And since 'a science (E7TlCTT~lq )
is one if it is of one genus' (1.28 87a38), it follows that these genera will
also form different sciences. If it seems strange to say that the study of
triangles and isosceles triangles are different sciences, we shall have to wait
until we can provide a fuller explanation in the context of focality.
Aristotle distinguished this conceptual abstraction, in which the abstracted genus maintains no per se relations to its ontological substrate,
from the concrete attribute, emblematized by the 'snub: which is defined
as curvature in the nose. 23 The name snub (UL,uOV ) contains nose in its
definition, and insofar as we are treating snub, nose will always be a per
se part of it. We may certainly study snub without the nose, but we shall
no longer be studying snub qua snub, but rather snub .qua curved in its
abstracted geometrical nature.
This same fact can be expressed in another way: once we have abstracted mathematicals from their natural substrate and developed the
science of mathematics, we can play the process of abstraction in reverse,
and add (7rPOCTTL8EvaL ) the mathematics back into the natural substance. We
maYI as it were, add the CUIVe back to the nose in order to get the snub.
The contrast is drawn at DC I1I.1 299a13-17, where Aristotle says that
mathematics deals with abstracts (Tel E~ a.c/JaLpEIIEw,), physics with concretes
(Ta EK 7rpoII8E"EW, ).24 The science of optics for Aristotle is analogous to the
snub nose (phys. 11.2 194a7-15). Lines and points, the stuff of geometry,
when added to the optical subject matter, become rays and eyes. Similarly
with nature in general (194a12-15):
Since two sorts of things are called nature, the form and the matter, we must
investigate its objects as we would the essence of snubness, that is neither independently of matte r nor in terms of matter only.
23 So also DA 1.1 403a25-b19; Met. E .1 1025b30-1026a6.

24 In fact, the contrast is extended to the barest logical applications in Met. M.2 l077b4-11,
according to which white is logically prior to white man, because it is by the addition
(EK 7fpou8iufwr) to the white that we speak of the white man. In a dIfferent formulation,
Aristotle says (Me t. A.2 982a25-28): 'Those [sciences] which involve few er principles
are more exact than those which involve additional principles (b: 7fpo<T8iuwr hfOY0f!illWII),
e.g. arithmetic than geometry: This statement superficially suggests that the difference
lies in more or fewer principles rather than the addition or abstraction of conceptions
from principles. But Aristotle's contrast here is nOt precise and the phrase be 7fpoufJ((]'(wr
AEi'0f!illWII does not mean 'more principles,' but 'principles which have conceptual
additions.' In any case, the two views are nOt incompatible: nOt only does optics require
a conceptual addition to the notion of geometrical line, but it also requires the addition
of a principle, the existence of light.

The 'snub' serves metonymically to refer to a broad variety of terms that
might be called 'embedded: It is the general character of the embedded
term that it is a predicate (snub) applied to its subject qua that subject
(nose). Some embedded terms are also necessarily (and perhaps per se)
related to other, abstract, objects that serve as subject-genera themselves
(curved) . The abstract subject-genera are, however, not coextensive with
the embedded term or its substrate, and so cannot be included in the
science of the embedded term and its subject. 25 In short, there is a tension
between the per se requirement of definitional inclusion (for an element in
a definition can extend beyond the definiendum) and the qua requirement,
which demands coextension.
When we abstract from one kind of object we are usually abstracting
some named feature common to many other kinds of objects as well.
Sometimes, however, the common feature, while having a common name,
also has a name peculiar to the specific genus from which it is abstracted.
So, for example, in abst racting the geometrical curve from the snub nose,
we abstract a feature that is common to many things besides noses. But so
long as the curve is in the nose, it goes by the name snub, and until snub
is abstracted into curved, it cannot be treated as something common. Only
a nose may be snub and only a leg may be bandy. Snub and bandy cannot
be treated together in a common science, since they are per se attributes
of different subjects:
For 'concave' has a general meaning which is the same in the case of a snub nose,
and of a bandy leg, but when added, in the one case to nose, in the other to leg,
nothing prevents it from meaning different things; for in the fonner cannexion it
means snub and in the latter bandy. (SE '31 181b37- 182a2)
It is within this context that Aristotle recognizes one legitimate kind

of m etabasis, that between general and specific sciences, in which the
principles of a superordinate and abstract science are used to provide a
proof in a subordinate and concrete science:
If this is not so [if the attribute and middle are not in the same genus as the
subject], then the theorems are proved as harmonical theorem s are proved through
arithmetic. Such things are proved in the same way, but they differ; for the fact
falls under a different science (for the underlying ge nu s is different), but the reason
25 Bahne 1987b, 311, arrives at the same conclusion through a different path, noting that
snub is properly a description of nose-flesh in a ce rtain state, rather than a quality
abstracted from nose-flesh.

under the higher science under which fall the attributes that belong in themselves.
Hence from this too it is evident that one cannot demonstrate anything simpliciter
except from its own principles. But the principles of these sciences have the common
feature. (APo 1.9 76a9-15)

In this passage, Aristotle discusses the so-called mixed sciences, in which
a branch of mathematics and a branch of natural science are mixed together. In other passages Aristotle considers a similar mixing between solid
geometry and mechanics, between mathematical and nautical astronomy,
and between geome try and optics. 26 In these cases the conclusion of the
demonstration, which is the fact to be proved, comes from a natural science,
while the reason or cause, the middle term, is located in a mathematical
science. Two different genera are operative within the same demonstration
and the same science. As such these sciences are different from a simple
science like mathematics, in which only one genus is involved.
This form of metabasis is important for the present purposes, because
the understanding in one genus directly bears on the understanding in an-
other, and there is not the tidy separation of genera we find with triangles
and isosceles triangles or with mathematicals and natural objects. It is one
of a group of cases I shall consider in which the autonomy of genera

becomes weaker and the demarcations less clear. It has been common
to characterize these mixed sciences as forms of application argument, in
which the gene ral conclusion proved at a higher, mathematical qua-level is

applied to a natural species or instance. On this interpretation the general
conclusion can be immediately applied to the specific instance without any
further premisses or explanation. I shall argue, however, that the general

attribute cannot be immediately applied to the specific genus, but that this
connection itself requires proof, and that the predication of the general
attribute requires that some explanatory work be done at a specific level.
On this interpretation the mixed science combines explanatory elem ents
from both subject-genera, rather than merely applying the explanation of

one to the other.
In order to understand how one science can provide the explanation
or reason for a fact that is found in another, we may once again turn
to a comparison of Aristotle and Euclid. To the extent that Euclid provides clarification for points Aristotle is making, we may use him for
corroborating evidence. We may start by turning to the proofs for optical
phenomena found in his Optics, which at once clarify Aristotle's discussion
26 APo 1.7 75bl4-17; 1.12 77a40-b6; 1.13 78b32-79a16.

of mixed sciences and raise the further questions I have mentioned. Of
course, Euclid's proofs are not arranged as syllogisms, but they start with
a statement of a proposition, which corresponds to an Aristotelian fact or
conclusion of a syllogism. For example, proposition 23 begins:
When any sphere is seen by a single eye it will always be seen as less
than a semicircle and that very part which is seen will appear bounded by
a circle. 27
The proposition clearly contains optical terms (e.g., eye, seen) and as such
belongs in the science of optics. There follows in Euclid's proof the setting
out (heECTL'), which ~rovides a bridge from the optical proposition to the
geometrical solution. 8 The eye, for example, is hypothesized as a point.
Thereafter, the proof (cbr61\"t,,) is conducted purely in geometrical terms,
and the conclusion finally relates the geometrical proof to the optical fact.
To make the distinction between optics and geometry in a Euclidean
proof is fairly straightforward, since they are separated in the stages of
the proof. In an Aristotelian demonstration, however, it is much more
difficult, since the requirement for immediacy in the premisses is so strict.
But we get some clue how this is done by examining Aristotle' 5 treatment
of various meteorological phenomena in Mete. 111.2-6 29 He begins his explanation of the shape of a halo in the following way (III.3 372b34--373aS):
The visual ray is reflected from the mist that forms round the sun or the moon,
and that is why the halo is not seen opposite the sun like the rainbow. Since the
reflection takes place in the same way from every point the result is necessarily a
circle or a segment of a circle; for if the lines start from the same point and end at
the same point and are equal, the points where they form an angle will always lie '
on a circle. 30
As with Euclid there follows a purely geometrical proof:

Let ACB and AFB and ADB be lines each of which goes from the point A to the
point B and forms an angle. Let the lines AC, AF, AD be equal and those at B -
27 My translation of Hayduck's edition of Euclid.

28 For the ElCeffItS see Heath 1981, I, 370.
29 Lennox 1986 has pointed out the importance of this passage for these issues, and my
discussion relies heavily on his.
30 ROT translates oo/tS as 'sight' instead of 'visual ray.' lowe the correction to an
anonymous reader.

viz. CB, FB, DB - equal too. Draw the line AEB. Then the triangles are equal; for
their base AEB is equal. Draw perpendiculars to AEB from the angles; CE from
(, FE from F, DE from D. Then these perpendiculars are equal, being in equal
triangles and all in one plane; for they are all at right angles to AEB and meet
at the single point E. So if you draw the line it will be a circle and E its centre.
(373a6-16)
Aristotle concludes with some principles that allow us to interpret the

geometrical proof in optical and natural terms:
now B is the sun, A the eye, and the circumference passing through the points
CFD the cloud from which the visual ray is reflected to the sun. (373al6-19)
SuperfiCially it is easy to see just what kind of explanation Aristotle has

in mind when he says that geometry provides the cause for the optical
fact. One common and plausible interpretation argues that in the context of a demonstrative syllogism, the major and middle terms of the
demonstration will come from geometry, while the minor term will be
optical, and the minor premiss will state that the optical phenomenon
falls under the geometrical explanation.31 Consequently, the demonstration will have the same sort of structure as that applying the general
2R theorem to the specific case of the isosceles triangle, an application
argument. But isosceles is a species of triangle, and the application of
the genus and its properties to the species does not require any further
explanation, since the genus-species connection is immediate. By contrast,
the connection between optics and geometry is not immediate and requires
explanation. 32
I should like to suggest that, because of the presence of embedded
terms in the proof, this mixed science cannot be a case of simple application argument. First of all, at Phys. II.2 194al-12 Aristotle clearly
places mixed sciences among those that behave like the snub. In this same
passage he claims that, 'while geometry investigates natural lines but not
qua natural, optics investigates mathematical lines, but qua naturaL not
qua mathematical.' The difficulty in setting a determinate qua-level for
such demonstrations is illustrated by his contradictory claim that 'neither
31 This is the interpretation given by McKirahan 1978, 201, and Lennox 1986, 48. Lennox
1987a, 94, notes the similarity between 2R-isosceles and mixed science, but rightly does
not identify their structure.
32 McKirahan 1992, 178, 184, recognizes that application arguments need not be to species,
but does not deal with cases where the application may not be immediate.
36 Aristotle's Theory of the Uniry of Science

[optics nor harmonics] considers its objects qua light-ray or qua voice,
but qua lines and numbers' (Met. M.3 1078a14-16). At what qua-level
optical phenomena are to be proved is clearly in doubt. By contrast, 2R is
clearly proved of isosceles triangle qua triangle. Optics cannot be studied
purely qua geometry (i.e., those mathematical proofs that apply to optics),
since then we should merely cull proofs from the Elements, and without
adapting their terms in any way, call them optics. No reference could
be made to rays or eyes. Obviously, neither Aristotle nor Euclid does
this, since this would not make clear how they explain optical phenomena.
Alternatively, we might cull proofs from the Elements and briefly apply
them to optical instances by identifying, for example, point A as centre of
a sphere, B as eye, and so on. Again, neither Aristotle nor Euclid does this,
since it would still not be clear what we were trying to prove, namely,
why this optical phenomenon exists. Instead, in both authors we begin
with an optical phenomenon to be explained. 33 Optical nature is deeply

embedded in the explanation in a way isosceles nature is not embedded
at all in the explanation of 2R. It is clear, then, that optics studies optical
phenomena but makes use of geometry in its explanations. How is this
the case?
We have already seen both the setting out of Optics 23 and the manner
in which Aristotle in Mete. III.3 begins his explanations of halos. It is
clear that geometry is not the only explanatory factor in these explanations. Instead, part of the explanation is optical and part is geometrical.
In demonstrative form we may represent the explanation for halos as
follows:
forming a circle IPO equal lines falling from one point
equal lines falling from one point IPO a halo
forming a circle IPO a halo
But this is not yet a demonstration, since neither premiss is immediate.
Between .the major and the middle term we must 'pack' or insert further
geometrical premisses. Equally, between the middle and the minor terms
we require packing of premisses containing optical terms in order to explain
why optical terms can be described in geometrical terms. These premisses
might be something like the following:

33 Cf. PA 1.1 639b5-10, where Aristotle asks whether the procedure in biology should be
similar to that in astronomical mathematics, in which the astronomical mathematician
first makes the obselVations and collects the phenomena, and then supplies the cause.

equal
equal
equal
equal
lines falling from a point IPO equal rays falling from a light source
rays falling from a light source IPO equal rays falling from the sun
rays falling from the sun IPO equal rays reflected by mist to the eye
rays reflected by mist to the eye IPO halo.
These premisses will be explanatory of why halos exhibit this particular

geometrical nature.
We now have an explanation of how these mixed sciences may have
both geometrical and optical explanatory components, and as a result it will

not be possible to say that the explanation resides either at the qua-level of
geometry or at the qua-level of optics: it resides at both. In a corresponding
way we can redescribe Euclid's Optics 23 in a schematic demonstrative
fashion:
smaller than the diameter IPO circle at the tangent from a point
circle at the tangent from a point IPO appearance of sphere from one eye
smaller than the diameter !PO appearance of sphere from one eye
Again the cone shape of the optical field will serve as a principle to explain
the connection between the middle and the minor terms.
As Lennox has rightly pointed out, the form of explanation in these
'mixed' sciences differs from the application of 2R to isosceles in that
halos are not species or determinate forms of circles. 34 In fact, circle is not
even part of the definition of halo. For this reason, the transference of
per se attributes of common features (geometry) to the instance (halo) is
not an immediate fact, but itself requires explanation. Aristotle describes
the situation in terms of facts and causes, because he is interested in
the reason why the halo takes a circular shape, rather than why it fall s
under geometrical analysis at alL Nevertheless, the example illustrates that
where the subordinate science is not a species of the superordinate science,
the subordinate science makes a genuine and unique contribution to the
understanding of why the major term belongs to the subordinate subject.

In proving that halos are circular, we are studying halos qua halos, that
is, we are studying what belongs to halos in virtue of their halo nature,
but we are proving attributes that extend beyond halos, attributes that are
non-coextensive per se accidents. Owing to the inconcinnity between the
per se and qua requirements, the distinction between the mathematical
34 1986,41.

genus of circle and the natural genus of halo cannot be sharply drawn in
this case.
The mathematical component of mixed sciences is treated as snub, that
is, as unabstracted from the natural substrate. But that mathematical component can also be completely abstracted and treated as pure mathematics.
Such is the nature of mathematical entities. Other objects are susceptible to
abstraction in different ways and lie somewhere in between embeddedness
and complete abstraction. These objects [ call 'semi-abstracts.' The degree
of abstractability depends on both the subject matter from which the
abstraction is made and the abstraction itself. Some abstractions simply
cannot be made, in which case demonstration can only proceed within a
single genus. Other abstractions can be made but only to the most limited
degree; still others, while not complete like mathematical abstractions, for
most explanatory purposes leave their concretes behind.'5 A study of these
cases is important, because they illustrate the basic principles of scientific
unity, focality and analogy.
[n the examples we shall now consider we are helped in determining
the limits of abstraction by the presence or absence of commensurability. It
is a peculiar feature of quantified things that they can be compared as less
and greater. 36 This is true, however, only if we are making comparisons
within a single genus or subject matter, for instance, one nose may be more
snub than another, but a nose cannot be more snub than a leg. So long as
the discourse concerns snub and bandy, there can be no com parison and no
commensuration between them, 'for things which differ in genus have no
way to one another, but are too far distant and are not comparable' (Met.
1.4 1055a6-7). [t is only as abstracted mathematicals, i.e., qua curved, that
. they form a single subject, a new genus, and so can be compared. Aristotle
makes the same point in the context of the parts of animals: parts of animals
in the same genus differ only by more and less (HA 1.1 486a21-23). Such
differences are contrarieties of affections or incidental attributes (naerj.uaTa
486b5). Excess or defect of these contrarieties does not affect the essential
nature of their substrate, and the per se attributes remain undisturbed by
35 Aristotle's example of snub has an ambiguous status in this scheme. Inasmuch as snub
is an accident of nose, it behaves as a predicate of the subject-genus nose. As such, it
is completely embedded. But inasmuch as it is emblema tic of fonn in a "matter-fonn
compound, it behaves as a semi-abstract, since, like soul and the form of natural objects
generally, it can be abstracted to the extent that it forms a subject of discourse with its
own per se predicates.
36 Cat. 6 6a19-25 claims that quantities themselves do not admit of the more and the less,
i.e., one three cannot be more three than another three.
changes in the affections. A wing may be longer or shorter without ceasing

to be a wing. Commensurability, then, is a mark of genus.
Aristotle recognizes degrees of abstractability according to how easily
the proposed object can be removed from the per se connections that bind
it to its substrate and how easily this new object forms a commensurable
genus. Let us consider three cases drawn from a wide range of contexts,
which illustrate the varying degrees to which semi-abstracts maintain per
se connection with their substrate .
1. Change is impossible to abstract, and so does not even qualify as a semiabstract. What it is to be a change is completely embedded in the specific
instance, its primary recipient. One cannot remove change from its per
se and qua connections to its substrate. This is indicated by the fact
that change is only commensurable within the genus of its substrate,
and different kinds of change, such as alteration and locomotion, are
incommensurable with each other.
2. The value of manufactured goods is only slightly easier to abstract.
Manufactured goods cannot form a single genus, because they perform a great variety of functions. Their value is dependent on their
function, and so value is per se and qua related to each specific kind
of good. But their exchange value in barter must be commensurable if
exchange is to occur. Nevertheless, exchange value, though common, is
not conceivable apart from the specific goods to be exchanged. Value is
commensurable, but it is dependent upon the specific goods, and cannot
be abstracted even conceptually from their manifold specific variety.
3. In the case of animal locomotion there is a series of abstractions that
fall short of mathematical completeness, but are more separable than
change or exchange value. Because the series of abstractions never
leaves the natural domain, each new abstraction remains a hylomorphic
compound, but they become increasingly general and increasingly focused upon the form. Accordingly, the abstracts always serve as causes
for the substrate, although their per se relations with the substrate
become less direct. As the qua-level changes, the basis for commensuration also changes.
1. Speed of Change
In one of the more important and searching passages for issues concerning abstraction, Physics VIl.4, Aristotle argues that the forms of change
(alteration, locomotion, etc.) must be specifically identical in order to
be commensurable. The chapter begins with an aporia: is every change

(K,vrycn<)commensurable? Aristotle approaches the problem from the issue
of equality, because commensurability depends on the notion of quantitative identiry. He begins with the hypothesis that if a circular and
a linear motion are equal, then the circle and line must be the same.
Before coming to a definite conclusion on this question, he cites a case of
obvious incommensurability: there can clearly be no comparison between
locomotion and alteration, for line and affection would have to be equal and
that is impossible, since only quantities can be equal. 37 Aristotle compares
such cases to cases of radical homonymy like 'sharp' in wine, pen, and
pitch. 38 The term 'quick' as used of linear and circular motion is just a more
subtle form of homonymy, and other terms, like much, equal, and one, are
similarly homonymous. Aristotle distinguishes these terms from 'double:
which means the same thing when applied to air and water, though air and
water are incommensurable. Since it is a term of proportionality, it can be
used to mark identical relations without being proper to the genus. Like
motion, quick and similar terms are bound per se and universally (qua) to
their substrates.
As a result, even if some general formulation of speed of change is possible, there may be homonymy lurking among the variables (249a21-25):
So we now have to consider how motion is differentiated; and this discussion serves
to show that the genus is not a unity but contains a plurality latent in it and distinct
from it, and that some homonymies are far removed from one another, some have
a certain likeness, and some are nearly related either generically or analogically,
with the result that they seem not to be homonymies though they really are. 39
Again (248b17-19):
In fact there are some terms of which even the definitions are homonymous; e.g.
if 'much' were defined as 'so much and more', 'so much' would mean something
different in different cases; 'equal' is similarly homonymous; and 'one' again is
perhaps inevitably homonymous.
37 Aristotle directly calls on the fact that these changes are not in the same category at
Phys. 1Il.1 200b32-201a3.
38 Cf. Top. US l07b13-18: 'See if tenns cannOt be compared as more or less or as in like
degree, as is the case (e.g.) with a dear sound and a clear argument, and a sharp lavour
and a sharp sound. For neither are these things said to be dear or sharp in a like degree,
nor yet is the one said to be dearer or sharper than the other. Clear, then and sharp are
homonymous. For synonyms are always comparable. For they will always hold either
in like manner (o,iJ.oiw~), or else in a greater degree (}.diAAOU) in one case.'
39 The analogical relation probably refers to the onns of change in different categories (e.g.,
substantial change and alteration), generic relation to different form s of alteration, etc.

The general tenn and definition only appear to be common to the various
forms of change. In fact, since they have different per se connections in
each case, they will be ambiguous.

The reason for the strict standards on commensurability is the fact
that the affection or kind of change cannot be abstracted from the primary
recipient, what the change occurs in. Three elements are present in the
definition of speed of change: the time in which it takes place, the affection,
like white or health, and the substrate, like surface or man (249a29-b26).
Speed is measured by the amount of the substrate changed to the affection
in a certain time: 10 square feet of surface changed to white in 40 seconds.
The affection and substrate must be related to one another per se and
not incidentally.'" Therefore, the affection and the substrate must both be
specifically the same in the cases compared, and equality of amount will be
denominated in amount of substrate. Thus the white of dog and the white
of horse are commensurable because both dog and horse have surface, and
surface, not dog or horse, is the primary recipient of white. The surface
becomes the single subject that allows for commensuration, and we are not
comparing dogs and horses.

Speed of change is bound by its necessary relations to be treated at
the same qua-level as its affection and primary recipient. Because these
things differ from change to change, and change is defined in terms of

them, change is necessarily ambiguous, and there is no one definition in
accordance with its name. The confusion ari ses because the re is a single
name, change, which suggests that there will be a single definition, and a
Single commensurable genus. But, in fact, the re is no abstract change apart
from the specific changes. Therefore, speed of change, too, is unabstractable.
2. Value
The concept of value admits of a greater degree of abstraction than change,
but remains nevertheless bound to its substrate. Aristotle's discussion of
this subject at Politics 1.9 1257a6ff. is aimed at showing how wealth properly speaking must always be bound to its substrate, property, which fulfils
some specific function for its owner:
Of everything which we possess there are two uses (XP7jffl:tS'): both belong to the
thing as such (KaO' aUTO). but not in the same manner, for one is the proper (oLKEia),
and the other is not the proper use of it (OVK OLKEla). For example, a shoe is used
for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe
40 Cf. Cat. 6 Sa38-bIO.

in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe
as a shoe (1J7Too~J.lan ii inroolU.l,a), but this is not its proper use, for a shoe is not
made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the
art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural,
from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may
infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth. (1257a6-18;
modified ROT)
The first problem is to provide an account for the apparent confusion of
terms, according to which a per se (Ka8' aim)) use of an object, one in which
the object is used qua that named object, is, however, not proper (olKda).
It is clear that the wearer of the shoe is using the shoe as a shoe. But the
exchanger is not wearing the shoe; he is instead using it for exchange. This
is not the proper use of it, because the shoe was not made for the purpose
of exchange. This, however, cannot be the whole story, because nothing
prevents the cobbler from making shoes expressly to exchange them.
In spite of the confusion in the technical expression, Aristotle's thought
seems to be this: 41 there is a natural circumstance in which some have too
much and others too little of some natural good (1257al4-17), and this is
caused by the practice of the crafts. The cobbler makes shoes. He wears
them (a per se and proper use of shoes). But he keeps on making them,
because he is a cobbler and cobblers make shoes to be put on feet. But
now he has too many, and other people are unshod. In trading his shoes
he is treating his shoes qua shoes, and they are achieving their per se
use, because they are protecting feet, the reason the cobbler made them
in the first place. But in the act of exchange he is also treating them as
exchange goods to fulfil his own natural needs other than shoes. This is
not the purpose for which they were made (OUK oiKfia), but they serve this
purpose because others need them and he needs what they have more of.
The exchange comes to an end when everyone has what they need. The
shoe can serve as an exchange good precisely because it is being treated as a
shoe and is needed as such, for otherwise it would have no exchange value.
The retail trader, by contrast, is neither interested in shoeing the world
as the cobbler is, nor in fulfilling his natural needs. He buys shoes not .to
wear them, but to sell them again at a profit, and since he sells them
neither to supply himself with other necessaries nor in accordance with
the art of seeing people shod, he is neither using the shoe as a shoe nor
using it in one of its two per se uses.
41 lowe this interpretation to Meikle 1995, 68-81.

Natural wealth cannot be abstracted from the specific good and the
purpose for which it is intended. That is what makes it natural wealth:
the wealth is derived from the inherent purposes of the objects. And even
when the shoe is being used for exchange, it is being treated qua shoe, since
it is fulfilling a natural need, and this is what gives it value in exchange.
The exchange value cannot be abstracted from the natural need. The same
object is at one and the same time treated both as a shoe and more generally
and abstractly as an exchange good 42 This is as far as one may abstract
and still be concerned with natural wealth.
Exchange within the context of natural wealth is possible, but Aristotle
does not discuss how it occurs in the Politics. We can instead draw on his
treatment of rectificatory justice in EN V.5. It is clear from here that some
form of equality must be established in order for exchange to take place."
But since the goods are of different kinds, absolute equality is impossible.
Instead rectificatory justice, like distributive justice, must be expressed by
proportional analogy:
Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a builder, B a
shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker
the latter' s work and must himself give him in return his own . If, then, first there
is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result
we mention will be effected ... And this proportional will not be effected unless
the goods are somehow equal. All goods must therefore be measured by some one
thing, as we said before. Now this unit is in truth need {)(pita) , which holds all
things together ... but money has become by convention a sort of representative
of need. (113307-29; modified ROT)

Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to need they may become so sufficiently. There
must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called
money); for it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are
measured by money. (1133bl8-23; rnodined ROT)

In contrast to distributive justice, in which different people receive different amounts of goods in proportion to the difference in their excellence,
42 Cf. EE VIL13 1246a26-31 for the gruesome example of the eyeball in its proper purpose
and in its beitig sold or eaten.
43 Meikle 1995, ch. 1 and 2, has denied that Aristotle provides a positive theory of
commensuration in this chapter. He takes 1133b18--20 as a denial of 'epistemic'
commensurability. See Judson 1997, 158n21, for an argument contra.

rectificatory justice depends on each party receiving equal shares. But in
the analogy, housebuilder:cobbler::house:shoe, it is difficult to see just what

the relationship between the housebuilder and the cobbler is so that they
could have a proportion of one. As Meikle has pointed out, for Aristotle
their most natural relationship is mediated through the political art, which
situates each craft within the activity of the polis." But that relationship
cannot be described by analogy, since, as we shall see, it is the job of the
focal relationship. Likewise, because houses are not shoes, a simple commensuration and equation between them is impossible. Yet the relationship
between the cobbler and the housebuilder must be some form of equality
for exchange to take place. We might think to express the relationship as
follows: the claims of and demands on the cobbler are equivalent to those of
the housebuilder. 45 But considering Aristotle's suspicion concerning equal-
ity in the context of change, he is likely to be wary of this formulation,

since the demands and claims of the exchanging partners are opposite
to one another (the cobbler claims a house, the housebuilder a pair of

shoes). Since need is bound to its object Aristotle puts strong emphasis
on the commensurating power of money, which mediates and measures
the goods exchanged. In the Politics Aristotle aids this commensurating

power by making exchange a per se use of a good, thereby essentially
joining the common function with the specific good. The EN manifests a
similar tension. The commonality between goods of exchange is posited
hypothetically (i~ inroecr,ws), a matter of convention rather than nature.

Need w,ia) as measured by money provides the equation between the
craftsmen and between the goods. While there is a natural analogy, housebuilder:house::cobbler:shoe (as artisan is to artefact), this analogy does not
express the commonality necessary to effect an exchange. This can only
be achieved when we treat the goods as objects of need:"
44 Meikle 1995, ch. 4.

45 Judson seems to concur (1997, 168-69): 'the ratio of the strength of their needs for the
goods in question .'
46 I am in fundamental disagreement with Meikle's basic views on commensurability. It is
the basic thesis of his book that Aristotle's economic theory was not that of neo-c1assical
utilitarianism, according to which goods in exchange can be fully commensurated
through the 'satisfaction a subject derives from possessing or consuming an object'
(38). So intent is he on shOwing that Aristotle viewed goods only in their proper use,
that he denies that Aristotle intended a quantitative commensurability at all, declaring
1133h18-20 as an 'unambiguous' denial of commensurability (35-6). The problem with
his analysis, as I see it, is that though he is trying to support Aristotle's economics
with an Aristotelian 'metaphysics' of substantial ends, he should also have considered
Aristotle's theory of science, and especially the role of the universal, the pcr sc, and

Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of 8, if the house is worth five
minae or equal to them, the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain, then, how many
beds are equal to house, viz. five. (EN V.5 1133b23-26)

The analogy now yields to something more common. When the goods are
treated as units of value, that is, qua minae, they can be commensurated.
But this is not to say that value has been entirely abstracted from the
specific goods. There are two ways in which the exchange value remains
per se related to the specific goods. First, in the exchange different goods
must be exchanged. One does not trade shoes for shoes. 47 Commensuration
to the point of absolute identity would destroy the exchange, since housebuilder and cobbler are not trading units of exchange value (minae), but
goods they need. The exchange can occur only if the exchange goods are
different in kind, but the same in value. Second, the exchange occurs only
when the parties are in need (EV xpfi~ 1133b7) of each other's goods. One
is in need when one lacks a component of natural wealth. Opportunities
for such exchange frequently occur, as the Politics says, because there are
naturally circumstances in which one person has too much, another too
little of something. In both these ways, then, the value of something in
exchange is necessarily related to the specific goods being exchanged and
cannot be abstracted from them.
But their value is commensurable and therefore abstractable to a
greater degree than change. How goods may be incommensurable and
commensurable at the same time is suggested in the passage quoted above:
'now in truth, it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to need (7I'pOS TTl" xp,iav) they
may become so suffiCiently.' It is clear that in their proper uses they are
no more commensurable than changes are. But when we treat them as
.relative to their xp,ia (which notwithstanding is a per se predicate of
them), and this xp,ia holds the exchange together as if it were some one
thing (iiv Tl ov 1133b7), xpfia has both a specific nature and a common
abstraction, to which he grants only passing mention (54-5) . That manufactured goods
have specific purposes and ends does not, as Meikle claims, immediately preclude
them from having some common nature as well . There is no need to preserve the
'metaphysics' of purposes at the COSt of making exchange virtually impossible. There
was never a con Oiet in the first place.
47 Cf. EN V.5 1133a16-18; EE VII.tO 1243b30-35: 'For how is a cobbler to have dealings
with a farmer unless one equates the work of the twO by proportion? So to all whose
exchanges are not of the same for the same, proportion is the measure, e.g. if the one
complains that he has given wisdom, and the other that he has given money, we must
measure first the ratio of wisdom to wealth, and then what has been given for each.'

nature. 48 Just what that common nature is is not made dear, but Aristotle
suggests that it is expressed analogically: as five shoes are in the fulfilment
of the house builder' s natural needs, so one house is in the fulfilment of the
cobbler's natural needs. The analogical structure allows Aristotle to treat
as a limited commonality what must be treated as generically different"
And yet there are more abstracted ways of dealing with wealth. Aristotle views retail trade and usury as successive deviations from natural
wealth-getting, and as a result he does not recognize them as abstracted
subject matters that have a per se existence. Although he does recognize
48 Cf. Judson 1997, 171, for a rather different view: 'Aristotle means that, if one considers
"houses and shoes in isolation from human needs, there is simply no fact of the matter
as to what a house is worth. This is quite compatible with thinking that there can be
such a fact of the matter when houses and shoes are considered as objects whicl;l satisfy
human needs.'
49 A similar analogical relationship is discussed at GC II.6 (333a20--34), where Aristotle
is criticizing Empedocles for holding that the elements are commensurable and
non-transfonnable:
'If it is meant that they [the elementsI are comparable in their amount, all the
comparables must possess an identical something whereby they are measu red. If, e.g.,
one pint of Water yields ten of Air, both are measured by the same unit; and therefore
both were from the first an identical something. On the other hand, suppose they are
not comparable in their amount in the sense that so much of the one yields so much of
the other, but comparable in power of action (a pint of Water, e.g., having a power of
cooling equal to that of ten pints of Air); even so, they are in their amount, though not
qua amount, but qua having power. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure
of their amount, they might be compared as tenns in an analogy: e.g., as x is hot, so Y
is white. But "as," though it means equality in quantity, means similarity in quality .
Thus it is manifestly absurd that the bodies, though they are not transformable, are
comparable not by analogy, but by a measure of their powers; Le. that so much Fire is
comparable with many times that amount of Air, as being equally or similarly hot. For
the same thing, if it be greater in amount, will, since it belongs to the same kind, ha~e
its ratio correspondingly increased.'
If the elements cannot undergo mutual transfonnation, then they can only be compared
by analogy. There seem to be tWO kinds of analogy under consideration, one that
allows for commensuration by quantification on the basis of measure of power, and one
that does not (as x is hot, so Y is white), since there is no similarity of the qualities.
Though the elements are not transfonnable, they may still be capable of eHecting
some common thing in a similar manner, and on that basis a ratio may be established
between the amounts necessary to bring about the similar effect. The commensuration
of the elements in question cannot be separated from the elements they are, since we
are not trying to commensurate cooling power, but the elements that bring about the
cooling. Commensuration through analogy is possible when some common attribute
is shared by different subjects, and can be partly abstracted from the subjecrs it is
found in.

discrete crafts, like retail sale and usury, governing each, he clearly thinks
these crafts are perversions. And yet as a result of the close connections
between the crafts of exchange and retail, he says, some people confuse
the different forms of wealth-getting (Pol. 1.9 1257b35). Usury is for him
the most unnatural form of wealth-getting just because it makes a gain
from money itself, rather than from the natural object of wealth (1.10
1258a38-b8). It is unnatural because it has become completely conceptually
separated from the only source of value per se, the manufactured good.
For Aristotle the subject matter of economics is natural wealth, and other
things, like money, may be included in the study to the extent that they
are relevant to natural wealth. Money is included because it measures the
need for natural wealth and therefore is per se related to natural wealth.
But it has no legitimate function apart from its relation to natural wealth.
And yet we see how easily usury and even capitalism can be made to
fit into Aristotle's scheme of abstraction. We are more inclined today
to view usury as part of the art of finance, and would consider it as a
more completely abstracted craft. The subject matter of finance is capital
and its properties, and these properties are different from those of shoes.
Banking is more abstract too in the sense that it gives principles to the
manufacturing arts, like those of capital investment or deficit finanCing.
But Aristotle did not abstract finance from manufactured goods, because
he did not conceive of value abstracted from some fairly primitive natural
needs of man. Value maintains its per se connections to the specific genus
of good, and a commensurable commonality is attainable only by analogy
and the convention of money.
3. Animal Locomotion
In the case of animal locomotion, Aristotle treats a series of subjects related

to one another by abstraction as he proceeds from the PA to the lA, MA,
and DA. Though these subjects are more abstractable than the arts of
wealth-getting, the abstraction is never as great as with mathematics, and
the per se connections to less abstract levels are not abandoned: the form,
no matter how abstract, is always conceived of as part of a hylomorphic
compound, and is always in a causal relationship, however distant, with
the lowest concrete object. so
The PA studies the parts of animals and their causes. The investigation
takes place at a concrete material level, and the treatise supplies reasons
50 See Peck's (1983, 8-10) comments on the organization of the biological treatises.

for the material nature of the parts. 51 Broadly speaking, these reasons
are couched in terms of function (form) and constraints (matter). The

treatise is organized largely part by part starting with the head and moving
down, and each greatest genus, like bird and fish, is treated more or less
separately. Aristotle does not devote much energy to the instrumental
parts of locomotion in the PA, but he does, for example, say that birds
have a pair of wings because it is part of their nature to be able to fly
(IV .l2 693blO--13) . Wings in their material constitution are commensurable among themselves: rapinous birds have unusually large wings, other
birds have smaller wings. As such, they form a genus. Fishes' fins form
another genus, commensurable among themselves, but incommensurable
with birds' wings. Aristotle explains the differences among wings by reference to the differences in the way of life (/3io<) of the several kinds of
birds (693b26-694a12). The fun ction and {3io, are introduced only to the
extent that it is necessary to explain the part and its variations. The subject
of the treatise, after all, is parts, not functions. Explanations are adapted to
the qua-level of the subject-genus, and for this reason a general account
of locomotion is not provided, though the ' four-point' theory is used.52
Like the PA , the fA is still concerned with parts and has not abstracted
from them; not all parts now, but only those useful for movement in place.
These parts are no longer being treated separately according to genus of
part and whole animal, but together as a group governed by common
principles. 53 At the beginning of the work Aristotle announces that he
intends to explain first
why each part is such as it is and to what end [a nimals] possess them, and
second, the differences between these parts both in one and the same creature, and
again by comparison of the parts of creatures of differen t species with one another.
(1 70435-9)
51 Lennox 1987a has done much to clarify the relationship between the PA and the
HA. According to him, the HA is a pre-demonstrative historia that collects facts into
divisionary groups according to commensurate universals, thus facilitating the process
of discovering the middle tenn. The PA begins the work of demon stration with a
consideration of the material and final cause. The GA continues with a study of the
moving cause. Though these trea tises are distinguished by the causes they treat, there
is nothing in the requirement for generic unity that demands their separation. Indeed
both causes do belong in the same genus, since the efficient cause is subsumed under
and is for the sake of the final cause.
52 Indeed. IA seems to be presupposed by the PA (IV.11 690bl4-16).
53 Cf. PA I.l 639a29-b3: 'Very possibly also there may be othe r characters which, though
they present specific differences, yet come under one and the same category. For
instance, flying, swimming, walking, creeping, are plainly speCifically distinct, but yet
are all fonns of animal progression.'
The IA is a problem-based inquiry. As in the PA the problems are material,

concerned with the instrumental parts, but now at a general level. Certain
facts are clear from the HA and this treatise must provide the cause (1
704b9-11 ). The questions concern the number of points of motion (some
animals have more, others fewer), the convexity or concavity of limbs,
and the way in which the limbs move. The point theory of movement is a
common explanatory principle and must account for the different features
of various animals taken now as a group. Features of locomotion are still
correlated to the broad divisions used in the PA (sanguineous animals move
at four points, birds have convex legs, and so on), but since the IA chooses
a different basis of comparison from the PA , the various genera of animals
become commensurable.
Whether the locomotions of animals are commensurable is not a question Aristotle explicitly addresses in the IA. It arises instead at Phys. VilA
in the context of determining the commensurable substrate tor change:
{Locomotion is specifically differentiated} also accordingly as the instrument of the
locomotion is different: thus if feet are the instrument, it is walking, if wings it
is flying. Or is that not so? Is locomotion different only according to the shape of
the path? (Phys. VII.4 249a17-19)
Aristotle hardly gives an unequivocal answer in this passage, but he clearly

leans towards commensurability, instrument of locomotion not making a
specific difference. We can say, then, that birds move faster than dogs (as
the crow flies). Commensuration is possible, but what is commensurated
here is obviously different from what we find in the PA. The genus has
changed from wing to locomotion. But in the IA Aristotle is not interested
in the quantitative aspects of locomotion, since these problems extend
more widely than animal locomotion, and belong in physics rather than
biology.
At the end of the IA Aristotle claims that after having investigated
the parts, we must move to investigating the soul (19 714b20-23).S4 But,
in fact, it is clear that the MA, not the DA, is methodologically the next
treatise, since it begins with an explicit statement that seems to assume
the IA:
Elsewhere we have investigated the movement of animal s after their various kinds,
the differences between them and th e causes of their particular characters (for
some animals fly, some swim, some walk, other move in various other ways);
54 This reference may suggest that the MA was not written at the time of the reference.
Cf. Nussbaum 1978, 27.3-4.

there remains an investigation of the common cause
animal movement whatsoever. (1 698al-7)
(ICOW7}S-
alTius) of any sort of
Aristotle shows in the first chapter that there must be a point of rest in the
animal that is the origin of motion. In addition there must be something
outside it that is absolutely at rest (ch. 2). This is a fact that extends beyond
animals even to physics in general, and is treated as useful for the present
science. 55 The MA will also consider how the soul moves the body. Accordingly there is a brief discussion of the practical syllogism (7701a7-bl),
which provides the psychological part of the answer. The corporeal part of
the answer is found in the expansion and contraction of the connatural
spirit (a1JJ.'CPVTOV '1TVEvJ.'a) located in the origin of movement (i.e., the soul)
which pushes and pulls and thus causes other movements in the instrumental parts. Absent from this common treatment is any mention of the
specific kinds of instrumental p~rts. Instead we learn about some common
material conditions for movement in general (not just locomotion), the
internal and external unmoved, and the joint; and some common formal
conditions, desire and the practical syllogism; and that which mediates
between formal and material, the connatural spirit. How and in what way
the soul is moved is the subject of the DA (MA 6 700b4-6).
In the treatment of movement in the DA all material considerations
are absent on the grounds that examination of it falls within the province
of the functions common to body and soul' (!IUO 433b19-21). Instead
the DA asks what part or parts of the soul are responsible for movement.
No one faculty by itself is sufficient, Aristotle avers, but appetite initiates
the movement and together appetite and thought or imagination suffice.
In general. then, the DA merely considers which faculties of the soul are
responsible for movement and the nature of the conflict between various
desires and faculties.
These four treatises, then, are organized in order of increasing generality and formality, away from what is specific and material towards
what is common and forma1. 56 Each step in the abstraction provides a
I
55 Cf. Nussbaum 1978, 107-14, who argues that the MA is 'a deliberate and fruitful'
(113) departure from Aristotle's strictures on metabasis; Kung 1982 correctly replies
that this does not constitute metabasis in any usual sense, that it is assimilable to the
subordinate-science model.
56 In organizing a subject matter, Aristotle sometimes identifies two levels of principles,
the first of which might roughly be characterized as internal to the subject matter,
the second as external. Patzig referred to this technique in the context of metaphysics,
which he called a 'doppelt paronymische Wissenschaft' (1961, 196). Here all being
depends on substance and cannot be separated from substance. Substance is, as it

new genus and qua-level, and new per se predicates. And yet for two
reasons abstraction of the mathematical kind is never attained. First, never
does Aristotle suggest that the abstraction of the soul faculties from their
material substrates can be fully effected in definition. Soul faculties must
always be defined as actualities of material potentialities. And yet it is
clearly legitimate to consider appetites and imagination separately from
the instrumental parts of locomotion in a way it was not appropriate for
money to be considered separately from specific exchange goods. Whereas
value is always tied to the specific good of exchange, the material conditions
of locomotion become increasingly abstracted and generalized from their
specific manifestations as Aristotle generalizes the formal components. The
increasingly abstract formal sequence, flying, locomotion, motion, desire,
is per se and qua related to the increasingly abstract material sequence,
wing, limb, joint, potentiality for desire. 57
Second, the more abstract and formal subject matters provide the causes
for the more concrete, and for this reason they remain necessarily connected to the more concrete. The soul provides a principle of animals (DA
L1 402a6-7) in several ways, being the formal, final, and moving cause of
living things. The instrumental parts are ultimately explained by reference
to the faculties of the soul, though they are not the subject of the DA.
The examples we have considered in this chapter develop the notion of
scientific autonomy. The case of 2R belonging to triangle is the simplest
case of 'pure generic autonomy,' in which a per se predicate is proved to
belong to a subject qua that subject. Alternating proportion shows that
the same predicate can be proved of two subjects of different extension
through generically different causes. This is a case of 'mixed autonomy,'

since the proof in each genus is autonomous and independent of the other.
The case of optical proofs and mixed science introduced the notion of the
'mixed genus,' in which two different but related genera were active within
a single proof. The genera are no longer treated as autonomous, but both
contribute to the same proof.
were, an internal cause. But in addition, god is the first substance and an external
cause of all other substances. Similarly, general and internal causes of the organs of
locomotion are considered, then the external causes of their motion. For desire and
perception are not part of the wing, etc., but instead are present in the heart. So
also Met. A.10 1075al4-15: 'For the good [of the army] is in the order and in the
leader, and more in the latter: for he does not depend on the order but it depends on
him.'
57 Cf. Met. H.3 1043a34-37, which by using the example of animal rather than man
or horse, implies that different levels of generality in form imply different levels of
generality in matter and composite. See Loux 1991, 163.
Speed of change, value, locomotion, and mathematics form a graduated

series of sciences, which illustrate the issue of autonomy from a different
perspective. Instead of a reduction in autonomy as two genera become fused
into 'Jne, this series marks the degrees to which autonomous genera can
be abstracted from the mixed genera in which they reside. In different
contexts, certain aspects of the natures of things can be more or less
abstracted so as to form new subject matters . In the case of speed there is
nothing common that can form a subject matter over the various speeds.
In the case of mathematics, we can completely abstract the quantitative
nature of objects and treat it as if it had no per se connections with its
substrate. Since mathematics loses its per se connections to its substrate,
it forms a science independent from physics. It genuinely has its own
principles and per se attributes. In the case of locomotion, and to a lesser
extent value, common features can be abstracted, but not to the extent that
they lose all their per se connections to their substrate. Such semi-abstract
subject matters do not form wholly independent sciences, even though
their subject-genera have different per se and qua relations from those of
their substrates. Semi-abstract subject matters are related to the science of
their substrate, and are really parts of the science of the substrate. To this
extent, as we shall see, they embody the principles of focality.
At the same time, in those cases where either abstraction or semiabstraction is possible (value, locomotion, mathematics), related terms exist
and function both at concrete and at abstract levels. The concrete term is
logically embedded in a specific genus, the wearing of a shoe, the flight of
a bird, the sn ubness of a nose. But they are all instances of more abstract
terms which are not embedded in the specific genus, though the degree
of the abstraction varies in each case: exchange value, locomotion, curve.
Where there are two or more terms that embed the same abstract concept
in different subject matters, those terms will be considered analogous, as
the snub is analogous to the bandy.
"
Analogy In Aristotle's Biology
Problems with Analogy

In this chapter I turn to analogy and its role in Aristotle's biological works.
The biological works serve as a good introduction to analogy, since the concept and the term are most frequently and systematically used here l I shall
first review some of the prominent interpretations of biological analogy,
and then provide some observations on its use derived from a thorough
examination of the evidence. These observations will form the foundation
for a new interpretation, one that fits analogy into the most basic organizational schemes of Aristotle's biology, the genus-species scheme and the
r ho!e-parts scheme. This interpretation exploits the t~nsion between the
'per se and qua requirement and shows how this tension operates to bind
together discrete genera of objects.
The clearest exposition of the role of analogy in biology is provided in
the first chapter of the HistoriaAnimalium:
or animals,
some resemble one another in all their parts, while others have parts
wherein they differ. Sometimes the pa rts are identical in form, as, for instance,
::me man's nose or eye resembles another man's nose or eye, flesh flesh, and bone
bone; and in like manner with a horse, and with all other animals which we reckon
to be of one and the same species; for as the whole is to the whole, so each to
~ach are the parts severally. In other cases the parts are identical, save only for a
1 The biological works represent 26 per cent of the Bekker edition. The uses of
avclhoyol1 / avahoyia. in these same works represent 36 per cent of the uses. The other
extensive use of the tenn is in the discussion of justice in the ethical works (EN and
MM, 12 per cent).

difference in the way of excess or defect, as is the case in such animals as are of
one and the same genus. By 'genus' I mean, for instance, Bird or Fish; for each of
these is subject to difference in respect of its genus, and there are many species of
fishes and of birds.
Among them, most of the parts as a rule exhibit differences through contrariety
of properties (TGS Ti;w 7Ta(fryj1.aTwV VavnwO'Hs-), such as colour and shape, in that
some are more and some in a less degree the subject 0' the same property; and
also in the way of multitude or fewness, magnitude or smallness, in short in the
way of excess or defect. Thus in some the texture of the flesh is soft, in others
firm; some have a long bill, others a short one; some have abundance of feathers,
others have only a small quantity. It happens further that, even in the cases we are
considering, some have parts that others have not: for instance, some have spurs
and others not, some have crests and others noti but as a general rule, most parts
and those that go to make up the bulk of the body are either identical with one
another, or differ from one another in the way of contrariety and of excess and
defect. For the more and the less lJ,tnAAov KaL 11nov) may be represented as excess
and defect.
There are some animals whose parts are neither identical in form nor differing
in the way of excess or defecti but they are the same only in the way of analogy
(KaT' avaAoytav), as, for instance, bone is only analogous to fish-bone, nail to hoof,
hand to claw, and scale to featheri for what the feather is in a bird, the scale is in
a fish. (HA 1.1 486al4-b22)
Though this system of identity - lOO~-yEvos-d.vaAoyia - seems intuitively

apt for biological phenomena, 2 it present us with two challenges. The first
has to do with the meaning of genus in this context. This challenge is
.one my account faces because I have treated genus strictly as subjectgenus, while here Aristotle is talking about a divisible genus. The second
challenge, the one that has most occupied scholars and will be the starting
point for my own interpretation, has been to justify 'more and less' as a
consistent demarcation between genus and analogy.
The last chapter focused on genus in the sense of subject-genus, which
I distinguished from the genus that is divisible into species. In the former
context species of a genus are relevant only in application arguments,
and their differentiae, that which makes them species, are not considered.
Instead, the differentiated species are treated as different subject matters
from their divisionary genus. As we saw, the differentiated species (like
isosceles triangle), when treated as a subject of demonstration, becomes a
2 See Thompson's (1961) chapter on the theory of transformation, esp. p. 273 .
55 Analogy in Aristotle's Biology

subject-genus in its own right. In light of recent research, there is little
dispute that the HA and PA make use of such subject-genera. These works
are organized according to subject-genera, and Aristotle is seeking coextensive universals to join in demonstration. 3 There remains, however, a great
deal of dispute concerning the technical terms genos and eidos. Eidos is
extensively used in the biological works and has been a source of confusion
and perplexity. Balme was the first to argue that Aristotle's genus -species
system was not a precursor of the Linnaean taxonomic system, and that
Aristotle's use of the terms, outside of what he called the 'programmatic

passages' (like the one above) was not consistently taxonomic. In fact,
Balme so despaired of finding a hierarchical use for these terms that he

opted for the etymological sense of genos as lineage group and eidos as
appearance, and he dismissed as later additions the 'programmatic' passages, in which eidos, genos, and analogia are placed in a clear hierarchy.4
Pellegrin thought that he could discern a consistent order in Aristotle's
use. 5 Genus and species were not fixed levels of generality, but were
relative to one another. The same group of objects could be considered
both as a genus and as a species. The difference was that the genus is
divisible into species, and the species are determined by differentiae. Both
scholars produced their work before the insights of the Posterior Analytics
were widely applied to the biological works, and so, for all the progress in
their battle against the taxonomic view, they never completely abandoned
the concept of genus as divisible. If, however, we distinguish the use of the
term in the HA and the PA, and especially if we distinguish the first book
of the PA from the other four books, we find some remarkable results .
It is reasonable that we should make this distinction, for, as Lennox has
shown, the HA provides the facts of biology, an enumeration of the kinds
and sub-kinds of animals together with their coextensive attributes. PA
!I-IV takes these facts and provides demonstrations for them. PA I is a
treatise on general biological method, and so is different in character from
both HA and the rest of the PA. Now, eidos is hardly used at all in PA
ll-IV, just six times, and on four of those occasions it clearly does not
mean a determinate kind, but, as Salme remarked, means appearance. 6
In two cases it arguably means species, but in neither of these cases is
it found in the context of a biological demonstration. Rather, on these
3 See especially the work of Lennox (1987a).

4 Programmatic passages include HA I.1 486al4-b22 (quoted above), 1.2 488b29-32, 1.6
491.14-19, PA 1.4644.16-23, .nd 1.5 645b20-28.

5 Pellegrin 1986a, 1987.
6 665b8; 680.15; 687b6; 692b13.

occasions Aristotle is introducing discussions of the great kinds, testacea
and crustacea, and 50 is recapitulating the findings of the HA? By contrast,
genas is widely used in PA II-IV and frequently in demonstrative contexts.
In short, genos, as we would expect, is the only term used in the context
of demonstration in the PA. When we turn to the HA, we find both
terms in fre~uent use. This is to he expected in view of the purpose of
that treatise. The HA is pre-demonstrative. Since it establishes genera,
divides them into species, and identifies coextensive attributes for both
levels, it is natural that in this context we should find extensive use of
eide as species into which a genas is divided. This divisionary stage is
followed by the demonstrative stage in the PA. We take each group of
whatever extensi<?n, whether we called it a genus or a species, and now
call it a genas (a subject-genus) and provide demonstrations concerning
it. Species disappear in this demonstrative stage. It is clear, then, that the
two senses of genos are not exclusive and in fact represent two stages in
the Aristotelian scientific method, the divisionary and the demonstrative.
Though the species disappear in demonstration, the same cannot be said
for analogy. In PA II-IV there are twenty-six uses of the term versus
thirty-two for the HA.
The second challenge, that of justifying Aristotle's demarcation between genus and analogy, arises because Aristotle has placed analogy in a
sequence together with genus and species based on degrees of similarity
or identiry. The first step - important because it has been the subject of a
great deal of controversy - is to examine Aris totle's use of ana logy, and
especially to show that it marks an important and unique level of identity
and similarity. The next task will be to argue that the unique contribution
of analogy to the system of similarity and identity is ultimately dependent
on the per se and qua criteria and the notion of abstractability.
The traditional view of biological analogy, supported by Muskens, Kullmann, and Gotthelf among many others, grants it a robust role alongside
species and genus, and accepts the 'more and less' marker as the criterion
and justification for generic identity' As a resu lt, these scholars exclude
7 679b15; 683b28. The statistics for the use of these tenns are
in HA :
cidos, 53 genos, 245 ratio, .21
in PA I:
eidos,32 genos, 28
ratio, 1.14
in PA II-IV : eidos, 6 genos, 65
ratio, .09
8 Though see n. 20 below for further qualifications.
9 Muskens 1943, 35, referring broadly to the biological analogies, says, 'Muneris
communitas omnibus his lads analogiae fundamento est.' He ignores the importance of
common relative position. According to Kulhnann (1974, 67n38), genera arc not related
to one another by similarities (also d. p. 86 and his comments on Salme's analysis

the possibility that analogues share any properties and restrict analogical
Similarity to identity of function. This might be called the orthodox, realist,
or functionalist position.
A second interpretation, that of the relativists or formalists, holds that

species and genus constitute a coherent pair of concepts by themselves to
which analogy has nothing genuine to contribute. David Balme and Pierre
Pellegrin are the principal advocates of this view 10 They have emphasized
that Aristotle's use of the terms genus and species in the biological works is
not the same as the Linnaean, taxonomic use of genus and species, and that
Aristotle is not interested in constructing a taxonomy based on fixed levels
of generality. For our purposes it is important to note that Balme extended
his argument to analogy: since Aristotle frequently claimed that the same
groups both differ by more and less and are analogically identical, the
distinction between genus and analogy is just as confused as that between
species and genus. To cite one of Balme's more difficult examples: 'oo-ToBv
and xovopo, are "vaAoyov at P.A. 653b36 ... but differ Tcr P.UAAOV Kat ~TTOV
at 655a32.' Moreover, Balme thought - if rather inconsistently -that
analogy was wholly dependent on the genera of whole animals, so that
any similarity in part or function between animals of different genera,
say, birds and fish, was ipso facto an analogue. Pellegrin, by contrast,
argued that the biological use of species and genus was consistent with
their hierarchical use elsewhere in the corpus: species and genus are only
fixed relative to one another, and are tools of analysis that can be applied
of analogy, p. 87). He explicitly calls the more and less a criterion of generic identity
(73-4). According to Gotthelf (1985, 48), the distinction between a part and its analogue
is precisely one between two parts with (essentially) the same function but which
differ in material constitution and structure, and do so by more than 'the more and the
less'; d. a similar description in Lennox 1987b, 341n8, who rightly stresses that the
function is the same at a very abstract level. Also see Ross 1949, 670. Cf. Nussbaum
1978,83: 'When [Aristotle] so frequently users] the phrase "the x or its analogue" [he
is] emphasizing that we are interested in a functional state of the organism, which is
realized in some suitable matter or other. An artificial pump might perform the heart's
function, whereas a non-functioning heart would be only homonymously a heart.' This
position is supported by Cohen 1992, 59, and Charles 1990, 157, who holds that the
genera are based on distinctive modes of discharging some function.
10 Balme 1962; also important for issues in this chapter are Balme 1961 and 1987a.
Pellegrin 1986a, 88--94. The English edition contains extensive revisions of his section
on analogy, and so I omit reference to the original French edition (La Classification
des animaJlx chez Aristote: Statllt de fa biologie et unite de l'aristotelisme. [Paris: Les
Belles Lemes, 1982]) . For a quick summary of most of the main issues in his book see
Pellegrin 1987. Balme 1987a, 79n8, said that he came to agree with Pellegrin on the
issue of analogy.

to groups of objects of any extension. Analogy completes the series by
allowing Aristotle to compare man, who forms the standard of biological
intelligibility, with other genera on the lower rungs of the scala naturae.
In general, the relativists have focused their attention on the relationship
between genus and species and as a result tend to trivialize the role of
analogy to the extent that it merely recapitulates the function of genus. It
simply becomes a higher order of generality than genus and can easily be
transformed into a genus if we generalize in the appropriate way.
Still a third interpretation has provided a deep 'scientific' reason for
demarcating generic from analogical identity. On the grounds that species
of a common genus develop out of a common physical matter, some
scholars have argued that this matter will provide the criterion of generic
identity. According to the embryological interpretation, there is some point
early in their development when all embryos of a genus have a common

form which later becomes differentiated into the various specific forms.
This common form is the matter for further differentiation, and will be
different for each genus. Thus, all and only birds are generated from bird
matter, all and only fish from fish matter and so on. If this were true,
then generic boundaries could be determined by a thorough study of the
embryos. Analogues, then, would be parts that perform the same function,
but come from animals of different generic matter. Lloyd, Rorty, and, at
one time, Lennox have supported this interpretation,l1 Like the orthodox
interpretation it is functionalist, but it grounds generic difference, not in
the more and the less, but in facts of embryological development. Like the
position of the relativists, it has the consequence of making all transgeneric
similarities into analogues.
All three positions share the assumption that analogy is an interpretative problem. Aristotle nowhere provides a clear and extended treatment of
analogy, and we are forced to piece his theoretical remarks together with his
actual practice in order to produce a coherent account. The functionalist
interpretation is prima facie most plausible, not least because it is most
closely based on the text, but its supporters have done little to defend it
against attack. Indeed the major stumbling block to maintaining analogy
as a Significant part of the system of identity has been the fact that the
distinction befween analogy and the generic 'more and less' simply cannot
be maintained without further qualification. For, as has been repeatedly
and correctly remarked, analogues frequently differ by more and less in
many ways. Though Aristotle does not call them analogues, the beak in
11 Lloyd 1962; Rorty 1973; Lennox 1980, and for his revised position see 1987b.

birds and the lips and teeth in humans are surely beyond differences of
degree, and yet Aristotle transforms one into the other in a remarkable
passage (PA II.16 659b23-27):
For supposing that one were to cut off a man's lips, unite his upper teeth together,
and similarly his under ones, and then were to lengthen out the two separate
pieces thus formed, narrowing them on either side - then we should at once have
a bird-like beak. 12
In fact, differences of more and less are pervasive throughout all levels of
generality. Within a single species one animal is taller, darker, and thinner
than another. And even within an ~ndividual animal variations are found,
for instance, in the temperature of blood, the lower parts being cooler than
the upper pans (PA IL2 647b29-35). Difference of degree is, therefore, not
sufficient in itself to distinguish generic from any other form of identity.

It was precisely by seizing on this problem that the relativists extended
their argument. Balme began with the observation that species and genus
had no hierarchical sense, and then pointed out that analogues too differed
by the more and the less, and so could be treated as belonging to the
same genus. The confusion that started with species and genus spread to
genus and analogy. It was likewise in response to this problem that the
embryologists invoked the material from which organisms develop as the
basis for drawing generic lines. For they realized that the 'more and less'
could not be trusted as a steadfast criterion, and cast about for a more secure
foundation for generic distinctions. The functionalists for their part, since
they deny that analogues are similar, have sidestepped the problem.
My own interpretation will attempt to combine the virtues of these
three accounts: remaining close to the text and respecting analogy as a
significant part of Aristotle's system of difference (as the functionalists
do), embracing the more and less of analogues (as the relativists do), and
providing a theoretical framework in hylomorphism and qua-levels that
will account for the fixity of analogy (as the embryologists do). But before
proceeding to that positive step, I shall argue against the relativists that (1)
12 Cf. also Pol. V.3 1302b33-1303a2: 'Political revolutions also spring from a
disproportionate increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many
members, and every member ought to grow in proportion so that symmetry may be
preserved. but it loses its nature ($8f'pfTal) if the foot is four cubits long and the rest
of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as
of quantity, it may even take the fonn of another animal; even so a state has many
parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for example, the number of
poor in democracies and in constitutional states.'

they are inconsistent in claiming that analogy is a relative designation, and
that (2) in spite of a couple of difficult cases, the analogues are fixed and do
not vary. I also wish to show, against the functionalists, that (3) analogues,
in a certain sense, are related by the more and the less, that (4) relative position is of fundamental importance in assigning analogical status, and that
(5) identity of function in different matter cannot be a criterion for ana-
logues, because there are analogues of function as well as of parts. Finally,

(6) I shall provide some arguments against the genus-as-matter position.
1. Fixity of Analogy
In the passage quoted above Aristotle describes analogy as a form of
identity in a descending scale together with generic and specific identity.
But in one important respect analogy is quite different l3 Whereas whole
animals can be specifically and generically identical, analogical identity
applies only to the parts of animals14 For analogy depends on two objects being compared as parts of two different systems, in this case whole
animals. But inasmuch as Aristotle groups analogy together with specific
and generic identity, he invites comparison between them. And to make
them comparable he presents all three kinds of identity in terms of the

parts of animals. Indeed in this passage he draws an explicit correlation
between parts and wholes and claims that as the parts are to the parts, so
the whole is to the whole (486a20-21). But while whole animals can only
be specifically or generically identical, parts can be specifically, generically,
or analogically identical.
Although Aristotle says here that there is a correlation between the
levels of analysis, it is by no means perfect. Speaking of generically identical animals, he says, 'as a general rule, most parts and those that go
13 In addition to the three common kinds of difference in animals - specific, generic, and
analogical- Aristotle adds several others: position, arrangement, possession/lacking.
These are not often included in the standard list because they do not fit logically into
that series. They are similar to analogy in that they deal prinCipally with parts rather
than wholes. So, for example, in viviparous quadrupeds teats may be found in the
breast or dose to the thighs (HA I.1 486b24-487a1). Identity of relative position is
almost always a condition for analogical identity.
14 Muskens 1943, 33. There is only one case where Aristotle calls whole animals
analogous. At GA 1II.1l 761a24-32, testacea and plants are said to be analogous (T~V
4>ucnu a.uaAoyov iXH) because the nature of testacea is to be in such a relation to water
as plants are to earth, as if plants were, so to say, land shellfish and shell fish water
plants. In this case the analogy is between the organisms and their environment, rather
than between pans a~d whole organisms.

to make up the bulk of the body are either identical with one another,
or differ from one another in the way of contrariety and of excess and
defect' (HA 1.1 486bl4-16). Among generically identical animals, then,
Aristotle says that some of their parts are either the same or differ by
excess or defect. Although fewer than fifteen lines before he had said
that whole animals are related as their parts are, here he qualifies his
previous statement and divides the parts of generically identical animals
into three categories, those that are the same, those that are present in
some and absent in others, and those, the majority, that differ by more
and less. We can envisage cases like the following: among species A,B,C,D
of a genus, A and B may have a certain part the same, which C has
to a lesser degree and D has not at all.15 Generic attributes that are
exactly the same represent the limiting case of more and less, and so
long as not all members of the genus share the same attribute to the
same extent, the more or less distinction stands, because it holds good
for the most part. At either end of the generic scale there will be attributes that are so little distinct between two animals as to be exactly
the same, or so much distinct that they are possessed to a negligible
degree by some members, and indeed are completely absent from them.'6
Evidence from the text overwhelmingly shows that some parts are more
widely distributed than others and that between two animals of the same
genus not all their parts need have exactly the same degree of difference. Indeed, this fact can be observed in the organization of the PA, for
while the internal parts of blooded animals are treated in common, their
external parts are treated separately for each greatest genus (p.YWTOV
yiVD', viviparous quadrupeds, oviparous quadrupeds, birds, fishes). Not
only within a genus are some parts more similar than others, some greatest
genera simply display a greater degree of internal similarity than others.
Aristotle's paradigm cases of genera, birds and fish, have by far most of
their parts the same or differing by more and less. This is especially so
with birds:
The differences of birds compared one with another are differences of magnitude,
and of the greater or smaller development of parts. Thus some have long legs,
others short legs; some have a broad tongue, others a narrow tongue; and so on
with the other parts. There are few of their parts that differ, taking birds by
15 Pellegrin prOVides a similar analysis in 1986b, 151.

16 This is suggested by Met. I.4, where the various fonns of opposition are arranged in
an order: contradictories, posseSSion/privation, contrariety, and relatives. The limiting
case of contrariety is possession/privation. See Pellegrin 1986a, 59-60.

themselves. But when birds are compared with other animals the parts present
differences of form also (Tfj flOp<j>fj TWV flopiwv). (PA IY.12 692b3-9)
Other genera, like viviparous quadrupeds, do not show this same degree
of internal unity.
At HA 11.1 497b6-12, Aristotle says that some organs and parts are
common to all animals, and some common only to a particular genus:

With regard to animals in general, some parts or organs are common to aU, as has
been said, and some are common only to particular genera ... For as a general rule
all animals that are generically distinct have the majority of their parts different
in form; and some of them they have analogically similar and diverse in genus,
while they have others that are alike in genus but specifically diversei and many
exist in some animals but not in others. 17
This passage clearly implies that if generically identical species can have
parts that are specifically the same, vary by degree, or are missing from
some members altogether, some parts of generically distinct animals will
be more closely related than others (e.g., the eyes of fish and birds are
more closely related than their scales and feathers)'8 Likewise, a part of
an animal in one genus may simply not have an analogue in an animal
of another genus. For example, cephalopods simply do not have analogues
of hair; testacea do not have analogues of lungs. Alternatively, a certain
17 The last part of the passage reads: UXEOOV yap oa-a y' fUTl yivEt Eupa TWV '~WV, Kat TO.
7TAftt1Ta rwv P.fPWV (Xft EUpa Tip dOft, I(al TO. ,!.tEV l(aT' avaAoyiav aOta.cpopa p.Ovov, Tlf yivEt
o EUpa. Til Of T~ yivEt }lfV TaVra r~ f!'Oft 0' fUpa.
18 The passage is nOt without controversy. In comparing it with HA 486al4--b22 quoted
above, Balme took issue with those who interpret them together and claim that
generically distinct animals have some partS generically distinct, others specifically
distinct (1962, 91): 'Thompson, ad loe.: "In the opening sentences, which must be read
together with those of Book I. brevity leads to a certain appearance of confusion: we
are reminded that a generic difference between two animals carries with it generic
difference between certain parts as wdl as specific difference between many others." But
the words which I have italicized are nOt in accord with I. 486316f. (above) . yivEt Eupa
are, for example, opw~ and 'XOvs (486a21 ). Their pans are to be compared ouu fWEt
OUTE KaO' inrfPOX~V I(al (hAEt",'V, ahAa I(ar' ava,).,oyiav ... 0 yap f V opvt8t 7TTfpOV. ToilTO
fV ;''X!JVl fO"T ~ hf1Tls. KaTa. ,!.tfv o~v .uDPla a. fXOtXnv (lC.aO"Ta TWIJ (~WIJ. TOVTOV roy rpinrov
fUpO. fO"Tll(a~ mimi (486bl8-23). The expression fUpa T<!J EWU, if used technically, is
applicable only to rivu Tairrcl (e.g. the difference between p1lX.pbv P1rtx0s and fJpaxjJ
frVrxos 486b10). Hence at 497blO lou cannot mean "species" but must either mean
"form" or be equivalent to yivEt (as at Cat . 1b16 TWV TEPOYfVWV . .. ETEpa TCf EWfl Kat
a1 ola$opai, cf. Top. l07b19).'

part shared by animals in two different genera may not be analogically,
but generically the same, for example, blood, which is shared by man,
viviparous quadrupeds, oviparous quadrupeds, and fish.19
In general, then, the relations of similarity among parts are fixed and
primary, and the similarity among whole animals is dependent upon these.
Since different parts have different extensions, there may be some ambiguity in assigning identity status to groups of whole animals. Since Balme
was concerned with problems of whole animal taxonomy, he tended to
devalue the importance of parts in determining identity status. Pellegrin,
by contrast, took the parts as primary. When a certain generic part is uncler
consideration, he argued, the animals which have that part form a genus,
and when a modification or species of that part is under consideration
the animals which have that part form a species. It follows that the same
animal group may be a species or a genus depending on which part is
under consideration. So, considered as an animal having a liver, birds form
a species of the genus blooded animals, but as having wings they are
a genus. The identity status of whole animals depends on the identity
status of parts, and these must be fixed. So, if a group of animals is called
a species, it is because the part that these animals have is a species, a
determination of a type; if they are called a genus, the part that they
have is a genus, a determinable type. To some extent, then, the passages
we have discussed corroborate Pellegrin's controversial thesis concerning
Aristotle's 'moriology: the claim that the parts of animals are ontologically
19 There is one statement which suggests that analogies are ubiquitous, since all similarities
between genera are analogues: TOVTO ~E 7rOLt:tV i1rl1TdCTul au pq.~tDlr TO. yap 'lTo.\M (~a
ava..\oyolJ
wf:rrov8f:v (PA 1.4 644a22-23). Peck translates: 'It is not easy to do this in
all cases, for the corresponding analogous parts of most groups of animals are identical.'
This is a rather difficult construal of the text, but he seems to mean that in most
animals (Le., between mOSt animals groups, however you take them) the proportional
relation is really identity (i.e., not analogy). So, e.g., as wing is to sparrow, so wing is to
finch, and the relationship, even if set in analogical form, is really identity. That is why
it is. difficult .to find genuine analogies, because most of them are really identities. If this
is what Peck has in mind, it strains the meaning of the words. The ROT translation ('It
is not easy to do this in all cases; for in most animals what is common is so by analogy';
W. Ogle) makes good sense of the last sentence, but it does not seem to fit the context.
The TOVTO 11"Otf:IV almost certainly refers back to the beginning of the chapter, meaning
that it is difficult to comprehend two groups into a single kind (so Balme 1972, 121),
and since it is difficult, presumably the common lot of men have not done it, and they
were right not to do so. The implication of the passage is that it is difficult to find a
common nature among distinct groups (animals that breathe do fonn such a common
nature). Among such groups analogy is a much more common relation. This passage,
then, does not constitute evidence that every transgeneric Similarity is an analogy.
ravTo

and epistemologically basic and that whole animals, species or genus, are
derivative.'o But when Pellegrin discusses analogy, he fails to apply this
scheme consistently and ignores the fact that analogy is a relationship that
exists between parts only, and not, as species and genus, between both parts
and wholes. While he rightly makes the genera of wholes dependent upon
their parts, when he treats analogy, he reverses the order of dependency
and makes the identity status of parts dependent on whole animals. He cites
the example of bone (to which I shall return) in order to show that under
one description a group of parts (bone and cartilage) may be considered
only analogically identical, while under another they may be generically
identical. He claims that there is no simple answer to the question whether
bone and cartilage are related analogically or by difference of degree, since
the contexts in which Aristotle talks of analogical difference are quite
different from those in which he talks of more and less. Inasmuch, he
says, as 'we have two genet .bony animals and cartilaginous animals,' there
is 'between them an analogical relation,,2l For Pellegrin, the determination
20 I cannot follow him in his argument regarding the use of the tenns genos and ddos
outside the programmatic passages for the reasons given at the beginning of the chapter.
Here Balme is basically correct: eido5 as used of whole animals very rarely designates
the technical 'species,' and the text does not support his claim that gene are ne<:essarily
divisible into cide, for suh.groups that are explicitly determinations of more extensive
groups are very frequently called gene {to provide just three examples from the HA,
which can easily be multipled: HA IV.1 523b27-29, all octopuses have a double row
of suckers, save for one genos; IV.8 534b12-15, the remaining gene of animals have
been divided into four gene (which is quite impossible on Pellegrin's reading); VI.12
566b12-13, many say that the porpoise is a genos of the dolphins). Throughout his
discussion (1986a, 94-106) Pellegrin's interpretations of the text are unconvincing.
21 1986a, 88. I quote the summary from his 1987, 328-9: 'Might one find in the notion
of analogy - which does not designate a class of animals - the fixed point which
would permit attributing to Aristotle at least the outline of a project of taxonomic
construction? What we have seen of this notion with respect to the logical usage of
concepts would seem to indicate that the answer must be "no", since analogy is a way
of going from one genos to another genos, and genos denotes classes of variable level.
Nevertheless one finds in Aristotle a doctrine which, in the biological corpus, opposes
analogical difference to difference "according to the more and the less" . .. But in the
Aristotelian conception, as we have seen, such a fixing is logically impossible. Thus as I
have just said analogy ought to be just as variable as genos. For, from the Aristotelian
point of view, it is impossible to say that the analogy feather-scale fixes the genos at
the level of "bird" or "fish ", but we must understand that feather and scale can be
called analogous as soon as one has decided to take "bird" and "fish" as gene. But if the
level called genos changes, which by definition it can do, analogy also changes level.
That is shown by a comparison of two passages, noted by Salme, located a few pages
apart in the Parts of Animals:

of genus ' is largely a matter of decision: 'from the moment one decides to
take' these groups as genera, parts common to both become analogous?2
But from a different perspective, he says, Aristotle considers the nature
and function of skeletons in general, and from this perspective 'bone and
cartilage are now two different "species" of material used by nature as
"support.'" Pellegrin's comments are brief and not altogether clear.23 He
The animals which do not have [boneJ have something analogous: in the fishes, for
example, in some there are spines, in others cartilage (11.8 653b35, after P.P.)
The nature of cartilage is the same as that of bone, but they differ according to the
more and the less. (11.9 655a33, after P.P.)
'Is there between cartilage and bone an analogical difference or a difference of degree?
That is not an Aristotelian ques tion. In the first case we have two gene, bony animals
and cartilaginous animals, which have between them an analogical relationship; but in
the second case the point of view is not the same. Chapter 9 studies the nature and
function of the skeleton: from this perspective bone and cartilage are two different
"species" of matter employed by nature as "suppOrt" of the body ... Within the
genos constituted by "parts" assuring the "support" of flesh, there are variations of
degree, particularly according to size and hardness, which relates, among others, to
the difference between bone and cartilage. And one may find other examples of these
changes in perspective which have the effect of "declassing" the analogical relationship,
even if these examples are less explicit from a terminological point of view. Compare
two texts :
In some animals the parts are not of the same ddos and do not differ by excess and
defect, but differ by analogy: that is the case, for example, of bone in relation to spine,
of nail in relation to hoof .. . (HA I.l 486b17, after P.P.)
We have here an example very close to the doctrine which we found above at PA
644a16 [not quoted here]: that which is nail for genos A, is hoof for genos B. But as in
the example given above, the point of view can change:
There are some parts which to the touch resemble bone, for example nails, hoofs, claws
of lobsters, horns, beaks of birds. All these parts at e possessed by animals for their
defense. (PA 11.9 655h2)
Although he does not say so explicitly, Aristotle now considers these different parts as
eide of the genos "organs of defense", and from this perspective nail and hoof are no
longer analogous. One may even suppose that when a little later Aristotle reminds us
that these parts are all composed of earth (655bll), that is a way of saying that they
form one genos:
22 1986a, 88: 'A logical examination of the concepts of genos and analogia shows us .
that feather and scale can be said to be analogues from the moment one decides to take
"bird" and "fish" as gene.' The italics are Pellegrin's.
23 The immediate context of the passage he quotes for this second perspective, PA 11.9
655a32-34, discusses the use of bone and cartilage in the same animal (i.e., in addition
to bones, we have cartilage which supports our ears and nose) .

seems to be aiming at a contrast between the way parts are treated when
they are considered as parts of animals of different genera (analogues)
and when they are considered as a group of parts that perform the same
function (members of a genus). Considered just as flesh support they differ
by the more and the less, harder and softer, and as such they are species
of a genus. But inasmuch as they discharge the same function in different
genera of animals, they are analogically related.
Taking another example, Pellegrin claims that the organs made of nail
stuff, including teeth, can be considered as species of the genus 'organs of
defence,' so making analogous organs fall into a single genus (EVTOlmp ni>
YEVEl 655b8). But inasmuch as they appear in different animal genera they
are considered analogous. This cannot be right. For while nail, horn, hoof,
claw, and bird beak are clearly made of a similar material necessitated by
their being defensive organs, Aristotle never says they are all analogues.
In fact, only nails, hooves, and claws are.24
For Pellegrin a solution lies ready at hand. It is one of the central
theses of his book and later work that the identity status of whole animals
depends upon the identity status of their parts. 25 Thus if we decide to take
a certain part as a genus, it will logically follow that the animals that have
this part will form a genus. This whole edifice falls unless it is based upon
the fixed identity status of parts, and for this reason Pellegrin should not
have abandoned this principle when dealing with analogy. According to his
general argument, Pellegrin should say that bony and cartilaginous animals
are placed in different genera only if the parts they have, bone and cartilage,
are generically different. He should remain faithful to this general principle
and claim that just as genus applies primarily to parts, and derivatively to
whole animals, so also analogy applies to parts first and foremost, and
is not something that logically follows from a predetermination that ' two
groups of whole animals constitute different genera. This position is more
in accordance with the spirit of his interpretation and the evidence from
the text. So, from the general argument provided by Pellegrin, we can
see that the relativists, since they are relativists only in regard to whole
animals and not in regard to parts, have no need to insist on the relativity
of analogy. Analogues are fixed at the level of parts, a wing just is an
24 Aristotle says (PA II.9 65Sb2-4; HA IILll 517b21-26) that nail etc. are the same as
bone with respect to hardness or to the touch, but at HA III.9 517a6-10 he goes $0 far
as to say that though these parts do not have the same nature, it is not too far removed
from that of cartilage and bone.
25 Pellegrin 1986a, 1987.

analogue of a fin, hair of scale, and so on. Pellegrin is generally correct
about the primacy of parts in determining group affiliation in the HA and
the PA. HA I- IV and PA II-IV are, after all, about parts, so it is natural
that the animals should be discussed in these terms."
2. Difficult Cases
Though the relativists, in order to maintain their basic thesis concerning
the primacy of parts over wholes, must"concede that the identity relation
between analogues is absolutely fixed and unchanging, there are several

cases in
which the demarcation between analogy and genus seems far from
fixed. For example, the distinction between flesh (TCipt) and its analogue
usually follows that between blood and its analogue (PA III.5 668a25-27;
HA 1.4 489a23-26). But on one occasion Aristotle divides among blooded
animals, and makes the division correspond to bone and fish-spine, thus
making fish-flesh only analogous to other blooded flesh rather than generically identical (HA II1.16 519b26-30). Likewise, there are variant accounts
about chests (aTijea,). On the one hand, 'all animals have a part analogous
to the chest in man, but not similar to his; for the chest in man is broad, but
that of all other animals is narrow. Moreover, no other animal but man has
breasts in front; the elephant, certainly, has two breasts, not however in
the chest, but near it' (HA I1.1497b33-498a2; d. HA 11.12 503b29-32). The
difference in the arrangement of the elements of the parts and the shape
of the whole parts are sufficient in this case to make the parts analogous.
Since the breasts are the major component of the chest in man, and this is
a major part of what chest is, without the breasts 'chest' can only deSignate
a position.27 Alternatively, when all perfect animals are divided in three
parts, the middle is called the chest in the largest animals, and in others
it is the analogue Uuv. 2 468a13- 17). In this context, the chest is invoked
26 For good reasons we need not, and should not, follow him in his ontological claim:
Aristotle clearly says that the whole individual C!idos is primary (PA I.4644a23-27).
Moreover, pans are often the explananda, not the explanantia, and so ultimi'!!ely may
not form pan of the definition of the animal. While pans are methodologically the first
way of looking at animals, they are not the last or best way. Cf. also G.E.R. Lloyd
1990.
27 Cf. HA I.12 493a12-16, which mentions the breasts as the only component of the chest:
'Next after the neck in the front part is the chest, with a pair of breasts. To each of the
breasts is attached a nipple, through which in the case of females the milk percolates;
and the breast is soft. Milk is found at times in the male; but with the male the flesh
of the breast is tough, with the female it is spongy and porous.'

as the seat of the nutritive faculty. Thus, the demarcation between chest
and its analogue can be drawn either (i) between man and other animals,
or (ii) between big perfect animals and other perfect animals.
Again, there are two quite different levels of analogy among wombs.
Copulating female insects frequently have a part that is extended into the
male, and this is called an analogue of a womb (GA 11.4 739a18-20). In what
is obviously a remoter analogy, an eggshell is also called an analogue of the
womb (GA 111.2 753b35-754a3). Some analogues even extend beyond animals. Without giving explicit examples Aristotle says that mouths among
animals may be analogous (HA 1.2 488b29- 32), but more remotely, the
roots of plants are analogous to the mouth in animals (Juv. 1 468a9-12).
It is clear from these examples that analogical distinctions can be made
at different levels, and that there is no precise degree of similarity that

characterizes analogous parts.
As a result, Aristotle is sometimes not clear whether the relationship is
one of analogy or something closer. Urchins have black fonnations attached

to the starting point of the teeth. Other animals like tortoises, toads,
frogs, and cephalopods have something like this or analogous (rowvrov
i) .lv/IAoyov HA IV.S S30b31-33). We may compare this to the case of
fish-flesh above, which may be considered either analogously or generically
related to the flesh of other blooded animals.
These cases present an important challenge to the fiXity of analogy and
genus, and suggest that the distinction is universally interchangeable or
relative. However, most analogues do not admit of these variations, and
there are good reasons why these cases are peculiar. Each part has a definition in accordance with its name (AOYOS- Karel TOVVO/la), and for most parts
the essential features of the definition are clear enough. But with some
parts, and especially those with nameless analogues, it is often difficult to
set a demarcation with exact precision, and sometimes essential features
float in and out of the definition according to the demands of grouping and
explanation. So chest may be defined either as the place where breasts are
located or as the seat of nutrition. Because named analogues like wing and
fin pick out clearly defined objects, there is never a question whether these
are analogues or form a genus. A nameless analogue, however, is invoked
because, though it corresponds to the named part, Aristotle feel s that it

is inappropriate to extend that name to it. In these cases the demarcation
has not been set by common usage. Without a definite contrast pair, the
definition of one member may vary. While this flux in definition is quite
marked in the cases of analogues, it is endemic to Aristotle's whole method,
which does not provide full definitions from the outset, but uses partial
definitions in an often ad hoc manner.

3. Analogues and the More and Less
Having considered the arguments of the relativists we must now turn to

the functionalists, and show that analogy involves not only identity of
function, but also material and structural similarities. 28
Most commentators have recognized that analogues exhibit material
similarities that may be characterized by the more and the less, and this is
the source of the problem of analogy. It hardly needs lengthy proof and a
few examples will suffice: bone and cartilage, though they are analogues,
share the same nature and are related by the more and the less, bone
being earthier and harder than cartilage (PA [1.9 655a23-34). Feathers,
hair, and scale all arise from the moist material under the skin (GA V.3
783b2-8). Talons and hooves are made of the same basic horny material
(PA [1.9 655b2-4). Blood and its analogue have a close material relation:
'The watery part of the blood is serum xwp), either owing to its not being
yet concocted, or owing to its having become corrupted' (PA [1.4 651a1718). Blood is a further concoction of ichor together with fibre, which is
added or formed in the concoction, and this fibre aids coagulation in the
blood (HA [[[.19 521a17-18; 520b25-26). The blood of the very young
is ichor-like (521a32-33). Ichor is at once materially similar to blood and
the analogue of blood. As Aristotle says, even among animals in different
genera there are common affections (EOT' yap fmQ, 7ra8'r] /cOLVa Kal. TOVTOtSPA 1.4 644al4-16).29
.
4. Analogues and Position
While the material similarities are notorious, the importance of position,

the arrangement of a constituent part within a whole, in determining
analogues has been underrated. 30 But the importance of. position is not
28 In the following review I have nOt included uses of a1.'Ti or any other looser expression
where one part is substituted for another that performs the same function. To do so
would immediately prejudice the results in favour of a purely functional interpretation
of analogy. I do not assume that Aristotle explicitly used avaAOYov on every appropriate
occasion, any more than he explicitly calls every genos YfllOr and so on, but any
even-handed study must start from his actual use of the tenn .
29 Among other examples that indicate the material similarity of analogues, we find DA
11.11 423aI2-15: 'For no living body could be constructed o f air or water; it must be
something solid. Consequently it must be composed of earth along with these, which is
just what flesh and its ana/oglle tend to be.'
30 Richard Owen (1804-92) first drew the distinction between homology (structures
differing in function and appearance but deriving from the same part in the 'archetype')

surprising, when we consider that the organization of the HA and the PA
is largely based on the position of parts within animals. Analogous organs
in generically different animals cannot, of course, have identi cal positions,
since the position is always relative to the particular kind, but their positions can correspond. While viviparous quadrupeds have hair, oviparous
quadrupeds have the analogue horny scales: these scales correspond in

position (o!,owv XWp'f) with the scales of fishes (PA IV.U 691a16).31
Still, neither similarity of function nor similarity of position is individually a sufficient condition of analogy. For a function may be discharged
by a variety of different parts without those parts being called analogous.
And though parts may occupy the same relative position, they are not
necessarily analogues. Humans have hands (X"P), and polydactylous
animals have paws closely analogous to hands (jJ.a.)"'TTa ava.,\oyov HA
[1.1 497bl8-20). For they use their paws for some of the same functions
as hands, such as grasping things and defending themselves (PA IV.10
687b28-688a2). Aristotle draws a contrast between them and hooved animals, which explicitly do not have such analogues (PA IV.10 688a2-4).
They have forelegs (7rpou$,a) instead of arms (avTl TWV /3paX'ovwv HA
II.l 497b18-19). So, even though the forelegs occupy the same relative
position, since they do not perform the same function as hands, they cannot
be analogues.
Conversely, though hooved animals use their back legs for defence (PA
IV.lO 688a2), these are not called analogous, because, even though they
perform some of the same functions as hands, they are not in the same
relative position. Again, though elephants have a trunk (jJ.VKT~p) instead

of a hand, it is never called analogous (HA II.l 497b26-27), in spite of the
fact that the elephant uses it as a hand (PA 11.16 658b35-36). Likewise,
mouths and teeth are used for defence, but are not called analogous to
.
hands (PA III.1 661b3-6).
By contrast nail (iivvt) and hoof (67r'\~) are analogous (HA I.l486b20).
Both are organs of defence (PA 11.9 655b4-5), but this is not sufficient
and analogy (structures performing similar functions, but not necessarily derived from
the modification of one and the same part in the 'plan' or 'archetype' according to
which the 'two animals compared were supposed to be constructed). Aristotle does .not
make a distinction between homology and analogy. His examples, however, are usually
obvious cases of homology rather than analogy, although they do not involve the
notion of archetype. LeBlond mistakenly claims that Aristotle did draw this distinction
(1973, 221). Nor is Aristotle concerned with visible fonns of ideal prototypes (contra
Thompson 1929, 55; d. Lennox 1980, 327-9).
31 Cf. wings and fins at fA 18 714b3-7.

to make them analogues for it is clear that they occupy similar relative
1
positions and are made of similar material (655b4-15).

Even among internal organs, analogues share relative position in ad~
dition to having similar material constituents . The most frequently men-
tioned are the heart, blood, blood vessel, and flesh and their analogues.
Together they form the most basic nutritive and sensitive system of an
animal. Heart and its analogue are the principle of nutrition, movement,
and sensation; flesh and its analogue are the medium of touch. Blood and
its analogue are food for flesh and its analogue, and must be contained in a
blood vessel or its analogue. Among these analogues shared function is not
the only consideration. The /lUTtS in cephalopods is clearly the analogue
of the heart because it occupies the same position (PA IV.5 681b28-30
furl TO aVO,AOrOV Tff KapOiq. TOVTO TO jJ.0PLOV, 017AOL (; T07TOS' (O~TOS'
yap f(rnV 0 aUTOS)). 2 The position of the P:UTtS' is not incidental to its
on o
function: the heart and its analogue occupy the central position of the
body, because they are the sources of control (PA IV.5 681b33-34). Again,
the fact that the fluid in the /lUTtS is sweet and has undergone concoction
shows that it is the analogue of blood. 33 Likewise, it is necessary that blood
and its analogue should be contained in a vessel (PA III.5 667b18- 20). At
HA 1.4 489a19-22 Aristotle mentions various similarities between blood
(aT/la) and its analogue, ichor (ixwp).34 They are both found throughout
the body, and they exhibit various material similarities. But ichor, when
present in blooded animals, does not serve the same function as blood. It
is only as parts of systems that parts can be analogous.
The brain is the only clear case of an inference to the existence of an
analogous organ on the basis of principle without any perceptible evidence

of position or material. All animals have sense perception, and since no
activity can be continuous, sense perception must occasionally rest, and
this state is called sleep. Although Aristotle cannot say with certainty
that all animals sleep, he accounts for those in which sleep is observed,
namely all the blooded animals, cephalopods, and insects, and says that
if his argument from sensation is persuasive (7HeaVOS'), it will persuade
32 That position plays an important role in analogy was recognized and briefly commented
on by Lones (1912, 211): 'It cannot be decided to what extent, if any, Aristotle was
thinking of the plan of structure of the parts, when he compared them [by analogy], but
it is clear that he was rderring chiefly to their functi ons, positions, and mere external
resemblances.' Cf. also Leblond 1945, 41-2.
33 For sweetness of the blood, HA III.19 520bl8-19.
34 Elsewhere he mentions the counterpart of blood without calling it ichor (e.g ., 645b8-10,
648a4-5, 650a34-35). At PA IVA 678a8-9 blood's analogue is said to be without name.

us that testacea sleep as well, though their sleep is not evident (Somn. 1
454bl4-23). Moreover, he explicitly makes the assumption that the causes
of sleep are the same or analogous in blooded and bloodless animals, and are
the same in blooded animals as in man (Somn. 2 455b32-33: inroil:rI7TTov
ivat TO. aina TOU 1Tci8ovs. ~ ravro'ry TO. Q.vaAoyov TOtS B' Vai}lOLf!: a.7f'fP TOtS
av8pw7ToLS). Nevertheless, he never mentions any features of the analogous
parts, except to say that since the bloodless animals lack blood, they have
little heat, and so presumably require smaller brain analogues. Aristotle
seems more certain in the PA that bloodless animals have an analogue of
the brain (PA Il.7 653a10--12). But apart from the octopus he mentions no
case of a brain analogue (652b23-25). It is clear that if Aristotle did not
see the brains of bloodless animals, then they could hardly be generically
related, that is, related by difference of degree. Nevertheless we can assume
that, since sleep is caused by the rising vapours of food to the brain, brain
analogues will have to be situated in the upper region of rhe body. Thus,
while analogues frequently exhibit obvious perceprual similarities, in this
case they are assumed on the basis of a principle. Although Aristotle does
not discuss how bloodless animals sleep, it is clear from his assumption of
a brain analogue that he supposed that the mechanism and position would
be much the same as in blooded animals.
There are examples of more remote analogies. An eggshell is called an
analogue of a womb (GA III.2 753b35-754a5), but even this is not a purely
functional analogy. The embryo must be in contact with the mother, and
in the case of the egg the mother is in the womb, namely the yolk in
the egg. But in spite of the inversion the analogy is partly based on the
similarity of structure, since the womb and its analogue, the shell, enclose
and protect the embryo.
Even the roots of plants, which are the analogue of the mouth, are in
the same relative position Uuv. 1468a9-12), since plants are simply upside
down (PA IV.IO 686b31-687a1) . The notion of shared relative position is
so basic to analogy that Aristotle is willing to view plants as inverted
animals to achieve the parallel.
5. Analogy of Function
So it is clear that analogues are based on more than shared function. But
even the function that analogues share cannot be identical, for there are
analogies of functions as well as of parts. Alrhough the passage is neither
clear nor consistent, Aristotle at least recognizes that activities (7TpatHS')
may be analogically, generically, or specifically identical (PA 1.5 645b20-28):

We have, then, first to describe the common activities, and those which belong to
a genus or to a species. By 'common' I mean those which belong to all animals;
by 'to a genus,' those of animals whose differences from one another we see to
be matters of degree - Bird is a genus. Man is a species, and 50 is everything not
differentiated into subordinate groups. In the first case the common attributes may
be called analogous, in the second generic, in the third specific.
If we can assume that Aristotle is talking about activities throughout this

passage, then the 'common activities' in the first line is to be glossed by
'analogically,' as he explains in the last sentence. It is strange that he explains commonality in terms of whole animals rather than their activities,
but perhaps we can suppose that he has in mind generic bird activities and
specific human activities. Elsewhere Aristotle considers the pOSSibility that
plants perform an action analogous to sleep (GA V.1 779a2-4). Although
he thinks this is a far-fetched analogy, he does not say that functions
cannot have analogues.
Other passages make the same point more clearly. Along with the
activities, the ways of life (f3iOL) and habits (~e~) are said to admit of the
same kinds of identity as the parts (HA VII (VIII).l 588a25-31). But little
actual use is made of the scheme. Most of the habits seem simply to be
shared more and less among various animals. This is because the analysis
by activities and habits tends to ignore the instrumental parts, and so the
correspondence between the parts on the one hand and the activities and
habits on the other becomes less clear, especially with the emotions. The
exception is intelligence, which man has primarily and the other animals
have analogically. Aristotle draws correspondences between intelligence
and material conditions. Art (T'XV~), wisdom (rro<j>ia), and understanding
(UVVULS-) are peculiar to man, but other animals have analogues. In general,
colder and thinner blood is conducive to sensation and intelligence, and
the same applies to the analogue of blood in bloodless animals. So bees are
intelligent (<j>POVL!'OL) because of the coldness and thinness of their blood
analogue (PA 11.2 648a4-8).
While it is easy to see how the function of walking is determined
by the particular material constitution of the leg, it is much less easy
to see how psychological functions like thought and the emotions could
have analogues, and for this reason Aristotle rightly leaves this part of his
scheme undeveloped. Nevertheless, analogues of function limit the degree
to which parts that perform these functions can be the same, and make clear
that Aristotle did not intend the functions to serve as higher genera under
which the analogues could be species. If functions can be analogues, they
cannot be abstracted from the instrument that performs them. Walking,

for instance, is a function that only legs can perform, and only wings can
fly. Since the function of parts cannot be considered separately from those
parts, function cannot provide the genus-creating unity that the orthodox
account (or Pellegrin) suggests.
6. Genus as Matter
Like the functionalist account we just considered the genus-as-matter approach tries to establish a clear demarcation between generic and analogical
identity, but it rejects as arbitrary or ad hoc the more and less criterion.
Instead it finds an empirical solution in certain facts about embryological development. Aristotle does, in fact, provide some tantalizing hints
that embryos develop towards greater articulation and specification from
a more common and generic form . But according to the genus-as-matter
interpretation there is some point in their development when all embryos
of a genus will have a common form that later becomes differentiated into
the various specific forms. This common form is the matter for further
differentiation, and will be different for each genus. Thus birds are generated from bird matter, fish from fish matter, and so on. If this were true,
then generic boundaries could be determined by a thorough study of the
embryos.
There are two variations on this account, corresponding to two rather
different views of division. The first treats the differentiations on the model
of Metaphysics Z.12 and successive divisions, for instance, footed, clovenfooted. On this model embryos become successively differentiated from a
common genus, and the history of this development can establish those
common attributes that are truly generic from those that are analogicaL 35
The second account begins from the system of differentiation laid out in
PA 1.2-4. 36 Starting from a group of generic characteristics that all embryos
of a genus have in common, each species takes on its specific differences.
This account would seem to be more consistent with the basic approach of
the biological works. Both accounts, however, face the problem that there
is no clear evidence in the GA that Aristotle seriously tried to establish or
A.c. Lloyd (1962) argues for a physical process of differentiation from the genus that
he identifies with matter to the ultimate species, identified with fonn. M. Grene (1974)
has pointed out difficulties that Lloyd and those who identify matter and genus face.
Though there are clearly passages where they are identified (Met. 6..28 1024b6-9; Z.12
1038a3-9; H.6 1045al4-25; 1.8 1058a21-26), it is not dear that matter must mean
material substrate. While these kinds of genus may be related by analogy, they are not
the same (Grene 1974, 65).
36 Once championed by Lennox: 1987h, 358. Since that time he has repudiated this view,
hut it is important to consider it for the lessons it teaches about analogy.
35

justify his demarcations through an appeal to the facts of embryological
development.
While Aristotle does discuss the order of development in individual
cases, there is no mention of fish matter or bird matter becoming specified,
and instead he confines himself to the order in which different parts of an
organism develop. He makes use of the basic principle that parts which
make other parts (i.e., the heart) must be the first to be formed; parts that
are the purpose of the animal (i.e., organs of sensation) are formed second,
and finally those parts that are instrumental to the end (e.g., legs, viscera)
are formed last (GA II.6 742a18-b17). He addresses his remarks here at
a very high level of generality, and he believes that this basic order is a
common feature of all animals. He clearly cannot have intended the order
of development as a practicable empirical criterion, since he express ly says
he has observed the formation of the heart only in blooded animals Uuv.
3 468b28-30), and nowhere does he consider specific differentiations from
a generic type.
The only suggestive evidence within the biological works is the passage
at GA II.6 743b18- 25:
The upper half of the body, then, is first marked out in the order of development; as
time goes on the lower also reaches its full size in the sanguinea. All the parts are
first marked out in their outlines (a7To.vTa. Of TatS 7Tfptypacpa'is OtOpiCTo.t 7TPOTPOV)
and acquire later on their colour and softness or hardness, exactly as if nature were
a painter producing a work of art, for painters, too, first sketch in the animal with
lines and only after that put in the colours.
Though this passage offers some superficial support for the position, the
genus that is differentiated here is animal, not one of the greatest genera.
Yet it was essential for the argument that it be the matter of the greatest
genera that is differentiated, if the matter is to be that which distinguishes
the genera. In fact, all of the parts whose development Aristotle describes
in this chapter are parts common to all animals, and not generic parts or
attributes at all. ROT translates a:rravTa as referring to all the parts, but
this passage as a whole is found in a discussion about the formation of
homoiomerous parts, and Aristotle is describing the changes that occur
in the nutriment to form these parts. It is far more likely then that
Q.7TavTa refers to these homoiomerous parts, and this is corroborated by the
differences these parts later take on: differences of hardness and colour are
associated with flesh, skin, nails, and so on. 37 And homoiomerous parts,
37 Cf. GA Its 741bll-lS, which clearly says as much.

as we have observed "above,. have only a very loose correspondence to the
greatest genera of whole animals.
The strongest argument against the genus-as-matter view is that it
would entail that all parts of two different genera could only be analogically
identical, which seems unlikely in view of the evidence adduced above.
When the matter of each genus is what separates the genera from one
another and all the parts of each genus are generated out of this matter,
analogy can be the only level of identity among parts of animals of different
genera.
To look to embryological development to solve the problem of generic
identity is to ignore more obvious evidence close at hand. The genera of animals are distinguished by their external form. The fact that some animals
are internally and externally viviparous, others oviparous or laxviparoll5
simply corroborates most of the other internal and external differences. Not
only is the embryological approach implausible, it is contrary to Aristotle's
stated method (PA I.1 640a10-19), which begins by taking the phenomena,
then goes on to consider how each animal comes to be formed. 38 From such
material and efficient causes we can explain and demonstrate the phenomena, but it would be a mistake to suppose that we can use embryological
research to establish or justify the demarcations. 39
Although Aristotle did not exploit the physical application of the
genus-as-matter approach, the logical formulation, in which, for example, hooked beak is a differentiation of the generic beak, turns out to be
very important, since it provides the basis of an order of explanation that
distinguishes analogical from generic similarities. Differentiations of a part
must be treated together, and different parts must be treated separately.
The logical formulation distinguishes these patterns on the basis of the
adult form rather than embryological development, and ultimately what
38 A similar point is made by Preus 1983, 344. Preus treats the 'genotypiC' (roughly
the account through embryological development) and the 'phenotypic' (common-sense
divisions of genera) to be rival methods of classifying animals, rather than two parts of
an explanation of phenomena.
39 Compare what Balme (1961, 208) says about the dualiZing animals: 'They are not
dismissed as exceptions that prove the rule, nor are they assigned to both sides of a
division .. . [T]hey compel a more precise definition of the division ... Their proper
grouping is rarely decided, and they seem to be brought into the discussions, not in
order to be classified, but in order to bring out sharper distinctions in the differentiae
concerned, or more precise statements of the ways in which the differentiae can be
combined.' Aristotle's method allows for increased accuracy and finer distinctions, but
even in a thoroughly empirical study such as biology, common-sense distinctions must
remain more or less intact.

qualifies as a variation or an entirely different part is a matter of definition
and first principle.

The physical and logical formulations of the genus-as-matter interpretation correspond to two different notions of potentiality. Aristotle in the
GA traces the development of embryos from menstrual fluid (KaTaI':'Ivia)
to the articulated organism. This development involves a transformation
of matter and potentiality through the addition of form: Karal''lvia is the
matter and potentiality for the formation of homoiomerous parts. The
matter and potentiality in this case is a substrate for transformation, and
as such is quite different from the kind of genus that is determined by
the more and the less. For in the latter case there is no transformation, only a specification of a more general form. This general form is
a potentiality, but it is not a potentiality to be transformed as KaTa/J:ryvia
is transformed into flesh or skin: a long or short wing is still actually
a wing, whereas KaTafJ.1Jvia transformed into flesh is no longer actually
KUTuIlTfvia.
A Solution
Aristotle, then, recognizes analogy as a legitimate and distinct level of generality based on perceptible similarities as well as functions. The weakness
of the functionalist, the relativist, and the genus-as-matter interpretations
is their failure to provide a convincing theoretical framework that accommodates these facts.
Analogy was not always a part of Aristotle's system of identity and
difference. Neither the Categories nor the Topics makes use of it. 40 But in
the biological works, as we have seen, it is clearly introduced in contrast to
the relationship between genus and species. However inadequate the more
and less is as a criterion of generic identity, the very fact that Aristotle
invokes it shows that he intends the species-genus and the genus-analogy
relationships to be different. The relationship between genus and analogy is not intended to be a recapitulation of the relationship between
genus and species, and the efforts to make it so, especially to view analogy as a functional genus, silence Aristotle on a point he seems urgent
to make.
A simple observation about the species-genus-analogy hierarchy may
serve as a starting point towards providing a reason for this difference. The
species-genus-analogy system (let us call this the SGA system) is a narrow
40 If these works are early and represent a pre.hylomorphic stage of Aristotle's thought,
there is good reason, as we shall see below, for the absence of analogy in them.

and limited system'! Although species, genus, and analogy represent different levels of generality, the hierarchy cannot be expanded upward or
downward. We do not find extended divisions of successive genus and
species terms as we do with dichotomy. The system of multiple generic
differentiae discussed in PA I has done away with that. As a result we find
the following sort of SGA string:
analogy
genus
species
wing: bird: :fin: fish

wing
long wing
The system is limited to three and only three steps, and there is nothing more specific than long wing or more general than the analogy,
wing:bird: :fin:fish. It is also a narrow system in the sense that the genus
term appears at all three levels of generality. These genus terms are particular denominated parts: wing, blood, hoof, and so on. They form the pivot
or centre of the system, and of these there are determinations of 7Tae~fJ.aTa
(species) and correspondences (analogues).
The parts, which are the cornerstone of the system, are those picked
out by common language. What Aristotle says concerning whole animals
(PA 1.3 643b10-13) applies equally to the parts:
We must attempt to recognize the natural groups, following the indications afforded
by the instincts of mankind, which led them for instance to form the class of Birds
and the class of Fishes, each of which groups combines a multitude of differentiae,
and is not defined by a single one as in dichotomy.
The common names pick out the appropriate groups, and although birds
and fish share some common features, these groups should be separated and
variations on the basic type should be taken together (PA 1.4 644a12-23).
Importantly, the various great genera of animals are not in turn species
of some higher genus like animal, nor are they distinguished among
themselves by contraty differentiae of more and less. Instead, birds are
defined by the generic differentiae 'having wings: 'having beaks: and so
on. The sum of these differentiae provides an autonomous characterization
of the genus defined in its own terms rather than by its difference from
other genera. Each genus, then, is other than, and not different from,
the other genera. The situation is exactly similar with the parts. Aristotle
41 Balme 1962, 88-9, makes this observation in support of his claim that the eidos' and
genos are not used in the biological works as they are in the logical works.

consistently uses common names and maintains the common distinctions
between them. Each part constitutes a genus and is defined by its generic
differentiae. Each is autonomous and other than, rather than different
from, all others. Since difference operates only within the genus, it follows that one generic part cannot differ from another by more and less.
Conversely, a part may differ by more and less only within the determinate
limits of the genus. For a wing can be a long wing or a short wing, but
it cannot be modified so as to cease to be a wing. The requirement that
a part must remain what it is in spite of its modification is reflected in
the way Aristotle describes the more and less in the passage from HA 1.1:
they are contraries of affections vavnw<Tm TWV 7[aOTlI'Q.TwV 486b5). For

7Tae~J.1.ara are 'characteristically opposed to QV(J'ia. 42 As a result, Aristotle
has expressed in the choice of terms that variations of more and less can
never bring about a change in the substance of the part. Aristotle says that
some flesh is soft, some hard, some things have the bill long, others have
it short. Soft, hard, long, short are differentiae of the genus, and yet they
are hardly constitutive of the genus. For the 'what-is-it' of flesh or bill is
not its hardness or shortness, but its function and so on. Certainly many
of the variations are essential features of species of the genus, especially
when they are confirmed by causes (e.g., birds of prey have hooked beaks,
because they are rapinous), but at the generic level the variations do not
affect the essence of the genus 3
42 Cf. also for the same idea HA 1.6 491a19 SI.a.r;f>if)E' TWV .7Ta.8-qp.6..WU (vo.unoTl]n. Bonitz's
Index cites Met. A.4 985b1D-13: 'And as those who make the underlying substance one
generate all other things by its modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be
the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences
in the elements are the causes of all the other qualities' (Ka.6o.'7I'EP oi EV 71'OWVVTES' ~u
inroKHllill1Jv oWiw T(~.\Aa TOtS' 71'0.8(o'lV aUrijS' yt'VVWul, TO 1Ul1l0V Kal TO '7I'1JKlIOll D.pXo.<;
n8illVO~ TWV '7I'a91tJuiTwv). The rare and the dense are not themselves '7I'u8lj,uara, but
are the principles or sources of the 1Tu8lj,uura. The 1Ta8~,uara are the great variety of
phenomenal qualities that are generat~d from a limited group of apxui.. Most important
is the contrast between the U1TOKtlliv'J] OV(1'LU and the '7I'u8lj,uum. It is the substance and
not the 7TO.8lj,uam that is essential and answers to the 'what-is-it.' Peck is surely wrong
in identifying these as secondary sex-characteristics (1965, 5 n.(b)). Further evidence for
this view of 1Ta8lj,uara comes from Phys. V.2 226a26-29, where modification (d..\Aoiw(nS')
is defined as change in respect of quality and as 'alteration in respect of affection.'
As Kirwan points out, when Aristotle says at Met. 6. 211022b15- 18 that the '7I'0.80S'
(and as Bonitz points out [Index, 554a56-b23], Aristotle's use of 71'&.80S' and 71'a.91t,ua is
promiscuous) is a quality in accordance with which a thing is capable of undergOing
alteration, he implies that there are qualities in accordance with which a thing is not
capable of undergoing alteration, namely essential differentiae (Kirwan 1993, 171).
43 Aristotle mentions 7Ta8lj,uara at the beginning of GA V like blue and dark colour of
eyes, high and deep pitch of the voice, colour of feathers and hair, that is, differences

The SGA system is one of the great organizational hierarchies in the
biological works. It is a system of identity and difference dependent upon
the genus term, and each genus is autonomous and incommensurable with
every other genus. But just because there are no relations of difference
between one genus and another does not mean that there are no relations
at all between genera. For all these genera are organized in the other great
hierarchy, the hierarchy of composition, the whole-parts (WP) system.
Aristotle describes this at the beginning of HA 1.1 (486a5-14) and PA Il.1
(646a13-24), and it is clear that it informs the conception and presentation
of the biological works. Whole animals, like birds and fish, are constituted
from complex parts, like wing, fin, stomach, hand, kidney, and so on. In
tum these are made of homoiomerous or simple parts, feather, scale, skin,
horn, flesh, bone, etc., which are shaped from stuffs often of the same
name, horn, blood vessel, bone, ichor, etc., and these finally arise from the
powers or 3vvaJ.'Ets, hot, cold, sticky, brittle, wet, dry, etc.:
Whole animals
Complex parts
Birds
wing
Simple parts
feather
Simple stuffs
horn
Powers
hot
cold
Fish
fin
Testacea
stomach
scale
flesh
flesh
bone
sticky
brittle
Crustacea
hand
tooth
kidney
skin
blood
wet
dry
To some extent this is an organizational hierarchy of matter and form. Each
item consists of matter from a lower level and is formally detennined by

its contribution to a higher level. Nevertheless, it does not distinguish and
separate the formal and material components of each part; each level is
simply a more highly organized hylomorphic compound. Primarily it is
a hierarchical system of biological subjects. Each of the terms provides
subjects for biological predicates or serves as a predicate for some other
term on the table. At various places in the biological works Aristotle talks
about the attributes of blood, kidneys, wings, and birds. These are the
entities whose existence must be hypothesized and whose -essence must be
defined 4 ' As such, they serve as the first principles of this part of biological
science, and this is why they are introduced first in both the HA and the
that do not make for differences in species. These 'Iralhjp.am are not species-creatin&
because they are not backed by teleological causes (Lennox 1980) . They are 71"a87/p.ara
not only with respect to the genus, hut also with respect to the species.
44 These are the hypotheses and definitions discussed in APo 1.2 72a14-24.

PA. If Aristotle does not expressly posit their existence or provide their
definitions, that is not unusual, for as he says at APo 1.10 76b16-19:
Nothing, however, prevents some sciences from overlooking some of these things
[statement of principles}, - e.g. from not supposing that its genus is, if it is evident
that it is (for it is not equally clear that number is and that hot and cold is).
Each of these parts has per se predicates that belong to it qua itself, and
each is found in the demonstrations characteristic of the PA. Each of the
levels of the table provides definable subjects, and none can be reduced to
another: wholes cannot be eliminatively reduced to their component parts.
Moreover, it is dear that Aristotle intended to map the SGA system onto
the WP system. He explicitly describes this mapping in HA 1.1 (486al4487a10), where he first discusses the SGA levels of complex parts, then
the SGA levels of simple parts: we find species, genus, and analogy at the
middle levels of the whole-parts system, the complex and simple parts.
We do not find analogy at the level of whole animals for reasons already
considered, and we do not find analogues at the level of powers for reasons
that will be important below.
Since the WP system is a system of composition, not difference, each
part is not different from, but other than, all others. They are certainly
related to one another, but not by sameness and difference. They are beyond difference, and as such provide grounds for the application of analogy.
At the same time, the WP system displays the correspondences typical of
analogy. For as we saw, analogy depends on relative position and similarity
of material as well as function, and these are displayed by the WP levels

above and below a part. So a feather is a certain simple part of the whole
animal bird, just as a scale is of a fish, and they correspond in their relative
position in their complex whole. Likewise, they have a similar material
origin in horny stuff and moisture, which appear at a lower WP level.
The WP system displays the parts of animals as a table of interrelated
subjects, and it is the task of the PA to explain these parts and their
properties. It is dear from the first lines of HA 1.1 and PA 11.1 that we
start from the material composition of the animals, saying first what those
parts are, and then why they are the way they are and why animals
have them. We start from the common conception, what is familiar to
us, the sensible and particular, and work towards the formal. intelligible,
and universal. These parts are the subject of our inquiry, and they are,
of course, not randomly chosen. They all belong to the same broad type,
organic physically isola table components of animals. They would certainly
all be found in the same category of existence. But there are good reasons

why they do not form a genus of the 'programmatic' variety. That system
of phenomenal identity and difference would fail to capture their most
important essential nature, namely their compositional relationships. If
we were to gather generic parts into higher genera based on function we
would immediately upset the compositional WP hierarchy. For lung and

gill, for example, do not have identical compositional relations.
In the presentation of the HA and PA, Aristotle gives precedence to
composition over function. The WP system, organized on the basis of
composition rather than difference, provides the theoretical ground for

analogy. The SGA system, as we have seen, is a system of difference, but
like the WP system, it is based on material and phenomenal features, as
the relationship between species and genus makes clear. As such the SGA
system makes a good yoke-mate for the WP system: together they provide
an interlocking hierarchical organization of the material nature of animals.
But biological nature can be studied from perspectives other than material
parts. At a later stage in the investigation, when Aristotle comes to the MA,
the PN, and the DA, he chooses new subjects that are more formal, more
universal, and less familiar to us, the soul activities, nutrition, sensation,
thought, and locomotion 4 S In the DA, for example, matter is considered
only to the extent that it is a potentiality for these activities. We see
here a different set of subjects, and as a result a different set of analogies,

primarily among the sense organs and their operation.46 We cannot, as
the relativists would have us do, casually form a new genus from the
analogues on the basis of the common function those analogues perform.
For to do so would be to change the subject of discourse and the qua-level
of the science. In the HA and PA the parts are the subjects and each has a
definition in accordance with its name. Functions are important, of course,
especially in the FA , but they are not subjects, they are middle terms.
Aristotle's method involves a fairly strict division of labour between

matter and form." Considering that HA and PA deal with material parts,
45 The investigation begins with what is more familiar to us and moves towards what is
more familiar without qualification . The order of the treatises as I have laid them out
here does not, therefore, reflect a logical priority. Indeed, Aristotle makes clear (Met .
Z.10 1035bl4-22) that the parts of the soul of the animal are prior to the composite
and that parts of the body (with the exception of the heart [or brain}) are posterior.
This same passage, however, clearly distinguishes the parts of the body from the parts
of the soul, and so wa rrants their being treated as different subjects.
46 For example, there is the analogy, sharp I fl at: hearing:: sharp I blunt : touch at DA 11.8
420b1-4; we find the analogy between taste and smell and their sensibilia at II.9
421016-20.
47 See Peck 1983, 9-10, for one interpretation.

there is little surprise that their species are distinguished by material
'lfa8"Jlam and that analogues should be materially and structurally based.
We can also understand why Aristotle studiously avoids any functional
description of analogy: analogues are merely proportionally related beyond a difference of degree. There is also no surprise that functions that
are treated universally in the VA are discussed as analogous in the PA.
For :within the qua-system of commensurate universals that lies at the
foundation of demonstration in the PA, the cause must be coextensive
with the subject and the attribute. And 'things the same by analogy have
their middles the same by analogy' (APo 11.17 99a15-16). Since functions
provide the middle terms in the PA, there will be analogues of functions
as well.
A Challenging Case
Let us return to the case of bone and its analogues, which has been widely
cited as an instance of hopeless confusion in Aristotle's use of analogy and
genus just because of the close similarities they exhibit. As we shall see,
this case illustrates some of the factors Aristotle had in mind in calling
parts analogous: the dependence on definition in accordance with the name
and the tendency to choose as analogues parts that are similar in material
and relative position.
As we might expect, Aristotle does not always give the same account
of what the analogues are. In the APo (11.14 98a20-23) he says that
bone (OOTOVV), fish-spine (aKav8a), and pounce (cn)1TWV in cephalopods)
are analogous. [n his main treatment of bone in the PA they are bone
(OO"TOVV), fish-spine (aKav8a) in some fishes, and cartilage (xovopo<) in
other fishes (11.8 653b35-36), and their purpose is the preservation of
the soft parts. Later, when dealing with the internal parts of bloodless
animals (IV.5 679a21-23), he says that the pounce (cn)mov) is cartilaginous
(xovOpWOE<)48 Thus, the representative genera of animals are (1) man and
viviparous quadrupeds, (2) oviparous fishes, and (3) either selachia or some
cephalopods.
Moreover, the correspondence between analogue and greatest genus is
not strict. Birds have weak bonesi in small serpents the bones are spinous
(aKav8woT/<); in big serpents they are bony; selachia are cartilaginousspined (xovopaKav8a PA 11.9 655a17-28). The flesh support of these animals
forms a 'series of graduated changes' (Peck; 1TapaA""TT" KaT" JlLKpOV) as
48 The tn/7Ha are especially earthy, indicated by the earthy ink and the presence in them
of the tn/7J'tOU (PA IV.S 679alS-21).

we move from viviparous quadrupeds through birds, oviparous quadrupeds, fishes, and cephalopods. Moreover, there are variations in the hardness of bones among viviparous quadrupeds and among serpents (PA 11.9
655a12-14; a20-23).
Again, the materials are very similar. Bone and cartilage have the
same nature (~ 4>vO' ~ aVT~) and differ by more and less and for this
reason neither continues to grow when cut off (PA 11.9 655a32-34). These
analogues also share relative position: they are clearly contrasted with the
exoskeletons of crustacea and testacea, which though they discharge the
same function are not called analogues, because their relative positions are
different (PA 11.8 653b35-654a19). For all these reasons these analogues
are as close as any Aristotle offers and could conceivably be treated as a
genus. But at the same time, there are reasons why they are not. Though
they share many attributes, they are parts bearing different names, and
each has its own definition. At APo 11 .14 (98a20-23) Aristotle says that
one may excerpt commonalities according to analogy: ffor you cannot get
one identical thing which pounce and spine and bone should be called.'
There is no common term that can be applied to all three kinds of flesh
support, But the lack of a common name is merely a sign of the lack
of a genuinely common nature. One reason for denying that these parts
differ by more and less is the fact that there are sharp discontinuities
in the 'series of graduated changes' from small cartilaginous animals to
large bony animals. Aristotle clearly does not think that the kinds of
flesh support are determined solely as a function of the size of the animal
they are found in. Dolphins, for example, which are no larger than many
selachia and oviparous fishes, have bone rather than fish-spine (PA 11.9
655a16- 17).
Moreover, as corresponding parts of different systems, bone, fish-spine,
and cartilage have a claim to autonomous genera. One of the major external
differences between selachia and oviparous fish, and one that marks them
off as different genera, is the presence or absence of gill coverings. While
fish have them, seIachia do not, since the gill coverings require fish-spine
for their formation, and the selachia have a skeleton invariably made
of cartilage-spine (nl oE O'AO.Xry 71'avTa xovopaKavGa PA IV.13 696b2-6).
The difference in material has other effects in their 71'pat<L< and /3io(,
as Aristotle goes on to describe: the motions of spinous fishes are rapid,
those of selachia are sluggish, since they have neither fish-spine nor sinew
(696b6-8).
So the case can be made that these flesh supports should be analogous,
since they correspond to other major differences as well. Though selachia
and oviparous fish share a great number of external parts, Aristotle clearly

distinguishes them not only by their skeletons but also by their modes of
reproduction, skin covering, and gills. This, however, concedes the argument to Pellegrin, that cartilaginous and spiny animals are analogous as
soon as we select those groups as genera.
But perhaps a more convincing solution to this difficulty lies in the

WP system:
simple part
affection
power
bone
harder
softer
hard
/
harder
cartilage
~
softer
soft
As Aristotle's description makes clear, the powers are paired in contrary
qualities (PA ILl 646b20-22): 'one part will be soft, another hard, another fluid, another solid,' and so on. As such, in their very nature they
are relative and on a scale of more and less. But the simple parts, like
bone and cartilage, have different powers, and inasmuch as the powers
contribute to the 'what-is-it' of a part, they are essential features of that
part. Aristotle's description in PA 11.1 treats the participation of the power

in the generic part as essential. So bone will be essentially (absolutely)
hard, blood essentially (absolutely) fluid. But, in addition, each part may
differ by contrarieties of affections (n;'v 7Tae'lllaTwV EVaVTLW(Tm). Like the
powers, these are contraries, but they are not essentiaL A part may vary
more and less in respect of these affections while still maintaining its
essential power, which is its nature as that part. Now it often happens that
a part may have the same quality both essentially and non-essentially.
There is, for example, an absolute hardness of bone that is necessary for
bone to maintain its essential nature and a different hardness that, while
not being essential to bone, makes lions' bone especially hard. While the
power is absolute, the affection differs by more and less within the genus.
The confusion for bone and cartilage arises because the power, which is
necessary and absolute for the simple part and its nature, may be considered
by itself separately from any part 4 ' When it is so considered it is simply

a contrary quality admitting of more and less (some parts are hard, some
soft, some wet, some dry). For this reason, the statement
bone is harder than cartilage

may be taken as ambiguous between
49 Cf. Mary Louise Gill 1997, 154-7, who makes similar observations about flesh based on
different levels of organization.

(1) bone qua bone is a harder form of the same essential nature as
cartilage qua cartilage and
(2) bone qua having the power hard is harder than cartilage qua having
the power soft.
According to Aristotle, (1) is false, (2) is true. By keeping in mind that the
various compositional levels of the WP system are causally related but not
reducible to one another, we can see why parts may be analogues while
exhibiting material similarities to one another.
Analogy and Abstraction

The SGA system of difference based on common names for parts and
whole animals is combined with the WP system of composition. Variations
within each part are important and revelatory of nature, but differences
based on affections among the parts (e.g., the liver is softer than the heart)
do not reveal much of scientific significance. Rather it is the compositional
relations and finally the causal relations among the parts that explain most
about their nature. For this reason it seemed most profitable to Aristotle to
limit the study of difference to the generic part, then continue with other
forms of relation among the parts. Analogy has a liminal position in this
dual system. It is placed within the SGA system of difference, but it is
logically dependent on the WP system in a way that neither species nor
genus is. The compositional system is not necessary in order to identify the
genera and species of parts, but it is necessary in order to identify analogies,
since analogies are determined by material and positional factors, and these
are determined within the WP system.

This liminal position between the two systems is mirrored by analogy's
dual nature. Analogues fall into different genera, because each analogue
has its own per se predicates (that is, the predicates contain the term of
the analogue in their definition) and these are treated qua that genus.
This makes each analogue an autonomous subject, and explains (or at least
makes manifest) that they do not fall into a single genus. But there are
also reasons why analogues are gathered together as analogues of each
other. They have something in common, of which the WP table provides
intimations. As I noted above, the WP table is to some extent a table of
form and matter, but each component is itself a hylomorphic compound.
The table has arranged the parts in such a way as to make the causal
relationships among them graspable without explicitly stating them. The
lower levels of the table provide part of the material cause for the higher
levels. The higher levels point towards the final and formal cause, since
position within a whole is an important ' clue to function. The WP table,

then, is not explicitly causal, but points towards cause. Analogies belong in
the WP system for this very reason: their similarities are pointed towards,
but not made explicit. Functions within this system are fully embedded in
the parts.
Analogues, while not haVing any term in common, point towards a
common term. There are two sets of related terms, a proper set, per se and
qua related to the special substrates, as snub and bandy are related to nose
and leg, and a common set, no longer qua related to the substrates. The
two sets are related because the common set is per se predicated of its own
particular manifestations (as curved is contained in the definition of snup
and bandy). The common set, then, is abstracted from the proper. Analogy
arises in this context, when terms specifically embedded in certain genera
are per se re lated to other terms that are more general and therefore at
a different and more abstract qua leveL So, for example, wing belongs to
bird qua bird; and fin belongs to fish qua fish. Wing and fin have their own
peculiar per se and qua relations. The sciences that study these features
are the science of wing and the science of fin, or morely properly the
science of bird qua winged and the science of fish qua finned. But wing
and fin have per se features in common. They are both instrumental parts
for locomotion that have joints and are related to the anterior pair of
the points of motion. These features extend beyond either of the particular genera, and although they may be useful in proofs concerning the
particular genera, attributes cannot be proved of the particular genera at
the qua-level that corresponds to these general features. If we want to

consider rather than just use the general causes and attributes, we must
select a more abstract and general genus, for instance, animals qua jointed
or animals qua progressing. Otherwise, to cross between the general and
specific genera is to commit metabasis. It is just within the tension between
the per se and the qua requirements that analogy operates. Analogues are
of different and autonomous genera in virtue of the qua requirement, but
are treated together in virtue of their common per se relation.
As we move from lower to higher subject-genus we are not moving up
a genus-specie.s chain. It is clear from the series wing, joint, heart, desire
that the more abstract entity is not the genus of the less abstract. A joint
is not what a wing and fin are, and even less is a heart what a joint is. But
each more abstract term is in one way or another a cause for the more
concrete tenn , and each is per se, but not qua, related to the subject before
it in the series. Each, therefore, forms a different but related subject, partly
abstracted from its predecessor.
Analogues exist in this no man's land between the level of lower and
strictly autonomous genera and a higher common genus. This no man's
3
Analogy and Demonstration
While the relationship between the SGA and the WP systems seems to
account for the phenomenal demarcation of analogy from other forms of
identity, the place of analogy in demonstration is more difficult to account
for. There are clear indications in the Posterior Analytics that analogy plays
a distinctive role in demonstration, but just what that role is, and whether
and how it is worked out in the biological writings is far from clear. Part
of the difficulty lies in the fact that analogy was not a central interest to
Aristotle when composing the APo. In fact, of the three passages in which
analogy in the appropriate sense is discussed, all seem to have the status and
importance of footnotes to major discussions. Moreover, the passages do
not all point in the same direction. Some suggest that analogy is manifested
in a distinctive form of demonstration, others seem to present analogues
as specific instances to which general principles and causes are applied.
The same difficulty, too, arises in Aristotle's analogical demonstrations in
the biological works. We often find distinctively analogical demonstrations,

but more frequently general explanations seem to be applied universally
to several analogues.
As we saw, the underlying genera of the PA are whole animals and

their parts, each with its own definition in accordance with its name. We
can now fill in some details from the Analytics 1 APo 1.4-10 discusses
demonstration in terms of the most stringent conditions, demonstrative
syllogisms in Barbara, where all the terms are related per se and qua the
subject. Proofs that fall short d this are incidental. Now the predicates
of animals and their parts apply at various levels of generality. Some
1 For more elaborate attempts to organize single.genu s biological proofs on the APo
model see Gotthelf 1997 and Dete11997.

predicates belong to a part qua that part, or to a species qua that species,
while other predicates will belong qua something more common. If we
use a specific part as a subject of demonstration, then attributes and middles must belong qua the part, that is, they must be in the same genus
as the part (1.7 75blO-ll). Predicates that belong commonly must have
a common subject, and belong qua something common. These common
subjects will be different from the specific subjects and will form different
genera, subjects of different sciences. If we try to prove something of one
subject through the per se predicates of a different subject, we will commit
metabasis. An example of a final-causal syllogism will help us to explicate
some of these relations:
wing IPO flier
flier IPO bird
therefore, wing IPO bird
We learn that being a flier is in the oVlIia of a bird, and therefore it will
appear in the account of its essence (PA IV.12 693bl3-l4). The relationship
between having a wing and being a flier is one of hypothetical necessity:
if something is to fly, it must have wings. We may express this hypothetical necessity through definitional inclusion in the following way: wing
is predicated of flier because in the definition of wing we find the term
flier (or a paronym thereof), since a wing is by definition an instrumental
part for flying. In the conclusion that birds have wings, wing will be a per
se accident of bird. The proof will have proceeded within the genus. The
proof concerning fish, fin, and swimming will be exactly parallel but in a
different genus, and clearly we must not use terms proper to birds in a
proof concerning fish.
Analogous parts, though they share common features, do not form a
common subject. Each constitutes its own separate genus. The predicates
that apply to it must apply at its qua-level and must be adapted to that
genus. Any common features that analogues share cannot be treated as
strictly common. So, if the subject is bird, then wing and flying will
be predicated of it universally, but if the term locomotion is used of
the subject bird, that term must be adapted as 'locomotion for a bird,'
that is, 'flying,' since bird is not the appropriate subject for the general
predicate, locomotion. Terms predicated of each analogue must be predicated commensurately with the analogues. For if a Single general term is
unambiguously predicated of two subjects, then, at least insofar as that
predicate is concerned, the subjects are instances of a genus rather than
analogues. Indeed in such cases the general term cannot be predicated of
91 Analogy and Demonstration
the instance qua what it is, but only through an application argument.
Analogy arises, then, within the strictest conditions for demonstrations
laid out in the core of Aristotle's demonstrative theory.
Analogy in APo: Passages and Discussion

Since the APo is primarily interested in demonstration within a single
subject-genus, and analogy is an exception to or special form of demonstration, it is treated rather briefly in that text. In fact there are only three
passages that make direct reference to analogy:
Of the things they use in the demonstrative sciences, some are proper to each
science and others common - but common by analogy (KOWa Of Kar' avaAoyia.u),
since things are useful (XP";UlJ.LOV) in so far as they bear on the genus under the
science. Proper: e.g. that a line is such and such, and straight so and so; common:
e.g. that if equals are taken from equals, the remainders are equal. But each of
these is sufficient (LKavov) in so far as it bears on the genus; for it will produce the
same result, even if it is ' not assumed as holding of everything, but only for the
case of magnitudes - or, for the arithmetician, for numbers. (1.10 76a37-76b2)
Again, another way [to grasp problems] is excerpting in virtue of analogy (Kanl
avaAOYOV EKAtyUV); for you cannot get one identical thing which pounce and
spine and bone should be called; but there will be things that follow them too, as
though there were some single nature of this sort. (11.14 98a20-23)
TO
And things which are the same by analogy will have their middle terms the same
by analogy (KaT' <ivaAoyiav) too. (I1.17 99a15-16)
From the first and second passages we learn that analogy affects both
axioms and special subject-genera; the third shows us that if major terms
of a demonstrative syllogism are analogous, the middle must also be analogous. Since analogies can only obtain between different genera, all the
terms of one demonstration will be in a different genus from the analogous
demonstration.
But these passages also point in two different directions, the first of
which is towards a trivializing of analogy. The first passage explains that
certain principles are common, but common by analogy, rather than common absolutely. But in this case there seems to be no reason intrinsic to
the principles themselves that they should be analogous, since they seem
to admit of a completely general formulation. Rather, what seems to be
at issue is the range of application of the common principles. Though the

principles, like the 'equals' axiom, extend beyond numbers, when we treat
this restricted subject-genus, we require that the principle hold good only
for number. Does Aristotle mean by this that in applying the common
principle we should retain its general formulation (if equals are taken ... ),
and simply use it in the special subject-genus, or that we should adapt
it to the specific subject matter (if equal numbers are taken from equal
numbers, equal numbers remain)? By describing the commonality as 'by
analogy' Aristotle indicates that he prefers the latter alternative: when
the common principle is used, it must be specifically adapted, not merely
applied. Nevertheless, the equals axiom seems to be quite intelligible in its
general formulation, and its adaptation to the specific subject-genus seems
to be a trivial matter of substitution of terms. It is true that Aristotle
held to the common opinion that arithmetic and geometry were separate
genera and studied quite different objects, but the common principle will
be analogical only because the genera in which it is used are different
and not because the principle itself is ambiguous. If this is so, then the
cause of the analogy of the principles in this case is the subject-genera to
which they are adapted, and the common prinCiple, even if it admits of a
general account, is given analogical formulations only because the subjects
to which it attaches are analogues.
This is surprising, since what we have learned about analogy so far
would lead us to expect that analogical identity would be reflected in a

distinctive pattern of demonstration. At least this seems to be the import
of the third passage from 11.17. The fact that the middles of analogues are
analogues implies that the causes of analogous phenomena are themselves
analogous. But again Aristotle is not clear in his expression, and this
statement can be interpreted in at least two ways: that the middle terms
are analogous in their own right, that is, though they are not identical
with one another, they hold identical relations within their corresponding demonstrations. On this interpretation the fact that the middles are
analogous will explain why the major terms are analogous. Alternatively,
the middles may be analogous merely because they apply to subjects that
are themselves analogous, and because the rules of demonstration require
them to be adapted to their genus. In this case it is the analogous subjects
that explain why the middles are analogous.

This interpretative dilemma clearly corresponds to that between the
relativist and orthodox views discussed in the last chapter. The relativist
interpretation claims that demonstrations and tenns in demonstrations are
analogous just because their subject-genera are treated as different genera.
This thesis is the demonstrative correlate of the relativist analogy theoty

of Pellegrin and Balme. On this view, attributes are analogously the same

when they are predicated in different genera. If we take this as a sufficient
condition of analogy, there will be every reason to suppose that generic
attributes can be analogously adapted to species. This is precisely Balme's

and Pellegrin's contention. But, if there is one thing that Aristotle makes
clear it is that generic features are not adapted to species by analogy
(e.g., the 2R theorem is not adapted analogously to the three kinds of
triangle).
The second passage provides little clarification for our problems. Superficially only the lack of a name to apply commonly to pounce, fish-spine,
and bone seems to prevent their forming a genus. But the mere lack of a
name is no bar to establishing a generic nature, and
if there is a nature it
can be named at least in principle. Malakostraka (HA 1.6 490b10-12) form

a genus, but they do not have a single name (avwvvl'a ivi ovol'an). The
problem with bone and its analogues is not the lack of a common name
to apply to a common nature. Aristotle simply does not think that these
objects form a single genus, and that is the reason why they do not have
a common name. And yet, as he says here, there are items that follow
bone, pounce, and spine as if they were a single nature, and this suggests
that for some purposes analogues may be treated as species of a genus. So,
again, it is not clear whether these common items are generically common
or common only by analogy.
The third passage is found in Aristotle's discussion of whether the
same thing may have different explanations, and it deserves to be quoted
more extensively (II.1? 99al- 16):
Is it possible for there not to be the same explanation of the same thing for every
case, but a different one? or not? Perhaps if it has been demonstrated in itself and
not in virtue of a sign or accidentally it is not possible (for the middle term is
the account of the extreme), but if it has not been demonstrated in this way, it
is possible? One can inquire accidentally both about what it is explanatory of and
about what it is explanatory for - but these do not seem to be problems. Otherwise,
the middle term will have a similar character - if they are homonymous, the middle
will be homonymous; if they are in a genus, it will have a similar character.
E.g. why do proportionals alternate? For the explanation in the cases of lines
and of numbers is different - and the same: as lines it is different, as having such
and such an increase it is the same. And so in all cases.
The explanation of a colour's being similar to a colour and a figure to a figure
is different in the different cases. For what is similar is homonymous in these
cases; for here it is presumably having proportionate sides and equal angles, but
in the case of colours it is that perception of them is single, or something else of
that sort.

And things which are the same by analogy will have their middle term the
same by analogy too.
In a lax sense of 'same' and 'different' it is possible to explain the same

thing in different ways, but, in fact, in two explanatory demonstrations
with the same explanandum (major term), the explanandum is a unity
only to the extent that the explanation (middle term) is. When the major
is ambiguous, the middle too is ambiguous, and where the major is gener-
ically the same, the middle is generically the same. The examples Aristotle
provides are not intended to correspond precisely with these degrees of
identity, but they clarify his general point.' The alternation of proportionals among lines and numbers are given different explanations when
treated as different genera. The alternation of proportionals among these

genera will be analogous, and the explanations will be analogous, as we
saw above. But when the genus, magnitude, is abstracted, the alternation of
proportionals will be generic and the explanation generic. Fully ambiguous
terms, like similarity among similar figures and among similar colours,
will have two unrelated explanations.

Aristotle goes on in this chapter to discuss the relationships between
the terms of a demonstrative syllogism, outlining the schema for application arguments (99a16-37), and cases where a single major term belongs
for different reasons to different subjects (99a37-b7). These latter cases
have strong affinities to analogical explanation, and the example Aristotle
offers may provide some insight into the demonstrative structure of anal-
ogy (99b4-7):
It is possible for there to be several explanations of the same thing, but not for
things of the same species - e.g. the explanation of longevity for quadrupeds is
their not having bile, but for birds their being dry or something else.
The fact that this example is based on the genera of the biological works
suggests that it might be relevant to our problem, although it does not
deal with any of the standard analogues we have seen. Aristotle does not
make explicitly clear which, if any, of the three candidates for multiple
causes the longevity case corresponds to, but the context indicates that it
is not an application of a generic feature to an instance, nor does longevity
seem to be radically homonymous in the way that similarity is (TO Ol'owv)

when applied to similar triangles and similar colours. After all longevity
2 Contra, Ross 1949, 668.

in both birds and quadrupeds is judged by the same criterion (they live
for several decades), whereas similarity in figures and colours is judged
by quite different criteria. Analogy, therefore, seems to be the most likely
candidate.'
The explanation for longevity is different in the case of quadrupeds and
birds. Now in the second book of the APo Aristotle regularly identifies the
definition of a major (or minor) term with the middle, that is, the cause.
If this doctrine may be applied in such cases as these, the definition of
longevity will be different for birds and quadrupeds, since the cause will
be different in each case. That is, longevity has a different significance in
the two genera' We can fill in the details of longevity from elsewhere:
life is dependent on vital heat Uuv. 6 470a19-20; Resp. 17 478b32-33),
which can be exhausted or extinguished Uuv. 5 469b21-22). And it can be
extinguished by excessive moisture (d. Resp. 20 479b19-26) or by bUe. Bile
is a useless residue, the opposite of nutriment, which fuels the vital heat.
Bile, therefore, causes impurity in the blood and contributes to shortness
of life (PA IV.2 677a25-35).' Dryness and bilelessness both contribute,

therefore, to the preservation of vital heat.
The subjects of our demonstrations here are birds and viviparous quadrupeds. The demonstrations are analogical, not merely because birds and
viviparous quadrupeds belong to different genera, but because dtyness and
bilelessness are different. That is, the cause of longevity is not merely
stipulated as different because the subject-genera are different. The causes
just are different and they discharge a corresponding function within their
genera. To be sure, longevity is an item that follows these two different subjects. This folloWing term has a common nominal definition (say,
longevity is the capacity for long life in each case) that offers a common
account and reveals some fact about the object that is more familiar to us,
but that requires further explanation. But in spite of this common account,
3 McKirahan 1992, 171-2, treats longevity, but does not comment (except hriefly in
n. 39) on its connection with analogy.
4 This is the conclusion that Goldin 1996, 147, comes to from an examination of the
relationship between the nominal definition (the major) and the causal explanation. He
denies, however, that Aristotle 'envisages the possibility of this sort of homonymy' in
which one nominal definition might have two causal definitions (147n13).
5 Cf. PA 11.2 648b2-8: 'There ought, then, to be some clear understanding as to the sense
in which natural substances are to be termed hot or cold, dry or moist. For it appears
manifest that these are properties on which even life and death are largely dependent,
and that they are moreover the causes of sleep and waking, of maturity and old age, of
health and disease.' Even among vivipara dryness may contribute to long life; d. EN
VIl.3 1147a5-6: dry food is the most healthy.

longevity remains ambiguous because it has different causes. The nominal
definition provides the fact, and the causal definitions, bilelessness and
dryness, provide the cause 6 The common fact is an effect of differing
causes. 7 The subjects, bird and quadruped, are conceived of as different in
virtue of their being bileless or dry and it is from these different causes that
we can infer the common effect, their capacity for long life. It is, however,
in virtue of the familiar fact of their longevity that birds' dryness and
quadrupeds' bile less ness are gathered together as analogues, since this is a
conclusion that follows from both of them S
And yet that is hardly the end of the story, for it is clear that we need
not settle for' capacity for long life' as a common definition of longevity.
Instead, 'preservative of vital heat' seems to provide a common cause for
longevity in birds and viviparous quadrupeds, and this can serve as the
common middle and the causal definition of longeviry. We would now have
an unambiguous (generic) middle explaining an unambiguous (generic)
major. What, then, would be wrong with accepting the general explanation
of longeviry, that which preserves vital heat, and applying it directly to
the specific instances? The reason has to do with the asymmetry of causal
explanation. We can construct the following explanatory syllogism for it:
1) longevity IPO preservative of vital heat

2a) preservative of vital heat IPO
bilelessness
2b) preservative of vital heat IPO

dryness
3a) bilelessness IPO
3b) dryness IPO birds
viviparous quadrupeds
therefore,
4a) longevity IPO

viviparous quadrupeds
4b) longevity IPO birds
6 There has been a considerable amount of attention given to the issue of nominal
definition: Bolton 1976; Demos and Devereux 1988; Goldin 1996.
7 Similarly in PA 1.4, in his defence of the common division of animal groups, Aristotle
says that water animals and feathered animals, though their correspondence is only by
analogy, share some 7ralhj .
8 In Long., Aristotle actually does discuss the causes of absolute longevity. He explains
why generally larger animals are longer-lived than smaller animals, viz., they contain
more moisture and this moisture is hotter and less liable to freeze or congeaL
Bilelessness is not mentioned in Long. as a cause of longevity, nor is dryness a cause in
animals (though it is in plants 16. 467a6-8}) . The scenario Aristotle lays out in Long.
does not involve the same examples as in the APo.

We can see that in contrast to the single-genus proofs for triangles
having 2R, there is here an additional premiss (2a and 2b) providing a
distinct reason in each case. It is ultimately not in virtue of one cause
that longevity is predicated of birds and viviparous quadrupeds. There
are two sets of middle terms: preservative of vital heat is the same in
both cases, but bilelessness is different from dryness. According to the
following chapter, APo 1l.l8, when there is more than one middle term
between major and minor (e.g., preservative of vital heat and bile lessness/ dryness), the proper explanation is the middle term that is closest
to the minor. The scheme of explanation is asymmetricaL because we
cannot invert preservation of vital heat and bilelessness in the order of
explanation. Bilelessness explains preservation of vital heat in quadrupeds,
not the other way around. This principle is stated immediately after the
II.17 example of longevity, and is clearlyintended to block an attempt to
find a universal explanation for the analogous term. The reason we choose
the middle closest to the subject is clear: the more specific middle explains
the more general but not vice versa. Thus, if we were to choose the middle
nearest the major, the analogy (or homonymy) could easily escape our
notice.
There are some important similarities and differences between the
longevity case as I have interpreted it and Aristotle's treatment of analogy
in the biological works. In both cases, common features are attributed to
different genera for different reasons, thus making these features analogous. We also find a similar distinction between general and specific cause,
where the latter is appropriately adapted to the subject-genus, and the
former is not. In all the important formal respects longevity is a case of
analogical explanation.
But there are also some significant differences that point to the variety
of forms and degrees of abstraction in which analogy can be found. In
the case of longevity, the common feature is the major term or the fact,
while the middle terms or causes are distinct. This is not always the
case in the biological practice. Frequently, to all appearances the causes
for which features belong to analogues are common. On other occasions
the entire demonstration has analogous terms throughout, the common
terms being explicitly nowhere in sight. Moreover, in the PA, which is
devoted primarily (though by no means exclusively) to explaining biological phenomena through the final cause, this cause tends, as we shall
see, to be more common and universal than the phenomena it explains. In
the case of longevity, by contrast, the causes, being material and efficient,
cons titute different explanations for a common explanandum. And indeed
it is generally the case that the relationship of common and specific terms

are oppositely arranged in demonstrations that involve final. from those
that involve efficient/material causes.
So the variation apparent throughout Aristotle's brief discussion of
analogy in the APo is mirrored in his practice in the biological works.
Aristotle tends to identify the form with the function as common and
universal, and the material conditions with plurality and specificity" In
demonstrations that relate form and matter (i.e., causal demonstrations
invoking the final and material cause) there will often be a tension between the formal terms, which are more general, and the material tenns,
which aTe more specific. In such cases it is not clear whether the COIDman terms are analogous in a merely relative sense or whether they
are naturally or really analogous. Aristotle's answer within the highly
constrained criteria of demonstration is that common terms when predicated in different genera will always be common by analogy unless an
application argument is used. As we saw with the case of alternating
proportion, it is possible for a predicate to be treated in both ways: alternating proportion is proved of lines and number by separate but anal-
agaus demonstrations, but alternating proportion also can be proved of
general magnitude and then applied to the species, line and number, by
application argument. This answer is made more plausible through the
observation that definitions are first principles of demonstrations and do
not admit of proof or justification. As a result, when we adapt a term
for a demonstration, that adaptation becomes a part of the definition of
the term and a first principle. The question, then, whether the adapted
term is 'naturally' analogous (the orthodox position) or analogous merely
because it has been formally adapted to different subject matters (the
relativist position) makes little sense. Since the adaptation is part of the
definition, the adaptation is as much a part of the essence of the term
as any other part, and so there is no further need to argue for the
term's being analogous. In this way Aristotle's theory of demonstrative
understanding, which concerns the relations between terms and between
prem isses, imposes constraints on the meanings and significance of terms.
The formal language of qua and per se captures some of the common
insight that terms mean different things in different contexts, and when
we say something about some subject, what we say applies only to that
subject and no further. The use of a term, for Aristotle, is to a large extent
its meaning.
9 It is important to distinguish the material cause in the sense of the components that
make up the developed form from the materials that undergo change so as
Ilew materials. It is the former that are identified as plural and specific.
to
become
' 99 Analogy and Demonstration

Analogy in the Biology
As in the APo, so also in the biological works there is good evidence that
Aristotle often used a distinctive form of demonstration when treating
analogues. But, as in the APo, here too there is no one single pattern.
Instead, we can discern three basic forms, in which the importance of
analogy is displayed to a greater or lesser degree:
L Analogous attributes proved of analogous parts by parallel demonstrations.
2. Systematic variations on analogous parts that are covariant with a
common feature proved by parallel demonstrations,
3, Apparently common attributes proved commonly by a general cause
and applied to analogues,
'
The progression from the first to the third is a progression from

greatest to least importance of analogy in demonstration, and from the
orthodox to the relativist conception of analogy, As a result of this variety
of form, the interpretative difficulties we faced in the APo presentation are
manifested again in the biological works:
(a) While there are cases in which analogy clearly has a profound influence on the proof structure, there are other cases in which the traits
being discussed appear to be absolutely common. In the latter cases the
introduction of analogues seems to be irrelevant to the proof at hand.
(b) Not all the terms of a demonstration are explicitly analogous, Indeed
there are usually common terms involved, and the analogues are often treated together under some common designation, as, for example, blood and its analogue are often discussed together as nutriment
(TPOCP~), in spite of the fact that this is a functional designation,
(c) Analogues are not introduced on all appropriate occasions, Often the
lesser analogue (the unnamed one) is not mentioned or is dropped
midway through a discussion,
(d) In spite of what Aristotle says at APo IL14 (98a20-23), analogues
are not always treated together for every purpose. Sometimes their
common aspects are treated together and their peculiar traits separately.
So, for example, heart and its analogue (when nameless) are treated
together, but the analogue, when named (}.tVH,), is treated separately,
One observation at the outset strongly suggests that analogy has
an effect on demonstration. Aristotle often says that certain parts and

functions are in the essence of an animal. Gotthelf has assembled a list
of such essential parts and functions and it includes such principles as
being blooded (PA IV.5 678a31-34), having a claw (PA IV.8 684a33-35),
or having a lung (PA 1ll.6 669b8-12).1O Other principles mention functions,
like being a flier (PA IV.12 693b4-13), a swimmer (PA IV.13 695b17-19),
or a thinker (PA IV.lO 686a25-28). All of these, whether functions or
parts, are mentioned elsewhere as having analogues. Now, since they are
irreducibly part of the essence of an animal, they are starting points of

explanation and mark first principles in demonstration. Since they form
part of the definition of the animal groups, they are predicated of the
animal subjects per se and universally. It is not the more general terms
that are part of their definitions. The general term 'having nutriment,'
for example, is not part of the definition of blooded animals, but rather
'having blood.' For this reason we should expect to find separate rather
than common demonstrations concerning and involving analogues.
In the first form of analogical explanation, Aristotle explicitly follows

the prescription of APo 11.17, that analogous attributes have their middles
the same by analogy. So, for example, at PA 1ll.5 668a4-7 Aristotle gives
the reason why the blood vessels are distributed all over the body:
[T]he reason for the vessels being distributed throughout the entire body is that
in the vessels, or in parts analogous to them, is contained the blood, or the fluid
which in bloodless animals takes the place of blood, and that this is the material
from which the whole body (CTw!'aTo,) is made. (modified ROT)
We may safely assume, in view of the second use of 'vessels,' that the
first use is lax, and properly should be 'blood vessels or their analogue.'
In this passage we find two entirely analogous demonstrations appearing
in parallel. The analogous major terms - blood vessels being distributed

all over the body, and blood vessel-analogues being distributed all over
the body - are predicated of blooded and bloodless animals respectively
in virtue of the channelling of blood and its analogue. Major, middle,
10 Gotthelf 1987, 190-1. Without providing the details, his list is the follOwing: sensation
is in the definition of animal; lung is present in the OWI.a. of lunged animals; blood is
in the logos defining the oixT{a of blooded animals; having many origins (of movement
and sensation) is present in the oixrla of insects; the reason lobsters have claws is that
they are of the kind that has claws; one kind of octopus has only one row of suckers
because of the length and slimness of its nature; thinking and reasoning is in the nature
or owla of man; being a flier is in the oUrT{a of bird; being a swimmer is in the logos
of the ourria of fish; being disproportionate in length relative to the rest of the bodily
nature is pan of the ourria and essence of snakes.

and minor are all analogous. ll Again, later in the same section Aristotle
explains why veins appear during emaciation (668a23--28): since blood and
its analogue are potentially the body (which is flesh and its analogue),
the former may actually become the latter and disappear until starvation
makes them reappear.
Elsewhere we find a more telegraphic form of parallel explanation (PA
II.12 657al8-23):
In birds, on the other hand, there are only the auditory passages. This is because
their skin is hard and because they have feathers instead of hairs, so that they
have not got the proper material for the formation of ears. Exactly the same is the
case with such oviparous quadrupeds as are clad with scaly plates, and the same
explanation applies to them (0 yap a.UTOS ap}J.O(JH Kat E7r' EKEtVWV "-OYOII).
ap/J.o(w is often used where corresponding or analogous arguments are

implied 12 It is clear in view of APo II.17 that" atJT'" Myo, must mean
the same by analogy, but the fact that Aristotle does not express himself
accurately is an indication of how lax he can be in practice.
In the second group of demonstrations not only do we find analogues
between parts, but also among the 'more and less' variations. These variations are the same by analogy because they are covariant with some
common feature. In this group common explanatory terms are frequently
used. So, for example, the demarcation between lungs and gills is clear, both
from their shape and from the kinds of animals that possess them. They are
mentioned as analogous in a programmatic passage (PA 1.5 645b6). While
lung is treated among the internal parts of blooded animals (PA III.6),
the gill is considered an external part of fish (PA IV.13). The functions
of the organs are also called analogous (HA VII [VIII].2 589b18- 19): as
air passes in and out of the lung, so water passes in and out of the
gill (Resp. 21 480a23-b20). We can provide a common formulation that
covers both cases: the fact that all blooded animals are hot accounts for
the need for respiration, but neither this formulation nor any variation
upon it can account for the materially and formally specified organs.
11 Strictly speaking, this passage seems to involve a double demonstration: proving

first that blood is transported allover the body, and then using that as a premiss to
show that blood vessels are distributed all over the body. The first conclusion will
hypothetically necessitate the second conclusion. Double demonstrations are common
in the biology, but no provision is made for them in the APo. There is a great deal
about packing, but APo recognizes only purely transitive fonns of inference.
12 E.g., Phys. IV.1 209.9; IV.8 214b22-23; Pol. IV.11288b12; d. Pol. III.1 1275033-34.

They must each be referred to their own proper function: only the fact
that one group breathes air and the other respires water explains the
presence of each organ: two different, but parallel final causes explain
the analogous parts. For this reason merely respiring is not a sufficient
explanation, and having a lung must be in the o1)(ria of those animals that
have them (PA Il1.6 669b8-12). Variations on these organs likewise can
be explained in parallel ways, and we can show that common properties
follow upon this grouping of analogues. Since viviparous quadrupeds are
especially hot, they have bloody and large lungs, and since ovipara are
cooler, their lungs are small and spongy (PA III.6 669a24-32). By analogy fish that are hotter have more numerous gills, while cooler fishes
have fewer (PA IV.13 696b16-20). Thus, we find attributes common by
analogy shared by both of the analogues. On the one hand, lung and
gill meet the common need to cool the animals, but they also display
variations according to an ana logous principle: the hotter the animal, the
larger the lung or the greater the number of gills. The two analogues are
treated as different subjects, but they vary in analogous ways according
to the same principle. In this case analogies exist both at a general and
a specific level. So not only do we find correspondences in the explanatory structure between the analogous parts, the animals to which they
belong, and their causes, but we also find correspondences among the
variations.
Again, throughout the HA, PA, and GA, Aristotle discusses various
kinds of body covering: hair, feathers, scaly plates, and fish scales. Some of
these analogues are more closely related than others. Some attributes are
analogously common to them all, others just to some. At HA 1.l486b21-22
Aristotle says that what the feather is in a bird, the scale is in a fish,
and it is clear that they are not related by difference of degree. At a
general level, they share a function, external covering for the animal, but
they also share certain material and structural similarities . They form a
covering over the skin, made of many discrete identical parts of similar
basic material lodged in the skin. To this extent hair among viviparous
quadrupeds is also analogous. The hair is said to protect from the heat
and cold (PA Il.14 658a6-7). Treating oviparous quadrupeds separately,
Aristotle says that they are covered with horny scales for the same reason.
Crocodiles and tortoises have especially hard and bony horny scales (PA
IV.ll 691a17-19). Aristotle tentatively says that the shell acts as a lid for
the heat (PA 11 .8 654a5-9)."
13 Note that this is also a function of exoskeletons and shells, which are, of course,
nowhere called analogues of hair and feathers.

Some animals have more or less hair, longer and shorter hair, just
as other animals have more or fewer feathers or scales, and so on. These
variations on the generic type are explained by the varying amounts of
moisture and earthy deposits from which they all are formed. Especially
interesting is a passage at GA V.3 782al4-20:
Men go bald on the front of the head, but turn grey first on the temples;. no
one goes bald on these or on the back of the head. Some such affections occur
in a corresponding manner also in animals which have not hair but something
analogous to it, as the feathers of birds and scales in the class of fish.
Balding, whether of hair or its analogues, occurs because, as the animal

grows older, it becomes drier, the skin becomes harder and thicker, the
heat fails, and the moisture, which is the material cause of the hair, fails
as well (GA V.3 783b2-8). There is no suggestion in these examples that
the moisture itself has analogous manifestations. One kind of moisture, it
seems, plays the same role in all the demonstrations, and the definition of
moisture is not explicitly adapted to fit each demonstration. 14
At PA II.2 648a2-7, Aristotle describes the differences in blood: thick
and thin, dear and muddy, cold and warm. There is also the difference
between those animals that have blood, and those that have instead some
other such part TEPOV TL }lOpWV TawilTav):
The thicker and the hotter blood is, the more conducive is it to strength, while
in proportion to its thinness and its coldness is its suitability for sensation and
intelligence. A like distinction exists also in the fluid which is analogous to blood.
(T~V aVT~v 0' EXEt otacpopav Kat TO ava'\oyov {nrapxov 7rPOS TO aip.a.) This explains
how it is that bees and other similar creatures are of a more intelligent nature than
many sanguineous animals.
We see here that intelligence is predicated of animals in virtue of the middle

terms, cold blood / cold blood-analogue. The intelligence which bees have
is in some ways similar to man's, but it too is analogous. In this case it is
nat perfectly dear whether the major term (intelligence) is generically or
analogically common. The result may be two entirely analogical demonstrations or two partially common demonstrations.
14 Likewise, differences in hair and its analogues correspond to differences in gender. At
HA IV.11 538b8-9 Ariswtle remarks that the female is more delicate in hair ~nd where
there is no hair she is less strongly furnished in some analogous substance. Here again
we observe analogous parts covariant with common features.

Finally, we find analogies of the senses of hearing and touch, which
also involve variations of more and less. These analogies do not involve
demonstration, but they illustrate the general point that analogies are often
systematic, involving not just the general case, but also variations upon it.
They are also peculiar in another respect. They concern sense perception,
which is an activity of the soul, rather than a part of the body. This
represents a higher level of scientific generalization, but here too there are
analogies. The terms sharp (at.,) and flat (j3a.pv) are applied metaphorically
to sound from the realm of touch,
where they mean respectively what moves the sense much in a short time, and what
moves the sense little in a long time ... There seems to be an analogy (auQ.Xoyov)
between what is sharp or flat to hearing and what is sharp or blunt to touch; what
is sharp as it were (oLov) stabs (KEVTf'i), while what is blunt as it were (orov) pushes
(Weft), the one producing its effect in a short, the other in a long time, so that the
one is quick, the other slow. (modified ROT; DA II.S 420a3D--b4)
Although there is no explicit demonstration here, it is clear that there is an

explanation of what makes sounds sharp or flat. The explanation is parallel
in the case of hearing and touch, and there is even a general explanation
of a sort available: what moves the sense in a long or short time is sharp
or flat/ dull. Notice that in spite of the general explanation Aristotle avoids
using language in one genus that properly belongs to another genus. For
this reason he uses the expressions oiov KEVT~ and orov weft.
Likewise,
.
it seems that there is an analogy between the senses of smell and taste, and that the
species of tastes (7(1 EWl1 TWV XlJ,uwv) run parallel to those of smells ... As flavours
may be divided into sweet and bitter, so with smells. In some things the flavour
and the smell have the analogous (civa.\.oyov; not as ROT, the same) quality, e.g.
sweet smell and sweet taste, and their opposites. Similarly a smell may be pungent,
astringent, acid, or succulent. But, as we said, because smells are much less easy
to discriminate than flavours, the names of these varieties are applied to smells in
virtue of similarity. (DA II.9 421a17-bl)
Again, the same features are apparent, including explicit mention of the
fr~l1 of tastes corresponding to those of smell. No causal explanations are
at work in this case, but we may safely assume that Aristotle would feel
obliged to give a common account of these variations. We do see some
explanations at work in the following passage (Sens. 5 443b3-12):

It is clearly conceivable that the moist, whether in air (for air, too, is esser:ttially
moist) or in water, should imbibe the influence of, and have effects wrought in
it by, the sapid dryness. Moreover, if the dry produces in moist media and air,
an effect as of something washed out in them, it is manifest that odours must be
something analogous to savours. Indeed, this analogy is, in some instances, a fact;
for odours as well as savours are spoken of as pungent, sweet, harsh, astringent,
rich; and one might regard fetid smells as analogous to bitter tastes; which explains
why the fonner are as unpleasant to breathe as the latter are to drink.
All the explanations canvassed above invoke different kinds of cause

(final, material, and efficient). In each of these cases some common formulation can be provided, and each group of analogues can conceivably
be denominated by some functional description, for instance, blood-cooler,
external surface residue, that which has intelligence, sensation. Clearly,
then, some common account can be substituted even in these cases, and
variations on this new common item can be accounted for by variations
in some other common feature, more or less heat, more or less moist
residue, longer or shorter time. But to provide a common account would
be to abstract beyond the appropriate subject matter of the sciences, for in
each case Aristotle is talking about the specific part or function.
The third and final form of demonstration, in which the major and
even middle terms are apparently treated as common and in which there
are no systematic variations, is the most frequent. It is a common practice
for Aristotle to provide a general argument that ends with a mention of
the analogues to which the argument applies. At PA 11.1 647a24-33, for
example, Aristotle says
[A]s the sensory faculty, the motor faculty, and the nutritive faculty are all lodged
in one and the same part of the body (EV TaVTC{J j.L0pl.'fl TOV (J'wj.LaTos)
it is
necessary that the part which is the primary seat of these principles shall on the
one hand, in its character of general sensory recipient, be one of the simple parts;
and on the other hand shall, in its motor and active character, be one of the
heterogeneous parts. For this reason (Ot07Tp) it is the heart which in sanguineous
animals constitutes this central part, and in bloodless animals it is the analogue.
For it is divided into homoiomeries like each of the rest of the viscera, and yet it
is anhomoiomerous on account of its shape. (modified ROT)
Aristotle provides a general argument concerning the common seat of

sensation and movement. At the beginning of the argument the parts have
not been given their proper names, and only subsequently are analogues

identified. They are treated as a single nature throughout. The last two
sentences of th e passage seem to constitute an application argument: since
both the heart and its analogue have a homoiomerous and anhomoiomerous nature, they qualify as the seat of these faculties 1s
This pattern of explanation is also found very frequently in the GA.
We see Aristotle discussing and explaining various common traits of the
principle (apx~), then stating that this principle is the heart or the analogue
of the heart. So, for example, 11.1 735al6-26:
Hence it is that only one part comes into being first and not all of them together.
But that must first come into being which has a principle of increase (for this
nutritive power exists in all alike, whether animals or plants, and this is the same
as the power that enables an animal or plant to generate another like itself, that
being the function of them all if naturally perfect). And this is necessary for the
reason that whenever a living thing is produced it must grow. It is produced, then,
by something else of the same name, as e.g. man is produced by man, but it is
increased by means of itself. There is, then, something which increases it. If this is
a single part, this must come into being first. Therefore if the heart is first made in
some animals, and what is analogous to the heart in the others which have no heart,
it is from this or its analogue that the first principle of movement would arise.
Here the general argument extends not only beyond the analogues themselves, but even beyond animal to encompass everything capable of nutrition. Again, the general argument seems to be applied to the heart and its
analogue as to species.
These examples of demonstration seem to belie the claim that a COIDman genus and a common explanation cannot be given for analogues. For
Aristotle seems to be perfectly capable of articulating the cause at a general
level and applying it directly to the analogues. These cases, then, support
the relativist interpretation whereby analogues can with no modification
be gathered into a genus.
How are we to account for this wide variation in practice, where sometimes, as we see, purely general arguments seem to be applied to analogues
as if to species, sometimes general features seem to be adapted to genera
15 So also at PA 11.1 647al4-21 we are told the reason for the existence of flesh and its
analogue, but in general terms; sensation takes place in the simple parts, but tou ch takes
place in the least simple of the parts. This part must be more complex, because this
sense deals with more than one sensible. Only after providing this general explanation
does Aristotle say that the sense organ of these, the flesh and it s analogue, is the most
corporeal of the sense organs.

to a greater or lesser extent, and sometimes again demonstrations are fully
analogo.us? One is tempted to fall back on the common and correct claim
that the biological works are not syllogized in the formal way that would
be necessary in order to reveal the intricacy of analogical demonstration.
Formalization would involve the tedious and unnecessary process of stating
explicitly all the per se and qua relationships. The mention of analogues in
contexts where demonstrations are not fully formalized may represent a
sort of promissory note, an indication of the mode of proof to be pursued
if one wishes to formalize.
No doubt, this view explains the variation in practice to some extent.
Aristotle throughout the biological works prefers to use a non-technical
and non-formal language, and the logical apparatus of the APo to the
extent that it is present remains largely implicit. But our difficulties are not
solved by this means alone. The other, more important reason is that any
given item must enter into causal relationships with several other items at
various levels of generality.16 This fact is made clear by the organization
of the WP system. The lower levels on the table provide the matter and
are the material cause for the higher levels. But the matter often has a
different extension from that for which it is the matter. Horny material,
for example, provides the stuff for a variety of different organs, fingernails,
talons, and horns. Horny material, that is, extends further than anyone of
the homoiomerous parts for which it is the materia1. 17 This situation occurs
not just among the components of the WP system, but also in the process
of generation, as the following passage makes clear (GA 1.19 726bl- S):
We have previously stated that the final nutriment is the blood in the sanguinea
and the analogous fluid in the other animals. Since the semen is also a residue of
the nutriment, and that in its final stage, it follows that it will be either blood or
that which is analogous to blood, or something formed from these.
Though in many demonstrations semen will be related to other terms

that have the same level of generality as itself, this is not the case here
with its material cause. Now, it would not be difficult to analyse this
16 This problem is discussed by Goldin 1996, 148- 51, who solves it by claiming that
Aristotle is not consistent in his injunction against metabasis, and that he frequently
invokes principles from other sciences. Goldin assimilates such cases [0 the use of
mathematical middles in optical demonstrations .
17 PA II.9 655b2-4; cf. ILl 646b3O-34, where some of the viscera are made of a common
homoiomerous material, differentiated presumably just by their shapes. So also Met.
H.4 1044a25-31, where a single matter may have. two forms and two different matters
may have the same form.
108 Aristotle' s Theory of the Unity of Science

case in accordance with the model of longevity and assume two different
but parallel causal processes of concoction whereby blood and its analogue
are transformed into semen. Semen will then have one general cause and
two analogous causes. As a concoction of nutriment it has one cause, but
as a transformation of blood and a transformation of blood's analogue
it will have two, and semen in this case will be ambiguous 1 8 But even
if we can provide an adequate analogical analysis for these cases, and
claim that for the sake of brevity Aristotle chose not to do so himself,
we are merely evading a more pervasive problem. We have seen that
analogues have their origin in the phenomenal analysis of the WP and
SGA systems. There each part was hypothesized as existent and fitted into
a compositional network. Generically different parts with similar material
and compositional constitutions were deemed analogous. The analogues
were hypothesized as generically different, but were called analogous because they fit into corresponding positions in the WP table . There was as
yet no consideration of cause or demonstration. But it is precisely these
correspondences and similarities that must either be explained or serve
as explanations in demonstrations, and it is precisely these that, when
they arise, are treated as common. We noticed the underdeveloped state
of analogies of function in the PA. Though Aristotle recognizes them in
theory and occasionally uses them in practice, he tends to treat functions as
common. In fact, this tendency is a manifestation of a widespread feature
of Aristotle's general methodology, which starts with the material, the
speCific, and the familiar and moves to investigate the common cause (d.
KOLV~ aiTia MA 1 698a4). Analogy appears especially clearly at a precausal
stage of investigation. But once causes are brought to bear on the subjects,
the common begins to prevail, both in the material cause, which often
extends more widely than the specific explanandum, and in the final cause,
which is expressed as a general function.
We have already seen in Aristotle' s study of animal movement the
transition from the material, the specific, and familiar fact to the formal,
generic, and abstract cause. The various aspects of animal movement (e.g.,
wings, joints, hearts, desire) are best treated at different qua-levels, because
they have different extensions. And yet these qua-levels cannot be entirely
18 Again, at GA 11 .3 737a36-b4, All bodies are held together by the glutinous; this quality,
as the embryo develops and increases in size, is acquired by the sinewy substance,
which holds togeth er the parts of animals, being actual sinew in some and its analogue
in others.' Sinew and its analogue are both glutinous, a material feature necessitated by
their common function. As such they share a power, and therefore differ by the more
and the less in a weak sense. And yet they remain analogues.
I

causally isolated from one another, the latter being causes for the former.
Likewise, we see in APo II.19 that in some cases the search for the cause
and the search for the universal is one and the same: the search for the
immediate connections of demonstration is the search for the universal. By
allowing specific subject matters to be subsumed under more general and
abstract subject matters, the assimilation of the cause and the universal
produces that scientific unification through hierarchy which is so characteristically Aristotelian. But at the same time it creates a tension with the
rules of demonstration, which require that the cause be treated at the same
qua-level as the fact.
The tendency to introduce the universal cause is especially strong when
the analogy on the phenomenal level is not matched by a terminology of

cause at the same level. This is especially prevalent with nameless ana-
logues. So underdeveloped is Aristotle's vocabulary that often an analogous

part is nameless; so much more likely is it, then, that the function of that
part,
which already tends in Aristotle's conception towards the universal,
will have no special name. It is not surp~ising, then, that the vast majority
of cases involving demonstrative analogy of the third kind involve parts
with nameless analogues.
Analogies arise in a demonstrative context when the subjects we are
treating are generically different. According to the rules of the APo, the
terms of the demonstrations must be adapted to the subject-genus. The

terms of analogous demonstrations, though they are adapted to their genus,
can be abstracted and generalized, but in so doing, the terms no longer
remain the same, and the subject matter changes and a different science
emerges. In cases where Aristotle does not follow this strict model, the
tendency to generalize the cause is usually matched by the unavailability
in the common language of specific causal terms. The language of facts is
more specific than the language of causes.
Analogy and the Scala Naturae

There is another form of explanation operative in the biological works that
is often confused with analogy. At the widest level, spanning the whole
range of animal kinds, Aristotle has established sweeping continuities,
which constitute what is traditionally known as the scala naturae. The scala
admits two different theoretical interpretations. It may either be considered
solely as a scale of difference with no normative implications, like that of

cartilage and bone, or it may also involve value, one end of the scale being
better than the other. It is clear from what we have said that various parts
of animals have different extensions, and some attributes, for example,

mouth, extend to all animals and vary by differences of degree. Mouths
are different because they serve different functions, and not because one
mouth is better than another mouth. In the same way, all animals have
vital heat, but some have more and others less. Furthermore, the scale
of heat may correspond to or be covariant with other attributes, like the
modes of reproduction and so on. Such scales, since they connect all the
genera of animals together, have threatened to erase generic distinctions
by representing animal kinds as a smear of variation rather than as discrete

groups. Dualizers (f7raJl<!>oTEpi("oVTES), like dolphins, are doubly challenging
in this regard: because they stand between two great groups, they are
difficult to place in either one of the groups, but because they can equally
be placed in either, they make the great groups themselves indistinct and
indefinite. These scales when treated non-normatively present the same
problem as we faced with bone and cartilage. Because the essential features
of the two parts differ by more and less, it is difficult to place an exact line
of demarcation between them and distinguish them exactly.
But the scala may also be a normative system, in which one end of
the scale is positively valorized, and all other points fall short of it for
various reasons. As a result, two objects on a scale are not just different,
one is better than the other, and we explain features of one kind of animal
in terms of its proximity to a different, but normative, kind. Indeed, the
challenge of the scala arises not so much within the first interpretation, but
rather when it is conceived as a hierarchical tool of explanation, in which
animals and their parts are explained as deficiencies from one primary type,
usually man. For on this view the usual injunction against metabasis breaks
down, and principles proper to one genus are used in the exp lanation of a
different genus. Indeed Pellegrin has asserted that analo~l has the purpose
of joining together animals in an intelligible hierarchy:
[I]n the Hi story of Animals (8.1.588a25), Aristotle explains that psychological
faculties differ between man and various other animals either by the more and the
less or analogically. And this example helps us to understand the truly fundamental
function of the analogical relationship in biology. It does not serve so much to
set apart natural families of living things as to relate one group of animals to
another by some point of reference, and ultimately to relate all living things to
one unique being, taken as a model of intelligibility, man ... Thus, in a sense,
all the 'anatomical' parts of the Hi story of Animals. really do not constitute,
19 1986a, 90--2. He cites Leblond's attempt to tie analogy to taxonomy by supposing that
analogy allows comparison of parallel and independent genera, and as such is a kind of
comparative morphology within a taxonomy (LeBlond 1945, 41-2).

despite what some have mistakenly said, a comparative anatomy, but are rather an
anthropocentric anatomy and ethology, and that thanks to the employment, explicit
or not, of analogy ... Animals are, as it were, sketches of the human animal
Aristotle declares that, in relation to man, they are like dwarves, that is, badly
proportioned and badly constructed men.
Pellegrin's argument here is an extension of his claim that there is no

natural distinction between genus and analogy, and that analogues are
interchangeable with genera. Here the more and less, analogues, and hierarchy all aim at one grand purpose. But, in fact, series arguments, which
are the basis of the scala naturae, presuppose a norm with respect to
the shared attributes in that scale, and that norm provides an explanatory
principle?O Analogical arguments/ _by contrast, make no such presupposition. Because they maintain their generic autonomy foremost, analogues
do not as such show any tendency to priority and posteriority. Although
there is indisputable evidence in general for a scala naturae, it does not
threaten to obliterate generic distinctions that are the basis of analogy.
Any attempt to construct a purely scalar arrangement of the parts and
their attributes would result in an overly simple scheme of explanation
incapable of accounting for the phenomena. 21
Although the non-normative interpretation of the scala has been discussed elsewhere,22 it is useful to clear up some confusions in what has
become a standard interpretation. The classic passage at the beginning of
HA VIII suggests in the Revised Oxford Translation that Aristotle thought
it difficult to make distinctions between genera:
Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way
that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side
thereof an intermediate form should lie.23 Thus, next after lifeless things comes
the plant, and of plants one will differ from another as to its amount of apparent
vitality; and, in a word, the whole genus of plants, whilst it is devoid of life as
compared with an animal, is endowed with life as compared with other corporeal
entities. Indeed, as we just remarked, there is observed in plants a continuous scale
of ascent towards the animal. So, in the sea, there are certain objects concerning
20 See Preus 1983 for this and other normative aspects of Aristotle's biological definitions.
21 See Lovejoy's judicious comments on Aristotle's use of scalar arguments, 1964, 55-9;
also Coles 1997.
22 These issues have been effectively discussed by Granger 1985.
23 OVTW l)' EK TWV a'/tvxwv Et~ TO. (0a IJ.ETaj3atvn KaTo. IJ.tl<POV ~ cpvrTt'). waH T~ I7VVEXEtq.
AaVOWEU! TO fJ-E86ptov atrrwv Kat TO fJ-EO"OV 7rOTEpWV EO"TW.

which one would be at a loss
(588b4-13)
to
determine whether they be animal or vegetable.
This passage does not claim that demarcations are impossible to determine.
In the first sentence the subordinate clause is constructed with WfJT and
the infinitive of natural result, and as such does not affirm that it is
impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, but only that it
is something that would naturally escape our notice 24 Obviously Aristotle
does not think that it has escaped his notice. Indeed, comparison of other
passages with WaTE plus Auv8civftv clearly shows that what escapes notice
nevertheless unequivocally exists." It is also seldom observed that this
passage is situated in the midst of Aristotle's introduction to the psychological traits of animals, and that throughout he is remarking not on
the difficulty of distinguishing the external forms of the various genera of
plants and animals, but of locating demarcations in psychological capaci ties.
It is difficult to tell, for example, whether certain animals sleep or have

sensation. This passage, then, cannot be used to suggest that Aristotle
thought his generic distinctions based on parts could be reduced to scales
of more and less. In spite of their own peculiar ambiguities, the physical
forms of the genera are clearer than the differences in functional capacities,
which can be associated with wider variety of externa l form.
We see the same kind of issue at stake in the other oft-cited passage,
PA IV.5 681a9-15:
The ascidians differ but slightly from plants, and yet have more of an animal
nature than the sponges, which are plants and nothing more. For nature passes
from lifeless objects to animals in such unbroken sequence, interposing between
them beings which live and yet are not animals, that scarcely any difference seems
to exist betWeen two neighbouring groups owing to their dose proximity?6
Again we see the same tentative natural-purpose clause with a verb which
distinguishes appearance from reality, and which states that the distinction, though obscure, nevertheless exists. 27 Again, Aristotle seems to be
24 Smyth 1956, 507-10.

25 Cf. HA 11.15 506a15; 11.17 508a16; and GA III.5 756032.
26 ~ yap cptxn<; }J.fTo.fjo.tllft O"VllfXWS ebra TWII iJ.vroxWII fis ni Wa lie" TWII (WVTWII }J.fll OUK
OllrwlI lif (4xuIl. oUTwr W(1Tf OOKfiu 1Ta.I-'7TlllI JUlKpOV lilllcpipnu 8o.Tf.pOV 8anpoll Tee a-VllfyytJS
aAAJjAOlS.
27 Cf. also a small selection of many passages: GA 1.2 716b5-9; 717a4-6; HA 510a21-23;
527b22- 24; 533,28-30: 540bl-3.

perfectly able to distinguish ascidians from sponges, and presumably these
two groups from algae and the various kinds of terrestrial plants. That is,
while the demarcation between animal and plant is difficult to observe, the
sub-groups are clear enough, and they do not blend into one another. The
reason, again, is that the demarcation between animal and plant is not so
much structural and based on parts as it is psychological and functional.

Sensation and movement are considered to be essential features of animals,
and yet some animals are sessile. Sponges, when pulled off from their
attachments die just like plants (681aI5- 17). Sponges and sea cucumbers
have no sensation (681aI9-20). Ascidians are sessile like plants, but they
are fleshy like animals and therefore probably are capable of sensation of
a kind (681a25-28). The loci classici do not support the interpretation that
the scala is so continuous as to erase the distinctions between genera. 28
In fact, dualizers, far from destroying the distinctions between groups, are
a strategy employed to preserve the essential natures of the genera. The
problem of dualizers occurs not because there are no generic differences,
but precisely because there are and those differences are set by the system
of internally defined multiple differentiae. Only in a system of dichotomous division could we ensure that there are no dualizers.
There is also clearly a normative component to the scala naturae. 29 One
passage, for example (PA IV.I0 686a24-687a2), places man first among the
animals because of his upright posture. Man stands erect because he is god-
like, and so must think and be wise. This hypothetically necessitates his
being not earthy, since earthiness impedes thought. Man has the natural
and normative posture (what we might call the default posture that occurs
if nothing prevents), and increased earthiness causes an animal to tend

downward and so require four legs for support:
Dwarf-like again is the race of the birds and fishes; and so in fact, as already has
been said, is every animal that has blood ... The explanation, as already stated,
is that in many their psychical principle is corporeal and impeded in its motions.
Let now a further decrease occur in the elevating heat, and further increase in
the earthy matter, and the animals become smaller in bulk, and their feet more
numerous, until at a later stage they become footless and extend full length on the
ground. (PA IV.l0 686b20-31)
28 Herein I concur with Granger 1985 .

29 Lennox 1985, 313-15, has argued briefly that the normativity of Aristotle's biology is
overrated. Coles 1997 has collected the data and argued more fully and persuasively
than anyone that Aristotle had in mind a single and coherent scala. He, however, did
not directly address the possible conflict with analogical explanation.

Other blooded animals are like dwarves having their upper parts larger than
their lower; this presses them down, makes them quadrupeds (or worse)
and incapable of thought. Such an argument has important implications for
generic unity. For it can prove that viviparous quadrupeds are quadrupeds
without invoking the principle that quadrupeds have four legs; instead it
uses man as a principle and demonstrates quadrupediry as a conclusion.
For one of the premisses must state that quadrupeds are dwarf humans,
and as such quadrupeds will be related per se to humans. This is either a
clear case of Jlfj(J./3acns or it genuinely erases generic distinctions.
Scalar arguments of this sort depend upon the highest member of the
scale to provide a principle for all the members. But it is evident by the fact
that Aristotle introduces many more specific principles to explain groups of
narrower extension that he did not consider the broad scalar attributes fully
explanatory. The subsequent changes from humans through quadrupeds
and testacea to plants cannot all. be explained on the principle of increasing
weight and dwarfishness. In fact, no single set of principles starting from
man can explain the variery of animals and their parts, and Aristotle clearly
does not suppose that they all can be completely explained as deficient
humans.
The normative status of the human is also undercut by the fact that this
passage explicitly states that thinking is in man's logos. For this implies
that thinking is a specific element in the definition of man, and as such is
not present in the logos of other animals. The series argument, by_contrast,
suggests that 'human' will be a per se predicate of other animals inasmuch

as they are deficient humans. That is, if they were not impeded by their
earthy nature and defiCiency of heat they would be humans as well. But
the denial of thinking as a part of their essence indicates that they are not
principally to be defined as deformed (7I'E7I''1pwjJ.Eva), in spite of the fact
that certain resemblances in their nature suggest
as much. In fact, Aristotle.
makes it just as easy to view man as a deviation from quadrupeds through

the addition of his thinking faculry. His intellect makes him capable of
using hands (PA IV.I0 687a8-23), and if he is to have hands, he must go
on two legs, and so must be upright, and be less earthy than quadrupeds.
On this view quadrupeds are causally primary and man is explained on the
basis of them. It is unclear which order of explanation Aristotle thought
correct. Ultimately the explanatory factors are so numerous and so complex
that any attempt to create a single scala can only capture a few closely
related genera of animals, and explain their attributes only in the roughest
way. The posture scala would seem to treat birds as closer to man than
quadrupeds, and yet the reproduction scala treats them as further removed.
Although Aristotle clearly thought that vital heat was the common element
US Analogy and Demonstration

in these various scala, the accompanying attributes are not consistently
covariant. As a result, each genus must still be treated independently.
Aristotle does not introduce analogy in the biological context in order
to facilitate and ground scalar arguments, but in order to complement their
deficiencies. The need for analogues as stafting points cannot be eliminated
by the occasional presence of arguments of scale or more and less. Without
denying that analogues exhibit structural and material similarities and that
sometimes these are scalar, they cannot fully explain the variation and
distribution we find. Some aspects of apart's nature can be explained by
scalar arguments, but other aspects are sui generis, and can be explained
only within the genus.
4
The Structure of Focality
'Focal meaning' is a term that was coined by G.E.L. Owen to translate

the phrase Trpo) V A.eyOjlEVOV,1 !t is used in several Aristotelian contexts,
and provides an explanation for why a word is applied to a variety of
objects that are neither specifically or generically identical nor completely
unrelated:
[E]ssence will belong, just as the 'what' does, primarily and in the simple sense to
substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also, - not essence simply,
but the essence of a quality or of a quantity. For it must be either homonymously
that we say these are, or by making qualifications and abstractions (7J'po(J"nBivras
Kal. dcpaLpovvTas) (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be
known), - the truth being that we use the word neither homonymously nor in the
same sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' when there is a reference to
one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, nor yet speaking
homonymously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument are called medical
neither homonymously nor in virtue of one thing, but with reference to one thing.
(Met. 2 .4 l030a29-b3)
1 Earlier discussions of focality have tended to concentrate on issues of meaning, including

G.E.L. Owen's (1960, 184), who called it 'focal meaning: Leszl, who has also treated
thes~ issues extensively, presented them largely in terms of synonymy, homonymy,
and meaning, and, unable to see how 'being' could apply to nonsubstance within this
framework, supposed that it applied metaphOrically from its application to substance.
See Hamlyn 19n-s for a critique of Leszl. For a new study in tenns of homonymy see
Shields 1999. The debate is now emerging from the confusions of linguistic philosophy,
and some attempts have been made to place focality and issues of meaning within the
framework of demonstrative science, e.g., Ferejohn 1980 and Bolton 1995. For other
attempts to remove Aristotle from the grip of conceptual analysis, see Irwin 1981 and
1982.
117 The Structure of Focality

There must, then, be three kinds of friendship, not all being so named for one
thing or as species of one genus, nor yet having the same name quite by mere
accident. For all the senses are related to one which is the primary, just as is the
case with the word 'medic~l'; for we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument,
or act, but properly the name belongs to that primarily so called. The primary is
that of which the definition is contained in the definition of all (Bonitz's 7rU(Tt for
MSS r,J.llV); -e.g. a medical instrument is one that a medical man would use, but
the definition of the contained is not implied in that of 'medical man.' (EE VII.2
1236a15- 22)
So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to
one. starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others
because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards
substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or
generative of substance or of things which are relative to substance, or negations
of some of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even
of non-being that it is non-being. As, then, there is one science which deals with
all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the
case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one
science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature.
(Met. r.2 1003b5-14)
We can draw a number of preliminary and tentative conclusions from

these passages:
1. In a certain sense focally related items share a name, for instance,
medical skill and medical instrument; substantial being and qualitative
being. However, focally derivative objects also have their own proper
names (scalpel, quality, etc. ), and the common focal term is predicated
of them in addition to this name. Properly speaking, then, they do not
share a name, but have the same term predicated of them.
2. There is a focus or primary term whose definition or whose name is
present in the definitions of the derivative terms, for example, medical
instrument is by definition a tool useful for the medical man.' We get
2 For the substitution of a name for a formula in focality, see Ferejohn 1980, 118-19.
Also, Met. Z.5 1030b23- 26: 'And such attributes [per se attributes1 are those in which
is involved either the formula or the name of the subject of the particular attribute, and
which cannot be explained without this; e.g. white can be explained apart from man,
but not female apart from animal: On the replacement of the name for the definition,
see Owen 1965, 262, who cites D1 21a29-32, APr 49b3-5; and Top. 101b39-102a1,
130,39, 142b2-4, 147b13-14, 149a1-3.

definitions of primary items from definitions of secondary items and
vice versa by addition (7rpo0"8m) and abstraction (acf>aipEO"L<).
3. There is a group of relationships that qualify as focaL In addition to the
examples listed in the third passage, others mentioned in the context of
health and medical are preserves x, produces x, symptom of x, capable
of x, possesses x, is naturally adapted to x, and is a function of x. 3 This
is a very broad group and not restricted to the categories of Being.
I will first take up the issue of eligible relationships and argue that
these represent the variety of ways in which items in a normal science
can be related to one another, and that as a result there is no structural
difference between focal and normal science" I shall then return to the
first two conclusions in the form of objections to this view. We shall find
that the reason 7rPO~ EV AEyOj.lVa share a name is because the terms are
related by natural causal connections. It is these causal connections, rather
than the commonality of name, that are fundamental and allow us to
analyse focality in terms of demonstrations. On this basis we shall be able
to distinguish between demonstrations of linguistic fact, which show why
objects are called by the same term, and demonstrations of cause, which
manifest the causal relations among the objects. We shall then be in a
position to consider whether the focus term is identical with the minor
term and the subject of demonstration. For it is reasonable to suppose
that the focus term is what the science is about. A closer investigation,
however, will force us to refine some of our ideas about the role of the
minor term as the determinant of the subject-genus, and will lead us to
expand our conception of the subject-genus in an important new way. We
shall find that, though the focus is in a certain sense the subject-matter of
the science, the derivative terms also form semi-abstractable and dependent
subject matters.
We have seen in chapter 1 that a normal science is constructed by
selecting a subject-genus and developing demonstrations from its per se
and universal' predicates. We also noticed that there is a relationship between the subject-genus and the divisionary genus, according to which a
divisionary genus is divided into species, and both the divisionary genus
3 For EPYOV as function (i.e., final cause) see Met . Z.10 1035b16-18, where the soul is
equated with the EPYOV; also 2.11 1036b30-32 and 0.8 1050a21-23.
4 Bolton (1995, 427) independently came to the same conclusion, noting that the per
se relations of focal science are the same as those of demonstrative science according
to the APo. His interest is not in categorial focality, however, but rather - if I may
characterize it in my own tenns - with the core science of substance discussed in the
later chapters of 2.

and its species may then form subject-genera for demonstrations. This
relationship implies that a single subject-genus will be composed of a
single kind of object. For example, when beaks are divided into straight
beaks and hooked beaks, and hooked beaks are treated as a subject-genus,
hooked beaks are all the same kind of thing. Confusion, however, arises
when we try to treat as a subject-genus objects that do not form a
single kind of thing, and that are not species derived from a division
of a single genus, for example, hooked beak and being predatory. This
confusion becomes especially acute when these objects are all described
by the same term, and so appear to be species of a common divisionary
genus and treatable as instances of the same kind of thing. Now, such
confusion does not usually occur among objects that share the same name
by accident. The attempt to treat capes (the article of clothing and the
geographical feature) as a single subject-genus is too obvious a mistake
to cause trouble. Serious difficulties, however, arise among homonyms
that are related to one another essentially, but not as species of a genus.
Medical instruments (scalpels) and medical people (doctors) are not species
of the same divisionary genus, but they can be considered to belong in
the same subject-genus, since there is an essential relationship between
them. In fact, between every focal term and its derivatives there is a per
se relation. Not only is the definitional inclusion criterion a guarantor
for the essential relationship between the terms, Aristotle's list of focal
relations also recalls the array of relations typical of normal demonstrations. Processes towards a focus and things productive of a focus, things
naturally adapted to or functions of a focus are all explanatory causes
of a focus, and so are descriptive of the immediate per se connections
of demonstrative premisses. Symptoms are attributes of a focus and are
descriptive of per se accidents or conclusions of demonstrations. Indeed,
with the exception of the accidental predications (affections, qualities, etc.,
to be dealt with in the next chapter), all the focal relationships mentioned
by Aristotle correspond to the causal explanations in normal sciences, and
are described in the same way as the relationships between terms in normal
demonstrative sciences.
In fact, Aristotle himself draws the parallel between focal and nonnal
demonstrative science in the Met. r.2 passage, where he explains the
structure of the science of Being through a comparison to the structure
of medicine. No one would dispute the fact that medicine is a science of
the normal sort, and by showing that the science of Being has a structure
corresponding to this science, Aristotle can argue that the science of Being
is of the same basic kind. Just as the terms of medical science are not all
drawn from the same divisionary genus, so it is also with the science of
Being. It is only because medicine is uncontroversially a normal science

that Aristotle can assimilate the science of Being to it, and argue that Being
forms a subject-genus.
Yet there are a number of important objections to the view that the
focal relation is the same as the per se relation characteristic of normal
demonstrative science. At the most obvious level, focally related items

share a name, whereas this is not explicitly the case among the terms of
a normal science. And even if we are willing to dismiss that objection as
a relatively trivial issue and concentrate instead on the logical and definitional relations, we still face problems with the criterion of definitional
inclusion. Let us take these questions up in turn.
It is important to be clear what focal homonymy consists in. Since
scalpel, patient, and so on are different names and refer to different things,
there is clearly no homonymy among them. Likewise, there is no homonymy between quality, quantity, and substance. Homonymy arises only
when a common term, medical or Being, is predicated of them, but each
in a different sense. This way of viewing the matter gives the appearance
of a one-over-many structure, and this is why Aristotle says that in some
sense the focal term is predicated univocally (we' EV r.2 1003bl4-15):
medical
is predicated of
patient scalpel operation doctor
in virtue of the relation of
undergoing instrument means having
The issue of homonymy, then, which results in an apparently universal
predication, is the problem to be solved, and when Aristotle solves it by

invoking definitional inclusion, he effectively dismisses the issue of names.
For if names and the definitions of these names signify the same thing,
then we can replace all the names with definitions and thereby eliminate
the homonymy. For example, it does not change the structure of the science
of health if we just talk about food, climate, exercise, and disease, without
explicitly saying that they are all healthy. The fact that they are all healthy
things results from their being related to the primary item, not from their
common name. That is, their focality does not arise from their being called
healthy climate, healthy exercise, or any other name, but from the fact
that their definitions contain 'health' in them. s Focal homonymy causes
difficulties only if we fail to make the distinction between the primary and
5 So also Bolton 1995, 428.

derivative terms. If we suppose that there is no difference between them, if
we suppose 'health' is predicated of bodies in the same way it is predicated
of climates, we make the typical Platonic mistake.
To take a biological example, bone is focally related to flesh, since
bone is defined as 'support of flesh.' Flesh is contained in the definition of
bone, because flesh is a final cause for bone in animals that have it. We
might say, then, that flesh is the primary fleshy thing, and bone is called
fleshy, not because it has the attributes that flesh has, but in virtue of
its relationship to flesh. But, of course, Aristotle never calls bone fleshy,
because focality is not a strategy for creating homonymy, but for resolving
homonymy by appealing to the per se connections characteristic of normal
science; and the talk about a common predicate need only be made explicit
when the homonymy is in current usage. Since it is obvious in what way
flesh is related to bone, and we do not call bone fleshy, there is no need
to make explicit the definitional inclusion latent in these terms. It is only
in especially abstract cases, like Being, where the nature of the object is
so difficult to determine, that such confusions arise. The fact that normal
demonstrations in the natural sciences do not regularly make their focality
manifest is irrelevant to the fact that these sciences are focal sciences and
are focal sciences precisely because they are based on the causal connections
of normal science.
The per se relation gives us important information about the nature
of focality. For focality is an application of the per se relations of ordinary
science to solve a problem that arises from the confusion between the
two senses of genus. Objects that because of their common name seem
to be, but are not, members of a common divisionary genus, may fall
within the same subject-genus. Since these objects are not specifically or
generically identical, the only remaining way to include them in a single
science is by relation. At the same time, focality and especially the examples
of health and medicine provide important clues about the structure of
ordinary science and the interpretation of the per se relation in that context.
The definitional inclusion criterion suggests that whenever some item is
used in a science, it must have the definition of the focal item in it. Because
of this strict criterion for focal inclusion in a science, focality provides an
answer to a question we faced in the last chapter, namely, whether common
terms mean different things when used in different sciences. To judge by
the focal relationship, the answer is yes, since the relation of the item to
the subject matter must be specified in the definition of the derivative item.
So, for example, in medicine the knife is medical and contains medicine in
its definition, but in cookery the knife is culinary and contains cookery in
its definition.
Focality and Per Se Predication

I would like now to address in more detail the question whether focality
is amenable to an analysis in terms of per se predicates and demon~
stration. There are good reasons why it should be. First, Aristotle announces at the beginning of Met. r that there is a science of Being
qua Being and the attributes that belong to it per se (ov y, OV Kat Ta
TOVTI!' lJ7rapX{'VTa <aB' allTO 1003a21-22). By using the important technical terms '[I and KaB' alno Aristotle is clearly signalling the scientific
connections he explicates in the APo. Second, Aristotle frequently discusses focality in terms of definitional inclusion, and this is the basis of
the per se relationship explained in APo. Since there are good reasons
to analyse focality in terms of the per se relation, we may reasonably
look for suitable demonstrative contexts that will explicate the focal relationship. This in tum will help us in determining the nature of the focal
science.
It is clear that focality involves predication. Healthy is predicated of

drug, and in general healthy is said or predicated in relation to one thing,
body, which is the primary healthy thing (TO UY<fLVOV )o"EY'TaL "'pos <v).
Now, if the focal relationship is a per se predicational relationship, which
of the per se relationships is it? When we look at focality from the angle
of homonymy, it appears that focal predications are per se (1) predications,
since the definition of the subject contains the predicate, for instance, drug
is healthy, because health is present in the definition of drug. Health is

predicated of drug, because drug is by definition a material that brings
about health. The fact that we now have a predication and a reason for
asserting the predication leads us to make a first attempt to place these
terms in a demonstration in such a way that the definition of the minor
term serves as the middle term:
healthy IPQ material that brings about health

material that brings about health IPQ drug
heal th y IPQ drug
There are a number of peculiar features in this demonstration. First, the
conclusion itself appears to be an immediate per se fact. As we already
noted, the focal predication seems to be a per se (1) predication, and as

such is immediate. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that health
appears both in the major and the middle terms. And the repetition of the
term suggests that there are one too many premisses here. If the conclusion
is an atomic fact, then the deduction cannot be a demonstration. Second,

the demonstration seems to explain a linguistic fact, namely, why it is that
we call drugs healthy, rather than the natural causal relationship between
drug and health. In order to show the linguistic fact of focality (i.e., that we
call drug healthy), the derivative term (i.e., drug) will appear as the minor,
the focus term (i.e., healthy) will appear as the major, and the definition
of the minor as the middle. These two features suggest that this is not a
proper demonstration, and for this reason it is a poor candidate on which
to base the structure of a focal science.

We can instead formulate genuine demonstrations that make use of
the focally related terms and that reflect the natural causal relationships
of normal scientific demonstrations. Whereas the improper demonstration
that proves the linguistic fact consistently places the focal term in the major
position, the demonstrations of natural connections are much more flexible,
and in fact place it in any of the three positions. Using as a model the causal
demonstrations discussed in APo II.ll and the rather loose way in which
Aristotle connects terms there, we can arrange the focally connected terms
in a variety of ways:
healthy IPO material restoring the uniform state of the body

material restoring the uniform state of the body IPO drug
healthy IPO drug
By substituting 'health' in the middle term with a definition of health,
'uniform state of the body,' we provide an explanation, not of the linguistic
fact anymore, but of the natural fact. Now, the explanation given here is
the formal cause, and indeed, this sort of substitution will in every case
change a demonstration of the focal linguistic fact into a demonstration
through the formal cause. Obviously, too, in this case, the arrangement
of the terms and the premisses will remain the same as in the linguistic
demonstration. But when we provide other causes, we must often rearrange
or change the terms of the demonstration:

taking drugs IPO restoring health
restoring health IPO patient
taking drugs IPO patient
In this case the focus is contained in the middle term and provides the final
cause. Middle and major can also be interchanged, thus changing the final
into an efficient explanation. The focus will appear as the major, as in the
linguistic explanations, but here the explanation is not of the term, but of
the fact:

restoring health IPO taking drugs
taking drugs IPO patient
restoring health IPO patient
Examples in which health occupies the minor position are rare, because
health is a state of the body, and is generally predicated of man or patient.
Moreover, objects that are predicated of health (e.g., good, desirable, useful,
pleasant, harmony) seem to be poor candidates for focality, since we do
not usually call any of these things healthy. The reason for this is that all
these predicates are generic and extend more widely than the focus subject.
But at least one seems amenable to this scheme:
pleasant IPO having a uniform state of the body
having a uniform state of the body IPO health
pleasant IPO health
So the arrangement of the terms in demonstrations of natural facts is
different from and more flexible than demonstrations of linguistic (focal)
facts' More important, according to this scheme the focally related terms
can be arranged into demonstrations, and so actually pass muster as a
science. It seems, then, that focally related terms must be arranged in this
normal manner if there is to be a focal science. Moreover, as we saw, th e
linguistic demonstrations are dependent on the natural causal connections,
6 When we manipulate the focal tenn$ to produce scientific (rather than linguistic)
demonstrations, we change the nature of the per se connections among the terms. Now,
Aristot.le leaves us in no doubt as to whether the causal definition passes muster as
an immediate and ne<essary connection, for it is the staple of the demonstrations in
APo II. But he does not discuss it in APo I.4, except if we interpret the fourth per se
relation as causal (as e.g., Ferejohn 1991, 118-19, does). Nevertheless, the predicational
arrangement in the major premiss is different from any of the per se relations, and
bears comment. For to predicate something of the phrase that states its definition (e.g.,
man is predicated of two-footed animal) is covered by none of the per 5e relations, but
it dearly forms an admissible demonstrative premiss. There are important results that
come out of this observation. There must be more per 5e connections than those in
Aristotle's list in APo I.4 and they must include such causal connections. These causal
per 51'! connections aTe also definitionally related, but in a different way: a name is
predicated of its own causal definition per Sl'! . It is the reverse of per se (I) predication
in which a definitional element is predicated of a name; here a name is predicated of a
definitional element. The causal per se connection is also different from the per se (1)
con nection in that the causal per se connection must meet the coextension criterion.
Whereas a genus term (which extends Wider) can be predicated per Sf (I) of a subject,
this is not possible for causal per se connections, since causal explanations must operate
at commensurate levels of universality.

and without these there would be no grounds for the focal relationship.
Focal science, then, to the extent that it is science, depends upon the natural
causal connections of nonnal science. The demonstration of the linguistic
fact is only an apparent demonstration. Because the focal relationship is
(usually) an immediate per se relationship, the syllogisms that show this
are not strictly demonstrations.
There are two principal problems in identifying focal and normal
demonstrative science that have to do with the per se criterion. The first
is that focality forces us to provide a single unified subject for a science,
which all related terms must contain in their definitions. This is a demanding requirement, and one that we have already considered. While it
is certainly true that in a normal science all the tenns are connected to one
another through a series of per se relations, it seems impossible for them
all to be connected directly to one single term through per se relations.
After all, th~ conclusion of a demonstration states a connection that is not
contained in the definition of its subject, and for this reason we might
suppose that the major term is not focally related to the minor. As we saw
in chapter 1, Aristotle recognized the conclusion as a per se connection,
but not one that required immediate definitional inclusion. But if focally
related terms are to appear in demonstrations, the conclusion must also
have an immediate definitional connection. This, however, would destroy
the nature of demonstration.
There are two solutions for this problem. First, it may be that, after all,
the definitional inclusion at work in focality is not the same as the per se
connection, but instead may be something looser, like a relevance criterion
that marks the derivative item as broadly related to the central subject of
the science. This is an interesting possibility, since it would make the unity
of a subject-genus dependent on something other than per se connections.
Alternatively, immediate definitional inclusion may not be essential to the
focal relationship. Instead, two terms may be focally related even if one is
only the per se accident of the other. That is, the focal relationship may
be transitive. There are two considerations which suggest that this latter
possibility is the more likely. First, Aristotle does not draw the distinction
between the two kinds of connection postulated in the first solution. He
recognizes only per se connections made explicitly in definitions. Second,
he clearly explicates the focal relationship in terms of per se connections,
and these connections may be used to prove remoter connections. The
possibility that focality is a transitive relationship is strongly suggested by
some examples in r.2: things that are 'productive or generative of substance
or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of some of these
or of substance itself' are said to be (I003b8-10). To take an extreme case,

it seems quite likely that even that which is productive of a negation of a
quality of a substance will be said to be and so be included in the science
of Being. Since these linguistic facts must be backed by natural causes, the
transitivity of the linguistic facts will be matched by transitivity of the per
se relations. For one term to be focally related to another does not, then,
entail immediate definitional inclusion.
There is a second problem in interpreting the focal science as a normal

demonstrative science, a problem that will lead us to a reconsideration of
the nature of the subject-genus. We might expect the focus term to serve
invariably as the ultimate subject of predication in the minor position.
After all, a science studies a genus and its per se attributes, and APo I.7
75a42- b2 implies that the genus is that of which the attributes are proved,
and this can only be the minor term . And yet it is clear that among the
focally related terms the focus will frequently, and in the specific case of
health most often, not be found in the minor or subject position. Not only
will the focus not be the subject, but there will be a variety of different
subjects and therefore a variety of different sciences. For if we accept the
claim that the identity of a science is determined
by the minor term, then
either there will be many sciences where there should only be one (in the
demonstrations given above, a science of patient, of health, of drug, etc.), or
all these demonstrations must ultimately be attached to some basic subject,
which will be the true genus of the science. An obvious candidate for such
a genus is patient or man qua healthy. The latter is especially appealing,
because it points to the two-fold answer to the question. The subject-genus
is determined by the qua expression, but the subject of predication is what
appears before the qua expression? This is Aristotle's practice in the PA.
The ultimate subjects of predication are the animals, which have parts and
attributes, but in each demonstration they are treated qua having some
part or other, and this is the genus. So, for example, having lungs is the
cause of having necks in animals that have necks (IlI.3 664a12-36). The
subject of predication is animal, but not animal universally. In this passage
Aristotle is talking about necks, so the subject-genus and minor term of
demonstration is animals qua having necks:
having
having
having
having
a
a
a
a
neck IPO having a larynx

larynx IPO having a lung
lung IPO animals qua necked
neck IPO animals qua necked
7 There is some evidence to suggest that the subject lenn must be a substance. APo 1.22
83,2-17; Met. Z.9 1034.30-32. Cf. Lewis 1991, 57.

Likewise in his discussion of cause as substance in Met. HA, Aristotle
mentions two cases in which an attribute belongs to a substance, but not
straightforwardly in virtue of that subject. When we seek the cause for
things, we must beware what we are seeking the cause of:
Nor does matter belong to those things which exist by nature but are not substances; their substratum is the substance. E.g. what is the cause of an eclipse?
What is its matter? There is none; the moon is that which suffers eclipse ... In the
case of sleep it is not clear what it is that proximately has this affection. Surely
the animal, it will be said. Yes, but the animal in virtue of what, i.e. what is the
proximate subject? The heart or some other part. Next, by what is it produced?
Next, what is the affection - that of the proximate subject, not of the whole animal?
Shall we say that it is immobility of such and such a kind? Yes, but to what process
in the proximate subject is this due? (1044b8-20)
The subject of predication in the case of eclipse is moon, a substance.

And since asking what an eclipse is is the same as asking why darkne~s is
predicated of the full moon (Z.17), the subject of predication is a substance,
moon, but not moon without qualification, since the eclipse occurs only
when the moon is full. Similarly sleep is an affection of animals, and
animal is the subject of which it is predicated, but it is in virtue of some
part of the essence of animal that sleep belongs to it, namely, the heart.
To return to the case of health, under this interpretation we would
modify the minor term so that it is not the focus, but is itself a derivative
term, that is, not health, but that which has health as such, for ultimately
we need as a subject a recipient of the state of health. With that in place
it may be possible to discuss the entire science of health as both a focal
science and one with the subject of health as such as the subject of the
science, for the minor term is considered only insofar as it is the recipient
of the focus term. In the first two demonstrations we provided above, we
can easily substitute 'patient' for 'that which has health as such.' In the
single case we considered in which the subject was health, we can again
easily reformulate it so that pleasure is predicated of the healthy subject
as such. In sum, the focal science can be interpreted as normal science, the
focal term being the genus of the science, and its substrate, if it has one,
being the subject of predication or minor term of the demonstrations. 8
8 This also distinguishes focality from paronymy to which it is often likened. For
the paronymy relationship exists between a substantive noun and its corresponding
adjective, e.g., courage and courageous (tivopda and aveptos-). Paronymy makes no
commitments regarding the categorial status of the paronyms: the word from which
-------------------------

The final and most important challenge to the view that focal science
is logically identical with normal science argues that I have simply misinterpreted Aristotle's basic intentions. Aristotle, the objection contends,
did not think of the focally derivative terms as the per se accidents and
causes of the focally primary term, and did not intend to force them into
a demonstrative mould. Instead he was concerned to show how various
subject-genera each with its own causes and per se attributes might he
considered as parts of a single science. My solution may solve the problem
of unity but at the price of destroying the architecture of focal science
that Aristotle wanted to account for. The 'normal science' solution simply
does away with the derivative terms as subject-genera, and makes them
instead into causes and attributes in demonstrations concerning the focal
subject-genus.
This challenge is important because the answer to it opens up a new
and wider conception of subject-genus and clarifies the connections between focality on the one side and analogy and semi-abstraction on the
other. Focality is the meeting-point of two conceptions of subject-genus.
The narrow subject-genus, now very familiar, is proper to the realm of
demonstration. It is the subject of the demonstration, and attributes and
causes are predicated of it. Since these attributes and causes do not belong
in the same divisionary genus as their subject-genus, they are included
in the subject-genus by focality . This focal inclusion of other terms is
uncontroversial, and indeed a necessary condition for demonstrative proof
as we saw in chapter l.
But there is a wider sense of subject-genus, beyond that of both the minor term of a demonstration and the whole demonstration together. Many
of the terms that are used in a demonstration, and that are therefore bound
to the specific subject-genus per se and universally, may be abstracted to
some degree from that subject-genus and treated as subject-genera in their
own right. In many cases, and in all cases of natural substances, perfect
conceptual abstraction will be impossible. The semi-abstracts maintain their
per se - though not their universal- connections to the genus from which
they are abstracted. When there is a variety of terms that are abstracted
in this manner and treated as semi-autonomous subject-genera, they may
be drawn back together in virtue of their remaining per se relations into
a single focal science. This view of focal science does not attempt to fit
the paronym is derived need not be a substance, though it must be a noun. By contrast,
the focus must be that of which attributes may be predicated, even if the subject need
not be a substa nce as such. The subject of health does not have to be man, but only
that subject which admits of health.

focally related terms into a single demonstrative syllogism; it is rather a
means for organizing semi-autonomous subject-genera.
There is no doubt that this is a great organizing principle of Aristotelian

science. In Aristotle's lists of the focal relations we can virtually read off the
treatises of his biological works: the affections of animals are the subject of
the HA, generations of animals are the subject of the GA, the preservation
and destruction of animals are the subject of Juv., instruments of animals
are the subject of the PA and lA, the various activities of animals are the
subject of the MA, PN, and DA . Since the focal term is animal, we might
look for a subject-genus of animal apart from all the derivative sciences. Of
course, it does not exist separately,9 Animal is always the ultimate subject
of predication, but it is always qualified by some qua expression.
This system of organization is not peculiar to the biological or even to
the theoretical works. The ethics too manifests all the traits of a wide focal
science. It studies. eudaimonia, which is defined as activity in accordance
with virtue. Accordingly, EN III and IV discuss the various species of

virtue, courage, liberality, and so on. They also study the things focally
related to virtue, the negations of virtue, vice, and later those things, like
friendship, that contribute to virtue.
So once again, focal science turns out to be normal science, though this
wider view describes new aspects of scientific organization. The wide and
the narrow view of focal science are hardly exclusive, indeed they form a
two-stage organization related through the nexus of semi-abstraction. A
term that is a focal member of a narrow genus may be semi-abstracted
from that narrow genus to become a subject-genus of a new science. But
since it has been only semi-abstracted, this new subject-genus remains
focally related within the wider focal science.

An important corollary of this connection between wide and narrow
focal science is that the subject of predication of the narrow science is the
same as the focus of the wide science. In the zoological works it is always
animal. In the narrow science the subject of predication is animal without
qualification, while the several biological treatises themselves are focused
on animal qua this or that feature .
The Limits of Focality in the Biological Works

Before turning to the metaphysical focalities, I want to discuss an aspect
of biological focality in the demonstrative mode. Focality is a means of
9 Aristotle suggests that it can exist, but that it is too cumbersome to treat animal s in
that way (PA 1.1 639alS- 29).

treating generically different terms as belonging to the same genus. How
far outside the divisionary genus can one go, and still remain within the
subject-genus? Can or does Aristotle use the techniques of focality to

develop a logic of interdisciplinarity? Just as scalpels are part of the medical
science through focalization, so we might expect nests to be included in
the study of birds (because they are the shelter for birds), or even antelope
to be included in the study of lions (because they are the prey of lions). In
fact, Aristotle generally remains within quite narrow limits in the biological
sciences. His procedure may be contrasted with evolutionary theory, which

finds sources of explanation both in the internal nature of the animal and in
the external environment. The genetic code proposes and the environment
disposes; the environment poses a problem that the genetic code must solve
on pain of extinction. Evolutionary biologists explain features of animals
as adaptations to the environment, and so make the environment (e.g.,
niches) a source of explanation for the animal. The study of ecology, the
way species are affected by one another and by inorganic factors, is a
natural development of this mode of explanation. Aristotle for the most
part avoids explanatory factors that come from outside of the animal, and
when avoidance is impossible, he redescrihes them so as to make them
internal to the animal's nature itself. So, for example, the environment is
described as a way of life or {3ios internal to the animal. Marsh birds

are well adapted to marshes, not because the marsh environment has
exerted evolutionary pressures, but because it is the internal nature of
marsh birds to live in marshes, and if they are to do so, they must have
such and such features. This is consistent with Aristotle's general system
of explanation in the PA, which provides the causes of parts of animals

from within the essential functions and activities each animal perfonns.
The reason why Aristotle chooses this method is fairly clear: his method
privileges unity of definition, while the evolutionary account makes a large
part of the cause and therefore the essence of an animal external" to the
animal. Obvious difficulties arise if we make antelope focally related to
lions because they are prey for lions. For in the definition of the antelope would be found the fact that they are essentially food for lions.
The problem here is not that this would represent a constraint on natural
teleology, but rather that those constraints would come from the outside
rather than, as Aristotle invariably presents them, from within, either as
material limitations or as limitations imposed by the need to fulfil other
functions.
Aristotle does, however, discuss some cases where environment, living
and non-living, plays a role. The terrestrial and marine environments
provide sources of explanation, but they have been focalized and are

represented as land animals and water animals.lO These definitory facts
of their {3io, explain the different kinds of limbs and modes of respiration.
Habitat may also have a more specific influence: the hot and dry environment of Libya seems to grow large animals (PA II.9 655aS-1O). Man has
the hairiest head because hair shelters the head from excessive cold and
heat (PA II.14 65Sb2- 7). Among the living environmental factors, some
animals are related to other animals
by the f3{or; of being- carnivorous. Bones
of carnivores, for example, are hard because they have to fight for their
food (PA II.9 655a12-17). We also find adaptations designed for defence
or preservation (aAK~ and O'wT'/Pia). But only rarely (as with eyebrows
and eyelashes, PA II.l5 65Sbl4-15) does Aristotle state explicitly what
external threat these parts provide defence against. Now, Aristotle does not
provide a hypothetical deduction for the existence of parts instrumental for
defence, but if he had, his clear inclination would be towards explaining
them as hypothetically necessitated by the life of the animal, rather than
as means to avoid being injured by something external. This tendency
towards exploiting internal principles of explanation has some effects on
his selection of facts for which he provides explanations. In explaining why
some animals lack certain modes of defence, he never cites lack of external
threats but only notes that the animal's own nature prevents such defence
from being useful.
The major source of external causation, however, is in the explanations
for sensation. For the organ of sensation is potentially what the sensible
object is actually, and the nature of the sense organ must correspond to the
nature of the sensible and the medium for the sensible. Since the actual
is prior in knowledge to the potential (Met. 0.S), external sensible objects
will have a causal role in animals l l So since the organ of touch deals with
more than one kind of sense-object, it must have several oppositions in it,
even though it is a uniform part (PA II.l 647al4-19). Likewise, the ears are
placed on man halfway around the head because they have to hear sounds
from all directions (PA 11.10 656b26-29). Environment also clearly plays
a role in the explanation of why fish have fluid eyes (PA 11.13 65Sa3- 10):
10 Cf. Top . VI.6 144b31-145al: 'See, too, if he has rendered being in something as the
differentia of a thing's substance, for it seems that locality cannot differentiate between
one substance and another. Hence, too, people condemn those who divide animals by
means of the terms terrestrial and aquatic, on the ground that terrestrial and aquatic
indicate locality. Or possibly in this case the censure is undeserved; for aquatic does not
mean "in" anything; nor does it denote locality, but a certain quality; for even if the
thing is on the dry land, still it is aquatic - and likewise a land animal, even though it
is in the water, will still be a land animal and not aquatic.'
11 See Cleary 1988, 57.

For animals that move much about have to use their vision at considerable distances.
For land animals, the air is transparent enough. But the water in which fishes live is
a hindrance to sharp sight, though it has this advantage over the air, that it does not
contain so many objects to knock against the eyes. For this reason, nature, which
makes nothing in vain, has given no eyelids to fishes while to counterbalance the
opacity of the water they have eyes of fluid consistency. (modified ROT)
Sense perception is not only an external cause; it is also the ultimate final
cause of animals, and all other parts and functions are in one way or
another instrumental towards this end. In fact, all the major soul faculties
and their objects (nutrition, sensation, and intellection) provide explanatory
grounds outside of the animal in the wider world, and in all three cases
. Aristotle provides this connection with a theoretical basis in potentiality
and actuality. So the material in the environment that animals ingest is
given a functional description as a potentiality and is consistently called
food (TpO<l>~) (e.g., PA II.3 650a2-8). Only rarely does Aristotle describe
food in independent per se terms. For example, in his discussion of beaks,
the kind of food each bird eats provides an explanation for the shape of its
beak. Crooked-taloned birds have hooked beaks because they feed on flesh;
their beaks are useful for them to master their prey and for the exertion
of force. Conversely, some birds have finely constructed beaks, because
they pick up seeds and minute insects. Swimming birds have broad beaks
because they dig for roots, and sometimes they have a sharp point at the
end of the beak by means of which they may easily deal with herbaceous
foods (III.l 662a33-b16).
There is one notorious case of environmentalism (PA IY.13 696b2431):
[In] the dolphin and the Solachia, [the mouth] is placed on the under surface [of the
body]; so that these fishes turn on the back in order to take their food. The purpose
of nature in this was appar~ntly not merely to provide a means of salvation for
other animals, by allowing them opportunity of escape . . . but also to prevent these
fishes from giving way too much to their gluttonous ravening after food.
If we are to follow the strict criteria of APo, 'preserving other animals from
them' must be per se related to dolphins and selachia and therefore part of
their definitions. It is probably for this reason that Aristotle provides an
alternative internal explanation for their mode of eating, which he seems to
consider more likely, namely avoiding the dangers inherent in the natural
gluttony of sharks.

The extent to which Aristotle has restricted his use of external explanations is dear through a brief comparison with some of the explanations
Plato provides in the Timaeus. Throughout the description of the structure
and composition of man, we find theological and moral principles invoked:
the head would have survived much longer if it were fleshy, but it would
have been less sensitive, and since it is better to live a short but good life,
rather than a long but inferior one, the gods ordained the former (75b-c).
The final cause of the liver is said to be the means for receiving prophetic
dreams (71d-72b). All other animals are food for humans (77a-c). Even
geometry provides principles: weaker triangles from which food is made
are overcome by the triangles of the body, which break them down for use
(81c--<l); eventually they are worn out and old age comes onl2
It is often remarked that Aristotle avoided universal teleology, and
restricted final cause to the nature of each animal, but it is clear also
that Aristotle tended 'to avoid most forms of external explanation even to
the point of denying the whole science of ecology. It is clearly the twin
factors of the conceptual unity of animal" and the requirement that the
explanations for predicates belonging to animals arise from definitions of
animals, that drive Aristotle away from external explanations. We should
not look to focality, therefore, as a source for interdisciplinary logic.
12 See Cleary 1995, 71f., for a discussion of Aristotle's critique of Plato's use of
mathematical principles in physics.
5
Metaphysical Focality
Our study of the definitional inclusion criterion and Aristotle's examples

of health and medicine have led us to interpret focal science as structurally
identical with normal science. We must now apply this interpretation to the
science of Being and consider whether metaphysics fits the model of normal
science. The importance of medicine and health as examples of sciences has
been largely ignored or denied. Most commentators have been content to
focus on the issue of homonymy and its logical form without considering
the scientific implications of the examples' Owen, however, related focality
to the issue of the autonomy of sciences and argued that focality provided
Aristotle with the means to unify the science of Being, and thereby to
establish a qualified return to Platonic universalism.' Ferejohn has extended
this observation and attempted to provide a sketch of what the focal science
of Being would look like.' He confined his remarks to Met. r .2 and even
within that chapter dealt only with the relation between substance and the
non-substantial categories. But he made the important advance of treating
the science of Being as a demonstrative science. He interpreted the science
of substance as a superordinate science over the subordinate sciences of
non-substances. The theorems to be proved in the subordinate sciences
were proofs of the existence of some of the objects in those sciences.
On the grounds that science A is superordinate to science B if some of
1 E.g., Owens 1978, 119; Ross 1924, i, 256. Kirwan 1993, 81, comments only on the
inadequacy of the illustrations to vindicate the possibility of metaphysics. Burnyeat et
a1. 1979, 25-8, do not mention these cases at all. Ferejohn 1980 and Bolton 1995 are
notable exceptions.
2 Owen 1960, 1965. See Shields 1999, 225-36, for a criticism of Owen's position.
3 Ferejohn 1980.
135 Metaphysical Focality

the principles of science B are proved within science A, Ferejohn argued
that the existence of quality can be proved from the principles proper to
the science of quality. One of the principles of the science of quality is
the statement that translates 'quality exists' into 'quality is predicated of
substance.' But that translation principle contains 'quality is predicated of
substance,' and Ferejohn claimed that if this statement is provable at all,
it must be provable in a science whose genus is composed of substances,
that is, in the superordinate science. 4
Ferejohn made only modest claims for this attempt to relate focal Being
to the theory of science. He did not try to extend the interpretation to cover
the other focal relations mentioned even in r.2, nor did he deal with the
discussion of categorial focality that arises in the early chapters of Z. But
apart from the fact that Ferejohn did not provide a comprehensive theory,
there are reasons for rejecting his suggestion that we should interpret the
relation of substance and non-substance as a superordinate-subordinate
relationship. Although there are some hints in the text that point in this
direction, Aristotle makes no mention of the paradigm case of superordinate and subordinate sciences, geometry and optics, in connection with the
focality of BeingS And yet we would expect him to call upon this example
rather than develop the new, or at least seldom used, example of medicine
which makes no pretense of illustrating the superordinate-subordinate relationship at all.
There are philosophical objections as well. A superordinate science is
capable of being formulated in complete abstraction from the genus of
the subordinate science. Geometry qua geometry has no per se relations
to optical rays. If it had, it would not be a superordinate and different
science. If the science of substance qua substance were superordinate, then
we would expect it to have no per se connections with the non-substance.
But in fact this is not so. One of the essential functions of substance is
to be a substrate, that of which other things are predicated but which is
itself not predicated of anything else. In virtue of this nature, substance is
per se related to predications of non-substance. Ferejohn admits this fact
freely, indeed, it is necessaty for his argument that' quality is predicated of
substance' be proved within the science of substance. But it is impossible for
a superordinate science to have such per se relations with the subordinate
science, and for this reason the superordinate-subordinate model must fail.
4 Ibid., 126.
5 Aristotle says that the focus is called a principle, and the other things are said on
account of it (l003b5-6; lOO3b16-17); he also says that these parts of the science of
Being may be arranged like universal and special mathematics (1004a6-9) .

Yet Ferejohn has pointed the way towards interesting possibilities, since
Aristotle himself extends the promise that the science of Being will be a
demonstrative science.' In this chapter I want to explore a group of related
issues concerning the science of Being. This exploration is not intended to
be a systematic exposition of Aristotle's doctrine, because in many respects
Aristotle allows us only the most tentative and sketchy conclusions. This is
nowhere more true than at our starting point, Aristotle's avowed reasons
for denying a genus of Being. In fact, I shall conclude rather reluctantly
that the reasons for his denial are relevant to the focal solution he proposes
only in the most general way. I shall then go on to consider focality in the
context of the categories of Being, and finally broaden the discussion by
considering the rather neglected focal relation between the One and Being.
On all these issues the difficult and ambiguous texts require both c.a ution
and speculation.
The Genus of Being

The reason that focal analysis has to be applied to Being is that Being
does not form a genus. Under the conventional understanding, therefore,
it cannot form a single subject-matter for a single science. Although Aristotle repeatedly stresses that Being cannot form a genus, he usually treats
this as an assumption, and argues the thesis only in one brief passage
in the aporetic book B of the Metaphysics.' It would stand to reason
that this argument should shed light on the focal science of Being that
Aristotle introduces. However, the context of the passage iS ,an argument
against the Platonists, who hold that the highest genus is the highest
principle. Since Aristotle merely needs to refute the Platonists, he need not
introduce a full-blown theory concerning the categories. Nevertheless, the
6 Met. B.2 997a25-33: 'Further, does our investigation deal with substances alone or also
with their attributes? I mean for instance, if the solid is a substance and so are lines and
planes, is it the business of the same science to know these and to know the attributes
of each of these classes (the attributes which the mathematical sciences prove), or of a
different science 7 If of the same, the science of substance also must be a demonstrative
science; but it is thought that there is no demonstration of the essence of things. And
if of another, what will be the science that investigates the attributes of substance?'
7 There is a brief recapimlation of this argument at K.1 1059b31-34. For Being being
said in many ways: DA I.5 410a13, Met. E.2 1026a33, Z.l 1028a10, Z.4 l030bll, H.2
1042b25, 8.10 1051a34, 1.2 1054a14. Being falls immediately into genera: r.2 1004a5,
1\.4 1070bl-2. For a recent treatment of this argument see Shields 1999, 247--60, who
argues against its relevance to the categories. His book was published too late for me to
take proper account of his argument.

argument is important since it supports a position that Aristotle clearly
held and without which there would be no need for a solution of any
kind at all.
Aristotle argues that there is no genus of Being because a genus term
cannot be predicated of the differentia taken by itself apart from the species:
But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a genus of things; for the
differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is
not possible for the genus to be predicated of the differentiae taken apart from the
species (any more than for the species of the genus to be predicated of the proper
differentiae of the genus) (B.3 998b22-26)
The argument consists of two premisses: no genus can be predicated of its

differentiae, and Being must be predicable of all differentiae. of course,
from these premisses Aristotle is only permitted to conclude that Being
as a genus is not predicated of its differentiae. But since Being is such a
predicate that it must be a generic term and express the essence of whatever
it is predicated of, Being can only be predicated as a genus. For details of
the reasons why a genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae, we must
turn to Topics VI.6 144a31-b3: 8
Again see if the genus is predicated of the differentiae; for it seems that the genus
is predicated, not of the differentia, but of the objects of which the differentia is
predicated. Animal (e.g.) is predicated of man and ox and other terrestrial animals,
not of the differentia itself, which we predicate of the species. (a) For if animal is
to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then many animals will be predicated of
the species (Eioovs"); for the differentiae are predicated of the species. (b) Moreover,
the differentiae will be all either species or individuals, if they are animals; for
every animal is either a species or an individual.
In spite of the specific example Aristotle has chosen, this argument seems
to be of general application, and there does not appear to be anything
preventing our applying it to Being. We may best begin with Aristotle's
8 Ross 1924, i, 235, cites this passage as an explanation of the Metaphysics passage, and
provides the following interpretation: '(a) If Igenus were predicated of the differentia],
the genus would be predicated of the species many times over, since it would be
predicated of each of the successive differentiae which constitute the species. (b) If
"animal" is predicable of each of its differentiae, each of them will be either a species
or an individual, since "an animal" always means one or the other.' There is no reason
to suppose with Ross that Aristotle has successive differentiae in mind. As in 2.12, the
iteration of the predicate is not impossible, just redundant.

second objection (b), which is clearer and more cogent. Like the Metaphysics passage this argument depends on the presupposition that a genus
term by its very nature as a genus term can be predicated only of species,
and whatever a genus is predicated of must for that reason be a species. The
clause 'if they are animals' (Er7fEp (0a 144b2), implies that the genus must
be predicated as the what-is-it (TL fUTL) of the differentiae, and so if animal
is the genus term predicated of the differentiae, then the differentiae must
be species (or individuals) of animal. Since biped is obviously not a species
of animal, the genus cannot be predicated of differentiae. This argument
prompts us to think of the genus as a pile of objects to be divided up. If this
pile is to be divided by differentiae, the differentiae cannot be members of
the pile, since the differentiae function quite differently from a species of
the genus. And so if we place the differentiae in the genus, we would have
to include both the items in the pile and the criteria used to distinguish
one sub-pile from another.
The first objection is less obvious and less cogent, but it probably
involves the issue of babbling ("OO'\EOX"")' a dialectical misdemeanour
(SE 3 165b12- 17) perpetrated when someone repeats himself (usually
implicitly) a number of times. Strictly speaking, babbling occurs in the
context of relative terms (SE 13 173bl-11) and so is not properly applicable
to this situation. Notwithstanding, Aristotle probably has in mind a less
vicious form of babbling, in which the same information is given twice,
once explicitly through the genus of the species and once again implicitly
through the genus of the differentia. If there are multiple differentiae for
one species the genus will be given many times. 9 Now, Aristotle claims
that both the differentia and the logos of the differentia are predicable of
the species (Cat. 5 3a22-28). If that logos contains a genus term, then the
genus of the differentia will also be predicable of the species. So man, who
is a biped animal, may have two genera predicated of him, animal and
legged, if legged is the genus of biped. Aristotle requires this conclusion in
order for the babbling charge to hold. And yet this same conclusion opens
up the possibility of a genus being predicated of a species, but not as a
genus of the species (legged is not the genus of man), and this seems to
9 So Ross 1924, if 235. Alexander objects that these arguments are tOO dialectical
(206.12-13) and provides a couple of counter-examples. First, if all differentiae are
qualities (7Tot6v), then the differentiae of quality will be qualities, and so in the category
of quality, the genus will in fact be predicated of the differentiae. Second, even if the
immediate genus is not predicated of the differentia of a substance as, for example,
biped taken by itself is not animal, yet at a higher level biped is ollsill . Alexander's two
objections arise out of the unclear categorial status of the differentia.

undermine Aristotle's argument against the genus of Being. For if we are
not saying the same univocal thing twice, then we cannot be babbling. Even
apart from this difficulty, babbling is at worst a venial sin, one that anyone
talking about the physical realm is bound to commit. The definitions of
snub nose and all natural substances also entail babbling (Met. 2.5), but
this does not immediately exclude their being defined. They may still be
defined with a qualification.
We face further problems when we apply the general argument of the
Topics to the specific case of Being. According to Aristotle's objection (a),
if we admit a genus of Being, we are forced to babble, since all definitions
will take the form, 'x is a Being differentiated by y whiCh is a Being.'
According to objection (b), a species is a Being with a differentia, which
is itself a Being. This species, then, would be many Beings, whereas in
fact it is just one. Again, the predication of the genus is to be taken in
the strictest sense: the genus is always predicated of species and when
predicated always creates species. Under this interpretation, a species like
man will not just be many Beings (which hardly seems problematic if we
understand animal and biped as two Beings), but he will be many species.
Since a man is essentially his differentiae, if his differentiae are species of
his genus, he will be several species of the same genus, and the unity of
man will clearly be lost.
This strict interpretation of the genus predication reveals further presuppositions of the argument. It is not possible for one object to be two
species, and the what-is-it question must have a unique answer for every
well-formed object. This presupposition becomes clear when the correct
genus is predicated of the differentia, for though the object will have
two different genus terms predicated of it, if its differentia is part of the
what-is-it of the species, it will not belong to two genera, since the genus
of the differentia is not the genus of the species (e.g., man is legged, but
legged is not his genus). By contrast, when we attempt to predicate the
genus univocally of its differentiae, the differentiae become species of the
genus in the same sense as the species (e.g., man) themselves.
Aristotle also presupposes that if the genus is predicated of a differentia,
then that genus cannot create species that will stand alongside (i.e., be
cogeneric with) the species of which the differentia is predicated. This is
tantamount to saying that the genus and the differentia play different roles
in definition and classification. If we try to predicate a term like Being of
both the species and the differentia, then we are assuming that, if Being is
univocal, it is being predicated in the same way, whereas in fact it is not.
To be a genus, then, implies among other things that its species are of the
same logical and predicational type.
If we insist on a unified genus of Being, Aristotle argues, the individual

and species will become many and lose their unity. We must therefore
sacrifice unity at the highest level of generality in order to achieve unity
at the lower levels. Genus and differentia will be different kinds of Being,
but the species will be a single thing, a unity of genus and differentia
and not two species. Given Aristotle's prejudice towards the species and
the individual, this is a reasonable response. Uniry at the lower level
is maintained by distinguishing different kinds of predication. Plato, by
championing the unity of the genus in the theory of the Forms, did not
allow for the unity of the species or individual, and as a result a thing
becomes many by participation. All the forms exist equally and have a
common nature to the extent that they are forms, and each species falls
under many kinds. Aristotle alludes to the Platonic origin of this problem
in a different context, Metaphysics H.6 1045al4-17:
What then is it that makes man one; and why is he one and not many, e.g.,
animal and biped, especially if there are, as some say, animal itself and biped
itself> (modified ROT)
There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that Being is not
a genus. Drawing on the class model, we may suppose that the differentia,
since it is Being, will be a member of the pile of Beings; but since it is
a differentia, it must be the criterion by which the piles are divided. If
a differentia is a criterion, it cannot be a member, and so cannot have
Being. Conversely, if it is a member, we shall need a new criterion by
which to divide the pile. Nothing on this view prevents all existing things
from forming a pile, but this pile cannot be divided and therefore cannot
be a genus. It must remain one pile, indeterminate and indeterminable,
an inchoate unintelligible AIL Not only can it not be divided, but nothing
positive can be said of it at alL Certainly no predicate can be applied to it,
since that predicate is Being, and therefore must be applied to all Beings
and itself. Since the predicate is a Being, we must still find something
predicable of all Beings, and so we must look for a further predicate, and
so on to infinity, In this way the genus of Being falls victim' to a third-man
argument.
Again, Aristotle assumes as a premiss of his argument that all differentiae are Beings and, as such, have Being predicated of them. 1O As a result,
10 B.3 998b23-24; at Top. JV.6 128a26-29 they are nOta.
l41 Metaphysical Focality

Being cannot be predicated of them as a genus. But as 1.2 l 053b20- 21
says, Being is the most universal of predicates, and so Aristotle seems to
be canvassing the possibility that even if Being is not predicated as a genus,
still it is a univocal universal predicate. But none of the other predicables definition, property, or accident - seems to be a possibility. In saying that
differentiae are, what else are we saying than that Being is their genus /"
Since Being is predicated of all Beings, but is neither a single genus nor
any other predicate, it follows that Being must predicated as more than
one genus: the Signification of Being must be different for the species and
its differentia. Being, therefore, is not a general predicate.
Even if Aristotle had something like this interpretation in mind, it
nevertheless fails as a problem that the categories solve. His argument
merely requires that differentiae and species not be in the same sense, as
the pile analogy makes clear. It does not require the ten ca tegories as a
solution. In fa ct, it does not require any of the canonical ca tegories at all.
How does he intend to bridge the gap / He does not explicitly provide an
argument, but he may. have had something like the following in mind.
There is no genus of Being, that is, of everything. But let us accept that
there are some genera, if only, say, low-level genera, like animal, that
are divisible into species. Animals, then, form a genus in the heap of
Being. Now we ask whether there is anything that prevents animal from
being a member of a higher genus, living things. If nothing prevents, we
may proceed to form a higher genus and continue the procedure up to the
highest level possible, that of the categories. At this point we are prevented
from going further. The categories are genera, but they are not species of
11 According to Loux 1973, while Aristotle's argument that there is no genus of Being
is valid, it does not entail that Being is equivocal. He is not satisfied with Aristode's
indirect method of es tablishing that there is no genus of Being, and accordingly he
provides his own argument, which is predicated on his understanding of genus. For
Loux a genus is an answer to the what-is-it question. And for there to be such an
answer, 'there must be competing, incorrect answers,' that is, other genera (230). A
genus, therefore, must have a place in a classification system. Loux then goes on to
argue that 'one can make sense of the claim that T-words [transcendental tenns like
being and one] are ambiguous on ly if he grants implicitly that the claim is false' (236).
For the categories are, according to Loux, a classification of things that are, and to
speak of 'things that are' is to assume an unambiguous sense of the term. Loux's
understanding of genus is mistaken. In fact, his description applies not to a genus, but
to a speci es, which is what it is by being differentiated from another species. A genus is
determined internally, without reference to differences from other thi ngs, as we have
already seen in the biological works. See Loux's retraction (1991, 27n29). For another
view of the argument see Wein 1983.
------
-------

any further genus. 12 The determination that Being is ambiguous along the
lines of the categories is the result of a closing in on these highest genera
from two sides. The first argument establishes that Being is not a genus,
but rather a heap, and then since there are genera, there must be highest
genera, and these must constitute the ultimate groups or parts of the heap.
But as Alexar:tder observes, the introduction of the categories creates
more problems than it solves B If all differentiae are ?TOt", as Aristotle

claims at Topics IV.6 128a26-29, then the genus of a quality will be
predicated of its differentia. And even if we defend Aristotle on the grounds
that he distinguishes ?TOt" as differentiae (a 'sort of' or determination of
a genus) from categorial quality, then 'we must still answer the question
about the categorial status of the differentia. 14 If it is not to be placed in
any category at all, then there will be no reason to worry that the genus
will be predicated of the differentia and there will be no argument against
a genus comprising the rest of categorial Being.
Since this is the only argument Aristotle provides for his claim that
Being does not form a genus, it is important to ask how it is related to
the solution Aristotle apparently developed for it, focality . The argument
against the genus of Being involves a fundmental distinction between
genus and differentia, and the categories seem at best secondary in this
scheme. If we assume that genus and differentia are the principal kinds
of Being, then we should expect these to enter into the focal relationship. On this interpretation genus would be the primary and differentia
the derivative Being, containing in itself the focal term, genus. This is a
plausible interpretation of the relationship, since differentia is arguably a
per se (2) predicate of genus. There is a focal solution that corresponds to
this problem, precisely that which solves the aporia quoted above in the
passage from H.6 1045al4-17. The genus animal is potentially man, and
the differentia biped is man in actualiry. They form a single thing just
because they are focally and per se related to one another, as we shall see
more clearly in chapter 6. Genus and differentia, then, cannot be in the
same genus of Being, but they can be studied by the same focal science of
12 So Met . 6.28 l 024b9-16: 'Those things are said to be other in kind (TeP )'fllH) whose
ultimate substratum is different, and which are not analysed the one into the other nor
both into the same thing ... and things which belong to different categories of being;
for some of the things that are said to be signify essence, others a quality, others the
. other categories we have before distinguished; these also are not analysed either into
one another or into some one thing:
13 In Metaphysica, 206.13-22.
14 Cf. Met. Ll.14, which distinguishes the senses of 7TOWV (differentiae from the attributes
of natural bodies); K.12 l068b18-20.

Being. All the same, this is not a solution that applies to the categories.
Substance is primary, and categorial Being, not differentia, is derivative.
In fact, since differentia is part of substance, it too will be primary, not
derivative. 15 So clearly the problem of Being in Metaphysics B is not a

problem solved by the form of categorial focality we find in Z.
Now, one might point to Met. H.2 and its assimilation of the differentiae and Beings in non-substantial categories. If differentiae of substance
are predicated in all the non-substantial categories, then the argument may
point the direction towards the genera of the categories. However, nothing
prevents OUf substituting accident into the argument in place of differentia
and arriving at the same conclusion. If the genus of man is predicated of
his accidents, in the same man Being will be predicated many times. over
and there will be many Beings. But accidents clearly are, and therefore
Being must be of a different kind in the case of accident and what the
accident is predicated of. This version of the argument seems as valid as
the differentia form, and moreover, it will come closer to generating the
canonical categories. At least it fits the description of the categories we
find
at Topics I.9. For there the ti esti corresponds to genus, and the other
categories are in the first instance non-ti esti predications, that is, accidents.
So the accident version of the argument rather than the differentia version
is more suitable to the generation of the categories. It also avoids some
of Alexander's criticisms, since a thing and its accident are not in the
same category. Aristotle did not make use of this version presumably
because the context of the B passage is an argument against the Platonists,
and he does not require the theory of the categories for his immediate
purposes.
Nevertheless, the argument of B.3 suggests that Aristotle's basic objection to a genus of Bein& whether that objection is described in terms of
differentia and genus or in some other way, consists in his observation that
different Beings have different logical functions, and that discourse itself
depends on the difference in these functions. To treat all things as species
of a genus will destroy discourse as surely as the sophists destroy discourse
by replacing all essence with accident. If this is the fundamental insight, it
is one that focality can address. For focality is precisely intended to provide
within a single study a treatment of items that are functionally related to
one another without being species of a genus. It is ideally situated to deal
with the problem of the unity of genus and differentia just because its
objects are relatives rather than congeners.
15 On this interpretation we shall face the problem that once again the same genus wlll be
predicated of both species and differentia; Top. VI.6 143a29-32; Met. Z.12 1038aI8- 21.
Categorial Focality in Metaphysics Z

Whatever the deficiencies of Aristotle's arguments against the genus of
Being, it is clear that he held that position, conceived of the problem
primarily in terms of categories, and sought to solve it by means of focality.
I shall argue that Aristotle lays out a focal science of Being that matches
the pattern described in the previous chapter. This science consists of two
closely related parts, corresponding to the focus term, namely substance,
and the derivative terms, namely the non-substantial categories, One, potentiality, and so on. As we have seen, this conception corresponds to the
model of health and ordinary science generally. The core science studies
substance and its functions, being a substrate and essence. But just as health
does not exist without a body or an animal without activities, so substance
does not exist without non-substance. Indeed, the most characteristic feature of substance, its being a substrate, requires that it be a substrate
for something. As such, substance in its designation as substrate cannot
be completely abstracted from that of which it is the substrate. In this
way the core notion of substrate points to the more expansive science of
Being, a science that includes non-substance. In addition to being substrate,
substance is also essence, and in a similar manner substantial essence will
necessarily imply non-substantial essence. For example, in the study of
nose (which is a substance or part of a substance) we must consider snub
(presumably, a quality), and in the study of animal, we must consider male
and female (an affection). Again, this view is in accordance with the model
of health: we can hardly have grasped much of the essence of the focus
health, if we do not know that it is the body that has health, or much of
medicine, if we do not know that it aims at the medical goal health 1 6 I aim
to show, then, that by taking seriously Aristotle's models of focality we
can construct a coherent interpretation of categorial focality and maintain
that in its broad outlines metaphysics is a normal science.
But first a couple of preliminary issues and observations. The claim
that the focus implies the derivative or network terms seems to be in
direct contradiction with the statement that the focus does not contain
the derivative objects in its definition (EE VII.2 1236a21- 22). But, simple
reflection on the cases involved shows that the situation cannot be so
straightforward. Some of the focally derivative items, as we have already
16 It is clear that the two examples of focality, medicine and health, are themselves focally
related, presumably with health as the core, since medicine contains health in its
definition, but not vice versa. This fact serves as a further indication that derivative
tenns can form semi-abstract subject matters on their own. Cf. EE VII.15 1249b9-13.

noted, must be present in the definition of the focus. So, for example, the
goal (,pyov r.2 l003b3) of medicine is essential to the art of medicine,
if anything is. Others, while not specifically mentioned in the definition
of the focus, must be implied in some way. For example, intelligent and
dextrous people are medically talented VCPUE, 7fPO, aVT~v l003b2-3). But
though being talented is not present in the definition of the medical art,
talent is certainly implied through necessary connections: an art necessarily
has practitioners, who necessarily are more or less talented. In this way
a derivative term need not be related to a core term by direct definitional
inclusion in order to be implied in the network. Likewise, substance in its
role as substrate does not contain in its definition quality, quantity, and
so on, but rather it implies a predicate being predicated of it, and that
predicate necessarily must be either a quality or a quantity and so on.
This may seem rather pat, but in fact, definitional inclusion is often
made to fit demonstrative convenience. Indeed, the focal criterion often
means little more than that the focus is the subject of the science and
the derivative terms are useful and adapted to it. For this reason, one
science's focus is another science's derivative, as Aristotle's own examples
make clear. So, for example, the art of medicine is the focus for operation,
patient, and knife, because the art is contained in their definitions. But the
art of medicine can also be called healthy, and serve as a derivative term in
the genus of health. Moreover, the connections among terms can become
multilateral without ever being confused. We may call medicine human for
two quite different reasons and include it in two quite different sciences.
Since health is a state of the human body, it can be called human and
be included in the genus of the substance man. For this reason, medicine,
too, can be human, in virtue of the transitivity of focal relations through
health. But in addition, medicine, since it is a cognitive state of the human
soul, can be called rational, and so be focally dependent on human in a
different way. For all the versatility of these focal relationships, there is
never any reason to confuse them, and it is always clear why medicine,
insofar as it heals our bodies, should be treated by a different science from
that which considers it as a cognitive state of the soul.
The focal science of categorial Being is constructed on an ambiguity in
the treatment of the non-substantial items, which arises as a result of their
being considered both strictly as predicates of substance as well as in their
own right. From the first perspective, they serve solely as non-essential,
sometimes accidental, predicates of substance (e.g., man is white); but as per
se Beings they themselves are treated as subjects of further predication, and
this predication is essential (e.g., white is the measure of colour). These two
perspectives give rise respectively to the core science of Being (substance)

and the extended science that includes the other categories. This ambiguity
makes it necessary to consider the nature of the categories, especially the
non-substantial categories. Unfortunately, Aristotle's statements on this
issue are almost perversely obscure. In various contexts and with confusing examples he conceives of the non-substantial items as accidents of
substances, as per se predicates of substances, and as objects that have
essences predicated of them. 17
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence, even before the Metaphysics, that
the non-substantial categories are treated both as accidents and as per se
Beings. 18 Topics 1.9 provides the clearest account of how the two views are
related and provides much of the framework for the focal science of Being
that emerges in the Metaphysics:
Next then we must distinguish between the categories of predication in which the
four above-mentioned [predicables] are found. These are ten in number: What a
thing is (ri OTt), Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity,
Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything will
17 A less serious difficulty concerns what is being focalized in metaphysics. Are categorial
items, like quality, being made focally dependent on substance, or are more specific
genera within each non-substance category, like snub and odd, made focally dependent
on specific genera of substance? Aristotle's statements and examples point towards both
the categorial and the generic interpretation of metaphysical focality. But inasmuch
as Aristotle is outlining a science of Being qua Being, his concern cannot be with the
genera that constitute the subject matters of the special sciences. When the science of
Being is focused narrowly on substance, the non-substances are predicated of substance
and no distinction is made as to whether they are per se or accidental; they are not part
of the what-is-it of the subject under consideration (substance) and, therefore, their
essence is irrelevant. They are merely properties or accidents of substance. However,
these same Beings can be semi-abstracted and treated as per SI! subjects. As such they
have essences (in a qualified way). This distinction holds whether we consider substance
and quality, etc., as categories or whether we consider particular kinds of substance and
quality, like nose and snub.
18 In the Cafegories the non-substantial categories are often treated as subjects with
essences in their own right. Chapters 5-8 form an incomplete study of the nature
of each category, starting with substance. We learn the basic sub-classes of each
category (for quantity [chap. 6], e.g., that some are continuous, other discrete), and
their properties (e.g., quantity does not admit of opposites or more and less; that they
are equal or unequal). In this incomplete survey the categories are considered not as
predicates of substance but as subjects, i.e., they are the kinds of things that exist,
rather than the way substance is qualified, quantified, etc. At the same time, the essence
of non-substance seems to be rather limited. For example, among the non-substantial
categories there is no mention of species, genus, or differentia in the appropriate senses.
The genus-species relationship in the Categories seems restricted to substance (Frede
and Patzig 1988, 66).

always be in one of these predications; for all the propositions found through these
signify either what something is or its quality or quantity or some one of the other
types of predicate. It is clear, too, from them (~ avrwv) that the man who signifies
what something is signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes
some one of the other types of predicate. For when a man is set before him and he
says that what is set there is a man or an animal, he states what it is and signifies
a substance; but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what is set
there is white or is a colour, he states what it is and signifies a quality. Likewise,
also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set there
is a cubit or a magnitude, he will be describing what it is and signifying a quantity.
Likewise, also, in the other cases; for each of these kinds of predicate, if either it
be asserted of itself, or its genus be asserted of it, signifies what something is; if,
on the other hand, one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind, it does not
signify what something is, but a quantity or a quality or one of the other kinds of
predicate. (Topics 1.9 l03b2Q.-39; modified ROT)
In this passage Aristotle first enumerates the categories, commenting

briefly on their relation to the four predicables (definition, property, genus,
and accident) and their place in propositions before drawing a further conclusion from them (ft aiiTwv). In the first step of this argument, Aristotle
thinks of the T{ (J'n predication primarily as substance and the non-T{
fun predications as accidents (necessary or not). Once this scheme is laid
down (it aUTwv), Ti fO"TL can secondarily apply to the other categories
as well. 19 This two-step procedure shows how the same non-substantial
predicate can be treated both as an accidental predicate of substance and
as a subject admitting of essential predication. It suggests that though one
step comes before the other, non-substance can be treated in both ways,
and that they need not be confused. One item may be predicated as quality
only or as what-is-it and quality, depending on whether it is property or
accident on the one hand or a genus or definition on the other. It is an
important consequence of this scheme that when a quality is predicated as
a quality alone, it may be predicated either as a property or as an accident,
and the categorial scheme does not distinguish between the two forms of
predication. 2o
19 Though the categories play only a very minor role in the Topics, Aristotle is very
generous in providing definitions of non-substances and treats them as uncontroversial.
It is clear that his treatment of non-substance as essential is not confined to I.9.
20 See Frede 1987a and Malcolm 1981 for promising attempts to provide an essentialist
reading for Topics 1.9. I do not, of course, follow Frede in his contention that substance
is not a category in the Topics.
Metaphysics Z provides a more searching investigation of the relationship between the categories and the centrality of substance in that
relationship. Focality among the categories of Being is featured in three
early chapters (1, 4, and 5), and in each chapter non-substantial Being
is per se. 21 Aristotle discusses the problem of categorial Being before he
ever comes to a definite conclusion regarding the nature of substance
itself, and so it is clear that the question of the focality of categorial
Being can be satisfactorily addressed without entering into a discussion
of form and matter. Z.l, as we shall see, considers Being as per se (3),
a self-subsistent subject of predication in its own right. Aristotle asks to
what extent non-substances have this 'sort of per se Being. Both Z.4 and
5 consider Being as essence, which is predicated as a per se (1) predicate,
that is, what can be predicated essentially of something. Substance has
essence primarily and -the non-substance categories have it by an addition
(7Tpo(J'8w'''). Z.5 also takes up per se (2) Being, in which categorial Being
is treated as belonging to its primary recipient.
Z.l begins with a recapitulation of the ambiguity of Being:
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed out
previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense it means
what a thing is or a 'this' (Ti fern Kal T(}OE TL), and in another sense it means that
a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it.
While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily is the 'what,'
(r{ EUTL) which indicates the substance of the thing. (Met. Z.1 l028a10-15)
21 Mctaphysics 11.7 also seems to provide a per se analysis of the non-substantial

categories. It enumerates and describes four of the major senses of av, accidental, per
sc, true I false, actual! potential:
Those things are said in their own right (per se) to be that are indicated by the figures
of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since some
predicates (rwv KanrYOpOVjJ.EVWV) indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others
quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its place, others its time,
'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no difference between
'the man is recovering' and 'the man recovers', nor between 'the man is walking' or
'cutting' and 'the man walks' or 'cuts'; and Similarly in all other cases. (11.71017a22-30)
But there are many features that suggest the predicational approach. The emphasis in the
passage is on predication, as indicated by the partitive genitive (rwv KarllyopoVjJ.EVWV),
which introduces the enumeration of the kinds of predication. Furthermore, the
examples cited at the end of the passage, man recovers, man walks, man cuts, all
seem to be accidental rather than pcr se predicates. See Ross 1924, i, 307-8. Met. B.2
996b14-22 makes th"e same distinction that the Topics makes.

This passage commences with an allusion to t..7, and because Aristotle
had joined the issue of categorial Being with per se Being in t..7, it is
reasonable to suppose that the discussion in Z.l will likewise be centred
on per se categorial Being.
We notice that the first category has changed, and in place of the simple
what-is-it (rt a-n) that we saw in the Topics we find rL tOIL Kat
n.
This does not, however, prevent the what-is-it from being applied to nonsubstances later in the chapter (1028bl-2) and again at Z.4 (1030a17-23).
It merely implies, as in the Topics, that the what-is-it is applied first and
foremost to substance. The this (ToIiE Tt) is the subject of predications, and
it itself is not predicated of anything else. Because of the identification
of the what-is-it with the this, subjecthood and essence belong primarily
to substance. Now, there has never been a doubt that substance serves as
subject, but the question becomes whether non-substances can also serve
as subjects. This question is addressed in a passage starting Z.11028a20:
roo
And 50 one might raise the question whether 'to walk' and 'to be healthy' and
'to sit' signify in each case something that is, and similarly in any other case
of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent (Kat)' aim)) or capable of
being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or is
seated or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real
because there is something definite which underlies them; and this is the substance
or individual, which is implied in such a predicate; for 'good' or 'sitting' are not
used without this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the
others is. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not is something) must
be substance. (1028a20-31)
The distinction in this aporia between that which walks (TO /3alii(ov) and
to walk (f3a/ii(ELv) lies in the fact that the latter is not per se (3) (i.e.,
self-subsistent) or capable of being separated from substance. By contrast,
there is something underlying that which walks, and therefore it involves
something self-subsistent. It is clear, then, that the sense of per se used in
this passage does not refer to a per se predicate, but rather to per se Being,
and it is described by the same example of walking that we find at APo
1.4.22 It is Aristotle's point in Z.l that although 'that which walks' is not
a per se Being, it is more like one than 'to walk' is. While such a Being
22 'What is not said of some other underlying subject - as what is walking is something
different walking (and white), while a substance, and whatever signifies some "this"
(T(~bE n) is just what it is without being something else. ' (73b6-8).

is explicitly called accidental in APo (73b9-10) and Z.5 (1030b20- 21), it is
granted in Z .I, rather paradoxically, a dependent per se status. By contrast,
'to walk' has no per se (3) Being, because it does not have a substrate. Since
per se (3) Being is the Being of the individual subject (TO KaB' EKarrTOV,
1028a27), non-substantial Being of the 'to walk' kind seems to have per se
(3) Being least of all, since it is a subject least of all. That which walks' at
least implies in itself a subject of the appropriate kind, and identifies such
a subject, even if accidentally.
In Z.1 Aristotle recognizes the possibility that entities like 'that which
walks' may have a qualified per se (3) Being. The innovation in this chapter
lies in the introduction of focality and the language of causal and definitional priority of substance over the other categories to describe how this
is possible:23
And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of
that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it,
and others some other determination of it. (1028a18- 20)
And in formula also {substance} is primary; for in the formula of each term the
formula of its substance must he present. (1028a3S- 36)24
Derivative Beings are said to be in a very qualified and attenuated sense.

Only because the subject is implied in predications of the kind 'that which
walks,' do such things have per se existence. Since the non-substance
contributes nothing per se in itself, substance in such compounds is the
only Being in this sense. It is only because such tags as 'that which walks'
pick out individual substantial subjects that 'that which walks' qualifies
as per se (3) Being. In this case focality provides a redescription of the
natural and ontological dependence of non-substance on substance. 25 In
fact, Aristotle draws this conclusion at 1028a29-30 when he says that it is
23 It has long been noted that the paronymy relationship of Cat. 1 1a12-1S is a precursor
to the focal relationship. It differs from focality, however, in that.it makes the
non-substantial category the focus, rather than the substance (the grammatical contains
grammar in its definition). Moreover, paronymy, for all its similarity with focality,
simply is not invoked as a means of scientific unification . See Owen 1960 and Patzig
1961.
24 Cf. the recapitulation at 0.1 1045b27-32: 'We have treated of that which is primarily
and to which all the other categories of being are referred - i.e., of substance. For it
is in virtue of the formula of substance that the others are said to be - quantity and
quality and the like; for all will be found to contain the formula of substance.'
25 So Ferejohn 1980, 122-3 .

on account of substance that each of the non-substances is. He clearly does
not mean to say that the non-substances make no contribution in any way
to the compound, but only that they do not contribute to its per se (3)
Being, its subjecthood, and without subjecthood there is no Being at all.
What precisely is the focal connection between predicate and subject?
How is substance implied in the definition of its predicate in these cases?
This question is of the first importance because the answer tells us how
Aristotle intends the science of categorial Being to form a unity. It is clear
from the examples that that which walks implies substance as a category,
and does not imply something specifically adapted to the predicate, like
legged animals. Aristotle makes no use of examples like the snub to suggest
that the subject must be per se related to the predicate in a speCifically
adapted way. More importantly, accidents no less than essential features
and properties require a subject. 26 The non-substantial categories, as we
saw, frequently pick out accidents predicated of a subject, and their chief
function is to identify features that are not the what-is-it of the subject. 27
Since being a subject is the roo n function of substance, and the T()OE n is
an individual subject, the focus term is not conceived of as an essence. The
upshot is that, even though substance must be included in non-substance
in order for non-substance to be a subject, the essence of some specific
substance need not be included. For example, the essence of nose need not
be included in snub in order for 'the snub' to be a subject. Likewise, for 'that
which walks' to be a subject is for walking to be predicated even accidentally
of a substance in its subject function. More than any of the others in Z,
this form of dependence seems to be a recapitulation of the natural priority
of the Categories, and in fact Aristotle uses some of the same tags. 28
In Z.4 Aristotle turns from the self-subsistent to a discussion of substance as essence (ro rl ryv ELVat). Here too the notion of essence involves
what is per se. However, the sense of per se is not that of per se (3) Being,
but what is predicated per se (5 A'YETat
1029b14). It is clear,
Kae' auro
26 The fact that the subject is 70 Ka8' (KarrrOV (1028a27) does not have any Significant
effect on the nature of the definitional inclusion. Both the categorial and the generic
relationship can be expressed individually (white is predicated of this/these individual
substance[s]; white is predicated of this/these individual surfacers]) or universally
(white is predicated of substance; white is predicated of surface).
.
27 It may be objected that Aristotle's fonnulations 'the healthy,' 'the sitting' do not
invoke accidental relations. However, they are part of an aporia that explicitly (ota
1028a20) grows out of the categorial distinction that dearly treats non-substantial items
as accidents.
28 For example, that 'good' or 'Sitting' are not said without substance (1028a28-29); d.
Cat. 5 2a34--b5.

or at least assumed for the time being, that essence belongs primarily to
substance. In Z.4 Aristotle considers whether essence can be extended to
the same sort of entities that were treated in Z.l, compounds of substance
and accident.
The central problem of this chapter concerns white man, an obviously
accidental compound, and Aristotle explicitly asks whether there is a logos
of the essence of such compounds (1029b22-27). The mention of the accidental at 1030a14 further indicates that accidents are the subject of this
chapter. However, the focal solution beginning 1030a17, if it is a solution,
makes no mention of white man, and instead argues that there is some
way in which non-substances, like the qualified (TO ?TOL6v) can be defined.
The difference between the two formulations can be exaggerated, however,
and I think that white man and the white can be treated as much the
same for the purposes of extending essence to non-substantial categories. 29
In spite of the fact that the chapter concludes with a statement that the
problem has been resolved and that accidental compounds, like white man,
have definitions, but in a different way from that which is white, the
difference between the two is clear and not very significant. For in both
cases the essence will have to embrace an accidental compound that includes
substance. The difference between the two is that, in the case of the white,
the substance will remain unspecified, whereas in the case of white man,
the essence of man will be included in the definition of the compound.
1029b22 introduces the major problem of the chapter, whether there is
an account of the essence of compounds of substances and non-substances
(O'VVeETa), like white man, which Aristotle then denominates 'mantle,:30
But after all, 'definition,' like 'what a thing is,' has several meanings; 'what a
thing is' in one sense means substance and a 'this,' in another one or other of the
predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as 'is' is predicable of all things, not
however in the same sense, but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in
a secondary way, so too the 'what' belongs simply to substance, but in a limited
sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that
a quality also is a 'what: - not simply, however, but just as, in the case of that
which is not, some say, in the abstract, that that which is not is - not is simply,
but is non -existent. So too with a quality. (Met. Z.4 1030a17-27)
29 So Frede and Patzig 1988, 64-5.

30 There does not seem to be any necessity to rename this object, but Aristotle does
so perhaps to indicate that many of our words, including mantle itself in its normal
designation, denote accidental compounds just like white man, and that if white man
does not admit of definition, many other objects that are commonly named also will
not.

Alluding to Top. 1.9 and Met. Z.l 1028bl-2, Aristotle says that the nonsubstantial categories also admit of the what-is-it. But within this passage
he does not explain how they do, nor does he invoke definitional inclusion,
except in the cryptic remark about the non-existent. For the dear use of
focality we must look to the immediately following passage:
[EJssence will belong. just as the 'what' does, primarily and in the simple sense to
substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also, - not essence simply,
but the"essence of a quality or of a quantity. For it must be either homonymously
that we say these are, or by making qualifications and abstractions (TrpOunf3EvTos
Kat acpa.~pofjvTas) (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be
known), - the truth being that we use the word neither homonymously nor in the
same sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' when there is a reference to
one and the same thing. not meaning one and the same thing, nor yet speaking
homonymously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument are called medical
neither homonymously nor in virtue of one thing. but with reference to one thing.
(Met. Z .4 l030a29-b3)
Essence can be extended to white man and the white in much the same way.
White man and the white will have essences because in their definitions
will be found respectively man (or its definition) and substance (or its
definition). The inclusion of non-substance in the science of essence is
based on the same inclusion of substance in a quality and quantity as we
saw in Z.l. Such inclusions extend to accidental relationships and are not
restricted to per se relationships such as that between female and animal
or snub and nose. It is because a quality, whether it is an accident or
not, must be predicated of a substance, that its definition and essence will
contain substance.
Aristotle seems also to express the focal relation in terms of addition
and abstraction, and it is probable that he had in mind the same logical
operations we have discussed in the first chapter. For in both cases what
is abstracted is part of the essential nature of some more concrete entity.
Now, it is easy to see how we can get -rrpo,; fV definitions by addition: we
simply add the definition of the primary entiry in the proper logical relation
to the other elements of the derivative's definition. But it is more difficult
to see how abstraction works, and there has been some dispute. 31 In view
31 Ross 1924, ii, 171, reports Ps.-Alexander's view, hut disagrees and offers 'If we say
that they [non- substances} are OUTa we add a qualificati on to, and deduct from the full
meaning of, Oll.' (Owens 1978, 350, agrees.) Bumyeat et al. (1979, 27-9) considered this
question twice. They are unhappy with Ross's suggestion because it means that different
types of things are being added and subtracted. If linguistic items are subtracted, then
154 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Scie"ce

of the similarity with DC III.1 299a13-17, which says that mathematicals
are said it a</>a<p,uEw< while natural objects are said .. 7rPOU8'UEW<, I
think that Ps.-Alexander is closest to the truth in taking abstraction to
mean 'without addition': by addition of the primary term we arrive at the
derivative terms and
by abstraction from the derivative terms we arrive at
the primary term. If we start from the primary term, we obviously need
no addition to arrive at its definition, but if we start from the definitions of
compounds we must abstract the essence of substance from them, just as
'known' can be abstracted from 'not-known.' The abstraction and addition
in this context proceeds in the opposite ontological direction from the
abstraction we observed in the mathematical context in chapter 1, but
the underlying logic of definitional inclusion is the same. Mathematics
abstracts quantity from sensible substance, and treats it in its per se
nature. The mixed sciences add quantity to sensible substance and treat
the composite nature. Conversely, the science of substance abstracts the
essential nature of substance from the accidental compound and treats it

separately to the extent that it can, though unlike mathematics it cannot
be treated as if it were wholly separate. The science of compounds adds
substance to accident and treats the compound essence.
Z.4 continues the work of Z.l, then, by investigating the essence of accidental compounds. The Z.l investigation began with the subject function
of substance, admitted non-substances as accidents, and consideTed how
these accidental non-substances might be subjects. 2.4, in turn, studies
the essence function of substance and considers how these same accidental
non-substances might have essences.
In Z.5 Aristotle considers a fundamentally different kind of case from

those in Z.l and 4. Here focaliry is based on per 5e (2) predications.
These cases are introduced in the context of the problem that arises if
one denies that there are definitions by addition (iK 7rPOU8'UEW5). One
kind of definition by addition is that of coupled terms, like snub nose.32
Aristotle explicitly distinguishes these per 5e predications from accidental
we have (a) Ps.Alexander's suggestion, or (b) given 'Socrates is a man,' one subtracts
'a man: In the next session, someone suggested that additionsubtraction was different
from '"par EV. Frede and Panig 1988, 70, note the problems with Ross's interpretation,
and claim that quality existing only as quality of substance represents addition, and the
notknown being known only as such, i.e., the not known, represents a subtraction.
32 Frede and Patzig 1988, 77-8, argue that the snub and similar cases are introduced to
bolster the plausibility of the argument of Z.4 that accidents include substances in thei r
definitions. Similarly Scaltsas 1994, 176, assimilates the case of white man and white
surface as both accidental predications. I argue instead that white surface is identical in
form to snub nose (as Z.4 1029b16-18 makes clear).

predications like white being predicated of Callias or man with a description
(1030b18-24) that matches the one at APo 1.4. He further distinguishes the
two kinds of predication by stating (1030b25-26) that white can be made
clear without man, whereas snub cannot be made clear without nose.
However, Aristotle seems to assimilate these per se (2) cases to catego-
rial predications in a claim at 1031al-3 that there is definition of substance

only, 'for if the other categories are definable (El yap Kat TWV aA.A.WV
KaTT/yopLWV), it must be by an addition, e.g. the odd, for it cannot be
defined apart from number.' He does not explain just how such predicates
will be definable, if indeed they are definable, though he does remark
that they will be defined in the same sort of way as other predicated
non-substances (1031a7-11). Snub and odd are clearly considered to be
in categories different from substances, but it is equally clear that they
are related to their subjects in quite a different way from the way white
is related to man, which was the case examined in Z.l and 4. For these
contain specific kinds of substrates in their definitions: snub contains nose,
odd contains number. The focality here depends on the essence function
of substance rather than the subject function.
The significance of these kinds of predicates lies in the different manner
in which they and the predicates of Z.1 and 4 are focalized. We have traced
through the Topics and Metaphysics what amount to two subject matters
involved in the science of categorial Being. These manifest different per se
and accidental relations. The first and central subject matter is substance.
Concerning substance Aristotle's basic distinction is between the what-is-it
and the other predications. The non-substantial items may be predicated

either as property or as accident, and there is no distinction drawn between these two modes. Because at this stage they are not answers to
the what-is-it question and because they are predicates, not subjects, the
non-substantial items are not part of the core science of Being except by
negative inclusion. That is, just as the not-known can be said to be known,
so non-substance is Being because it does not fulfil the functions of Being. 33

33 In order for there to be a science, its terms must be essentially related. "For this reason,
the science of Being too must treat essence, and cannOt treat accidental cases. This is
why Aristotle rejects a science of accident in E.2. But accidents may be included in the
science of Being through the rule of negative inclusion, which Aristotle describes as the
inclusion of that which is not, because it is not. Accident is included in the science of
Being, because science concerns that which is per se related, and accident is not per se
related, it is the opposite of being per se related. Accident is whatever occurs neither
always nor for the most part (1026b27-33). For this reason he speaks approvingly of
Plato's identification of non.being with the accidental (E.2 l026bl4-21). This method
allows for the inclusion of accident as such, and gains further support from the text at

It provides the limits of the study of Being, and helps us make sense of
the distinction between subject and non-subject, essence and non-essence.
But non-substantial items can also be treated in another way. They

may be treated in their per se nature both as subjects and as essences.
Aristotle's thoughts on this issue are far from clear, and many factors are involved that are not altogether consonant. Z.1 suggests how
non-substances may have subjecthood. This form of subjecthood is open
to accidental as well as necessary attributes. Accidents are included now
in the wider focal science, not merely by negative inclusion, but in virtue
of the fact that their accounts include substance as subject. Essence too is
extended from substance to non-substance, but this extension takes two
forms. Z.4 treats the essence that corresponds precisely to non-substantial
subjecthood, a form of essence that can cover accidents. And within this
rype of essence there appear to be two further sub-types, the fully specified accidental compound, like white man, and the unspecified accidental
compound, the white. Such compounds have essences because the essence
of substance or the essence of a specific substance is included in their
definitions.
The second main form of non-substantial essence is the special concern
of Z.5. Snub is predicated of nose, male and female are predicated of

animaL These predications are not and cannot be accidentaL By contrast,
white is an accident of man, and there are no focal relations between
white qua white and man qua man. Not only are the predications of
the snub type not accidental, the per se relations are more varied and
do not adhere strictly to the substance/non-substance relations of the

categorial level. A non-substantial item does not have to be immediately
predicated of a substance. Although it is true that nose and animal are
substances or parts of substances, other substrates that Aristotle mentions
are not substantial. So, odd is predicated per se of number, but number
is not substance (Z.5 1031a2-5). White is predicated per se of surface,
but surface is not substance. Now this peculiarity is problematic, because
Aristotle does connect the odd-number predication closely with the categorial predication. It is supposed to serve as an example that there is
definition only of substance, and that of the rest of the categories there
is definition only by addition. In fact, this difficulty is only apparent.
Such items will still have essence and belong in the science of Being in
virtue of a mediated focal relationship to substance. Odd, for example,
2 .4 l030a23-27. This interpretation could account unproblematically for the example of
white man, a genuine accidental compound with no per se connections between white
and man. It is considered by the science as that which is not a per se thing.

is predicated per se of number, which in turn is predicated per se of
substance. 34 Aristotle recognizes such mediated relationships in r.2, where
he includes in the science of Being things that are destructions and priva-
tions and qualities both of substance and 'of things which are relative to
substance' (1003b8-9).
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the logic of odd and snub is different
from that of accidents, and their importance for the science of Being is
indisputable. For the definition and existence of such objects form the first
principles of demonstrative sciences (APo 1.10), and metaphysics in some
way provides these first principles (r.l). If Aristotle cannot account for
the Being of such entities, then his theory of science is in grave peril.
For such predications are the bulwark of the special sciences. We need,
therefore, some account of the essence of objects that are not substances
and whose Being is not merely to be accidentally predicated of substance
(as white man or the white is). In fact, the very model of focal science
itself, health, is in danger of lacking an essence for exactly this reason,
Health is a state of a living body, not a substance itself, and yet Aristotle
t~eats it as the focus of its genus, upon which other objects are dependent.
In order for it to do its work as the subject of a science, its Being and
essence cannot be merely an accident of some substance, since accident is
not the subject of any science. It is for this reason that the coupled terms
are so important. For whereas the Being of accidents and its corresponding
science is questionable at best, the Being of necessary attributes (per 5e (2))
dearly comes under the purview of the science of Being (for this science
studies Being qua Being and its per se attributes 1003a21- 22), and if Being
means in the first instance substance, such per se (2) attributes of substance
are also a part of the science.
The focal science of Being, then, consists of two parts. The first is the
core study of substance. The science of Being is the science of substance
(Z.l 1028b2-4), because substance is the focal term to which all other
terms of the science are related. Of substance in general, some things
can be said and perhaps even proved, for instance, that it is species form
or individual form; that some substance is enmattered, and therefore is
sensible; that because substance is a subject, it has attributes, both necessary
and accidental. These and similar propositions and proofs constitute the
core science of substance. 35
In addition, the derivative items may themselves act as parts of a more
diffuse focal science and may be treated in different sections of that science.
34 So Loux 1991, 84.
35 See Bolton 1995 for an attempt to flesh out some aspectS of this core science.

Quality qua quality can be semi-abstracted and studied as a per se entity."
As such it is similar or dissimilar to other qualities; it has potentiality,
actuality, unity, plurality, substrate, and so on. It is in virtue of this
semi-abstraction that all the generic qualities and non-substantial items,
like snub, odd, and health can serve as subjects with essences in their
own right. Aristotle alludes to this in a passage concerning the nature of
mathematicals at M.3 1078a5-8:
Many properties attach to things in virtue of their own nature as possessed of
some such property; e.g. there are attributes peculiar to the animal qua female or
qua male, yet there is no female nor male separate from animals.
Aristotle here exaggerates the conceptual separability of female and male,

but it is clear nevertheless that he recognizes some way in which male
and female can be provided with a qualified essence, and be a subject of
study in their own right. It is important also to note that though female
cannot be separated from animal, it is not coextensive with animal or any
kind of animal. As a result there are properties that can only be treated
as belonging to female and not as belonging to animal in general. The
clear implication is that subjects within the wider focal science will have
extensions different from that of the core science, and yet this will not
compromise the unity of the science.
Demonstration in the Science of Being

We can now hazard some suggestions as to the demonstrative structure
of the science of categorial Being. But first some caveats. There is little evidence of a richly developed demonstrative science here. 37 Though
demonstrations are common in the PA, they are very rare in the M etaphysics, in spite of the fact that in his discussion of the aporiai Aristotle
seems to consider the science of substance demonstrative. 38 The obvious
36 At APo H.l3 96a34-37 and 96b5--6 Aristotle extends the tenn ovrrla to the definition of
triad (which is dearly not a substance).
37 The degree to which metaphysics is amenable to demonstrative analysis continues to
be debated . See Bolton's (1994) arguments against Code concerning demonstrative
metaphysics in r and Bolton 1995 for a different view on Z.
38 B.2 997a25-32: if the .science of substance concerned both substance and its per se
accidents, then the science will be demonstrative, since the per se accidents will be
proved from the essence and definitions of substance. Bolton (1995) discusses this
passage in his model of metaphysics as a demonstrative science. He argues that Met. Z
is laid out according to the canons of APo II, and in a manner familiar from PA. i.e.,

reason for this difference is that metaphysics is the science of principles
(A.1 982al-3), and to this extent the focal science of categorial Being
will not be similar to any ordinary demonstrative science. For the special
sciences make no study of the what-is-it. Rather they make it clear by
perception or assumption, and they prove the properties from their assumptions (Met. E.1 1025b7-13). Even so, special sciences do not have
to be richly demonstrative in order to be scientific. After all, the Physics,
like the Metaphysics, clarifies and discusses principles, but provides little
in the way of demonstration. The principles that the Physics proVides are
scientific, because they are based on necessary connections. So, the per
se relations characteristic of focal sciences are the same per se relations
characteristic of ordinary science, even if those relations are not strung
together into long chains of deductions.
All the same, there seems to be some scope for demonstration in the
science of categorial Being. There is at least one demonstration in Z.l which
proves that non-substances have per se (3) Being, but confusion arises when
we try to prOVide a specific formulation of it: 'Clearly then it is in virtue
of this category [substance] that each of the others is.' Substance is said
to be a cause of Being (3<" TaVT1/V 1028a29-30), and as such we expect it
to appear as the middle term of a demonstration. At the same time it is
the subject-genus of the science of Being, and as such we would expect to
find it as the minor (subject) term of demonstration. How, then, are we to
construct the demonstration?
Confusion is especially acute in this case, because Aristotle makes use
of three levels of discourse, and each level has its own distinct predication
relations. The natural discourse occurs when we predicate non-substance of
substance, for example, man is white, whiteness is predicated of man. This
form of predication expresses the natural subject function of substance and
the predicate function of non-substance. Second, there is a focal discourse
according to which substance is predicated per se (1) of non-substance,
because substance is present in the definition of non-substance, for instance, the white is man. Although this predication relation is reversed
from the natural predication, it is dependent on the natural predication.
That is, it is only because of the natural relation between substance and
non-substance that the focal predication holds. Finally there is what might
be called universal predication, according to which Being or existence is
providing causal definitions for facts that are more familiar to us and that are found in
the Cat. (458). According to this view, the various candidates for substance, substrate,
genus, universal and essence are causes of the familiar fact (e.g., self-subSistence), of
substance, rather than substance themselves.

predicated of both substance and non-substance. This form of predication
is to all appearances universaL but in fact it is based on the focal predication,
and ultimately on the natural predication. The distinction between focal

and universal discourse is mentioned by Aristotle at 2.4 1030a27-32 and
1030b3-4. In these passages he discusses various ways of talking about
the essences of substance and non-substance and draws the distinction
between a dialectical mode of expression (AOYLKW, 1030a25), which states
how one should speak about them (7TW, /l" AiYEL" a27) and how things
really are (7TW, EXEL a28).39 The dialectical or universal mode of expression
predicates Being of quality and even of non- Being without considering the
grounds on which the predication is made. Aristotle says that it does not
matter which mode of expression we wish to use; it does not matter, that
is, whether we treat the Beings as homonymous, or as a single universal
type, or focally, just so long as we keep the facts straight. It is important
to keep this distinction in mind in order to avoid the confusion that arises
on account of the fact that the terms involved in focal predications are
themselves natural predications.
We may begin solving the problem of constructing the demonstration
by turning again to the demonstration concerning the model of medicine

and health:
medicine (medical) IPa instrument of medicine
instrument of medicine IPa scalpel
medicine (medical) IPa scalpel
This demonstration expresses the argument that scalpel is called medical
because it is an instrument of medicine. The common focal term, 'medical,'
does not in itself explain why the various medical things are treated by the
same science; rather 'instrument of' and similar relational terms explain
the application of the focal term to the derivative items. For this reas'on,
when we consider our demonstration in the science of Being, the proposal
Being IPa substance
substance IPa quality
Being IPa quality
hardly seems satisfactory. Although substance is clearly in the middle position as befits its role as cause of the Being of non-substance, nevertheless
39 Following the interpretation of Frede and Patzig 1988, 68.

substance alone by itself does not express the relation in virtue of which
quality is called Being. Instead, we might reorganize the terms starting
with:
substance (Being) IPO ?

? IPO quality
This more closely follows the medical example by placing the focal term in
the major position, but it is unclear what relation can explain why quality
should be treated by the same science as substance. Accordingly we must
alter the example:
substance (Being) IPO quality predication
quality predication IPO red
substance (Being) IPO red
Or more universally:
substance (Being) IPO quality predication
quality predication IPO a quality item
substance (Being) IPO a quality item
A quality item is called Being because it is predicated as quality of a
substance. We make use here of the distinction Frede has clarified, that
between the predicate and the predication, that is, between the item predicated and the mode or relation in which it is predicated. 40 The predication
relation (e.g., predicated as a quality of) must always be in the middle
position, and the item that is predicated must be in the minor position.
This scheme reveals that the cause of Being is not just substance, but
the predication relation to substance. It is clear that the modes of predication provide the explanation for the existence of the items predicated.
Under this interpretation we must distinguish the subject of ontological
predication (substance) and the subject of demonstrative predication (the
non-substantial item of which existence is predicated).
It is precisely this ontological dependence characteristic of nonsubstantial categorial Being that proVides the most powerful challenge
that metaphysics does not follow the pattern of the science of medicine
or health. Ontological dependence is not an issue in the case of medicine.
40 Frede 1987a.

Scalpel is not predicated of medicine in the same way that quality is
predicated of substance. It is certainly true that if medicine did not exist at
all, neither would scalpels exist, but a scalpel is at least physically separable
from the state of the doctor's soul (the medical art). This is not true
of quality and substance. In fact, it is clear that the ontological priority
of substance over quality, quantity, and so on, is the very basis of the
categorial focality. For if qualiry were not dependent on substance for
its existence, then there would be no reason to suppose that substance is
included in the definition of quality. For since a quality can be predicated as

an accident, there is no other reason than ontological dependence to include
substance in the definition of the accident. If this is the case, then categorial
metaphysics, contrary to what Aristotle avers, is focal in a different way
from medicine. It is focal for ontological (dependency of existence) reasons.
This means that its subject matter is special and importantly different from
that of medicine or health.
There are a number of answers to this challenge at a couple of levels.
First, even if the challenge is cogent, nevertheless the ontological basis of
focality applies only to the categorial form of Being, and not generally
throughout all the areas of metaphysics. Processes towards Being, mentioned in r.2, for example, are not predicated of substances in the same
way as qualities arc, and therefore arc not focally related to substance on
the basis of ontological priority. For this reason, the ontological predication
involved in categorial Being cannot be the grounds for focalizing the whole
science of Being, since the same ontological conditions do not obtain in the
other parts of this science. Nothing, then, prevents most of the science of
Being from following the pattern of medicine.
Moreover, there are reasons to suppose that the challenge itself does
not hit the mark. While the ontological dependency certainly grounds and
provides the cause for the definitional inclusion, ontological dependency
is not identical with the focal relationship. The distinction we drew above
between natural, focal, and universal forms of predication makes this clear.
The demonstration,
per se (3) Being IPO what is predicated in the category of quality of a per
se (3) Being
what is predicated in the category of quality of a per se (3) Being IPO
qualified thing
per se (3) Being IPO qualified thing
manifests and distinguishes all three levels of discourse. The conclusion of
the demonstration displays a connection that applies universally (Ku8' EV)

to all non-substances, and as such it is couched in the universal discourse.
The terms in the premisses of the argument are bound to one another
by per se connections, which display the focal relationship between the

qualified thing and substance. In the minor premiss 'what is predicated
in the category of quality ofa per se (3) Being' is a definition or partial
definition of 'qualified thing.' And in the major premiss the relationship
between ' per se (3) Being' and 'what is predicated in the category of
quality of a per se (3) Being' is a per se (1) predication. It is this first
premiss that expresses the focal relationship. Finally, natural predication
is exhibited in the terms themselves. The natural fact that substance is not
predicated of anything else is manifested in its being a per se (3) Being.

The natural fact that quality is predicated of substance is manifested in
its being what is predicated in the category of quality of a per se (3)
Being. Thus this one demonstration, which proves that non-substances are
subjects, involves all three forms of predication and displays the dependency relationship, according to which the universal conclusion is proved
from focalizing premisses constructed out of terms that express the natural
relations.
If these predication relations are distinguished, there is no reason to
suppose that the science of categorial Being is extraordinary. Although the

natural relations have to do with ontological dependence and predication,
these relations are just as amenable to being expressed in focal terms as any
other per se relationship. In fact, they are mentioned in r.2 alongside other
quite different focal relationships. Along with privations of substance and
things that generate substance, we find qualities and affections of substance
(lO03b6- 1O). The ontological dependence of non-substance on substance is

just one of the many focal relations. And just like all focal relations, it
can be expressed in terms of per se predication. It is strictly irrelevant to
focality that the item being focalized is itself a predication relation. Thus,
though the natural priority of substance over quality is the basis of the
definition of quality and the inclusion of substance in that definition, it
is the per se relations that ground the focality of categorial metaphysics.
Metaphysics is indeed unusual in that most sciences do not take predication
relations as such for their subject matter, but there is no reason to suppose
that the focal structure invoked in metaphysics is in any significant way
different from the focality we find in a normal science like the science of
medicine.
.
In fact, the normalcy of the science can be seen when we alter the focal
demonstration so that the conclusion no longer expresses the universal fact
that quality is a per se (3) Being, but rather expresses the natural fact that
quality is predicated of substance:

a quality item IPO quality predication of substance
quality predication of substance IPO substance
quality item IPO substance
A quality item is predicated of substance because substance is of such a
nature that it admits a predication in the category of quality. Here the
conclusion reflects the natural order of predication, and the middle term
expresses something of the nature of substance. Such demonstrations are
parallel to the natural demonstrations concerning health that we saw in
the last chapter:
pleasant IPO having a uniform state of the body
having a uniform state of the body IPO health
pleasant IPO health
Again categorial metaphysics is unique in taking as its subject matter
predication relations, but its logical form is common. To the extent that
the content of categorial metaphysics is demonstrable, we may expect it to
take this form.
Demonstrations concerning essence can be formulated in the same way
as those concerning subjecthood. 'Essence' is a universal predicate that
belongs to all non-substance categorials in virtue of the middle term, 'logos
containing substance in it':
essence IPq logos of quality containing essence of substance in it
logos of quality containing essence of substance in it IPO quality
essence IPO quality
The universal conclusion (essence IPO quality) is proved through premisses

focally related (,essence' is a per se (1) predicate of 'logos of quality containing essence of substance in it') and consisting of terms that express
the natural relationship between the essence of quality and the essence
of substance (quality logos containing substance). The especial ground for
confusion in dealing with the focality of essence is that the natural and the
focal relationship are expressed by exactly the same per se relations. At
the natural level, the essence of quality implies that it will have a natural
relation to a substance, and this is precisely captured by the definitional
inclusion criterion characteristic of focality.41 It is for this reason that
41 For a similar distinction between essence used as a predicate and the natural predication
that backs it up, see APo 11.4 91bl-7.
165. Metaphysical Focaliry

non-substance is included in the science of Being, not just because it is
related to substance, but also because it stands alongside substance as a
subsidiary subject. For snub naturally contains nose in its definition, and
this makes it part of the science of nose; but at the same time, the essence
of nose contained in the definition of snub provides snub with its claim to
essence and per se Being.
The Wider Focal Science of Being
Categorial focality is only one part of the science of Being. Focality shows
its unifying power, not only by joining substance and non-substantial
categories, but also by joining a host of other items. First, the science
of Being treats substance and its essential attributes:
We must inquire ... whether OUf investigation is concerned only with substances
or also with the essential attributes of substances. Further, with regard to the same
and other and like and unlike and contrariety, and with regard to prior and posterior
and all other such terms, about which the dialecticians try to inquire . (Met. B .1
995b18-24)
Aristotle then goes on to include qualiry as well as the things that belong to
quality per se. This will naturally include substance (since substance is per
se related to quality) but also other things, for example, 'it is in virtue of
qualities only that things are called similar and dissimilar' (Cat. 8 11a15).42
In focal terms, the statement 'qualified things are similar' forms part of the
science of Being, because similar is per se (2) predicated of a qualified thing,
and qualified thing, of course, is per se related to substance inasmuch as it
implies substance as its subject. Thus, this statement in the science (still
not adapted to a specific demonstration) is about the attributes of quality,

but at the same time maintains the dependence on substance necessary for
unified focal science. In this way the science of Being is articulated and
ramified.
r .2 presents an outline of the elements and architecture of the science
of Being. In general Aristotle's task is to show that a number of different
subjects fall under the same science. Focaliry is one, but only one, of the
means used to accomplish this task. The two great parts of the science,
TO DV and TO iv, for example, are joined in a different manner. Their

42 Cf. also Met. B .1 995b26-27, where Aristotle considers the possibility that the science
should treat not only the what~is-it of the accidents, but also whether each has a Single
opposite:

connection is more intimate though less clear than focality: they are of one
nature (cpvem), though they are not made clear by one "oyo< (1003b22-25).
Minimally, they are coextensive, but they also imply one another, and
imply one another necessarily, since Aristotle says that the substance of
each thing is one not by accident (ov KaT" uv!'-(3,(3'1KO< b32-33). For this
reason they belong in the same science. If we can describe them in focal
terms at all, they must be 'bifocally' related. Aristotle, in any case, does
not use the focal technique to unify them . Their being of one nature is
sufficient to warrant their inclusion in the same science.
There is in addition a third technique of inclusion, the rule according

to which the same science treats opposites. Again, Aristotle invokes this
rule without any mention of focality, although, since one of the pair of
opposites is explainable by the presence or absence of the other (Met. Z.7
1032b2-5; Phys. 1.7 191a6-7), and presence or absence is a focal relation
(Met. r.2 lO03b8), the rule of opposites can be subsumed under focality.
These, then, are the three techniques Aristotle uses to unify the science
of metaphysics. Other information is provided in Met. i, but from r .2 alone
we can construct an already quite elaborate scheme, as illustrated in the
accompanying figure.
Within r the science of One is represented as a large part of the science
of Being. I wish to discuss it in some detail, because the connection between
Being and One is not entirely clear and has been largely ignored. [ shall
argue that the most promising candidate for the connection between Being
and One is the notion of measure, which is the Single nature (cpvu) that
receives different logoi according to whether it is treated as Being or as
One. It is the difference in these logoi that accounts for the structural
differences in the two parts of the science.
Aristotle's claim that One is said in as many ways as Being leads us to
expect that the ambiguity of One will be isomorphic with Being and will
be overcome by the same focal strategy.43 He encourages this expectation
in r.2.44 He argues that One is studied by the same science as Being
(1003b33-36), and that One and Being are the same and have a single
nature (1003b22-25) and follow one another (i.e., are coextensive), though
they do not have the same logos's Aristotle even goes so far as to say that
43 2.4 1030b8-12; 2,16 1040b16; 1.2 1053b22-24; r.2 1003b33-34.

44 [n a passage that Jaeger in his ocr (following Alexander) thinks breaks the argument
and is out of place (lOO3b22-1004a2). I tend to agree, though it certainly belongs
somewhere nearby, since it discusses what the subject matter of metaphysics is.
45 For how they can have the same nature but not the same logos, see 1.1 1052b1-19; d.
teeth and bone in GA 11.6 745b2-9.
167 Metaphysica! Focality

denial (not Being)
I
qualifications
engenderings
productions
affections of
road to
' - , , - - - - - - - _ substance _ _ _ _ _ _ _--'
I
!
,-------------__ on< ______________-,
Being (species of)
similar
same
equal
[p rivation / denial}
I
dissimilar
other
unequal
many _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _+_ difference _
making
opposition
having - - - - - - - '
Science of Being qua Being according to r.2 lOO3b5-1004a31
we may suppose that the logoi are similar, since the phrases 'one man
and 'man being' and 'man' do not refer to anything different from one
another. His argument is intended to show that the species of One are as
many as the species of Being (l003b33-34), and that the reason why Being
forms its species applies to the One with analogous results.
We are led to expect, then, that the articulations of the science of
Being (categoria! Being, potentiality, etc.) will be mirrored in the science
of One. Moreover, if One is ambiguous in the same way as Being is,

we would expect the resolution of the ambiguity to occur in the same
way, with a focus on substantial unity. In fact, Aristotle does consider
the possibility that substantial unity is the primary kind of unity (<:'.6
1016bl-3; 1.1 1052a31-34). He also presents forms of unity corresponding
to the categories, identifying the species of One as Same, Similar, and
50 on (1003b35-36). But this is neither the only nor the most important
analysis of One. Moreover, it is difficult to see why Similar, a form of
unity in the category of quality, should contain in its definition Same. For
this reason too it is difficult to provide a focal account for this categorial
form of One.
Again, Aristotle's discussions of One and Being in <:'.6 and 7, though
they are clearly written as a pair, do not establish a correspondence between
meanings of the two terms. The chapters contain the same basic division
between the accidental and the per se use and these clearly correspond
to one another, but Aristotle also provides some meanings that have no
clear correspondence. Whereas ~.7 analyses the per se uses of Being in
terms of the categories, we find no corresponding analysis in <:'.6. Again,
while Being can mean truth, there is no corresponding serise for One.
Conversely, One is analysed as measure and as that which is continuous,
and for neither of these is there a corresponding sense of Being. We cannot,
therefore, draw the straightforward correspondence between the senses of
One and the senses of Being, and this fact in turn makes it more difficult
to establish the basis for the unified science of One and Being.
The difficulties are further increased by the fact that the One itself
suffers from an especially troublesome ambiguity. On the one hand, in
r.2 Aristotle identifies the species of One as Same, Similar, and so on
(1003b35-36). He clearly has in mind here a relational sense of unity.
To be One in this sense is to belong to one group in virtue of some
shared feature. So, two substances are the same if they share a single
form. We shall call this the 'relational' sense of One 46 On the other, there
is a non-relational, 'internal' sense of One according to which a thing
constitutes a unity in itself and is not merely a heap. So, for example,
46 Kirwan (1993, 134, on 6. .6) quotes Popper's distinction between type 1 questions
regarding unity ('what are the conditions under which x and y make up one thing,
or under which the combination of x and y is Singular and not plura!?') and type 2
('what are the conditions under which x and yare one and the same thing, and not
different things?'). There seems to be a correspondence between this distinction and
that between my internal unity and relational unity. Kirwan (wrongly, 1 think) places
Aristotle's discussion of accidental unity with type 1. Kirwan is aware of the possibility
of confusion, and defends his claim by citing b23 that artistic and Coriscus are one
'because one coincides in the other. '

that which has one form, like the shoe assembled from its parts is one
(1'>.6). Likewise, that which is continuous (O"vv'X~,) is one in this sense,
because it is one thing, not twO. 47 Aristotle holds out a fleeting promise
that both senses of One may be unified with the science of Being in a way
that mirrors the dependence of non-substantial categories on substance.
But in the end he leaves both schemes undeveloped and takes up instead
the notion of measure.
It is the internal sense of unity that promises the closest connection
between One and the categories of Being. Aristotle argued in Z that a
definition can apply to a substance and cannot apply properly to anything
with an addition. The addition clearly takes away from the definability of
the object and also from its unity. Substance is prior in definition, because it
can be defined without reference to anything else. Items in other categories
cannot be independently defined. Unity and substance, therefore, coincide
in essence and definability. For this reason he says that the cause of the
unity of substance is the first unity (1.11052a33-34). At H.6 essence 'is by
its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of being a this, a quality or a quantity ... This is why none of these has any reason
outside itself for being one, nor for being a kind of being' (1045a36-b5).
The connection between One and Being through the unified essence
extends the promise that One will be explicated along categoriallines, just
as Being was in Z, and in one short passage Aristotle does seem to relate
One to the categories:
Now most things are called one because they do or have or suffer or are related to
something else that is one, but the things that are primarily called one are those
whose substance is one, - and one either in continuity or in form or in formula; for
we count as more than one either things that are not continuous, or those whose
form is not one, or those whose formula is not one. (.6. .6 l016b6-11)48
At first glance this appears to be a reference to the focality of One: there

will be a Single primary substantial Unity to which all the derivative non47 There are differences between the presentations in 6.6 and 1.1. 6.6 is primarily
concerned with the relational sense: of the seven uses I count, four are relational. By
cOntrast, in 1.1 all uses besides measure are internal. Aristotle starts by leaving per
accidens uses out of account, and for this reason his interest in relational similarity
may retreat to the background.
48 Cf. 1.4: 'the other contraries must be called so with reference to these, some because
they possess these, others because they produce or lend to produce them, others because
they are acquisitions or losses of these or other contraries' (1055a35-38). The same
kind of focal arrangement for One is mentioned at r.2 1004a28-31.
------,

substantial Unities (activity, state, passivity) are related. 4Y But to interpret
this as a focality focused on substance would be a mistake. For while we
find definitional inclusion, there is no primary focal One to which all the
derivative Ones are related. It seems rather to be a recipe for accidental
unities. If a thing is one if it does one thing, then for example a baker is
one thing because he doe; one thing, namely, baking. The odd feature of
this relationship, then, is that it reverses the usual priority in the realm
of Being: according to this passage an accidental compound is called one
in virtue of the accident that is predicated of a substance: the accidental
unity of the man performing the baking activity is a unity in virtue of the
baking activity, rather than in virtue of the unity of the substance, man. As
such it is reminiscent of the paronymy relationship of Cat. 1, which also
names an accidental compound. 50 If this is what the passage intends, then
One and Being are not focalized in a parallel manner, since the unity of
accidental compounds is dependent on the unity of the accidental addition.
Nevertheless, we can see how this order of priority would be useful in the
special sciences, which depend on the ability to abstract a unified accidental
feature of substance and treat it as essence, while letting the substance fall
into the scientific background.
Even if this passage makes accident prior to substance, that does not
imply that the orthodox priority of substance over accident in unity does
not also apply. In fact, t..6 (on One) and 7 (on Being) treat the accidental
forms in a similar manner, and it is clear in this context that the accidental
unity is a unity because accidents inhere in one thing, the substance.
Substance is the cause of the unity of the compound.
In the end, there does not seem to be a contradiction between the
view that the substance is the cause of unity and the view that the accident is the cause of unity. In fact, the distinction between them seems
. 49 The predominant interpretation of the passage, however, which stems from Alexander
and is accepted by Ross (1924, i, 303-4) and Kirwan (1993, 138) views the One here
as relational: honey is one with honey because it affects things similarly, musician is
one with musician (having), the heated with the heated (suffering) . This interpretation
is, however, almost certainly wrong. Kirwan finds the passage intrusive and strange,
bur, in fact, the immediate context (starting 1016b1) shifts from the relational to the
definitional sense of unity. That passage argues that those things, of which the thought
of the essence 'is one, are one. If man qua man does not admit of division, it is one.
Substances most of all are one in this way. Whatever does not admit of division in this
sense is one. It is at this point that Aristotle adds his focal qualification: most things
are called one because they do things that are one, etc. The immediate context gives no
indication that Aristotle is considering relational unity.
50 Cf. Lewis 1991, 88-90.

to correspond to the two parts of the science of Being in Z, the narrow
science of substance in which non-substance is viewed strictly as something
predicated of substance, and the wider science in which non-substance is
treated as per se Being. It is interesting and important for the unity of
metaphysics that these two ways of treating One correspond to ways of

treating Being. But for all its interesting consequences, Aristotle leaves this
strategy undeveloped.
There is also some evidence of categorial focality in the context of
the second, relational, form of unity. r.2 lists as kinds of One, the Same,
Similar, and such like (1003b35-36), which suggests that he has catogorial
species or forms (cLOry) in mind. The Same means oneness in substance,
Similar means oneness in quality, and so on. However, there is no attempt
to arrange these relational predicates in focal order, and rightly so, since
Similar does not seem definitionally dependent on Same. Moreover, when
Aristotle elaborates the ambiguity of these terms in 1.3, he does not observe
the strict categorial correspondences. So the Same is used to denote what is
numerically the same, what is the same both in form and number, and what
is the same in the definition of the primary essence. For the latter Aristotle
provides the example, equal straight lines are the same, and so makes clear
that 'same' does not refer solely to substances. Likewise, Similar is not
restricted to quality: 'Things are similar if, not being absolutely the same,
nor without difference in their concrete substance, they are the same in
form, e.g., the larger square is similar to the smaller' (modified ROT;
1054b3-6). It is clear, then, that relational unity is not focally organized
in a way parallel to categorial Being.
We have considered two possibilities of focal ordering within the field
of One, the first concerning internal unity, the second concerning relational
unity. In both cases we see that Aristotle does not develop these schemes
fully or consistently. This result leads us to approach the question from

a different angle and to consider whether the study of relational unity
has anything to do with the study of internal unity, or whether they are
independent of one another. The answer to this question in turn will lead
us to a more satisfactory answer to the problem concerning the relation of
One and Being.

What is the connection between relational and internal unity? Two
heaps of objects may be identical either numerically or in description

without either heap forming an internally coherent unity. Heaps have no
essential unity, and yet two heaps can be identical with one another. So it
seems clear that internal unity is not a necessary condition for relational
unity (and it hardly need be said that relational unity is not a necessary
condition for internal unity).
----
--

Aristotle intends to unify the science of One through the primary
designation of One, measure, in such a way that measure will be a focus
for both internal and relational unity. Measure provides the criterion of
sameness. One thing, whether quantity or quality or substance, is the
same as another thing with respect to measure. At the same time, measure
provides internal unity: to be one is to be the first measure of a kind (genus)

(1.1 1052bl8-20). This measure is indivisible and one (1052b31-32) . It
is true that measures are often arbitrary, as in the case of measures of
weight and so on, which occur in the genus of continuous quantity, but
in the category of substance, where the object measured is not continuous
quantity, measure will be based on the essences of substances. The view
that the reconciliation of the forms of One is to be found in measure is
confirmed by Aristotle in 1.1 where he distinguishes the things said to be

One from the essence (T{ ~v etVaL) of One, and says that measure is the
essence of One. If measure is the essence of One, all uses of One should be
explicable with reference to it. So although internal and relational unity
are not mutually explicable, measure will, nevertheless, be the focus of
both kinds of One.
This is one possible strategy for unifying the science of One, according
to which measure provides the focus for both relational and internal unity.
But there is also a more direct way of establishing the connection, and
at the same time establishing a connection with Being. Essence is the
common term. It takes little effort to show that essence is fundamental
to measure. Outside of continuous magnitude, the unit will be determined
by some essence or quasi-essence, depending on the category of the genus
measured. Nor is it difficult to establish that internal unity is dependent

on essence, since it is precisely essence that is the cause of unity of an
object. T~e distinction between essence and accident is just the distinction
between internal unity and internal plurality. A substance together with
an accident is not a unity, at least not in the same privileged way as a
substance alone is. Difficulties by all means arise if we demand a metaphysical structure identical to that of Being, one that sets substance in
the preeminent position. For measure is found primarily in the category
of quantity. Nevertheless, to the extent that there is an internal unity to
measure, that unity will be based on essence.
It is somewhat more complicated to establish the nature of the connection between essence and relational identity. As we noted, there seems to
be no reason to suppose that identity depends on essence. One man may
be identical with another man, one heap with another, and the degree of
internal coherence of the objects being compared is irrelevant to the issue
of identity. And yet it is clear that all identity is identity in some respect;

so two objects are identical in number or in form. Similarly, two objects
may be accidentally the same, as the white and the musical are, if they are
both this man. Two objects may be identical, of course, in one respect, for
instance, in form, without being numerically or accidentally identical. As
a result, the notion of identity is incomplete without further specification,
and that specification must make the distinction between essence and accident. In order to identify two objects, there must be identity conditions.
Even if the objects being compared are heaps, we must know the essence
of a heap, to the extent that a heap has an essence. Even a heap has unity
of position, and this will be its essence to the extent that it has one. Now,
relational unity is posterior to internal unity. Internal unity is of various
degrees, that of the heap, of the accidental compound, of the substance.
We need to detennine the degree of internal unity we are interested in
before we can make an evaluation of relational unity. In order to determine
whether two objects are identical in essence, we must know what essence
is in general and what their particular essences are, and this is tantamount
to knowing their internal unity. Though Aristotle does not provide this
analysis of unity, the unification of the science of One is clearly one of
his goals. This interpretation provides a unification scheme consistent with
Aristotelian doctrine, and is constructed out of the major components of
his focal theory of One and Being.
More important for Aristotle than the focalization of the ambiguities of
One is the relation between One and the other objects included in the same
science, the many, same, different, and the other, opposite, and privation.
The One in its primary designation is measure, and it is explicated in terms
of genus: 'but [to be One] is especially to be the first measure of a kind, and
above all of quantity' (1.1 1052b18-19). Thus measure and One have per
se relations with genus, and continuing in this way Aristotle increases the
scope of the science. The measure is of importance in knowledge, because it
is the principle of number, and number is that by which we know quantity.
The measure also is one and indivisible, and necessarily indivisible, and so
again indivisibility joins the list of terms of the science. Now, opposites
are included in the same science, not only because of the old sophistic rule,
but also because that rule can be subsumed under the focal scheme. For
opposites are relative, and relatives by their definitions are defined in terms
of one another, and are therefore focally related. The opposite of One is
Many, and so Many too is included in the science of the One.51
51 This is not the only way of connecting One and Plurality. Without a lot of fanfare,
Aristotle introduces plurality in 1.3: 'that which is divided or divisible is called a
plurality.' In this case the order of priority is reversed: 'the one gets its meaning and

Of course, the interesting feature of the passage above is the claim that
measure is found first and foremost in the category of quantiry, rather than
in substance. This is peculiar, and shows the extent to which Aristotle was
unconcerned to maintain isomorphy between Being and One. It may be
argued that the whole discussion in I is less dependent on r than I have
supposed, but r clearly mentions as focally related precisely the subjects
that Aristotle discusses in J. The significance of the One lies in the fact
that the internal organization of the terms of this part of metaphysics
does not follow the organization of the terms concerning Being. Just as
non-substantial categories can be semi-abstracted and treated as per se

Beings with their own per se attributes, so too One has a nature of its
own, however logically dependent that nature is on Being. Measure, for all
its connections with essence, means something different from essence and
operates differently from Being. Focality, as a flexible strategy of generic
unification, can both explain the unity of a subject matter and provide for
an articulated study of the disti~ct elements within that subject matter.
explanation from its contrary .. so that in formula, plurality is prior to the indivisible:
It is clear that the divisible must be de6nitionally prior to the indivisible, so that if
this is what we mean by One, then it will be posterior to plurality. The oddity of this
reversal of priority is increased by Aristotle's statement that 'plurality and {he divisible
is more perceptible than the indivisible' (l.3 1054a26-29). This is obviously unusual
for Aristotle. Perception cannot ground definition
this way, and it is impossible that
plurality should be prior to one, for in order for there to be plurality, there must be a
measure, and the measure is the unity. So the measure must be prior to the plurality
measured. Moreover measure, the principle of number, is that by which quantity is
known: plurality cannot be prior to one. This difficulty points to the problems involved
in establishing the appropriate priority relations. If we define the One as the indivisible
we may not be defining it in terms more intelligible without qualification, and if we
define in this way, as Aristotle makes dear in Topics V1.4, we cannot show the essence
of the definiendum (141b15-18). Such a definition is intended only to lead a less
scientific mind to some understanding of the subject.
in
Mixed Uses
of Analogy and Focality
Because the categories constitute the irreducible genera of Being, and everything that exists is predicated in one of these categories, it is reasonable
to suppose that relational similarities among them will best be expressed
by analogy. However, as we saw in the biological context, analogies are
resolved into identities by choosing a new common subject, which, though
not their genus, is nevertheless pe"r se related to them. Among the categories, by contrast, there is no common Being that is not already a Being in
one of the categories, and so analogies at this level cannot be resolved into
a more abstract identity. For this reason analogy in metaphysical contexts
has sometimes been viewed as significantly different. 1 For since no absolute
identity can be found, analogy is the only form of commonality available.
I want to argue, however, that this difference between categorial analogy and analogy in the special sciences has been exaggerated. We often find
that these metaphysical analogies, like potentiality and good, are not in fact
based on the categories, but rather on lower and abstractable genera. But
more importantly, we invariably find that they are based on a commonality, not of course on the absolute generic commonality of the biological
analogies, but on some kind of natural or focal relationship among the
subject-genera. Whereas wings and fins share common principles of locomotion, potentialities are found in categories, like substance and quality
that are focally and naturally related. In no instance, however, is analogy
a fundamental and independent form of similarity; there is always some
relationship besides analogy that exists between the subject-genera. Now,
this issue has had a controversial history. G.E.L. Owen, because of his
1 Hesse 1965.

developmental view, conceived of focaliry and analogy largely as competing
principles of organization, and though he recognized that the development
of focality did not eliminate the usefulness of analogy, he saw them as
alternative solutions to the same problem.' So, for example, he (rightly)
observed that Aristotle does not mention focality in his discussion of the
principles in the supposedly early Met. A, and omits analogy from r in
favour of focality. From this observation (and others) he concluded that the
analogical presentation of A was an inadequate unification of the science
of Being and was superseded by r's focality.
Though Owen's view has been influential and provocative, it has not
become the received opinion. Most scholars, whatever their views on the
general question of philosophical development, agree that many groups of
objects are amenable to both analogical and focal analysis. j. Owens may
be taken as the vox consensus in pronouncing that 'the two types though
clearly distinct are not mutually exclusive.,3 On this view A does not aim
at unifying the subject-genera of the science of Being, as r does, but at
drawing to our attention the differences and identities among the principles
of various kinds of Being. Different problems, even if they involve some
of the same objects, will naturally require different solutions.
The arguments in favour of this consensus are compelling, but a stron-
ger claim should also be made. Whether or not focality was explicitly
articulated at a later stage of Aristotle's development, in its logical nature
it is prior to analogy in two ways.4 At a general level it is a logical
precondition for all analogy, and as a result one might say that analogy
is a focal derivative of focality. For in order for there to be analogy, there
must be different genera, each one constituted out of elements per se
related to its core subject in the focal manner. So, while focality can exist
independently of analogy, analogy cannot exist independently of focality.
Since th~ focal connection is identical with the normal per se connection,
this focal precondition has generally escaped notice, in spite of the fact
that it is common to all analogies. It is most apparent in the case of
potentialities: they are analogously the same, but each is homonymous
2 1960,193 and n. 39.
3 1978, 125; so also Berti 1971; Rist 1989, 276; Menn 1992; Code 1996; for recent
contributions on the question of development see Wians 1996.
4 Cf. M. ~ D. Philippe 1969, 46-7: 'These various ways of considering unity in diversity
[analogy and focality] do not necessarily exclude one another; on the contrary, they
can complete one another, yet remain distinct, each having its own proper character.'
However, Philippe holds that analogy has precedence over focality: 'unity according to
analogy is surely ultimate, since it is achieved within the greatest variety and reduces
this diversity to a certain unity.'
177 Mixed Uses of Analogy and Focality

with its corresponding actuality (e.g., the potentially and the actually hot)
and includes its actuality in its definition.
There is, in addition, a special use of focality that, together with the
natural priority relation, provides the framework for some metaphysical
analogies. As we have seen, analogues must share some abstractable and
essential feature. Among metaphysical analogues, however, there is no

absolutely common feature to be abstracted, because the analogues are
found in several or all of the categories of Being. Nevertheless, analogues,
if they are to avoid the metaphorical and unscientific quality Aristotle
criticized in Plato, must be bound by some essential connections, even if a
common abstractable is not available. For otherwise the analogies will be
accidental. Among the metaphysical analogies the necessary connection is
provided by natural or focal priority. Sometimes the categories of Being

provide this framework, but more often they do not.
Two cases reveal the interaction of analogy and focality especially
clearly, potentiality and the good. The discussion of potentiality is dominated by analogy, but throughout focality (or natural priority) provides
the framework for the analogues in more or less explicitly developed ways.
Good, by contrast, is dominated by focality, and since focality is logically
prior to analogy, analogy's role becomes ultimately inconsequential.
Matler and Potentiality

In three separate passages (Met. A.4-S, Phys. 1.7, Met. 0.6) Aristotle
discusses two pairs of principles: actuality and potentiality, and form and
matter. There are good superficial reasons for considering these passages
and pairs together. The passages are among the few in which Aristotle
discusses the most general principles in terms of analogy and, because
he often elides the two pairs, he is clearly talking about closely related
elements and principles. A close examination of the contexts of the passages, however, reveals a multiplicity of purpose. Let us first consider
why Aristotle treats these principles as analogous, and then ask how their
underlying subject-genera are related to one another.
Aristotle has two basic reasons for treating the principles as analogous,
corresponding to the relativist (formalist) and realist (orthodox) view of
biological analogy, which we saw in chapter 2. According to the relativist
account, prevalent in Met. 1\.4-5, potentiality and the other principles are
analogous, because they are principles of sciences, and as such are bound
to their subject-genera. The various potentialities and other principles will
be analogous at any level of generality we choose to examine: the potentialities associated with light and sound are analogous, and likewise the

potentialities of substance and quantity (A.S 1071a26). On this interpretation potentialiry and the other principles are analogous solely because
of their use and function in various subject-genera, and there is nothing
peculiar about their natures themselves that makes them capable of only
analogical identity. As we shall see, the subject-genera themselves are
connected by natural priority.
The second, realist view, found in Phys. 1.7 and Met. 0.6, applies
specifically to potentiality or matter and looks to the kinds of potentialities
or matters in each case: potentialities are analogous because they are different kinds of potentiality. The potentialities function differently in each
case: one is associated with change and another with activity, or one is
associated with artefacts and another with substance. They are different
conceptions of what it is to be potentiality. These different conceptions are
related by focality and the logic of abstraction and addition. Specifically,
Aristotle leads us from a more familiar to a less familiar conception of
potentiality by a process of induction (E7TaywY'i). This induction is not
a path to a universal definition of potentiality, but rather a movement
between different but logically related conceptions.
The strongest evidence for the relativist interpretation of analogy and
its underlying scheme of natural priority is found in A.4-S. Because Aristotle is concerned here not only with matter, but also with the other
causes, principles, and elements of things, including form, privation, and
the moving cause, it is clear that the multiplicity of subject-genera is the
reason for the analogy. The principles are analogical because they are used
in different genera:
These things then have the same elements and principles, but different things
have different elements; and if we put the matter thus, all things have not the
same elements, but analogically (Tee avaAoyov) they have; Le. one might say that
there are three principles - the form, the privation, and the matter. But each of
these is different for each class [my italics; YEvos-I, e.g. in colour they are white,
black and surface. Again, there is light, darkness, and air; and out of these are
produced day and night. (A.4 l070b16-21)
Aristotle explicitly connects analogy with the fact that the principles are
found in different genera; and this difference in the genera certainly provides the reason why they can be treated as only analogically identical. It
is also dear that analogy holds equally among the categories and among
the more specific genera. The passage above cites specific genera, but the
question concerning the identity of principles is first taken up in -the context

of the categories (1070a33-b10), and the analogical solution that immediately follows seems to be directed to that question. Moreover, categories
are explicitly mentioned and included among more specific genera in the
context of analogy later in A.S (1071a26). The fact that Aristotle treats
special genera and categories as equivalent for the purposes of analogy
shows that the justification for the analogical identity of the principles does
not reside in the nature of the things that are called principles, but rather in
their function as principles of different genera. For while arguments might
be produced to show that the kinds of things that are potentialities in substance and in quality should be analogous, it is very difficult subsequently
to extend this argument to specific genera. For if the substantial and qualitative potentialities are analogous to one another, then we have assumed
that the substantial potentiality forms a genus and that the qualitative
potentiality likewise forms a genus. We cannot then argue that the potentialities among the various genera of substances are analogous. If we do, we
have clearly already supposed that all the analogies are purely formal. And
if analogy applies to potentiality for this reason, it applies equally to all
the other principles merely because they are principles of several genera.
In corroboration of the relativist interpretation is the fact that Aristotle
is explicitly discussing the principles of things, and talk about the principles
of things is distinct from talk about things in their own right. We can,
for example, talk about earth, its nature and transformations, in which
case earth is the subject-genus and receives predications. But once we caU
earth a potentiality, we treat it as relative to something else, say wood.
Earth now explains something about wood, namely its material nature. s
This distinction between subject and principle is made clear in a different
context at Met. 1.1 (10S2b7-16):
This [that there is sometimes a difference between what a thing is called and the
essence of the thing so denominated] is also true of 'element' or 'cause', if one had
both to specify the things of which it is predicable and to give the definition of the
word. For in a sense fire is an element (and doubtless 'the indefinite' or something
else of the sort is by its own nature the element), but in a sense it is noti for it is
not the same thing to be fire and to be an element, but while as a particular thing
with a nature of its own fire is an element, the name 'element' means that it has
this attribute, that there is something which is made of it as a primary constituent.
And so with 'cause' and 'one' and all such terms.
5 See
eill 1997 for similar observations in the context of Mete. IV.l2.
---------------------

Aristotle makes this claim of all terms that describe relative functions
rather than things. Fire has a nature in its own right, but relative to some
other subject it performs a certain function. To say that fire is an element
is to include this relative function in its definition. All causes and elements
as such will be definitionally related to that of which they are the causes
and principles.
This very distinction provides a reason why matter and potentiality
especially should be considered analogous: matter is said to be that which
is potentially form or privation directly and per se (1fpwrov Ka8' aim) A.4
1070b12-13). This fact about matter and potentiality clearly impressed
Aristotle, since he mentions it on several occasions. 6 Potentiality or matter
is not like any other term that happens to be useful in a specific genus;
rather in its own nature it is adapted to that of which it is the potentiality. Unlike earth, which can be both a per se thing and a principle,
for something to be a potentiality, it must be defined in terms relative to
its actuality, and as a result it cannot even be logically abstracted from
what it is the potentiality for without ceasing to be a potentiality. This
seems to be less the case with a principle like form or actuality, because
form and actuality are not what they are relative to something else. There
is no difference between being something and actually being something,
and this is certainly why Aristotle pays more attention to the analogy of
potentiality than to the analogy of actuality.
This interpretation is attractive, but there are some reasons to suppose
that it is not an adequate basis for the analogy of potentiality. When

we say that two things are analogically the same, we say, among other
things, that they do not have a wholly common definition. And yet Phys.
1.9 (192a31-32), for instance, provides the following general account of
matter:
by matter I mean the primary substratum of each thing (KaO"Tce), from which it
comes to be, and which persists in the result non-accidentally. (modified ROT)
There is no mention here of specific actualities of which matter is the
potentiality. The definition seems perfectly general and unadapted to any

specific subject matter? Potentiality can, it seems, be treated as a genus.
6 In reference to privation Phys. 1.8 191b15-16; Met. Z.3 1029a20-26; DA 11.1 412a7-8.
7 Cook 1989, 117-18, argues that we understand through analogy not what the
underlying nature is in general, but rather what it is in particular cases, but she
suggests that Aristotle can nevertheless give a general account of it.

This 'general' definition, however, exhibits a characteristic that we see
in several other definitions,' an ambiguous term, 'of each thing,' which
makes dear that the account must be adapted to each use. This same kind of
formulation is used for friendship (NE VIII.2 1156a3-5) and motion (phys.
III.1 200b32-201a1), both being genera that contain a latent plurality. It is
clear that Aristotle does not consider the plurality to be trivial:
I
To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and

wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons [pleasure, utility, virtue;
my italics].
There is no such thing as motion over and above the things. It is always with
respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes,
changes. But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything common to these
which is neither 'this' nor quantity nor quality nor any of the other predicates.
Hence neither will motion and change have reference to something over and above
the things mentioned; for there is nothing over and above them .
The matter or underlying nature (il'7rOKHJ.tEY7) <1>-0,,), just like friendship

and change, cannot be defined without adapting it to some specific application, and there is no formulation that is abstracted from any of these
specific kinds.'
All the same, we can grant that a potentiality cannot be a potentiality
without being a potentiality for some specific thing, and still claim that
that very fact, namely that potentiality is a relative term, is common to
potentialities in general and might be included in the account in order to
render a legitimate general definition. This feature of potentiality, after all,
arises from the fact that it is a relative term (TWY 7rpo< n Phys. IL2 194b9),
and yet Aristotle does not suggest in the Categories that relatives are any
less amendable to general definition than any other non-substance term
(Cat. 7 6a36-37): 'we call relatives all such things as are said to be just
what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation
to something else.'
It is, however, precisely because potentiality is a relative that a common
definition is impossible. For at Topics VL8 146a36-b1, Aristotle recommends that 'if the term is relative, either in itself or in respect of its
genus, see whether the definition fails to mention that to which the term,
8 For a similar point see Owen 1978-9, 283; and Kung 1986, 11.
--
---------
--

either in itself or in respect of it s genus, is relative: 9 The specification of
the relata is an essential part of the definition of the relative.
While these considerations reveal a plurality in potentiality, they do
not explain why that plurality cannot be included in a definition . A final
answer may be provided by noting that a potential something is a Being,
and its Being and essence is to be potentially some Being. Since Being is
not a genus, potentiality, since it necessarily is defined relative to some
actual Being, will be predicated in all the categories. The analogy of potentiality arises from the fact that definitions in the proper sense can only
be provided for existent Beings. To be susceptible of real definition (and
not merely a nominal definition), something must be a Being, primarily
a substance, secondarily some non-substance. A potential Being can be
defined, and a general definition can be given to the extent that its relative
can be generalized and still remain a Being, that is, to the level of the
categories. By contrast, potentiality abstracted from anything that is a
Being is not a Being and cannot be defined. While it is possible to provide
a general account of the meaning of the word 'potentiality,' this cannot be
the definition of any existent thing. This interpretation would explain the
relativity of analogy and the various levels of analogy we find in A .4-S,
categories and particular genera. For at whatever level of generality the
Being is determined, at that level will the analogy be found.
Granted that analogy in A is of the relative sort, we must now ask
how the genera and categories in which the principles operate here are
connected to one another. Though the principles may be analogously related, it is an important fact that, properly speaking, the categories of Being
themselves can never be analogously related IO Quality cannot be analogous
to substance, since an analogy requires at least four terms. Only something
related to quality, like a principle of quality, can be analogous to something
related to substance. Met. H .2 comes the closest to claiming the analogy
of Being, but even here it is clear that what is analogous is the cause of
("
' ) .In eac h case. 11
t hB
e emg
atnov TOVA
LVat
9 At Top. V .B 13Bb23-26 Aristotle sa ys that simple iden tity of relation is revealed by
analogy: 'The rule based on things that are in a like relation differs from the rule
based on attributes that belong in a like degree, because the fanne r point is secured
by analogy, not from reflection on the belonging of any attribute, while the latter is
judged by a comparison based on the fact that an attribu te belongs:
10 In spi te of Owen 1960, 193n38: 'beings are the same by analogy because as one use of
"being" is to substance so another is to quantity, etc.'
11 H.2 1043a2-7: 'It is dear then from th!!se facts that if its subs tance is the cause of each
thing's being, we must seek in these differentiae the cause of the being of each of these
things. Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter,

We are accustomed from biological analogy to find some abstractable or
semi-abstractable commonality that provides the necessary connections be-
tween the analogues. The commonality extends further than each analogue,
but not further than the group of analogues. This commonality prevents
the analogues from being incidentally or metaphorically connected; it prevents the introduction of inappropriate analogies, like sail:boat::wing:bird,
into biological science. Minimally, the analogies must occur at the same
level of generality, categories with categories, genera with genera, and in
selected contrast sets, and minimally the relata must be essentially of such
a nature as to admit of that relation.
Where are we to look for a similar commonality among the analogues
of potentiality? One obvious answer is that since thes e analogies are pur-
sued at the highest level of generality, there is no danger of metaphorical

analogy, since there is nothing outside of the genera in which the analogies
occur that could be irrelevant and non-scientific. There is nothing that
could be a metaphorical analogy to potentiality in the way a sail could

be a metaphorical analogy of a biological wing or a fin. Such an answer
makes the defensible assumption that the categories of Being are exhaustive
of reality (APa 1.22 83b13-l?). But because we may be comparing one

irrelevant heap with another, we should look to other, more rigorous,
means by which the various genera are related. In A, the obvious candidate
is natural priority. Aristotle opens chapter 4 by asking whether the causes

and principles are the same for all things, and begins with the answer that
there are a couple of ways of looking at the issue:
The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a
sense,
if
one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all. (1\.4
1070.31- 33)
The expression 'universally and analogically' (Ka86Aov ... Kat KaT' dvaAo~
yiav) is initially surprising, but as Aristotle goes on, he makes clear what
kinds of sameness and difference he has in mind. 12 In a way the causes
of substance are the causes of all things because if they are destroyed, the
other things are destroyed (A.5 1071a34-35). This expression of natural
yet in each there is something analogous to substance; and as in substances that which
is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what
most resembles full actuality.'
12 There is no reason to suppose that the Kat is not epexegetic. For another use of Ka8dholJ
that does not mean 'univocal universal,' see Phys. 1.1 184a23-25. Cf. r.2 l003bl4--15,
where focally related Beings are said to be Ka8' fV.
-.-
--
--
---------------~~~~

priority establishes the causes of substance as universal principles. Aristotle
makes clear that this is not a contradictory but merely an alternative and
perhaps complementary way of looking at the question (1071a29-35). If

the members of non-substance categories like light and colour are viewed
as subjects in their own right, they must have their own principles, but
in another sense substance is the principle of everything, because it is
naturally primary.
Aristotle nowhere says that the analogies hold because some other
relation holds. Nevertheless we have seen reasons why analogues should
be fixed in a framework avoidance of metaphor and, what is essentially
the same thing, the need for the parts of a science to be bound by per
5e relations. Of the connection between the analogy of principles and the
underlying connections among their subject-genera, Aristotle has little to
say. His comments opening A..5 are the clearest:
Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the fanner that are substances. And therefore all things have the same causes, because, without substance,
affections and movements do not exist. Further, these causes will probably be soul
and body, or reason and desire and body.
Aristotle is hardly clear in his expression, and he could be implying several

things:
1. Substance is the cause of all, because it is the cause of itself and the
cause of non-substances.
2. The causes of substance are the causes of all, because they are the
causes of substance, and they provide the substrate for non-substance.
3. The causes of substance are the causes of alL because the causes of substance are identical with the causes of non-substance (i.e., potentiality
for substance is potentiality for quality, etc.).
The third interpretation is attractive inasmuch as it provides the greatest unity among the principles, but it is also the least likely since Aristotle
holds that the causes are different for different things (though analogously
the same). It is clear that the causes of substance are limited in their
explanatory power, just as the oblique course of the sun is a limited moving
cause (1071a15- 17): they do not explain all the essential features of the
Beings.
The first interpretation is recommended by the fact that Aristotle at the
beginning of A.5 draws the distinction between what is separable and what
is not. This distinction seems to be important in explaining why substance

functions as a general cause. But separability is a feature of substance, not
of its causes, least of all matter and privation.
The statement at the end of A.5 that 'the causes of substances are the
causes of all things, in this sense when they are destroyed all things are
destroyed' (modified ROT; 1071a34-35) supports the second interpretation.
Indeed, in 0.7 Aristotle presents a way of understanding the causes of
substance, at least matter and form, as the causes of all other things.
Aristotle says there that man, both body and soul, is the substrate for his
affections, the affections being the white and the musical (1049a29-30).13
It is clear that musical is an affection of the soul and white is an affection
of the body. If we understand the issue in this way, then the causes of
substance, both matter and form, serve as subs trates, potentialities, and
existential preconditions for non-substance. 14
Although this natural priority does not proVide as tight a form of unity
as foca lity and definitional inclusion, it does provide a sufficient framework
for treating the principles as an analogical unity. The non-substantial genera are dependent on substance for their existence, and they are dependent
in a specific way, not as I am dependent on the sun, but because they
are inseparable (0,) xwp'O'T<i) from substance. They are inseparable because they are predications of substance. The substances, Aristotle says,
will be soul and body, or mind and desire and body (1071a2-3). The
non-substances are predications of these, as 0.7 makes clear: the mu-
sical is an affection of the soul, and white is an affection of the body

(1049a29-30). One of the causes of substances, then, is identical with one
of the causes of non-substance: the principles of substance serve as the
substrate and potentialities for non-substance. Moreover, the other causes
of non-substances also are caused by substance, because these causes can
only be predicates of substance, as for example white, which is a principle

of colour, is a predicate of body. At a categorial level and at a generic
level, non-substance is dependent on substance. Without going too far
beyond the apparatus of A, we can say that the causes of substance furnish
the substrate for non-substances, and to that extent there is an essential
13 Cf. Z.3 1029a23-24, where the other categories are predicated of substance and
substance is predicated of matter.
14 In Z.l Aristotle provides a focal reinterpretation of this precondition, but in A we find
no mention of definitional indusion. And yet, the difference between the two concepts
in this context can be exaggerated. After all, Aristotle is talking here about the causes of
things, and causes provide what he considers to be scientific explanations, and scientific
explanations must have a per se relation with that of which they are the explanation .
Natural priority here necessarily involves a per se (2) relation: non-substance belongs
to substance, because substance is included in the definition of non-substance.
_.
--

commonality among non-substances. This commonality is the basis upon
which the various categories and genera can also be treated analogously.
At the same time, in substances as well as non-substances there are proper
principles that discharge the function of form, privation and moving cause.
The passage at Phys. 1.7 191a7-12, though it manifests superficial
similarities to A, does not invoke the genus argument, and so leads us
away from the relativist towards the realist account. 15 We find that here
and at Met. 0.6 Aristotle treats as analogous different senses of what it is
to be potentiality:
The underlying nature (V7TO/cELJlEV1J CPl)(Tts) can be known (E7HOTl1T?j) by analogy.
For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the
formless before receiving form to anything which has form, so is the underlying
nature to substance, i.e. the 'this' or existent.
The motivation for introducing analogy here is different from A, in spite of

the fact that the principles of sensible bodies are at issue in both passages. In
order to discover what this motivation is, we may most profitably start with
the grouping of examples: on the one hand, statue, bed, and other things
that have form are contrasted with bronze, wood, and the unformed before
it gets form (7Tpiv !l.a{3.lv T~V !-,opcp~v); on the other side of the analogy, the
underlying nature is contrasted with substance (overia) and the particular
thing (T66. n) and the being (TO ov). The grouping within the analogy
suggests that the first three pairs illustrate some common relation. If so,
Aristotle is not interested in shOWing the analogy of potentiality across all
genera as he was in A. Instead he is pointing to two sets of differences
in the very notion of potentiality. First, craft production (though a!-'opcpov
is certainly ambiguous in this respect), in which there is, a pre-existing
substrate, is contrasted with substances (like animals) in which there is
no pre-existing substrate, but only a coexisting one. Second, there is a
15 Charlton (1970, 78-9) mentions the two standard interpretations: a traditional

interpretation has connected this passage closely with Met. Z.3 and claimed that
Aristotle is trying to arrive at a conception of prime matter. On this view the
analogy involves a series of inductive steps whereby properties are stripped away until
prime matter is reached. Alternatively, 'underlying thing' is a generic name for the
relationship that exists between the members of the proportion (the position Charlton
accepts). There is a further interpretation, by which the heuristic analogy induces not
to a concept of prime matter, but to the matter underlying substance. Accordingly
Aristotle is trying to grasp the nature of substantial change, having dealt with the
general principles of change earlier in 1.7 (Witt 1989, 67). See also Hesse 1965 and
Cook 1989, for further references.

contrast between coming-to-be and being. The wider context of Physics J,
however, makes the coming-to-be/persistent Being interpretation somewhat out of place. As Aristotle says just after this passage, there had
been a move among his predecessors from positing just the opposites as
principles towards including a third principle, the underlying thing. Our
passage is introduced as part of the proposal that these three principles
may be considered in a way as two in number: the underlying thing can
be considered numerically identical with one of the contraries, privation.
This identification will serve as the key to the paradox of change, which
earlier philosophers had engendered (1.8), a solution already alluded to in
1.7 190b17-27 16 By reducing the contraries to presence and absence in a
substrate, and insisting that the substrate changes in a way per se related to
itself (e.g., it is the patient, not the man, that is healed), there comes to be a
logical unity, which had not been present before, between the substrate and
the element changed. As Aristotle says, this solution can also be expressed
in the two-term contrast between actuality and potentialiry (191b27-29).
Rather than just the contraries being related (a situation in which change is
still difficult to explain), the substrate and form will now be per se related.
It is this context that motivates our analogy. Aristotle needs to show how
the two different conceptions of the principles (their being two or three in
number) are related. The generalizing description 'as the matter and the
formless before receiving form to anything which has form ' represents
the three-principle view, involVing the matter (,)1..1]),17 privation (ap.opq,ov.
7rP'V 1..a{3fLv T~V p.opq,ryv ), and the form (TOW 'XDVTWV p.opq,ryv), while the
last pair, 'so the underlying nature is to substance, i. e. the this or existent,'
represents the two-principle view, which Aristotle is moving towards as
a solution to the problem of change. The examples of the three-principle
view come from the realm of artefacts, because artefacts have an ambiguous
status between the three- and the two-principle view. With res pect to
their names they behave like substances (wood:bed::f1esh:man), but their
categoriallogic is closer to that of an accidental compound, since the q,UG...
of bed is not bed, but wood, and bed is an accidental arrangement of wood.
According to the logic, therefore, artefacts follow the three-principle structure: wood is what exists before it takes on the form; it is formles s, then
it takes on a form. The analogy, then, is not primarily about a comparison
between artefact and natural substance, since it is clear that the general
formulation in the first half of the analogy is applicable to cases other than
artefacts (e.g., substance-accident relations). Nevertheless, artefacts setve
16 50 Charlton 1970, 80; see Waterlow 1982, 14nll.
17 Keeping the reading of the M5S against Diels ~nd Ross 1936, 494.

both as a paradigm case of the three-principle view and as a station along
the way towards understanding the two-principle structure, which is best
adapted to natural substances.
Why, then, on this interpretation is the analogy necessary? It is note-
worthy that Aristotle does not explicitly state that a general definition of
the underlying thing is impossible. Although induction is not explicitly
mentioned, the fact that the underlying nature is known (E7ftaT'IT~) by
analogy recommends the inductive view, and this in turn may suggest that
we are supposed to arrive at a universal account. Moreover, there is a clear
movement of discovery in the chapter as Aristotle approaches a solution
to the paradox of change using the pre-existing philosophical material at

his disposal and setting the pieces in a new arrangement. But the inductive
context of analogy does not entail the move to a universal account. Quite
the opposite. Aristotle rarely uses analogy in an inductive context, and
does so in fact only in this passage, 0.6, H.2 (1042a4-5) (all passages
concerning principles), and in the discussion about excerpting problems in
APo 11.14 (98a20--23). In all these passages Aristotle carefully distinguishes
between what belongs universally and what belongs according to analogy.

It is clear, then, that universal connections are treated differently from
analogical connections, and that even in an inductive context the standard
considerations of analogy are still relevant.
The fact that Aristotle is working with different views of potentiality,

based on three and two principles, recommends a realist view of analogy.
The three-principle view, especially in the realm of artefacts, makes a clear

distinction between matter, privation, and form, just because the matter
can exist separately from the form. Indeed, that which is the matter for
the form has itself a per se existence, as wood and bronze do, and only
incidentally does it lack or have the specific form. By contrast, in the

two-principle view the matter exists only insofar as it is related to the form,
and its being is to have that form potentially. Aristotle makes this clear
when he says that the potentiality-actuality distinction is an alternative
solution (1.8 191b27-29). As a result, the principles have different per 5e

relations in each case, and therefore belong in different genera.
At the same time, the constituent genera of the analogy are not in-
cidentally related. Artefacts provide more than merely metaphorical understanding of the underlying principle in substances. The three-principle
genus is related to the two-prinCiple genus in virtue of the fact that only
in the latter is the matter directly and per se related to its form. That is,
a per se relation is added to the three-principle genus in order to generate
the two-principle genus. Equally, a principle, privation, is subtracted. That

is to say, a relation of subtraction and addition, similar to that in Met. Z.4,

binds together the two genera between which the analogy arises. For the
notion of capacity for a form is added to the notion of persistent substrate
of change. At the same time, the addition entails the subtraction of the
principle of privation conceived independently from the substrate. The fact
that they are related by addition and subtraction ensures that the principles
will be of different genera, but it also ensures that they will be per sc
related. And this in turn provides a reason why the two genera should
be treated together and why we may legitimately move in the process
of understanding from one to the other. Although this structure is only
implicit in the Phys., Aristotle develops it further and more explicitly,
though with different emphases, in Met. 0.6 18
The discussion of potentiality in
is most interesting for our purpose
because of the explicit interaction between focality and analogy in a realist

account. Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of livval'm. The first kind, which
he treats in 0.1; 2 and 5, is concerned with change (Kivry<TL<). He introduces
it because this is the form that is the most legitimate use of the term
ovval'L< (l'a"'<TTa Kvpiws 1045b36), although it is not the most useful for
his purposes (1045b36-1046al). It is not the most useful, because ovval'L<
and iVEPYEta extend beyond the senses of the terms related to change to
encompass persistent objects. These two kinds of ovva,uELS'" are related in a
manner reminiscent of the way Z .4 relates non-substance as accident to
non-substance as essence. In Z we saw a two-step science first involving
substance and accident, and then non-substantial essence. In the first step,
non-substance was treated purely as accident, but in the second it became a
per se Being in its own right. We noticed that, when this happened, the per
se relations of non-substance did not remain entirely consonant with those
of the first step. For instance, when non-substances, like white or odd, are
treated as per se beings, they do not dir,ectly contain substance generally or
any specific substance in their definitions. And even if ultimately, through
several focal connections, white and odd are per se related to substance,
nevertheless this connection is expressed differently from the connection
of accident to substance. White, treated as an accident, has different per
se relations (it contains raj substance directly in its definition) from white
treated as a per se Being. In a similar way the ovvci,u.t), when considered
18 Cook (1989, 118) denies the parallel between 8 .6 and Phys. 1.7: 'The 191a7- 12
analogy and the 86 analogy do not have the same sort of structure. In 86, Aristotle
uses generalization from examples to understarid what sort of "thing" actuality
is. We understand this through understanding the role that actuality plays in the
actuality-potentiality pairing. At 191a7- 12, we come to know through an analogy what
the underlying nature is in particular cases of substantial coming-to-be.'
--------

m the context of change, have a different significance from the OWal''''
when considered in the context of persistence. Just as non-substance can
be treated as per se Being only if the focal relationship between accident
and substance is broken, so here too the OVVa.,uH~ of persistence can only
emerge, if the focal connection characteristic of change is dissolved.
Aristotle begins his discussion of DVVal't< with a focal scheme in the
context of change. In 8.1 he takes up the sense of 'active capacity,' and
defines DVVal't< as a 'principle of change in another or in itself qua other'
(1046a10--11). This sense he designates as primary, and explicitly builds a
focal scheme of derivative tenns around it. One of the derivatives is the
passive capacity, the principle of being affected in change by something
else (im' a""au) or by itself qua other (1046a11-13). Owen proposes for
the focally derivative formulation 'source in patient of change effected by
another or (by itself) qua other, viz. by a source of change (something
which is/has dunamis [in the primary senseD,19
When we come to 0.6 Aristotle reiterates the important methodological claim he made in 0.1, saying that he will introduce EV<PYHU and that
when he does, it will become clear that the sense of ovvajlt) KaTa Kiv1}(Jw
19 Burnyeat 1984, 47. For a full focal transcription of related terms see 46-8. Scrupulousness
in definitional inclusion can be overdone, since it is dear from the present passage
that Aristotle is casual: 'the accounts of the prior SVllcillt:t~ are somehow present in
the accounts of these SVVcillt:t~' (Wo"TE Kat (I) TOt~ TOWWV A6)'ot~ (vv7rcipX0txTl 7TWS 01 TWI)
7TPOTEPWI) SVllall(WV Myot 1046a17-19). Aristotle may have wanted the definitional
inclusion to be casually expressed for reasons that pick up on problems discussed in
chapter 4. It is difficult to see why the active capacity is primary and the passive
secondary, if, as Owen has claimed, the inr' aAAov phrase is the basis for the focality.
For JUSt as the passive capacity clearly implies the active capacity (that implication is
noted explicitly at 1046al4-15, inr' apxfis p.ETaJ3A1]nKfj~) , so that which is capable of
changing something for the same reason surely implies something that is capable of
being changed. Since Aristotle clearly intended the inT' aMov expression to be the basis
of the focality, it is impossible on the basis of definitional inclusion alone to assign focal
primacy to one or other of the pairs. For otherwise we quickly face the problems of
recursive definitional inclusion to which Aristotle was so sensitive: active capacity could
be defined as 'principle of change in another or in itself qua other (i.e., in something
that has a principle of change by another or by itself qlta other [i.e., by something that
has a principle of change in another or in itself qua other ... 1).' Cf. snub nose nose . . .
Within the framework of change some kind of mutual or bifocal relationship seems to
be inevitable. Burnyeat et a1. 1984, 11-13, on H.3 1043a29-b4 discuss the ambiguity of
'man' and the problem of the focal meaning, and suggest two readings (soul is primary;
man [as composite] is primary). They are reasonably perplexed as to which of the twO
senses of 'man' is primary. This example reveals the disturbing fleXibility in the notion
of definitional priority.

is not the only one. We may come to know this new form of 3VvaJ.L'S by
analogy:
Actuality means the existence of the thin& not in the way which we express by
'potentially'; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the
block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out,
and even the man who is not studying we call a man of science, if he is capable
of studying. Otherwise, actually. OUf meaning can be seen in the particular cases
(E7Tt TC;JV /CaB' g/CQOTa) by induction (i.'rraywyfi), and we must not seek a definition
of everything (7TQVTOS' opov) but be content to grasp the analogy, - that as that
which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is the waking to the
sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and
that which is shaped out of matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought
to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and
the potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist
actually, but only by analogy - as A is in B or to S, C is in D or to 0; for some
are as movement to potentiality, and others as substance to some sort of matter.
(1048a30- b9)
We note some immediate similarities with the Physics passage: induction is
explicitly mentioned (E7TaywY'i); the statement that the potential is known
as different from the form or actualiry (fOT' a~ EVpy"a TO V7Tapx"v TO
7TpdYJ.La J.L~ OVTWS wrnrEp AyoJ.L'" BvvaJ.L" 1048a30-32; J.Lia J.LEV ouv iipX~
aVTl1. ouX ovrw jJ.ia ova-a Ou~ ovrws- OV WS TO r6~ n 191a12-13) . In
addition, it is clear that Aristotle is engaged in a process of discovery,
since he begins from the more familiar senses of Suva/.us- and moves to the
less familiar and technical senses; moreover, he is investigating the familiar
sense for the purpose of arriving at the technical sense (B,o ('1ToilVTfS Kat
7TEpt TOVTWV a,~A80J.LEV 1048a30). This process is linked with induction and
analogy in the passage above (1048a35-37). Nevertheless, even in the context of induction the rigours of per se connections apply. The language of
definition and the distinction between universal and particular are present
(opos, TWV Kae' EKaOTa, 7TavTos). In this passage the use of analogy is an
explicit indication that no universal definition of BVvaJ.Lts can be attained.
The scheme introduced in the first chapter of 0 in its simplest form
had consisted in the focal relationship, active BVvaJ.L'..-passive BVvaJ.L's, According to this scheme the application of the first element to the second
produces change. It is reasonable to suppose that when EVPYELa is introduced it will be paired with each BVvaJ.L'S, and that by this pairing a new
sense of BvvaJ.L's will emerge. Aristotle does not make explicitly clear how

he intends the introduction of EVEpYfLa, but he seems to have the following
scheme in mind:
active ~UVa.J..LL~
(building art)
passive Bvva/-LLS
(buildable material)
active fvepYELa
passive fvepyta
(building activity)
(a building being built / having been built)
The examples provided here are still suitable for and adapted to bVVa}LLS in
the context of change, and as a result the conception of the scheme has not
moved significantly beyond 0.1. But a new sense of OVVa}LLS emerges when
the focal relation bet~een active and passive 5vva,u.Ls is set aside, and the
significance of the OVVci,uHS' are no longer seen in relation to one another,
but each in a new relation with its corresponding form of Evipyf.w. This
new relationship is described at 0.8 1049b12- 17 in terms of definitional

inclusion, and so has the logical form of focality, even though the items do
not share a name: EvePYHa is prior in definition to ovvap.ts. By setting aside
the primary focal relation between active and passive OVVajlLS, Aristotle is at
the same time setting aside the EV aAA1p-{nr' aAAov relations characteristic
of change that bound them in the first scheme 20 Change is now no longer
being considered as an essential feature of ovva}u~, and is abstracted from
the definitions of the terms. The new scheme contains the same terms as
the original (but now expanded) scheme, but those terms are understood in
a new set of per se relations, and therefore take on a new significanceY The
senses of ovva}LL< and EVEpYHa are now apprehended by analogy, since the
focal arrangement based on change (EV aAA'f'-inr' aAAov) that kept active
and passive capacity linked has been set aside, and the BVVG.}LEL< are being
treated in relation to their actualities.
The chief difficulty in understanding the import of the analogy has

been interpreting the examples provided. The clearest (though still hardly
lucid) contrast is provided at the end of the quoted passage: EVEPYHa is not
the same in all cases but is analogical; as
KiV17GU
is to ovvaJlt~, so ovuLa is to
some vA'I (1048b6-9). This in some ways seems to recapitulate the Physics
analogy. The first pair seems to imply change, the second pair persistence.
It has been often pointed out that the distinction between the OVVa}LLS
of 0.1- 5, ovva}L'~ for change, and the ovva}LL< of 0.6, ovva}LL< in stable
20 Charles 1994, 97, discusses the significance of this distinction between the two schemes.
2] This seems to be Frede's (1994) basic point, though he seems to extend the focal sense
from the first scheme to the second (190 and passim).

being, seems to fit the purpose of the Metaphysics insofar as it aims at an
understanding of being qua being and not qua moving and changing. 22
But the examples provided at 1048a37- b4 do not fit this pattern well:
waking/ sleeping and seeing/having eyes shut do not suit either side of
the analogy. I follow Gill, therefore, in interpreting all the examples
as belonging to the conception that has been abstracted from change:
building, waking, and seeing are active VPYlaL that correspond to the
active owaf"' ability to build, sleeping, and being able to see but having
one's eyes shut. No doubt the activity of building usually implies change,
but strictly within the pair as Aristotle has provided it - building and
the ability to build - there is no change in another thing or even in
oneself as other. 23 It is merely the actualization of the internal learned
capacity. The last two examples of ivipYHa, that which has been separated from the matter (a7ToK'Kp(f'ivov) and that which has been worked up
(o:TrHpyaap.vov), co.rrespond to the passive QvvafJ.EL>, matter and what is
not worked up. As Gill points out, the fact that perfect participles are used
in both cases suggests that the persistent state, not change, is at issue .24 On
this interpretation, then, active ovvaj.w; is a capacity for an activity, passive
ovvaf' a potentiality for a form. The KtV'1CT-ovvaf' pair (1048b8) must
accordingly be interpreted as ivipYHa- OVVaf'.25
What is the relationship between the original focality and the analogy that arises between the
OVVcljJ.H)
in the context of persistence? When
actuality is added to the original focal scheme, nothing prevents the expanded scheme from being applicable to change. In fact, the example of
building provides a complete range of terms to fill up a scheme associated
with change. In this case, the original focality and the original range and
22 Gill 1989, 172ft and 214ff. distinguishes the first scheme concerning change from the
second scheme concerning persistence; d. Ide 1992, 3-4 and Burnyeat et al. 1984, 48,
who advert to the use of SVVaI-'LS' and fVfpYHa in H.6.
23 Gill 1989, 21Snll cites DA II.S 417b8-9 for building as pure activity.
24 Gill 1989, 215. But how are we to interpret the first set of examples? The first two
representing MVUI-'LS' are the Hermes in the wood and the half in the whole. They
are potentially, because they could be taken out of what they are in (d. the almost
identical example at Phys. 1.7 190b7-8 in the context of coming*to.be). The third is
the knower who is not actively studying/ contemplating. The first two, then, seem to
imply change, and the third does not. I suggest that since at this point Aristotle has
not yet introduced analogy or the induction, we should not be too concerned about
finding consistency in this set of examples. Their purpose here is merely to give an
outline of the distinction between actuality and potentiality, and to introduce actuality
as a kind of Being not like potentiality. Aristotle then goes on (in accordance with his
stated purpose) to distinguish the senses and draw the analogy.
2S See Gill 1989, 217 and Ross 1924, ii, 251.

significance of 5vva,."tr; remain in place, and the focality is based on the
EV aA.ACf-inr' Q.AAOV relation. But in order to extend the sense of ovva}lt'l
beyond change, the EV aAAcp-tm' al\i\ov relation must be set aside, and an
analogy rather than a focality will take its place. The focality will cease
to exist, because the necessary relations concerning change no longer hold
universally. It is dear that the first pair at least (e.g., active thinking, seeing,
etc.), when it is considered complete in itself, extends beyond sources of
change in another and encompasses activities that do not result in any
products or any changes in other objects.

The relationship between the two conceptions of bVva!"t< (change and
persistence) is similar to what we saw in Z between non-substance considered as an accident of substance and non-substance considered as per se
Being. For in order to arrive at the per se conception of non-substance, we
had to break the accidental relationship between white and man and set
white into a new per se relationship with surface. The function of white is
quite different in the two relations. In a similar manner, the relationship
between the active and the passive
owa!"". is broken in order that each
may enter into a new per se relationship with their respective EVEpyta;
and the function of ovva!"L> is quite different in these two relations.
Aristotle, then, makes two very different uses of analogy in the context
of potentiality and matter. One is a relativist use appropriate for the study
of principles, the other a realist view intended to lead us to a new conception
of matter and potentiality. In all cases, however, we find a relationship of

natural priority or focality connecting the genera of the analogies, which
either allows us to treat the principles as a single group or allows us to
move from one conception of the principles to another by addition or

abstraction.
The Good
The good has traditionally been treated alongside other transcategorial
terms, like Being, One, and potentiality, in discussions of analogy and
focality. 26 It seems especially promising for our purposes, because Aris-
totle's discussion of the good in EN 1.6 1096b26-29 contains the only

passage in the corpus that mentions analogy and foeality immediately
together. OUf discussion begins again with Owen: since the EE lacks a
passage parallel to EN's discussion of analogy and focality, Owen argued

for the ea rly dating of the EE. He supposed that Aristotle had not yet
26 E.g., Alexander on Met.
r. ,242.5-6.
.--~-
'"'-

thought to use focality in the context of transcategorials, and so had not yet
developed the focal solution that is fully revealed in Met. r.2. But Owen
was misled by EN 1.6 1096a23-29 (where good is said to be predicated
in all the categories) into supposing that the 1.6 1096b26- 29 passage was
relevant to the categories, and his misreading seems to persist in some
recent accounts." Interpretation of the passages is further bedevilled by
the fact that the context throughout is a critique of the Platonic idea of
the Good. Aristotle adduces arguments in both the EE 1.8 and EN 1.6 only
to the extent that they are useful for his critical task, and where he does
make positive comments (1096b26-29) he explicitly recognizes that they
are strictly speaking out of place (1096b30-31).
In response to Owen's claims concerning the EE, Berti has argued I think successfully - that Aristotle implicitly recognizes the basis of a
focal arrangement in the EE. This arrangement consists in the means-ends
relationship, and it fulfils both of the formal criteria of focality. Both means
and ends are called 'good,' and the definition of the end is contained in the
definition of the means.28 Robinson, while agreeing with Berti about the
EE, urged that a focality based solely on ends and means would result in
a single ultimate good, which the EN with its multiplicity of per se ends
denies (1096b16-25).29 In this state, more or less, the controversy has
rested. There is, however, more to be said about the scope for focality and
analogy among the goods and the role of categories in these arrangements.
Both the EE and the EN offer further evidence for a focal arrangement
among means and ends, and this becomes apparent in light of the intimate
relationship between focality and demonstration. For a passage at EE 1.8
1218b16-24 expressly discusses the final good as T<I\O< in terms of demonstration and necessary connections:
And that the end [the first good] is the cause of all that comes under it, the
method of teaching shows; for the teachers first define (optcra,uwOL) the end and
thence show (ow.::vvovcrw) of each of the other things that it is good; for the end
aimed at is the cause. E.g. since to be in health is so and so, so and so must needs
be what conduces to it; the health-giving is the efficient cause of heath and yet
only of its actual existence; it is not the cause of health being good. Further, no
one demonstrates that health is good (unless he is a sophist and no doctor, but one
who produces deceptive arguments from inappropriate considerations), any more
than any other principle.
27 Broadie 1991, 28-9; Menn 1992, 550-1 and n. 11.
28 Berti 1971 .
29 Robinson 1971.
--
---

A series of means and ends, which are connected in hypothetically neces-
sary premisses (civaYK'11218bI9), can be displayed in a syllogism. The ends

are causes (bI6, 18) and principles (24), and as such take the middle position. The per se relations, which underlie focal relations, are clearly present
and at issue here. The use of the relative
is a further indication of
the focal arrangement (avciYK17 rODE Eiva~ TO crV}J.cpEpOV npos aVT7JV). We see
the familiar distinction between the natural and the focal demonstration.
The natural final-cause syllogism
"'po,
exercise IPO health

health IPO man
exercise IPQ man
does not contain the term 'good,' though it is implicit through our understanding of the relations between the terms. The good can be made more
evident through a linguistic, focal demonstration,
healthy IPO conducive to health

conducive to health IPO exercise
healthy IPO exercise,
in which 'conducive to' implies the relationship of means to ends. By
substituting 'conducive to' and 'exercise' for other terms we can fill out
the terms of the science of health. Finally, if we substitute 'health' and
'exercise' for the general 'good,' we shall have the desired focal demonstration:
good IPO conducive to the final good
conducive to the final good IPO means (specifically exercise)
good IPO means (specifically exercise)
It is easy, then, to see how ends and means
fit into the wider focal science.
The derivative good, means, has a different significance and different properties from a good in some other derivative sense, for example, evil, which,
ov
by the I'~
rule of focal inclusion, can also be called 'good.' Means, though
they qualify as focally derivative because they are homonymous with the
focus and imply the focus in their definition, are also peculiar in that they
actually share some properties with the focus. For the final good and the
derivative good are both objects of desire and both are pursued. This is
obViously one of the reasons that Plato was led to the idea of the Good,
and it is preCisely this fact that allows goods to be treated analogically as

well as focally. It is an arrangement closely akin to cumulative series, as
we shall see in the next chapter.

In the EN as well, Aristotle maintains the focality of ends and means
(1.6 1096b8-14), and although he does not use the 7TPO< iiv expression
in this context (perhaps because he is arguing in this section that the
means are not related 7TPO< iiv but 7TPO< 7ToMa) the language of focality
is unmistakable. The means are described as 'those which tend to produce
(7TOL'lnKa) or preserve (q,vAaKnKa) these [ends] somehow or to prevent
their contraries' and they 'are called so [good] by reference to these (BLD.
ravra AiyreaL) and in a different sense.' These are the standard formulae
of Met. r.2 30
But the EN also moves beyond ends-means focality . The further development comes at 1096bl4-26, where Aristotle calls on us to set aside the
means and consider whether the ends themselves are goods in accordance
with a single form (KaTD. /liav 1biav). He claims that the definitions of
honour, prudence, and pleasure are different and distinct qua goods (iiTEpOL
Ka, BLaq,ipoVTE> 01 A6yOL ralJTy/ Vayaea). Since they are not related as ends
and means and do not share a common definition qua goods, we are forced
to consider whether they are chance homonyms (1096b26-31) :
But then in what way are things called good? They do not seem to be like the
things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being
derived from one good or by all contributing to one good or are they rather one by
analogy? (a.hA' ct.pa.)'f TCp clq,' EVo) fivQt 17 7rpo) Ell a7rQVTQ UVVTfAE1v 17 p.O.AAOV Kar'
civaAoyiav;) Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on
in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present;
for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of
philosophy.
Since Aristotle does not provide a solution to this question here, we
should not immediately take the disjunction, ~, to imply that only one
or another of the techniques of unification is correct, nor even that thet;
are exclusive.31 Certainly to look for three distinct techniques is hopeless. 2
The first two disjuncts are to be treated as a unit, T~ acp' vO~ ElvaL r, 7TPO~ V
a:rravTa CTVVTEhELV. Granted, the diction, as Fortenbaugh has pointed out,
30 Met . r .2 1003a35-36: CPVNiTHIV, 7fOllV; 1003b17: ~l ' 0 AEYOVTal .
31 Berti 1971, 170, claims that the goods can he both analogically and focally related. So
also Menn 1992, 551n11.
32 Ross 1914, 291, distinguishes acp' EVOS as the efficient cause, 7fPOS fV as the final cause.
This is not an Aristotelian usage.
--------------------
.-

does not correspond to the technical expression for focality,33 and there
are hints towards a means-ends interpretation:
(T1)VTEAtV
is chosen in part
because of the root TfA-; and it is connected with usefulness at GA 1.18

725a5. Nevertheless, a passage at PA IlL5 667b21-26, though in a quite
different context, contains similar diction and suggests that
"'pos fV
act>' VOs and
represent two ways of looking at the same phenomenon. 34 And a

more relevant use for CTVVTfAE'V is found at SE 1 165a35-37. Concerning
sophistical arguments, Aristotle says that he will discuss how many kinds
there are, the number of their elements and parts, and the other things that
contribute to this art (7Tpl. TWV aAAwv TWV CTVVTEAOVVTCOV ELS T1JV TxvrJV
TavT~v).35 He provides some indication of what he thinks the CTVVTfAOVVTa
are at the beginning of SE 34: the appropriate order of questions, how to
solve arguments and solecisms, and so on, both of which go beyond a mere
enumeration and description of the parts and elements. This passage is the
closest parallel to the EN, since it deals with the logical organization of
an investigation. 36 As the order of questions contributes, but is not neces-
sarily an element, so the per se goods contribute to a single good without

necessarily being elements of that good. The traditional interpretation that
reads this phrase as a reference to focality, then, is not likely to be far off
the mark. 37
.
If this is correct, can Aristotle provide a focal arrangement for these
per se goods 138 He lists four: intelligence, sight, certain pleasures, and honours (1096b17-18), to which we might add virtue generally (from 1097b2;
Aristotle already provides <l>p6V~CT"). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides no
example of what he has in mind and expressly dismisses the question as too
exact for his study. Moreover, in the remainder of book I he leaves aside
the relations among these per se goods, because he has already asserted
that they are also desired for the sake of something else, and it is this
33 Fortenbaugh 1966, 188-9.
34 'The reason why these two vessels [the aorta and the great vessel] coalesce into one
source and from one source ((is' ",ia.I1 apxi]v a-vVTA.t"tv leal cina ,tuas) is that the sensory
soul is in aU animals actually one, so that the part in which it primarily abides must
also be one' (modified ROT).
35 TWV ci.v..wv TWV cTVlITEAovlITWV means 'the other things, I mean the ones contributory':
the parridple 'is emphatically attributive.
36 This tells against Fortenbaugh's generic interpretation, since Eta77 TWV Ao)'wv (165a34)
are dearly distinguished from the contributory factors .
37 E.g., Owens 1978, 116-17.
38 Fortenbaugh has tried to show that the phrase clef {vat Eivcu 11 1TpOt iv Q'l'T(U)TCl O'lWTEAEiv
does not refer to focality, but to generic affiliation through means and ends. This is, of
course, impossible since Aristotle has already set this possibility aside at 1096bl4-16
and b24-25.

something else that he pursues in 1.7 through the methodology of the
means-ends scheme. This obviously does not preclude other relationships
alluded to in the 7rPO, EV ITVVTfAElv phrase, for how can we exclude some
other relationship to VOaLMOvia if we do not yet know what EvoaLMovla
is? What that relationship might be, we are left to speculate, and yet,
our understanding of focality provides a clear direction for the search.
We should look beyond the confines of EN I to the later books, and
seek Aristotle's final word on the focal relationship in the host of per
se relationships that bind together the central terms of his ethical theory.
Each of the per se goods is not just a means to EVOaLj.wv{a in some vague
sense, but also enters into a very precise relationship with EVaaLJ1-0vla and
with the terms in which Ev~a'Jlovia is defined. 39 A brief survey of these
reveals that their relationship to EvoaLfLov{a is not the same in all cases.
f:voaLjlOv{a, the human good, is the activity of the soul in accordance with
virtue, and if the virtues are severaL then in accordance with the best
and the most complete of them (1098al6-17). Virtue, then, is obviously
a central part of the theory, because it is per se (1) related to happiness.
It is a state of the soul concerned with choice, lying in the mean relative
to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man
of practical wisdom would determine it (11.6 1l06b36-1107a2). Virtue is
good because it is the activity in accordance with this state that is good.
Accordingly, q,povryIT" too is part of the theory, because it is a virtue,
indeed in many ways it is the most complete virtue. For C/>POVTfa"LS is not
only a virtue (whose activity constitutes the human good), but it is the
virtue that determines the mean states that constitute the other virtues
(whose activities in turn constitute the human good). It is therefore both
a species of virtue, and related to ethical virtu~. Honour turns out to have
a plurality of roles in Evoa'Jlovia. Ev~a'Jlovia itself is honoured (1102al;
1178b31-32). But honour is also that with which the state of pride is
concerned. In this sense it is not a good at ali, but rather it is how we
act and react relative to it that is a good; and honours and dishonours are
the object with respect to which the proud man is as he should be (that
is, has the human good) (IV.3 1123b20). Pleasure has the most interesting
relationship to EVOaLfJ.OVta. In a general way, all ethical virtue is concerned
with pleasure and pain (7rEPL ~~ovas yap KaL Alma, 'ITn ~ ~elK~ apET~ 11.2
1l04bS-9; d. X.l), since virtue concerns action and reaction, and pleasure
and pain attend every action and reaction. But pleasure enters the theory
through another relation, and thereby has a different significance: pleasure
39 See Tuozzo 1995 for some similar conclusions, though from a different perspective.
- - - - - - - - - -- -
---

completes the (best) activity not as the inherent state does, but as an end
that supervenes (X.4 1174b31- 33). We do not have to determine the exact
nature of this form of pleasure to see that it has a different significance
from the more general form. Finally, of sight Aristotle has little relevant
to say in the ethical treatises, but the outlines may be filled in from the
first chapter of the Metaphysics. In general, then, the per se goods may be
said to contribute to a single end through a variety of focal relationships
without being means to that end.
Although Aristotle left us to speculate about the focal relationship, he
does provide an example of the analogy of the goods: as sight is in the body,
so reason is in the soul. Sight is the good for the body, in that the body
generally (the instrumental parts) is to be explained with reference to it.
Though sight may also contribute to the welfare of the body, we enjoy sight
most of all for its own sake, since it is the purest (EN X.51175b36-1176a1).
The genera, body and soul, are obviously related as matter and form. Sight
and reason will be the goods of the two parts of the substance. Moreover,
we have here a continuous analogy (A:B::B:C), since sight is an activity
of the soul, and soul is for the sake of reason. This analogy is obViously
complete as it stands, and it is difficult to see how pleasure or honour can
be fit into the scheme. For this reason the analogy should only be taken
exempli gratia. A much more promising field for analogy is found among
the crafts. After all, tradesmen need only know the good of their own craft
(1097a3- 8), and the good of each activity and craft is different (a16-18).
But Aristotle also makes clear that the analogy is not sufficient in itself,
or at least that it must be framed by some further form of commonality.
For all the crafts derive their ends from the political craft, connected by
ends-means focality. Similarly among the per se goods, a simple analogy
without some framework would result in incommensurability of ends, and
would be no guide for a rational life. We might think back to exchange

value, which though it was analogically distributed among the various
trade goods, nevertheless was made somehow commensurable by being
treated in terms of need through money. If we want to avoid complete
incommensurability among the per se goods within the analogical scheme,
we could try to commensurate between them in some way, seeking so
much honour and expending so much intelligence for it, trading as it were
among the ends 50 as to achieve a certain balance in life. This is, of course,
not Aristotle's solution. Focal unity is the ultimate unity among the goods.
The mention of voils as a per se good and the fact that analogy is found
among terms associated with the categories has encouraged the assimilation
of this passage with the passage at 1096a23- 29, which also discusses the
ambiguity of the term good. In the context of refuting the Platonic idea

of the Good, Aristotle asserts that the good is not one thing, because it is
said in as many ways as Being. Essentially the same argument is found in
the EN and EE with only minor modifications:
[S]ince good is said in as many ways as being is said (for it is said40 both in the
category of substance, as God and reason, and in quality, e.g. the virtues, and in
quantity, e.g. that which is moderate, and in relation, e.g. the useful, and in time,
e.g. the right opportunity, and in place, e.g. the right locality and the like), dearly
the good cannot he something universally present in all cases and single; for then
it would not have been predicated in all the categories hut in only one. (EN 1.6
1096.23-29)
[T]he good has many senses, as numerous as those of being. For being, as we have
divided it in other works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity,
now time, and again some of it consists in being changed and in changing; and the
good is found in each of these modes, in substance as mind and God, in quality as
justice, in quantity as moderation, in time as opportunity, and concerning change
that which teaches and that which is being taught. As then being is not one in all
that we have just mentioned, so neither is good, nor is there one science regarding
Being or the Good. (modified ROT; EE 1.8 1217b25-34)
The key to the correct interpretation of these passages comes from Topics
1.15 107a3-17: terms, like AfVKOV, when they are applied to subjects, like
body and sound, have different significance, and indeed refer to predicates
in different categories 1 For a body to be AfVKOV is for that body to be
40 A slight alteration from the Oxford translation, which reads 'since things are said to
he good in as many ways as they are said to be {for things are called good both in
the category .. .' The Oxford translation inclines towards the correct interpretation, hut
without indication from the Greek.
41 lowe this interpretation to Ackrill 1978, who noticed the significance of the Topics
passage: 'Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the tenn, and see if
they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same, then clearly the term is
homonymous; e.g. good in the case of food is what is productive of pleasure, and in
the case of medicine what is productive of health, whereas as applied to the soul it
is to be of a certain quality, e.g. temperate or courageous or just; and likewise also,
as applied to a man. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, e.g. what
happens at the right time; for what happens at the right time is called good. Often
it signifies what is of a certain quantity, e.g. as applied to the proper amount; for the
proper amount too is called good. So then good is homonymous. In the same way also
hUlK"" as applied to a body, signifies a color, but in regard to a sound it denotes what
is easy to hear.' Notice that this tapas does not consider the possibility of ambiguity
between the good in the area of food and good in the area of medicine {a shock for a

somehow qualified; for a sound to be A.evKov is for that sound to cause
some effect. Since the Topics treats the cases of good and II.VKOV as parallel,
the term good, when predicated of various objects, will likewise fall into
different categories. For a man to be good is for that man to be virtuous,
to have virtue predicated of him (Le., to be somehow qualified). Similarly,

for the weather to be good is for it to be neither too hot nor too cold,
to be moderate (i.e., somehow quantified). For a delivery to be good is
for it to arrive before 5:00 pm, at the right time (i.e., sometime). This
interpretation fits the examples provided by both the EE and the EN
versions. For it is clear that the examples are essentially goods in their
category, but it is equally clear that the predicate, that which teaches, is
not the only good in the category of change. Virtue, moderation, and so on
are predicates that signify 'good' for various things, and these predicates
fall under different categories. Within some categories, doubtless, 'good'
has several significations, for others it has not only just one signification
but one object of which it is predicated. 42

In view of the proximity of the EN passage to the passage later in
the same chapter that proposes a logical organization among per se goods,
it has been suggested that good in our present passages is amenable to

being expressed as an analogical or a focal unity3 It is true that there is
no explicit mention of analogy in these passages, and, in fact, it would
probably be inappropriate in the context of Aristotle's critique of the
platonic doctrine of the unity of the good, but the claim that the good
is said in as many ways as Being encourages an analogical view along
the same lines as potentiality.44 However, analogy among the goods at a
categorial level, while possible, is not especially useful for Aristotle, and
for this reason he makes no mention of it.
The examples of the Topics passage do provide some superfiCial encouragement for an analogical arrangement of the good along categoriallines: as
food is good because it is productive, so man is good because he is qualified

(TO 7TOlo'V e1'vat). But a brief examination of these examples reveals that the
reader of the Gorgias), since the first is 1TOU7TlKOV of pleasure, the second 1I"OUITUCOV of
health. Since both goods are 1J'Otl1TIICOV, no ambiguity can be detected by this topos. The
ambiguity of the good is treated solely on a categorial level. For a different view see
Shields 1999, 202-4.

42 For the problem of god and mind, see Ackrill1978, 23, and more recently, Menn 1992.
43 So Owen 1960, 193n38, and to some extent Menn 1992, 550-1 and n. 11 . Broadie has
li nked the passages for the purposes of focality (1991, 28-9).
44 As Rist points out (1989, 276), we should not expect to see Aristotle saving the Platonist
position by introdUCing focality in the midst of an anti-Platonist polemic.
203 Mixed Uses of Analogy and Focality .

category of the subject and the category of the predicate do not have to be
the same. Only in the case of substance, where self-predication is the only
logical possibility, are the subject and predicate necessarily of the same
category: for god to be good is for god to be reason (ie., a substance).
Since the categories of the goods do not consistently correspond to the
categories of the subjects of the goods, it is clear that the Topics examples
cannot provide a model for the analogy of the good along categorial lines.
If we look, not at the predicate-subject relation, but instead at the relationship between the good predicated and the category in which it is predicated, we find a more promising candidate, virtue:quality::god:suhstance,
and so on. In this analogy, the goods are clearly not the goods for a
category, in the sense that Aristotle develops his analogies of the good
elsewhere. While in some sense substance is for the sake of god, clearly
quality is not for the sake of virtue. If these goods were the goods for
their categories, then all and only the members of the category would be
instrumentally good for the good of that category. Vice would then be
an instrumental good for virtue. Moreover, as we saw, the goods by no
means have to be in the same category as that of which they are goods, so
there is no reason to suppose that the good for a quality will be a virtue.
Again, if the good for a category falls into several categories, then there
can hardly be one good that is the good for that category. This seems
to happen in many cases: the good of an express delivery (a 7TO"'V) is a
7TOT<, but the good of a dry-cleaning (a 7TO"'V) is a 7To<on/< (it matters
that the spots are removed). Moreover, Aristotle maintains that goods
of sciences fan into many categories (medicine has a good in time and
quantity; EN 1.6 1096a31-34). He also consistently interprets the good
as something different from the essence of the thing for which it is the
good. Strategy is the art of fighting wars, but the good of strategy is
victory. Even the <pyov argument follows this pattern: Aristotle draws the
distinction between playing the cithara and playing it well, and ap<n7 is
added to the <pyov (1.7 1098a7-17).45 The good of each thing, then, is not
what the thing is, but some additional accident of it. The relation in our
proposed analogy cannot be 'is the good for'
Although these facts about the good prevent there from being a categorial analogy on the basis of the 'for the sake of' or the 'good of' relation,
the relation virtue:quality: :god:substance, and so on, is as legitimate as the
analogy same:substance::similar:quality. That is, virtue, moderation, and
45 So Gomez-Lobo 1989.
--
-~---------
-_.. -
-~

so on are the terms given in each category to the things that are aimed at
or chosen. This is not, however, a very interesting or revealing analogy,
because it is the 'for the sake of' relation that does the real explanatory
work. This may be one of the reasons why the good is not treated extensively in the Metaphysics (with the exception of god, whose essence is
to be good), and with that exception does not belong in a study of being
qua being: good is an accident and is best understood in the context of
action and in the analogical and focal arrangements that relate one good
to another rather than to Being. Their categorial status, which is the basis
of the science of Being qua Being, is largely irrelevant 4 '
In thi~ respect the good is significantly different from potentiality,
for which the categorial analogy is genuinely significant. For potentiality
discharges its function as potentiality in the category for which it is the
potentiality. Good does not. Potential substance does not exist in several
categories, but if in any category, in substance. 47 The categorial status of
non-substantial potentialities is arguably twofold. For non-substance the

substrate is always the same, substance (Z.3 1029a23-24). Of course, the
substrate is actually a substance, but it is potentially the non-substance it
may become (in a different sense of is, of course). So air is actually air,
but potentially transparent (so as to be light). However, since the privation
is in the same category as the form, and since the substrate is considered
only insofar as it is relevant to the form (Phys. 1.8 191b4-10), Aristotle

makes the matter essentially adapted to take on that form. Inasmuch as
the matter is potentially, say, transparent, it is potentially qualified and so
is in the category of quality.
If a categorial analogy of the good is an unpromising arrangement,
Aristotle extends even less of an invitation to interpret the categorial goods
focally, in spite of the attractive suggestion that god as substantial good can
be viewed as the focus 4s It is true that god is the ultimate final cause and
end (DA 11.4 41Sa23-b7), the goal towards which all things strive, and that
for the sake of which they do whatsoever their natures render possible.
At the end of EE (VII.IS 1249a21-b2S) god and the ruling principle in
us are likened to health and medicine respectively: it is with an eye to
46 Shields 1999, chap. 8, comes to a slmilar conclusion from a very different argument.
47 As 6.7 says, per SI! being is said in the categorial ways (1017a22-27; d. 2.3 1029a20-23),
so potentiality, since it is not a per se being, may be thought not to be in a category. But
A.4-5 presents matter as associated with categories, and matter is one sense of Ol/sin
(e.g., Z.10 1035a2; H .2 1043a19-21), and so would seem to be categorially detennined.
48 As Berti rightly points out (1971, 166), Aristotle's positive thesis about the organization
of the goods does not depend on the doctrine of the categories.

god that the ruling principle directs the part of us that takes commands.
And just as there is a focal relationship between health and medicine, it is
not unreasonable to posit a focal relationship between god and the ruling
principle: the ruling principle is called good, because it aims at attaining, to
the extent possible, the primary good (god). And since the ruling principle
defines virtue and virtue defines EvbaL!,ovia and the human good, in the
definition of the human good will ultimately be found, by one or more steps
of focal inclusion, the term god, or its definition, and since its definition is
to be the good substance, substance, too, will be included in the definition of

the human good. Mutatis mutandis, the same situation applies to the good
of all other things. We can and should accept this form of focal inclusion
as important for Aristotle's ethical theory, since he argues that god is a
determinative cause in the human good, and as such must be included in
the theory.
That inclusion, however, does not depend on substance and its relations
to the other categories of Being. The fact that good falls into all the
categories is not relevant to Aristotle's theory of the good, alid he only
alludes to it in these passages because he is criticizing the Platonic idea of
the Good. The dependence of the good does not follow the dependence of
Being. For virtue (as good quality) includes in its definition a substance, not
god, but man, or whatever substance of which it is the quality. And the
case is similar with all the other non-substantial categories. Moreover,
the proposed focality is peculiar in that the non-substantial goods are
dependent on god rather than on substance generally, as is the case with
the focality of categorial Being. Since there is no substantial good except
god, non-substantial goods must be directly dependent on god for their
goodness. This is clearly not the way that Aristotle chose to develop the
focal relations among the goods in his ethical theory. Aristotle made the
important and anti-Platonic discovery that, though it is a transcategorial,
good does not follow Being per se. As such the categorial organization
of good does not reveal the nature and function of the term, and in fact
disrupts the fundamental relation of means and ends. To pursue the good
through categorial Being and essence is to resign oneself to a second sailing
and to ignore the winds blOwing towards the o~
fVKa.
Analogy and focality, then, are not merely compatible means of providing necessary scientific relations among terms; rather, they bear a fixed
and determinate relation to one another. In the cases we have studied,
analogy is posterior to focality (or some similar logical arrangement such
as natural priority or subtraction/ addition). Potentiality is dominated by

the analogical structure, but is framed by focality. Because it is a relative term, its primary affiliation is to the genus in which it functions;

but if potentiality is to form a single subject, and if we are to pass in
understanding from one form of potentiality to another, there must be
some per se relations between them or their subject-genera. The good, by
contrast, is dominated by focaliry, and as a result of the prioriry of focality
over analogy, largely dispenses with analogy. The concept of good is best
adapted to the unification provided by focality.
7
Cumulation
Finally, we turn to a fusion of analogy and focality, an Aristotelian technique I shall distinguish by the term 'cumulation.' According to this technique objects from the same categoty form a series of priority and posteriority, each member of which potentially contains in its definition the
antecedent term. We have already seen similar techniques in the scala
naturae and the ends-means relationship among the goods. It is due to
this similarity that cumulation is sometimes supposed to be a focal relationship, but I hope to show that this is not accurate 1 In spite of the fact
that focality and 'cumulation share the definitional inclusion criterion and
manifest an order of priority and posteriority, they have very different
logical properties and involve different kinds of objects. Whereas focally
derivative objects have a single subject to which they are causally related,
each cumulative object is first and foremost a subject in its own right,
though it may also exhibit certain causal relations with other objects in
the series. It is not the purpose of cumulation to form one genus. In
contrast to focal objects, Aristotle takes pains to show why cumulative
objects cannot form a single genus. Although these objects are the same
basic type of thing at a certain level of generality, they show less coherence
with one another than do focally related objects.
The difference between cumulative objects and other serial objects, like
the scala naturae and the goods, is more subtle. The latter series might
be called series of perfection, because the first members are the perfect
instances, and the subsequent members are qualifications and diminutions
1 E.g., Owen 1960, 187, who notes that there are differences between foeality and
cumulation without discussing them. Shields 1999 most recently conlates them as
'core-dependent homonymies.'

of the first. In such series the focal aspect predominates, and as a result
the genus is strong. Means are good, for example, because of their rela-
tionship to the end, and they are intelligible as goods only in virtue of
that relationship. By contrast, in cumulative series, where the members
are not primarily viewed in causal relationship with each other, the genus
is weaker: the sensitive soul is a soul in its own right and not because it
requires the nutritive souL Because perfective series are best understood
as a variation on focality, my main attention will be on cumulative series.
Two cases are of especial interest to us, souls and friendships. Aristotle's
treatment of souls is a paradigm case of cumulation and allows us to
determine the pattern. The discussion of friendship provides variations
on the theme and allows us to compare a focal arrangement (in the EE)
with a hybrid account that contains elements of cumulation and elements
of similarity (in the EN). We shall, however, return at the end to a series,
which Aristotle seems to understand as perfective, but which may be more
amenable to a cumulative interpretation, the series that locates theology
in the science of Being qua Being.
Souls
In turning to Aristotle's treatment of the soul in the de Anima we are
completing the task of chapter 3 by considering the affiliations among the
functions of animals at the most abstract level (KaT' aKpif3ELav 402a2).
For this treatise deals with the highest functions of animals, nutrition,
sensation, locomotion, and intellect, and these constitute the final causes
of all of the instrumental parts. These highest functions are, however, not
independent of one another. In an intricate analysis Aristotle considers in
turn whether they are universally (KaB' fV), or analogically, or cumula-
tively related.
Aristotle's analysis in DA 11.1-3 of the kinds of souls and their relationships to one another is framed as an answer to three problems that he
has introduced in 1.1. As he solves these problems he calls upon the universal (<aB' EV), analogical, and cumulative explanation. The first problem
concerns whether there are different parts or species of soul (1.1 402bl-8).
Aristotle asks whether we should look for a single generic definition of
the soul or whether we should rest content with several specific ones.
There follows a second closely related problem: if the soul does have parts,
should we study it as a whole or should we study these parts, their per
se accidents, their functions and objects, and, if we should, to what extent
(402b9-403a2)? Finally, are all the parts of the soul enmattered vvAa) or
are some separable from matter, and for those that are inseparable should
209 Cumulation
we define them in terms of their final cause or in terms of their material
conditions (403a3-b19)?
Each of these problems presents a contrast between abstract and concrete approaches to the subject. While we must look for the most general
legitimate explanation, if we focus too narrowly on abstractions, we run
a risk of committing one of three related errors corresponding to each of
these three problems: defining a genus where there is none, providing a
definition that explains nothing about how living things live, and asserting
that the entire soul is separable from the body.
Aristotle devotes DA II.1-3 to solving these three problems in a preliminary way. As he solves each problem, he moves in turn towards a
fuller account of soul. Since voil, does not easily fit into the organizational
format he is constructing, he leaves it conspicuously on the side. 2 He takes
the problems in reverse order, declaring that the faculties of the soul are for
the most part not separable from the body. The reason he gives constitutes
the first' definition' of the soul: the soul is the first actuality of a natural
organic body potentially having life (Il.1 412b4-9). Since the soul is the
actuality of a body, it is as inseparable from the body as the impression of
a signet ring is from the wax that bears it.
Without completely solving this problem (Il.1 413a8-9), he moves on
to the second aporia, which is the subject of the second chapter and half
of the third (to 414b19). The quick answer is that we simply cannot study
the whole soul, since soul is said in many ways. We must distinguish
the faculties, since each is a sufficient condition for calling a thing living
(413a22-23). Later at II.3 414b6-14 (and again at II.4 415al4-23) Aristotle
impliCitly accepts the need to consider the objects of the senses as well as
the individual faculties, and so answers both parts of the second problem.
Again he promises further investigation (414b14).
In the last half of II.3 he takes up the first problem, and concludes
that we must consider the individual kinds of souls, since there is no
single kind (414b32- 33). The tendency in all three solutions is to drive the
investigation away from the general account towards the particular, and
away from the separate soul towards the composite. The three solutions are
set in a discussion that moves from the most common and familiar account
of the soul to the most sophisticated and explanatory. Each of the three
successive accounts of the soul explains and grounds the preceding account,
and is contained in the next. They are respectively universal, analogical,
and cumulative. Let us consider them in more detail.
2 IU 413,8-9; IL2 413,31-32; 413b24--27; II.3 414b16-19; 415,11-12. Cf. Me'. E.1
1025b34--1026,6.

1. The Analogical Account
The first, universaL account presents the soul as the first actuality of a
natural organic body potentially having life (11.1 412b4-5). Before introducing his second account of the soul at 11.2, Aristotle says that this first
account is more evident to us (tK cpaVPWTEpWV) rather than more familiar
in account (KllTa TOV AOyov yvwP'/,-WTpov), and that it plays the role of
the conclusion of a demonstration rather than the middle, as a definition
should (413a11-20). The first definition is too general to deduce all the per
se accidents of the soul from it. Though it tells us something about souls, it
does not tell us what soul is, since soul is not a Single general thing. In the
Topics (V1.10 148a25-26) Aristotle had already cast this problem in terms
of homonymy: ' [IJf the definition applies in a like manner to the whole
range of the homonym, it does not define any of the objects described by
the term. ,3 Life is homonymous, he goes on to say, and there is no single
definition that holds good for both animals and plants. Dionysius' account
of life, which Aristotle quotes in the Topics passage as 'movement of a
creature sustained by nutriment, congenitally present in it,' is common to
plants and animals, but is not the definition of either because (W'I names
particular kinds of life, not an abstracted and general concept of life 4 In
3 There is no mention here of ordered series, or what kind of homonyms we are dealing
with, and Aristotle does not suggest that some kind of homonyms can be gathered
together under one definition. Owen (1960, 187) notes the Topics position as a stage
along the path to the final position in the DA. Comparing the use of 'focal meaning'
in metaphysics and psychology, he remarks, '[Alt the same time there are large
differences in the two uses of focal meaninSt and we are not concerned with the
psychology.' A more thorough study of the DA forrilUlation could well have altered
some of his conclusions, especially his depreciation of the role of analogy (192-3): he
denies that analogy engages in studying 'a particular connexion between the definitions
of a polychrestic word ... [I]t is merely to arrange certain tenns in a (supposedly)
self-evident scheme of proportion.'
4 We find a similar test for homonymy in APo II .13 (97b7-15):
We should look at what are similar and undifferentiated, and seek, first, what they all
have that is the same; next, we should do this again for other things which are of the
same genus as the first set and of the same species as one another but of a different
species from those. And when we have grasped what all these have that is the same,
and similarly fo r the others, then we muSt again inquire if what we have grasped have
anything that is the same - until we come to a single account; for this will be the
definition of the obje<:t. And if we come not to one but to twO or more accounts, it is
dear that what we are seeking is not a single thing but several.
Aristotle cites as an example high-mindedness (p.eyall.0o/uxia.) and advises us' to look
at individual cases - Achilles, Ajax, Socrates. There is nOt just one thing in virtue
211 Cumulation
the DA Aristotle elaborates this argument by introducing the language of
demonstration as a way of explaining the homonymy of the objects. At
II.2 he sets aside the common 'definition,' and turns to the species of soul.
We can deduce from the definitions of the species both their specific per se
accidents and the general account, which is posterior (414a17-28). This is
not to say that Aristotle considers the conclusion of the first chapter false,
but its status is down-graded from that of a first principle to a theorem
of psychology. He can prove the first' definition' by means of the second
using the same scheme as we used for longevity;
first actuality of a certain body IPQ that in virtue of which things live
(414a12-19)
that in virtue of which things live IPO nutrition, sensation, intellect
(413a22-25; bl-2)
nutrition, sensation, intellect IPQ soul (413bl1-13)
first actuality of a certain body IPQ soul (414a27-28)
From the conclusion we can further deduce that the soul is not separable
from the body, since inseparability from the body is predicated of the first
actuality of a certain body. Since soul is homonymous in the sense that
many values can be substituted for it, the conclusion must be proved for
each of the homonyms S Although Aristotle's argument is not so neatly
laid out as this, it is clear that he reaches this conclusion at the end
of 11.2.
When Aristotle claims that living (TO 07v) is homonymous (413a22),
he is not denying that plant and animal life have something in common.
What he denies is that the definition in accordance with the name is the
same in each case. When we answer the question 'What is it for this plant
to be alive?', we say that it absorbs nutriment and grows. When we answer
of which they are called high-minded, but two, unwillingness to brook insult and
indifference to misfortune. If there is some attribute common to both, say self-respect,
it is secondary and explained by the two kinds of states of the soul. The fact that
unwillingness to brook insult is manifested in different actions, withdrawing from the
fight (Achilles), committing suicide (Ajax), and making war (Alcibiades), does not mean
the 'unwillingness to brook insult' itself is homonymous. These actions are not kinds
of high-mindedness, but rather the results of high-mindedness. Unwillingness to brook
insult is not part of the concept of committing suicide, even though it may be a result
of it in particular cases. Such cases are contrasted with animal, which, at least in the
Categories, is predicated of man and ox in virtue of the same account of substance.
S Bolton (1978) has proposed that the definitions of the soul in Il.1 (he counts four) are
indeed proved by the definition of Il.2, but they are proved generically.

the question for animals, we say 'It moves and has sense perception.' If we
give the most general account that will cover all the cases, it will make no
mention of any faculties in virtue of which we sayan animal is alive. Since
we say something is alive in virtue of its thinkin~ perception, nutrition,
growth, and so on, we say that so long as there is one of these faculties
present, a thing is alive (413a22-25). There is not a single set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for life; there are many sufficient conditions or
causes. For a plant to be alive, it must have nutrition. For an animal to
be alive, it must have sensation, and what it is for animal to be and to be
alive are the same thing. But as we saw in APo Jl.l7, there cannot be two
different causes of things that are the same in species; so where there are
two causes, the things caused must be different, and so the actuality of the
body potentially having life in it will be different in each case.
There are several other reasons why Aristotle should adopt the analogical strategy in the case of the souls. As a result of the analogy, inseparability cannot be proved universally for all the kinds of souls, but only
specifically for each kind. This fact is of advantage when Aristotle comes to
deal with voi), 6 For the fact that there is no general proof for inseparabiliry
makes it easier to accept the possibility that there may be an instance of
soul that is not the actuality of some body. If we admit a case of separabiliry
.- and Aristotle must prepare for it, even if he does not immediately deal
with it - the universal/definition' of soul is incorrect. If vovs is a faculty of
soul and is separable, it cannot fall under the common definition provided,
and must be related to soul, or be soul, in some other way. The analogical
account of soul provides a solution both to the separation problem and the
second, parts / whole problem.
Moreover, the fact that the general account is couched in terms of
actuality and potentiality without a specification of a particular actuality
and potentiality should remind us of the warnings Aristotle issues regarding the analogy of principles in Metaphysics A. Moreover, as we have
seen, definitions as well as terms can be ambiguous (e.g., the definition
of 'quick' in Phys. VII.4), and the general account of soul contains an
ambiguous term, 'life.' Thus, the actualities and potentialities mentioned
6 Bolton 1978 deals more extensively with this feature. I think he is generally right in
saying that there is no fundamental contradiction between the hylomorphic view of the
soul in the VA and the unembodied soul of the unmoved mover. Aristotle is almost
completely consistent in his resolve to deal with soul only among 8v'T/TCt. I disagree with
Bolton, however, that there is a generic definition of soul. Like Hicks, he assimilates the
serial problem to the nonnal dependency of the genus on the species. More recently,
G. Matthews (1992, 190-1) has also tried to discover a generic definition of life.
213 Cumulation
are of different sorts of things, and this is sufficient to eliminate the general
account as a universal definition.
Finally, the analogical strategy also suits the basic Greek conceptions
of the soul. It is among humans primarily and, through theories of transmigration of sout among other animals too, that the traditional Greek
notion of tvx~ is most at home? For Greeks it is an extension of the
term to apply it to plants. Aristotle complains that previous thinkers had
confined their discussions to human soul (1.1 402b3-5), but in fact they
were doing nothing more than following common conceptions. But the
common conceptions are also the source of the homonymy. Since "'VX~ is
a term that applies first and best to humans and to what human beings are,
Aristotle and the Greeks in general find it more natural than we do to say
that man lives by virtue of his intellectual soul. It would be for Aristotle
an abuse of the term to say that human "'vX~ is a "'VX~ in virtue of its
vegetative functions. Moreover, the higher faculties are in some way the
purpose of the lower faculties, and thus are the most important part of the
definition of higher living things. When Aristotle extends "'vX~ to other

animals and plants, they must be alive in virtue of some other faculty than
intellect. For all these reasons, the analogical strategy seems more suitable
than the universal.
But the analogical account does not do full justice to the phenomena.
Whereas among the biological analogues there was some common essential
feature to which all the analogues were related, but that was not their
genus, Aristotle has not yet provided any common feature among the
souls, which would serve as the framework for drawing analogies.' It is
clear that it cannot be a common function, since the souls are themselves
functions and are fundamentally different from one another. What, then,
prevents the homonymy among the souls from being chance homonymy
or the analogy between them from being pure metaphor? Aristotle has two
answers. First, from the definition of each subject separately we can deduce
at least one shared property that only those subjects have. But that shared
property, to be an actuality of a natural organic body, is defined in terms
of the matter rather than the form, and so hardly provides an adequate
connection among the souls themselves. The second and more compelling
answer is that the souls are related among themselves by a variety of per se
7 For some of the limited evidence on animal and especially plant souls, see Bremmer
1983, 125f.
8 Hamlyn (1968, 94), who rightly subscribes to the 'empty' theory of the general
definition, suggests that the general definition will be uninformative because it will
leave out the crucial fact that the species are serially ordered.

relations, which have the effect of gathering together the several subjects
of study. The souls fonn a group because of their serial order and their
definitional inclusion relations. This does not make them a Ka8' EV genus,
but it does legitimate their being treated under the same study.
2. The Cumulative Account
The second half of DA 11.3 answers the first aporia, concluding that there
is no genus soul, and explaining how instead the souls are related to one
another. Here Aristotle considers the serial nature of the faculties and its
implications: the faculties of the soul are cumulatively organized. While it

is true that any faculty of the soul is a sufficient condition for life, in fact,
only the vegetative soul can be found apart from the other faculties. This
fact complicates but does not nullify the analogical relationship between
the faculties. It shows that the causes, which have been so far treated only
as analogical, are related in some more intimate way. Aristotle explains
the implications of the serial order of the soul faculties in a difficult and
controversial passage:
It is now evident that a single definition might be given of soul in the same sense
as one might be given of figure. For, as in that case there is no figure apart from
triangle and those that follow in order, so here there is no soul apart from the
forms of soul just enumerated. There might be a common definition given for
the figures which will fit them all, but it will not be the peculiar definition of
any figure. So here in the case of the aforementioned souls. Hence it is absurd in
this and similar cases to look for a common definition which will not express the
peculiar nature of anything that is and will not apply to the appropriate indivisible
species, while at the same time omitting to look for an account which will. The
cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for in both the case of figures and
living beings the predecessor is potentially contained in each successive term, e.g.
the triangle in the square, the nutritive in the sensory power. Hence we must ask
in each case, What is its soul, i.e. What is the soul of plant, man, beast? (modified
ROT; 11.3 414b19- 33)
The two basic features of cumulation are clear from this passage. First,
souls and figures form series by adding some factor to a prior member
in order to form a posterior member. Second, the addition does not alter
the category or basic type of the object, that is, the addition of a triangle
to a triangle creates another figure, and the addition of sensitive faculties
to nutritive faculties creates another kind of soul. This is in contrast to
focality, where the addition of 'operation of' to 'doctor' creates an object
215 Cumulation
of a different category from that of the focus term, 'doctor.' Yet in spite of
the explicit comparison between figures and souls, there are several ways
in which the likeness is inept. Since this passage is the locus classicus for
cumulation, it is important to examine in detail how the example of figures
is inappropriate for Aristotle's purpose. I shall subsequently argue that a

different example concerning types of citizenship found in the Politics is
more apposite.
There are some important differences between figures and souls.
Whereas the figures form a potentially infinite series, the souls form a
finite series; and whereas the figures are generated by the same addition
at each step, the generation of the souls requires a different addition. 9 For
thi s reason sensitive and intellectual soul cannot be ana lysed into vegetative
soul, as if three digestive systems connected together could make a mind.
Furthermore, if this passage is taken as a denial of a genus of figure,

then Aristotle is not entirely consistent with himself. For at Met. 6.28
(1024a36-b3) he says that plane is the genus of plane figures and that
each figure is a plane of such and such a kind ("i"dlov TOLOVOi) .
There are also difficulties in understanding the nature of the series
itself. Though Aristotle says that the predecessor in the series is potentially
contained in each successive term (aEt yap EV T'i' Ecpefr,!> irmipXL l>vvaf-LL TO
"ponpov), he does not explain what he means by potential containment.
In view of the fact that he is looking for a definition, it is reasonable to
suppose that the containment is logical, if nothing else besides. However,
it is clear from the term l>vVaf-LEL that this containmen t is not explicit
definitional containment. This is also clear from the examples: th e square
is not defined in terms of triangle, though it necessarily contains two
triangles in it; the sensory power is not defined by nutrition, though it
presupposes nutrition. Natural priority also seems to be at issue, at leas t in
these examples. The prior member can exist independently of the posterior,
but the posterior cannot exist without the prior (415al - 11). In the context
of psychological faculties this natural priority can also be described as
hypothetical necessity: if an animal is to have sensation, it must have the
nutritive faculty to sustain it (d. PA I.l 640a34-35). Nutrition, therefore,
is not present in the essence of sensation, but is necess itated by it. In the
geometri cal context, the triangle is naturally prior, since if there were no
triangle, quadrilateral could not exist.

Most important for our purposes is determining the role of th e general
accou nt of the series, for Aristotle says, ' [T]here might be a common
9 Cf. Met. 1.2 l054a3-4, where the triangle is the uni t measure of rectilinear figures.
---
------ -

definition given for the figures which will fit them all, but it will not
be the peculiar definition of any figure.' Concerning this difficulty there
are two interpretations. First, by drawing on parallel passages at EE 1.8
1218al-9, EN 1.6 1096a17-23, and Met. B.3 999a6-14,'0 one can argue
that it is impossible for objects arranged in a series to form a genus.
Aristotle provides a dialectical and ultimately unsatisfying argument for
this position. Although these passages use series of mathematical objects,
including figures, and so support the contention that Aristotle intended
to deny a genus of soul in our passage, they are all polemic arguments
against the Platonists, and rely on premisses granted by them to refute
their own position. For this reason the denial of a genus over a series need
never have been an Aristotelian doctrine. This interpretation, however,
has become orthodoxy, and whether or not it has been viewed as a valid
argument, most scholars agree that Aristotle intended to apply it to his
series of souls. It will be necessary, in consequence, to spend some time in
its refutation and to argue that although it is valid for a Platonic context
and a Platonic understanding of genus, Aristotle could not have used the
argument in his own voice. The second interpretation of the difficulty
begins by comparing a different form of the series argument found at
Pol. III.1 1275a34-b5 concerning forms of citizenship, and argues that
Aristotle did not intend to reject a genus of souls on purely logical, but
rather on pragmatic, grounds. That is, when objects are arranged in a
series, their genus contains so little of causal significance as to be negligible. This second interpretation seems to be better adapted to the DA
passage, and relies on peculiarly Aristotelian doctrines of demonstration
and explanation.
The first, dialectical interpretation receives its clearest expression in the
context of the refutation of the platonic idea of the Good in EE 1.8:
[I]n things having an earlier and a later, there is no common element beyond, and,
further, separable (xwPW"Tov) from, them, for then there would be something prior
to the first; for the common and separable element would be prior, because with its
destruction the first would be destroyed as well; e.g. if the double is the first of the
multiples, then the universal multiple cannot be separable, for it would be prior to
the double ll ... if the common element turns out to be the Idea, as it would be if
one made the common element separable.
10 The Metaphysics argument intends to do away with separate genera altogether,

showing that they are secondary in every case, and not just among series of prior and
posterior.
11 There seems to be a lacuna here in the text. See Woods 1992, 72.
217 Cumulation
EN 1.6 1096a17-23 assures us that this argument had a Platonic origin, and
was used to deny Forms over Form numbers and over any other series in
which there was prior and posterior. Aristotle turns the argument against
the Platonists by showing that trans-categorials like the good, among which
substance is prior, cannot have a genus.
Even in its Platonic contex~ the motivation for the argument is not
undisputed. There are those who hold, contrary to Aristotle's express statement, that the argument is directed specifically and solely against Forms
of Form number. Their position can be outlined as follows. Plato identified
three kinds of numbers, sensible, mathematical, and Form numbers. The
mathematical numbers (we can ignore sensible numbers) are combinable
with one another and subject to all manner of ordinary mathematical
operations . They are eternal and without matter, but there is a multitude
of each kind so that, for example, two can be combined with another two
so as to make four. Of Form number, by contrast, there is only one of
each kind, Oneness, Twoness, and so on. These numbers, being Forms,
cannot change or undergo operations. They cannot be divided so .as to
become other numbers, for in that case they would admit of becoming and
not-being. Unlike mathematical numbers, Form numbers exhibit an order
of priority and posteriority, since their unchanging Oneness, Twoness, etc.
make them well suited to staying in their appointed order.
Cook Wilson, the champion of this view, asserted that there is no
Form of Form numbers because Form numbers are aa1;M{3A:TlTO~, incomparable with one another, and therefore uncombinable; and because the
numbers are incombinable, they form series of prior and posterior over
which there is no Form or genus. This uncombinability stems from their
being Forms, since no Forms can be combined with one another. 'They
are entirely outside one another, in the sense that none is part of another.
Thus they form a series of different terms, which have a definite order.'l2
This interpretation does go some way towards explaining why they are
uncombinable: if the Two and the Three were combinable so as to make
up the Five, then the Three will be part of the Five. But it does not explain
why their uncombinability entails their forming a series of priority and
posteriority. After all, in order to be related as prior and posterior, Form
numbers must be related to one another, even if they are not part of
one another. Making them uncombinable and incomparable is precisely to
take away the grounds upon which they may be compared as prior and
posterior. The Two cannot be prior to the Three in generation, since Form
12 Cook Wilson 1904, 253; d. Cherniss 1944, 513- 14.
numbers are not generated; nor can it be prior ontologically, since one
Form does not depend on another for its existence; nor logically, since in
the realm of the Forms logical priority is identical to ontological priority.
What makes the Two prior to the Three, if not the fact that the Three is
One more than the Two? Form numbers must either be combinable or they
cannot form a series. Contrary to Cook Wilson, then, the uncombinability
of the Form numbers, far from providing a sound reason for priority and
posteriority, destroys any possibility of there being a series among thernY
Not only is the Form number interpretation of the argument suspect
on its own grounds, but Aristotle also states that Platonists considered the
argument valid in all series of prior and poste rior, and not just among Form
numbers.14 Michael Woods, while adduCing reasons why such an argument
could not be held by Platonists at all, suggests a different approach to the
Platonic argument, one that neither relies on the uncombinability of Form
numbers to ensure their serial order, nor restricts the series argument
solely to Form number. In the main issue he is correct. Woods's interpretation relies on seriality to show that there can be no genus, and as
such has the virtue of being consistent with Aristotle's claims about the
argument. He points out that the Form of the Form numbers will be prior
to the Form numbers, and because of the self-predication of the Forms, the
Form of Form numbers will also share in the essential features of Form
numbers. But he argues that the Form of Form number will be prior in a
different sense from that in which the first member is prior to the second:
'[TJhere seems no good reason why a holder of the theory of Forms should
retain the premiss that the number two is, without qualification, the first
number. It may be the first number in the number series, but there seems
13 For variations on the Cook Wilson thesis, see Burnyeat 1987, who claims that
incomparability is the Aristotelian incomparability of the constituent units of each
Form number.
14 Cherniss charged that Aristotle misunderstood Plato's argument in a way that affects
his own prior-posterior arguments. He argued that the Platonist argument was intended
only for application among Form numbers, that the priority and posteriority here
is numerical order and not ontological priority and posteriority (1944, 522); that
Aristotle's criticisms, which imply that the Platonists did not distinguish between the
twO senses of priority (first in the sense of ideal and first in the sense of first term of a
series), is belied by the fact that the Platonic 'first one' and 'first twO' etc. (mentioned
Met . 1081b8-10) did not imply a series of ones and twos, etc. (520). Cherniss contends
that when Aristotle extends the prior-posterior argument beyond mathematicals by
generalizing the argument and making it hold good in every case of ontological priority
(to which, citing Met. 1019a11- 12, Cherniss claims Aristotle reduced all other forms of
priority), the argument that had been inappropriate against the Platonists suffices for
his purposes to show that there cannot be a genus of things arranged in a series.
219 Cumulation
no reason why a holder of the theory of Forms should continue to hold
that it is the first number in every sense, if he holds that each Form is prior
to its particulars and is itself a possessor of the character it represents. The
Form of number will itself be a number, and in an appropriate sense prior

to any member of the number series. /1S Contrary to Woods's assertion,
however, there is no reason to suppose that the Platonists did not accept
the full implications of their own argument, and admit that the Form of
Form number will become the first member in the number series. For the
power of self-predication entails the Form's inclusion in the series, and
therefore makes the Platonic argument valid for (Aristotle's interpretation

of) Platonic metaphysics: since it is an essential characteristic of the Form
numbers to be members of the series of Form numbers, the Form of Form
number must also share this characteristic, that is, it must be in the series
of Form numbers, and since it is also prior to all Form numbers, it will
be prior to the first in the series. If we emend Woods's interpretation in
this way, the argument does what Aristotle says it is meant to do. For
he says that the Platonists denied Forms over series of prior and posterior
things generally, and not only over Form numbers. This argument holds
good in all cases where members of series are essentially serial, and for
the Platonists that will occur wherever Forms are serially ordered. It also
shows how being a series prevents there being a genus of it, and does not
rely on the obscure argument from uncombinability.
Problems arise, however, when we suppose that Aristotle accepts the
argument as his own and applies it to the soul series. To create an Aris~
totelian metaphysical framework for the argument we need only change
the meaning of XWPLrrTOV from 'separable' to 'logically or conceptually
distinct.'16 The denial of the genus is established by two sub-arguments.
First, it is a fact about series that the first element is a member of the series,
a subject alongside all the others, for all that it may also be the principle
of the series. If it were to serve as the genus of the series, the members
of the series, including the first member, would become its species. The
identical thing, the first member, would have to be both a species and its
own genus; and this is impossible, since a species is distinct from its genus.
This argument is sufficient to eliminate the first member of the series as a
candidate for genus. Second, it is necessary to argue that there is nothing
15 Woods 1992, 71.

16 Bonitz's Index (1961, 86Oal1-21) identifies a use of XWpKHV meaning 'ratione et notione
distinguere: used principally for the function that the differentia discharges: Tau WlOV
T17~ oixrias .occlOTO'U '\o)'ou Ta,~ 7fpl E.ocaOTou oua:ia,~ lllacpopatr XWpi(HU dWOalJ.(U (Top. 1.18
l08b6). According to this use XWptOTOU means 'distinct.'

common to and distinct from all members of the series including the first.
Such a thing would be an element in the logos of all the members of the
series. Aristotle's argument at a very dialectical level might be that such
an element would be prior to the first member (TOi) 7rPWTOV 7rpOTEpOV), and
nothing can be prior to the first. This argument is based on the implausible
assumption, as Woods points out, that priority is univocal and that the first
member of the series cannot be preceded in some other way; for we can
grant that a genus will be prior without admitting that it must be the first
member of the series.
For this reason, Aristotle might make the stronger claim that the
prospective genus must become the first member in the series displacing the
previously first member. He describes this prospective genus as common,
distinct, and naturally prior. But the prior members of the series are also
described as common, distinct, and naturally prior to the posterior members
(d. t..ll1019a3ff.). By describing the genus in such a way that it has all
the same logical characteristics as a prior member, Aristotle might argue
that the genus will become the new first member of the series. And if
this occurs, then the genus is identical with one of the species, and this is
impossible.
Such an interpretation provides a fine description for a Platonic genus,
but does some violence to Aristotle's notion of genus and consequently
faces serious difficulties in explaining why this argument would apply to
the souls 17 The Platonic genus is naturally prior to the first member of the
series, is common and separable, and this will make it into the new first
member of a Platonic series. 18 But this does not fit Aristotelian doctrine. For
if the common element were an Aristotelian genus, the difference between
it and the original first member would have to be the specific differentia of
the original first member, and since we are supposing that all.the members
of our new series have the same logical relationship to one another, the
genus-species relationship, which holds between the new first member and
the original first member, will hold between all the subsequent members
of the series. The result will be that the series is merely an extended
genus-species string. 19 Since the series will form a string, each successive
species will be differentiated by the differentia of the preceding differentia,
in the manner of Met. 2.12's footed, cloven-footed model. But Aristotle's
argument never explicitly assumed that series create genus-species strings,
and a consideration of the applications of the argument amply shows that
17 Chemiss 1944, 513ff.
18 For these characteristics of a Platonic genus, see Met . B.3 999a16-23 .
19 This position is defended by A.c. Lloyd (1962) .
221 Cumulation
the assumption is absurd: a quadrilateral is not a species of triangle nor a
sensitive soul a species of nutritive SQu1. 20 Posterior members are not 7TOta
of prior members . On logical grounds also it is impossible: there cannot be
only one species of a genus, but this is what this argument entails. 21 The
EE argument against the genus of series, then, seems to be better adapted
to Platonic than to Aristotelian logic and metaphysics.
So far, then, the dialectical interpretation of the DA passage provides
only unAristotelian reasons for denying a genus over a series. There is,
however, an alternative interpretation. There are two contexts in which
Aristotle uses the prior / posterior argument in his own voice, our DA
passage and in the Politics, and in neither passage do we find the dialectical
formulation for the rejection of genera of ordered series. Instead, other,
pragmatic reasons are offered. At Pol. III.1 1275a34-b2 Aristotle discusses
the definition of the citizen:
But we must not forget that things of which the underlying things (imoIH:i,uwa)
differ in kind (njJ Ei'OH), one of them being first, another second, another third,
have, when regarded in this relation (Y TOtaVra), nothing, or hardly anything,
worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and
that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty
or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (modified ROT)
The passage itself seems clear as far as it goes. Unlike the previously
considered passages, Aristotle does not deny that there may be some commonality among the citizenships, only that this commonality is negligible .
This is quite a different objection from arguing on dialectical grounds that
per impossibile the genus will become the first member of the series. The
passage suggests that, when the objects are arranged in a series TOLaiha) ,
the first member is contained in all the others, and therefore by treating
it, one not only treats something that is explanatory, but also everything
that is common to the series. Accordingly, he leaves open the possibility
that there may be some arrangement other than a series in which there is
significant generic commonality.
This is borne out in Aristotle's discussion of the citizen. The definition
of the first citizen is provided immediately prior to this passage, a definition
that he says is most adapted to all those who are called citizens (}.ta)u(1T'
Ecpapp.oCTa~ OPLCTP.O~ E7T1. 7T(iUTa~ TOV~ AyOP.UOV~ 7TOAtTar; 1275a33- 34):
en
au
20 Cf. Me t. A.9 992a18- 19 for a similar series; ' [TJhe broad is not a genus which includes
the deep, for then the solid would have been a species of plane.'
21 So Top . 1.5 102a31 b3 .

the citizen is one who shares in the indefinite offices (deliberation and
judicial administration) of the state (1275a30-33). For the real power of
the state resides in these offices, which have no fixed tenure. As it turns
out, however, some bona fide citizens do not
fit this definition. For he
says (1275b5-6) that the definition is best adapted to the citizen of the
democracy, which is only one of the perfect constitutions (aristocracy and
kingship being the others). In Sparta and Carthage, by contrast, it is only

the holders of the definite offices who are admitted to deliberative and
judicial offices, and therefore they are not indefinite officers. That is, they
hold executive offices for determinate lengths of time, and they judge and
deliberate ex officio. Aristotle is unwilling to emend the definition so as
to make any office-holder a citizen, because he thinks that the citizen
is the one who has the power in the state, and the power is exercised
through deliberative and judicial function, and not, say, through being an
overseer (a Spartan ephor). For this reason, Aristotle treats the Spartan
citizen as a perversion of the perfect citizen. Accordingly, he provides a
second definition, 'whoever has the power (itovCTia) to have a share in

deliberation and judicial administration' (1275b18-19)." This definition
potentially contains perfect citizenship insofar as it covers perfect citizenship, but it does not define it in the strict sense that the first definition
does. The difference between the two definitions seems to consist in this:
the democratic citizen, who holds the indefinite offices, is a citizen most
of all, since he has a penn anent hold on these offices and exercises them
throughout his life. The Spartan citizen, who holds definite offices, has
limited opportunity to be a citizen; and limited in two ways: limited in time
because of the definite tenure of the office, and limited in extent, since the
deliberative and judicial job is split up among the various definite offices.
The second definition is more generaL in the sense that it will include the
democratic as well as the oligarchic citizen, but it is also defective because
in the addition of the itovCTia clause is contained the notion that the ex
officio potential for citizenship activity is sufficient to qualify as a citizen.
In those respects in which the second kind of citizen is similar to the
first, it is similar because it is related to the first, that is, it is a perversion
of the first. The first member, then, will appear in explanations concerning
the second, but not vice versa. In the investigation of the citizen we should
22 Irwin 1990, 82, has sensibly argued that the first definition is not annulled by the
second, but that they are serially ordered. He provides a different reason for the order:
the first definition is first because it accounts for the fact thaI in order for the citizen
to be good, he must rule as well as be ruled, and this is not ensured by the Spartan or
Ca rthaginian constitution.
223 Cumulation
expect the majority of the attention to be paid to the judicial and legislative
functions of indefinite tenure and only secondarily to the definite executive
functions. It is clear that citizenship can be studied in its most common
form, but to treat it as a set of differences within a genus would ignore the
fact that the second form is a perversion of the first. The genus arrangement
would neither capture citizenship in its fullest sense, nor would it call upon
the explanatory principles central to understanding the deficient citizenship
as deficient.
Now, the series of citizenships is in some important respects different
from the series of souls. It is a perfective series: the definition of the first
form of citizenship is logically prior and is somehow contained in the definition of the second on the basis of the 'better and worse' relationship (ef.
Met. B.3 999a13-14). Moreover, the citizenships are not arranged by ontological addition, nor by natural priority; rather Spartan and Carthaginian
citizens are included as citizens on the basis of a qualification to the first
form of citizenship. In spite of these differences, the common account of
the souls is vacuous for the same reasons. Though the second account of
citizenship will cover all cases, we should first explain democratic citizen-
ship and its legislative and judicial functions, since that is where the real
citizenship power resides, then turn to the executive functions of Spartan
citizenship and their relationship to the authoritative functions. Similarly,
Aristotle does not deny that there is a general account of the soul, he only
says that it is absurd to overlook an account that will treat the peculiar
nature of the serial objects. Though 'the actuality of the potentially living
body' is common to all the souls, it only explains inseparability of the soul
and body. What are most important for explanations are the particular
faculties of the soul and their per se relations among one another.
If the members of the series do not form a strong generic unity, what
makes them a Single group, that is, what are the principles of extending
and limiting the series? First, each requires a non-nindom addition to the
member before it. The prior member is the precondition for the posterior
member. DA III.12 provides a more detailed account of the faculties in the
series: nutritive soul is first, because it is necessary for all living embodied
things. As such, it can be treated as an independent and per se subject. Taste
is a sort of touch and is relative to nutriment, which is tangible body. For
this reason, taste and touch presuppose nutrition (which is now relative
to them) and are next in the series, first among the senses. Imagination
does not occur without sensation, nor thought without imagination. In
this way a prior faculty can be treated both per se and as related to
a posterior through hypothetical necessity: the relations of hypothetical
necessity establish the order and explain the reasons for that order.

Second, we need something that will limit the series at the beginning
and the end. After all, what prevents something causally significant and
logically prior to the first member from being included in the soul series?
For example, just as nutritive soul is prior to sensitive soul, so the natural
change of simple bodies is prior to the nutritive soul. Why should the
natural change of simple bodies not be such a member? To say that this
natural change is not life is to beg the question, since life is said in many
ways and the only thing binding homonyms together is their serial order,
in which natural change also participates. It is clear that the series is
generated, but not limited, by logical potential containment. The limits of
the series come from the posterior commonality that the members of the
series generate, specifically from the material component. Natural change
of simple bodies cannot be included in the series, because simple bodies

are not organic. Every faculty of the soul per se must be in an organic
body. The common account, then, provides a common feature that limits
the series both at the beginning and at the end. For there is no activity
that is logically prior to nutrition that requires an organic body, and there
is no activity logically posterior to embodied intellect that in its own right
requires an organic body. Nevertheless, 'having an organic body' cannot
be the genus of soul, because the genus must be the genus of the form,
not the matter. 'Having an organic body' is not what the soul is.
The cumulative soul series, then, introduces us to a new form of organization among subject matters. The subjects are generated by a series
of additions. The additions are ontological, in the sense that one faculty is
added to another faculty, but the relationship between the members is one
of natural priority and hypothetical necessity, that is, the posterior faculty
requires the existence of the prior. The members of the series share a
common account that is not the account of their genus, but rather of their
material correlate. Nothing prevents such subjects from having a genus,
but it is unlikely that the genus will explain much that the first member
of the series does not.
Friendship
Aristotle trears friendship both in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. In both works he distinguishes three kinds of friendship,
those based on virtue, pleasure, and utility. In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle characterizes the relationship between these three kinds as focal, but
in the Nicomachean version he speaks in terms of similarity (op.oiwp.a
and Ka(J' O,uoLoT17Ta). The Ka8' o,umoT11Ta solution is characteristic of many
discussions in the EN, and has close affinities to cumulation and analogy.
225 Cumulation
There has been much discussion as to whether Aristotle changed his mind
about the relationship between the kinds of friendship. I think he did,
but not in the way or for the reasons often attributed to him. I interpret
the shift not in terms of a general chronological development away from
focality, but as a realization that the focal analysis of friendship does not
do justice to the phenomena. 23
1. Eudemian Ethics and the Problems
of Focal Friendship
In the Eudemian version Aristotle argues at length for a focal arrangement

of the ends of friendship and, therefore, of the friendships themselves.24
The argument we are concerned with appears in EE VII. 1-3, of which the
following is part:
[W}e must attempt to .gain clear distinctions, starting from the following principle.
The desired (OPKT()V) and the wished for (f3ovA71TOV) is either the good or the
apparent good. Now this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good;
for some think it such (OOKt:L), and to some it appears such (~aiVf.TaL), though they
do not think so (om,V) . For appearance and opinion do not reside in the same part
of the soul. It is clear, then, that we love both the good and the pleasant. (VII.2
1235b24-30)
Before this passage Aristotle discussed the opinions of others (ooKOvvm)

and the aporiai; now he lays down a principle that states that the object
of desire (OpEKTOV) and wish (f3ovl\~TOV) is either a good or an apparent
good. From this principle and the fact that the pleasant is an apparent
good, Aristotle concludes that both the good and the pleasant are objects
of desire.
23 So also the conclusion of Price 1989, 148: '[WJhile the EHdemian Etllies offers an
explicit statement (of focality) that is clearly less than successful and satisfactory,
the Nicomaellean offers a less explicit analysis that seems much more apt to the
subject-matter ... ' See his chap . 5 for a significantly different analysis of the focal
relationship.
24 The details of the argument have not been carefully studied by those who have
been concerned with the question of focality. Owens (1989) makes no mention
of this section, and speaks of the focal relationship in terms of imitation (136-7).
Berti sees the Significance of the argument, but treats it only briefly (1971,
176). Moreover, he says that just because a focal relationship holds benveen the
three objects of friendship, there must also be a focal relationship between the
friendships themselves. Rowe (1971, 57-60) sees no difference in purpose between
the nvo passages, but considers the EN presentation a misleading version of
the EE.

He next introduces a second principle: some goods are good with-
out qualification, others are good to somebody (1235b30-32). Through

an induction he argues (1235b33-1236a7) that what is pleasant without
qualification is good without qualification." And since he has already laid
down in the first principle that what is pleasant to someone is good to that
person, he can conclude that there are two kinds of pleasant things, ~bv
a7rAw< and ~M ny"~ of which the first is identical with the a.yaeov a7rAw<
and the second with the aya80v
TLVt.
In detail Aristotle's argument goes something like this:

1.
PRINCIPLE:
x is OPEKTOV and f3oVATJTOV,
iff x is aya80v
or x is $aWOJ.l.EVOV
a.yaeD".
2. Additional premiss:
x is ~M, iff x is q,awDp.EVov a.yaeD" (whether

x is actually a.yaeD" or not)
3. Therefore
if x is
4. and, since
if x is a.yaeD", x is OPEKTD" (from
5. Therefore
(if x is a.yaeD", x is OPEKTD") and (if x is ~M,

x is 0pEKTOV)
6.
some aya80v is aya80v
PRINCIPLE:
~avl x is
0PE/(TOV
a7TA(JYi!
PRINCIPLE)
some is aya86v
nVL
7. From induction:
x is ~av o.:trAw'i, iff x is aya80v arrA.ws
8. (an interpretation
of 2)
x is ~ov
TLVL,
iff x is aya6lov
HIlt
Aristotle has established a focal relationship between the good and the
pleasant, since the pleasant can be defined as a function of the good. If
something is pleasant without being absolutely good, then it is pleasant
25 The structure of the argument is not entirely dear. He needs to argue that there is a
certain kind of ~M that is both r,ov tt1TAw!> and aya80v cbr'\'wS', and especially that there
are psychic as well as physical pleasures that fall into this category. He argues from the
obvious case that what is advantageous to a healthy body is aya8ov, to what is pleasant
to a health body is pleasant without qualification, and finally to what is pleasant to
a healthy soul is pleasant without qualification. There is no explicit connection made
between the pleasant and the good until the end of the passage, and this is stated as a
conclusion: 'To [sensible and good adults] that which suits their habit is pleasant, and
that is the good and noble' (1236a5-7) .
227 Cumulation
because it is apparently good." Although both the pleasant and the good
are objects of desire, they are not coordinate species of desirables. The good
is prior, while the pleasant is posterior and dependent on the good.
By establishing a focal relationship between the objects of friendship
Aristotle prepares the way for a focal interpretation of the friendships
themselves. Since pleasure is definable in terms of the good - for it is the
apparent good, if it is not the good itself - pleasure is said to be focally
related to the good (VII.2 1236a15- 33):
There must, then, be three kinds of friendship, not all being so named for one thing
or as species of one genus, nor yet having the same name quite by mere accident.
For all the senses are related to one which is the primary, just as is the case with
the word 'medical'; for we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument, or act, but
properly the name belongs to that primarily so-called. The primary is that of which
the definition is contained in the definition of all/7 e.g. a medical instrument is one
that a medical man would use, but the definition of the contained is not implied
in that of 'medical man.' Everywhere, then, we seek for the primary. But because
the universal is primary, they also take the primary to be universal, and this is an
error. And so they are not able to do justice to all the phenomena of friendship;
for since one definition will not suit all, they think there are no other friendships;
but the others are friendships, only not similarly 50. But they, finding the primary
friendship wiJI not suit, assuming it would be universal if really primary, deny
that the other friendships even are friendships; whereas there are many species of
friendship; this was part of what we have already said, since we have distinguished
the three senses of friendship - one due to excellence, another to usefulness, a
third to pleasantness.
Later he explains further (VIl.2 1236b17-26):

But those whose love is based on pleasure do not seem to be friends, when we look
carefully, because their friendship is not of the primary kind, being unstable, while
that is stable; it is, however, as has been said, a friendship, only not the primary
kind but derived from it. To speak, then, of friendship in the primary sense only
is to do violence to the phenomena, and makes one assert paradoxes; but it is
impossible for all friendships to come under one definition. The only alternative
left is that in a sense there is only one friendship, the primary; but in a sense all
26 Although apparent x's are not regularly listed as focal terms, we can compare the focal
way in which that which is not known may be said to be known, Met. Z.4 1030a33-34.
27 This is to accept Bonitz's emendation of 1fucn for ~J.Ltv .

kinds are friendship, not as possessing a common name accidentally without being
specifically related to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather
as in relation to one and the same thing.
It is clear here why the medical things are not one species or species of
one genus. In spite of their per se relations, they are different kinds of
things, substance (man) and non-substances (actions, events, etc.). But the
application of the principle here to friendship is much more problematic,
and has been used to support the theory that the EE is earlier than the
EN, which rejects the focal relationship in favour of mB' Ol'-o<aT'Ira28
The focal argument faces two major problems.'9 Much of the difficulty
lies in the fact that Aristotle is forced to make pleasure friendship into a sort
of sick or failed virtue friendship, an interpretation that is intuitively unconvincing. In the EN by contrast it is characterized as merely incomplete.
The EE account classes desirables as either goods or apparent goods, and
bases the difference on psychological faculties of cognition. Apparent goods
are the objects of cpavTaO'La alone, whereas goods are at least accompanied
by opinion (OOta 1235b27- 29). Aristotle cites four examples to illustrate
the identity of the ayaB,," Q.1f)..w, and ryo;' Q.1f)..w" and indicates the way in
which the relative ayaBa" and ryov are dependent on the absolute form in
virtue of a debility or sickness:
For we say that what is advantageous to a body in health is absolutely good for a
body, but not what is good for a sick body, such as drugs and the knife. Similarly,
things absolutely pleasant to a body are those pleasant to a healthy and unaffected
body, e.g. seeing in light, not in darkness, though the opposite is the case to one
with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not that which is pleasant to one
whose tongue has been spoilt by inebriety .(for they add vinegar to it), but that
which is pleasant to sensation unspoiled. So with the soul; what is pleasant not to
28 Fortenbaugh (1975, 59-60) has said that it is difficult to construe the three friendships in
the 7fPOS ElJ arrangement. He suggests that the E illustrates and explains focal meaning
but does not apply it directly to friendship, because it does not work. '[TJhe Eudemian
Ethics does not go on to apply this analysis to the different kinds of friendship. Having
stated that the focal logos must appear in the other definitions, the Eudemian version
does not show how the definition of perfect or primary friendship is involved in the
definitions of other kinds of friendships.' He suggests that the friendships of the EN
are analogically related, claiming oddly as the reason that the three kinds of friendship
do not perform the same function. Walker (1979) argued that the EN did not present
an analogical arrangement.
29 For a recent defence of the focal arrangement, see Ward 1995.
229 Cumulation
children or brutes, but to the adult is really pleasant; at least, when we remember
both we choose the latter. And as the child or brute is to the adult man, so are the
bad and foolish to the good and sensible. (VII.2 1235b33-1236a2)
Aristotle implies a division into two kinds of desirables: those goods and
pleasures that are natural and not peculiar to an individual in aberrant
condition, and those that are both cpaLVO/lEVa aya86. (apparently good) and
aya86. TLV' (good to someone). The examples provided imply that cpavTaIT{a
incorrectly affirms the not-good object to be good. Thus, an immature
person will mistake the pleasant for the good. He must mistake his pleasure
friend for a virtue friend. Now, if the pleasant is to be focally related to
the good, pleasure must contain the definition of good in it. But equally
there are many pleasure friends who can accurately identify the basis of
their friendship. There is no reason to suppose that every person must
say of his pleasure friend that he thought he was a virtue friend and
intend by 'virtue' what the word is defined to mean. We do not have to
be deluded or bad to have a pleasant friend whom we do not think to be
virtuous. If this is so, the focal relationship between pleasure and good
breaks down.
Aristotle is not wholly unaware of this problem. He treats virtue and
pleasure friendship together and makes it clear that bad men are not capable
of virtue friendship. Owing to their debility the pleasure they derive is
perverted:
Nothing prevents [bad men's] loving with the other kinds [0 friendship]; for
owing to pleasure they put up with each other's injury since they are incontinent.
(modified ROT; VII.2 1236b15-17)
The harm they do one another is a result of their perversion. Such a view,
however, makes it impossible for a good man to pursue a purely pleasure
friendship, something Aristotle makes room for at the end of the chapter:
For the bad may be pleasant to one another, not qua bad or qua neither good nor
bad, but (say) as both being musicians, or the one fond of music and the other
a musician, and inasmuch as all have some good in them, and in this way they
harmonize with one another. (VIL2 1238a35-38)
The pleasure friendship that a good man enters into cannot be for merely
the apparent good, for he would not in that case be good. Conversely,
the pleasure friendship that the bad man shares with the good man is

not merely an apparent good, since 'all have something of the good'
(1238b13-14). In order to save the phenomena, then, Aristotle assimilates
pleasure friendships that are not actually perverted to virtue friendships
by identifying the grounds of pleasure in some limited virtue.
What is the result if we reject the focal principle in its present fonn?
If we treat good and pleasure as independent ends but preserve the relative/ absolute distinction for each in its own right, we eliminate the basis of
the focal relationship. And, as we shall see, this is precisely what happens
in the EN account.
Clearly, though, Aristotle intended this argument to be the basis of his
claim that the friendships are focally related. In order for the argument to
succeed, the cpawoJ.Lwou aya80v must appear to the bad man to be virtue,
but in fact be pleasure; he must mistake pleasure for virtue. Since virtue
is pleasurable, Aristotle may have supposed that the mistake would not be
infrequent.
The characterization of the useful friendship also presents a problem for

the focal relationship. The EE seems to take the dependency of the useful
on the good as obvious, but it is clearly not the same kind of dependency as
that of the pleasant. For, as we saw, pleasure friendship was construed as a
kind of sick virtue friendship. A friendship is useful, however, because it is

a means to other ends, like pleasure and virtue. Now, utility friendship is
useful for many things, among them virtue and pleasure friendships. But
utility friendship is useful for other goods and pleasures besides friendship,
since friendship is not the only locus of virtue or pleasure. Although one
can easily argue that the useful is focally related to the pleasant and the
virtuous (and if the pleasant is itself focally related to the virtuous, then
the useful is always ultimately focally related to the virtuous), the utility
friendship is not focally related to the pleasure or virtue friendship. For the
definition of utility friendship does not potentially contain the definition
of pleasure or virtue friendship, even though it may potentially contain
the definition of pleasure or virtue. In spite of Aristotle's attempts, neither
utility friendship nor pleasure friendship can convincingly be brought into

a dependency relationship with virtue friendship.'o Pleasure friendships
can be made focally dependent only if they are perversions of virtue
friendships, and utility friendships cannot be subordinated focally to virtue
friendships at all.
30 Even the pleasure associated with virtue is different from the pleasure pursued as
an end. So, for example, Aristotle asks (1.5 1216a33-37) whether for the good life
it will be necessary to add pleasures, or whether it will be pleasurable in another
way.
231 Cumulation
2. The Nicomachean Version
In the EN Aristotle makes no explicit mention of analogy or focality of
friendship. But, just as in the EE, EN VII/'2 says that the problem of friendship can be solved if we first come to know the purposes of friendships, and
by knowing the purposes we shall be able to make the distinctions. Since
the purposes of friendship differ in species, so do the friendships differ in
species (VIII.3 1156a6-8)31
The most notable feature of EN VIII.2 is Aristotle's dismissal of the
focal relationship between the ends of friendship (1155b17-27):
The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the
object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this
is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would seem to be that by which some good or
pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it is the good and the pleasant that are
lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good for them? These
sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each
loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable,
and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what
is good for him but what seems good, This however will make no difference; we
shall just have to say that this is that which seems lovable.
Aristotle assumes from the beginning that there are three ends of friendship, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, and asks whether one loves
the good or what is good for oneself. Although his analysis of the problem
considers only the good, the pleasant could be easily substituted. He implies
that the ends are to be treated ,eparately for the purpose of his analysis,
and makes no attempt to connect or relate the pleasant and the good. In
this way he treats the good and the pleasant as independent objects of
love and, as a result, eliminates the basis for the focal arrangement. As for
utility friendship, it is almost brushed aside, this time not because it is easy
to fit into a focal arrangement (although it is), but because it is not an end
in itself. This separate treatment for the three objects of love is picked up
again in chapter 3, where Aristotle considers the three kinds of friendship
in terms of their ends. Virtue friends love each other for themselves, but
pleasure and utility friends abstract some feature from their friend that is
of interest to them. The pleasant aspects of another person are abstracted
from the whole person, and are not considered as logically dependent on
31 bta<PipH bf mvm a.lI.lI.~lI.wv "rOEt' Kat at
EWl1. lCTapt8p.a TOtS QHlI.l1Toi:s.
CPtll.~CTHS
apa Kat
at cptll.{at. Tpla b~ TO. T11S CPtll.iM

the whole person or on virtue friendship, which has as its object the whole
character of the other (1156a10-16). Pleasure and utility friendships are
considered as abstractable parts of complete friendship. Thus, Aristotle's
efforts in the EE to construe pleasure as dependent on the good are overturned, and pleasure is treated as an independent end alongside virtue. A
focal arrangement on this basis is no longer possible.32
In the place of a focal analysis Aristotle arranges the friendships in a
manner that in several respects is similar to the cumulative arrangement
of the souls. First, he provides a general account that covers all the cases
(me' EmITTOV, 1156a8-10) but that fails to be a definition:
[W]ith respect to each of the aforementioned objects there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other wish each other well in that respect in
which they love one another (ad apa d)VOE~V clAi\~i\O~S' KUL f3ovAf.(J"ea~ Taya8a /J.r,
Aav8avovTuS' at' Ell n TWV Elprfl.LEvwV). VIII.2 1156a3-5
In spite of the fact that he is able to give a general account, he clearly

says that pleasure and utility friendships are only incidentally friendships
(1156a16-17).33 They are incidental because one wants the friends' good,
not for their own sake but in order that they may continue to be a source
of profit or pleasure to oneself. That is not to say that pleasure friends
do not wish each other well, but they do so insofar as they are pleasant
to each other. The friend's good, then, may either be defined in terms of
oneself Oust as one is a friend to wine, in order that it may be preserved for
oneself), in which case it is the friend's good only incidentally, or it may
be defined in terms of one's friend, for his own sake. 34 This distinction
makes clear that the general definition contains at least one -ambiguous
term, en' EV TL TWV ip1JJ1.vWV and this casts doubts on the generic status
of the definition. 35
Second, in the EN Aristotle both reverses and alters the dependency
we found in the EE, so that pleasure and utility friendship will be prior
to virtue friendship in the series. No longer is virtue friendship contained
in pleasure friendship, instead pleasure friendship is contained in virtue
32 Gauthier and lolif (1959, ii, 686) quOte the EE passage on. focal meaning without
mentioning the differences between the two presentations. They suppose that the
similarity mentioned at 1157a32 (V yap aya.8olJ n Kat O},wtOlJ n. TaUT!! $ii\m) is the kind
of similarity discussed in EE, which is certainly incorrect.
33 KaTa (J"V}J.f3Ej37JK6~
TE
01) at $!ALa! aUral ELn-W.
34 This is contrary to the opinion of Walker, who holds that the definition states the
necessary and sufficient conditions for all kinds of friendship (1979, 185).
35 Cf. Phys. VIl.4 248b17-19 and the discussion above on the soul.
233 Cumulation
friendship. The nature of the containment has also changed. The term
'pleasure friendship' is not contained in the definition of virtue friendship,
but pleasure friendship is nevertheless implied in virtue friendship, and can
be proved to belong to virtue friendship because of the essential attributes
of virtue friendship. So at EN VIII.3 1156b12- 17, Aristotle says:
And each [virtue friend ] is good without qualification and to his friend, for the
good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So they are
pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other,
since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions
of the good are the same or like.
Whether or not this argument is sufficiently articulated to constitute a

proof, it is clear that virtue friendship is pleasant and useful because of its
own nature. The virtue friendship is not a pleasure friendship in the way
a pleasure friendship is a pleasure friendship, since a virtue friendship is
not pursued for pleasure, but it is nonetheless pleasant, and presumably
more pleasant than a pleasure friendship. In a similar way, the definition of
the sensitive soul does not explicitly contain the definition of the nutritive
soul, though it implies the existence of the nutritive souL Likewise, too,
the nutritive soul is not the final cause of the animaL as it was for the
plant, but rather is set in some causal relation, namely necessary condition,
to the sensitive soul.
Third, the series are also similar with respect to ontological priority and
posteriority. Just as the nutritive soul can exist without the sensitive soul,
but the sensitive soul cannot exist without the nutritive souL so there can
be a pleasure friendship without it being a virtue friendship, but a virtue
friendship must be a pleasure friendship.
At the same time, there are features of the friendship series that are
more difficult to assimilate to cumulation of the soul type. Clearly, the
utility and pleasure friendship are not serially related to one another,
but only to virtue friendship. Again, Similarity (0I"0'OT'1< 1156b33- 1157a4)
figures largely in Aristotle's description of the relationship between perfect (virtue) friendship and pleasure friendship, and this would be more
appropriate within a perfective series:
This kind of friendship, then is complete both in respect of duration and in all other
respects, and in it each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something
like what, he gives; which is what ought to happen between friends. Friendship for
the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance (of.LoiwJ.W.) to this kind; for good people
too are pleasant to each other. So too does friendship for the sake of utility; for
- -- - -

the good are also useful to each other. Among men of these sorts too, friendships
are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other.
VIII.6 (1158b5- 11) gives a similar description:

II]t is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are
thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendshi p
of excellence that they seem to be friendships (for one of them involves pleasure
and the other utility, and these characteristics belong to the friendship of virtue
as well); while it is because the friendship of virtue is proof against slander and
lasting, while these quickly change (besides differing from the former in many
other respects), that they appear not to be friendshipsi Le. it is because of their
unlikeness to the friendship of virtue. (modified ROT)
The likeness and unlikeness are based on three sets of factors that serve
to determine friendships: the general account, the purposes of friendship,
and the characteristics (Tp07TO< ) of the complete friendship .'6 The general
account establishes their common claim to the title, while their purposes
differ. The purposes, in turn, entail certain characteristics that the complete
friendship has most completely and others share more or less." The friendships are even described as differing by the more and the less, in spite of the
fact that they are speCifically different (VIII .11155b13-16). The Similarity
among the characteristics of friendships, then, is a deduced result of the
36 These three sets fonn a
SOrt
of tree. The general definition contains three factors: 1.
IlEt EVVOEtii aA'\~'\otS' Kat !3ovAE(!"8aL TayaOci 2. J.l.~ Aav8civoVTa~ 3. OL' ill TL TooV Elp1JJ.l.f.vwv.
The last is divided into 1. virtue; 2. pleasure; 3. utility. Virtue friendship is then
characterized by (i) durability, (ii) age-group considerations, (iii) living together,
(iv) needing a long time to fonn, (v) getting the same thing from one another, (vi)
unsusceptibility to slander, (vii) between people who are similar, and (viii) who trust
each other.
37 The Magna Momfia ILll (1209a19-35) gives an explanation that combines elements of
the EE and the EN accounts:
And these forms of friendship, that of the good, the pleasant, and the useful ... hang
in a way from the same point. JUSt so we call a knife surgical, a man surgical, and
knowledge surgical ... Similarly ... the fri endship of the good which is based on the
good, the friendship depending on pleasure, and that depending on utility ... while they
are nm actually the same, they have still in a way the same sphere and the same origin
... [TJhe friendship of the virtuous ... is a compound of all these, of the good and the
pleasant and the useful.
Clearly, the author of the MM combines the definitional inclusion (from the medical
example) and association by accumulation. There is no reason why they can not apply
to the same objects, but they do not explain one another.
235 Cumulation
purposes. For this reason, these similarities are secondary and need not be
thought to establish any sort of rival order among the friendships: they are
posterior to the purposes. They are discussed at length, because Aristotle
is interested in explaining why pleasure and utility friendships are called
friendships (1157a25-32), in spite of the fact that he considers them to be
incidentally friendships.
On balance, then, Aristotle's analysis of friendship in the EN has
strongest affiliations with cumulation. He is able to give an account of
why one friendship is more, another less, like friendship properly so called
on the basis of the logically prior purposes, and these purposes most closely
resemble the order of inclusion among the souls. By these organizational
means Aristotle is able to provide a more convincing and plausible account
of the nature of friendship than he had in the EE.
Series in which there are prior and posterior members manifest a
variety of forms . The souls and the friendships, when viewed serially, are
generated through logical and ontological additions and they progress in
order of perfection. As such, they are basically cumulative series. For their
logical additions are not diminutions or perversions of the first member,
but rather completions. In other series, like that of citizenship, the order
is based on logical but not ontological inclusion: the first member is not
ontologically prior to the second member. Instead, the terms of the series
are related by the addition of an element that represents a qualification and
diminution of the first member. In all cases, though, it is the additions that
give the series their distinctive scientific form. For each member individually serves as a principle of explanation for analogically common features,
and the first member serves as the causal explanation for all the properties
that derive from it and that all the other members share in because of their
possessing that member.
The Place of Theology in the Science of Being

Our findings concerning cumulation may help clarify a famous problem
in metaphysics, the place of theology in the science of Being. Metaphysics
r discusses general metaphysics but does not include any consideration of
theology. E .1, by contrast, makes theology the centrepiece of the science of
Being qua Being. 38 The question 'arises, then, whether these are compatible
positions. If Aristotle meant what he clearly appears to mean in E.l, then
he is probably overestimating the perfective aspects of the series of Being
38 For a brief summary of the controversy see Patzig 1960-61, 185- 7, and Frede 1987b,
84.

and is granting too large a role to theology. There is no question that in
K1 he intends theology to have the central place in the science of Being
(1026a23-32):
One might indeed raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals
with one genus; i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences
are all like in this respect, - geometry and as tronomy deal with a certain particular
kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if
there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science
will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this
must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it
is first. And it will belong to this to conside r being qua being - both what it is and
the attributes which belong to it qua being .
Both Frede and Patzig view the relationship between sensible substance
and god (non-sensible substance) as focal; Patzig, insofar as god is the
cause, that is, the prime mover, for sensible substance, and Frede because
god is form and pure actuality, and therefore more abstract than sensible
substance, though containing that feature which is substance first and
foremost. 39 What is said of it qua Being will, therefore, apply as well to
concrete sensible substance, which in turn will be treated as a subordinate
science. 'Why would it be the task of the theologian to consider these
matters [i.e., general metaphysics]?' Frede asks. 'There are two possible
explanations. The first is that since these matters have to be discussed
somewhere, and since they are most naturally discussed in the context of
ontology, it will be the task of the theologian to deal with them, since
it is his task to do ontology. But there is another possible explanation
which ties this fact to Aristotle's claim that first philosophy is universal,
because it is first. Since it is first, and since these principles and notions
are unive rsal, first philosophy will be the first place where they are used.
Hence, it will be the task of the theologian to introduce them: 40
There are important distinctions between these views, and each is open
to particular objections. Patzig's view that god is cause, the prime mover
of all things, implies that god is useful in the explanations of sensible
substances and is adapted to these substances, just as Aristotle suggests
in A.4-S. Accordingly, the definition of god will contain the definition of
sensible substance, and god will be secondary to sensible substance. This
39 So also Owens 1978, 298: 'In studying thi s definite nature, one studies the Being found
in everything else.'
40 Frede 1987b, 93.
237 Cumulation
is not to say that god cannot be focally primary in some relation, but as
prime mover god will be derivative.
Frede, by contrast, claims that god, being pure form and actuality,
will be treated prior to sensible substance in the order of the science.

All those attributes that belong to Being qua Being will be treated first
when god as form is treated. For this reason the science of form as well
as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) and principles such as unity
will be treated under theology. Frede notes the parallel Aristotle adduces
between metaphysics and mathematics to support his claim. But there are
some problems with Aristotle's parallel. The study of proportion, universal

mathematics, considers attributes that are common to all magnitudes and
can be abstracted in conception. When theorems of proportion are proved,
they are proved of the genus, general magnitude, and can be applied to
the specific instances of magnitude, geometry and astronomy. God, by
contrast, is a separate substance and not just the sum of common attributes
of sensible substance. God has peculiar attributes, pure actuality, thought

thinking itself eternally, and so on, that are discussed in /\, and that
sensible substances do not share. Similar difficulties arise for Frede's claim
that theology will consider the principle of non-contradiction. For PNC
does not hold of god as such, nor even of actuality as such.
Now, there is no question that Aristotle claims that theology is the
science of Being qua Being, and universal because it is first . But it is equally
clear that he must be overstating the case, and may be assimilating theology
to the role of the primary member of a strong perfective series, like ends
and means, in which the good of the means is defined in terms of the good
end. 41 If this is so, there are a couple of respects in which his account in E.l
is off the mark. There is no question that the substances form a series of
prior and posterior - god, sensible substances; and that god is the most abstract, lacking matter and change (the Metaphysics for the most part treats
substance with matter, but not with change). I suggest, though, that for
the purposes of the science of Being qua Being this series should be likened
to the cumulative soul series, vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, in which
conceptual and ontological additions are made to each member in order to
generate a series of objects that share the same category. As we saw, what is
said commonly of all living things, namely, that the soul is the actuality of
the potentially living organic body, is not said just of vegetative soul only
nor is it said of the other kinds of soul in virtue of vegetative soul. Rather
41 Compare also Aristotle's comment in the EE's discussion of friendship: 'But because the
universal is primary, they also take the primary to be universal, and this is an error'
(VII. 2 1236a23-25).

it is said of all souls in virtue of each kind of soul, and it is a conclusion
derived equally from the nature of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual
souls. We may interpret the kinds of Being and the general attributes of
Being, like PNC, in a similar manner. In the series god, sensible substance,
conceptual and ontological additions are made, but the general attribute
PNC does not belong to sensible substance in virtue of god, but rather
it belongs in virtue of the nature of sensible substance. Now it may be
argued that the order of excellence is reversed in the two series: the series
vegetative, sensitive, intellectual increases in order of excellence while the
series god, sensible substance decreases. But in fact, this just strengthens
the point. For god is separate and unchanging essence and actuality. As
a result, PNC will belong to god if it belongs to anything. But PNC also
belongs to Beings that do not meet the stringent qualifications of god. In
fact, it applies to anything definite, substance or non-substance, in virtue
of whatever their definition is. Aristotle's favourite example in
r,
man as
a biped animal, indicates that PNC will hold even of. definition expressed
in terms of the matter of a substance. Moreover, Aristotle nowhere claims
that PNC holds in virtue of god or pure actuality; rather he makes clear
in APo 1.10 and r.3 (1005.22- 29), that PNC is common by analogy, just
as the common definition of soul is common by analogy.
The example of general and special mathematics mentioned at the

end of E.1 is .lso relevant, though not in the way Aristotle appears to
use it. The study of PNC belongs to the science of Being at the general
and universal level, and so corresponds to universal mathematics. But the
specific branches of mathematics (geometry and astronomy) are based on

ontological principles that form a series. Geometry considers the plane or
solid, astronomy adds motion. Correspondingly, god and sensible substance

form an ontological series, god concerning form alone, sensible substance
concerning form together with matter. Just as general mathematics (theory
of proportion) does not hold generally in virtue of its holding specifically

of geometry (for there can be proportion in locomotion), so general metaphysics (PNC) holds of all Beings qua what they are and not in virtue of
god or pure actuality.42 PNC holds of Being in an even more abstract sense
than god.
There is another respect in which Aristotle's E.l account differs from
his usual doctrine. He claims that if separate and unchanging substance
does not exist, physics will be the first science. But this does not follow
from what he says about abstraction elsewhere. For if there were only
42 The fact would be especially dear in the series arithmetic and geometry, since general
mathematics holds for both rational and irrational quantity.
239 Cumulation
isosceles triangles or even bronze isosceles triangles, 2R would still not
belong to them in virtue of bronze or isosceles (APo 1.5 74a16). Aristotle

clearly has ways of talking about sensible substance abstracted conceptually
from change even if it is not actually separated, as he says at Met. M.3
1077b17-30. Likewise, god need not exist in order for PNC and general
metaphysics not to be included in physics. For these reasons Aristotle
would have been better off organizing Being in accordance with the cumu-
lative pattern rather than the focal and perfective pattern that Patzig and
Frede envision.
Conclusion: Analogy, Focality, and Cumulation

Aristotle once accused Speusippus of representing nature like an episodic
tragedy, on the grounds that he had made each hypostasis independent

and isolated from every other (Met. N.3 1090b19-20). His own theory
of the subject-genus, however, was perhaps even more vulnerable to this
charge. Accordingly, Aristotle developed the doctrine of abstraction together with analogy, focality, and cumulation to provide a set of interlocking and mutually dependent techniques for overcoming the isolation
of the subject-genus. In spite of the fact that these techniques receive little
attention within the formal presentation of the APo, it is clear that they
can be expressed best within that theory and especially within the fundamental notions of genus and essential connections. Without sacrificing
the integrity of the autonomous genus, these techniques allow for the
inclusion of the relevant and necessary external objects and causes within
a science as the well as the connections between autonomous genera.
Focality is, of course, the primary relation, being identical with per se
predication. It provides a flexible description of normal science in both its
core and extended aspects. Focally derivative items, which surround a core
subject-genus, both reveal the nature of the core subject and may also be
semi-abstracted so as to become subjects in their own right. These new
subjects, nevertheless, remain part of the science of the core. Any per se
(2) predicate, for example, male and female which belong to animal, may
have properties proved of them per se, and these proofs will form a part
of the extended science of animal. Focality, then is the primary means of
unifying a science and displaying the unity of the components of a science.

Analogy allows Aristotle to remain within the limitations of the
qua-requirement, and yet consider commonalities between different but
related genera. Analogy resolves the tension between qua and per se
requirements within the same science, since the genera in which analogies
occur must be related in virtue of some abstractable commonality. The

nature of this commonality varies. In lower ge'nera, the commonality is
often some aspect of form, and is related to each genus by a common
relation, as, for example, the functions in the biological works are common
among various parts. Among higher genera, where no genuine commonality is available, some sort of serial order supplies the per se relations
necessary for the unity of science. Focality provides one such series. The
analogy of potentiality in A.4-S is arguably backed by such a focality. The
focal relations take many different forms, including the causal relations
characteristic of normal science and the medical example; but we also find
the relations of imitation and deficiency, which are especially useful in
backing analogies. For objects so related are of the same basic kind and
therefore amenable to analogical comparisons. Such is the basis of the
scala naturae in which one genus, man, forms a normative kind in terms
of which other genera are explained. The imitation and deficiency relation
is not, as I have argued, an essential feature of analogy, but only one of
the means by which two analogous genera can be related.
Owen suggested that the relationship between the souls is focal, on the
grounds that the definitions of the souls exhibit definitional inclusion and
are related by 7fporr$f(n< and acpaipErr.43 He is certainly right that cumulation exhibits some focal characteristics. We find, besides these additions,
relations of hypothetical necessity among the souls discussed in DA III.l2.
But the cumulative soul series is not focal insofar as the primary purpose of
cumulation is not to bring one object into an explanatory relationship with
the primary object, in spite of the fact that this is a necessary condition
for cumulation. Although the souls do exhibit definitional inclusion, the
n+ 1 th member of a series does not include the nth member for the purpose
of explaining the nth member. Nor are cumulative objects included in the
science only to the extent to which they are useful for the primary term,
as focally derivative objects are; each member of the series is treated as a
subject in its own right with its own per se predicates.
Again, an important criterion of a focal science is that all members
have their shared name in virtue of the first member. This may also be
true of imitative or perfective series, but since the kinds of souls are called
soul in virtue of the highest faculty they possess, this series cannot be
called focal in the proper sense. 44 Ontological and logical priority alone
are not enough to create a focal term. The first term must also be that in
43 Owen 1960, 192n37.
44 Because cumulation is a fusion of analogy and focahty, Rodier (1900, 218) was partly
correct to say that the kinds of soul are analogically related, and Owen (1960) partly
correct to say that they are focally related.
241 Cumulation
virtue of which all subsequent terms are called by the same name. When
these three criteria are taken together, it becomes impossible for a series
of the soul type to be focally related.
Cumulation also has some analogical characteristics. Like analogues,
cumulative subjects are all in the same category; focally related subjects
are not; and all share some per se attribute and not just by relation.
Souls are all actualities of organic bodies, friendships are mutual and
recognized bonds of affection. The result of the cumulative TrpoO"$'O"t< is
not the creation of a genus network around a subject, but a proliferation
of parallel subjects, which share attributes analogically and in virtue of
common essential elements, for instance, the assimilation of the nutritive,
sensitive, and intelligible by that which has the capacity to receive them.
Souls are per se things and are treated in their own right and not as relative
to the first member of the series.
Cumulation differs from biological analogy because in biological analogy there must be some absolutely common element to which the analogues are all per se related, and which is semi-abstractable, but which,
given the concrete subject matter is not abstracted. This semi-abstractable
element is causally significant and distinct. In cumulation, by contrast, .
there is not a single common cause to which the members are all related;
their commonality is posterior and proved from different and specific
causes. Like metaphysical analogues, members of cumulative series are
gathered together because of their mutual focal relations of definitional
inclusion. Since members of cumulative series are not per se related to
some common and logically prior item, they do not need to be related to
anything more abstract than themselves in order to be analogically related.
For this reason they are well adapted to operate at the most general and
abstract levels of Aristotle's ontology. Indeed, analogues, precisely because
they require a distinct abstract can never be the ultimate form of scientific
unification, but instead always rely on focality or cumulative series.
Finally, these three techniques themselves can be seen to form a sort
of cumulative series: focality, analogy, cumulation. A new qualification is
added at each stage in order to create an additional form of unification.
To the per se relation between genera that is characteristic of focality
we add a proportional identity in order to create analogy, and the per
se relation among analogical genera is further qualified by progressive
ontological and logical additions in order to create cumulation. Together
these techniques contribute to a style of philosophy and science that is
distinctively Aristotelian. For Aristotle combines that rigour so admired
among us moderns, that isolates a subject matter for study and seeks
to understand it in its own right together with the synoptic vision of

cosmic unity through hierarchical and progressive abstraction. From these
techniques also emerges a certain flexibility, according to which several
modes of unification can be used on the same group of objects to different
effects. Aristotle, with his interest in explaining the phenomena and solving
aporiai, maximizes thereby his ability to explain. These techniques are
most properly expressed in the formal language of essential relations and
demonstration, and for this reason Aristotle can provide a unified view of
the world while avoiding the nebulous and metaphorical expression of the
Platonists.
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d' Aristote.' Revue Thomiste 48: 461-79.
- 1969. 'Analogon and Analogia in the Philosophy of Aristotle.' The Thomist 33:
1-74.
Preus, A. 1983. 'Eidos as Norm in Aristotle's Biology.' In J. Anton and A. Preus,
eds, Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy II, 34<H53. Albany: SUNY Press.
Price, A.W. 1989. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon
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Rapp, C. 1992. 'Ahnlichkeit, Analogie und Homonymie bei Aristoteles.' Zeitschrift
fur philosophische Forschung 46: 526-44.
Rist, J. The Mind of Aristotl" A Study in Philosophical Growth. Phoenix
Supplementary Vol. XXV. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
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Symposium Aristotelicum, 185-93. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Rodier, G. 1900. Traite de I'ame. Paris: Ernest Leroux (Brown Reprint Library).
Rorty, R. 1973. 'Genus as Matter: A Reading of Metaphysics Z-H.' In
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INDEX LOCORUM
Cat.
1
3
5
5
6
6
7
8
1.12- 15
1b16
2.34--b5
3.22-28
5.38-b10
6.19- 25
6.36-37
11.15
150n23
62n18
151n28
138
41n40
38n36
181
165
21.29-32
117n2
D1
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.7
11
1.7
1.7
73b9-10
73b10-16
73b26-32
73b32-33
74.12-13
74.16-17
74.17-25
74.35-b4
74b8-10
75.28-29
75.38-39
75.39-b2
75a42-b1
APr
1.39
49b3--5
117n2
72.14--24
72.16- 17
73.24--25
73.24--27
73.34--b16
73.34--37
73.37-b3
73b4--5
73b5-10
73b6-8
80
26
19n8
15
16
16
16
21
16
149n22
APo
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.10
1.10
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
75b10--11
75b12-20
75bl4--17
75b37-76.2
75b37-38
76.4--7
76.9-15
76.37- b2
76b16-19
77.26-35
77.40--b6
78b32-79.16
150
16
17n4
17n4
17n4
18, 239
24
30
16n2
30
21- 2
20
18n7,
126
21,90
21-22
33n26
22
21
18
32-3
157, 238
26, 91
81
26
33n26
33n26
256 Index Locorum

1.22
1.22
1.22
1.28
128
11.4
11.4
11.11
11.13
11.13
11.13
11.13
11.14
IU7
11.17
11.17
11.17
11.17
11.17
11.18
11.19
Top.
1.5
1.5
1.9
1.9
U5
1.15
1.15
1.18
IV.6
V.2
V.8
VI.4
VI.4
VI.6
83a2- 17
83b13-17
83b19-20
87a38
91,18- 21
91bl-7
96b5--6
97.6-19
97.34-37
97b7-15
98a20--23
99.1-16
99.8- 10
99a15- 16
99.16--37
99.37- b7
101b39102.1
102.31-b3
103b20--39
107.3-17
107b13- 18
107b19
108b6
128a26-29
130.39
138b23-26
141b15-18
142b2--4
143a29-32
126n7
183
19n7
21
31
19n8
164n41
123
158n36
6n1
158n36
210
83, 84,
91,99,
188
212
93
28
83,91
94
94
97
109
117n2
221n21
143, 153
146-7
201
40n38
62n18
219
140nl0,
142
117n2
182
174n51
117n2
143n15
VI.6
VI.6
VI.8
VI.9
VUO
VI.11
144,31-b3
144b31- 145al
146,36- bl
147b13- 14
148,25- 26
149al-3
137- 8
131nl0
181
117n2
210
117n2
165.35- 37
165b12-17
173bl-11
181b37-182a2
198
138
138
32
198
184a23- 25
183n12
177-8
193n24
166
186
191
187
187
187
204
180n6
188
180
SE
1
3
13
31
34
Phys.
U
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.9
11.2
190b7-8
191,6--7
191.7- 12
191a12- 13
191a17- 27
191a27-29
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.2
II.2
11.2
lll.1
191b4-10
191b15- 16
191b27-29
192a31- 32
193b22194.12
193b26--32
193b32-33
193b34
194al-12
194.7-15
194b9
2OOb32-201a3
IV.l
IV.8
V.2
209,9
214b22- 23
226,26- 29
30
19n7
30n22
30
35
31
181
40n37,
181
101n12
101n12
79n42
257 Index Locorum

VnA
39-41,
212
VnA
24Sb17-19
40,49,
Vn.4
Vn.4
249.21-25
249a29-b26
232n35
40
41
26Sb17-19
299,13-17
23n14
31, 154
333a20-34
46n49
372b34373,5
373,6-16
373,16-19
34
35
35
DC
1.2
IIJ.I
GC
11.6
Mete.
III.3
III.3
III.3
DA
1.1
I.l
1.1
I.l
I.l
I.l
1.5
11.1
11.1
11.1
II.l
n.3
n.3
11.3
n.3
11.3
nA
11.4
1I.5
11.8
n.s
11.9
11.9
11.11
1II.l0
1IJ.12
414b19-33
414b19
414b32-33
415al-11
415a11-12
415,14-23
415a23-b7
417bS-9
420a30-b4
420bl-4
421,16-20
421,17-bl
423,12-15
433b19-21
214
209
209
215
209n
209
204
193n23
104
82n46
S2n46
104
69n29
50
223,
240
Sens.
443b3-12
104
454bl4-23
455b32-33
72
467a6-S
96
468,9-12
468a13-17
468b28-30
469b21-22
470.19-20
6S,72
67
75
95
95
478b32-33
479b19-26
480.23-b20
95
95
101
486.5-14
80
Somn .
402,6-7
402bl-8
402b3-5
402b9-403,2
403,3-b19
403,25-b19
410a13
412.7-8
412a4-5
412b4-9
413a8-9
11.1
11.2
413a11-20
413a22-23
11.2
11.2
11.2
11.3
n.3
413a31-32
413b24-27
414.12-28
41416-14
414b16-19
51
208
213
208
209
31n23
136n7
180n6
210
209
209,
209n2
210
209,
211-12
209n
209n
211
209
209n
1
2
72
Long.
6
Juv.
1
2
3
5
6
Resp.
17
20
21
HA
1.1
258 Index Locorum

1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.12
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.12
11.15
11.17
I1I.1
111.9
I1I.11
111.16
II1.19
III.19
IY.1
IV.3
IV.5
IV.8
IV.8
IV.11
V.4
486.14487.10
486.14-b22
81
53-4,
55n4,
62n18
486.20-21
60
486.21-23
38
486b5
38,79
486b14-16
61
486b17
65n21
486b20
70
102
486b21-22
486b24-487.1 60n13
55n4,
488b29-32
68
489.19-22
71
489.23-26
67
490b10-12
93
491.14-19
55n4
79n42
491.19
493.12-16
67n27
497b6-12
62
497b1S-20
70
497b26-27
70
497b33-498.2 67
503b29-32
67
506.15
112n25
508.16
112n25
510.21-23
112n25
517.6-10
66n24
517b21-26
66n24
519b26-30
67
520b1S-19
71n33
520b25-33
69
523b27-29
64n20
112n27
527b22-24
530b31-33
68
112n27
533.28-30
534b12-15
64n20
538b8-9
103
112n27
540bl-3
VI.12
VII(VIII).l
VII(VIII).1
VII(VIII).2
566b12-13
588.25-31
588b4-13
589b1S-19
64n20
73
111-12
101
PA
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
639.15-29
639.15-19
639.29-b3
639b5-10
640.10-19
640.34-35
1.2-4
1.4
1.4
1.4
644.12-23
644.14-16
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.1
11.2
112
11.2
112
11.2
11.3
11.3
11.4
11.7
11.7
11.8
644.22-23
644.23-27
645b6
645bS-10
645b20-28
646.13-24
646b20-22
646b30-34
647.14-21
647.14-19
647.24-33
647b29-35
648.2-7
648.4-8
648.4-5
648b2-8
650.34-35
650.2-8
651.17-18
652b23-25
653.10-12
653b35654.19
644.1~23
7n1
129n9
19n7
48n53
36n33
76
215
74
78
69
55n4,
65n21
63n19
67n26
101
71n34
55n4, 72
80
85
107n17
106n15
131
105
59
103
73
71n34
95n5
71n34
132
69
72
72
84
259 Index Locorum
11.8
653b35
11.8
11.8
11 .9
11.9
653b36
65435-9
65538-10
655312-17
11.9
11.9
11.9
655317-28
655323-34
655332
11.9
11.9
655333
655b2--4
11.9
655b2
11.9
11.9
11.9
11.9
11.10
11.12
11.13
11.14
11 .14
11.15
11 .16
11.16
I1I .1
655b4--15
655b4--5
655b8
655bll
656b26-29
657318-23
65833-10
65836-7
658b2- 7
658bl4--15
658b35-36
659b23-27
661b3--<i
665b8
667b18-20
667b21-26
66834--7
668323-28
668325- 27
IlI A
I1I .5
I1I.5
111.5
III.5
111.5
III.6
III.6
111.6
IV.2
IVA
669.24--32
669b8- 12
677325-35
67838-9
65n21,
83
57
102
131
131,
84
83
69
57,
65n23,
84
65n21
69,
107n17
65n21,
66n24
71
70
66
65n21
131
101
131
102
131
131
70
59
70
55n6
71
198
100
101
67
101
102
100, 102
95
71n34
IV.5
IV.5
IV.5
IY.5
IV.5
IV.5
IV.5
IY.5
IV.8
IV.8
IV.10
IV.10
IV.10
IV.10
IV.10
IV.10
IV.10
IV.ll
IV.ll
IV.ll
IV.12
IV.12
IV.12
IVJ2
IV.12
IV.12
678331-34
679315-23
679b15
680315
68139-15
681315-28
681b28-30
681b33-34
683b28
684333-35
686324--68732
686325-28
686b2D-31
686b31-68731
68738-23
687b6
68832--4
690bl4--16
691316
691317-19
692b3-9
692b13
693b4--13
693b1D-13
693b13-14
693b26694312
100
83
56n7
55n6
112
113
71
71
56n7
100
113
100
113
72
114
55n6
70
48n52
70
102
61-2
55n6
100
48
90
695b17-19
696b2-8
696bl6-20
696b24--31
48
101
100
84
102
132
1
1
6
7
69831-7
69834
700b4--<i
70137-b1
49-50
108
50
50
70435-9
48
IV.13
IV.13
IV.13
IV.13
IV.13
MA
lA
260 Index Locorum

1
18
19
704b9-11
714b3- 7
714b20-23
49
70n31
49
716b5- 9
717.4-6
725.5
726bl-5
735.16-26
737.36- b4
739.18-20
741b11-15
742.18-b17
743bl8-25
745b2-9
753b35- 754.3
756.32
76la24-32
779.2-4
782.14-20
783b2-8
112n27
112n27
198
107
106
108
68
75n37
75
75
166n45
68,72
112n25
60n14
73
103
69, 103
B.1
B.2
B.2
B.2
982.1- 3
982.25-28
985blO-13
992.18-19
995b18- 24
995b26-27
996bl4-22
997.21-22
997.25-33
159
31n24
79n42
221n20
165
165
148n21
18n7
136n6,
158n38
B.3
B.3
B.3
B.3
B.3
B.3
f.
998b9- 21
998b22-28
998b23-24
999.6-14
999.13-14
999.16-23
1003.21-22
GA
1.2
1.2
Ll8
Ll9
ILl
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.6
11.6
lll.2
111.5
IIL11
V.l
V.3
V.3
Met.
A.l
A.2
AA
A.9
B.l
6, 137
140n10
216
223
220n18
122, 157
f.2
f.2
f.2
f.2
f.2
f.2
f .2
f.2
1003.35- 36
1003b2-3
1003b5- 14
1003b5-6
1003b6-10
1003b8-10
1003b8
1003bl4-15
f.2
f.2
f.2
1003b16- 17
1003b17
1003b221004.2
1003b22-25
1003b32-36
f .2
f .2
f.2
f.2
f.2
f.2
f.3
f .3
6.2
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.7
6.7
6.8
6.11
6.11
6.14
6.18
6.21
6.28
6.28
6.28
6.30
.1
1003b33- 34
1003b35-36
1004.5
1004.6-9
1005.22- 29
1005.26-27
1014.1-3
1016bl- 3
1016b1
1016b6-11
1017.22-30
1019.3
1019.11-12
1022.31-32
1022b15-18
1024.36-b3
1024b6-9
1024b9-16
1025.30-32
1025b7-13
197n30
145
117
135n5
163
125, 157
166
120,
183n
135n5
197n30
166n44
166
166,
166n43
167
168, 171
136n7
135n5
238
26n20
20n10
170
168
170n49
169
170
148n21,
204n47
16n1
220
218
142n14
19n8
79n42
215
74n35
142n12
18, 18n7
159
261 Index Locorum

E.1
E.1
E.2
E.2
E.2
E.2
2 .1
2.1
2.1
2 .1
2.1
2.1
2.1
1025b3G-1026.6
1025b341026.6
1026.23-32
1026.33
1026bl4-21
1026b27-33
1028.1G--15
1028.10
1028.18-20
1028.20
1028.20-31
1028.27
2 .1
2.1
2.1
2 .1
2.1
2.3
1028.28-29
1028.29-30
1028.35-36
1028bl-2
1028b2-4
1029.20-26
2.3
1029.23-24
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2 .4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2 .4
2.4
1029b14
1029bl6-18
1029b22-27
1029b22
1030.14
1030.17-27
1030.17-23
1030.17
1030.23-27
1030.25-28
1030.27-32
1030.29-b3
1030.33-34
1030b3-4
1030b8-12
31n23
209n
236
136n7
155n33
155n33
185n14
148
136n7
150
151n27
149
150,
151n26
151n28
150, 159
150
149, 153
157
180n6,
204n23
185n13,
204
189
151
154n32
152
152
152
152
149
152
156n33
160
160
116, 153
227n26
160
166n43
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
1030b11
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.7
2.9
2 .10
2.10
2.10
2.11
2 .11
2.12
103101- 3
1031.2-5
1031.7-11
1032b2- 5
1034.30-32
1035.2
1035bl4-22
1035bl6-18
1036.26-b3
1036b3G--32
2.12
2.12
2.16
H .2
H.2
H.2
H.2
H.2
H.3
H.3
H.4
H.4
H.6
H.6
H.6
8.1
8.1
1038.3-9
1038.18-21
1040b16
8.1
8.1
8.6
1030b18-24
1030b2G--21
1030b23-26
1042.4-5
1042b25
1043.2-7
1043.19-21
1043.29- b4
1043.34-37
1044.25-31
1044b8-20
1045.14-25
1045.14-17
1045.36- b5
1045b27-32
1045b361046.1
1046.11-13
1046.17-19
136n7
139
155
150
117n2,
155
155
156
155
166
126n7
204n47
82n45
118n3
18n6
118n3
74,
137n8,
220
74n35
143n15
166n43
143
188
136n7
182
204n47
190n19
51n57
107n17
127
74n35
140,142
169
150n24
189
190
190n19
177-8,
188
262 Index Locorum
8.6
8.6
8.6
8 .6
8.7
8.8
8 .8
8.8
8.10
L1
L1
L1
L1
L1
L1
L2
1.2
L2
1.2
L3
L3
1048a30-b9
1048.37- b4
1048b6-9
1048b8
1049.29-30
1049b12- 17
1050.21-23
1051.34
1052.31-34
1052.33-34
1052bl- 19
1052b7- 16
1052bl8-20
1052b31-32
1053b20-21
1053b22-24
1054.3-4
1054.14
1054.26-29
1054b3-6
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.8
K.l
K.12
1\.4-5
1055a6-7
1055.35-38
1058.21-26
1059b31-34
1068b18- 20
1\.4
1\.4
1\ .4
1\.4
1\.4
1\.5
1\.5
1\.5
1\.5
1\.5
1\.10
1070.31-33
1070.33-b10
1070bl-2
1070b12-13
1070bl6-21
1071.2-3
1071.15-17
1071.26
1071.29-35
1071.34-35
1075.14-15
191
193
192
193
185
131
192
118n3
136n7
168
169
166n45
179
172, 173
172
141
166n43
215n9
136n7
174n51
171
61n16
38
169n48
74n35
136n6
142n14
177,
204n47,
240
183
179
136n7
180
178
185
184
178, 179
184
183, 185
51n56
M.2
M.3
M.3
1077b4-11
1077b17-30
1078.5-8
M.3
M.3
M.7
N.3
1078.14-16
1078.31-b5
1081b8-10
1090b19-20
EN
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.7
1096.17-23
1096.23-29
IV.3
V.5
V.5
V.5
V.5
V.5
1096.31-34
1096b8-14
1096bl4-16
1096b16-25
1096bI7- 18
1096b24-25
1096b26-31
1096b26-29
1096b30-31
1097.3-8
1097al6-18
1097b2
1098a7-17
1098al6-17
1102.1
1104b8-9
1106b361107.2
1123b20
1133.7-29
1133al6-18
1133b7
1133b18-23
1133bI8-20
V.5
V.ll
VIL3
1133b23-26
1138.4-b14
1147a5-6
I.7
1.7
1.12
11.2
11.6
31n24
29, 239
19n7,
158
36
23n15
218n14
239
216, 217
195, 200,
201
203
197
198n38
195, 197
198
198n38
197
194-5
195
200
200
198
203
199
199
199
199
199
43
45n47
45
43
43n43,
44n46
45
5
95
263 Index Locorum

VIII.1
VIII.2
VIIl.2
VlIl.3
VIIL3
VIIL3
VIIL3
VIIL3
VIllA
VIII .4
VIIl.6
X.1
X.4
X.5
X.8
1155b13- 16
1155b17-27
1156a3-5
1156a6-8
1156a1G-16
1156al6-17
1156b12-17
1156b331157a4
1157a25- 32
1157a32
1158b5- 11
1174b31- 33
1175b361176a1
1178b31-32
234
231
181, 232
231
232
232
233
233
235
232n32
234
199
200
200
199
MM
11.11
1209a19- 35
234n37
1216a33- 37
1217b25-34
1218al- 9
1218b16-24
1235b24-30
1235b27-29
1235b301236a7
230n30
201
216
195-6
225
228
EE
L5
L8
L8
L8
VII.2
VII.2
VII.2
226
VII.2
VII.2
VIL2
VII.2
VII.2
VII.2
VII.2
VII.2
VII.2
VII.2
VII.10
VIL13
VII .15
VII.15
Pol.
L9
L9
L9
LlO
11.5
IILl
IILl
IILl
IILl
IILl
IV.1
V.3
1235b331236a2
1236a5-7
1236a15-33
1236a15-22
1236a21-22
1236a23-25
1236b15- 17
1236b17-26
1238a35- 38
1238b13- 14
1243b30- 35
1246a26-31
1249a21-b25
1249b9- 13
1257a6- 18
1257al4-17
1257b35
1258a38-b8
1264b4-6
1275a30- 33
1275a33-34
1275a34-b5
1275b5-6
1275b18-19
1288b12
1302b331303a2
229
226
227
117
144
237n41
229
227
229
230
45n47
43n42
204
144
41- 2
42
47
47
5
222
101n12
216, 221
222
222
101n12
59n12
GENERAL INDEX
abstraction 30, 239; addition and 31,

154, 178, 188, 240; in biology 82;
from change 193-4; degrees of 15,
38 (see also semi-abstraction); among
friendships 231; general cause and
47, 51; genus-species chain vs., 87;
inappropriate 47, 105; mathematical
10, 29, 154; outside mathematics 30;
other views of 30021; per se/qua and
29, 39, 51; pure 14; among souls
209; from substances 154
Academy 5- 6, 13
accident 8; good as 203; per se 19;
science of 143,151, 155n33
activity 193
actuali ty, absence of analogy among
kinds of 180. See also potentiality
adaptation of terms to subject-genus
26, 90, 92
addition, ontological 224, 235. See also
abstraction; cumulation
affection (mii17)f'aj, 79, 83, 85
Alexander Aphrodisiensis 138n9, 154,
194n26
alternating proportion, theorem
of 24-9. Sec also mathematics;
universal
ambiguity. See homonymy

analogy 10,53-115,239; absence in Cat.
and Top. 77; biological demonstration
and 89-115; common cause among
88,95- 7, 101- 8; continuous 200; demarcation of genus and 56- 8,91, 183;
flexibility and fixity in 60, 67-8, 86,
183; foca lity and 12,175,189, 240 (sec
also focality); function in 10 (see also
function); of goods 200-3; between
greatest kinds 61; in imperceptible
cases 71; in lower genera 239; other
views of 56-9 (sec also realist view;
relativist view); place in speciesgenus-analogy and wholes-parts
systems 77-86, 108; relative position
and 69; role in APo 89-99; semiabstraction and 128; among subjectgenera 26-8, 88; ubiquity in biological works 53, 53n1; among whole
animals 60. See also Being; common
cause; good; potentiality; soul
appetite 50
application argument 19, 35, 106;
adaptation and 26, 106; metabasis
and 23; mixed science and 33
Aquinas, Thomas 12
266 General Index

artefact 186
ascidian 113
auditory passages 100
autonomy 8, 33
axiom 9, 26, 91
composition of parts 80-2, 108. See

also wholes-parts system
conclusion, demonstrative 18
connatural spirit 50
connection, techniques of 4, 239-42.
See also analogy; cumulation; focality

Cook Wilson, J. 217
babbling 138
balding 103
Balme, D. 55, 92
core science 144-5; of Being 155-7,
barter 42
Being: difficulties in interpreting the
science of 136; and foeality 12,
142-3; genus of 136-43; internal
coupled terms 156- 7

crafts, analogy among the 200
unity of 169; One and 166-71,

174; prior to genesis 76. See also
demonstration, in the science of
Being; metaphysics
Berti, E. 195
bifocality 166, 190n19. See also focality
171; extended and 155,189, 194 (see

also extended science)
cumulation 13,214-24,240-1; analogy

and 13, 241; focality and 13, 207,
240-1; of friendship 232; of god
235-9; at high levels of abstraction
241; means and ends and 207; scala
naturae and 207; of soul 214-24
biological works, organization of
dating of EN and EE 225
48n51, 81, 108, 129

{3ios. Sec way of life
blood 69, 71, 100, 103, 107
blood-vessel 71, 100
bone 69, 83, 93
brain 71
defence, parts for 131

definition: in accordance with the
name 211; empty 223; in Euclid 27;
breast 67
bronze triangle 239
capitalism 47
carnivore 131
cartilage. Sec bone
categories: analogy among 175, 182;
among goods 202-4; One and 171;

in the science of Being 141-2,
144--65, 183
coextension. See extension; noocoextension
commensurability 15, 38, 40-4, 46n49,
49
common cause 49-50
generic 180, 191, 209-12, 221, 223,

232; matter in the 213, 224; nominal
and real 182; of relative terms 181;
unity of 130, 140

definitional inclusion 117, 240; in
accidental compounds 151-3; with
ends and means 195; in focal
conclusions 125; and homonymy
120; potential 215, 222, 233;

problems with 145
demonstration 7, 15, 34; accidental
22; analogy in 90-2, 100; in the

biological works 90; conclusions
of 18, 210; Euclidean 34; of focal

facts 123, 196 (see also linguistic
predication); and focality 195; at
general and specific levels 25-8;
of natural facts 123, 196 (see also
267 General Index

natural predication); parts of 34;
in the science of Being 136, 158,
164
difference and otherness 78
Dionysius 210
division: dichotomous 74, 220; genus
as subject to 9n7, 11, 21; by
multiple differentiae 74. See also
species-genus-analogy system
doctor. See medicine as example
dualizer lID, 113
dunamis. See potentiality
ear 131
eggshell 72
embedded terms 32-6
embryology 58, 75
ends 230. See also means and ends
essence 151-5
Euclid 24-9, 33-7
eudaimonia 129, 199
evolution, theory of 130
exchange 43-5
explanation: asymmetry in 97; external
and internal 130-1; flexibility in
114; generic and specific 105 (see
also demonstration, at general and
specific levels). See also middle term
extended science 144-6, 156-7; of
Being 165, 171. See also core science
extension 158; of animal parts 61; in
demonstration 91; as part of definition 98. See also non-coextension
eye 131
familiarity (yvwP'fWV) 108, 191, 210
feather 69, 102
Ferejohn, M. 134
figures, series of 214. See also series;
soul
flesh 67
focality, 11, 116-74; analogy and

12, 176, 193, 200, 205, 239 (see
also analogy); in biology 129;
demonstrations and 122; in EE
225-31; in EN 197, 231; homonymy
and 120, 240; perfective series
and 208; predications in 159-64;
relation of, broken 192; relations
of 118, 145, 197; in the science of
Being 12, 134-74, 177; subordinate
science and 135; transitivity of
125, 157; as two-step process 144;
various cases of 44, 148, 194,
230-1. See also bifocality; normal
science
food 132
formal cause 98
formalist view of analogy. See relativist
view
Form Numbers 217
form as substrate 185. See also
substrate
Frede, M. 161, 236
friendship 224-35; accidental 232;
complete 234; non-cumulative
features of 233; objects of 225, 231
function(s): analogy among 72-4,213;
general and specific 44; similarity,
difference, and 82
functionalist view of analogy. See
realist view
general account. See definition, generic
Generation of Animals, role of 48n5l.
See also biological works
generation of parts, order of 75
genus: ambiguity in term 54-5, 78;
Aristotelian vs. Platonic 216-20;
of Being, see Being, genus of; and
commensurability 38; demarcation
of analogy and, see analogy,
268 General Index

demarcation of genus and; and
difference 79, 142; of series 215-16;
and species 138, 220. Sec also
division; focality; subject-genus
gill 101
Gill, M.L. 193
god 204, 235-9
good 194-206; " accident 203;
apparent 225-9; and categories
204-5; foeality of 195, 206; god as
focus of 204; independence of 231;
potentiality and 204
Gotthelf. A . 56
greatest kind (}liyWTO/.l yivos) 61
hair 69-70, 102, 131
halo 34
happiness. Sec eudaimonia
health 157
heap 183; Being as 138-40; unity of
171
hearing 104
heart 71
homonymy 5, 40, 94, 160, 195-{;,
210-12; of Being 148, 201; in
definitions 40, 181, 212, 232; and
foeality 119-20, 134; of good 201;
of potentiality 190
honour 199
hoof 69-70
horn 107
hylomorphism 80-6; and abstraction
47
ichor 69
incidental. Sec accident
incommensurable number 217
incomplete abstraction. See semiabstraction
induction 188, 191
instrumental parts of locomotion 48
intelligence 73, 103

in terdisciplinarity 130, 145
internal unity 168, 172-3
interpretation of Aristotle's corp us as
unity 4
irrational quantities 27
joint 50
kind-crossing. See metabasis
knowledge, relational 5-6
Kullmann, W. 56
land animal 131
linguistic predication 118,124. See a/so
natural predication
locomotion, animal 39, 47-8, 73;
abstraction in 47; four-point theory
of 48
longevity 94-7, 211; and analogy 97
lung 101
manufactured goods 39
many 173. See a/so One
material cause 98
mathematics, universal 10, 237-8. See
also alternating proportion
matter: definition in terms of 213;
genus as 58, 74; logical vs. physical
76; as substrate 185. Sec also
potentiality
me,ming 98, 121
means and ends 205, 237; as focally
related 196-7
measure 166, 172-4; and essence 172
medicine as example 11, 119, 144
metabasis 9-10, 21-2, 32-3, 87; and
application argument 23; between
closely related genera 22-4; and
scala naturae 110-14
metaphor 177, 184
269 General Index

metaphysics: general 236; as normal
science 161-2; and predication
relations 163. See also Being
middle term 94--5, 159

mind . See nous
minor term, focus as 126
mixed science 31-7

money 47
more and less 58, 69, 79, 84, 101-2;
and scala naturae 110
mouth 72
Muskens, G.L 56
nail 70
names 117; generic 24, 32; lack of 68,
84, 93, 109

natural dependence 150
natural predication 159,162-4; identity
of focal and 164

necessity 8, 20, 157, 159
need lxPEia) 43- 5
non-coextension of terms 107
non-contradiction, principle of 237- 8.
See also axiom; principle
non-substance 145, 156. See also
accident; category; substance
normal science 118-19, 144. See also
foeality
normativity 109, 113
nous 200, 209, 212

offices, indefinite 222
One 166- 74; categories of 169 (see
also categories); as divisible 173n51;
internal and relational 168, 171;
measure as essence of 172 (see also
measure); science of 166. See also
Being
opposites 166
orthodox view of analogy. See realist
view
otherness 78; and animal composition
81
Owen, G.E.L 116, 134, 175, 190, 194
Owens, j. 176
packing 36
paronymy 8n5, 127n8, 170
particulars 7
parts of animals: corresponding to
whole animals 61, 76, 84; as
essential 100; order of generation of
75
Patzig, G. 236
Pellegrin, P. 55, 63- 6, 73-4, 92, 110
perfective series. See series, perfective
per se 4, 8, 11, 41, 45, 81, 188;
accident 19; goods 198; predication
and abstraction 15, 31; predication
and analogy 86-7; predication and
confusion of terms 42; predication
and focality 119-22, 124, 146-8,

192, 196; predication and metabasis
22-3; predication and qua 40,
90, 98, 107, 135; predication and

subordinate science 135; specific,
predications 16-17, 149, 154, 161;

tension between qua and 32, 37, 53,
109, 128, 239. See also qua
perversion 228-9, 235
Plato 5,136,140,143,177,195- 6,200,

202, 205, 218-19, 242
pleasure 199, 226-32
Posterior Anaiytics, importance of 4
potentiality 177-94; analogy and 191,
205; compared with good 204;

different kinds of 178; focality and
191; in persistence and change 190;
as a principle 177, 180; and the
science of Being 194
pounce. See bone
practical syllogism 50
270 General Index

practical wisdom 199
precausal stage of inquiry 108
predicables, four 147
predication, vs. predicate 161. See
also linguistic predication; natural
predication, per Sf, qu.a
principle 7, 80, 159, 178-9
priority 150, 218, 220; in friendship
series 232; natural 183, 185, 215,
220, 223, 233; ontological 161-2,
232
Proclus 25n18
proper (OiKEtOV) 41
proportional analogy 43. See also

alternating proportion
qua 4, 8, 81, 86; abstraction and
29-30; analogy and 11, 86; locality
and 122, 126; metabasis and 22-3;
tension between per se and 32, 37,
53, 109, 128, 239. See also per se
realist view of analogy 56, 92; in

potentiality 177-8, 186; resolu tion
with relativists 98. See also relativist
view
recursive unification 13n13. See also
cumulation
relational unity 168, 171
relative terms, definition of 181
relativist view of analogy 57, 59, 82,
92, 177, 179; resolution with realists
98. See also Balme; Pellegrin; realist
view
relevance criterion, focal relation as
125
rest, point of 50
restriction of demonstrative terms 92.
See also adaptation
Robinson, D. 195
root 72
Same 168, 171

scala naturae 109-15, 240; analogy
and 58, 111; lack 01 explanatory
power Ill, 114; more and less and
112, 115; psychological capacities and
112
scales 69-70, 102
Selachia 132
self-predication 218-19
semen 107
semi-abstraction 10, 14, 38, 51-2, 158,
183, 241; and core and extended
science 129; and subject genus 51-2.
See also abstraction
sensation 131
separability 185, 211
series: first member of 220; and focality
207-8, 214; 01 locality, an~logy, and
cumulation 241; of Form Numbers
217; genus of 216, 221; kinds 01
235; limiting the 224; perfective
207-8, 222, 235; species in 221; 01
substances 237
sight 200
Similar 168, 171
similarity 208, 224, 233. See also more
and less
sleep 73
snub 154, 156; ambiguities of 38; and
bandy 32; distinct from accidental
predication 155; and focality 144;
and mathematical abstraction 31;
and mixed science 35; and per se
31
soul 208-24; analogical account of
208, 210-14; compared with figures
214-15; cumulative account of 208,
214-24; defined by actualiry and
potentiality 212; as primarily intellectual 213; problems concerning
208; relations among faculties of 223;
................................
.,
271 General Index
serial order of 214; traditional

concept of 213; universal account of
208. See also series
species-genus-analogy (SGA) system
77-86, 108; different from dichotomy
78; hierarchy of 77; reasons for the
system 86; relation to wholes-parts
(WP) system 81-2
Speusippus 5, 239
sponges 113
subject-genus, 14, 20-1, 30, 239;
absence of species in 54; and analogy
10; core and extended 128; different
from divisionary genus 54, 118;
different from substrate 127; and
explanation 7; identity conditions of
14, 20-1; Euclid and 25; isolation of
3, 9; multiplicity of, in mixed science
33; principles in 26, 50; problems
with 3. See also genus
subordinate science 9, 37. See also
mixed sciences
substance 151, 170, 184. See also
Being; metaphysics; non-substance
substrate 149, 185-7; form and matter
as 185; of non -substance 150;
pre-existing and coexisting 186
subtraction. See abstraction
UlJVn-At:'iV 198
superordinate science. See subordinate
science; mixed science
syllogistic 107. See also demonstration
talons 69
taxonomy 55, 57
teeth 68
teleology, universal 133
theology 235-9. See also god
theorem 211, 233. See also demonstration, conclusions of
third-man argument 140
Ti. E(rn. See what-is-it
Timaeus 133
touch 104
trade, retail 42, 47
traditional language 78, 107
traditional view of analogy. See realist
view
transitivity. See focality, transitivity of
trunk 70
underlying thing. See substrate
universal: and cause 7, 97; and focality
120; and qua 17; science 3, 6, 7, 13
unity: accidental 170; within greatest
kind 61; internal and relational 168,
172- 3. See also One
universal predication 159, 162, 164. See
also nat ural predication; linguistic
predication
usury 47
value 41, 200. See also exchange; trade
virtue 109; friendship 228-30, 231-5
water animals 131
way of life (/3io,) 48, l30
wealth 42; and abstraction 43
what-is-it (Ti. fun) 147, 149
whole animals 60. See also parts of
animals
wholes-parts system 80, 107; and cause
86; and function 81; and position
81; relation to species-genus-analogy
sys tem 81. See also species-genusanalogy system
womb 68,72
Woods, M. 218
PHOENIX SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES
1 Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood edited by Mary E. White

2 ArbitH of Elegance: A Study of the Life and Works of C. Petronius
Gilbert Bagnani
3 Sop hocles the Playwright S.M. Adams

4 A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style C,M.A. Grube
5 Coastal Demes of Attica: A Study of the Policies of Kleisthcncs C.W.]. Eliot

6 Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Piotinu5, and Origen John M. Rist
7 Pythagoras and Early Pythagorean ism l.A. Philip
8 Plato's Psychology T.M. Robinson

9 Greek Fortifications F.E. Winter
10 Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery Elaine Fantham
11 The Orators in Cicero's 'Brutus'; Prosopography and Chronology G.V. Sumner
12 'Caput' and C%nate: Towards a History of Latc Roman Taxation
Walter GoHart
13 A Concordance to the Works of Amrnianus Marcellinus Geoffrey Archbold

14 Faffax opus: Poet and Reader in the Elegies of Propertius John Warden
15 Pindar's 'Olympian One': A Commentary Douglas E. Gerber

16 Greek and Roman Mechanical Water-Lifting Devices: The History of a
Technology John Peter Oleson
17 The Manuscript Tradition of Propertius James L. Butrica

18 Pannenides of Elea Fragments: A Text and Translation with an Introduction
edited by David Gallop
19 The Phonological Interpretation of Ancient Greek: A Pandialectal Analysis

Vit Bubenfk
20 Studies in the Textual Tradition o/Terence John N. Grant

21 The Nature
0/ Early Greek Lyric: Three Preliminary Studies
R.t. Fowler
22 Heraclitus Fragments: A Text and Translation with a Commentary edited by

T.M. Robinson
23 Th e Historical Method of Herodotus Donald Lateiner

24 Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100-30 Be Richard D. Sullivan
25 The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philoso phical Growth John M. Rist

26 Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC Michael Alexander
27 Monumental Tomb s of the Helleni stic Age: A Study of Selected Tomb s from the
Pre-C lassica l to the Early Imperial Era Janos Fedak
28 The Local Magistrates of Roman Spain Leonard A. Curchin
29 Empedocles The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Tran slation with an
Introduction edited by Brad Inwood
30 Xenophanes of Colophon Fragments: A Text and Translation with a
Commentary J.H. Lesher
31 Festivals and Legends: The Formation of Greek Cities in the Light of Public
Ritual Noel Robertson
32 Reading and Variant in Petronius: Studies in the French Humanists and Their
Manuscript Sources Wade Richardson
33 Th e Excavations of San Giovanni di Ruoti, Volume 1 Alastair M. Small and
Robert J. Buck
34 Catullus Edited with a Textual and Interpretative Commentary by D.ES.

Thomson
35 The Excavations 0/ San Giovanni di Ruoti, Volume 2: The Small Finds c.J .
Simpson, with contributions by R. Reece and
J.J. Rossiter
36 The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus Fragments: A Text and Translation

with a Commentary by c.C.W. Taylor
37 Imagination of a Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda KA Hazzard
38 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science Malcolm Wilson

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MALCOLM WILSON

Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

@ University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2000

Printed on acid-free paper

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing

CHAPTER 1: GENUS, ABSTRACTION, AND

Analogy in APo; Passages and Discussion 91

Focality and Pcr Se Predication 122

The Genus of Being 136

Matter and Potentiality 177

BIB L lOG RAP H Y

Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

Aristotle is renowned for having been the first to create autonomous

sciences and independent disciplines. By distinguishing physics, political

damental questions as the unity of the science of Being and metaphysics,

4 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

kinds of friendship. In treating each technique in turn and with an eye

Many of the basic concepts of Aristotle's formal scientific methodology, like

of tools of various vintages scattered haphazardly throughout the corpus,

Finally, by describing these techniques in terms of the central concepts of

confirmed that Aristotle's philosophy forms a basically consistent unity,

6 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

and ground of knowledge. Plato's nephew, Speusippus, while rejecting the

As a member of Plato's Academy and as a philosopher in the Platonic

for a universal science (998b22-28).

1 According to Aristotle (APo II,13 97a6-19). See my 1997a.

8 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

example, can be demonstrated as having interior angles equal to two right

a proof is said to be an accidental proof, because 2R does not belong to

10 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

9 This is Aristotle's standard pattern of demonstration in the PA . We perceive that a bird

12 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

13 Grice 1988, 190--2, has called this 'recursive unification.'

for identifying and demarcating subject-genera. Next, I shall introduce

15 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

Demarcating the Genus

modified Revised Oxford Translation [ROT])

16 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

relevant to predication, all involve definitional relations. Only the fourth

refer to a causal rather than a definitional relationship. According to the

17 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

18 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

would not belong to isosceles qua isosceles

between the terms of a demonstrative conclusion. Whereas the terms of a

19 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

20 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

The subject-genus is the underlying subject matter of a demonstration,

21 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

22 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

Aristotle calls this error metabasis. Further elucidation of the problem

23 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

kept separate, and metabasis is forbidden.

24 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

Aristotle introduces this case as a parallel to the triangle / isosceles-2R case,

over the particulars kinds of triangle. Formerly the law of alternating

quiring multiple parallel solutions, though in fact it was a generic problem

25 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability

less-developed work on proportion into two books of the Elements, book V

The subject-genus is different in each of the specific sciences, and the

26 Aristotle's Theory of the Unity of Science

27 Genus, Abstraction, and Commensurability