Case 1:11-cr-00425-ENV Document 402 Filed 12/01/14 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 4039

Michael H. Gold
350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4400
New York, New York
10118
Tel (212) 838-0699
Fax (212) 868 0013
December 1, 2014

The Honorable Eric V. Vitaliano

United States District Judge
United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Re: United States v. Anthony Christian, et al., 12-350 (ENV)
Dear Judge Vitaliano:
I am writing on behalf of my client, Anthony Christian, pursuant to Rules 29 and 33 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to respectfully request that the Court set aside the
verdict of guilty on all counts and enter a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, order a new
trial.
In reviewing a Rule 29 and Rule 33 motion the Court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, and must presume that the jury has properly carried out its
functions of evaluating credibility of witnesses, finding the facts, and drawing justifiable
inferences. A verdict will be overruled only if no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as
sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United
States v. Campbell, 702 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C.Cir.1983) (citations omitted); see also United States
v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1125 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1233, 89
L.Ed.2d 342 (1986); United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir.1981).
Here, the defendant was convicted of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1962(c) and (d) (Counts One and Two; the
conspiracy to murder members of a rival drug trafficking organization in or about and between
January 1994 and June 1995 (Racketeering Act Two); the conspiracy to murder Corey Brooker,
also known as Shank Bank, in or about and between March 1999 and June 1999 (Racketeering
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Act Three); the murder of, and conspiracy to murder, Jerome Estella, also known as Boo Boo,
on or about June 19, 1999 (Racketeering Act Four); the conspiracy to murder William Jones aka
Budha in or about and between January, 2010 and February, 2010 (Racketeering Act Five);
and three instances of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute (Racketeering Acts
Six, Seven and Eight). All three defendants are also charged with substantive counts of
conspiring to distribute cocaine, cocaine base and marijuana, in violation of Title 21, United
States Code, Section 846 (Count Three), and the unlawful use of firearms in furtherance of those
racketeering and drug trafficking crimes, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
924(c) (Count Six). In addition, Anthony Christian was convicted of a substantive count based
on the murder in aid of racketeering of Jerome Estella, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1959(a)(1) (Count Four); Anthony Christian and Harvey Christian were convicted
of a substantive count of conspiring to murder Budha in aid of racketeering, in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1959(a)(5) (Count Five); and Anthony Christian, Harvey
Christian and Quinn were convicted of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in
violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) (Counts Seven, Eight and Nine).
Quinn also was convicted of a separate count of using firearms in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime (Count Ten) and with continuing to distribute crack cocaine while on pretrial
release (Count Eleven).
We respectfully urge the Court to set aside the verdict as to each count for lack of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. This motion will address in specific the RICO, murder and
conspiracy to murder convictions.
As properly charged by the Court, the essence of a RICO enterprise is the continuity of
membership, the continuing nature and existence of the enterprise and a relatedness of predicate
acts both to each other and to the enterprise. Here, the proof is lacking in all regards.
With the exception of the defendants Anthony and Harvey Christian, no other person was
involved or associated with the enterprise for longer than 2 years and no proof was offered of the
existence of the enterprise between 2000-2001 and 2010. In effect, the government proved, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a series of unconnected conspiracies to sell
varying amounts of drugs in various places by a constantly changing core of sellers. Anthony
Bestman was a supplier of crack to Harvey Christian in 1991-1993 before fading from contact
other than to pay the defendants rent and back rent in the late 1990s. ( Tr. 106-108, 179-180,
220). Lamar Goodwine was a rival in the mid-1990s and had gun battles with the defendants in
1995. He observed them making sales in 1998-1999 and assumed further sales were being
conducted in 2010. (Tr. 1114, 1120, 1131, 1135, 1140). Amos Boone had one conversation with
Anthony Christian in 1997-98 and claimed to have observed a hand to hand sale of drugs in
2001. (Tr. 1445, 1472-73). Paul Ford was a supplier for one year in the mid-1990s and claimed

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knowledge of their continued drug dealing from 1998-2000. (Tr. 849-850). Brian Humphreys
was a self-described enforcer in the late 1990s.
After 2001, there is a glaring gap in the alleged functioning and existence of the
enterprise. Anthony Britt, Felix Grant and William Cothren testified about transactions after
2010, although Britt stated he never sold or bought drugs from the defendant and Grant never
even mentioned his name. (Tr. 1340-1342). To fill this evidentiary void, the government
introduced a series of unconnected acts and seizures.
In 2004, Anthony Christian was arrested after an altercation with Awie Kowie. Kowie, a
former college football player, tried to rob the defendant of a $5.00 bag of marijuana and when
he tried to prevent the theft, he was dangerously assaulted by Kowie. Specifically, Kowie placed
his hand around the defendants throat and would not let go. (Tr. 1278,1283-1289). A witness
called for help and Harvey and James Christian came out to assist their brother. During the
ensuing fight, Kowie was cut.
In what could only be described as tortured logic, the government claimed that this
intervening act by one brother in defense of another somehow constitutes an effort to promote
and preserve the enterprise. The idea that anything was running through Harvey Christians mind
other than to get Kowies hand off of his brothers throat is ridiculous.
Additionally, the government introduced evidence of an altercation between the Christian
brothers and the police in January, 2005, during an attempt to make an arrest of some loiterers at
55 Bowen. ( Tr. 1953-1959).There was no testimony about who the loiterers were and the
likelihood is that they were not drug workers or associates of the enterprise since the police did
not recognize them. ( Tr. 1978). Critically, the arresting officers, who regularly patrolled the area
and made arrests near 55 Bowen were unable to identify any of the so called workers the
government claimed to be associated with the enterprise. ( Tr. 1979). Nevertheless, the
government argued that the attempt to prevent the arrest was further proof of the enterprise and
the desire to protect its home base from police activity. Without linking the loiterers to the
defendant or the enterprise in any way completely belies that argument. Without such linkage, it
was pure speculation to argue any connection.
As well, the government offered proof of gun seizures in March, 2009, from the lobby of
55 Bowen, the fortress of the enterprise where the defendants could not afford to pay rent, and
from 186 Park Hill, where a machine gun was found in a closet and a handgun was in the open.
(Tr. 1311). No fingerprint, DNA or other forensic evidence linked any of these guns to the
defendant and no prosecution was undertaken against him. There was not even an attempt at trial
to link the defendant forensically or testimonially with the seizure of weapons or drugs in the
lobby of 55 Bowen or the apartment at 186 Park Hill.
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When the defendants apartment was searched in February, 2010, no money, gold or
other assets linking him to or evidencing a large scale drug operation was found. (Tr. 1602). In
fact, at the time of the search Anthony Christian possessed $32.00 and 26 $5.00 bags of
marijuana. No witness or other evidence established or even suggested that he lived a luxurious
lifestyle or otherwise flaunted the proceeds of a 20 year old RICO enterprise. To the contrary,
prior to 2011, they even lacked basic necessities such as food and shoes. (Tr. 1721). It simply
defies credulity that anyone perpetrating such a massive narcotics enterprise over such a lengthy
period of time would not have any recognizable income or assets from its commission. And
could not pay $1500 monthly rent.
The failure to establish the continued existence and operation of the enterprise is a fatal
flaw and the count must be dismissed.
Anthony Britt testified about the short lived conspiracy to kill William Jones aka
Budha and his testimony could not have been clearer. Britt, who never sold drugs, made
money with or took or gave orders to Anthony Christian, had a violent relationship with Budha. (
Tr. 1771). The dispute was personal and had nothing to do with drugs, turf or a criminal
enterprise.
Q And it was at this time when you started this verbal
altercation with the individual you identified as Buddah,
right?
A Yeah. Started by myself. I started it.
Q You started it?
A Yeah.
Q It had nothing to do with Anthony Christian?
A Not at all. I started it.
Q It had nothing to do with drugs?
A It had nothing to do with drugs.
Q It had nothing to do with this Christian brothers
enterprise, right?
A He didn't acknowledge me.
Q So that was personal?
A He didn't acknowledge me.
Q And that was a personal dispute that you had with
Buddah that had nothing to do with the Christian brothers or
the sale of drugs, correct?
A It was on my own.
THE COURT: That's a yes or no.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. GOLD: Yes, okay.
( Tr. 1777-78).
In fact, Anthony Christian intervened and tried to be a peacemaker during this personal dispute
and prevent violence from escalating but Britt was intent on pursuing his revenge. (Tr. 1778).
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Budha disrespected Britt which led to shootings between the two and ultimately involved
the defendant when Budha shot at him and Harvey Christian while they were in their apartment
at 55 Bowen. Harvey Christian told Britt that he wanted to go after Budha because, after the
shooting at the building, Budha made him afraid to go outside. (Tr. 1779-80). According to Britt,
after the shooting, again having nothing to do with the functioning or operation of the enterprise,
Britt, Anthony and Harvey Christian went out looking for Budha in a street version of selfdefense. Not finding him, the feud quickly dissipated and, much to Britts consternation, within a
month the long time friends had made peace. (Tr. 1728-29).
It is beyond cavil that whatever occurred between Britt and Budha and ultimately
involved the Christian brothers had nothing to do with drugs or the enterprise. As such, the
conspiracy to kill Budha as a matter of law was not done in aid of racketeering and could not be
a predicate RICO act or substantive offense. Accordingly, it must be dismissed.
The murder and conspiracy to murder conviction of Jerome Estella, aka Boo Boo, and
Cory Brooker, aka Shankbank, was predicated on the testimony of Brian Humphreys and, to a
lesser extent Paul Ford. Their testimony was incredible as a matter of law and the counts must be
dismissed.
Ordinarily, determining the credibility of witnesses falls within the purview of the jury
and will not be disturbed by the courts. United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713-714 (2nd
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). However, that determination must be based upon
rational evaluation and must be reversed if the underlying testimony is so incredible that no
reasonable juror could believe him. United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d. 384, 388 (2d. Cir.
1980); see also Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 794-795 ( 9th Cir. 1963). In light of the
wildly inconsistent and admittedly perjurious testimony of the two star witnesses, the deference
normally accorded a jury finding must be disregarded.
Brian Humphreys testimony was incredible as a matter of law and no reasonable juror
could have credited his oath. He is a lifelong criminal who has sold multiple drugs, committed
multiple robberies and murders and told multiple lies. He told at least 7 stories, some under oath,
to various law enforcement officials, both admitting and denying his culpability in the murder of
Jerome Estella. He admittedly fabricated the identities of fictitious perpetrators, falsely
implicated James Christian and lied about his own and others involvement in the heinous crime,
all the while with a singular purpose; to protect himself. That same sense of self preservation
prompted his continued adherence to his final version pursuant to his second cooperation
agreement.
Throughout his many police and law enforcement interviews, Humphreys, like Ford,
concededly sensed what they wanted him to say and he willingly complied. He anticipated the
governments interests and contoured his testimony to fit their theories. Humphreys testimony
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was inescapable: he falsely implicated the Christian brothers in the 1992 murder of Barry Blue
and lied about being paid by Anthony Christian to kill Estella because that is what he believed
the government wanted to hear. He concocted stories to ensure his own receipt of a 5k1 letter
without regard for the truth. In the absence of any objectively corroborative evidence, it simply
cannot be said that a rational juror could believe him. Clearly, the jury was more impressed with
redressing the horrific murder he committed than they were in examining the latent incredibility
of his testimony.
Ford, too, fails any objective test of credibility. He suffered from the same fatal flaw as
Humphreys; both are inveterate criminals and liars who admittedly tailored their testimony to
what they thought the police expected. Their concern and interest was not to tell the truth but to
tell a story that the government would accept. He lied when convenient and changed his story
when challenged.
As Humphreys invented imaginary murderers, Ford was oblivious to the reason and fact
of Estellas killing. He never authorized nor approved of it in advance and only learned from the
defendant that it resulted from some dispute between Humphreys and Estella. Like Humphreys,
everything he said was designed in hopes of avoiding any lengthy term of imprisonment.
Eventually, his testimony evolved with each passing police or law enforcement interview as he
shaped it to satisfy perceived government approbation. An oath to Humphreys and Ford was
nothing more than a ministerial act to perform in order to gain favored treatment.
When witnesses calculate their testimony to conform to law enforcement expectations
and repeatedly take an oath and lie, they cannot be relied upon by a reasonable person in a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When the truth is not an imperative but merely a
temporally useful device when falsity fails, no reasonable juror could believe him. United
States v. Shulman, supra. Concededly, credibility is generally the province of the jury, but if a
Court will not intercede after such a demonstrable disregard for the truth and lack of fundamental
credibility and character, it is difficult to contemplate a set of circumstances under which a jury
verdict will be overturned.
The governments rebuttal summation improperly marshalled the evidence and severely
prejudiced the defendant by selectively and unfairly referencing trial testimony and by vouching
for its witnesses. The cumulative effect of these errors substituted argument for fact and deprived
the defendant of a fair trial. Since the evidence was so weak as to the charged murder and murder
conspiracies, the improper summation undoubtedly swayed the jury into an unsupported verdict.
Concededly, a defendant seeking to overturn a verdict based upon prosecutorial error in
the rebuttal summation faces a heavy burden. United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 123
(2d. Cir. 2000); United States v. Farhane, 634 F3d. 127, 167 (2d Cir. 2011). The defendant
must show not simply that a particular summation comment was improper, but that the comment,
viewed against the entire argument to the jury, and in the context of the entire trial, was so
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severe and significant as to have substantially prejudiced him, id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted), such that the resulting conviction [was] a denial of due process, United
States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 227 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Shareef, 190 F.3d 71,
78 (2d Cir.1999)).
In several instances, the government argued and read isolated, selected trial testimony
that misrepresented the record and the argument of counsel. In so doing, it intended and
succeeded in minimizing the central attack against the cooperators credibility and improperly
reinforced the governments repeated effort to assure the truthfulness of these witnesses because
of their fear that the cooperation agreement would be voided if they lied. Based on the record,
the defendant vigorously argued that the threat of a breach of the agreement was empty and that
the witnesses were basing their testimony not on the truth but on what they perceived the
government wanted them to say. We never argued that the government affirmatively suggested,
implied or directed false testimony. That does not change now. To the contrary, the argument
focused on the manipulative and calculating decision by the cooperators to fabricate, enhance or
otherwise shape their testimony in ways the witnesses believed would satisfy the government
and, thereby, result in a favorable 5k1 letter.
During summation, I cited the several instances of the cooperating witnesss breaches
either through lying or committing new crimes which had little or no impact on their respective
agreements. In fact, virtually every witness had lied or committed a new crime, the most
egregious example, of course, being Brian Humphreys, yet each testified pursuant to an
agreement. Certainly, the government was permitted to counter the argument, as they did, with
reference to the additional 5 year penalty faced by Humphreys in the second agreement and the
unresolved status of William Cothrens agreement. The other six agreements remained
untouched.
However, the government went well beyond the record of those instances and continued
to advance its argument while misstating the record in the process. First, the government sought
to undermine the defense argument that the cooperators lied by calling it a tactic and one that
was routinely employed by defense lawyers as if there was something wrong and sleazy with its
presentation:
So the defense lawyers have resorted to
a classic defense tactic: You don't like the
discussion, you've got to change the subject. Don't talk
about the defendants' crimes; talk about the crimes that the
cooperating witnesses have committed. Don't focus on the
proof of the defendants' guilt; focus on things that don't
matter and hope that the jury doesn't catch it. Kick up a
smokescreen and gamble that you'll say look, it seems like
these guys are guilty, but there's just so much here and I
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don't want to have to sort it out. So hopefully Anthony

Christian, Harvey Christian and Jason Quinn can just be
someone else's problem.
(Tr. 2567, emphasis added).
It is not a classic defense tactic to attack the credibility of an accuser but, rather, a
legitimate, permissible and time honored method of raising reasonable doubt. The cooperators
were the heartbeat of the trial and assailing their credibility was not a smokescreen but the very
essence of the defense. It mattered. Stating it as such was an attack on the integrity of counsel
and an implication that there was something ordinary, formulaic and sleazy in making the
argument. As the Court, and the government, is well aware, witnesses testifying pursuant to
cooperating agreements are subjected to special scrutiny not as a tactic but as a central core of
assessing the credibility of the witness. Every Court charge, as here, includes language
addressing cooperating witnesses and the need to look closely at any witness who stands to
benefit by their testimony. Suggesting that arguments assailing witness testimony was just a
typical, unworthy tactic that should be summarily ignored was akin to dismissively saying we
were asking for an acquittal based upon some legal technicality. Reasonable doubt is not a
technicality and attacking a cooperating witness is not a tactic.
The government had overnight to prepare its remarks. This was not a fleeting,
spontaneous or isolated response to a surprise defense argument but a determined and
coordinated effort to suggest that counsel was doing something typically improper that defense
lawyers do in what amounted to a sleazy tactic to make Anthony Christian somebody elses
problem. The implication was very clear that an acquittal would result in the defendant
committing additional crimes and be someone elses problem in the community and,
ultimately, at another trial. They further suggested that counsel was asking them to shirk their
duty by ignoring the evidence. This is patently unfair and untrue. We properly challenged the
credibility of the witnesses and 1) dismissing the argument as a typical and unsavory defense
tactic; 2) categorizing the argument as an effort to ignore the evidence and make the jury
responsible for the future crimes that undoubtedly would be committed by the defendant if they
acquitted; 3) telling the jury not to make Anthony Christian somebody elses problem and, 4)
impugning the integrity of counsel by demeaning its efforts, is unfair, prohibited and requires
vacating the convictions. United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990).
As well, on summation I referenced Felix Grants testimony, without quotation, as an
example of witnesses providing the government with what they believed they needed in order
to secure the cooperation agreement. After admonishing the jury that counsel have not been
careful with the facts in this case, the government on rebuttal sought to discredit my argument
by selectively quoting from the trial transcript and leaving out the critical questioning I referred
to that was a mere seven questions after the cited passage:
Mr. Gold told you yesterday that when I asked Felix
Grant what he was required to do under his cooperation
agreement, Mr. Gold told you that Mr. Grant responded that he
was obligated to tell the Government what they need, "Just
tell the Government what they need and I will get my letter."
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Look at the transcripts, ladies and gentlemen. This

is page 2079, direct examination of Felix Grant.
"Question: Did you plead guilty pursuant to an
agreement?"
"Answer: Yes, sir."
"Question: What kind of agreement?"
"Answer: If I cooperate with the government, the
government will write me a letter, if everything went
according to. I told the truth and helped the government out,
I will receive a letter at the end."
Mr. Gold told you yesterday that Mr. Grant made it
seem that truth-telling was an afterthought and really what he
had to do was give the Government what it needed, but that's
not what the transcript said.
(Tr. 2570 emphasis added).
In fact, that is precisely what the transcript said only the government chopped off the
reading and never told the jury. Seven questions after the cited testimony, the witness, still on
direct examination, was asked what he expected the 5k1 letter would say:
Question: And what does the letter say?
Answer: I worked with the Government. I provided
all the information they needed and I kept my end of the
bargain basically.
(emphasis added).
As seen, Mr. Grant testified exactly as argued; to wit, that he expected the government to advise
the sentencing Court that he provided all the information the government needed.
Nevertheless, the government affirmatively stated that the transcript did not reflect what it truly
states.
It is one thing for the government to read and cite transcripts that are favorable to its
position. They certainly are not required to raise defense points that contradict. However, that
right does not give license to denying what the transcript says, particularly when the defense has
no way of correcting that obvious misstatement. The net result is that the jury was told, without
correction, that the defense made up testimony that was not in the record when a mere seven
questions after the cited reference, the testimony plainly says what the defense argued. Since I
repeatedly and affirmatively refrained from attacking the government personally, the jury had no
reason to confirm that the transcript was properly read and were left with the mistaken
impression that I had attempted to mislead them. Again, in conjunction with the attacks on
counsel that we were employing classic defense tactics to distract the jury, this selective
citation of the record was designed and effectively impugned the integrity of counsel as a means
to undermine his arguments.
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In another instance, the government stated:

Ladies and gentlemen, I submit that Paul Ford, like
all the cooperating witnesses, don't dare accuse these
defendants of things that they didn't do because it's too
risky, because as all the cooperators told you, they don't
know what the other proof is, and if they get caught in a lie,
they're going to have a lot to answer for.
(Tr. 2583 emphasis added).
All the cooperators most assuredly did not testify that they were unaware of the other
proof in the case. In fact, Paul Ford testified that he not only was aware of Brian Humphreyss
testimony but that he had read transcripts of it and had also heard at least one recording from the
wiretaps before deciding to cooperate. (Tr. 879, 880).Other witnesses simply were not asked
about their knowledge of the evidence in the case. Some were. However, the blanket statement
on rebuttal that no witness was aware of the testimony or other proof in the case is inaccurate and
amounts to improper bolstering and vouching for the witnesses as a collective group. Ford was
acutely aware of Humphreys testimony and the government improperly vouched for other
witnesses lack of knowledge when they werent even asked. In essence, the government testified
to facts that were not presented and assured the jury that it had private information that
confirmed the defendants guilt.
Finally, the government made an overarching argument that the jury should believe the
cooperators because they can be assured that the government did everything within its power to
corroborate and convince themselves that the witnesses were telling the truth. In effect, the
government advised the jury that they should trust the testimony because the government did.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Government takes our
witnesses as we find them, but let me be very, very clear, I'm not playing
hot potato with these cooperating witnesses. What's the expression, the
buck stops here. We represent the United States Government.
We have the burden of proof. The defendants chose these men,
but we chose to call them as witnesses and to present their
testimony to you, and we did that because we believed that
their testimony was important, it was probative, it provided
you with a more full sense of who these defendants are, what
they were about, and what they did.
That said, we didn't present their testimony lightly
or cavalierly, or without regard to the crimes they've
committed in their lives. At every turn when a cooperator
told us something, agents and prosecutors went back and said
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what can we do to corroborate what we've been told? How can

we establish that what we're hearing is actually true? When
we have to present this case to a jury some day, they're going
to have expected us to look under every rock, chase down every
lead, and do everything that we can to confirm each and every
possible fact that's possible to confirm because we're going to
be asking these jurors to make some very important
decisions based on testimony from people who've committed some
very serious crimes.
(Tr. 2578-79, emphasis added)
The rebuttal then proceeded to argue how the witnesses were corroborated in various ways.
Certainly, the government can argue how other evidence supports and corroborates the
cooperators. It may not, however, go beyond highlighting areas of corroboration and venture into
personal vouching. The government clearly advised and asked the jury to believe that the
government did everything to assure that they knew the witnesses testified truthfully because
they verified every detail, even if it wasnt presented as corroboration at trial, and that the jury
could rely on and substitute the governments belief for their own in returning a verdict of guilty.
Since the government believed them based upon this all-encompassing vetting, then the jury
should believe them too. This is precisely the type of argument that is constitutionally prohibited.
Attorney statements vouching for the credibility of witnesses are generally improper
because they imply the existence of evidence not placed before the jury, United States v. Perez,
144 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), and because
prosecutorial vouching suggesting that the prosecutor has special knowledge of the facts, Id,
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence, United States v. Newton,
369 F.3d 659, 681 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 1819, 105 S.Ct.
1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)).
The jury deliberated for over two days. In the overall context of the case, with its
enormous issues of credibility and fact as outlined above, the impact of the improper rebuttal
cannot be dismissed as harmless. By vouching for the witnesses, the government invited the jury
to substitute its opinion for their own, thereby substantially prejudicing the defendant and
denying him due process. United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 227 (2d. Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, we ask the Court to set aside and enter a verdict of not guilty as to all
counts. There was not enough proof from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and these counts must be dismissed.

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We continue to join motions submitted by co-defendants that are applicable to the

defendant.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael H. Gold

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