Alano vs.

CA
Facts
on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Alano did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,172 square meters,
more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for
P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for
P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of
the said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid
amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and
entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et. al.," concerns the nullity of
the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned Civil Case, private
respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of
said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the
said land was previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold the
property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale
in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. At this
juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before
June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.
During pre-trial, Alano failed to raise the defense of forgery.
Issue: w/n petition has merit
Held
there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as
declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties 10 and by virtue of
which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense
waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit. 11
Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the
petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true
that the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution, 12 this right may be waived
expressly or impliedly. 13
Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural
matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the

doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and
without detriment to the community at large. 14
Accordingly, petitioner's admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal
amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to
nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 15 Furthermore, it must be
emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the rule that no
proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.

PEOPLE V. SISON 1997

-In the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of his house
situated in Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder brother Carlos Abaoag and
Ricardo Manuel when all of a sudden, Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west
complaining that he was being chased by Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon. On that same
occasion, Fernando Abaoag also arrived at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are
making trouble again." The latter answered, "I am not making trouble uncle because while I was
inside the house of Eling Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me.
Seconds later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando
Abaoag told them to stop throwing stones but before they desisted and left, one of them uttered
"even you Andong, you are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of your mother, you
Abaoag[s]" Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando Abaoag whose nickname is
Andong.
- Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside
his house lying down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his
brother Fernando. He went out to see who were throwing stones. When already near the house of
Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw his brother Fernando already outside his house. He also saw
Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a big stone against
Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow,
-Fernando turned his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also
throwing stones towards his direction. On the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near
the victim, with a very sharp double bladed dagger, stabbed Fernando, first on the left side just
below the armpit, then on the left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck below the jaw
- Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him which landed
on his right side below the armpit. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions
saying, we will also kill Cesar," Cesar desisted in helping brother. Instead, he ran to his brother's
house and informed Felicitas, the wife, about the helpless condition of Fernando.

- Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied by Carlos Abaoag, went to the place of the
incident. The assailants were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying prostate on the
ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened, Fernando answered
"naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" Fernando told his wife that his assailants were
Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion
- Appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong Sion and Felix Sion alias "Ellet,"
respectively, admitted that on the night in question, he participated in a stone-throwing incident
and "free-for-all rumble" between his group (the Sions and Johnny Juguilon) on one hand, and
the Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he professed his innocence, claiming that it
was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim
- Appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no participation in the killing
of Fernando Abaoag
- The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the prosecution
- RTC HELD Sion and Disu Guilty of murder. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P50, 000.00 and
to pay the costs of the proceedings. Also, the Accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico
Disu alias Miguel Disu are ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P11, 910.00
as actual damages- Felipe Sion alias "Junior," and Federico Disu alias "Miguel" seasonably
appealed therefrom to this Court and the appellants attack the identification made of them by
prosecution witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the witness, Abaoag, positively identified the appellants.
HELD: Yes, Abaog positively identified appellants.
RATIO:
- Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away
when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light
illuminating the place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly
Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger
- Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu, throwing stones at the
victim. He was definite, however, that it was only accused Johnny Juguilon who was able to hit
the victim at the left eyebrow. The three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury at
the left eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juguilon jibed with the post mortem findings of
Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left eyebrow as "contusion superimposed abrasion
left eyebrow." - If Cesar had any ulterior motive to testify against appellant Disu, he could have
declared that it was Disu, and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar then honestly
narrated what he observed.
- The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the declaration
made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly characterized this as a
"dying declaration," having been made under the consciousness of impending death

ISSUE: Whether or not the Dying declaration made satisfied the requisites of Sec. 37 of RULE
130?
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- The court finds these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a
dying declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent
and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration
within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or circumstances
pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he survived.
- Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because of
necessity and trustworthiness.
- Necessity, because the declarant's death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it
often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness,
for it is "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every hope of this world is
gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth.
- Also, the court finds no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the declarations of
her husband.
- In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu's alibi must fail. It is settled
that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot prevail over and is
worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses that an accused
perpetrated the crime

NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO,

as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.

This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the resolution of
public respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition
to annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to
testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present." After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated,
trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3) witnesses before taking the
witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. On 11 January 1989, private respondents
counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of
the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, and a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioners counsel opposed the motion
on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the
latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be
suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued on 12 January
1989.

Issue:
W/N all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient privileged communication under
Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence) exist in the case at bar.

Held: Yes

This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community.
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection
is made to the physicians testimony.
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur: "1.
the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one
duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4. the information
was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and,
if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient."cralaw virtua1aw
library
These requisites conform to the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment
of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to wit: "1. the communications

must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3.
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."
The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication
that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation
and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated." library
Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009
Facts: Lourdes Pacana commenced an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and
Possession against the heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, et al. In the complaint, it was alleged that
Lourdes was the sole owner of a certain parcel of land, which she inherited from her mother,
Hermogena Gabatan, who in turn inherited it from the grandfather, Juan Gabatan. Countering,
the heirs of Teofilo Gabatan alleged that Juan died without issue, which necessarily means that
they are the rightful heirs to the subject property as they inherited it from Teofilo, Juans brother.
The RTC decided in favor of Lourdes, stating that Lourdes relationship with Juan was
sufficiently established. The CA affirmed this decision. Not giving up, the heirs of Teofilo
appealed to the SC.
It must be noted in this case that Lourdes presented a Deed of Absolute Sale, which appeared
to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document
involving the sale of a lot different from the subject lot, Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the
deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement
therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest,
that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. The CA considered the same statement
as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.
Issue:
1. W/N the Deed of Sale is admissible in evidence.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The Deed was a mere photocopy and not properly authenticated. Under the best
evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Although the best evidence
rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public

record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. A
party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for
non-production of the original instrument. In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of
the testimony of the witness who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original,
whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office. Hence, the Deed is
inadmissible for being violative of the Best Evidence Rule.

Cruz v. Court of Appeals and Salonga (192 SCRA 209)

Facts: Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages against Cruz, alleging that the latter
contracted a loan from him but has not paid. Cruz countered by alleging that the money he
received from Salonga were not proceeds from a contract of loan, but rather from a contract of
pakyaw and sublease. The trial court ruled in favor of Cruz. However, the CA reversed the trial
court and considered that the contract was one of loan.
The crux of the matter in this case lies in the presentation of two pieces of evidence, Exhibits D
and I. Exhibit D is a receipt attesting to the fact that on a certain date, Cruz received from
Salonga the amount of PHP 35,000. Exhibit I is also a receipt, but more than that, it also
contained a statement that the money received is consideration for a pakyaw contract. It must
be noted that Cruz tried to present parol evidence on these exhibits to show the true agreement of
the parties. These exhibits were disregarded by the CA, arguing that parol evidence cannot be
admitted because the agreement was already put into writing.
Issue:
1. W/N the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits D and
I despite the fact that these documents fall under the exceptions provided for in Sec. 7,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (and thereby making a sweeping conclusion that the
transaction effected between the private respondent and petitioner is one of contract of
loan and not a contract of lease).
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. Parol evidence on the true agreement of the parties should have been admitted in
evidence. First, while the Rules on Evidence state that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, this rule is not
applicable. Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document embodying
the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a
receipt attesting to the fact that on a certain date, Cruz received from Salonga the amount

of PHP 35,000.00 It is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole
memorial of their agreement.
Second, the statement in Exhibit I of Cruzs receipt of the PHP 28,000.00 is just a
statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by
Salonga. Its reference to the amount as consideration of the pakyaw contract does not
make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced
to explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to Cruzs receipt of the amount and of the
date when the said amount was received.

Lozano v. Delos Santos and Anda (274 SCRA 452)

Facts: Lozano was the president of a drivers association (Kapatiran) while Anda was the
president of another drivers association (Unified). Eventually, these two associations merged. An
election was held for the determination of new officers, and Lozano won as president.
Embittered, Anda refused to recognize the results of the election and Lozanos authority to
collect dues from the members. Lozano was then constrained to file an action with the MTC
against Anda to stop the latter from still collecting dues from the members. To counter, Anda
argued that the MTC had no jurisdiction, as this is an intra-corporate dispute which necessarily
falls under the auspices of the SEC. The MTC sided with Anda, dismissing the case on the
ground that it was an intra-corporate dispute outside of its jurisdiction.
Issue:
1. W/N the MTC erred in holding that the dispute is an intra-corporate one.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. It is not an intra-corporate dispute; hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. There is no
intra-corporate nor partnership relation between Lozano and Anda. The controversy
between them arose out of their plan to consolidate their respective associations into a
single common association. This unified association was, however, still a proposal. It
had not been approved by the SEC, neither had its officers and members submitted their
articles of consolidation in accordance with the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members but only upon
issuance of the certificate of consolidation by the SEC. When the SEC, upon processing
and examining the articles of consolidation, is satisfied that the consolidation of the
corporations is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Corporation Code and existing
laws, it issues a certificate of consolidation which makes the reorganization official. The
new consolidated corporation comes into existence and the constituent corporations
dissolve and cease to exist. In this case, this certification has yet to come to existence.

People v. Malimit (264 SCRA 167)

Facts: Malimit was charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. In this appeal to the SC, he argued that it was error for the trial court to admit into
evidence the victims wallet together with its contents, viz., residence certificate; his
identification card; and a bunch of keys. According to Malimit, this violates his right against selfincrimination. Likewise, Malimit sought for their exclusion because during the custodial
investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid the
victims wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
1. W/N the evidence objected to by Malimit should be admitted into evidence.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. Hence, the evidence is admissible. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed
under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from a suspect. It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the accuseds own lips, against
his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
Also, the evidence should not be excluded. It is true that Malimit was not read his
Miranda Rights. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or
rules is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own
counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he
execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional
prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility
of the victims wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of
establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish

the fact that it was the very wallet taken from the victim on the night of the robbery. The
identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other
hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to the victim. Furthermore,
even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not
detract from Malimits culpability considering the existence of other evidence and
circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime
charged.