1. De Guzman v.

CA
GR L- 47822
Dec 22, 1988
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and
brings those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the
return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various
merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates.
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with
respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970,
respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because
the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked along the way. Petitioner commenced an
action claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent,
being a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed
to do. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not
be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled against the respondent, but such
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
HELD:
Yes, article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one
who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized
as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a
periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though
private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.
There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling
their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant
here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability
under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
2. First Phil Industrial Corp vs CA
GR No. 125958
Dec 29, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner is a grantee of pipeline concession to contract, install and operate pil
pipelines. In Jan. 1995, petitioner applied for a mayors permit. However, the permit
could be issued, the City treasurer reuired petitioner to pay a local tax based on its
gross receipts pursuant to the LGC. In order not to hamper its operation, petitioner
paid the tax under protest. On June 15, 1994, petitioner filed in the RTC a complaint
for tax refund against respondent which was in violation of the LGC and that the term
contractors under the LGC excludes transportation contractors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier.
HELD:
Yes, the test for determining the whether a party is a common carrier of goods
are the ff:
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the
transportation of goods or person generally as business and not as a casual
occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is
confined;
3. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business
isconfined;
4. The transportation must be for hire.
Based on the above reuirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common
carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods ie petroleum
products for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry persons indifferently,
that is to all persons who choose to employ its services and transports the goods by
land for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier.
3. Calvo vs UPCB
G.R. No. 148496
March 19, 2002
FACTS:
A contract was entered into between Calvo and San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
for the transfer of certain cargoes from the port area in Manila to the warehouse of
SMC. The cargo was insured by UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. When the
shipment arrived and unloaded from the vessel, Calvo withdrew the cargo from the
arrastre operator and delivered the same to SMCs warehouse. When it was
inspected, it was found out that some of the goods were torn. UCPB, being the
insurer, paid for the amount of the damages and as subrogee thereafter, filed a suit

against Calvo. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that it is a private carrier not
required to observe such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods. As
customs broker, she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but
only to selected parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier.
HELD:
Yes, the law makes no distinction between a carrier offering its services to the
general community or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. Note that the transportation of goods holds an integral part of Calvos
business, it cannot indeed be doubted that it is a common carrier.

4. Sanchez Brokerage vs CA and FGU Insurance

GR No. 147076
Dec 21, 2004
FACTS:
AF Sanchez is engaged in a broker business wherein its main job is to calculate
customs duty, fees and charges as well as storage fees for the cargoes. Part also of
the services being given by AF Sanchez is the delivery of the shipment to the
consignee upon the instruction of the shipper. Wyett engaged the services of AF
Sanchez where the latter delivered the shipment to Hizon Laboratories upon
instruction of Wyett. Upon inspection, it was found out that at least 44 cartons
containing contraceptives were in bad condition. Wyett claimed insurance from FGU.
FGU exercising its right of subrogation claims damages against AF Sanchez who
delivered the damaged goods. AF Sanchez contended that it is not a common carrier
but a brokerage firm.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AF Sanchez is a common carrier, thus liable in case of loss,
destruction and negligence.
HELD:
Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
The contention, therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs
broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and
proper shipping documents as required by law is without merit. It cannot be denied
from the evidence presented that part of the services it offers to its customers is the
delivery of the goods to their respective consignees. In this light, petitioner as a
common carrier is mandated to observe, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code,
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports according to all

the circumstances of each case. In the event that the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.

5. Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport Venture, Inc

458 SCRA 557
FACTS:
Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, receive the
cargoes from the shipside and deliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel Pipe
Corporation warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, hired the services of respondent Transport
Venture Incorporation (TVI)s tugboat for the hot rolled steel sheets in coil. Coils were
unloaded to the barge but there was no tugboat to pull the barge to the pier. Due to
strong waves caused by approaching storm, the barge was abandoned. Later, the
barge capsized washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee was executed a
subrogation receipt by Industrial Insurance after the formers filing of formal claim.
Industrial Insurance filed a complaint against both petitioner and respondent herein.
The trial court held that petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable
for the subrogation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation is a common
carrier.
RULING:
Yes, Article 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The contention,
therefore, of petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose principal
function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents as
required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for
pecuniary consideration. Further, to declare otherwise would be to deprive those with whom it
contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to
carry goods for its customers, is part and parcel of petitioners business