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P.M.

S CT 208 Cantonments,
Accra-Ghana
T:+233. 21. 786093 F: +233.21.782615
Email: info@softtribe.com
Website: www.softtribe.com

Software Solutions for a Growing Africa


12th February 2010

The Controller & Accountant General


Controller & Accountant Generals Department
Ministries
Accra

Dear Sir,
Re: IPPD Major Risks

SOFTtribe has completed


This therefore

training and is ready to formally

seems an appropriate

handover the IPPD3 system to CAGD.

time to highlight a few of the challenges we experienced

in the

execution of the project.


The single most challenging aspect ofthe

project was the migration

of data from IPPD2 to IPPD3.

Given the major issues we observed during the execution of this task, we think it only fair to bring
our decades of local industry experience in payroll computerization

to the table.

We therefore think it is only prudent to make sure-these issues are documented


It i;; important
knowledge

that this information

required

be included in the nandover

for anyone assuming responsibility

and well-known.

documentation.

for the day-to-day

as it is essential

operations

of AKATUA!

IPPD3.
Additionally,

CAGD might have to engage in data migration

from IPPD2 to IPPD3 periodically

in the

future.
The detailed Issues to do with IPPD2 data handed to IPPD3 team are as follows:
1)

Absence of audit trail in data structure:


The data that was handed to us from IPPD2 did not contain information

about who put that

data in and when it was entered.


This is a serious issue whic.h could result on the following:
a)

In the

event

accountable.

that

fraudulent

data is entered

into

the

system,

nobody

can be held

(ghost names, undue allowances ...).

. Hypotheticall,!,

if it was shown that, in the IPPD2 system, certain staff were being promoted

before the pavroll run, paid accordingly to their new, higher grade, and then brought back to
their true grade after the payroll run; all this could happen without
the responsible

a hope

user unless by sheer luck.

Directors:

Herman

Chinery-Hesse,

Tetteh

Antonio,

David Bolton, Steve Antwi-Asimeng_

of eve, catching

/f.:....=~----,---
./

Essentially,

as things stand today,

originated

from

the

computer

therefore,

no staff member

if payroll fraud is identified

system,

there

can be indicted

would

and can be demonstrated

be no way to pinpoint

for the crime.

The guilty

the

to have

culprit

and'

party will essentially

be

walking away scot-free.


2)

Original amounts

of loans are not kept; therefore

Loans may not be recovered

b)

In the event of a loan dispute with a staff member,


staff member's refusal to repay the loan.

c)

Additionally,

can be paid out against

Calculation

of arrears is a major problem


This is evidenced
regarding

Staff deleted
trail within

there is no basis for GOG to counter


non-existent

the

loans and the payment

after the fact.

over time.
problems
4)

fully.

loans payments

records destroyed
3)

no loan history is available. This means that:

a)

which results in many employees

by the fact that

IPPD2 arrears resulting

and re-inserted

the

IPPD3 team's

in having to recalculate

into IPPD2 payroll

without

first

not getting

back pay

task was to fix major

all arrears from 2003 to date.

any documented

justification

or audit

the system or database:

This is a complete

violation

of fundamental

payroll rules and would fail any system audit. Payroll

data is never to be deleted.


5)

Sometimes

the amount

very strong

indicator

on the pay slips does not match the amounts

of system malfunction

or the presence

going to the banks: this is a

of fraudulent

activities

and should

trigger alarm bells every time it happens.


6)

Some employees
active

on the

automatic
This should

above 60 years are still present

system

flagging

but are not

in the payroll

"on Contract."

and are being paid.

They seem to have escaped

They are

the system

mechanism:

have been caught easily by the system's validation

facilities

as those employees

may

well be ghost staff.


7)

We observed

strange

invalid

characters

in employee

codes handed

to us.

suggest severe source data corruption.


It could result in inconsistent
generally serve to make a software system inaccurate and unreliable.

These

reporting

normally
and could

We had to resort to writing unique and complicated


order for AKATUA to accept it for processing.
8)

There were major

misassignments

example some employees


This is a major

between

issue and could totally

We observed

duplication

This is a serious
workers.

staff and their

relevant

to rectify this anomaly

employment

agencies.

in

For

of MOH were stored in the data as MOE workers.


misrepresent

can exist may suggest weak procedures


9)

ad-hoc programs

and validation

of employees.

reporting.

That this situation

protocols.

Some employees

issue which could cause double

It is exactly the kind of thing a computerized


It should easily raise red flags in a ny audit.

organizational

existed

multiple

times

in the data.

pay. It may also suggest the existence

of ghost

payroll system should be designed to eliminate.

10) We observed
by their

staff at the same level with different

grades.

organizations

In some

cases staff

salaries.

had been

grades

that

were not justified

did not

exist, in the

in which they worked.

This could also be a major cause of general inaccuracy


11) We observed

that the currency-related

un-denominated
This could

in a payroll system.

data (Ghana Cedis) contained

both re-denominated

and

amounts.

cause

an accounting

processing

all of GaG's payroll.

If however

different

programs

is an even more serious


reliability

These differences

assigned

mathematical

disaster

assuming

the

or processes are being used to run different

problem,

since there

can be no consistency,

same

program

is

parts of IPPD2 then it

predictability,

fidelity

or

on any payroll run.

12) We observed
This resulted

many names of staff members


in additional

13) We observed

that had no IPPDl staff numbers.

delays as we matched

IPPD1 and IPPD2 data for arrears processing.

that active staff that were on the payroll but were not being paid.

It is more likely these individuals were left on the system after termination
but this issue may
provide opportunity
for fraud as an unscrupled user can reactivate payment which results in
new ghost names.

It must be noted that all of the observations


There may be legitimate
Best industry

practice,

In conclusion,

made were derived from the data we received.

reasons that explain some of observations


however,

dictates

IPPD3 was brought

that all relevant

made.

payroll data reside within the system.

in as a backup for IPPD2. IPPD3 is being handed over to the staff of

CAGD.
Given the obvious weaknesses
encountered

while

complications

migrating

caused

in processing

arrears that exist in IPPD2, and the resultant

the data to IPPD3, we deem

by the

above

discrepancies

it important

especially

difficulties

to alert CAGD about

considering

the

above

list

the

is not

exhaustive.
If these issues are not tackled,
be created

in the event of a switch to the IPPD3 in a given month, confusion

among the civil service staff

by the significantly

different

payroll

output. numbers

may
that

may emerge.
We would like to urge CAGD to immediately
from IPPD2 to eliminate
Additionally,
approximately
issues.

it

is our

the potential
opinion

One Billion United

that

rectify these major issues that exist in data emanating

for payroll fraud.


a system

used

to

States Dollars per annum

process
should

wages

and

not be saddled

salaries

totalling

with such basic

/)F
/'
"

As always, we want
support

to assure CAGD of our continued

your goal of administering

an efficient

Furthermore,

regarding the above

backing data where applicable.


we stand ready to assist with the solution

cc: The Honourable

Minister-

The Deputy Minister


The Chief Director

MOFEP

- MOFEP
- MOFEP

Deputy Controller

& Accountant-General

(F&A)

Deputy Controller

& Accountant-General

(FMS)

IPPD3 Project Coordinator

to provide

first class services

to

payroll system.

SOFTtribe will be available to answer any questions


the requisite

commitment

if required.

observations

and to provide

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