risk management and assessment for business

Advances in Process
Control 9
20 September 2011, York, United Kingdom

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Are Blowout Preventers and Fire & Gas Systems ready to

be classified as Safety Instrumented Systems on offshore
installations?
Presented By:
Jasjeet Singh MCMI, AMIChemE, MBA, BE (Chemical)
Senior Engineer, Risktec Solutions Limited

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Jasjeet Singh

Objectives
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Introduce briefly to Blowout Preventer (BOP), and Fire and Gas Systems (FGS) in
offshore oil & gas installation context;
Simplistically evaluate the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) these systems would be
expected to achieve; and,
Discuss if these systems should be designated as Safety Instrumented Systems
(SIS);
Discuss challenges in upgrading BOP and FGS to SIS status.

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Jasjeet Singh

Functional Safety Definition

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What is Functional Safety?

The industry standard IEC 61511 defines it as Functional safety is

part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment
operating correctly in response to its inputs.
Example:
An over-temperature protection device, using a thermal sensor in
the windings of an electric motor to de-energise the motor before
they can overheat, is an instance of functional safety.
Specialised insulation to withstand high temperatures is not an
instance of functional safety (although it is still an instance of safety
and could protect against exactly the same hazard).

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Basic SIS Configuration

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Detec
t

Decid
e

Sensor
Elements
Pressure

Temperature
Flowrate

Composition

Logic
Control
Safety PLC
Relay Logic

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Execut
e
Final Elements
Valve
Assemblies
Circuit Breakers
Power Drives
Secondary
Systems

Jasjeet Singh

Systems under the Scanner

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Blow Out Preventer

Fire and Gas System

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Jasjeet Singh

Blow Out Preventer

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What is a Blow Out Preventer?
A Blow Out Preventer (BOP) is a
combination of several valves
installed at the wellhead.
Function: Prevention of escape
of well fluids from primary
containment
BOP Typical Location:
Beneath the rig for land rigs;
At the waters surface on jackup rigs;
On the seafloor for floating
offshore rigs.
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What a BOP Looks Like

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Jasjeet Singh

Simplistic LOPA on a BOP

System

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Scenario

Unexpected release of high pressure gas in the reservoir

into the well causing abnormal and sudden increase in riser
pressure. Potential for release of high pressure oil / gas jet
at the platform from the well (Blow-Out).

Consequences

Multiple fatalities from fire & explosion on the installation;

MATTE

Target Frequency
Factor

6 (equivalent to 10-6 per year)

Initiating Event

Unexpected well pressure due to accumulated gas

Initiating Event
Frequency Factor

3 (equivalent to 1 in 1000 well sites)

Conditional
Modifiers

Ignition Control 0 (No credit)

Exposure 0 (No credit)

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Jasjeet Singh

Simplistic LOPA on a BOP

System
Independent Protection Layers
BPCS
Alarms
Mitigated
Event
Factor

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Risk Reduction Factor

Indication of pressure in the

control room and process shut
down

Linked to the BPCS system Not

Independent

(6) (3) (1)

Required SIL for chosen SIF

Hence the BOP System may be required to meet SIL 2 requirements.

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BOP Control System

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Primary Functions:
To ensure that sufficient hydraulic pressure is conveyed to the BOP
assembly when a demand is placed;
Ensure that the sequence of valve activation is executed as per
design;

Elements:
Pressure measurement devices (an array of pressure transmitters /
switches at different strategic locations)
Logic Control (Sub sea modules and on Topsides)
Final Elements (The BOP assembly - Actuators & Valves)
Support Elements (Hydraulic Power Unit)

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Typical BOP System

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Challenges in upgrading BOP

to SIS Status

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Technical Challenges:
Complex System An array of devices including multiple sensors
Manufacturing high integrity equipment for subsea environment
Operation and Maintenance Challenges:
Proof Testing as per requirements of the Standard
End to End tests in operation are not feasible - Destructive nature of
final elements
Maintenance of equipment under harsh & corrosive environment
Compliance / Standards related Challenges:
Human in the loop limited reliability issues
Same Equipment Different Requirements

LOOP, LOOP AND THE WHOLE LOOP, NOTHING BUT THE LOOP

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PHASE 1
PHASE 11 Safety Life Cycle Structure and
Planning (IEC 61511-1 Clause 6.2)

PHASE 10 SIS Functional Safety Assessment (IEC

61511-1 Clause 5)

PHASE 9 SIS Verification (IEC 61511-1 Clause 7,

12.4 and 12.7)

SIS Safety Life Cycle

Where will a BOP cause issues

PHASE 2
Allocation of Safety Functions to
Protection Layers
PHASE 3
SIS Safety Requirements
Specifications
PHASE 4
SIS Design & Engineering
PHASE 5

SIS Operation & Maintenance

PHASE 7
SIS Modification
PHASE 8

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IEC 61511-1
Clause 9
IEC 61511-1 Clause
10, 12

IEC 61511-1 Clause

11, 12

IEC 61511-1 Clause

14, 15

IEC 61511-1
Clause 16

IEC 61511-1
Clause 17

SIS Installation, Commissioning &

Validation
PHASE 6

SIS Decommissioning
STAGE 1: Analysis
Stage
STAGE 2: Realization
Stage

IEC 61511-1
Clause 8

Hazard and Risk Assessment

IEC 61511-1
Clause 18

STAGE 3: Operations and Maintenance Stage

STAGE 4: Management and Planning Stage

Jasjeet Singh

Regulators Position
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United Kingdom
?
HSE Offshore Divisions Guide GASCET (April 2006) includes BOP as one of the
devices for which a functional safety assessment is recommended using:
UKOOA Guidelines for Instrument Based Protective Systems
IEC 61508
IEC 61511
Norway
Australia

United States
Middle East South Asia -

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?
?

Jasjeet Singh

Fire and Gas System

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Fire and Gas Detection Systems

Three principal types of detectors commonly in use on off-shore
installations:
Heat, Flame & Smoke
Flammable Gas
Toxic Gas

Fire and Gas System Final Elements

HVAC System
Emergency Shut Down Sequence Initiation
Shut Off / Isolation Valves
Blowdown and Depressurisation System

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Simplistic LOPA on a FGS

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Scenario

Release of flammable gas. Potential for jet fire / VCE.

Consequences

Multiple fatalities from fire & explosion on the installation

Target Frequency
Factor

6 (equivalent to 10-6 per year)

Initiating Event

10 gas pipeline failure due to vessel impact

Initiating Event
Frequency Factor

Conditional
Modifiers

Ignition Control 0 (No credit)

Exposure 0 (No credit)

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Jasjeet Singh

Simplistic LOPA on a FGS

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Independent Protection Layers
BPCS
Alarms
SRPS
Mitigated
Event
Factor

Risk Reduction Factor

Process shut down. Isolation of

pipeline from nearest isolation
valves.

Non - Independent Alarms

Temporary refuges & escape

crafts

(6) (3) (1)

Required SIL for chosen SIF

Hence the FGS may be required meet SIL 1 requirements.

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Challenges in upgrading FGS to

SIS Status

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Technical Challenges:
FSG is also a complex system and is linked with the Emergency Shutdown
System
FSG is a combination of a number of loops multiple SIFs with different SIL
requirements
Operation and Maintenance Challenges:
A large amount of kit to be maintained
Compliance / Standards related Challenges:
Usual suspects

LOOP, LOOP AND THE WHOLE LOOP, NOTHING BUT THE LOOP

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BOP and FGS as SIS The Two

Sides
Against

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For

Field devices and technologies are

fundamentally different

But the devices are available, and are

being developed

Not be considered performing a critical

safety function

They do. ESD is only part of the overall

safety & risk control

IEC 61508 is not applicable

Covers all E/E/PE systems...

Too costly

Not more than cost of an accident

Difficult to materialise

Effort should be made necessity is

mother of invention

Regulator does not want this

Post DwH, they domostly

Industry has been operating this way

Why now?

Continuous improvement

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Recommendations
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Oil and gas industry should explore the possibility of

upgrading the BOP and FGS to SIS.
IEC, Industry and Regulators should red-define / amend
the relevant requirements to clarify the issue.
Design engineers and safety consultants should be
aware of the issue and endeavour to improve the safety
system .

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Jasjeet Singh

Closing Remarks
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Not all safety systems are created equal and every

installation has different performance, risks and financial
goals to meet.
Small regional operators are much less likely to make
this step change in the way the BOP and the FGS are
managed due to limited resources. It is up to global
organisations to take this initiative, and raise standard of
best practice in managing these systems.

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Jasjeet Singh

APC
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Thank You for Your Attention

Advances in Process Control 9

Jasjeet Singh