Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and
MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of
its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the
Decision 1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of
Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered
confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a
decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and
assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6However, during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado represented by their
aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that
the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the
Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit
"E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view
that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: 8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is
mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional;

while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the
Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As
to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to
assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also
in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's
counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final
disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under
Rule 65. 9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of
general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer
jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due
process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in
mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side."
Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other
requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous
places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the
application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an
order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days
from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale
behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of
the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a
statute. 15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon
its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.
In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of
the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the
law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the
petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of
notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law
included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure
of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. Anin rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested
or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has
been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be
achieved when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified
and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due
process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said
parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires
notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the
case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and
is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the allencompassingin rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any
excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no
authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation;
there is room only for application. 19There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL,
AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April
29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C.
Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition
and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being
the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband
(Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where
she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual
is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were
are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of
the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until
the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia
Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in
Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the
hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged
natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception ( Rollo,
p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious
children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and
the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia
and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate
children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their
descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of
representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselvesillegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation
is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be
argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the
provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable
to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article
992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in
Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate
or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former
Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When
the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be
harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general
rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will
not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly
settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiffappellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of
the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May
counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to
possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question
the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked
the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the
information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license
or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor."
Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented
four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June
2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay
and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963,
to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the
above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such
of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties
were given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 116719

January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to
Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon
the latter, the following injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH
PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND
MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and able medical assistance
immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

(p. 1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime of murder, to wit:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the
latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty ofreclusion temporal in its maximum to death and
to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out
the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect
when the offense was committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the
evidence, are as follows:
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon
Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car
Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his
two year old son, who were all seated at the front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the
said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by
one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the
Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the
comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain
Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw,
causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went
down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see
you". (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted
from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely
a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to interfere, since he had
nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it you?" With a ready answer Benito
said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7
and 19)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of about one minute, Patricio returned
and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are a Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly
responded in the affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist
and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away
and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the injuries he had already inflicted,
still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of
which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out
of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid. p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since
there were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger
to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the
left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing
Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus,
she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and
consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was
operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3)
weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly
confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH
SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has already circulated in the blood all over the body.
(ibid. pp. 6-7)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death
penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accusedappellant without the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should bereclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4
months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing happened, the computation
of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty
is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying
circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised
Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without
categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through
Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which
were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras inPeople vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as
the minimum; the upper half ofreclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

10

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine
announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution.
This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared
by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original
interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the
penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three
new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III,
Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which expressly declares the
abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the
language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition.
Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding
modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the
Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such
intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning.
One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation
that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said another or strangely, considering their
loquacity elsewhere did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the
Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a
second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body.
It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives.
And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified rules
grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path
is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of
continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the
current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return
to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it
to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who
committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with the same
medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this
Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the
Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked longer than others hired
later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the
court over the person. An appearance may be madt agree with me for a penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are
essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them
or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the
commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the

11

Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is
the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with
the others. The award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby
increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
(at pp. 120-125.)
The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz(216 SCRA 476
[1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy.
Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity
for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and
furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka
na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

12

CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka
"ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. " Putang-ina" sasabisabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob
ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information
charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape
recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to
other person.
Contrary to law.

13

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO
Asst. City Fiscal

M.

CUNETA

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by
R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a personother than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred
the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989
null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the
information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to
the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under
the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of
R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either
by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now,
suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is

14

made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation
of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there
is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases
or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all
the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it
and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken,
there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being
made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here
may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what
is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a
public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication between one person and
another person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional
Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one
can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the
"process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or

15

gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings
or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But this statement
ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects
of their lives they do not wish to expose. Freeconversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be
found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion
by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides
compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of
frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and
petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused
was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama
when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to
"any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The

16

claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner's
presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was
basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11,
1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a)
of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit,
thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review
by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court
resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on
appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the
language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he
was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would
be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof,
the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the
crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation
on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon
of construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in
question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation
before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and
the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of
reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because
he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant,
because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient
to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of
doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral
and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted"
by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the
burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence
not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that
he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that
he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution
to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. 5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence.
An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due
to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand,
correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal
Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

17

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt
that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe
in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of
any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even
though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably,
and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition,
to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then
imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction
by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on
less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based
on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the
product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his coaccused were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a
grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their
way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said
the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail
to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed
anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail
and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and
Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked:
where was the coming together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes? Basbacio was
as the record shows nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why
was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between
petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but
they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because
of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not
commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

18

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30,
1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of
failure to post the required appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the
POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are
already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited
by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall
likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating
to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the
principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under
POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the
validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with
Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of
recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are
applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed
by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash
or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall
state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date
when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such
appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.

19

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA
Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an
appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously,
the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed
on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal
claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have
been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions
of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other
liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and
not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This
amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other
subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein
private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not
against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other
obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the
bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation
for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers
abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter
is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local
agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the
aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would
in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under
Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By
sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its
commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF
OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T
ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160
entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its
Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property owing and
belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use and
benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the said
respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and
reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and
on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter that
"the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final
determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of the
case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order; on
December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal and real
properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they ( sic) appealed in
the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut down its
factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be investigated the real properties in the
names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid
properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such development, it is their
submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3,
1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order (which has
not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion and motion to direct
respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor
(Annex "E").

21

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the insolvents had
passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent court
issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered
claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount
of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his functions, as
such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March 9,
1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to
clear with their principals, shall have already been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the actual or constructive custody
and management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed
under this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court hereby dissolves
the receivership previously authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order
directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice
thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430
in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets and other
appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary attachment
on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980,
3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of spouses Carlos
Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry
No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-defendant
Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of
14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5",
Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and executory, a writ of
execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold
at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the
certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but respondent
sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things, that subject motion is
improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the reason that
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court
for the determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved credits/liabilities of the
insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to
matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed extended order with the following
decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a similar motion of the movant,
the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate
in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines,
forcertiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

Inc.

(RTPI,

for

short)

filed

petition

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April
19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues

22

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION
ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A
LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:
Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument under
his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and effects of the
debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of
the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law
shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne
process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent
debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced
within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment
entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject
properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while
the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on
July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that
its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit
was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements
of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent
Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of
the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should
not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear
that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and
judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor,
where the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short,
there is a cut off period one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to
the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if
the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the
defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is
no conflict between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will
give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of
more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof
operative and effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E.
Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference
by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the
Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within
30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period
cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.

23

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency
court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the
CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were not within its jurisdiction;
undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The
attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership of
subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District
Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars.
(a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
having been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar
as it affects the municipality of Paraaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso
of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the
members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately
succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod
and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in
1995, they shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque
fall under this category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much
less,
that
he
is
prejudiced
by
the
election,
by
district,
in
Paraaque.
As
such,
he
does
1
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right that has
been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by
the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush
aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly
through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on Elections. 2

24

Now on the meat of the dispute.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing
for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan.
The elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall
be elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide them into two (2)
districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in
the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative
districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No.
6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila
Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with
the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A.
6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A.
7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district
municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in
recommending to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the
number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Paraaque
together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective
councilors for each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the
election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall
apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of
Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition asserting that
under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of
the May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would include in this class of
sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality of Paraaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and
Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on synchronized elections, Senate
Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language
of the law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof,
and they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory
speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if
we pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the
single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in the second proviso of

25

par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be
elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning,
its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction,
as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of
the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a
statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are
sought to be attained by the enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for the necessary
implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing
therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be
elected not at large, but by district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting
the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May
11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the
districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by the President of the
Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation of the Commission on Elections
aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section 3 thereof, the
Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election
Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors
in the community, the Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities in
the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district apportionment are as follows: a.
compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of
population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities,
shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats
is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral
process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts,
and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the
single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to
continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned.
But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough
time to apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be
elected by district; (2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each
under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the
cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the
thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the
second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities
outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to
continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the

26

full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he
stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

27