THIRD DIVISION

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 175587

Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.

- versus -

JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

September 21, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the May 31, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78200 affirming the August 30, 2000 Decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which granted respondent Joseph Anthony M.
Alejandros claim for damages arising from petitioner Philippine Commercial
International Banks (PCIB) invalid garnishment of respondents deposits.
On October 23, 1997, petitioner filed against respondent a complaint[3] for
sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. Said complaint alleged that on September 10, 1997, respondent, a
resident of Hong Kong, executed in favor of petitioner a promissory note
obligating himself to pay P249,828,588.90 plus interest. In view of the

fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the insufficiency of the
deposits assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner requested the
latter to put up additional security for the loan. Respondent, however, sought a
reconsideration of said request pointing out petitioners alleged mishandling of his
account due to its failure to carry out his instruction to close his account as early as
April 1997, when the prevailing rate of exchange of the US Dollar to Japanese yen
was US$1.00:JPY127.50.[4] It appears that the amount of P249,828,588.90 was the
consolidated amount of a series of yen loans granted by petitioner to respondent
during the months of February and April 1997.[5]
In praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section
1 paragraphs (e) and (f) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleged that (1)
respondent fraudulently withdrew his unassigned deposits notwithstanding his
verbal promise to PCIB Assistant Vice President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to
withdraw the same prior to their assignment as security for the loan; and (2) that
respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. The application for the issuance of
a writ was supported with the affidavit of Nepomuceno.[6]
On October 24, 1997, the trial court granted the application and issued the
writ ex parte[7] after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P18,798,734.69,
issued by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Inc., under Bond No. HO-4676497. On the same date, the bank deposits of respondent with Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) were garnished. On October 27, 1997, respondent,
through counsel, filed a manifestation informing the court that he is voluntarily
submitting to its jurisdiction.[8]

Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to quash [9] the writ contending that
the withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was approved by
petitioner. He also alleged that petitioner knew that he maintains a permanent
residence at Calle Victoria, Ciudad Regina, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, and an
office address in Makati Cityat the Law Firm Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura
Sayoc & De los Angeles, [10] where he is a partner. In both addresses, petitioner
regularly communicated with him through its representatives. Respondent added
that he is the managing partner of the Hong Kong branch of said Law Firm; that
his stay in Hong Kong is only temporary; and that he frequently travels back to
the Philippines.
On December 24, 1997, the trial court issued an order quashing the writ and
holding that the withdrawal of respondents unassigned deposits was not intended
to defraud petitioner. It also found that the representatives of petitioner personally
transacted with respondent through his home address in Quezon City and/or his
office in Makati City. It thus concluded that petitioner misrepresented and
suppressed the facts regarding respondents residence considering that it has
personal and official knowledge that for purposes of service of summons,
respondents residence and office addresses are located in the Philippines. The
dispositive portion of the courts decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION TO QUASH, being
meritorious, is hereby GRANTED, and the ORDER of 24 October
1997 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the WRIT OF
attachment of the same is hereby DISCHARGED.
SO ORDERED.[11]

With the denial[12] of petitioners motion for reconsideration, it elevated the

case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 50748) via a petition
for certiorari. On May 10, 1999, the petition was dismissed for failure to prove
that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the aforesaid order.[13] Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on October 28, 1999.[14] On
petition with this Court, the case was dismissed for late filing in a minute
resolution (G.R. No. 140605) dated January 19, 2000.[15] Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was likewise denied with finality on March 6, 2000.[16]
Meanwhile, on May 20, 1998, respondent filed a claim for damages in the
amount of P25 Million[17] on the attachment bond (posted by Prudential Guarantee
& Assurance, Inc., under JCL(4) No. 01081, Bond No. HO-46764-97) on account
of the wrongful garnishment of his deposits. He presented evidence showing that
his P150,000.00 RCBC check payable to his counsel as attorneys fees, was
dishonored by reason of the garnishment of his deposits. He also testified that he
is a graduate of the Ateneo de Manila University in 1982 with a double degree of
Economics

and

Management

Engineering

and

of

the

University

of

the Philippines in 1987 with the degree of Bachelor of Laws. Respondent likewise
presented witnesses to prove that he is a well known lawyer in the business
community both in the Philippines and in Hong Kong.[18] For its part, the lone
witness presented by petitioner was Nepomuceno who claimed that she acted in
good faith in alleging that respondent is a resident of Hong Kong.[19]
On August 30, 2000, the trial court awarded damages to respondent in the
amount of P25 Million without specifying the basis thereof, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises above considered, and defendant having

duly established his claim in the amount of P25,000,000.00, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering Prudential Guarantee & [Assurance] Co.,
which is solidarily liable with plaintiff to pay defendant the full amount
of bond under Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. JCL(4) No.
01081, [Bond No. HO-46764-97], dated 24 October 1997 in the amount
of P18,798,734.69. And, considering that the amount of the bond is
insufficient to fully satisfy the award for damages, plaintiff is hereby
ordered to pay defendant the amount of P6,201,265.31.
SO ORDERED.[20]

The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on October 24,
2000.[21]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
findings of the trial court. It held that in claiming that respondent was not a
resident of the Philippines, petitioner cannot be said to have been in good faith
considering that its knowledge of respondents Philippine residence and office
address goes into the very issue of the trial courts jurisdiction which would have
been defective had respondent not voluntarily appeared before it.
The Court of Appeals, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded to
petitioner and specified their basis. The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the
decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The award of damages in
the amount of P25,000,000.00 is deleted. In lieu thereof, Prudential
Guarantee & [Assurance, Inc.], which is solidarily liable with appellant
[herein petitioner], is ORDERED to pay appellee [herein
respondent] P2,000,000.00 as nominal damages; P5,000,000.00 as moral
damages; and P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees, to be satisfied against the

attachment bond under Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. JCL (4)
No. 01081.
SO ORDERED.[22]

Both parties moved for reconsideration. On November 21, 2006, the Court
of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration but granted that of
respondents by ordering petitioner to pay additional P5Million as exemplary
damages.[23]
Hence, the instant petition.
At the outset, it must be noted that the ruling of the trial court that petitioner
is not entitled to a writ of attachment because respondent is a resident of
the Philippines and that his act of withdrawing his deposits with petitioner was
without intent to defraud, can no longer be passed upon by this Court. More
importantly, the conclusions of the court that petitioner bank misrepresented that
respondent was residing out of the Philippines and suppressed the fact that
respondent has a permanent residence in Metro Manila where he may be served
with summons, are now beyond the power of this Court to review having been the
subject of a final and executory order. Said findings were sustained by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50784 and by this Court in G.R. No. 140605. The
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, which obtains under the premises, precludes
the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same
parties even if based on a different claim or cause of action. The judgment in the
prior action operates as estoppel as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or judgment was rendered. The
previous judgment is conclusive in the second case, as to those matters actually

and

directly

controverted

and

determined. [24] Hence,

the

issues

of

misrepresentation by petitioner and the residence of respondent for purposes of

service of summons can no longer be questioned by petitioner in this case.
The core issue for resolution is whether petitioner bank is liable for damages
for the improper issuance of the writ of attachment against respondent.
We rule in the affirmative.
Notwithstanding

the

final

judgment

that

petitioner

is

guilty

of

misrepresentation and suppression of a material fact, the latter contends that it

acted in good faith. Petitioner also contends that even if respondent is considered a
resident of the Philippines, attachment is still proper under Section 1, paragraph (f),
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court since he (respondent) is a resident who is
temporarily out of the Philippines upon whom service of summons may be effected
by publication.
Petitioners contentions are without merit.
While the final order of the trial court which quashed the writ did not
categorically use the word bad faith in characterizing the representations of
petitioner, the tenor of said order evidently considers the latter to have acted in bad
faith by resorting to a deliberate strategy to mislead the court. Thus
In the hearings of the motion, and oral arguments of counsels
before the Court, it appears that plaintiff BANK through its contracting
officers Vice President CORAZON B. NEPOMUCENO and Executive
Vice President JOSE RAMON F. REVILLA, personally transacted with

defendant mainly through defendants permanent residence in METROMANILA, either in defendants home address in Quezon City or his
main
business
address
at
the ROMULO
MABANTA
BUENAVENTURA SAYOC & DELOS ANGELES in MAKATI and
while at times follow ups were made through defendants temporary
home and business addresses in Hongkong. It is therefore clear that
plaintiff could not deny their personal and official knowledge that
defendants permanent and official residence for purposes of service of
summons is in the Philippines. In fact, this finding is further confirmed
by the letter of Mr. JOHN GOKONGWEI, JR. Chairman, Executive
Committee of plaintiff BANK, in his letter dated 6 October 1997 on the
subject loan to defendant of the same law firm was addressed to the
ROMULO LAW FIRM inMAKATI.
[Anent the] second ground of attachment x x x [t]he Court finds
that the amount withdrawn was not part of defendants peso deposits
assigned with the bank to secure the loan and as proof that the
withdrawal was not intended to defraud plaintiff as creditor is that
plaintiff approved and allowed said withdrawals. It is even noted that
when the Court granted the prayer for attachment it was mainly on the
first ground under Section 1(f) of Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, that defendant resides out of the Philippines.
On the above findings, it is obvious that plaintiff already knew
from the beginning the deficiency of its second ground for attachment
[i.e.,] disposing properties with intent to defraud his creditors, and
therefore plaintiff had to resort to this misrepresentation that defendant
was residing out of the Philippines and suppressed the fact that
defendants permanent residence is in METRO MANILA where he
could be served with summons.
On the above findings, and mainly on the misrepresentations
made by plaintiff on the grounds for the issuance of the attachment in the
verified complaint, the Court concludes that defendant has duly proven
its grounds in the MOTION and that plaintiff is not entitled to the
attachment.[25]

Petitioner is therefore barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment

from again invoking good faith in the application for the issuance of the

writ. Similarly, in the case of Hanil Development Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
[26]

the Court debunked the claim of good faith by a party who maliciously sought

the issuance of a writ of attachment, the bad faith of said party having been
previously determined in a final decision which voided the assailed writ. Thus
Apropos the Application for Judgment on the Attachment Bond, Escobar
claims in its petition that the award of attorneys fees and injunction bond
premium in favor of Hanil is [contrary] to law and jurisprudence. It contends that
no malice or bad faith may be imputed to it in procuring the writ.
Escobars protestation is now too late in the day. The question of the
illegality of the attachment and Escobars bad faith in obtaining it has long been
settled in one of the earlier incidents of this case. The Court of Appeals, in its
decision rendered on February 3, 1983 in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-14512, voided the
challenged writ, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Escobars bad
faith in procuring the writ cannot be doubted. Its Petition for the Issuance of
Preliminary Attachment made such damning allegations that: Hanil was already
able to secure a complete release of its final collection from the MPWH; it has
moved out some of its heavy equipments for unknown destination, and it may
leave the country anytime. Worse, its Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Petition alleged
that after personal verification by (Escobar) of (Hanils) equipment in Cagayan
de Oro City, it appears that the equipments were no longer existing from their
compound. All these allegations of Escobar were found to be totally baseless and
untrue.

Even assuming that the trial court did not make a categorical pronouncement
of misrepresentation and suppression of material facts on the part of petitioner, the
factual backdrop of this case does not support petitioners claim of good faith. The
facts and circumstances omitted are highly material and relevant to the grant or
denial of writ of attachment applied for.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent can be
considered a resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines upon whom service
of summons may be effected by publication, and therefore qualifies as among

those against whom a writ of attachment may be issued under Section 1, paragraph
(f), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which provides:
(f)
In an action against a party x x x on whom summons
may be served by publication.

In so arguing, petitioner attempts to give the impression that although it

erroneously invoked the ground that respondent does not reside in the Philippines,
it should not be made to pay damages because it is in fact entitled to a writ of
attachment had it invoked the proper ground under Rule 57. However, even on this
alternative ground, petitioner is still not entitled to the issuance of a writ of
attachment.
The circumstances under which a writ of preliminary attachment may be
issued are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a
plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in the following cases:
(a)
In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of
money or damages, other than moral and exemplary, on a cause of action
arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a
party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud
his creditors;
(b)
In an action for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer,
or an officer of a corporation or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or
clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in
a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c)
In an action to recover the possession of personal property
unjustly or fraudulently taken, detained, or converted, when the property,
or any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to
prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized person;
(d)
In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action
is brought, or in the performance thereof;
(e)
In an action against a party who has removed or disposed
of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors;
(f)
In an action against a party who resides out of
the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.

The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the
debtor in advance of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of satisfying said
judgment, as in the grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court; or (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or
constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected, as in
paragraph (f) of the same provision.[27]
Corollarily, in actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of
sum of money,[28] summons must be served by personal or substituted service,
otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. In case the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines (and hence personal
and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for
the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the defendant.
[29]

Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant

resides out of and is not found in the Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for

the court to convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching
the defendants property. The service of summons in this case (which may be by
publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the
summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant), is no
longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction but for compliance with the
requirements of due process.[30]
However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of
the Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an action in personam, is not
always necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an
action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within
the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of
court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section.

The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15 which

provides for extraterritorial service (a) personal service out of the Philippines,
(b) publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the
summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant; or (c) in
any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
In Montalban v. Maximo,[31] however, the Court held that substituted
service of summons (under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court) is
the normal mode of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court

over the person of residents temporarily out of the Philippines. Meaning, service of
summons may be effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving
copies at the defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.[32] Hence, the court may acquire jurisdiction over an
action in personam by mere substituted service without need of attaching the
property of the defendant.
The rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of
service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines, was expounded
in Montalban v. Maximo,[33] in this wise:
A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of
residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which
any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return.
Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands
of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to
do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with
him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or
his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home
or with his business associates information as to where he may be
contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up.

Thus, in actions in personam against residents temporarily out of

the Philippines, the court need not always attach the defendants property in order
to have authority to try the case. Where the plaintiff seeks to attach the defendants
property and to resort to the concomitant service of summons by publication, the
same must be with prior leave, precisely because, if the sole purpose of the
attachment is for the court to acquire jurisdiction, the latter must determine

whether from the allegations in the complaint, substituted service (to persons of
suitable discretion at the defendants residence or to a competent person in charge
of his office or regular place of business) will suffice, or whether there is a need to
attach the property of the defendant and resort to service of summons by
publication in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case and to
comply with the requirements of due process.
In the instant case, it must be stressed that the writ was issued by the trial
court mainly on the representation of petitioner that respondent is not a resident of
thePhilippines.[34] Obviously, the trial courts issuance of the writ was for the sole
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Had the allegations
in the complaint disclosed that respondent has a residence in Quezon City and an
office in Makati City, the trial court, if only for the purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction, could have served summons by substituted service on the said
addresses, instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The rules on the
application of a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the
defendant. For attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature; it is a
rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. [35] It
should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy.
It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a
resident temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ of
attachment because the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by
substituted service instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The
misrepresentation

of

petitioner

that

respondent

does

not

reside

in

the Philippines and its omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move
to ensure that the application for the writ will be granted.

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals properly sustained the finding
of the trial court that petitioner is liable for damages for the wrongful issuance of a
writ of attachment against respondent.
Anent the actual damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in not awarding
the same inasmuch as the respondent failed to establish the amount garnished by
petitioner. It is a well settled rule that one who has been injured by a wrongful
attachment can recover damages for the actual loss resulting therefrom. But for
such losses to be recoverable, they must constitute actual damages duly established
by competent proofs, which are, however, wanting in the present case.[36]
Nevertheless, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for
the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed, nominal damages are damages
in name only and not in fact. [37] They are recoverable where some injury has been
done but the pecuniary value of the damage is not shown by evidence and are thus
subject to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.[38]
In this case, the award of nominal damages is proper considering that the
right of respondent to use his money has been violated by its garnishment. The
amount of nominal damages must, however, be reduced from P2 million
to P50,000.00 considering the short period of 2 months during which the writ was
in effect as well as the lack of evidence as to the amount garnished.

Likewise, the award of attorneys fees is proper when a party is compelled to

incur expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. The basis of the
award thereof is also the amount of money garnished, and the length of time
respondents have been deprived of the use of their money by reason of the
wrongful attachment.[39] It may also be based upon (1) the amount and the
character of the services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the
nature and importance of the litigation and business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money and the value of
the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the
skill and the experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the
professional character and the social standing of the attorney; (8) the results
secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much
larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.[40]
All the aforementioned weighed, and considering the short period of time it
took to have the writ lifted, the favorable decisions of the courts below, the absence
of evidence as to the professional character and the social standing of the attorney
handling the case and the amount garnished, the award of attorneys fees should be
fixed not at P1 Million, but only at P200,000.00.
The courts below correctly awarded moral damages on account of
petitioners misrepresentation and bad faith; however, we find the award in the
amount of P5 Million excessive. Moral damages are to be fixed upon the
discretion of the court taking into consideration the educational, social and
financial standing of the parties.[41] Moral damages are not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant. [42] They are awarded only to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate

the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of petitioners culpable

action. Moral damages must be commensurate with the loss or injury
suffered. Hence, the award of moral damages is reduced to P500,000.00.

Considering petitioners bad faith in securing the writ of attachment, we

sustain the award of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for
public good. This should deter parties in litigations from resorting to baseless and
preposterous allegations to obtain writs of attachments. While as a general rule,
the liability on the attachment bond is limited to actual (or in some cases,
temperate or nominal) damages, exemplary damages may be recovered where the
attachment was established to be maliciously sued out. [43] Nevertheless, the award
of exemplary damages in this case should be reduced from P5M to P500,000.00.
Finally, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the instant case for damages by
reason of the invalid issuance of the writ, survives the dismissal of the main case
for sum of money. Suffice it to state that the claim for damages arising from such
wrongful attachment may arise and be decided separately from the merits of the
main action.[44]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The May 31,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78200
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. As

modified,

petitioner

Philippine

Commercial International Bank is ordered to pay respondent Joseph Anthony M.

Alejandro the following amounts:P50,000.00 as nominal damages, P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and P500,000.00 as moral damages, and P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages, to be satisfied against the attachment bond issued by Prudential
Guarantee & Assurance Inc.,[45] under JCL (4) No. 01081, Bond No. HO-46764-97.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice