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(1) Barredo vs. Garcia & et. al. No.

48006/July
8, 1942
Article 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
Damages; Quasi-delict or "Culpa Aquiliana";
Primary and Direct Responsibility of Employers
under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.A head-on
collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the
death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers of
the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the
taxi driver and he was convicted and sentenced
accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. Thereafter the parents of the deceased
brought suit for damages against the proprietor of the
taxi, the employer of the taxi driver, under article 1903
of the Civil Code. Defendant contended that his liability
was governed by the Revised Penal Code, according to
which his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil
action had been brought against the taxi driver. Held:
That this separate civil action lies, the employer being
primarily and directly responsible in damages under
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
-----------------------------------------------------(2) SALEN & et. al. vs. BALCE No. L-14414/ April 27,
1960
ARTICLE 2180 : VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF
PARENTS
CIVIL LIABILITY; PARENTS SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE
FOR CRIMINAL ACT OF MINOR" OVER 15 YEARS;
ARTICLE 2180 OF NEW CIVIL CODE APPLICABLE.
Under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is
civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if
the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of
age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears
that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is
because a son who commits the act under any of those
conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability
(Article 12, subdivisions 1. 2 and 3, Revised Penal
Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the
person who has the delinquent minor under his legal
authority and control. But a minor over 15 years who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal
liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the
subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case resort should be had to the
general law, the Civil Code, which, under Article 2180,
provides that "The father and, in case of his death, or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages
caused by the minor children who lived in their
company." This provision covers not only obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts but also those which
arise from criminal offenses. To hold otherwise would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent.
__________________________
(3) Virata & et. al. vs. Ochoa & et. al. 81 SCRA 472/
Jan. 31, 1978
ARTICLE 2176: FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE

Civil liability in negligence cases; Option of


offended party to file action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal or action for recovery
of damages based on culpa aquiliana; Prohibition
against recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission.In negligence cases the
aggrieved parties may choose between an action
under the Revised Penal Code or for quasidelict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Pshilippines is to recover twice for the same negligent
act.
Quasi-delicts; Phrase fault or negligence
includes voluntary and negligent acts punishable by
law.Article 2176, where it refers to fault or
negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by
law but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.
Obligations; Sources of; Quasi-delict and acts or
omissions punished by law constitute two
different sources of obligations. Under Article
1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict
and an act or omission punishable by law are two
different sources of obligation.
_______________________________
(4) Spouse Elcano vs. Hill & Hill 77 SCRA 98/ May 26,
1977
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; The concept of
culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or negligent.Contrary to
an immediate impression one might get upon a reading
of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to contemplates only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary actsdeeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact is actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be
seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations which are derived from acts
or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of
Chapter 11, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasidelicts.) And it is precisely the underlined
qualification, not punishable by law, that Justice
Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law
that killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life
hence, the ruling that (W)e will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such fullgrown development as culpa aquiliana or causi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902

to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. And so, because


Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted
after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, not
punishable by law, thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or negligent.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim
do not recover damages on both scores.. . . It results,
therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a
delict committed by their minor child is not
extinguished by the fact that said, child who is Hiring
with and dependent upon said parents is married.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginalds emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld. . . . . It must be borne in mind that,
according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of parents with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399,
in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does
not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the
child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any
litigation, in the same manner that the parents are
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation
or encumbering of real property which cannot be done
by their minor married child without their consent, (Art.
399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in Our considered
view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
________________________________
(5) Singson &et. al. vs. BPI & et. al. 23 SCRA 111/ June
27, 1968
Civil law; Tort; Damages; Existence of a contract
between the parties is not a bar to the
commission of a, tort by the one against the
other.It has been repeatedly held: that the existence
of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and
the consequent recovery 01 damages therefor (Cangco
v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada v. Manila
Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vasquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560).
Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.

Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966, involving an


airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accomodation and compelled to take a seat in the
tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort
on the latters part, for, although the relation between
a passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin
and nature the act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.
__________________________
(6) Air France vs. Carrascoso & et. al. 18 SCRA 155/
September 28, 1966
Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in
breach of contract of carriage.Where at the start of
the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard that he intended to prove that, while sitting in
the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted .by
petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a white
man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the
contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner, it is therefore unnecessary to inquire as
to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence.
Exemplary damages.The New Civil Code gives the
court ample power to grant exemplary damages in
contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is
that defendant should have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso
from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
Attorney's fees.The right to attorney's fees is fully
established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies
a similar judgment for attorney's fees. The least that
can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but
just and equitable that attorneys fees be given. We do
not intend to break tradition that discretion well
exercisedas it was hereshould not be disturbed.
___________________________
(7) Farolan & et.al. vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation,&
et. al. 195 SCRA 168/ March 13, 1991
Damages; Good Faith, defined; Good faith refers
to a state of the mind which is manifested by the
acts of the individual concerned. It consists of
the honest intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another.The
respondent
court
committed
a
reversible error in overruling the trial courts finding
that: x x x with reference to the claim of plaintiff to
damages, actual and exemplary, and attorneys fees,
the Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard
totally the defendants defense of good faith premised
on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting
clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter:
We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for
good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who
alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. In
Abando v. Lozada, we defined good faith as refer[ring]
to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite

of fraud, and its absence should be established by


convincing evidence.
Public Officers; Mistakes concededly committed
by public officers are not actionable absent any
clear showing that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.But even granting that the petitioners
committed a mistake in withholding the release of the
subject importation because indeed it was composed
of OPP film scraps, contrary to the evidence submitted
by the National Institute of Science and Technology
that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is
the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are
not hampered in the performance of their duties or in
making decisions for fear of personal liability for
damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage
they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous
interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a
damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly
committed by public officers are not actionable absent
any clear showing that they were motivated by malice
or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all,
even under the law of public officers, the acts of the
petitioners are protected by the presumption of good
faith.
------------------------------------------------(8) Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co (MERALCO) 52
Phil. 900 March 7, 1929
ARTICLE 2179: CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
NEGLIGENCE;
CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE;
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES.Contributory negligence
upon part of a plaintiff, not amounting to the proximate
cause of his injury, is not completely destructive of his
right of action in cases where liability arises from
breach of a contractual duty; but such contributory
negligence goes in mitigation of damages, under
article 1103 of the Civil Code.
CARRIERS;
STREET
RAILWAY;
PASSENGER
BOARDING MOVING CAR; DUTY OF MOTORMAN
NOT TO INCREASE RISK.Though there is no
obligation on the part of a street railway company to
stop its cars to take on intending passengers at other
points than those appointed for stoppage, nevertheless
when the motorman sees a person attempting to board
the car while in motion, and at a place not appointed
for stopping, he should not do any act to increase the
peril of such person; and if, in violation of this duty, the
motorman in charge of a car prematurely accelerates
speed while the intending passenger is in the act of
boarding the car, with the result that he slips and gets
his foot crushed under the wheel of the moving car,
the company is civilly liable in damages.
OBLIGATION OF COMPANY TO PASSENGER.The
relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its
patrons is of a contractual nature; and the failure upon
part of the carrier to use due care in conveying its
passengers safely is a breach of obligation under
article 1101, and related provisions, of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers
owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the.
cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
-----------------------------------------------------(9) Astudillo vs. Manila, Electric Co., 55 Phil. 427(1930)

DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE; ELECTRICITY, INJURIES


INCIDENT TO PRODUCTION AND USE.The liability
of electric light companies for damages for personal
injuries is governed by the rules of negligence.
Considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies
must
be
commensurate
with
or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this
high. degree of diligence and care extends to
every place where persons have a right to be.
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH OF BOY.A
young man met his death through electrocution when
he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an
electric light pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate,
Intramuros, in the City of Manila. The young man was
at that time less than 20 years of age, a student, and
working in a college. It is held: That the mother of the
deceased should be awarded damages from the
Electric Company in the amount of P1,500.
_______________________________
(10) Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil.,
478(1932)
Negligence; Unexplained Break in Electric Wire;
Responsibility of Lighting Company for Death of
Child.Shortly after 2 o'clock in the afternoon trouble
developed in an overhead wire conducting electricity
for lighting purposes in the City of Manila. The wire
soon parted and one of the charged ends fell to the
ground in shrubbery close to the way. The lighting
company received a telephonic report of this incident
at 2.25 p. m., and promised to send an inspector. At 4
p. m. the neighboring school turned out and as the
children went home one of the boys, of the age of 9
years, touched the wire with his hand and received a
shock which resulted in death. Held, that the lighting
company was responsible for the death. The delay in
leaving this danger unguarded so long after
information of the trouble was received constituted
negligence on its part.
Apparent Contributory Negligence of Child.The
circumstance that the boy who was killed touched the
wire after one of his companions had warned him not
to do so, did not relieve the company of responsibility,
owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity
of a child to do something out of the ordinary.
________________________
(11) Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co., & et. al. 33 Phil.
8(1915)
Article 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER.
Where an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee of a public enterprise, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both. But
that presumption may be rebutted.
If, in such a case, the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection of the
employee and in his supervision over him he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption of negligence on his
part is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

NEGLIGENCE; GARAGE COMPANY; FAILURE TO


PROPERLY
INSTRUCT
DRIVERS
CROSSING
RAILROADS.A garage and taxicab company whose
business it is to let automobiles and taxicabs for hire
and to furnish drivers therefor is negligent where it
appears that it was the custom of the drivers, known to
the officers of the company, to pass over railroad
crossings without any effort to determine the proximity
of a train, and the company made no effort to change
the custom or to instruct its drivers to the effect that
railroad crossings should not be passed over without
due diligence being observed to determine the
approach of trains.
RESPONSIBILITY OF GARAGE COMPANY.Where,
under such circumstances, one of the drivers of the
said company, conveying passengers in the company's
machine, attempted to pass over a railroad crossing
without precaution or effort to determine the proximity
of a train, the automobile was struck by a train and the
passengers injured, the taxicab company is responsible
for the damages sustained by the passengers.
---------------------------------------------------(12) Go & et. al. vs. IAC & et. al. 197 SCRA 22(1991)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; Although as a rule,
there should be no penalty on the right to litigate, but
under the peculiar circumstances of this case showing
that it was the bank officers gross negligence which
caused inconvenience, humiliation and embarrasment
to private respondent, the latter is entitled to an award
of damages.Although this Court has consistently held
that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate
and that error alone in the filing of a case be it before
the courts or the proper police authorities, is not a
ground for moral damages, we hold that under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, private respondent
is entitled to an award of damages. Indeed, it would be
unjust to overlook the fact that petitioners negligence
was the root of all the inconvenience and
embarrassment experienced by the private respondent
albeit they happened after the filing of the complaint
with the constabulary authorities. Petitioner Gos
negligence in fact led to the swindling of his
employer. Had Go exercised the diligence expected of
him as a bank officer and employee, he would have
noticed the glaring disparity between the payees
name and address on the treasury checks involved and
the name and address of the depositor appearing in
the banks records. The situation would have been
different if the treasury checks were tampered with
only as to their amounts because the alteration would
have been unnoticeable and hard to detect as the
herein altered check bearing the amount of $913.40
shows. But the error in the name and address of the
payee was very patent and could not have escaped the
trained eyes of bank officers and employees. There is
therefore, no other conclusion than that the
bank through its employees (including the tellers
who allegedly conducted an identification check
on the depositor) was grossly negligent in
handling
the
business
transaction
herein
involved. While at that stage of events private
respondent was still out of the picture, it definitely was
the start of his consequent involvement as his name
was illegally used in the illicit transaction. Again,
knowing that its viability depended on the confidence
reposed upon it by the public, the bank through its
employees should have exercised the caution expected
of it. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be

liable for all damages which are the natural and


probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen by the defendant. As Gos negligence was the
root cause of the complained inconvenience,
humiliation and embarrassment, Go is liable to
private respondents for damages.
Petitioner-bank cannot disclaim liability for the
negligence of its employees, because it failed to prove
not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent
damage but that it was not negligent in the selection
and supervision of its employees.Anent petitioner
banks claim that it is not co-equally liable with Go
for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code, (E)mployers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees x x x acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks. Pursuant to this
provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its
employee unless there is proof that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the bank
and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own
failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence
to prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
________________________________
(13) Gilchrist vs. Cuddy & et. al. 29 Phil. 542(1915)

DAMAGES; INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS BY


STRANGERS.The interference with lawful contracts
by strangers thereto gives rise to an action for
damages in favor of the injured person. The law does
not require that the responsible person shall have
known the identity of the injured person.
FACTS OF THIS CASE.The defendants induced the
owner of a cinematograph film to break his contract of
lease with a theater owner and lease the film to them,
with the avowed purpose of exhibiting it in another
theater in the same city. As the profits of the lessee
depended upon the patronage of the public and hence
the task of estimating his damages with accuracy
would be quite difficult if not impossible: Held, That
injunction against further interference with the contract
was properly issued.
At the time the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga
offered their claim for damages arising out of the
wrongful issuance of the restraining order, there was
nothing between them and the plaintiff to litigate, the
rightfulness of plaintiff's demand having already been
finally adjudicated and determined in the same action.
__________________________
(14) SAMSON VS. DIONISIO ET AL., 11 Phil. 538(1908)
LAW OF WATERS; PUBLIC DOMAIN.No private
person has a right to usurp the possession of an estero,
a branch of a river, or a lake of public dominion and
use, unless it is shown that the body of water is
entirely within his own property, otherwise he violates
the law which expressly excepts such waters from
exclusive private use.

OBSTRUCTION OF FLOW OF PUBLIC WATERS.


Any person who without due authority constructs a
bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing
loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of
the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of
an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured
party.
____________________________

Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and


reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on
his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
_____________________________

(15) Andamo & et.al. vs. IAC & et. al. 191 SCRA
195(1990)
Civil Law; Action; The purpose of an action or suit
and the law to govern it including the period of
prescription is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action made in his argument or brief
but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief.It is axiomatic that the nature of an
action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
it, including the period of prescription, is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
The nature of an action is not necessarily determined
or controlled by its title or heading but by the body of
the pleading or complaint itself.
Quasi-delicts; Elements of quasi-delict.A careful
examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that
the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements
of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
There is an assertion of a causal connection between
the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners; Case at bar.Clearly, from
petitioners
complaint,
the
waterpaths
and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to fault or
negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by
law but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

(16) Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban E. &


Ice Plant, 54 Phil. 327(1930)
DAMAGES; DEATH OF CHILD.Damages in the
amount of P1,000 are allowed the mother of a child five
years of age, for the death of the child as a
consequence of burns from the hot water which was
permitted to flow down the side of a public street and
into which the child fell, the cause of death being the
fault and negligence of the defendant. (Civil Code, art.
1902; Manzanares vs. Moreta [1918], 38 Phil., 821.)

(17) Tenchavez vs. Escao,& et. al. 15 SCRA


355(1965)
Husband and wife; Foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil
Code; Remarriage of divorced consort.A foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens,, sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Republic Act
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the
Philippines; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to
the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this
country.
Invalid divorce entitles innocent consort to
recover damages.The desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other
to recover damages.
Action for alienation of affections against parents of
one consort; Absence of proof of malice.An action for
alienation of affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice
or unworthy motives on their part.
_______________________________
(18) Ylarde & et. al. vs. Aquino,& et. al. 163 SCRA
697(1988)
Torts and Damages; Schools and Colleges;
Liability of teachers for torts committed by their
students.It is only the teachers and not the principal
or head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students. In a
school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the
school who can be held liable. Under Section 2180 of
the Civil Code, the teacher-in-charge of school children
should be held liable for negligence in his supervision
over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.

Teacher's responsibility.A teacher who stands in loco


parentis to his pupils should make sure that the
children are protected from all harm in his company.
Work Education.Excavation should not be placed in
the category of school gardening, planting trees, and
the like as these undertakings do not expose the
children to any risk that can result in death or physical
injuries.
Existence of reckless imprudence, determination.In
determining whether or not reckless imprudence
exists, the degree of care required to be exercised
must vary with the capacity of the person endangered
to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the
same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct
should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience.
____________________________
(19) Jarco Marketing Corporation & et.al vs. Court of
Appeals, & et. al. 321 SCRA 375(1999)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Words and Phrases; Doctrine
of Attractive Nuisance, Explained.One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities
or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is
liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is that
the condition or appliance in question although its
danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
alluring to children of tender years as to induce them
to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is
an implied invitation to such children. (Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488, 490
[1952]). Same; Same; Same; Accident, Explained.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is
a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
Negligence, Explained.Negligence is the omission
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.
Accident
and
negligence
are
intrinsically
contradictoryone cannot exist with the other.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory;
one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when
the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which
is not caused by fault of any person and which could
not have been prevented by any means suggested by
common prudence.
Test in Determining Existence of Negligence.The test
in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith,
thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an

ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same


situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Same;
Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Res Gestae; Witnesses;
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of
pain or suffering and statements made to a physician
are generally considered declarations and admissions.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of
pain or suffering and statements made to a physician
are generally considered declarations and admissions.
All that is required for their admissibility as part of the
res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the
influence of a startling event before the declarant had
the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed
by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme
pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with
her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales
testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no
act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners
did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
make stable the counters base.
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Children; Presumptions; Children
below nine (9) years old are conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence.Anent the
negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
conclusive presumption that favors children below nine
(9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. In his book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco
stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless
it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and
required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of
negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of
a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a
rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is
that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
__________________________
(20) Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA
674(1969)
Damages; Negligence; One is liable for damages for
act of negligence causing damage to another.The
Civil Code making clear .that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage
done. (Art. 2176) Unless it could be satisfactorily
shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of
negligence, then it could not be held liable.
Definition.Negligence is want of the care required
by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative,
not an absolute, term and its application depends upon
the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.

Where victim has duty to stop despite failure of


appellees employer to put down crossing bars.The f
irst two assigned errors would make much of ,the
failure of the lower court to hold that the crossing bars
not having been put down and there being no guard at
the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of
the- victim to stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that
main witness of defendant-appellee, who drove the
engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the
accident. For one cannot just single out a circumstance
and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and
significance. Considered separately, neither of the two
above errors assigned would call for a judgment
different in character. Nor would a combination of acts
allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to alter the
result. The quantum of proof required still had not been
met. The alleged errors fail of their desired effect. The
case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it was, had not
been improved. There is no justification for reversing
the judgment of the lower court.
Criminal negligence; May be attributed to a person
who does not exercise precaution and control in
crossing railroads.A person in control of an
automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular
road crossing, and who does not exercise that
precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop
the same almost immediately upon the appearance of
a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a
collision occurs and injury results.
Where facts of the case show it was incumbent upon
the victim to stop his vehicle.Predicated on the
testimonies of the plaintiff s witnesses, on the
knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the
set up of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks,
and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown
its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses,
it is dear that the victim was so sufficiently warned in
advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent
upon him to avoid a possible accidentand this
consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the
crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent
man under similar circumstances would have acted in
this manner. This, unfortunately, the victim failed to do.
_________________________
(21) Fernando & et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, & et. al.
208 SCRA 714(1992)
Civil Law; Negligence; Definition of; Under the Law,
a person who by his omission causes damage to
another, there being negligence is obliged to pay for
the damage done.Negligence has been defined as
the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v.
Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a person who by his
omission causes damage to another, there being
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done
(Article 2176, New Civil Code).
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from
the negligence of another, a claimant must establish
the relation between the omission and the damage;
Definition of Proximate cause.To be entitled to
damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must prove

under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the


defendants negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has
been defined as that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil.
181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is
not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way
contribute to the negligence of the defendant.
However, where the resulting injury was the product of
the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty
to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate
cause of the accident.
___________________________
(23) Fuellas vs. Cadano, 3 SCRA 361(1961)
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Damages; Subsidiary liability; Civil liability for
crimes committed by minors; Scope of parents
liability.The subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code covers obligations
arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
Liability determined under both the Civil Code and the
Penal Code.The subsidiary liability of parents arising
from the criminal acts of their minor children who act
with discernment is determined under the provisions of
Art. 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and
not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by
his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent.
____________________________
(24) Tamargo & et. al. vs. Court of Appeals,& et. al.
209 SCRA 518(1992)
Actions; Quasi-delicts; Parents
and
Child;
Adoption; The natural parents of a minor still
living with the former when the latter
accidentally shot a girl with an air rifle are liable
for damages thus caused rather than the
adopter even if petition for adoption filed before
the accident and granted thereafter.We do not
believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the
time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting
parents had no actual or physical custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given
to the granting of the petition for adoption where such
is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so
as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not
have prevented (since they were at the time in the
United States and had no physical custody over the

child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.


Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine
of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
In the instant case, the trial custody period either had
not yet begun or had already been completed at the
time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual
custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents,
not the adopting parents.
_________________________
25) Cuadra vs. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160(1970)
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENTS
Civil Law; Minors; Damages; Diligence of a good
father of a family; Liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children.In the
present case there is nothing from which it may be
inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was
in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act
which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where
she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as
the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate, much less guard against.
Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the childs character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
would be attributed to her parents.
Civil Law; Minors; Damages; What constitutes fault
within contemplation of law on torts; Knowledge of
consequence of minors acts could be determined by
her age.She was 13 years and should have known
that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found an
earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl,
tossed the object at her, it was likely that something
would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.
Liability of the father.There being no evidence
that he had properly advised his daughter to behave
properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her
classmates and playmates, he can be liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
________________________
(26) Amadora & et.al vs. Court of Appeals,& et. al. 160
SCRA 315(1988)
Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic.After an exhaustive examination of
the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that
the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, following the first part of the provision. This is
the general rule. In the case of establishments

of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and


only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in
general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which
case it is the head thereof who shall be anBwerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis,
teachers should apply to the words pupHs and
students and heads of establishments of arts and
trades to the word apprentices.
No substantial distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned.
There is really no substantial distinction between the
academic and the non-academic schools insofar as
torts committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever
the nature of the school where he is teaching, The
suggestion in the Sxconde and Mercado Cases is that
the provision would make the teacher or even the head
of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury
caused by any student in its custody but if that same
tort were committed in an academic school, no liability
would attach to the teacher or the school head. All
other circumstances being the same, the teacher or
the head of the academic school would be absolved
whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic
school would be held liable, and simply because the
latter is a school of arts and trades.
No plausible reason why different degrees of
vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities.The Court cannot see why different
degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
respective schools. There does not seem to be any
plausible reason for relaxLng that vigilance simply
because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is
nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor
it is a result of the operations of the school or its
equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by
any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in
an academic school where, on the other hand, the
head would be held liable if the school were nonacademic.
Reason for the disparity.The reason for the
disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer
tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on
the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of
the school of arts and trades was such a master and so
was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so
came under his constant control, supervision and
influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school
was not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who were
the persons directly dealing with the students. The
head of the academic school had then (as now) only a
vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently,
while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades,

because of his closer ties with them, could be so


blamed.
Distinction no longer obtains at presentIt is
conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the
direct and personal contact of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged.
In its present state, the provision must be interpreted
by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the
changes in the situation subject to be regulated, sees
fit to enact the necessary amendment.
Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil
Code does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities but the
student should be within the control and under
its influence at the time of the occurrence of the
injury.From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the custody
requirement, to repeat Palisoc vs. Brillantes, does not
mean that the student must be boarding with the
school authorities, it does signify that the student
should be within the control and under the influence of
the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of
the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such
custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning
with the start of classes and ending upon the close
thereof, and excluding the time before or after such
period, such as the period of registration, and in the
case of graduating students, the period before the
commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the
student is in the custody of the school authorities as
long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester
has not yet begun or has already ended.
Teacher-in-charge must answer for his students
torts. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by
the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him
as a result of such influence.
The school may be held to answer for the acts of
its teachers or even of the head thereof under
the general principle of respondent superior but
may exculpate itself from liability by proof that
it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias.

Liability attaches to the teacher and the head of


the technical school although the wrongdoer was
already of age.In this connection, it should be
observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age.
Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is
still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law
for the act of the student under him regardless of the
students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical
school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In
this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
_________________________
(27) Exconde vs. Capuno, 101 Phil. 843(1957)
ClVIL LlABILITY OF PARENTS FOR DAMAGES
CAUSED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RELIEF
FROM LIABILITY.The civil liability which the law
imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them is a
necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents
the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means" while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code).
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of
such liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil
Code).
LIABILITY
OF
TEACHERS
OR
DIRECTOR;
INSTITUTIONS
AFFECTED.The
civil
liability
imposed by Article 1903 of the old Civil Code on
teachers or directors of arts and trades for damages
caused by pupils or apprentices under their custody,
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution. [Exconde vs.
Capuno, 101 Phil. 843(1957)]
_________________________

(28) Mercado & et. al. vs. Lira, & et. al. 3 SCRA
124(1961)
Damages; Moral damages; Death of passenger;
Amount recoverable; Heirs entitled to moral
damages.Damages in excess of P3,000.00 may be
awarded for the death of a passenger, and in addition,
the heirs may demand moral damages commensurate
with the mental anguish suffered by them.
Passengers injured not entitled to moral
damages.A passenger who suffered physical injuries
because of the carriers negligence (culpa contractual)
cannot be considered in the descriptive expression
analogous cases used in Art. 2119 for which the new
Civil Code authorizes indemnification for moral
damages in favor of the injured party.
Breach of contract of transportation; When moral
damages recoverable.Moral damages are not

recoverable in damage actions predicated on a


breach of the contract of transportation except
when there is evidence of fraud, malice or bad
faith on the part of the carrier.
_____________________________
(29) E. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands., 34 Phil. 311(1916)
ARTICLE 2180: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF STATE
An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to
no liability not previously existing unless it is clearly
expressed in the act.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;
LlABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS
OFFICERS,
AGENTS,
AND
EMPLOYEES.The
Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for
the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and
employees when they are acting as special agents
within. the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of
the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital
is not such a special agent.
In the case at bar GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS is not liable for the acts of the
chauffeur of the General Hospital who is not such a
special agent.
_________________________________
(30) Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez,
Jr., & et. al. 321 SCRA 393(1999)
Torts;
Quasi-Delicts;
Employer-Employee
Relationships; Words and Phrases; The phrase
even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry found in the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should
be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his employee who is
acting within the scope of his assigned task.Petitioner
contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code should only apply to instances where the
employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since
it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said
provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not
accurate. The phrase even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth
paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
business or industry to be liable for the negligence of
his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
Fourth and Fifth Paragraphs of Article 2180 of
the
Civil
Code,
Distinguished;
Admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hatsthey
perform functions which are beyond their office, title or
designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the
call of duty.A distinction must be made between the
two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in
general, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent
acts of employees committed either in the

service of the branches or on the occasion of


their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting
within the scope of their assigned task. The latter
is an expansion of the former in both employer
coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of
employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in
a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats.
They perform functions which are beyond their office,
title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still
within the call of duty.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or
not engaged in any business or industry, an employer
is liable for the torts committed by employees within
the scope of their assigned tasks.Under the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the
torts committed by employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee.
The mere fact that an employee was using a
service vehicle at the time of the injurious
incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his
employer with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that
he was operating the vehicle within the course
or scope of his employment.The court a quo and
the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is
within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the
time and circumstances. We do not agree. The mere
fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time
of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are
applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the
doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of
bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employers business or within the scope of his assigned
task.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs
of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not
in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28
August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours.
ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had
no connection to petitioners business; neither had it

any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using


his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a
form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to
his position. Since there is paucity of evidence that
ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.
Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner
be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in
driving its vehicle.
_________________________________
(31) Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals,
& et. al. 190 SCRA 485(1990)
Torts; Quasi-Delict; Even assuming that an
employer-employee relationship exists between
Filamer and Funtecha, still, Filamer cannot be
made liable for the damages sustained by the
victim, considering that at the time of the
accident, Funtecha was not acting within the
scope of his employment.But even if we were to
concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still
the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be
imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that
at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily
shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of
his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the
school passages for two hours every morning before
his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep
from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and
then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting
in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not
within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words,
at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in
the execution of the janitorial services for which he was
employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but
fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt
of his tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be
made liable for the damages he had caused.
-----------------------------------------------------------31) Caedo & et. al vs. Yu Khe That, & et. al. 26 SCRA
410(1968)
Civil law; Negligence; Damage; Liability of
vehicle owner for his driver's negligence; Basis
of master's liability.In mo-tor vehicle mishaps, the
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he has been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months (Art. 2184, Civil Code).
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor
was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
The rule is not new, although formulated as law for .the
first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in
Chapman v. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is .that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own

negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent


injury or damage.
Test of imputed negligence; Article 2184, Civil
Code, construed.The test of imputed negligence
under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great
degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held
to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are
professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from
driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to
drive for them precisely because they are not trained
or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the
rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers
posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under the aforesaid Article on the part of a
car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the
part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not
similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his negligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of
his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid
the accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services,
would be effectively proscribed.
______________________ _____
32) Ramos & et.al. vs. Court of Appeals, & et. al. 380
SCRA 467(2002)
Physicians; Anesthesiologists; Medical Malpractice;
Negligence;
The
conduct
of
a
preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an
operation, whether elective or emergency, cannot be
dispensed withsuch evaluation is necessary for the
formulation of a plan of anesthesia care suited to the
needs of the patient concerned.The conduct of a
preanesthetic/preoperative evaluation prior to an
operation, whether elective or emergency, cannot be
dispensed with. Such evaluation is necessary for the
formulation of a plan of anesthesia care suited to the
needs of the patient concerned. Pre-evaluation for
anesthesia involves taking the patients medical
history, reviewing his current drug therapy, conducting
physical examination, interpreting laboratory data, and
determining
the
appropriate
prescription
of
preoperative medications as necessary to the conduct
of anesthesia. Physical examination of the patient
entails not only evaluating the patients central
nervous system, cardiovascular system and lungs but
also the upper airway. Examination of the upper airway
would in turn include an analysis of the patients
cervical spine mobility, temporomandibular mobility,
prominent central incisors, deceased or artificial teeth,
ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental distance.
To auscultate means to listen to the sounds arising
within organs as an aid to diagnosis and treatment, the
examination being made either by use of the

stethoscope or by direct application of the ear to the


body. (WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, p. 145 [1976]).
Witnesses; Expert Testimony; A pulmonologist could
not be considered an authority on anesthesia practice
and procedure and their complications.What is left to
be determined therefore is whether Erlindas hapless
condition was due to any fault or negligence on the
part of Dr. Gutierrez while she (Erlinda) was under the
latters care. Dr. Gutierrez maintains that the
bronchospasm and cardiac arrest resulting in the
patients comatose condition was brought about by the
anaphylactic reaction of the patient to Thiopental
Sodium (pentothal). In the Decision, we explained why
we found Dr. Gutierrez theory unacceptable. In the
first place, Dr. Eduardo Jamora, the witness who was
presented to support her (Dr. Gutierrez) theory, was a
pulmonologist. Thus, he could not be considered an
authority on anesthesia practice and procedure and
their complications.
The standard practice in anesthesia is that every single
act that the anesthesiologist performs must be
recorded.The Court has reservations on giving
evidentiary weight to the entries purportedly contained
in Dr. Gutierrez synopsis. It is significant to note that
the said record prepared by Dr. Gutierrez was made
only after Erlinda was taken out of the operating room.
The standard practice in anesthesia is that every single
act that the anesthesiologist performs must be
recorded. In Dr. Gutierrez case, she could not account
for at least ten (10) minutes of what happened during
the administration of anesthesia on Erlinda.
Captain of the Ship Doctrine; Words and Phrases;
Under the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, a surgeon is
likened to a captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to
control everything going on in the operating room.
The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine was discussed in
McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this
doctrine, a surgeon is likened to captain of the ship, in
that it is his duty to control everything going on in the
operating room.
Human Relations; A surgeons irresponsible
conduct of arriving very late for a scheduled
operation is violative, not only of his duty as a
physician but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Dr. Hosakas irresponsible conduct of arriving very
late for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda is
violative, not only of his duty as a physician to serve
the interest of his patients with the greatest solicitude,
giving them always his best talent and skill, but also
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person,
in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and
give everyone his due.

Hospitals;
Employer-Employee
Relationship;
Elements.It has been consistently held that in
determining
whether
an
employer-employee
relationship exists between the parties, the following
elements must be present: (1) selection and
engagement of services; (2) payment of wages;
(3) the power to hire and fire; and (4) the power
to control not only the end to be achieved, but
the means to be used in reaching such an end.
There is no employer-employee relationship between a
hospital and medical consultants.DLSMC maintains
that first, a hospital does not hire or engage the
services of a consultant, but rather, accredits the latter
and grants him or her the privilege of maintaining a
clinic and/or admitting patients in the hospital upon a
showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the
necessary qualifications, such as accreditation by the
appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship
and references. Second, it is not the hospital but the
patient who pays the consultants fee for services
rendered by the latter. Third, a hospital does not
dismiss a consultant; instead, the latter may lose his or
her accreditation or privileges granted by the hospital.
Lastly, DLSMC argues that when a doctor refers a
patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who
prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient.
The hospitals obligation is limited to providing the
patient with the preferred room accommodation, the
nutritional diet and medications prescribed by the
doctor, the equipment and facilities necessary for the
treatment of the patient, as well as the services of the
hospital staff who perform the ministerial tasks of
ensuring that the doctors orders are carried out
strictly. After a careful consideration of the arguments
raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent
hospitals position on this issue is meritorious. There is
no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC
and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold
DLSMC solidarity liable for the injury suffered by
petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The contract between a medical consultant and his
patient is separate and distinct from the contract
between the hospital and said patient.Neither is
there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of
its consultants for medical services rendered by the
latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the
contract between the consultant in respondent hospital
and his patient is separate and distinct from the
contract between respondent hospital and said patient.
The first has for its object the rendition of medical
services by the consultant to the patient, while the
second concerns the provision by the hospital of
facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and
laboratory personnel necessary for the proper
treatment of the patient.