ALANMcMICHAELANDEDZALTA

AN ALTERNATIVE
NONEXISTENT

THEORY
OBJECTS

OF

Many of us share certain intuitions regarding the truth-values of sentences

about nonexistent objects. For example, we believe Pegasus is a winged
horse is true, whereas Pegasus is a minotaur is false. Theories which
renounce nonexistent objects, attributing them no being at all, have
difficulty accounting for these intuitions.
Consider a theory apparently held by Russell. According to that theory,
any ordinary name, on a given occasion of its use, is short for a definite
description. Thus, Pegasus is a winged horse, on a given occasion, is
short for The F is a winged horse, for some predicate F. But by
Russells Theory of Definite Descriptions, The F is a winged horse is
true just in case there exists a unique thing satisfying F and it is a
winged horse. Since there exist no winged horses, the second sentence is
false. And by Russells theory, the falsity of this sentence implies the
falsity of the original sentence - contradicting out intuitions.
To avoid this problem, others have suggested that Pegasus is a winged
horse is a truth about a winged horse existing in another possible world,
and that it can be true of that other world even though Pegasushas neither
existence nor being here.2 However, this suggestion runs into difficulty with
another set of intuitions. It is evident that we do have intentional attitudes
toward non-existent objects. For example, Conan Doyle created Sherlock
Holmes. Some Greeks imagined Pegasus.Children dream about
Rumpelstiltskin. Sentences expressing these attitudes are true of this
world. The above suggestion gives us no clue how to interpret such truths.
In fact, it seems to preclude uniform treatment: Pegasus is a winged
horse is a truth about a winged horse existing in another possible world,
but Some Greeks imagined Pegasus is a truth about no winged horses at
all (since it is true of this world, where there are no winged horses).
Meinongian theories which countenance nonexistent objects by
supposing them to have being in this world may yield a more satisfying
explanation of these data. One such theory, developed by Terence Parsons,
treats nonexistent objects on a par with existent objects.3 Parsons
Journal of Phibsophical Logic 9 (1980) 297-313.
0022-3611/80/0093-0297$01.70.
Copyright 0 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrech t, Holland and Boston, CI.S.A.

298

ALANMcMICHAELANDEDZALTA

distinguishes two types of properties, nuclear and extranuclear. Objects are

correlated one-to-one with the sets of nuclear properties they have. A comprehension principle says that there is an object for every expressible set of
nuclear properties. Some of these objects have, while others lack, the extranuclear property of existence. Parsons assignsone of the nonexistent
objects to Pegasus - the one which exemplifies just the nuclear properties attributed to the winged horse of Greek mythology. Pegasus,so
identified, exemplifies certain extranuclear properties like being imagined,
being thought about, being dreamed about, etc. Parsons theory is a powerful and insightful explanation of the data with which were concerned.
However, some philosophers may share another of our intuitions,
namely, that non-existent objects dont have or exemplify their properties
in quite the same way that actual objects do. Parsons theory, with its
single domain of objects and single mode ofpredication, doesnt capture
this intuition. But the theory discussed by W. Rapaport4 (which has its
roots in theories by Mally and Castaiieda) does justice to this intuition by
sharply distinguishing between existent and nonexistent objects, and by
introducing a second form of predication for the latter. Actual objects
have or exempZi& their properties, whereas non-actual objects may
exemplify some properties and include others. For example, Pinkerton
exemplifies detectivehood but does not include it. Holmes includes
detectivehood but does not exemplify it. And Holmes exemplifies being
thought about by Conan Doyle, but he does not include that property.
Notice that a fictional object includes the properties ascribed to it in the
work of fiction, but exemplifies certain intentional properties, such as
being imagined, being discussed, being more famous than any real detective,
and so forth.
In an earlier paper by one of the authors, a language was produced in
which the distinctions between exemplification and inclusion, and between
the two kinds of objects, could be represented precisely.6 In addition, an
axiomatic theory of objects was developed there. The system presented here
incorporates several improvements on that earlier paper - we give a fuller
treatment of relations and we develop a semantics for the A-notation which
is used to form complex property expressions. The Relations axiom, which
appears here for the first time, is an important addition to the original
axiomatic theory. We expect that our system will serve as a prototype for a
larger and richer language into which we may translate significant portions
of English.

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY
I. THE

OF NONEXISTENT
LANGUAGE

OBJECTS

299

ZM

ZM is a second-order language with a number of special features: (1) There

are three sorts of object-terms, Meinongian object terms (x-variables and
a-constants), actual object terms (y-variables and b-constants), and neutral
object variables @IS). (2) The language contains both simple and complex
predicate terms. Under any admissible interpretation, these denote
relations, nor sets. (3) There are two basic ways of forming atomic
predicative sentences. When n object terms, TV, . . . , r,, occur to the left
of a bracketed relation term, the resulting sentence says that the objects
exemplify the relation. When a single M-object term occurs to the right of
a bracketed property term, the resulting sentence says that the M-object
includes the property.
A. Syntax
1. Primitive Vocabulary
a. Singular terms
i. Meinongian object terms.
Constants: al, a2, a3, . . . .
Variables: x 1, ~2, ~3, . . . .
ii. Actual object terms.
Constants: br , bs, bs, . . . .
Variables: yI,y2,ys, . . . .
iii. Object variables: z,, z2, z3, . . . .
b. Simple predicate terms.
i. Constants: fl, z, E, . . . I2 and E! (existence).
ii. Variables: p:, p$ pz, . . . .
NOTE: We will systematically misspell formulas of the form r1r2[Z2]
m 7, =A 72. =A is the relation in our system which most closely
resembles the identity relation of orthodox theories (namely, identity
among existing objects).
c. Connectives: &, v, -, +, E.
d. Existential quantifier: 3.
e. Purely formal identity sign: =.
f. Parentheses and brackets: ( , ), [ , 1.
g. Lambda: X.
2. Wffs

300

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McMICHAEL

AND

ED

ZALTA

a. Atomic: If CYls an n-place predicate term, and ri, . . . , 7, are

singular terms, then rl. . . rn[o] is a wff.
b. Atomic: If OLis a l-place predicate term, and r is a Meinongian object
term, then [cu]7 is a w ff.
c. Atomic: If CY,0 are both singular terms or both predicate terms with
the same number of places, then a = fl is a wff.
d. Molecular: If 9, J, are wffs, then so are @I& J/, # v $, # + $,$ E $,
and-@.
e. Quantified If I$ is a wff, and a! is any variable, then (a)# and (!~cY)#
are wffs.
3. X-predicates: If 4 is a formula which has at least n free z-variables,
71,.
* *, r,, which has no inclusion subformulas [cr]?, which has no
purely formal identities as subformulas, which has no predicate
quantifiers, and which contains no xs, then Xri . , . XT,@ is an n-place
predicate.
z-variables are used to form X-predicates because neutral placeholders
are needed in complex predicate terms.
We will use the following defmed notation for asserting relations
among non-existents:
[R]a,.

. .a, =a,,br [AZ 2112.. . a,[R]]al&

& [AZ ulzug.. . a,[R]]uz

& [hzu1up.

&. . .

. a,-,z[R]]u,.

There is an asymmetry between exemplification and inclusion. Objects may

exemplify (bear) relations, but they include only properties. Nevertheless,
there is a sense in which M-objects may include relations to one another,
and this is captured by the definition.
B. Semantics
An interpretation of ZM is to be any octuple, S, which meets the following
conditions:
1. The first member of S is a non-empty set M which will be called the
classof Meinongian objects.
2. The second member of S is a set A which will be called the class of
actual objects.

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF

NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS

301

3. The third member of S is a sequence of non-empty classes

Rl,&,R3..
. . Each R, is called the class of n-place relations.
RIuR2vR3u...
must be closed under all the logical operations
specified in the seventh member of the interpretation, F.
(When R is followed only by subscripts, it will stand for classesof
relations.)
4. The fourth member of S is a function, extR, which maps each r E R,
to a class of ordered n-tuples of M u A. Intuitively, for n > 1, these sets
of n-tuples are the extensions of the relations among the objects which
exemplify these relations. And for n = 1, the sets of objects serve as the
extensions of the properties among the objects which have or exemplify
these properties.
5. The fifth member of S is a function, extI lM, which maps each r E R 1
to the class of members ofM which include r. (Read ext[ l,&): the
extension of r among the M-objects which include it.)
6. The sixth member of S is a one-to-one function, f, which maps each
member of M to a subclassof R 1 in such a way that

f(x) = {r E R I Ix E ext[ I&}.

7. The seventh member of S is a class of logical functions, F, which has as
members PLUG (plug), CONV (conversion), REFL (reflection),
PROJ (projection), M-PROJ (Meinongian projection), A-PROJ
(actual projection), NEG (negation), and CONJ (disjoint
conjunction):
(a) PLUGisafunctionfrom(R2uR3...)x(MuA)x~into
. . ) subject to the condition: eXtR(PLuG(R
, 0, i)) =
@lu&.
eXtR(PLUG(R,
(01,.

0, i))
. . , 01-1909

=
Oi+ls

{bl,.

. . , oiel,

* . . 3 0,)

ol+l,.

. . , on>1

E eXtR(R)}

Intuitively, PLUG (R, o, i) is the n - 1 place relation which is the result

of plugging individual o into R in its ith place.
For example,
PLUG(loves, Abelard, 2) = loving Abelard,
PLUG(loves, Heloise, 1) = being loved by Heloise.
(b) CONV is a function from (R2 u RP . . . ) x w x w into

302

ALAN

McMICHAEL

AND

ED

ZALTA

(R2u Rs . . . ) subject to the condition:

ext&O~W,

i,i))

= {bl,

. . . , OL~,O~,O~+~,. . . ,of+,

01, oj+l,. . . , o,>l(ol, . . . ,o,) E extR(R)}.

Intuitively, CONV(R, i,j) is the n place relation which is the conversion of the relation R about its ith andith places.
For example,
CONV(loves, 1,2) = being loved by,
CONV(gives ( ) to, 1,3) = being given ( ) by.
(c) REFLisafunctionfrom(RauRg...)x
. . ) subject to the condition:
(RIu&.
extn(RJZFL(R,

i,i))

((01,.

ox winto
. . , oi,.

. . , Oj-1,

oj+1,. * - , On)l(O~,...,Oi,...,Oj,..~,On>E

EextR(Rn)&oi

= oi}

Intuitively, REFL(R, i, i) is the n - 1 place relation which is the

reflection of R that links its ith and ith places.
For example,
REFL(kil1, 1,2) = committing suicide,
REFL(shaves, 1,2) = shaving oneself.
(d) PROJisafunctionfrom(R~uRg...)x~into(RRuRR2...)
subject to the condition:
extR(PROJ(R,i))

= ((or,. . . , o~-~,o~+~, . . . ,o,)I

(30)((01, . . . , oiwl, o, o~+~,. . . , 0,) E extR(Rn))}.

Intuitively, PROJ(R, i) is the n - 1 place relation which is the ith

projection of R.
For example,
PROJ(loves, 2) = loving someone,
PROJ(loves, 1) = being loved by someone.
(e) M-PROJisafunctionfrom(RzuR~...)x~into(R1uRa...)
subject to the condition:

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF

NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS

303

extR(M-PROJ(R, i)) = {(or,. . . , oiml, ~r+~, . . . , o)l.

(30)(oEM&(ol,.

. . ,o~-~,o,o~+~, . . . ,oEextR(R))).

Intuitively, M-PROJ (R", i) is the n - 1 place relation which is the ith

projection of R" with respect to the Meinongian objects.
For example,
M-PROJ (thinking about, 2) = thinking about some
Meinongian object.
(f) A-PROJisafunctionfrom(R2uRg...)x~into(RIuR2...)
subject to the condition:
extR(A-PROJ(R,i))

= {(or,. . . , of-l,of+l,.

. . , o>l

(30)(0 EA & (0 I, . . . , of+, 0, of+l, . . . , 0,) E e%(R))).

Intuitively, A-PROJ (R", i) is the n - 1 place relation which is the ith
projection of R" with respect to the actual objects.
For example,
A-PROJ (thinking about, 1) = being thought about
by some real thing,
A-PROJ (thinking about, 2) = thinking about some
real thing.
(g) NEGisafunctionfrom(R1uRz...)into(R1uRz...)
subject to the condition:
extR(NEG(R))

= ((or,. . . ,o,,)l(or,

. . . ,o>

4 ext&)}.
Intuitively, NEG (R") is the n-place relation which is the negation of

R".
For example,
NEG (red) = being non-red,
NEG (met) = not having met.
Q

CONJisafunctionfrom(R1uR2...)x(RluR2...)into

(R,u RJ... ) subject to the condition:

304

ALAN

McMlCHAEL

extn(CONJ(Z2,9))

AND

ED ZALTA

= {(or,. . . , on,oi, . . . , &)I

(01, . . . ,o,) k ext,(R)

&

& <ol, . . . ,c&> E extn(Y)}.

Intuitively, CONJ (R, Sm) is the n + m place relation which is the
disjoint conjunction of R and Sm.
For example,
CONJ (red, round) = the relation any two objects bear to
each other just in case the first is red
and the second is round
(Note that REFL(CONJ(red, round), 1,2) = the property of being red
and round.)
CONJ (being clever, being the mother of) =
= the three place relation any three objects
bear to one another just in case the first is
clever and the second is the mother of the third.
(Note that REFL(CONJ(being clever, being the mother of), 1,2)
= the relation any two objects bear to each other just in case the first
is the clever mother of the second. Also note that PROJ(R.PFL.(CONJ
(being clever, being the mother of, 1,2), 1) = the property of having a
clever mother.)s
8. The eighth member of S is a function Z which is the assignment function.
Z is defined on the terms and simple predicates of the language:
(a) If r is an M-object term, Z(r) EM.
(b) If r is an A-object term, Z(r) EA.
(c) If r is a z-variable, Z(T) EM u A.
(d) If a! is an n-place simple predicate, Z(o) E R,.
Moreover,
extR(Z(=A))

= ((0, o>lo E A}, extn(Z(E!))

= A.

C. Definition of extended assignments

Given an interpretation S with assignment function Z, I* is the extended
assignments. Z* is defined on object terms, simple predicates, and
A-predicates, in accordance with the rules:

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF

NONEXISTENT

305

OBJECTS

1. For any object term or simple predicate &Z*(a)

= Z(a).

2. If a is a simple n-place predicate, and rl, . . . , rn are distinct z-variables,

Z+(hl . . . X7, r1 . . .7, [a]) = Z*(a).
3. If x71.. . AT,@is a A-predicate, and
I*

07

1 . . . iTi_,

ATi+1

. . A?,$),

/Ti))9
z*(K),

=
i)).

AT&Jis a A-predicate,

4. IfATl...

zyx71..
=
If

is an object term

. . . h,,#(K

= PLUG(ZS(AT1 .

5.

x71..

. X7&1

ATjATf+1.

CONv(Z(kI

. . ATj-1

. . . AT&J),

A7fATj+l-

- , A7n#)

l-J).

AT,$I is a A-predicate,
Z*(AT~ - e wA71a . . ATi- ATj+l s- aA~n@(T~/Tj)) =

= REFL(Z*(Arl
6. IfArl...

. . . AT&), i, j).

AT,@is a A-predicate and T is a z-variable not occurring in @,

f(X71 . . . Aqel AT~+~.. . A~,(W#W1))

= PROJ(Z*(AT, . . . AT,@), i).

AT,+ is a A-predicate and p is an M-object variable not
7. IfArl...
occurring in 9,

z*(x71 . . . Ari-lAri+l . . . A~n(W401hN

= M-PROJ(Z*(AT~ . . . AT&), i).

8. IfAT1...

AT& is a A-predicate and 7) is an actual object variable not

occurring in $,
Z*(AT~. . . AqselAT~+~. . . A7,(317)$(7)/71))

= A-PROJ(Z*(Aq . . . AT,&), i).

9. If kl

. . . AT&Jis a A-predicate,
Z*(hl.

. . AT, - #) = NEG(Z*(A~l . . . AT,@)).

10. IfArl..
.A?,@and Au,. . . Au, JI are A-predicates and all the TSand
us are distinct,

ALAN
I*(&.

McMICHAEL
. . XT&J~.

AND
. . Au&

CONJ(Z* (Xrl

ED
& 4))

. . . AT@),

z*@u~.

ZALTA
=
. . Au,JI)).

D. Recursive definition of trues

D1

If 01is an n-place predicate and r1 . . .7, are any singular

term& then r1 . . . TV[a] is trues iff (1(7,), . . . , Z(7,)) E
extR(Z+(a)).
If aris a 1-place predicate term and T is an M-object term,
then [ar] 7 is trues iff Z*(a) E f(Z(7)).

D2

iff I*@) = I@).

03

a = p is trues

04

-@istruesifff$isnottrues.

DS

(# & JI) is trues iff 4 and $ are both trues.

D6

(@Iv $) is trues iff at least one of 4, $4is trues.

Dl

(4 -f $) is trues iff at least one of - 4, $ is trues.

DS

($J= $) is trues iff $ and JI are both trues or neither is

trues.

(~CY)I#J
is trues iff + is trues for some S which is just like S
except that its assignment function may differ from the
assignment function of S in what it assignsto a.

D9

(a)# is trues iff - (301) - (J is trues.

40

IL

AXIOMS

AND

CONSEQUENCES

OF

A THEORY

OF

OBJECTS

1. Non-existence:
(x) -x [E!]
No M-objects have existence.
2. Existence: @)r[E!]
All actual objects have existence.
3.

Objects: For any wff $ which does not contain x free, the universal
closure of the following is an axiom:
(3x)W)([Plx

= $4.

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF

NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS

307

For every expressible set of properties, there is a Meinonglan object

which includes just those properties.
Some one might want to adopt the view that for eve)3rset of
properties, there is an Object which includes just those properties.
But we wont commit ourselves to that view.
For any X-predicate hrr . . . XT,+, the universal closure
4. Relations:
of the following is an axiom:

(21).. .(Z)z1.. .Z,[ATl..

.AT&J]
= 4 ;I*. .i .
(
(71 7,11
This is our abstraction schema for relations.
5.

VqriabZes: (z)((-Jx)x = z v (3y)y = z) & (x)@z)z =x &

cv)(3z)z =Y.

6.
7. Ident@ forMobjects:

(x1)(x2)(x1 =x2 = @)([P]x~

= [p]x2)).

We deny that M-objects exist (the Nonexistence Axiom accomplishes

this). Nevertheless, we do quantify over them. Thus it might be said that
we admit Meinongian objects into our ontology. We do indeed count them
among the things there a7e.1
Some M-objects are objects of imagination. But not all M-objects have
been imagined. This is fairly clear from the Objects Axiom, which can
generate infinitely many M-objects. For any expressible set of properties,
we obtain an M-object. For example, we get the existent golden mountain
as follows:
(3x)@)([p]x
= p=E! vp=G
(instance of Objects Axiom)

vp=M)

where G stands for being golden and M stands for being a mountain.
By similar applications of this axiom, we can generate all the other nonexistent objects as well, for instance, the round square. Also, by letting
$J= rp f ~1, we obtain the empty M-object. It includes no properties.
That there is such an object may seem strange, but this shouldnt constitute
an objection to the theory.
There is an important correlation which arises in this system, a

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correlation between actual objects and certain M-objects. For each actual
object, there is an M-object which includes exactly the properties the
actual object exemplifies. When this happens, we call the M-object a
blueprint and the corresponding actual object its !.Seincorrelate
(Rapaports terminology). We introduce a defined notation for Sincorrelation:

yscC may not express a relation, since the notation it abbreviates cannot
be made into a A-predicate. This is so because the notation which is abbreviated contains an inclusion formula, violating a restriction on h-predicates.
By the Objects Axiom, we know that every actual object has at least one
M-object blueprint. We can also show that an actual object has at most one
blueprint. For suppose it had two distinct blueprints. By the Meinongian
Identity Axiom, there is a property which one blueprint includes and the
other doesnt. By the definition of Sein-correlate, it would follow that the
actual object both has and doesnt have this property.
Also, no two actual objects have the same blueprints. For suppose
distinct actual objects, b1 and b2, do. Then, b1 has iu z =A bl, whereas
bz lacks this property. So they cant have the same blueprint.
Certain other M-objects could have been blueprints of actual objects.
Let us call these potential blueprints. They will prove extremely useful
when developing a modal version of this theory. Potential blueprints are
the principal bearers of possibility. For example, Jimmy Carter is possible
onty in the sense that his blueprint is possible. That is, his blueprint could
have, and indeed does have, a Seincorrelate. Pegasusis possible in the
primary sense, for in some world he has a Seincorrelate.
III.

APPLYING

THE

SYSTEM

TO

FICTION

In this section of the paper, we shall put the system to work translating
English and motivate certain features of the language in the process.
Naturally we shalI concentrate on sentences containing names of fictional
characters, so that our translations will illustrate the uses of inclusion
predications and fictional object constants.
In our translations, we use the first letters of the names of fictional
characters to stand in for Meinongian object constants, the first letters of

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF

NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS

309

the names of actual objects to stand in for actual object constants, and the
fmt letters of English predicates to stand in for predicate constants. The
intended interpretation of an M-object constant is that fictional object
which includes (1) all the properties expressed by predicates which are
attached to the corresponding English name in the work of fiction, and
(2) whatever properties normal readers infer from th~se!~
Preferred readings are given first.
1. Raskolnikov is a student.
(a) [S] r Raskolnikov includes being a student. (True, since this was
ascribed to him in the novel.)r3
(b) r]S] Raskohrikov exemplif%s being a student. (False. He never
attended any existing school.)
2. Dostoyevsky created Raskohrikov.
(a) &[CJ Dosteyevsky bears the creation relation to Raskohrikov.
(Due, since Dostoyevsky did create the fictional character
Raskolnikov.)
(b) fAzdz[Cj]r
Raskohlik ov includes the property of being created
by Dostoyevsky. (False, since this was not ascribed to Raskolnikov
in the novel.)
3. Porphyry arrested Raskolnikov.
(a) [A]pr Porphyry includes the arresting relation to Raskolnikov,
or Raskolnikov includes the property of being arrested by
Porphyry, and Porphyry includes the property of arresting
Raskolnikov. (Due. [A]@ is an abbreviation for [AZ pz [A]] r &
[AZ zr[A]]p. The conjunction is true because Raskolnikov and
Porphyry are attributed these properties in the novel.)
(b) pr[.4] Porphyry bears the arresting relation to Raskolnikov.
(False. No real arrest took place between these two characters.)
4. Smerdyakov hung a cat.
(a) [hz (3y)& [c3 & zy ]I!Jl)J s Smerdyakov includes the property of
having hung a cat . (True).
(b) (3x)( [c]x & [H] se) Some M-object which includes being a cat is
such that Smerdyakov includes the relation of hanging to it, or
Some M-object which includes being a cat is such that it includes
the property of being hung by Smerdyakov, and Smerdyakov

310

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includes the property of hanging it. (This is true only if

Smerdyakov hung some cat which is a chmucter of the novel.)
(c) (3y)(~ [Cl & [AZ zy [H]] s) For some actual cat, Smerdyakov
includes the property of hanging it. (False).
(d) (3y)O, [Cl & sy [HJ) Smerdyakov bears the hanging relation to
some actual cat. (False).
5. Everyone that met Alyosha loved him.
(a) [AZ (v)@z [M] + yz [L])] a Alyosha includes the property of being
loved by everyone that meets him. (True, lets suppose.)
(b) (x)( [M] xa + [L] xa) Every M-object such that it includes meeting
Alyosha and Alyosha includes being met by it includes loving
Alyosha and AIyosha includes being loved by it. This is true just
in caseevery character that meets Alyosha loves him. It is not
likely to be a good translation of a sentence of the novel, but could
be used to interpret a critical remark.)
6. Dmitri lived in Russia.
(a) [AZ zr[L]] d Dmitri includes the property of living in Russia.
(True, since this was ascribed to him in the novel.)
(b) dr[L] Dmitri bears the living in relation to Russia. (False, since
Dmltri is not among the real inhabitants of Russia.)
7. Dmitri lived in an actual country.
(3y)(j~ [q & [Xz zy [L ]] d) Note that this is true whereas 4(c) is
false. Y names the actual country, Russia, in 6(a).

IV.

PARADOXES

In certain naive versions of our Meinongian theory, paradoxes arise. For

example, if we may introduce the property of an object being its own Seincorrelate and the property of an object not being its own Seincorrelate,
contradictions soon follow. r4 And if for every M-object x, there is a
property of being identical to x, we also get contradictions! One way in
which we might avoid such contradictions is by giving a restricted abstraction schema for relations, so we do not assert the existence of properties
corresponding to such predicates as is its own Sein-correlate and is
identical to ai. For example, we might use the schema:

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF

NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS

311

where C#Icontains no formal identities or inclusions. In the present language,

we have chosen a less direct means. By restricting the formulas which may
appear in A-predicates, we are unable to denote any paradoxical propertiesr6
Although any solution to these paradoxes involves some compromises,
our solution does leave us with a rich variety of properties and relations.
The intuitive closure conditions are preserved: every property and relation
has a negation, every two properties or relations have a conjunction, all
relations have their appropriate projections, and so on. Many solutions fail
to preserve these conditions. For instance, one solution examined by
Rapaport has the result that some properties lack negations.
The paradoxes have forced us to banish formal identities from Apredicates. The loss is not grievous; we still have an identity relation which
is well-behaved on the actual objects.
Naive Meinongian theories employing one mode of predication also
engender contradictions. For suppose that for every set of objects, there is
a property which just those objects have, and that for every set of properties
there is an object which has just those properties. Then the set of properties
is of greater cardinality than the set of objects, and the set of objects is of
greater cardinality than the set of properties - which is absurd.
Yet such theories have an even more elementary difficulty. From them
we may prove, The existent golden mountain exists. By the existent
golden mountain we mean the object which has just tbis set of properties:
{existence, being composed of gold, being a mountain}. On the theories in
question, this object has existence. Also we may prove, Russell never
thought about the round square, since the object which has just the
properties roundness and squareness does not have the property of being
thought about by Russell.
Parsons evades the contradictions by distinguishing nuclear and extranuclear properties. For every set of objects, there is an extrunuclear
property which just those objects have, but it is only for every set of
nuclear properties that there is an object which has just those properties.
No contradictions arise. The difficulty concerning the existent golden
mountain is solved by asserting that existence is an extranuclear property,
and not a nuclear property. Hence there is no set of nuclear properties, no
object-forming set, which contains existence. Similarly, the property of

312

ALAN

McMICHAEL

AND

ED ZALTA

being thought about by Russell is extranuclear, not nuclear, and so does not
appear in an object-forming set.
The difficulty concerning the existent golden mountain is solved here by
asserting that existence is included, not exemplified, by the object which
also includes goldenness and mountainhood. Also, the property of being
thought about by Russell is exemplified, but not included, by the object
which includes exactly roundness and squareness. So possible advantages
of our theory are (a) it doesnt exclude existence and being thought about
by Russell from object-forming sets, and (b) it doesnt leave us with the
difficulty of trying to say what the watered-down versions of extranuclear properties are, something which Parsons must face in order to
relate his domains of properties systematically.
We concede that these advantages may not be telling. We are content to
have provided a viable theory based on the fundamental distinctions
between real and imaginary objects and between two kinds of predication.
Any final decision for or against the theory must be the outcome of future
discussion.
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
NOTES
* For Russell, the description might exist in thought alone, with no corresponding
English expression.
a See, for example, David Lewis, Truth in fiction, American Philosophical Quarterly
l&37-46.
3 Prolegomenon to Meinongian semantics, Journal ofphilosophy 71(1974), 561580. Nuclear and extranuclear properties, Meinong, and Leibniz, Nous 12 (1978)
137-151. Nonexistent Objects, (forthcoming), Yale University Press A familiarity
with the ideas in these works made our essay possible.
4 Meinongian theories and a Russellian paradox, Nous 12 (1978). 153-180.
5 Indeed, fictional objects exemplify many negative properties as well, such as
being non-red and not being clever.
6 Ed Zalta, Alternative Meinongian semantics, unpublished. In that paper, the basic
logic of inclusion was worked out - the several domains of quantification, ext func
tions, correlation functions, and the logical function PLUG. This basic logical
apparatus resembles that of Parsons in Nonexistent Objects. The semantics for the
remaining logical functions was developed by McMichael as a result of famiharity with
work by Quine (see Note 5). The ReZations axiom replaces the property abstraction
axiom of Alternative Memongian Semantics.
The logical functions are ultimately derived from Quines predicate operators in

ALTERNATIVE

THEORY

OF NONEXISTENT

OBJECTS

313

Variables explained away, Selected Logical Papers, Random House, New York, 1966,
pp. 227-235. Of course, the difference between our functions and his operators is
enormous.
8 Other logical functions, such as DISJ (disjunction), BICON (biconditional),
and MCON (material conditional), can be added if you think equivalent logical
functions can yield distinct properties when applied to the same arguments.
9 We use the symbol @(a/r)* to mean the fomula which results from @when every free
occurrence of r is replaced by an occurrence of K.
Perhaps this is what Rapaport means when he says that Meinongian objects are
actual. (Meinongian theories. . . , p. 171).
I Strictly speaking, Pegasus is not a potential blueprint. Since he includes only the
properties ascribed to him in myth, he is not complete (i.e., for some properties, he
includes neither them nor their negations). However, there are many potential blueprints which include all the properties Pegasus includes, and each of them might have
had a S&correlate.
This is essentially the account of fictional characters given in Zaltas Alternative
Meinongian semantics. We presume that a more detailed account could be constructed
along the same lines as Parsons account iniVonexistenf Objects.
I3 We obtain no other readings using h-predicates. For example, [ ti z [S] ] r
expresses the same proposition,as [S] r, and t[hz z[S]] expresses the same
proposition as t[S] . The first follows from clause 2 of the definition of extended
assignmentg, and the second follows from our intuition that expressions which are
equivalent by the Axiom of Relations express the same proposition.
See Rapaport. Meinongian Theories. . . , p. 172. The contradiction is worked out
in detail in Zaltas Alternative Meinongian semantics.
For suppose there were. Since for any distinct M-objects x, and x, , the property
of being identical to x L would be distinct from the property of being identical to x, ,
a one-to-one correspondence would exist between the set of M-objects and a subset
of the set of properties This leads to contradiction.
Consider the following instantiation of the Objects Axiom:
@)([p]x

= (3x,)@

= Azz = x, & - [U 2 = x,]x,)).

From this we may deduce a contradiction:

[Azz = XIX = -[tit

= XIX.

I6 We have also barred property-quantifiers from A-predicates. Had we allowed them,

we would need a more complicated set of logical operations.
I Meinongian theories. . . , p. 173.
I* One reason he must relate them is so that he may claim that the sentence, The
existent golden mountain is existent, may be read, The object which has nuclear
existence, nuclear goldenness, and nuclear mountainhood has nuclear existence. So
he must say what nuclear existence is. His wateringdown
axiom (in Nonexistent
Objects) generates the nuclear versions of extranuclear properties without really
telling us precisely what these nuclear versions are.