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This article focuses on risk taking as one important dimension of entrepreneurial orientation and its impact in family rms. Drawing on a sample of Swedish SMEs, we nd
that risk taking is a distinct dimension of entrepreneurial orientation in family rms
and that it is positively associated with proactiveness and innovation. We also nd that
even if family rms do take risks while engaged in entrepreneurial activities, they take
risk to a lesser extent than nonfamily rms. Moreover, and most importantly for our
understanding of entrepreneurial orientation in family rms, we nd that risk taking in
family rms is negatively related to performance. Both theoretical and practical implications of our ndings are provided.
Introduction
The relationship between entrepreneurship and
risk taking has long puzzled researchers. Research
at the individual level has found little empirical
evidence to support the idea that entrepreneurs
take considerable risks. For example, on average,
entrepreneurs do not take greater risks than
managers (Brockhaus, 1980), and terms such as
risk avoiders (Miner, 1990) or risk optimizers
(McClelland, 1961) have been suggested for entrepreneurs. One important reason for these inconclusive results is likely to be that the rm-level
governance structure in which entrepreneurial
behavior takes place inuences managers risk
choices (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998). More
precisely, a problem with current literature on
entrepreneurship and risk taking is that not
enough attention has been paid to the role of the
organizational context in which this risk taking
takes place. Firms differ in terms of their organizational and governance structures and risk
taking may be higher in some organizational contexts than in others, as agency theorists argue
FAMILY BUSINESS REVIEW, vol. XX, no. 1, March 2007 Family Firm Institute, Inc.
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same individuals or represent the same ownerfamily. Traditionally, this lack of separation from
ownership and management has led researchers
to suggest that agency costs are low in family rms
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) because of a lesser need of
formal monitoring and control systems (Daily &
Dollinger, 1992; Geeraerts, 1984; Randy & Goel,
2003). Agency theorists prediction about the lack
of formal information and control systems has
been supported by scholars observing that family
rms are less likely to have active boards with
external board members (Brunninge & Nordqvist,
2004; Schulze et al., 2001) and strategic planning
processes (Ward, 1988). Moreover, Carney (2005)
argues that the personalism and the overlap of
ownership and management in family rms mean
that organizational authority is incorporated in
one person or family. Hence, family rms where
ownership and management is held within a
denable family operate under less pressure from
external constituents, such as minority shareholders, market analysts, and institutional monitors,
that demand accountability, disclosure, and transparency (Carney, 2005) than, for instance, publicly
traded rms or other rms with external owners
or managers. This, in turn, renders family rms
more vulnerable to self-control problems. Indeed,
family managers have the authority and legitimacy to pursue what they perceive as being the
best option (Gedajlovic et al., 2004).
As argued above, entrepreneurial activities in
family rms do involve taking risks, but to a lesser
extent than in nonfamily rms. If family rms
generally are characterized by less internal and
external formal monitoring, risk taking in family
rms is likely to mean that these rms make decisions that are less based on closely calculated
risks; less grounded in a systematic, unbiased way;
and with less incorporation of outsiders perspectives and opinions (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). The
lack of more formal monitoring and control
systems and practices for systematic collection
and analysis of information can result in family
rms investing in projects without thoroughly
considering the pros and cons in terms of risk.
This logic suggests that managers in family rms
have less control and understanding of the risk
that they are taking. Moreover, they have less pressure to analyze and motivate different alternatives
for both internal and external stakeholders. In
other words, family rms have greater latitude to
allocate resources on the basis of animal spirits or
gut feel and to pursue opportunities that can only
be rationalized by particularistic or intuitive criteria (Carney, 2005. p. 23). Thus, we expect that:
Hypothesis 3. Risk taking is negatively related to
performance in family rms.
Method
Research Design and Sample
To provide a baseline for comparing the risk
taking of family rms with that of nonfamily rms
as stated in Hypothesis 2, we selected a sample
that includes nonfamily rms as well as family
rms. A stratied sample of Swedish small and
medium-sized (SMEs) rms was surveyed and the
respondents were later broken down into two subsamples, that is, family and nonfamily rms. Sampling criteria for the whole sample were (1) four
industrial sectors based on ISIC codes (manufacturing, professional services, wholesale/retail, and
other services); (2) employment size, divided into
two groups (1049, 50249); and (3) corporate
governance (independent rms and members of
business groups). The sampling population contained 2,455 rms obtained from Statistics
Sweden (the Bureau of Census). We collected data
using telephone and mail surveys targeting the
CEOs of the SMEs.
In 1997, we collected data for the independent
and control variables. Data for the dependent
variable were obtained in 2000. We initially contacted the rms by telephone, resulting in 2,034
responses (82.9%). All rms interviewed received
a mail survey, generating 1,278 responses after two
reminders, for a response rate of 52.1% of the
original sample. In 2000, rms responding to
the 1997 survey were contacted again for a telephone interview for the dependent variable. T test
checks for response bias revealed no signicant
difference concerning age, size, and ownership.
This applied also to the family and nonfamily
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included in the 1997 survey. The scale for measuring past performance was identical to the one
measuring the dependent variable. The scale
for measuring environmental heterogeneity was
adapted from Miller and Friesen (1982). We used
three of the four original items (a = 0.85). To
measure industry sectors, we dummy coded rm
industry by SIC classication into manufacturing,
professional services, retailers, and other services.
Respondents were asked to state the year the rm
was founded, which was used to calculate rm age.
Independence was measured by dummy coding
whether the rm reported being independently
owned or belonging to a company group. To
measure size (small or medium-sized), we dummy
coded whether the rm reported having more or
less than 50 employees.
Control Variables
The multiple regression analyses also controlled
for rms past performance, environmental heterogeneity, industry sector, rm age, independence, and size. These are variables that have been
included in previous research on the relationship
between EO and performance. All variables were
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INNOVATIVENESS
.85
NEW PRODUCTS
.84
.72 e1
.71
e2
.30
INITIATE CHANGE
.60
PROACTIVENESS
.37
FIRST TO INTRODUCE
.86
.42
.55
.66
.59
FEARLESS, AGRESSIVE
RISK-TAKING
.35
e3
.73
e4
.30
e5
.44
.35
e6
e7
Family
Chi-
RMS
Square
EA
17.257
0.045
GFI
AGFI
CFI
IFI
NFI
PGFI
PNFI
AIC
0.986
0.965
0.986
0.987
0.972
0.387
0.509
54.72
firms
a
RAMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; AGFI =
adjusted goodness-of-fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; IFI = incremental fit index; NFI =
normed fit index; PGFI = parsimony goodness of fit; PNFI = parsimony normed fit index; AIC =
Akaike information criterion.
Figure 1 Confirmatory Factor Analyses and Fit Indices in Family Firms (Where e1e7 Represent the Error Terms).
Table 1 Results From Multiple Regression Predicting Performance for Family Firms
Context
Variable
Control Variables
Full Model
Family
Past performance
Heterogeneity
Manufacturing
Professional services
Retailing
Age
Independent
Small or large
Innovativeness
Proactiveness
Risk taking
R2
R2 Adj.
DR2
0.461***
0.011
-0.057
-0.016
0.067
-0.029
-0.130*
0.002
0.455***
0.008
-0.070
-0.030
0.058
-0.036
-0.134*
-0.017
0.103
0.048
-0.193**
0.290***
0.260***
0.037***
0.253***
0.230***
0.253***
Discussion
There is reason to believe that the relationship
between risk taking, entrepreneurship, and performance may depend on organizational context.
In this article, we have analyzed family rms.
Family rms represent a relatively distinct category in terms of ownership and governance. To
examine these issues, we relied on the entrepreneurial orientation construct and focused on the
risk-taking dimension of this construct. The key
ndings of this study are now discussed.
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taking into account the organizational and governance context, we found some interesting results.
Agency theory and previous empirical and conceptual research on family rms led us to hypothesize a negative relationship in family rms. This
was supported by our data and is an interesting
nding that advances our understanding of entrepreneurial orientation and risk taking in family
rms. First, it is in conict with previous research
that addresses the link between EO and performance, without taking into account the specic
organizational and governance context of family
rms. Research has not before addressed the link
between EO and performance in samples of family
rms only and disentangled the aspects of risk
taking, innovation, and proactiveness empirically.
Our result suggests that family rms take on
risks, but with negative implications for their performance. In line with our argumentation above,
one explanation, albeit tentative, for this nding
can be the following: family rms with the same
individuals or individuals from the same family
dominating both ownership and management of
the rm and who perceive the rm to be a family
rm expect the rm to stay within the family over
generations (James, 1999) and let key business
decisions be inuenced by the family (Chua et al.,
1999). This type of rm is often characterized by
little use of formal control systems (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Geeraerts, 1984; Randy & Goel, 2003),
few outside board members (Cowling, 2003;
Schulze et al., 2001), and weak pressure from
external monitors demanding accountability and
transparency (Carney, 2005). At least partly as a
result of this, it is plausible to argue that these
rms make decisions, invest in projects, and
pursue new venture in a more informal, intuitive,
and less calculated way. Put differently, risk taking
in family rms might not be rmly grounded in
systematic and formal procedures and not have
enough inclusion of outsiders perspectives and
opinions (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Therefore,
risk taking in entrepreneurial activities in family
rms might be less understood and possible outcomes more difcult to predict.
If this explanation is correct, it seems to support
recent arguments for family rms to install formal
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Limitations
This article has several limitations that should be
kept in mind. An increasing number of scholars
have argued that family rms do not constitute a
homogenous population of rms (Salvato, 2002;
Sharma, 2004). Rather, family rms differ on a
range of dimensions (Klein, Astrachan, &
Smyrnios, 2005) and it is possible that different
types of family rms show different patterns in
terms of entrepreneurial orientation and risk
taking. Our data consisted of Swedish SMEs and
inference to other countries should be made with
caution. National culture and tradition may inu-
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Conclusions
Research on corporate entrepreneurship and
entrepreneurial orientation will advance by
paying greater attention to the role of organizational context for different dimensions of entrepreneurship. In this article, we have focused on
risk taking as one important dimension of entrepreneurial orientation and its impact in family
rms. We conclude that risk taking is a distinct
dimension of entrepreneurial orientation and that
it is positively associated with proactiveness and
innovation. This is a contribution to the literature
on entrepreneurial orientation and risk taking
since it shows that the EO construct seems to
have great generality across organizational types.
Further, we conclude that even if family rms do
take risks while they are engaged in entrepreneurial activities, they take risk to a lesser extent than
do nonfamily rms. Moreover, and most importantly for our understanding of corporate entrepreneurship in family rms, we conclude that risk
taking in family rms is negatively related to performance. This is a contribution to the literature
on family rms, which so far has not paid enough
attention to the specics of corporate entrepreneurship in this very important type of rm
worldwide.
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Appendix: Measurements
Performance (adapted from Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003)
I will now mention four measures of outcome. For each of them I want to know if you think that your
outcome during the past 3 years has been better, worse or equal to that of other companies in your
industry (5-point scale ranging from much worse to much better).
Net prot (i.e., sales minus operational costs)
Growth of the companys value
Cash ow
Development of sales
Heterogeneity (adapted from Miller & Friesen, 1982)
Are there great differences amongst the products/services you offer, with regard to (seven-point scale
ranging from Approximately the same for all products to Considerable difference between
products)
Buying behavior of the customers
Nature of the competition
Market uctuations and uncertainty
Innovativeness (adapted from Covin & Slevin, 1989)
Generally our company prefers
to . . .
a. Strongly emphasize the
marketing of the companys
present products.*
1234567
1234567
No new products/services.
1234567
1234567
1234567
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1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
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