A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy

Thom Brooks

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal

in American Philosophy, Volume 45, Number 1, Winter 2009, pp. 50-54
(Article)
Published by Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.1353/csp.0.0066

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A Critique of
Pragmatism
and
Deliberative
Democracy
Thom Brooks

Abstract
Robert B. Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy
of Democracy is a genuine tour de force. His
aim is both to defend a particular view of
pragmatism originating with the work of
Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same
time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisses
Peircean pragmatism. The result is a stunning achievement with real persuasive
power. In this article, I will focus on one
worry, namely, that the picture of democracy on offer is incomplete. While Talisse
correctly argues that democracy is about
more than elections, democracy is also
about more than deliberation between citizens. Talisses deliberative democracy is
problematic to the degree its view of deliberation fails to account for democracy. If
my analysis is correct, then I do not aim to
demonstrate that Talisses Peircean pragmatism is incorrect, only incomplete. Thus, the
hope of this article is to help develop this
pragmatism further.
Keywords: democracy, democratic theory,
judiciary, Peirce, pragmatism, Schumpeter,
Talisse
I. Introduction
Robert B. Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy
of Democracy is a genuine tour de force.1 His
aim is both to defend a particular view of
pragmatism originating with the work of
Charles Sanders Peirce and, at the same
time, argue in favour of a new view of deliberative democracy developed from Talisses
Peircean pragmatism. The result is a stunning achievement with real persuasive
power.
Nevertheless, there are a few worries that
we may have with this important project. In

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Vol. 45, No. 1 2009

II. Deliberation and Democracy

Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy is a development of his
previous Democracy after Liberalism, with the former making explicit
the pragmatist roots and motivations of the conception of democracy
that he offers in the latter (viii). Together, these works offer us a new
theory of deliberative democracy.
Talisse offers a philosophy of democracy based on Peircean pragmatism (25). This philosophy is built off a particular view of democracy.
Talisse defines democracy as a form of politics according to which the
legitimacy of governments and their coercive power rests upon the
freely given consent of the governed (29). Democracy is majoritarian, but not simply majority rule (29). We cannot expect all collective decisions to be unanimous, but should expect certain reasonable
constraints on how decisions are made, especially with regard to the
protection of individual rights. Democracy is also a representative form
of government (29). This is because democratic decisions are not
freely consented to by the people directly, but indirectly through elected
representatives.
On this view, deliberation is about more than just electing representatives. For example, deliberation concerns questions relating to the
organization of our schools, workplaces, and families . . . within a
democratic politics (94). This seems largely correct. One mistake of
classical democratic theory is the idea that democracies are only genuinely democratic on election day itself. Surely, democracies are about
more than the act of voting alone. The issues that impact election
results change from one election to the next and the relative importance
of these issues is itself one product of deliberations about politics
amongst citizens. Moreover, citizens deliberate about more than how
they might vote on election day: they also deliberate about the best
means of educating their children or lending support to their families.
In these ways, Talisse seems largely correct to highlight the ways in
which deliberation in democracies is about more than the act of voting
alone, but extends to other areas of civic life.3
While I agree with Talisse that democracy is about more than elections, democracy is also about more than elections and civic associations. Talisses focus appears fixed on the deliberative discussions held

A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy Thom Brooks

this article, I will focus on one worry, namely, that the picture of
democracy on offer is incomplete. While Talisse correctly argues that
democracy is about more than elections, democracy is also about more
than deliberation between citizens. Talisses deliberative democracy is
problematic to the degree its view of deliberation fails to account for
democracy. If my analysis is correct, then I do not aim to demonstrate
that Talisses Peircean pragmatism is incorrect, only incomplete. Thus,
the hope of this article is to help develop this pragmatism further.

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between citizens. The problem is that this identifies but one level of
democracy. Citizens elect representatives and it is these representatives
who make political decisions on behalf of citizens. There is then deliberation between citizens about democratic politics, but also between
elected representatives at a different level. As citizens engage largely
with one another, their representatives engage with one another, too.
These two levels of deliberation are not entirely separate and each
informs the other. For example, debates held in either Congress or Parliament are not merely deliberations between political leaders, but
deliberations often informed by public opinion and other factors. If
this picture is correct, then deliberation is more complex than noted by
Talisse. It would not be difficult for him to move beyond a onedimensional picture of deliberation to a multidimensional picture of
deliberation, although this move is absent thus far.
Finally, this multidimensional picture has a further element. Talisses
focus is on citizens deliberating with one another about elections and
the civic associations to which they belong. I have added that there is at
least a second level containing the citizens representatives that any
deliberative democratic theory must account for, as well as the interplay
between these two levels. Of course, this picture is also still overly simplistic. We have identified the citizens and their representatives, along
with the different forms of deliberation each may engage in. However,
any plausible picture of democracy has at least two further aspects that
continue to remain unaccounted for. These aspects are the bureaucracy
and the judiciary.
It is impossible to imagine a well-administered democratic government without an efficient and highly qualified bureaucracy composed of
civil servants. Indeed, one of the achievements of Joseph Schumpeters
groundbreaking work was not simply his identification of democracy as
rule by the politicians rather than rule by the people, but his identification of the professional bureaucracy as essential to democracy (and
perhaps all modern forms of governance).4 The deliberative democratic
picture we are offered by Talisse focuses on citizens deliberating with citizens about civic associations and how they may vote. Yet, democracy is
not simply about elections and associations, but also possesses a bureaucracy responsible for helping our representatives draft the laws and public policies that we deliberate about and consent to, as well as create
plans for the implementation of these laws and public policies we desire
as a deliberative democratic polity. It is far from clear how the deliberative model offered by Talisse can account for the bureaucracy without
whom democratic governance would be impossible.
The second aspect missing from Talisses account is the judiciary.
Democratic governance is about more than voters and the persons they
elect. Citizens may elect persons to the executive and legislative
branches, but citizens do not normally elect judges and magistrates to

III. Conclusion
In this article, I have discussed the relationship between Talisses deliberative democratic theory and his understanding of democracy. I have
argued that Talisses view of democracy is too limited. He is correct to
argue that democracy is about more than elections, but still his account
fails to account for significant parts of any democracy, including a professional bureaucracy and the third branch of democratic government,
the judiciary. If we were to accept Talisses view as presented, then he
must explain: (a) how he might expand his theory to account for these
gaps, offering us a more robust deliberative democratic theory than he
does, or (b) he should more clearly note that his theory of deliberative
democracy does not account for major democratic institutions nor
more than one level of democratic deliberation. Talisses deliberative
democracy is then not incorrect, but only incomplete.
Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy represents a genuine
advance in both our understanding of pragmatism and democratic theory. In my view, this understanding can be advanced further with a few
qualifications about how much of democracy a deliberative democratic model will capture and it should abandon the view that Peircean
pragmatism endorses only democracy forevermore. If adopted, these
amendments would make an already attractive philosophy even more
attractive.5
University of Newcastle
t.brooks@newcastle.ac.uk

A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy Thom Brooks

the judiciary, the third branch of government. It seems clear that a

deliberative democratic theory can take account of how deliberation
amongst citizens might relate to the activities of the judiciary. However,
Talisses theory nowhere makes this case.

NOTES
1. See Robert B. Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (London: Routledge, 2007). All references in the text will be to this work unless otherwise noted.
2. See Robert B. Talisse, Democracy after Liberalism: Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics (London: Routledge, 2005).
3. However, it is worth noting that deliberating about civic life is not itself
inherently democratic. Nor might the act of voting, as elections regularly take
place in countries normally characterized as non-democratic, such as Saddam
Husseins Iraq. Instead, democracy seems to entail not simply elections and the
right to free association, but opportunities to elect persons who might best represent your interests and opportunities for all to become a candidate for political
office. These latter considerations mark out democracy from other forms of governance, although these considerations appear in neither Talisses Democracy after
Liberalism nor his A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.

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4. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New

York: Harper & Bros., 1942): 28485, 28889, 292. See also Thom Brooks,
Plato, Hegel, and Democracy, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 53/54
(2006): 2450.
5. This paper was presented as part of the panel Talisses A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy: Author Meets Critics at the 2008 Political Studies Association
annual conference at Swansea University. My sincere thanks to Bob Talisse for
helpful criticisms, as well as for his engaging work.