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China Naval Modernization: Implications for

U.S. Navy CapabilitiesBackground and


Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
December 23, 2014

Congressional Research Service


7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33153

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Summary
China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability
for conducting operations beyond Chinas near-seas region. The question of how the United
States should respond to Chinas military modernization effort, including its naval modernization
effort, is a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S.
Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces
would fall within the Navys budget.
As a part of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region announced in January
2012, Department of Defense (DOD) planning is placing an increased emphasis on the AsiaPacific region. Observers expect that, as a result, there will be a stronger emphasis in DOD
planning on U.S. naval and air forces. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding
constraints on U.S. defense spending, DOD will seek to protect initiatives relating to the U.S.
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.
Chinas naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs,
including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines,
surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. Chinas naval modernization
effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine,
personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
Observers believe Chinas naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities
for doing the following: addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; asserting or
defending Chinas territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea; enforcing Chinas
view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive
economic zone (EEZ); displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting Chinas
status as a leading regional power and major world power. Consistent with these goals, observers
believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
forcea force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in Chinas near-seas region over
Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of
intervening U.S. forces. China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting
maritime security (including anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign
countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR)
operations.

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Potential oversight issues for Congress include the following: whether the U.S. Navy in coming
years will be large and capable enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime forces
while also adequately performing other missions around the world; the Navys ability to counter
Chinese ASBMs and submarines; and whether the Navy, in response to Chinas maritime A2/AD
capabilities, should shift over time to a more distributed fleet architecture.

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1
Scope, Sources, and Terminology ............................................................................................. 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2
Overview of Chinas Naval Modernization Effort .................................................................... 2
Date of Inception ................................................................................................................. 2
A Broad-Based Modernization Effort with Many Elements ............................................... 2
Quality vs. Quantity ............................................................................................................ 3
Limitations and Weaknesses................................................................................................ 3
Goals of Naval Modernization Effort .................................................................................. 4
January 2014 ONI Testimony.............................................................................................. 5
Selected Elements of Chinas Naval Modernization Effort ....................................................... 5
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) ................................................................................ 5
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) ................................................................................... 7
Submarines .......................................................................................................................... 7
Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-Based Aircraft ..................................................................... 15
Surface Combatants........................................................................................................... 24
Land-Based Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) .......................................... 35
Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons ....................................................... 37
Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems .................................................................. 37
Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters .............................................................. 37
Numbers of Chinese Ships and Aircraft; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ..................................... 39
Numbers Provided by ONI in 2013................................................................................... 39
Numbers Provided by ONI in 2009................................................................................... 39
Numbers Presented in Annual DOD Reports to Congress ................................................ 40
Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities.............................................................. 41
DOD Response to China Naval Modernization....................................................................... 43
Renewed DOD Emphasis on Asia-Pacific Region ............................................................ 43
Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept .......................................................................................... 44
August 2013 Press Report on Revisions to War Plans ...................................................... 44
Navy Response to China Naval Modernization....................................................................... 45
Force Posture and Basing Actions ..................................................................................... 45
Acquisition Programs ........................................................................................................ 46
Training and Forward-Deployed Operations..................................................................... 50
Statements of Confidence.................................................................................................. 51
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 51
Future Size of U.S. Navy ......................................................................................................... 51
Long-Range Carrier-Based Aircraft and Long-Range Weapons ............................................. 52
UCLASS Aircraft .............................................................................................................. 53
Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW)/Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile
(LRASM) ....................................................................................................................... 53
Next-Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) ........................................................... 54
Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile ......................................................................................... 54
Air-Sea Battle Concept ............................................................................................................ 54
Navys Ability to Counter Chinas ASBMs ............................................................................. 55
Breaking the ASBMs Kill Chain ...................................................................................... 55

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Endo-Atmospheric Target for Simulating DF-21D ASBM ............................................... 59


Navys Ability to Counter Chinas Submarines ....................................................................... 60
Navys Fleet Architecture ........................................................................................................ 61
Legislative Activity for FY2015 .................................................................................................... 62
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979)...................................................... 62
House................................................................................................................................. 62
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 67
Final Version ..................................................................................................................... 71
FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235)............................... 82
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 82
Final Version ..................................................................................................................... 82
Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act (H.R. 4495) ......................................................................... 83

Figures
Figure 1. Jin (Type 094) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine ............................................................ 8
Figure 2. Yuan (Type 039A) Class Attack Submarine ..................................................................... 9
Figure 3. Acoustic Quietness of Chinese and Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarines .................. 11
Figure 4. Acoustic Quietness of Chinese and Russian Non-Nuclear-Powered Submarines .......... 12
Figure 5. Aircraft Carrier Liaoning (ex-Varyag) ............................................................................ 16
Figure 6. J-15 Carrier-Capable Fighter .......................................................................................... 21
Figure 7. Luyang II (Type 052C) Class Destroyer......................................................................... 26
Figure 8. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Class Frigate............................................................................ 28
Figure 9. Type 056 Corvette .......................................................................................................... 30
Figure 10. Houbei (Type 022) Class Fast Attack Craft .................................................................. 31
Figure 11. China Coast Guard Ship ............................................................................................... 32
Figure 12. Yuzhao (Type 071) Class Amphibious Ship ................................................................. 33
Figure 13. Type 081 LHD (Unconfirmed Conceptual Rendering of a Possible Design)............... 34

Tables
Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings .......................................................................... 14
Table 2. PLA Navy Destroyer Commissionings ............................................................................ 27
Table 3. PLA Navy Frigate Commissionings ................................................................................ 29
Table 4. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Provided by ONI in 2013 ................................................. 39
Table 5. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships and Aircraft Provided by ONI in 2009 ............................. 40
Table 6. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Presented in Annual DOD Reports to Congress ............... 41

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Appendixes
Appendix A. January 2014 ONI Testimony ................................................................................... 85
Appendix B. Background Information on Air-Sea Battle Concept ............................................... 96
Appendix C. Article by CNO Greenert on Navys Rebalancing Toward Asia-Pacific ................ 122

Contacts
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 127

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Introduction
Issue for Congress
China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability
for conducting operations beyond Chinas near-seas region. The question of how the United
States should respond to Chinas military modernization effort, including its naval modernization
effort, is as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the
U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military
forces would fall within the Navys budget.
Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for
countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or
possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some
other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of
significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could
cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance
in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries,
including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States.
In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy
programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political
evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals
relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

Scope, Sources, and Terminology


This report focuses on the potential implications of Chinas naval modernization for future
required U.S. Navy capabilities. Other CRS reports address separate issues relating to China.
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual DOD report to
Congress on military and security developments involving China,1 an August 2009 report on
Chinas navy from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),2 published reference sources such as
Janes Fighting Ships, and press reports.
For convenience, this report uses the term Chinas naval modernization to refer to the
modernization not only of Chinas navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside Chinas navy
that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air
Force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars
for detecting and tracking ships at sea.
1

Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples
Republic of China 2014. Washington, June 2014. 87 pp. Hereinafter 2014 DOD CMSD. The 2010-2013 editions of the
report are cited similarly. The 2009 and earlier editions of the report were known as the China military power report;
the 2009 edition is cited as 2009 DOD CMP, and earlier editions are cited similarly.
2
Office of Naval Intelligence, The Peoples Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,
Suitland (MD), Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009. 46 pp. (Hereinafter 2009 ONI Report.)

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Chinas military is formally called the Peoples Liberation Army, or PLA. Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the Second Artillery Corps (SAC).
This report uses the term Chinas near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and
South China Seathe waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second
island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the
Philippines and Guam.3

Background
Overview of Chinas Naval Modernization Effort4
Date of Inception
Observers date the beginning of Chinas naval modernization effort to various points in the
1990s.5 Design work on the first of Chinas newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later
1980s.6 Some observers believe that Chinas military (including naval) modernization effort may
have been reinforced or accelerated by Chinas observation of U.S. military operations against
Iraq in Operation Desert Storm in 1991,7 and by a 1996 incident in which the United States
deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Taiwan in response to Chinese missile
tests and naval exercises near Taiwan.8

A Broad-Based Modernization Effort with Many Elements


Although press reports on Chinas naval modernization effort sometimes focus on a single
element, such as Chinas aircraft carrier program or its anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
Chinas naval modernization effort is a broad-based effort with many elements. Chinas naval
modernization effort includes a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs,
3

For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2013 DOD CMSD, p. 81.
Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from Janes Fighting Ships
2012-2013, and previous editions. Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding
projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy
shipbuilding.
5
China ordered its first four Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993, and its four Russian-made Sovremennyclass destroyers in 1996. China laid the keel on its first Song (Type 039) class submarine in 1991, its first Luhu (Type
052) class destroyer in 1990, its Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer in 1996, and its first Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G)
class frigate in 1990.
6
First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previous footnote) likely reflect design work
done in the latter 1980s.
7
See, for example, Robert Farley, What Scares Chinas Military: The 1991 Gulf War, The National Interest
(http://nationalinterest.org), November 24, 2014.
8
DOD, for example, stated in 2011 that The U.S. response in the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis underscored to Beijing
the potential challenge of U.S. military intervention and highlighted the importance of developing a modern navy,
capable of conducting A2AD [anti-access/area-denial] operations, or counter-intervention operations in the PLAs
lexicon. (2011 DOD CMSD, p. 57.)
4

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

including programs for ASBMs, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles
(LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, aircraft
carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine countermeasures
(MCM) ships, underway replenishment ships, hospital ships, and supporting C4ISR9 systems.
Some of these acquisition programs are discussed in further detail below. Chinas naval
modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval
doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.

Quality vs. Quantity


Although numbers of some types of Chinese navy ships have increased, Chinas naval
modernization effort appears focused less on increasing total platform numbers than on increasing
the modernity and capability of Chinese platforms. Changes in platform capability have been
more dramatic than changes in platform numbers. In some cases (such as submarines and coastal
patrol craft), total numbers of platforms have actually decreased over the past 20 years or so, but
aggregate capability has nevertheless increased because a larger number of older and obsolescent
platforms have been replaced by a smaller number of much more modern and capable new
platforms. ONI states that
Although [Chinas] overall [navy] order-of-battle [i.e., numbers of ships] has remained
relatively constant in recent years, the PLA(N) is rapidly retiring legacy combatants in favor
of larger, multi-mission ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine
weapons and sensors.... Even if order-of-battle numbers remain relatively constant through
2020, the PLA(N) will possess far more combat capability due to the rapid rate of acquisition
coupled with improving operational proficiency.10

Limitations and Weaknesses


Although Chinas naval modernization effort has substantially improved Chinas naval
capabilities in recent years, observers believe Chinas navy currently has limitations or
weaknesses in several areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations
in distant waters, joint operations with other parts of Chinas military, antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), MCM, a dependence on foreign suppliers for some ship components,11 and a lack of
operational experience in combat situations.12

C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
[Hearing on] Trends in Chinas Naval Modernization [before] U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014],
11
DOD states that China continues to invest in foreign suppliers for some propulsion units, but is becoming
increasingly self-reliant. (2014 DOD CMSD, p. 46.)
12
DOD states that
China would face several shortcomings in a near-term conflict.... First, the PLAs deep-water antisubmarine warfare capability seems to lag behind its air and surface warfare capabilities. Second, it
is not clear whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to
launch platforms in time for successful strikes against targets at sea beyond the first island chain.
Chinese submarines do, however, already possess some capability to hold surface ships at risk, and
China is working to overcome shortcomings in other areas.
(2014 DOD CMSD, pp. 31-32.)
10

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

The sufficiency of a countrys naval capabilities is best assessed against that navys intended
missions. Although Chinas navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be
sufficient for performing missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As Chinas navy reduces its
weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential
missions. China reportedly is working to overcome its limitations in ASW in part by deploying
arrays of acoustic sensors on the ocean floor.13

Goals of Naval Modernization Effort


Observers believe Chinas naval modernization effort is oriented toward developing capabilities
for doing the following:

addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be;

asserting or defending Chinas territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS)
and East China Sea (ECS);14

enforcing Chinas viewa minority view among world nationsthat it has the
legal right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime
exclusive economic zone (EEZ);15

displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and

asserting Chinas status as a leading regional power and major world power.16

Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as
an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forcea force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in
Chinas near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or
reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. (A2/AD is a term used by U.S. and other
Western writers; writers in China sometimes use the term counter-intervention force. During the
Cold War, U.S. writers used the term sea-denial force to refer to a maritime A2/AD force.)
ASBMs, attack submarines, and supporting C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of
13

See Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, Wired for Sound in the Near Seas, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
April 2014: 56-61; Harry Kazianis, Chinas Underwater A2/AD Strategy, The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com),
May 6, 2014.
14
For more on Chinas territorial claims in the SCS and ECS, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report
R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley
A. Kan.
15
For more on Chinas view regarding its rights within its EEZ, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16
DOD states that
Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which includes deterring or defeating thirdparty intervention, remains the focus and primary driver of Chinas military investment. However,
the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) also is placing emphasis on preparing for
contingencies other than Taiwan, including potential contingencies in the South and East China
Seas....
As Chinas interests, capabilities, and international influence have grown, its military
modernization program has also become increasingly focused on military investments for a range
of missions beyond Chinas coast, including sea lane security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).
(2014 DOD CMSD, p. i.)

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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Chinas emerging maritime A2/AD force, though other force elementssuch as ASCMs, LACMs
(for attacking U.S. air bases and other facilities in the Western Pacific), and minesare also of
significance.
Chinas maritime A2/AD force can be viewed as broadly analogous to the sea-denial force that
the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War to deny U.S. use of the sea or counter U.S.
forces participating in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. One potential difference between the Soviet
sea-denial force and Chinas emerging maritime A2/AD force is that Chinas force includes
ASBMs capable of hitting moving ships at sea.
China may also use its navy for other purposes, such as conducting maritime security (including
anti-piracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals in foreign countries when necessary, and
conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.

January 2014 ONI Testimony


In his prepared statement for a January 30, 2014, hearing on Chinas military modernization and
its implications for the United States before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Jesse L. Karotkin, ONIs Senior Intelligence Officer for China, summarized Chinas
naval modernization effort. For the text of Karotkins statement, see Appendix A.

Selected Elements of Chinas Naval Modernization Effort


Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
China for several years has been developing and testing an ASBM, referred to as the DF-21D,
that is a theater-range ballistic missile equipped with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV)
designed to hit moving ships at sea. DOD states that
China continues to field an ASBM based on a variant of the CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBM that it
began deploying in 2010. This missile provides the PLA the capability to attack large ships,
including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific. The CSS-5 Mod 5 has a range exceeding
1,500 km [810 nautical miles] and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.17

Another observer states that the DF-21Ds warhead apparently uses a combination of radar and
optical sensors to find the target and make final guidance updates.... Finally, it uses a high
explosive, or a radio frequency or cluster warhead that at a minimum can achieve a mission kill
[against the target ship].18
Observers have expressed strong concern about the DF-21D, because such missiles, in
combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to
attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the
Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
17

2014 DOD CMSD, p. 37. A similar statement appears on page 7. See also 2009 ONI Report, pp. 26-27.
Richard Fisher, Jr., PLA and U.S. Arms Racing in the Western Pacific, available online at
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp. A mission kill means that the ship is damaged
enough that it cannot perform its intended mission.
18

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missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to
the DF-21 as a game-changing weapon. Due to their ability to change course, the MaRVs on an
ASBM would be more difficult to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic missile reentry
vehicles.19
According to press reports, the DF-21D has been tested over land but has not been tested in an
end-to-end flight test against a target at sea. A January 23, 2013, press report about a test of the
weapon in the Gobi desert in western China stated:
The Peoples Liberation Army has successfully sunk a US aircraft carrier, according to a
satellite photo provided by Google Earth, reports our sister paper Want Dailythough the
strike was a war game, the carrier a mock-up platform and the sinking occurred on dry
land in a remote part of western China.20

A January 27, 2014, press report stated:


In the view of the U.S. Navy, the Mach 10 test of a hypersonic glide vehicle that China
conducted on Jan. 9 reflects its predictions of future warfare. If and when China can put the
technology into service, Beijing will have a weapon that challenges defenses and extends the
range of its ballistic missiles against land and sea targets, but its offensive application is still
some years away and depends on solving tough challenges in targeting and guidance.
The hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) test appears to mark a step beyond Chinas anti-ship
ballistic missile (ASBM) program, featuring a slower, shorter-range maneuverable reentry
vehicle (RV)and may point to a second-generation ASBM.
To some analysts, the test underscores the need for the U.S. to field directed-energy
weapons, since interceptor missiles may be unable to handle targets that appear with little
warning and then maneuver at speeds above Mach 5. The U.S. is developing directed-energy
weapons, but it is not clear when they will be needed or available.
Chinas HGV, called WU-14 by the Pentagon, was launched into space by an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) booster, after which it returned to the atmosphere to
glide at up to Mach 10. The test was conducted within China, says the defense ministry in
Beijing. On Jan. 19, another object was test-launched from the same space base at Taiyuan,

19
For further discussion of Chinas ASBM-development effort and its potential implications for U.S. naval forces, see
Craig Hooper and Christopher Albon, Get Off the Fainting Couch, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 4247; Andrew S. Erickson, Ballistic TrajectoryChina Develops New Anti-Ship Missile, Janes Intelligence Review,
January 4, 2010; Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile
Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States, The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2009: 67114; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, On the Verge of a Game-Changer, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
May 2009: 26-32; Andrew Erickson, Facing A New Missile Threat From China, How The U.S. Should Respond To
Chinas Development Of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems, CBSNews.com, May 28, 2009; Andrew S. Erickson,
Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns, China Brief, June 24, 2009: 4-8; Andrew S. Erickson and
David D. Yang, Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile, Naval
War College Review, Autumn 2009: 53-86; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, Chinas Antiship Ballistic Missile,
Developments and Missing Links, Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009: 87-115; Mark Stokes, Chinas
Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability, The Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime
Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond, Project 2049 Institute, September 14, 2009. 123 pp.
20
PLA Sinks US Carrier in DF-21D Missile Test in Gobi, Want China Times (http://www.wantchinatimes.com),
January 23, 2013, accessed March 21, 2013, at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=
20130123000112&cid=1101.

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says analyst Richard Fisher of the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy
Center. The Jan. 9 test was first detailed by Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon....
A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, is operational, according to the Pentagon,
raising the possibility that HGV development will lead to a longer-range, more
maneuverable anti-ship weapon.21

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)


Among the most capable of the new ASCMs that have been acquired by Chinas navy are the
Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn (carried by Chinas four Russian-made Sovremenny-class
destroyers) and the Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler (carried by 8 of Chinas 12 Russian-made
Kilo-class submarines). Chinas large inventory of ASCMs also includes several indigenous
designs. DOD states that
The PLA Navy deploys the domestically produced ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM; the Russian
SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on Chinas SOVREMENNY-class
DDGs acquired from Russia; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM on
Chinas Russian-built KILO SS. It has, or is acquiring, nearly a dozen ASCM variants,
ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B.
The pace of ASCM research, development, and production has accelerated over the past
decade. In addition, the PLA Navy Air Force employs the YJ-83K ASCM on its JH-7 and H6G aircraft. China has also developed the YJ-12 ASCM for the Navy. The new missile
provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to its long range and supersonic speeds. It is
capable of being launched from H-6 bombers.22

Submarines
Chinas submarine modernization effort has attracted substantial attention and concern. DOD
states, The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force.23 ONI
states that
China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence,
particularly when conducting counter-intervention against modern adversary. The large,
but poorly equipped [submarine] force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern

21
Bradley Perrett, Bill Sweetman, and Michael Fabey, U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV As Part of Wider Threat,
Aviation Week & Space Technology (www.aviationweek.com), January 27, 2014. See also Staff Reporter, PLAs
Hypersonic Vehicle Can Travel 10 Times The Speed Of Sound, WantChinaTimes.com, March 16, 2014.
22
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 40. See also Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility
Force Multiplier, Assessing Chinas Cruise Missile Ambitions, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, 2014, 165 pp.; Dennis Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and
Jingdong Yuan, Chinas Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast Under the Publics Radar, The National Interest
(http://nationalinterest.org), May 12, 2014; Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Potent
Vector, Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments, Joint Force Quarterly, 4th Quarter 2014: 98-105; Bradley
Perrett, China Strongly Pushing Cruise Missile Capability, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 22, 2014: 4;
Wendell Minnick, Report: Chinese Cruise Missiles Could Poses Biggest Threat to US Carriers, DefenseNews.com,
June 2, 2014; Richard D. Fisher Jr., China Unveils Third Russian Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile, Aerospace
Daily & Defense Report, November 10, 2014: 4.
23
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 7.

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submarine force, optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major
sea lines of communication.24

Types Acquired in Recent Years


China since the mid-1990s has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSs) and put into service at least four new classes of indigenously built submarines,
including the following:

a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) design called the Jin
class or Type 094 (Figure 1);

a new nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) design called the Shang class or
Type 093;25

a new SS design called the Yuan class or Type 039A (Figure 2);26 and

another (and also fairly new) SS design called the Song class or Type 039/039G.
Figure 1. Jin (Type 094) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine

Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

The Kilos and the four new classes of indigenously built submarines are regarded as much more
modern and capable than Chinas aging older-generation submarines. At least some of the new
indigenously built designs are believed to have benefitted from Russian submarine technology
and design know-how.27
DOD and other observers believe the Type 093 SSN design will be succeeded by a newer SSN
design called the Type 095. The August 2009 ONI report includes a graph (see Figure 3) that

24
[Hearing on] Trends in Chinas Naval Modernization [before] U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014], accessed February 12, 2014, p. 7.
25
Some sources state that a successor to the Shang class SSN design, called the Type 095 SSN design, is in
development.
26
Some sources refer to the Yuan class as the Type 041.
27
The August 2009 ONI report states that the Yuan class may incorporate quieting technology from the Kilo class.
(2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)

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shows the Type 095 SSN, along with the date 2015, suggesting that ONI projected in 2009 that
the first Type 095 would enter service that year. DOD states that
China seeks some high-tech components and certain major end items, particularly from
Russia, that it has difficulty producing domestically. China is pursuing... a new joint-design
and production program for diesel-electric submarines based on the Russian
PETERSBURG/LADA-class.28

Figure 2.Yuan (Type 039A) Class Attack Submarine

Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

DOD also states that:


China continues the production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094) are currently operational, and up to five may
enter service before China proceeds to its next generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next
decade....
China also has expanded its force of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Two
SHANG-class SSNs (Type 093) are already in service, and China is building four improved
variants of the SHANG-class SSN, which will replace the aging HAN-class SSNs (Type
091). In the next decade, China likely will construct the Type 095 guided-missile attack
submarine (SSGN), which may enable a submarine-based land-attack capability. In addition
to likely incorporating better quieting technologies, the Type 095 will fulfill traditional antiship roles with the incorporation of torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).
The mainstay of the Chinese submarine force remains the diesel-powered attack submarine
(SS). In addition to twelve KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and
28

2014 DOD CMSD, p. 47.

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2000s, eight of which are equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM, the PLA Navy possesses 13
SONG-class SS (Type 039) and 12 YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). The YUAN-class SSP is
armed similarly to the SONG-class SS, but also includes a possible air-independent power
system. China may plan to construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.29

China in 2011 commissioned into a service a new type of non-nuclear-powered submarine, called
the Type 032 or Qing class according to Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, that is about one-third
larger than the Yuan-class design. Observers believe the boat may be a one-of-kind test platform;
Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 refers to it as an auxiliary submarine (SSA).30
A March 25, 2014, press report states:
Instead of providing the older Lada-class submarines to the Peoples Liberation Army Navy
as requested by Beijing, Russias president, Vladimir Putin, will likely authorize China to
receive the more advanced Kalina-class submarine, reports the Voice of Russia, citing
Vassily Kashin, a senior research fellow from the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies.
Viktor Chirkov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, officially announced that the
Kalina-class conventional submarine equipped with an advanced air-independent propulsion
system will be developed and produced in the future on Mar. 20. Russia is currently
designing a fifth-generation conventional submarine, dubbed Project Kalina, which will be
fitted with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system, said Chirkov.
Authorities also declared that the construction of the older Lada-class submarine will be
cancelled. The Lada-class, or Project 677, is a fourth-generation diesel-electric submarine
based on the older Kilo-class submarine.
China was negotiating with Russia to purchase four Lada-class submarines from the Rubin
Design Bureau based in St Petersburg. China hoped those submarines could be refitted with
Chinese engines and an electronic fire-control system, according to the Canada-based Kanwa
Defense Review.
As Russia remains isolated over its intervention in the Ukraine crisis, Moscow values
Chinas position as one of its strategic partners, Kashin said. He added that the PLA Navy
will benefit from the cancellation of the Lada-class as it will open a new door for China to
gain more advanced technology from Russia to build its own submarine in the future.
Meanwhile, China may be able to design its own fifth-generation conventional submarine
with the help of Russia under this new concept, Kashin said.31

In August 2014, it was reported that researchers at the Harbin Institute of Technology in China are
developing technology for a high-speed submarine that would take advantage of supercavitation
(which essentially involves maintaining an air bubble around the submarine) to achieve speeds
that are much higher than those of other submarines.32

29

2014 DOD CMSD, pp. 7-8.


Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, p. 134.
31
Staff Reporter, Russia To Give China More Advanced Submarine Technology, WantChinaTimes.com, March 25,
2014.
32
See, for example, Terrence McCoy, Chinese Reportedly Working on Submarine That Would Fly in An Air
Bubble, Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com), August 26, 2014.
30

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Figure 3 and Figure 4, which are taken from the August 2009 ONI report, show the acoustic
quietness of Chinese nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered submarines, respectively, relative to that
of Russian nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered submarines. The downward slope of the arrow in
each figure indicates the increasingly lower noise levels (i.e., increasing acoustic quietness) of the
submarine designs shown. In general, quieter submarines are more difficult for opposing forces to
detect and counter. The green-yellow-red color spectrum on the arrow in each figure might be
interpreted as a rough indication of the relative difficulty that a navy with capable antisubmarine
warfare forces (such as the U.S. Navy) might have in detecting and countering these submarines:
Green might indicate submarines that would be relatively easy for such a navy to detect and
counter, yellow might indicate submarines that would be less easy for such a navy to detect and
counter, and red might indicate submarines that would be more difficult for such a navy to detect
and counter.
Figure 3. Acoustic Quietness of Chinese and Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarines

Source: 2009 ONI Report, p. 22.

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Figure 4. Acoustic Quietness of Chinese and Russian Non-Nuclear-Powered


Submarines
(Non-nuclear-powered submarines are commonly referred to as diesel or diesel-electric submarines)

Source: 2009 ONI Report, p. 22.

Chinas submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and
wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Eight of the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia (presumably the
ones purchased more recently) are armed with the highly capable Russian-made SS-N-27 Sizzler
ASCM. In addition to other weapons, Shang-class SSNs may carry LACMs. Although ASCMs
are often highlighted as sources of concern, wake-homing torpedoes are also a concern because
they can be very difficult for surface ships to counter.
Although Chinas aging Ming-class (Type 035) submarines are based on old technology and are
much less capable than Chinas newer-design submarines, China may decide that these older
boats have continued value as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines that can be used to draw
out enemy submarines (such as U.S. SSNs) that can then be attacked by other Chinese naval
forces.
In related areas of activity, China reportedly is developing new unmanned underwater vehicles,33
and has modernized its substantial inventory of mines.34 DOD stated in 2012 that China has
33

Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, Coming Without Shadows, Leaving Without Footprints, U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 2010: 30-35.
34
See, for example, Scott C. Truver, Taking Mines Seriously, Mine Warfare in Chinas Near Seas, Naval War
College Review, Spring 2012: 30-66.

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developed torpedo and mine systems capable of area denial in a Taiwan scenario. Estimates of
Chinas naval mine inventory exceed 50,000 mines, with many more capable systems developed
in the past 10 years.35

Submarine Acquisition Rate and Potential Submarine Force Size


Table 1 shows actual and projected commissionings of Chinese submarines by class since 1995,
when China took delivery of its first two Kilo-class boats. The table includes the final nine boats
in the Ming class, which is an older and less capable submarine design. As shown in Table 1,
China by the end of 2012 was expected to have a total of 40 relatively modern attack
submarinesmeaning Shang, Kilo, Yuan, Song, and Qing class boatsin commission. As shown
in the table, much of the growth in this figure occurred in 2004-2006, when 18 attack submarines
(including 8 Kilo-class boats) were added, and in 2011-2012, when 9 attack submarines were
added.
The figures in Table 1 show that between 1995 and 2012, China placed or was expected to place
into service a total of 52 submarines of all kinds, or an average of about 2.9 submarines per year.
This average commissioning rate, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steadystate submarine force of about 58 to 87 boats of all kinds, assuming an average submarine life of
20 to 30 years.
Excluding the 12 Kilos purchased from Russia, the total number of domestically produced
submarines placed into service between 1995 and 2012 is 40, or an average of about 2.2 per year.
This average rate of domestic production, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a
steady-state force of domestically produced submarines of about 44 to 67 boats of all kinds, again
assuming an average submarine life of 20 to 30 years.
The August 2009 ONI report states that Chinese submarine procurement has focused on smaller
numbers of modern, high-capability boats, and that over the next 10 to 15 years, primarily due
to the introduction of new diesel-electric and [non-nuclear-powered] air independent power (AIP)
submarines, the force is expected to increase incrementally in size to approximately 75
submarines.36
A May 16, 2013, press report quotes Admiral Samuel Locklear, the Commander of U.S. Pacific
Command, as stating that China plans to acquire a total of 80 submarines.37

35

2012 DOD CMSD, p. 23.


2009 ONI Report, p. 21. The report states on page 46 that Because approximately three-quarters of the current
submarine force will still be operational in 10-15 years, new submarine construction is expected to add approximately
10 platforms to the force. See also the graph on page 45, which shows the submarine force leveling off in size around
2015.
37
Richard Halloran, China, US Engaging in Underwater Arms Race, Taipei Times, May 16, 2013: 8, accessed May
17, 2013, at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2013/05/16/2003562368.
36

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Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings


Actual (1995-2013) and Projected (2014-2016)
Jin
(Type
094)
SSBN
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Shang
(Type
093)
SSN

Kilo SS
(Russianmade)
2d

1d
1d

Ming
(Type
035)
SSa
1
1
2
2

1
1

1
1
1
n/ag
n/a
n/a

1h
n/a
n/a

Yuan
(Type
039A)
SSb

Qing
(Type
032)
SS

1
1
1
1

1
4
3

Song
(Type
039)
SS

2
2
3
3
2

2
1
3
5f
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

1e

Annual
total
for all
types
shown
3
1
2
3
2
1
3
1
2
4
7
7
2
0
2
2
4
6
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Cumulative
total for all
types
shown
3
4
6
9
11
12
15
16
18
22
29
36
38
38
40
42
46
52
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Cumulative
total for
modern
attack
boatsc
2
2
2
3
5
5
7
7
9
13
20
27
28
28
30
31
35
40
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Source: Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, and previous editions.


Note: n/a = data not available.
a.

Figures for Ming-class boats are when the boats were launched (i.e., put into the water for final
construction). Actual commissioning dates for these boats may have been later.

b.

Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the
Type 039A.

c.

This total excludes the Jin-class SSBNs and the Ming-class SSs.

d.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 lists the commissioning date of one of the two Kilos as December 15, 1994.

e.

Observers believe this boat may be a one-of-kind test platform; Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 refers to it
as an auxiliary submarine (SSA).

f.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that a class of up to 20 boats is expected (page 133).

g.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that the fourth boat in the class began sea trials in 2014 (page 128).

h.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that, following the first two ships in the class, up to four further boats
(Type 093A), the first of which was launched in 2012, are under construction. These are reported to be a
modified design (commercial imagery suggests that Type 093A may be slightly longer than Type 093). (Page
129.)

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JL-2 SLBM on Jin-Class SSBN


Each Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs). DOD states that
The JIN-class SSBN will carry the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
with an estimated range of 7,400 km [3,996 nautical miles]. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will
give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. China is likely to conduct its
first nuclear deterrence patrols with the JIN-class SSBN in 2014.38

A range of 7,400 km could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack

targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to
China;

targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle)
from locations south of Japan;

targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and
Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii; and

targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii.

Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-Based Aircraft39


China has begun operating its first aircraft carrierthe Liaoning, a refurbished ex-Ukrainian
aircraft carrierand reportedly has begun construction of its first indigenously built aircraft
carrier. Observers expect that it will be some time before China achieves proficiency in the
operation of an embarked air wing on the Liaoning.

Liaoning (Ex-Ukrainian Aircraft Carrier Varyag)


On September 25, 2012, China commissioned into service its first aircraft carrierthe Liaoning
(Figure 5), a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier, previously named Varyag, that China
purchased from Ukraine as an unfinished ship in 1998.40 The Liaoning is named for the province
containing Dalian, the port city where the ship was refurbished. DOD states that in 2013, the

38

2014 DOD CMSD, pp. 7-8. A similar statement appears on page 30.
China, according to one set of observers, initiated studies on possible aircraft carrier options in the 1990s, and
approved a formal aircraft carrier program in 2004. (Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, The Calm Before the
Storm, FP [Foreign Policy] National Security (www.foreignpolicy.com), September 26, 2012.) Another observer dates
Chinese activities in support of an eventual aircraft carrier program back to the 1980s. (Torbjorg Hemmingsen, PLAN
For Action: New Dawn for Chinese Naval Aviation, Janes Navy International, June 2012: 12-17.) Chinese officials
have been talking openly since 2006 about eventually operating aircraft carriers. A 2009 report from the Office of
Naval Intelligence states that Beginning in early 2006, PRC-owned media has reported statements from high-level
officials on Chinas intent to build aircraft carriers. (Office of Naval Intelligence, The Peoples Liberation Army Navy,
A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, Suitland (MD), August 2009, p. 19.
40
The Soviet Union began work on the Varyag in a shipyard in Ukraine, which at the time was part of the Soviet
Union. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, construction work on the ship stopped and the unfinished ship
became the property of Ukraine.
39

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ships home port was shifted from Dalian to the PLA Navys Yuchi naval base, located in the
North Sea Fleet.41
Figure 5. Aircraft Carrier Liaoning (ex-Varyag)

Source: Highlights of Liaoning Carriers One-Year Service, China Daily, September 26, 2013, accessed
September 30, 2013, at http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-09/26/content_30142217.htm. This picture shows
the ship during a sea trial in October 2012.

The Liaoning is conventionally powered, has an estimated full load displacement of almost
60,000 tons,42 and might accommodate an eventual air wing of 30 or more aircraft, including
fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters. A September 7, 2014, press report, citing an August 28,
2014, edition of the Chinese-language Shanghai Morning Post, stated that the Liaonings air wing
may consist of 24 J-15 fighters, six anti-submarine warfare helicopters, four airborne early
warning helicopters, and two rescue helicopters, for a total of 36 aircraft.43 The Liaoning lacks
aircraft catapults and instead launches fixed-wing airplanes off the ships bow using an inclined
ski ramp.
By comparison, a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier is nuclear powered (giving it greater cruising
endurance than a conventionally powered ship), has a full load displacement of about 100,000
tons, can accommodate an air wing of 60 or more aircraft, including fixed-wing aircraft and some
helicopters, and launches its fixed-wing aircraft over both the ships bow and its angled deck
41

2014 DOD CMSD, p. 7.


Janes Fighting Ships 2012-2013 lists a full load displacement of 59,439 tons for the ship.
43
Wendell Minnick, Chinese Carriers Purported Air Wing Deemed Plausible But Limited, Defense News
(www.defensenews.com), September 7, 2014.
42

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using catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability greater than that of
aircraft launched with a ski ramp. The Liaoning, like a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, lands fixedwing aircraft using arresting wires on its angled deck.
Some observers have referred to the Liaoning as Chinas starter carrier.44 The PLA Navy is
currently learning to operate aircraft from the ship. DOD states, The most significant
development in the PLA Navy over the past year has been the first long-range deployment and
continued flight operations of Chinas first aircraft carrier, CV-16, the LIAONING,45 and that the
ship continued flight integration training throughout 2013, but it is not expected to embark an
operational air wing until 2015 or later.46
A May 16, 2013, U.S. press report stated:
It will take less time for China to learn how to effectively operate aircraft carriers than it took
the U.S., the commander of the U.S. Navys Atlantic air arm, Rear Adm. Ted Branch said
Wednesday.
They will learn faster than we did and they will leverage our lessons, Branch said during a
panel at the at the [sic] EAST: Joint Warfighting 2013 symposium in Virginia Beach, Va....
But the PLAN [PLA Navy] will unlikely be proficient in carrier operations for several more
years.
They have the advantage of starting with more modern technology but its still a tough nut
to crack to learn how to do this business, Branch said.
They still have a lot of learning to do before they have a viable capability.47

A September 12, 2013, press report stated:


The Chinese navy is using its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, for training and testing and
will decide on an operational carrier for the fleet after a few years of evaluation, Admiral Wu
Shengli said on Thursday [September 12].
The navy chief of the Peoples Liberation Army, on a military-to-military visit with his U.S.
counterpart, told reporters at the Washington Navy Yard that Chinese sailors would carry out
very heavy training over the next two or three years as they assess the carrier.
44

See, for example, China Plans New Generation of Carriers as Sea Disputes Grow, Bloomberg News, April 24,
2013.
45
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 68.
46
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 7. On page 36, DOD states that During 2013, China focused on integrating the LIAONING
with its J-15 aircraft as well as working out other carrier operations. On page 68, DOD states that
The J-15, a carrier-based fighter modeled after the Russian Su-33, conducted its first takeoffs and
landings from the LIAONING on November 26, 2012. By September 2013, J-15s were conducting
full-stops and takeoffs with weapon loads at full maximum gross weights. Additional full-stop
landings, ramp takeoffs, and storage of aircraft in the hangar bay below the flight deck continued in
October. Although the J-15 has a land-based combat radius of 1,200 km [about 650 nautical miles],
the aircraft will be limited in range and armament when operating from the carrier, because the skijump design does not provide as much airspeed and, therefore, lift at takeoff as a catapult design.
47
Admiral: China Will Likely Learn Carrier Ropes Faster than U.S., USNI News (http://news.usni.org), May 16,
2013. See also Chinas First Aircraft Carrier Advances With jet Take-Off Drills, Bloomberg.com, July 4, 2013.

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After the training and experimentation we will have a final evaluation on the development
of the aircraft carrier for the PLA navy, said Shengli, whose delegation included the
commander of the Liaoning and the first pilot to land on its flight deck....
We have around 36 airplanes operating on board our ship, [Senior Captain Zhang Zheng,
the commander of the Liaoning] told reporters. And we are still practicing and doing tests
and experiments for the equipment and systems.
Wu, Zhang and Captain Dai Ming Meng, the pilot who first landed on the carrier, visited
several American ships in California earlier this week, including the carrier USS Carl
Vinson, where they met with their counterparts.48

Indigenous Aircraft Carriers


DOD states that China also continues to pursue an indigenous aircraft carrier program... and
likely will build multiple aircraft carriers over the next decade. The first Chinese-built carrier will
likely be operational sometime at the beginning of the next decade.49 On July 25, 2014, Admiral
Jonathan Greenert, the U.S. Navys Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), stated that China will
build another carrier [in addition to the Liaoning], probably relatively soon, that Chinese
officials said it will look just like the Liaoning, with a ski ramp, that it will be similar in size to
the Liaoning, with a displacement of 65,000 tons or 70,000 tons, and that China is moving on a
pace that is extraordinary.50
An October 22, 2014, press report states:
China will soon start building its second locally designed aircraft carrier in Shanghai,
according to a Canadian report.
Kanwa Asian Defence, an English-language monthly defence review produced in Toronto,
said Shanghais Jiangnan Shipyard was preparing to start work on the carrier.
When completed, the carrier and another under construction in Dalian will give the PLA
Navy two fully functioning, battle-ready aircraft carriers.
The recently completed Liaoning, the refitted former Soviet carrier Varyag, is classed as a
training platform, not a full combat vessel, by the navy, since it went into service in
September 2012.
Counter to many expectations, the new carrier about to be built at the Jiangnan Shipyard will
use conventional, not nuclear power....

48
David Alexander, China Navy Chief Says Operational Aircraft Carrier A Few Years Away, Reuters.com,
September 12, 2013.
49
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 7. On page 38, DOD states that China will probably build multiple aircraft carriers over the
next 15 years. On page 68, DOD states that China acknowledged publicly for the first time in 2013 its desire to build
indigenous aircraft carriers. The first Chinese-built carrier will likely be operational sometime at the beginning of the
next decade.
50
Claudette Roulo, Greenert: China Moving Quickly to Modernize Navy, DoD News, Defense Media
Acitivty/American Forces Press Service (www.defense.gov/news), July 26, 2014; Bill Gertz, Chinese Missile Forces
Pose Threat to U.S. in Future Conflcit, Washington Free Beacon (http://freebeacon.com), July 28, 2014.

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Military experts said China would not attempt a nuclear-powered carrier until a range of
issues were resolved, such as the reliability of nuclear-powered engines, crew training and
establishing a reliable home port for carrier maintenance.51

A June 20, 2014, blog post states:


According to a June 5 report in the Strait Times.... China is preparing to deploy three new
carrier battle groups (CBG) in the worlds oceans, with the first expected just three years
from now.
The Singapore-based newspaper seems to have sourced the information from the latest GI
Zhou newsletter. The newsletter is published in Australia and specializes in forensic
analysis of Chinas defense-related publications and news sources....
The report lays out some very ambitious plans for Chinas supposed new carriers.
In what one would have to assume would be a new class of ships for the PLAN, the new
vessels will have an overall length of 320m and a planned displacement of 85,000 tons. The
Liaoning has an overall length of 300m and a displacement of 67,000 tons....
The challenge with such reports is that they are tough to verify and even harder to make
accurate predictions against. When you consider how difficult it was for China to fully
develop and put to sea one carrier that was partially completed (yes, it was completely
refurbished from top to bottom) it seems quite the challenge to develop a whole new class of
carriers so quickly.
Could the report be more a wish list than a stated fact? Thinking through the logic it would
seem so....
My own take: China will have four carriers and accompanying CBGs at some point, just
dont look for Beijings latest flat top on the high seas in three years time.52

A May 28, 2014, press report states:


The Peoples Liberation Army Navy will commission between three and four carrier battle
groups over the next 15 years, reports the latest issue of Kanwa Defense Review, a military
magazine run by Andrei Chang also known as Pinkov, a defense expert from Canada....
China is also quicker at constructing large surface combat vessels than the United States,
according to the magazine, which stated that China already has plans to build two domestic
aircraft carriers after the Liaoning. Over the next 15 years, the PLA Navy may be able to
maintain four carrier battle groups.53

A March 2, 2014, press report states:


51
Minnie Chan, Shanghai Shipyard To Build Second Chinese Designed Aircraft Carrier, South China Morning
Post (www.scmp.com), October 22, 2014.
52
Harry Kazianis, Chinas Oversized Carrier Ambitions, The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com), June 20, 2014. See
also Sean OConnor, PLAN To Get First Homegrown Carrier by 2017, Claims Local Media, Janes Defence Weekly,
June 11, 2017.
53
Staff Reporter, PLA Could Commission Four Carrier Battle Groups: Kanwa, Want China Times
(www.wantchinatimes.com), May 28, 2014.

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The Moscow-based Military Parade has revealed more details on Chinas secretive
construction of indigenous aircraft carriers in Dalian and Shanghai.
In an [sic] report on Feb. 28, the Russian website said that the first vesselknown as 001A
and designed by the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporationis being built in Dalian in
northeast Chinas Liaoning province and will be equipped with a steam catapult. The new
carrier is expected to have a greater tonnage than Chinas first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning,
which was originally a Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov-class carrier purchased from Ukraine
in 1998.
The second vesselknown as 002under construction at Jiangnan shipyard on Shanghais
Changxing island, will be Chinas first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the report said. The
size of the 002 will be similar to the USS Kitty Hawk with a tonnage of 61,351, and will be
5% larger than the 001A.
Both vessels have been designed based on blueprints of the unfinished Soviet Ulyanovskclass aircraft carrier, according to Military Parade. The 002 will be fitted with four steam
catapults, while the 001A will only have two. The 001A is likely to be named after the
northeastern province of Shandong, similar to the Liaoning, which was also named after a
Chinese province.
The Shandong aircraft carrier may enter service with the PLA Navy as soon as 2018, the
report said, adding that China plans to build a total four aircraft carriers. Once completed, the
PLA Navy would be able to establish four carrier battle groups to expand its maritime
influence in the South China Sea and Western Pacific.54

A January 20, 2014, press report stated:


A senior Communist Party official in northeastern China said that China was at work on a
home-built aircraft carrier and had plans to operate a fleet of at least four of the vessels, a
Hong Kong newspaper reported.
The comments by Wang Min, the party secretary of Liaoning Province, are an official
indication of what outside observers have long predicted: that Chinas commissioning of a
refurbished aircraft carrier in 2012 was only a first step in its effort to develop its capacity to
build and sail its own aircraft carriers.
According to the Hong Kong-based Ta Kung Pao, Mr. Wang said on Saturday that Chinas
second aircraft carrier was being built at a shipyard in the coastal city of Dalian and should
be completed in six years.55

Carrier-Based Aircraft
China has developed a carrier-capable fighter, called the J-15 or Flying Shark, that can operate
from the Liaoning (Figure 6). DOD states that
54

Staff Reporter, Work Well Underway on Chinas Two New Aircraft Carriers: Military Parade,
WantChinaTimes.com, March 2, 2014.
55
Work on New Chinese Aircraft Carrier Reportedly Underway, New York Times
(http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com), January 20, 2014. See also China Building Second Aircraft Carrier: Reports,
Reuters.com, January 18, 2014; and Li Yan, New Aircraft Carrier Under Construction, Global Times (via
http://www.ecns.cn), January 20, 2014.

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The J-15 aircraft conducted its first takeoffs and landings from the Liaoning on November
26, 2012. Subsequently, at least two aircraft conducted multiple landings and takeoffs from
the ship. The J-15 carrier-based fighter is the Chinese version of the Russian Su-33. The J-15
is designed for ski-jump takeoffs and arrested landings, as required by the configuration of
the Liaoning. Although the J-15 has a land-based combat radius of 1200 km, the aircraft will
be limited in range and armament when operating from the carrier, due to limits imposed by
the ski-jump takeoff and arrested carrier landings.56

A November 10, 2014, trade press report states that China has put the Shenyang J-15 Flying
Shark carrier-borne multirole fighter into serial production, with at least eight production
examples known to be flying already. This is in addition to the six J-15 prototypes, some of which
conducted carrier trials on board Chinas refurbished former Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier,
Liaoning.57
Figure 6. J-15 Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Zachary Keck, Chinas Carrier-Based J-15 Likely Enters Mass Production, The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), September 14, 2013.

In a September 14, 2013, blog post, one U.S. observer, noting recent press reports from China,
stated that
A number of recent reports in Chinese state-run media indicate that the countrys carrierbased J-15 multirole fighter jets have entered mass production.
The Shenyang J-15 (also called Flying Shark) is Chinas carrier-based fighter aircraft. It was
reverse[-] engineered from a Russian Sukhoi Su-33 that China acquired from Ukraine,
although it reportedly is equipped with some indigenous weapons, avionics and other
features that Beijing claims greatly enhances its capabilities....

56

2013 DOD CMSD, pp. 65-66.


Mike Yeo, Chinese Carrier Fighter Now In Serial Production, USNI News (http://news.usni.org), November 10,
2014. See also J-15 Carrier-Based Fighter Modified for Catapult Launch, Want China Times
(www.wantchinatimes.com), November 3, 2014. See also David Axe, Is China Sending a Stealth Fighter to Sea? J-31
Mock-Up Appears on Carrier Deck, Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com), October 1, 2014.

57

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Although hardly conclusive, the reports strongly suggest that mass production of the J-15 has
begun, or at least that the Communist Party wants to create that impression....
Meanwhile, one of the other J-15 articles that appeared on the Peoples Daily website
compared it favorably relative to other countries carrier-based aircraft. Indeed, Admiral Yin,
who was also quoted in that article, is paraphrased as saying that the J-15 reaches a similar
level to the U.S. F/A-18C/D Super Hornet and is superior in terms of its air combat
capability.
However, Want China Times flags a Xinhua report that quotes Sun Cong, the J-15s designer,
noting that currently the aircraft cannot launch attacks against ships and ground targets when
taking off from the Liaoning. That is because the aircraft carrier utilizes a ski-jump ramp and
the J-15 would be too heavy to take off if it was carrying air-to-surface missiles and bombs.
Thus, until the Navy acquires a Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested-Recovery
(CATOBAR) carrier, the J-15, which is a multirole fighter, will be limited primarily to air
superiority operations (and ship defense).
Notably, one of the Peoples Daily reports observed that the J-15s front wheel is suitable
for catapult launch similar to the carrier-based fighter of the U.S. Navy. The catapult launch
was taken into consideration at the beginning of its design.58

A September 28, 2013, press report stated:


In an unusual departure for mainland Chinese-language media, the Beijing-based Sina
Military Network (SMN) criticized the capabilities of the carrier-borne J-15 Flying Shark as
nothing more than a flopping fish....
What sounded more like a rant than analysis, SMN, on Sept. 23, reported the new J-15 was
incapable of flying from the Liaoning with heavy weapons, effectively crippling its attack
range and firepower.
The fighter can take off and land on the carrier with two YJ-83K anti-ship missiles, two PL-8
air-to-air missiles, and four 500-kilogram bombs. But a weapons load exceeding 12 tons
will not get it off the carriers ski jump ramp. This might prohibit it from carrying heavier
munitions such as PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles.
To further complicate things, the J-15 can carry only two tons of weapons while fully fueled.
This would equip it with no more than two YJ-83K and two PL-8 missiles, thus the range
of the YJ-83K prepared for the fighter will be shorter than comparable YJ-83K missiles
launched from larger PLAN [Peoples Liberation Army Navy] vessels. The J-15 will be
boxed into less than 120 [kilometers] of attack range....
Built by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, the J-15 is a copy of the Russian-made Su-33.
China acquired an Su-33 prototype from the Ukraine in 2001. Avionics are most likely the
same as the J-11B (Su-27). In 2006, Russia accused China of reverse engineering the Su-27
and canceled a production license to build 200 Su-27s after only 95 aircraft had been built.
58

Zachary Keck, Chinas Carrier-Based J-15 Likely Enters Mass Production, The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com),
September 14, 2013. Press reports cited in this blog post (via live links) include With A Service Lifespan of About 30
Years, J-15 To Have Stable Performance Once in mass Production, Peoples Daily Online, September 10, 2013; J-15
Better Than U.S. F/A-18 In Terms Of Air Action, Slightly Inferior In Terms Of Attack Against Sea Targets, Peoples
Daily Online, September 10, 2013; J-15 A Major Threat to US (But Cant Take Off With Payload),
WantChinaTimes.com, September 13, 2013.

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Vasily Kashin, a China military specialist at the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies, suggests the J-15 might be a better aircraft than the Su-33. I
think that there might be some improvements because electronic equipment now weighs less
than in the 1990s, he said. It could also be lighter due to new composites that China is using
on the J-11B that were not available on the original Su-33.
Despite improvements, Kashin wonders why the Chinese bothered with the Su-33 given the
fact that Russia gave up on it. Weight problems and other issues forced the Russians to
develop the MiG-29K, which has better power-to-weight ratio and can carry more weapons.
Of course, when the Chinese get their future carriers equipped with catapults, that limitation
will not apply and they will be able to fully realize Su-33/J-15 potentialhuge range and
good payload, Kashin said.
The Liaoning is the problem. The carrier is small53,000 tonsand uses a ski jump. From
Russias experience, taking off from the carrier with takeoff weight exceeding some 26 tons
is very difficult, Kashin said.
Roger Cliff, a China defense specialist for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments in Washington, said this is one of the reasons why sky-jump carriers cant be
considered to be equivalent to full-size carriers with catapults.
A number of unanswered questions are raised by the SMN report, Kashin said, including the
amount of fuel on board, carrier speed, wind speed and direction.
Cliff also raises issues with SMNs conclusions. It doesnt make sense to me that the J-15
can take off with YJ-83s but not PL-12s, since the YJ-83 weighs about 1,800 pounds and the
PL-12 weighs about 400 pounds.
A possible answer is that it was unable to take off with both. The article says that it can only
carry two tons of missiles and munitions when fully fueled, which is 4,400 pounds, and two
YJ-83s plus two PL-8s would weigh over 4,000 pounds, leaving no margin for any PL-12s.
But I dont see why it couldnt take off with PL-12s if it wasnt carrying YJ-83s. Cliff
concludes that the J-15 should be capable of carrying PL-12s when it is flying purely air-toair missions and that it probably just cant carry PL-12s when it is flying a strike mission.59

Potential Roles, Missions, and Strategic Significance


Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is
acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to symbolize Chinas
status as a leading regional power and major world power.
Chinese aircraft carriers could be used to impress or intimidate foreign observers, and for powerprojection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces.60
59

Wendell Minnick, Chinese Media Takes Aim at J-15 Fighter, DefenseNews.com, September 28, 2013. See also
Chinas Got an Aircraft CarrierWhat About the Air Wing? War is Boring (https://medium.com/war-is-boring),
undated but apparently posted in early March 2014; and J-31 Could Replace J-15 as Chinas New Carrier-Based
Fighter, Want China Times (www.wantchinatimes.com), June 10, 2014.
60
For a discussion, see, for example, Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft
Carriers, Chinas Carrier Plans Target U.S. Alliances, Not Its Navy, Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
(continued...)

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Chinese aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly
valuable to China for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft
carriers are viewed by many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation
involving opposing U.S. naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable
to attack by U.S. ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and
aircraft from performing other missions in a conflict situation with China.61
DOD states that the Liaoning most likely will conduct extensive local operations focusing on
shipboard training, carrier aircraft integration, and carrier formation training for the next three to
four years. The carrier conducted operations in the East China Sea and South China Sea in
November may be used for other missions as needed.62 DOD also states that
Although the LIAONING is serving in what officials describe as an experimental capacity,
they also indicate that China will build additional carriers possessing more capability than
the ski-jump-configured LIAONING. Such a carrier force would be capable of improved
endurance and of carrying and launching more varied types of aircraft, including electronic
warfare, early warning, and anti-submarine, to increase the potential striking power of a
Chinese battle group in safeguarding Chinas interests in areas outside Chinas immediate
periphery. The carriers would most likely perform such missions as patrolling economically
important sea lanes and conducting naval diplomacy, regional deterrence, and humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief.63

Surface Combatants
China since the early 1990s has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia and put
into service 10 new classes of indigenously built destroyers and frigates (some of which are
variations of one another) that demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface
combatant technology. DOD states that Chinas new destroyers and frigates provide a significant
upgrade to the PLA Navys area air defense capability, which will be critical as it expands
operations into distant seas beyond the range of shore-based air defense.64 China reportedly is
also building a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates) and has put into service a new kind of
missile-armed fast attack craft that uses a stealthy catamaran hull design. China may also be
planning to build a new cruiser design. ONI states that
(...continued)
April 10, 2014.
61
For further discussion, see Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, The Flying Shark Prepares to Roam the Seas: pros
and cons [for China] of Chinas aircraft carrier program, China SignPost, May 18, 2011, 5 pp.; Aaron Shraberg,
Near-Term Missions for Chinas Maiden Aircraft Carrier, China Brief, June 17, 2011: 4-6; and Andrew S. Erickson,
Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, Beijings Starter Carrier and Future Steps, Naval War College Review,
Winter 2012: 15-55.
62
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 68.
63
2014 DOD CMSD, pp. 36-37. On page 68, DOD states that The formation of carrier battle groups will enable the
PLA Navy to conduct comprehensive sea control and power projection operations and enhance its long-range
operational capabilities. For an additional discussion of Chinese efforts to acquire aircraft carriers and develop naval
aviation, see Andrew Erickson, A Work in Progress: Chinas Development of Carrier Strike, Janes Navy
International (https://janes.ihs.com), June 19, 2014.
64
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 7.

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Less than a decade ago Chinas surface force could be characterized as an eclectic mix of
vintage, modern, converted, imported, and domestic platforms utilizing a variety weapons
and sensors and with widely ranging capabilities and varying reliability. By the second
decade of the 2000s, surface ship acquisition had shifted entirely to Chinese designed units,
equipped primarily with Chinese weapons and sensors, though some engineering
components and subsystems remain imported or license-produced in-country....
The PLA(N) surface force has made particularly strong gains in anti-surface warfare
(ASuW), with sustained development of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and
over-the-horizon targeting systems.65

Press Reports of Potential New Type 055 Cruiser


Photographs showing the mockup of what appears to be the deckhouse (i.e., superstructure) of
a large surface combatant have led some observers to conclude that China may be planning to
build a new cruiser, perhaps called the Type 055, that might displace roughly 10,000 tons.66 If
China is planning to build a cruiser, that would make China the only country known to be
planning to build a ship referred to as a cruiser. The U.S. Navys most recent cruiser was procured
in FY1988 and entered service in 1994, and the Navys 30-year shipbuilding plan includes no
ships identified as cruisers. The three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers currently being built
for the U.S. Navy, however, will each displace more than 15,000 tons. The U.S. Navys other
cruisers and destroyers have displacements of 9,000 to 9,500 tons.

Sovremenny-Class Destroyers
China in 1996 ordered two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia; the ships entered service in
1999 and 2001. China in 2002 ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia;
the ships entered service in 2005 and 2006. Sovremenny-class destroyers are equipped with the
Russian-made SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM, a highly capable ASCM.

Six New Indigenously Built Destroyer Classes


China since the early 1990s has put into service six new classes of indigenously built destroyers,
including three variations of one class. The classes are called the Luhu (Type 052), Luhai (Type
051B), Luyang I (Type 052B), Luyang II (Type 052C), Luyang III (Type 052D), and Louzhou
(Type 051C) designs. Compared to Chinas remaining older Luda (Type 051) class destroyers,
which entered service between 1971 and 1991, these six new indigenously built destroyer classes
are substantially more modern in terms of their hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors,
weapons, and electronics. The Luyang II-class ships (Figure 7) and the Luyang III-class ships
65
[Hearing on] Trends in Chinas Naval Modernization [before] U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014], accessed February 12, 2014, p. 3.
66
David Axe, Looks Like Chinas Building a Giant New Warship, Possible Missile Cruiser Could Outweigh Rival
Surface Combatants, War Is Boring (https://medium.com/war-is-boring), undated; David Axe, New Chinese
CruiserNot as Big as We Thought, But Still Pretty Big, War Is Boring (https://medium.com/war-is-boring),
undated; Bill Gertz, China Reveals New Carrier Jet Prior to Hagel Visit, The Washington Free Beacon, April 9,
2014; Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, Learning More About Chinas New Massive Warship Plan (055 Cruiser), Popular
Science (www.popsci.com), May 1, 2014; Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: Chinas Missile Cruiser A Major Step To Naval
Warfare Buildup, Washington Times (www.washingtontimes.com), May 7, 2014.

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appear to feature phased-array radars that are outwardly somewhat similar to the SPY-1 radar
used in the U.S.-made Aegis combat system. Like the older Luda-class destroyers, these six new
destroyer classes are armed with ASCMs.
Figure 7. Luyang II (Type 052C) Class Destroyer

Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

As shown in Table 2, China between 1994 and 2007 commissioned only one or two ships in its
first four new indigenously built destroyers classes, suggesting that these classes were intended as
stepping stones in a plan to modernize the PLA Navys destroyer technology incrementally before
committing to larger-scale series production of Luyang II- and Luyang III-class destroyers. As
shown in Table 2, after commissioning no new destroyers in 2008-2012, commissionings of new
Luyang II- and Luyang III-class destroyers appear to have resumed. Regarding the 2008-2012
gap in commissionings, one observer states, The relocation of JiangNan shipyard and
indigenization of [the] DA80/DN80 gas turbine (QC-280) delayed the production of follow-on
units [of Luyang II-class destroyers] for several years.67 In March 2014, it was reported that
China had commissioned its first Luyang III class destroyer into service, and that a second is on
sea trials.68

67

Blog entry entitled 2012 in Review, December 28, 2012, accessed March 21, 2013 at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/12/2012-in-review.html.
68
Ridzwan Rahmat, PLAN Commissions First Type 052D DDG, Puts Second on Sea Trials, IHS Janes 360
(www.janes.com), March 23, 2014.

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Table 2. PLA Navy Destroyer Commissionings


Actual (1994-2013) and Projected (2014-2017)
Sovremenny
(Russianmade)

Luhu
(Type
052)

Luhai
(Type
051B)

Luyang
I (Type
052B)

Lyugang II
(Type
052C)

Louzhou
(Type
051C)

Luyang
III
(Type
052D)

Annual
total

Cumulative
total

1997

1998

1994

1995
1996

1999

2000

2002

2003

2001

2004

10

12

13

2008

13

2009

13

2010

13

2011

13

2005

2006

2007

2012
2013

2014

2015

13

15

20

22

2016

24

2017

1a

25

Source: Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, and previous editions.


a.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that a total of 12 Luyang III-class ships is expected (page 140).

DOD states that


Construction of the LUYANG II-class DDG[s] (Type 052C) continued [over the past year],
with one ship entering service in 2012, and an additional three ships under various stages of
construction and sea trials, bringing the total number of ships of this class to six by the end
of 2013. Additionally, China launched the lead ship in a follow-on class, the LUYANG IIIclass DDG (Type 052D), which will likely enter service in 2014. The LUYANG III
incorporates the PLA Navys first multipurpose vertical launch system, likely capable of
launching ASCM, land attack cruise missiles (LACM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and
anti-submarine rockets. China is projected to build more than a dozen of these ships to
replace its aging LUDA-class destroyers (DD[s]).69

69

2103 DOD CMSD, p. 7.

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Four New Indigenously Built Frigate Classes


China since the early 1990s has put into service four new classes of indigenously built frigates,
two of which are variations of two others. The classes are called the Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G),
Jiangwei II (Type 053H3), Jiangkai I (Type 054), and Jiangkai II (Type 054A) designs. Compared
to Chinas remaining older Jianghu (Type 053) class frigates, which entered service between the
mid-1970s and 1989, the four new frigate classes feature improved hull designs and systems,
including improved AAW capabilities. As shown in Table 3, production of Jiangkai II-class ships
(Figure 8) continues, and Janes projects an eventual total of at least 20.
Figure 8. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Class Frigate

Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

DOD states that China has continued the construction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class
FFG[s] (Type 054A), with 12 ships currently in the fleet and six or more in various stages of
construction, and yet more expected.70

70

2013 DOD CMSD, p. 7.

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Table 3. PLA Navy Frigate Commissionings


Actual (1991-2013) and Projected (2014-2015)
Jiangwei I (Type
053 H2G)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Jiangwei II
(Type 053H3)

Jiangkai I
(Type 054)

Jiangkai II
(Type 054A)

1
1
1
1

1
4
1
2
1
1

1
1
4
3
2
4
3
3
1a

Annual
total

Cumulative
total

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
4
1
0
2
0
1
2
1
0
4
0
3
2
4
3
2
1

1
2
3
4
4
4
4
5
9
10
10
12
12
13
15
16
16
20
20
23
25
29
32
34
35

Source: Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, and previous editions.


a.

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that a total of at least 20 Jiangkai II-class ships is expected (page 144).

Type 056 Corvette


China is building a new type of corvette (i.e., a light frigate, or FFL) called the Jiangdao class or
Type 056 (Figure 9). Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that the first 8 ships in the class
entered service in 2013, another 10 were projected to enter service in 2014, and that a class of at
least 30 is expected if the class is to consolidate replacement of older classes such as the Jianghuclass frigates and Houxin-class attack craft.71 DOD states that nine of the ships entered service in
2013, and that China may build an additional 20 to 30 vessels of this class.72 A November 12,
2014, trade press report states that the 18th ship in the class was commissioned into service in
Novmber 2014.73
71

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, p. 148.


2014 DOD CMSD, p. 9.
73
Sam LaGrone, China Commissions New Sub Hunting Corvette, USNI News (http://news.usni.org), November 12,
(continued...)
72

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Figure 9. Type 056 Corvette


Shown under construction

Source: Blog entry entitled PLANs New Type 056 Class, August 12, 2012, accessed October 12, 2012, at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/08/plans-new-type-056-class.html.

One observer states that


The [Type] 056 program seems to follow an even more aggressive production schedule than
[Type] 022 FACs [fast attack craft]. We are seeing four shipyards (HuDong, HuangPu,
WuChang and LiaoNan) producing [Type] 056s simultaneously before the first [Type] 056
was ever launched. In fact, the first [Type] 056 launched from both HP and HD shipyard had
their funnels and the bow section reworked after they were already launched.74

Houbei (Type 022) Fast Attack Craft


As an apparent replacement for at least some of its older fast attack craft, or FACs (including
some armed with ASCMs), China in 2004 introduced a new type of ASCM-armed fast attack
craft, called the Houbei (Type 022) class (Figure 10), that uses a stealthy, wave-piercing,
catamaran hull.75 Each boat can carry eight C-802 ASCMs. The Houbei class was built in at least
six shipyards; construction of the design appeared to stop in 2009 after a production run of about
60 units.

(...continued)
2014.
74
Blog entry entitled 2012 in Review, December 28, 2012, accessed March 21, 2013 at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/12/2012-in-review.html.
75
For an article discussing how the Type 022 design appears to have been derived from the designs of Australian highspeed ferries, see David Lague, Insight: From a Ferry, a Chinese Fast-Attack Boat, Reuters, June 1, 2012.

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Figure 10. Houbei (Type 022) Class Fast Attack Craft


With an older Luda-class destroyer behind

Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

Surface Ships Operated by Non-PLAN Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies


In addition to the PLAN surface combatants discussed above, China operates numerous
additional surface ships in maritime law enforcement (MLE) agencies that are outside the PLAN.
China in 2013 consolidated four of its six MLE agencies into a new China Coast Guard (CCG).
China usually uses CCG ships, rather than PLAN ships, to assert and defend its maritime
territorial claims and fishing interests in the South China Sea and East China Sea, although PLAN
ships are available as backup forces. PLAN ships have also conducted exercises in parts of the
South China Sea that appear intended, at least in part, at asserting Chinas claims over those
waters.76 While Chinas CCG ships are often unarmed or lightly armed, they can nevertheless be
effective in confrontations with unarmed fishing vessels or other ships. China is rapidly
modernizing its inventory of CCG ships, and some of Chinas newest CCG ships are relatively
large.77 Figure 11 shows a picture of a CCG ship.

76
For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. See also CRS Report R42930, Maritime
Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan.
77
See, for example, Ryan Martinson, Power to the Provinces: The Devolution of Chinas Maritime Rights Protection,
China Brief (http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief), September 10, 2014.

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Figure 11. China Coast Guard Ship

Source: Picture accompanying Jeff. W. Benson, Clash for Naval Power in the Asia Pacific, USNI News
(http://news.usni.org), November 25, 2013, accessed May 23, 2014.

Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship


China has put into service a new class of amphibious ships called the Yuzhao or Type 071 class
(Figure 12). Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that the first three ships in the class were
commissioned into service in 2007, 2011, and 2012.78 A fourth ship in the class may now be
under construction79 The Type 071 design has an estimated displacement of more than 18,500
tons,80 compared with about 15,900 tons to 16,700 tons for the U.S. Navys Whidbey
Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships, which were commissioned into service
between 1985 and 1998, and about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navys new San Antonio (LPD-17)
class amphibious ships, the first of which was commissioned into service in 2006.

78

Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, p. 153.


See Ridzwan Rahmat, Images Suggest Fourth Chinese Type 071 LPD Is In Build, Janes Defence Weekly
(https://janes.ihs.com), October 21, 2014; More Amphibious Ships for Chinese Navy, Information Dissemination
(www.informationdissemination.net), October 13, 2014.
80
Unless otherwise indicated, displacement figures cited in this report are full load displacements. Janes Fighting
Ships 2014-2015, p. 153, does not provide a full load displacement for the Type 071 class design. Instead, it provides a
standard displacement of 18,500 tons. Full load displacement is larger than standard displacement, so the full load
displacement of the Type 071 design is more than 18,500 tons.
79

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Figure 12.Yuzhao (Type 071) Class Amphibious Ship


With two Houbei (Type 022) fast attack craft behind

Source: Photograph provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, December 2010.

Reported Potential Type 081 Amphibious Ship


DOD states that China might begin construction on a new Type 081-class amphibious assault
ship within the next five years.81 Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015 states that There are reports
that construction of a Type 081 LHD is under consideration. The ship is believed to be of the
order of 20,000 tonnes and may be based on the Type 0781 hull.82 One press report states that
that construction of the ship has begun and that it might displace 35,000 tons.83 By comparison,
U.S. Navy LHD/LHA-type amphibious assault ships displace 41,000 to 45,000 tons. Figure 13
shows an unconfirmed conceptual rendering of a possible design for the Type 081 LHD.

81

2014 DOD CMSD, p. 38. Elsewhere in the report (page 9), DOD states that it appears likely that China will build its
first amphibious assault ship during this decade.
82
Janes Fighting Ships 2014-2015, p. 153.
83
Kyodo News International, China Building 1st Amphibious Assault Ship in Shanghai, GlobalPost
(www.globalpost.com), August 26, 2013.

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Figure 13. Type 081 LHD (Unconfirmed Conceptual Rendering of a Possible Design)

Source: Global Times Forum, accessed July 31, 2012, at http://forum.globaltimes.cn/forum/showthread.php?p=


72083.

Potential Roles for Type 071 and Type 081 Ships


Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071 and the Type 081 would be of value for
conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe that
China is building such ships more for their value in conducting other operations, such as
operations for asserting and defending Chinas territorial claims in the East China Sea and South
China Sea, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security
operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
Politically, larger amphibious ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and
engagement activities) and for impressing or intimidating foreign observers. DOD states that
The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale
invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China
could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas
or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better defended offshore island such as
Matsu or Jinmen is within Chinas capabilities....
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military
operations the PLA might pursue in a cross-Strait contingency.... China does not appear to be
building the conventional amphibious lift required to support such a campaign....

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The PLA Navy currently lacks the amphibious lift capacity that a large-scale invasion of
Taiwan would require.84

Air Cushioned Landing Craft


In June 2013, it was reported that China in May 2013 had taken delivery of four large, Ukrainianmade air-cushioned landing craft (LCACs). The craft reportedly have a range of 300 nautical
miles, a maximum speed of 63 knots, and a payload capacity of 150 tons. Some experts
reportedly discounted the operational utility of the LCACs, describing them as giant toys.85

Land-Based Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)


Land-Based Aircraft
China has introduced modern land-based fighters and strike fighters into the PLA Air Force and
PLA Naval Air Force. These include Russian-made Su-27s and Su-30s and indigenously
produced J-10s and J-11s. At least some of the strike fighters are or will be armed with modern
ASCMs. Chinas land-based naval aircraft inventory includes, among other things, 24 Russianmade Su-30 MKK 2 Flanker land-based fighters, whose delivery was completed in 2004. The Su30 is a derivative of the Su-27. Some of the Su-30s might eventually be fitted with the Russianmade AS-17A/B ASCM. (Chinas Air Force operates at least 150 Su-27s; these aircraft could be
used for fleet-defense operations.) Chinas navy also operates 100 ASCM-armed JH-7 land-based
fighter-bombers that were delivered between 1998 and 2004, and older ASCM-armed land-based
maritime bombers.
China in January 2011 reportedly began testing a stealthy, land-based, fighter-type aircraft, called
the J-20. Some observers believe, based on the aircrafts size and design, that it might be intended
as a land-based strike aircraft for attacking ships at sea.86
China in June 2012 reportedly reached agreement with Russia to license-produce long-range TU22 Backfire bombers; the planned force of 36 Backfires would be armed with ASCMs.87

84

2014 DOD CMSD, pp. 55, 56.


Minnie Chan, Experts Dismiss PLA Navys Landing Craft From Ukraine as Giant Toys, South China Morning
Post, June 25, 2013.
86
See, Bill Sweetman, Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter In Taxi Tests, AviationWeek.com, January 3, 2011; Jeremy Page,
A Chinese Stealth Challenge, Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2011: 1; Phil Stewart, U.S. Downplays Chinese
Stealth Fighter Status, Reuters.com, January 5, 2011; Agence France-Presse, US Downplays Concern Over Chinese
Stealth Fighter, DefenseNews.com, January 6, 2011; Tony Capaccio, Chinas J-20 Stealth Fighter Meant to Counter
F-22, F-35, U.S. Navy Says, Bloomberg.com, January 6, 2011; David A. Fulgham, et al., Stealth Slayer? Aviation
Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2011: 20-21, Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, Chinas New
Project 718/J-20 Fighter: Development outlook and strategic implications, China SignPost, January 17, 2011, 13 pp.;
Dave Majumdar, U.S. Opinions Vary Over Chinas Stealthy J-20, Defense News, January 24, 2011: 16; Stephen
Trimble, J-20: Chinas Ultimate Aircraft Carrier-Killer? The DEW Line (www.flightglobal.com), February 9, 2011;
Carlo Kopp, An Initial Assessment of Chinas J-20 Stealth Fighter, China Brief, May 6, 2011: 9-11; David Axe,
Stealth Fighter or Bomber? The Diplomat (http://the-diplomat.com), July 26, 2011; Bill Sweetman, Chinese J-20
Stealth Fighter Advances, Aviation Week Defense Technology International, January 31, 2012.
87
Norman Friedman, Back(fire) to the Future, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2012: 90-91.
85

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UAVs
DOD states that acquisition and development of longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV[s]), including the BZK-005, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV[s]), will
increase Chinas ability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations.88 A
September 21, 2013, press report states:
The government and military are striving to put China at the forefront of drone
manufacturing, for their own use and for export, and have made an all-out push to gather
domestic and international technology to support the program....
China is now dispatching its own drones into potential combat arenas. Every major arms
manufacturer in China has a research center devoted to drones, according to Chinese and
foreign military analysts. Those companies have shown off dozens of models to potential
foreign buyers at international air shows.
Chinese officials this month sent a drone near disputed islands administered by Japan;
debated using a weaponized drone last year to kill a criminal suspect in Myanmar; and sold
homemade drones resembling the Predator, an American model, to other countries for less
than a million dollars each. Meanwhile, online photographs reveal a stealth combat drone,
the Lijian, or Stealth Sword, in a runway test in May.
Military analysts say China has long tried to replicate foreign drone designs. Some Chinese
drones appearing at recent air shows have closely resembled foreign ones. Ian M. Easton, a
military analyst at the Project 2049 Institute in Virginia, said cyberespionage was one tool in
an extensive effort over years to purchase or develop drones domestically using all available
technology, foreign and domestic.
The Chinese military has not released statistics on the size of its drone fleet, but a Taiwan
Defense Ministry report said that as of mid-2011, the Chinese Air Force alone had more than
280 drone units, and analysts say the other branches have thousands, which means Chinas
fleet count is second only to the 7,000 or so of the United States. The military significance
of Chinas move into unmanned systems is alarming, said a 2012 report by the Defense
Science Board, a Pentagon advisory committee....
A signal moment in Chinas drone use came on Sept. 9, when the navy sent a surveillance
drone near the disputed Diaoyu Islands, which Japan administers and calls the Senkakus.
Japanese interceptor jets scrambled to confront it. This was the first time China had ever
deployed a drone over the East China Sea. The Chinese Defense Ministry said regular
drills had taken place at relevant areas in the East China Sea, which conform to relevant
international laws and practices.
The drone appeared to be a BZK-005, a long-range aircraft used by the Chinese Navy that
made its public debut in 2006 at Chinas air show in Zhuhai, said an American official....
I think this is really just the beginning of a much broader trend were going to seefor
China to increase its ability to monitor the East China Sea and the Western Pacific, beyond
the Philippines, and to increase the operational envelope of their strike capabilities, [Mr.
Easton] said....
88
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 95. See also Ian M. Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese Peoples Liberation Armys
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities, Project 2049 Institute,
March 11, 2013, 28 pp.; Bill Gertz, Game of Drones, Washington Free Beacon, March 26, 2013.

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Chinese strategists have discussed using drones in attack situations if war with the United
States were to break out in the Pacific, according to the Project 2049 report. Citing Chinese
military technical material, the report said the Peoples Liberation Armys operational
thinkers and scientists envision attacking U.S. aircraft-carrier battle groups with swarms of
multimission U.A.V.s in the event of conflict.89

Nuclear and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons


A July 22, 2011, press report states that Chinas military is developing electromagnetic pulse
weapons that Beijing plans to use against U.S. aircraft carriers in any future conflict over Taiwan,
according to an intelligence report made public on Thursday [July 21].... The report, produced in
2005 and once labeled secret, stated that Chinese military writings have discussed building lowyield EMP warheads, but it is not known whether [the Chinese] have actually done so.90

Maritime Surveillance and Targeting Systems


China reportedly is developing and deploying maritime surveillance and targeting systems that
can detect U.S. ships and submarines and provide targeting information for Chinese ASBMs and
other Chinese military units. These systems reportedly include land-based over-the-horizon
backscatter (OTH-B) radars, land-based over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-SW) radars,
electro-optical satellites, radar satellites, and seabed sonar networks.91 DOD states that
The PLA Navy is also improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with sky
wave and surface wave OTH radars, which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance
satellites to locate targets at great distances from China (thereby supporting long-range
precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs).92

Chinese Naval Operations Away from Home Waters


Chinese navy ships in recent years have begun to conduct operations away from Chinas home
waters. Although many of these operations have been for making diplomatic port calls, some of
them have been for other purposes, including in particular anti-piracy operations in waters off
Somalia. DOD states that
The PLA Navy remains at the forefront of Chinas military efforts to extend its operational
reach beyond the western Pacific and into what China calls the far seas. Missions in these
89

Edward Wong, Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes For Drones, New York Times, September 21, 2013.
Bill Gertz, Beijing Develops Pulse Weapons, Washington Times, July 22, 2011: 1. Except for [July 21],
materials in brackets as in original.
91
See 2011 DOD CMSD, pp. 3 and 38; Ben Blanchard, China Ramps Up Military Use of Space With New Satellites
Report, Reuters, July 11, 2011; Andrew Erickson, Satellites Support Growing PLA Maritime Monitoring and
Targeting Capabilities, China Brief, February 10, 2011: 13-18; Torbjorg Hemmingsen, Enter the Dragon: Inside
Chinas New Model Navy, Janes Navy International, May 2011: 14-16, 18, 20, 22, particularly the section on target
tracking on pages 15-16; Simon Rabinovitch, Chinas Satellites Cast Shadow Over US Pacific Operations, Financial
Times, July 12, 2011; Andrew S. Erickson, Eyes in the Sky, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 36-41.
92
2013 DOD CMSD, p. 42. See also Shane Bilsborough, Chinas Emerging C4ISR Revolution, The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), August 13, 2013; Andrew Tate, China Launches Latest of Military, Experimental
Satellites, Janes Defence Weekly (http://www.janes.com), September 28, 2014; William Lowther, Chinese Spy
Satellites Might Threaten Navy, Taipei Times (www.taipeitimes.com), October 2, 2014.
90

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areas include: protecting important sea lanes from terrorism, maritime piracy, and foreign
interdiction; providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; conducting naval diplomacy
and regional deterrence; and training to prevent a third party, such as the United States, from
interfering with operations off Chinas coast in a Taiwan, East China Sea, or South China
Sea conflict. The PLA Navys ability to perform these missions is modest but growing as it
gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced
platforms. The PLA Navys goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional
force that is able to project power across the greater Asia-Pacific region for long-term, highintensity operations. However, logistics and intelligence support remain key obstacles,
particularly in the Indian Ocean.
In the last several years, the PLA Navys distant seas experience has derived primarily from
counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and long-distance task group deployments
beyond the first island chain in the western Pacific. China continues to sustain a three-ship
presence in the Gulf of Aden to protect Chinese merchant shipping from maritime piracy.
This operation is Chinas first enduring naval operation beyond the Asia region.93

Some observers believe that China may want to eventually build a series of naval and other
military bases in the Indian Oceana so-called string of pearlsso as to support Chinese naval
operations along the sea line of communication linking China to Persian Gulf oil sources.94 Other
observers argue that although China has built or is building commercial port facilities in the
Indian Ocean, China to date has not established any naval bases in the Indian Ocean and instead
appears to be pursuing what U.S. officials refer to as a places not bases strategy (meaning a
collection of places for Chinese navy ships to occasionally visit for purposes of refueling and
restocking supplies, but not bases).95 DOD states that
Limited logistical support remains a key obstacle preventing the PLA Navy from operating
more extensively beyond East Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean. China desires to
expand its access to logistics in the Indian Ocean and will likely establish several access
points in this area in the next 10 years. These arrangements likely will take the form of
agreements for refueling, replenishment, crew rest, and low-level maintenance.96

93

2014 DOD CMSD, p. 37.


Bill Gertz, China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes, Washington Times, January 18, 2005, p.1. See also Daniel J.
Kostecka, The Chinese Navys Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean, China Brief, July 22, 1010: 3-5;
Edward Cody, China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military, Washington Post, April 12, 2005, p. 1; Indrani Bagchi,
China Eyeing Base in Bay of Bengal? Times of India, August 9, 2008, posted online at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China_eyeing_base_in_Bay_of_Bengal/articleshow/3343799.cms; Eric Ellis,
Pearls for the Orient, Sydney Morning Herald, July 9, 2010.
95
Daniel J. Kostecka, A Bogus Asian Pearl, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2011: 48-52; Daniel J. Kostecka,
Places and Bases: The Chinese Navys Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean, Naval War College Review,
Winter 2011: 59-78; Daniel J. Kostecka, Hambantota, Chittagong, and the Maldives Unlikely Pearls for the Chinese
Navy, China Brief, November 19, 2010: 8-11; Daniel J. Kostecka, The Chinese Navys Emerging Support Network
in the Indian Ocean, China Brief, July 22, 2010: 5.
96
2014 DOD CMSD, p. 38. See also Brendan Thomas-Noone, The Master Plan: Could This Be Chinas Overseas
Basing Strategy? The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org), November 6, 2014.
94

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Numbers of Chinese Ships and Aircraft; Comparisons to U.S. Navy


Numbers Provided by ONI in 2013
Table 4 shows figures provided by ONI in 2013 on numbers of Chinese navy ships in 2000, 2005,
and 2010, and projected figures for 2015 and 2020, along with the approximate percentage of
ships within these figures considered by ONI to be of modern design.
Table 4. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Provided by ONI in 2013
Ship type

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Diesel attack submarines (SSs)

60

51

54

57 to 62

59 to 64

Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)

6 to 8

6 to 9

Ballistic missile submarines

3 to 5

4 to 5

Aircraft carriers

1 to 2

Destroyers

21

21

25

28 to 32

30 to 34

Frigates

37

43

49

52 to 56

54 to 58

Corvettes

20 to 25

24 to 30

Amphibious ships

60

43

55

53 to 55

50 to 55

Missile-armed coastal patrol craft

100

51

85

85

85

Diesel attack submarines

40

50

70

75

Nuclear-powered attack submarines

33

33

70

100

Destroyers

20

40

50

70

85

Frigates

25

35

45

70

85

Numbers

Approximate percent of modern design

Source: Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and Kimberly Hsu, Chinas Naval Modernization and Implications for the
United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), August 26, 2013, Figures 1
through 4 on pp. 6-7. The source notes to Figures 1 through 4 state that the numbers and percentages were
provided by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, PLA Navy Orders of Battle 20002020, written response to request for information provided to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Suitland, MD, June 24, 2013. Citing this same ONI document, the USCC publication states in
footnotes on pages 6 and 7 that Modern submarines are those able to employ submarine-launched
intercontinental ballistic missiles or antiship cruise missiles, and that Modern surface ships are those able to
conduct multiple missions or that have been extensively upgraded since 1992.

Numbers Provided by ONI in 2009


Table 5 shows figures provided by ONI in 2009 on numbers of Chinese navy ships and aircraft
from 1990 to 2009, and projected figures for 2015 and 2020. The figures in the table lump older
and less capable ships together with newer and more capable ships discussed above.

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Table 5. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships and Aircraft Provided by ONI in 2009
(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more capable units)
1990

1995

2000

2005

2009

Projection for
2015

Projection for
2020

Ships
Ballistic missile submarines

4 or 5?

4 or 5?

Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs)

80

82

65

58

59

~70

~72

SSNs

n/a

n/a

SSs

75

77

60

52

53

n/a

n/a

Aircraft carriers

1?

2?

Destroyers

14

18

21

25

26

~26

~26

Frigates

35

35

37

42

48

~45

~42

Subtotal above ships

130

136

124

127

136

~146 or ~147?

~146 or ~147?

Missile-armed attack craft

200

165

100

75

80+

n/a

n/a

Amphibious ships

65

70

60

56

58

n/a

n/a

Large ships (LPDs/LHDs)

~6?

~6?

Smaller ships

65

70

60

56

57

n/a

n/a

Mine warfare ships

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

40

n/a

n/a

Major auxiliary ships

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

50

n/a

n/a

Minor auxiliary ships and support craft

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

250+

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

~145

~255

~258

~60

~90

Aircraft
Land-based maritime strike aircraft
Carrier-based fighters
Helicopters

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

~34

~153

~157

Subtotal above aircraft

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

~179

~468

~505

Source: Prepared by CRS. Source for 2009, 2015, and 2020: 2009 ONI report, page 18 (text and table), page 21
(text), and (for figures not available on pages 18 or 21), page 45 (CRS estimates based on visual inspection of
ONI graph entitled Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels). Source for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005: Navy data
provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 9, 2010.
Notes: n/a is not available. The use of question marks for the projected figures for ballistic missile submarines,
aircraft, carriers, and major amphibious ships (LPDs and LHDs) for 2015 and 2020 reflects the difficulty of
resolving these numbers visually from the graph on page 45 of the ONI report. The graph shows more major
amphibious ships than ballistic missile submarines, and more ballistic missile submarines than aircraft carriers.
Figures in this table for aircraft carriers include the Liaoning. The ONI report states on page 19 that China will
likely have an operational, domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015. Such a ship, plus the Liaoning,
would give China a force of 2 operational carriers sometime after 2015.
The graph on page 45 shows a combined total of amphibious ships and landing craft of about 244 in 2009, about
261 projected for 2015, and about 253 projected for 2015.
Since the graph on page 45 of the ONI report is entitled Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels, aircraft numbers
shown in the table presumably do not include Chinese air force (PLAAF) aircraft that may be capable of attacking
ships or conducting other maritime operations.

Numbers Presented in Annual DOD Reports to Congress


DOD states, The PLA Navy has the largest force of major combatants, submarines, and
amphibious warfare ships in Asia. Chinas naval forces include some 77 principal surface
combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85

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missile-equipped small combatants.97 Table 6 shows numbers of Chinese navy ships as


presented in annual DOD reports to Congress on military and security developments involving
China (previously known as the annual report on China military power). As with Table 5, the
figures in Table 6 lump older and less capable ships together with newer and more capable ships
discussed above. DOD stated in 2011 that the percentage of modern units within Chinas
submarine force has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 2004 to about 47% in 2008 and
50% in 2009, and that the percentage of modern units within Chinas force of surface combatants
has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 2004 to about 25% in 2008 and 2009.98
Table 6. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Presented in Annual DOD Reports to
Congress
(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more capable units)
Year of DOD reporta

2000

2002

~60

~ 50

~ 60

> 60

Missile-armed coastal patrol craft

n/a

Amphibious ships: LSTs and LPDs

almost
50

Nuclear-powered attack submarines


Diesel attack submarines
Aircraft carriers
Destroyers

~20

Frigates

~40

Corvettes

Amphibious ships: LSMs

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

n/a

n/a

51

50

53

54

54

54

49

48

49

51

1b

n/a

21

25

25

29

27

25

26

26

23

24

n/a

43

45

47

45

48

49

53

53

52

49

8b

~ 50

~ 50

n/a

51

45

41

45

70

85

86

86

85

85

~ 40

> 40

n/a

20

25

25

26

27

27

27

28

29

29

n/a

23

25

25

28

28

28

28

23

26

28

~60

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in 2000-2014 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on
military and security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China
military power).
Notes: n/a means data not available in report. LST means tank landing ship; LPD means transport dock ship;
LSM means medium landing ship.
a.

The DOD report generally covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2014 edition of the report
covers events during 2013.

b.

First year that this category was included in the table in DODs annual report.

Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities


U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of
U.S. and Chinese ships. Although numbers of ships (or aggregate fleet tonnages) can be relatively
easy to compile from published reference sources, they are highly problematic as a means of
assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, for the following reasons:

97
98

A fleets total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial
metric of its capability. In light of the many other significant contributors to

2014 DOD CMSD, p. 7.


2011 DOD CMSD, p. 43 (figure).

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naval capability,99 navies with similar numbers of ships or similar aggregate


tonnages can have significantly different capabilities, and navy-to-navy
comparisons of numbers of ships or aggregate tonnages can provide a highly
inaccurate sense of their relative capabilities. In recent years, the warfighting
capabilities of navies have derived increasingly from the sophistication of their
internal electronics and software. This factor can vary greatly from one navy to
the next, and often cannot be easily assessed by outside observation. As the
importance of internal electronics and software has grown, the idea of comparing
the warfighting capabilities of navies principally on the basis of easily observed
factors such as ship numbers and tonnages has become increasingly less valid,
and today is highly problematic.

Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines, destroyers, or


frigates) can obscure potentially significant differences in the capabilities of
those ships, both between navies and within one countrys navy.100 The
potential for obscuring differences in the capabilities of ships of a given type is
particularly significant in assessing relative U.S. and Chinese capabilities, in part
because Chinas navy includes significant numbers of older, obsolescent ships.
Figures on total numbers of Chinese submarines, destroyers, frigates, and coastal
patrol craft lump older, obsolescent ships together with more modern and more
capable designs.101 This CRS report shows numbers of more modern and more
capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3,
respectively.

A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that increases in total
numbers necessarily translate into increases in aggregate capability, and
that decreases in total numbers necessarily translate into decreases in
aggregate capability. For a Navy like Chinas, which is modernizing in some
ship categories by replacing larger numbers of older, obsolescent ships with
smaller numbers of more modern and more capable ships, this is not necessarily
the case. As shown in Table 5, for example, Chinas submarine force today has
fewer boats than it did in the 1990, but has greater aggregate capability than it did
in 1990, because larger numbers of older, obsolescent boats have been replaced
by smaller numbers of more modern and more capable boats. A similar point
might be made about Chinas force of missile-armed attack craft. For assessing
navies like Chinas, it can be more useful to track the growth in numbers of more
modern and more capable units. This CRS report shows numbers of more modern
and more capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 1, Table 2, and
Table 3, respectively.

99
These include types (as opposed to numbers or aggregate tonnage) of ships; types and numbers of aircraft; the
sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and networking capabilities; supporting maintenance and logistics
capabilities; doctrine and tactics; the quality, education, and training of personnel; and the realism and complexity of
exercises.
100
Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number of other factors, including sensors,
weapons, C4ISR systems, networking capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum
speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time the ship is available for operation).
101
For an article discussing this issue, see Joseph Carrigan, Aging Tigers, Mighty Dragons: Chinas bifurcated
Surface Fleet, China Brief, September 24, 2010: 2-6.

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Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take


into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting locations
of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide responsibilities, and a
substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the Atlantic. As a
consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might be available for a
crisis or conflict scenario in Chinas near-seas region, or could reach that area
within a certain amount of time. In contrast, Chinas navy has limited
responsibilities outside Chinas near-seas region, and its ships are all homeported
along Chinas coast at locations that face directly onto Chinas near-seas region.

Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into


account maritime-relevant military capabilities that countries might have
outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based Air Force aircraft
armed with ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant maritime-relevant
non-navy forces present in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries, this is a
particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and Chinese military
capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China
incident at sea might involve only navy units on both sides, a broader U.S.-China
military conflict would more likely be a force-on-force engagement involving
multiple branches of each countrys military.

The missions to be performed by one countrys navy can differ greatly from
the missions to be performed by another countrys navy. Consequently, navies
are better measured against their respective missions than against one another.
Although Navy A might have less capability than Navy B, Navy A might
nevertheless be better able to perform Navy As intended missions than Navy B is
to perform Navy Bs intended missions. This is another significant consideration
in assessing U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, because the missions of the two
navies are quite different.

DOD Response to China Naval Modernization


Renewed DOD Emphasis on Asia-Pacific Region
Two DOD strategy and budget documentsa strategic defense guidance document that was
released on January 5, 2012,102 and a document outlining selected program decisions for DODs
FY2013 budget that was released on January 26, 2012103state that U.S. military strategy will
place an increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as one result, there will be a
renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that
notwithstanding constraints on U.S. defense spending, DOD will seek to protect initiatives
relating to the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Although Administration officials
state that the renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region is not directed at any single country,

102

Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012,
cover letters and pp. 2, 4-5. For further discussion of this document, see CRS Report R42146, Assessing the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In Brief, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell.
103
Department of Defense, Defense Budget: Priorities and Choices, January 2012, pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9.

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many observers believe it is in no small part intended as a response to Chinas military


modernization effort and its assertive behavior regarding its maritime territorial claims.

Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept


DOD has been developing a new Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept that is intended to increase the
joint operating effectiveness U.S. naval and Air Force units, particularly in operations for
countering anti-access forces. The ASB development effort was announced in the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD has established an Air-Sea Battle Office to guide the
implementation of the concept.104 Although DOD officials state that the ASB concept is not
directed at any particular adversary, many observers believe it is focused to a large degree, if not
principally, on countering Chinese and Iranian anti-access forces. On June 3, 2013, DOD released
an unclassified summary of the ASB Concept; the document builds on earlier statements from
DOD officials on the topic. DODs unclassified summary of the ASB document is reprinted in
Appendix B.

August 2013 Press Report on Revisions to War Plans


An August 2, 2013, press report stated that
The U.S. military is conducting a sweeping overhaul of its war plans for potential conflicts
from the Middle East to the Pacific, as commanders adapt to a future of dwindling numbers
of ground troops.
Plans that had presumed the availability of large U.S. forces for invasions and occupations
are being redrafted to incorporate strategies such as quick-reaction ground units, air power
and Navy ships, according to officials. A big part of the new plans will be options for the use
of cyberweapons, which can disable enemies offensive and defensive capabilities....
... officials said the military had looked at existing plans for conflicts in the Middle East
involving Iran, as well as conflicts in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea and East
China Sea, where U.S. allies and partners have conflicting territorial claims with China....
A defense official said that with the war in Afghanistan coming to an end, the U.S. is at a
strategic inflection point. War plans hadn't been updated to conform with revisions to
military strategy outlined by President Barack Obama in 2012.
Defense officials said Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has received regular updates on the
work, and has reviewed the revised plans for Asia.105

104
Christopher P. Cavas, Air-Sea Battle Office Targets DoD Blind Spots, NavyTimes.com, November 10, 2011;
Gabe Starosta, Pentagon Stands Up new AirSea Battle Office, Inside the Navy, November 14, 2011; Ann Roosevelt,
DoD Office Created To Implement Air-Sea Battle Concept, Defense Daily, November 14, 2011: 6; Michael Fabey,
Pentagon Acknowledges New Air-Sea Battle Office, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 14, 2011: 3.
105
Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Conducts Overhaul Of War Plans, Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2013: 5.

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Navy Response to China Naval Modernization


The U.S. Navy has taken a number of steps in recent years that appear intended, at least in part, at
improving the U.S. Navys ability to counter Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities, including
but not limited to those discussed below. A November 14, 2012, article by Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, provides an overview of Navy activities associated with
the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific (which Administration officials state is not
directed at any one state in particular); the text of the article is presented in Appendix C.

Force Posture and Basing Actions


Navy force posture and basing actions include the following, among others:

The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directed the
Navy to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally
available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to
support engagement, presence and deterrence.106

More generally, the Navy intends to increase the share of its ships that are
homeported in the Pacific from the current figure of about 55% to 60% by 2020.

The Navy states that, budgets permitting, the Navy will seek to increase the
number of Navy ships that will be stationed in or forward-deployed to the Pacific
on a day-to-day basis from 51 in 2014 to 58 in 2015 and 67 by 2020.107

In terms of qualitative improvements, the Navy has stated that it will assign its
newest and most capable ships and aircraft, and its most capable personnel, to the
Pacific.

The Navy will increase the number of attack submarines homeported at Guam to
four, from a previous total of three.108

The Navy has announced an intention to station up to four Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs) at Singapore by 2017,109 and an additional seven LCSs in Japan by
2022.110

In April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed an agreement that will
provide U.S. forces with increased access to Philippine bases.111

106

U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. (February 6, 2006) p. 47.
Victor Battle, US Navy Shaping Events in South China Sea, VOA News (www.voanews.com), May 20, 2014.
See also Mike McCarthy, CNO Sees More Integration With Asian Allies, Defense Daily, May 20, 2014: 1-2.
108
Fourth Attack Sub to be Homeported in Guam, Navy News Service, February 10, 2014.
109
Jim Wolf, U.S. Plans 10-Month Warship Deployment To Singapore, Reuters.com, May 10, 2012; Jonathan
Greenert, Sea Change, The Navy Pivots to Asia, Foreign Policy (www.foreignpolicy.com), November 14, 2012.
110
Zachary Keck, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations: 11 Littoral Combat Ships to Asia by 2012, The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), May 17, 2013.
111
See, for example, Mark Landler, U.S. and Philippines Agree to a 10-Year Pact on the Use of Military Bases, New
York Times, (www.nytimes.com), April 27, 2014; Associated Press, Obama Says US-Philippines Military Pact Will
Improve Asias Security, Fox News (www.foxnews.com), April 28, 2014; Luis Ramirez, US-Philippines Defense
Deal to Improve Asia Security, VOA News (www.voanews.com), April 28, 2014; Armando J. Heredia, New Defense
Agreement Between The Philippines and U.S.: The Basics, USNI News (http://news.usni.org), April 29, 2014; Ankit
(continued...)
107

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In addition to the above actions, U.S. Marines have begun six-month rotational training
deployments through Darwin, Australia, with the number of Marines in each deployment
scheduled to increase to 2,500 in 2016.112

Acquisition Programs
As mentioned earlier (see Limitations and Weaknesses in Background), Chinas navy
exhibits limitations or weaknesses in several areas, including antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and
mine countermeasures (MCM). Countering Chinas naval modernization might thus involve,
among other things, actions to exploit such limitations and weaknesses, such as developing and
procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines, torpedoes, unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs), and mines.
Many of the Navys programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapon systems
can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navys ability to counter
Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities. Examples of highly capable ships now being acquired
include Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carriers,113 Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines,114
and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers, including the new Flight III version of the
DDG-51, which is to be equipped with a new radar for improved air and missile defense
operations.115 The procurement rate of Virginia-class submarines was increased to two per year in
FY2011, and the Navy wants to start procuring the Flight III version of the DDG-51 in FY2016.
Examples of highly capable aircraft now being acquired by the Navy include F-35C carrier-based
Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs),116 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and EA-18G Growler
electronic attack aircraft,117 E-2D Hawkeye early warning and command and control aircraft, the
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA),118 and the follow-on Unmanned Carrier Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.

(...continued)
Panda, US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Bolsters Pivot to Asia, The Diplomat
(http://thediplomat.com), April 29, 2014; Philippines To Give U.S. Forces Access To Up To Five Military Bbases,
Reuters (www.reuters.com), May 2, 2014; Carl Thayer, Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement, The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com), May 2, 2014.
112
Seth Robson, US Increasing Number of Marines On Rotation To Australia, Stars and Stripes (Stripes.com), June
15, 2013.
113
For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
114
For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
115
For more on the DDG-51 program, including the planned Flight III version, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
116
For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah
Gertler.
117
For more on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G programs, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G
Aircraft Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
118
For an article discussing the use of P-8 for countering Chinese submarines, see Jeremy Page, As China Deploys
Nuclear Submarines, U.S. P-8 Poseidon Jets Snoop on Them, Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com), October 24,
2014.

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The Navy is also developing a number of new weapon technologies that might be of value in
countering Chinese maritime anti-access capabilities, such as an electromagnetic rail gun
(EMRG) whose potential missions include air and missile defense, and high-power free electron
lasers (FELs) and solid state lasers (SSLs), whose potential missions also include air and missile
defense.119
An October 10, 2011, press report states that Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), in a memorandum dated September 23, 2011, has launched a new review to
identify warfighting investments that could counter Chinese military methods for disrupting key
battlefield information systems. According to the report, the memorandum requests options for
warfighting in the complex electromagnetic environment and for countering anti-access/areadenial threatsterms closely associated with Chinas military. The report quotes the
memorandum as stating that Todays weapons rely on EM [electromagnetic] sensors, EM
communications and EM seekers to complete their kill chains, while defenders are increasingly
turning to EM methods for protection, and that some kill chains never leave the EM
environment at all, damaging an adversarys military capability by affecting control systems
aloneno bomb or missile required. The report states that the memorandum directs the group
to generate innovative concepts for [the] Navy to employ the EM environment as a primary line
of operation in a 2025-2030 warfighting campaign.120
In a December 2011 journal article, Greenert stated that
regional powers in 2025 could use ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, and guided
rockets and artillery to prevent military forces or legitimate users from entering an area
(anti-access, or A2) or operating effectively within an area (area-denial, or AD). Those
capabilities can be characterized as defensive, reducing opposition to them, and they can be
deployed from the countrys mainland territory, making attacks against them highly
escalatory. Their intended purpose, however, is clearintimidation of neighboring countries,
including U.S. allies and partners. Aggressors can threaten to hold key maritime crossroads
at risk, render territorial claims moot, and assert that intervention by the United States or
others in these disputes can be delayed or prevented. The stated or unstated implication is
that their neighbors should capitulate to the aggressors demands.
To help defend our allies and protect our interests, U.S. forces in 2025 will need to be able to
operate and project power despite adversary A2/AD capabilities. Over the next decade naval
and air forces will implement the new AirSea Battle Concept and put in place the tactics,
procedures, and systems of this innovative approach to the A2/AD challenge....
Over the next decade, maintaining the Navys war-fighting edge and addressing fiscal
constraints will require significant changes in how we develop the force. We will need to
shift from a focus on platforms to instead focus on what the platform carries. We have
experience in this model. Aircraft carriers, amphibious ships and the littoral combat ships are
inherently reconfigurable, with sensor and weapon systems that can evolve over time for the
expected mission. As we apply that same modular approach to each of our capabilities, the
weapons, sensors, unmanned systems, and electronic-warfare systems that a platform
deploys will increasingly become more important than the platform itself.
119

For more on the Navys laser-development efforts, see CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface,
Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
120
Christopher J. Castelli, Memo: Navy Seeks To Counter Chinas Battle-Disruption Capabilities, Inside the Navy,
October 10, 2011.

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That paradigm shift will be prompted by three main factors. First, the large number, range of
frequencies, and growing sophistication of sensors will increase the risk to ships and
aircrafteven stealthy oneswhen operating close to an adversarys territory. Continuing
to pursue ever-smaller signatures for manned platforms, however, will soon become
unaffordable. Second, the unpredictable and rapid improvement of adversary A2/AD
capabilities will require faster evolution of our own systems to maintain an advantage or
asymmetrically gain the upper hand. This speed of evolution is more affordable and
technically possible in weapons, sensors, and unmanned systems than in manned platforms.
The third factor favoring a focus on payloads is the changing nature of war. Precision-guided
munitions have reduced the number and size of weapons needed to achieve the same effect.
At the same time, concerns for collateral damage have significantly lowered the number of
targets that can be safely attacked in a given engagement. The net effect is fewer weapons
are needed in todays conflicts.
Together, those trends make guided, precision stand-off weapons such as Tomahawk landattack missiles, joint air-surface stand-off missiles, and their successors more viable and
cost-effective alternatives to increasingly stealthy aircraft that close the target and drop
bombs or shoot direct-attack missiles. To take full advantage of the paradigm shift from
platform to payload, the Fleet of 2025 will incorporate faster, longer-range, and more
sophisticated weapons from ships, aircraft, and submarines. In turn, todays platforms will
evolve to be more capable of carrying a larger range of weapons and other payloads.
Those other payloads will include a growing number of unmanned systems. Budget
limitations over the next 10 to 15 years may constrain the number of ships and aircraft the
Navy can buy....
The future Fleet will deploy a larger and improved force of rotary wing unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) including todays Fire Scout and soon, the armed Fire-X. Those vehicles
were invaluable in recent operations in Libya and in counterterrorism operations around the
Central Command area of responsibility. Deploying from the deck of a littoral combat ship, a
detachment of Fire Scouts can provide continuous surveillance more than 100 miles away.
Those systems will expand the reach of the ships sensors with optical and infrared
capabilities, as well as support special operations forces in the littorals. Even more
significant, the Fleet of 2025 will include UAVs deploying from aircraft carrier decks. What
started a decade ago as the unmanned combat air system will be operating by 2025 as an
integral element of some carrier air wings, providing surveillance and some strike capability
at vastly increased ranges compared with todays strike fighters. Once that aircraft is fielded,
it will likely take on additional missions such as logistics, electronic warfare, or tanking.
Submarines will deploy and operate in conjunction with a family of unmanned vehicles and
sensors by 2025 to sustain the undersea dominance that is a clear U.S. asymmetric
advantage. Large-displacement unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will deploy from
ships, shore, or Virginia-class submarine payload tubes to conduct surveillance missions.
With their range and endurance, large UUVs could travel deep into an adversarys A2/AD
envelope to deploy strike missiles, electronic warfare decoys, or mines. Smaller UUVs will
be used by submarines to extend the reach of their organic sensors, and will operate in
conjunction with unattended sensors that can be deployed from surface combatants,
submarines, and P-8A patrol aircraft. The resulting undersea network will create a more
complete and persistent common operational picture of the underwater environment when
and where we need it. This will be essential to finding and engaging adversary submarines,
potentially the most dangerous A2/AD capability.
The undersea picture is extremely important in terms of countering enemy mining. The most
basic of A2/AD weapons, mines can render an area of ocean unusable for commercial

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shipping for weeks or months while we laboriously locate and neutralize them. Even the
threat of mines is enough to severely restrict ship movements, significantly affecting trade
and global economic stability if it happens in key choke points such as the Malacca or
Hormuz straits. The mine countermeasure capabilities we are developing for littoral combat
ships and MH-60 aircraft rely heavily on unmanned sensors to rapidly build the underwater
picture, and unmanned neutralization systems to disable mines. By 2025 those systems will
be fully fielded, and their portable nature could allow them to be another swappable payload
on a range of combatants....
Electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations are increasingly essential to defeating the
sensors and command and control (C2) that underpin an opponents A2/AD capabilities. If
the adversary is blinded or unable to communicate, he cannot aim long-range ballistic and
cruise missiles or cue submarines and aircraft. Today, Navy forces focus on deconflicting
operations in the electromagnetic spectrum or cyber domains. By 2025, the Fleet will fully
operationalize those domains, more seamlessly managing sensors, attacks, defense, and
communications, and treating EW and cyber environments as maneuver spaces on par with
surface, undersea, or air.
For example, an electronic jammer or decoy can defeat individual enemy radar, and thus an
enemy C2 system using the radars data. A cyber operation might be able to achieve a similar
effect, allowing U.S. forces to avoid detection. This is akin to using smoke and rubberduck decoys in World War II to obscure and confuse the operational picture for Japanese
forces, allowing U.S. ships to maneuver to an advantageous position. The future Fleet will
employ EW and cyber with that same sense of operational integration.121

An August 20, 2012, press report stated that the Air-Sea Battle concept prompted Navy officials
to make significant shifts in the services FY2014-FY2018 budget plan, including new
investments in ASW, electronic attack and electronic warfare, cyber warfare, the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
(BAMS) UAV (a maritime version of the Global Hawk UAV). The report quoted Greenert as
saying that the total value of the budget shifts was certainly in the hundreds of millions of dollars,
and perhaps in the low billions of dollars.122
A July 13, 2013, blog post states that
a new and dangerous mystery weapon has Americas admirals scared.
Thats according to a recent approval for up to $65 million over three years from the Naval
Research Laboratory to defense contractor ITT Exelis. The funds, according to a Navy
document, are for a suite of 24 electronic warfare systems to be mounted on U.S. warships
sailing near Chinese waters.
The reason? Its necessary to thwart an immediate threat for naval fleet operations, the
Navy stated. The sailing branch wants the new defenses in place by March 2014.
121

Jonathan Greenert, Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 20.
Greenerts statement about stationing several LCSs at Singapore followed statements by other Administration officials
dating back to June 2011 about operating a small number of LCSs out of Singapore. See, for example, Wong Maye-E
(Associated Press), Gates Pledges Wider U.S. Military Presence in Asia, USA Today, June 4, 2011; and Dan de Luce
(Agence France-Presse), Gates: New Weapons For Robust U.S. Role in Asia, DefenseNews.com, June 3, 2011.
122
Christopher J. Castelli, CNO: Air-Sea Battle Driving Acceleration Of Key Programs In POM-14, Inside the Navy,
August 20, 2012. POM-14 is the Program Objective Memorandum (an internal DOD budget-planning document) for
the FY2014 DOD budget.

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The urgent notice, first spotted by Military & Aerospace Electronics, is an unusually stark
warning for the planets mightiest fleet. Navy officials told the magazine the undisclosed
danger is a newly discovered threat, which caused U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Adm.
Cecil Haney to fast-track the project.
The Navy isnt saying what the threat is, which country developed it or when it was
discovered by the Americans. Requests to the Navy for comment were not returned.
But its possible to make informed guesses. As the trade magazine notes, shipboard
electronic warfare systems typically are designed to detect and jam enemy radar threats
particularly the electronics in radar-guided anti-ship missiles. (Our emphasis.)
And its reasonably safe to assume if theres a new missile out there, its Chinese....
To be clear, nobody outside the Navy knows for sure whats got the sailing branch so
startled. Until the Navy discloses exactly what the threat is, everyone will be guessing.
Besides China, the other players in this scenario are, of course, Russia, Iran and North
Korea.123

A July 28, 2013, blog post states that


The U.S. Navy has asked missile manufacturers to quickly design and build them a target
drone that will simulate sub-sonic Chinese anti-ship missiles. Previously the U.S. Navy had
spent a lot of effort developing and building similar drones to simulate super-sonic anti-ship
missiles. Apparently someone did the math and realized that the most likely near-term
opponents (China, North Korea, or Iran) all had a lot of Chinese sub-sonic missiles.124

Training and Forward-Deployed Operations


The Navy in recent years has increased antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training for Pacific Fleet
forces and conducted various forward-deployed operations in the Western Pacific, including
exercises and engagement operations with Pacific allied and partner navies, as well as operations
that appear to have been aimed at monitoring Chinese military operations.125 In a December 2011
journal article, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
Critical to shaping the environment is cooperation with partners and allies across the range of
operations. At the high end [of operations], we will expand our combined efforts with allies
in Japan, South Korea, and Australia to train and exercise in missions such as antisubmarine
warfare and integrated air and missile defense. Over the next decade, we will also increase
deployments of ships and aircraft for the cooperative missions our other allies and partners
123

Mystery Weapon Terrifies Americas Admirals, War is Boring (https://medium.com/war-is-boring), July 13,
2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at https://medium.com/war-is-boring/9b7312dc7bf5. See also John Keller, ITT
Exelis To Help Navy With New EW System To Protect Ships From Recently Discovered Threat, Military and
Aerospace Electronics (www.militaryaerospace.com), July 9, 2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at
http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/07/itt-shipboard-ew.html.
124
James Dunnigan, U.S. Navy Hurries Preparations For War With China, Strategy Page (www.strategypage.com),
July 28, 2013, accessed September 5, 2013, at http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/U.S.-Navy-HurriesPreparations-For-War-With-China-7-28-2013.asp.
125
Incidents at sea in recent years between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) appear to involve, on the U.S. side, ships and aircraft, such as TAGOS ocean surveillance ships and EP-3
electronic surveillance aircraft, whose primary apparent mission is to monitor foreign military operations.

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need most. Our ships ships [sic] in Singapore will conduct cooperative counterpiracy or
countertrafficking operations around the South China Sea. Similarly, 2025 may see [landbased] P-8A Poseidon [maritime patrol] aircraft or unmanned broad area maritime
surveillance aerial vehicles periodically deploy to the Philippines or Thailand to help those
nations with maritime domain awareness....
As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted in a recent Foreign Policy article, the AsiaPacific region will be emphasized in our forward posture.... We will continue our robust
rotational deployments to the western Pacific, complemented with our forward-stationed
navy and marine forces in Japan, Guam, Singapore, and Australia.126

A July 2, 2013, blog post states that


The U.S. Navys multi-national exercises in the Pacific theater are growing in size and taking
on new dimensions due to the U.S. militarys overall strategic re-balance or pivot to the
region, service officials explained.
Although many of the multi-national exercises currently underway have been growing in
recent years, the U.S. militarys strategic focus on the area is having a profound impact upon
training activities there, Navy officials acknowledge....
The Pacific re-balance is allowing us to do things we have not been able to do in the past.
Some of our allies were looking for something a little more compatible with what they had.
The LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] allows us to better train and adapt to our partner navies who
have been operating smaller, shallow-draft platforms for years, said [Lt. Anthony] Falvo
[spokesman, U.S. Pacific Fleet].127

Statements of Confidence
Countering Chinas naval modernization effort can also involve stating publicly (while
withholding classified details) the U.S. Navys ability to counter improved Chinese maritime
forces. Such public statements could help prevent Chinese overconfidence that might lead to
incidents, while also reassuring regional allies, partners, and neutrals. Conversely, some observers
might argue, having an ability to counter Chinese maritime military forces but not stating it
publicly could invite Chinese overconfidence and thereby be destabilizing.

Issues for Congress


Future Size of U.S. Navy
One potential oversight issue for Congress, particularly in the context of constraints on U.S.
defense spending, concerns whether the U.S. Navy in coming years will be large enough to
adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also adequately
performing other missions around the world of interest to U.S. policy makers. Some observers are
concerned that a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven reductions
126
127

Jonathan Greenert, Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 20.
Kris Osborn, Navy Pivots Training to Match Pacific Transition, DOD Buzz (www.dodbuzz.com), July 2, 2013.

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in the size of the U.S. Navy could encourage Chinese military overconfidence and demoralize
U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific, and thereby destabilize or make it harder for the United
States to defend its interests in the region.128
Navy officials state that, to carry out Navy missions around the world in coming years, the Navy
will need to achieve and maintain a fleet of 306 ships of various types and numbers. Many
observers are concerned that constraints on Navy budgets in coming years will result in a fleet
with considerably fewer than 306 ships.129 The issue of whether the U.S. Navy in coming years
will be large enough to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces is part
of a larger debate about whether the military pillar of the U.S. strategic rebalancing to the AsiaPacific region is being adequately resourced.
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:

Under the Administrations plans, will the Navy in coming years be large enough
to adequately counter improved Chinese maritime anti-access forces while also
adequately performing other missions around the world of interest to U.S. policy
makers?

What might be the political and security implications in the Asia-Pacific region
of a combination of growing Chinese naval capabilities and budget-driven
reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy?

If the Navy is reduced in size, and priority in the allocation of deployed Navy
ships is given to maintaining Navy forces in the Pacific, what will be the impact
on Navy force levels in other parts of the world, such as the Persian Gulf/Indian
Ocean region or the Mediterranean Sea, and consequently on the Navys ability
to adequately perform its missions in those parts of the world?

To what extent could the operational impacts of a reduction in Navy ship


numbers be mitigated through increased use of forward homeporting, multiple
crewing, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation (i.e., Sea Swap)?
How feasible are these options, and what would be their potential costs and
benefits?

Long-Range Carrier-Based Aircraft and Long-Range Weapons


Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns Navy plans for developing and procuring
long-range carrier-based aircraft and long-range ship- and aircraft-launched weapons. Aircraft and
weapons with longer ranges could help Navy ships and aircraft achieve results while remaining
outside the ranges of Chinese A2/AD systems that can pose a threat to their survivability.130

128

See, for example, Seth Cropsey, Chinas Growing Challenge To U.S. Naval Power, Wall Street Journal, June 21,
2013: 13.
129
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
130
For an article that provides an overview discussion of the issue, see Robert Haddick, The Real U.S.-China War
Asia Should Worry About: The Range War, The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org), July 25, 2014.

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UCLASS Aircraft
Some observers have stressed a need for the Navy to proceed with its plans for developing and
deploying a long-range, carrier-based, unmanned UAV called the Unmanned Carrier Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft. Some of these observers view the
acquisition of a long-range carrier-based UAV as key to maintaining the survivability and mission
effectiveness of aircraft carriers against Chinese A2/AD systems in coming years.131
The operational requirements for the UCLASS aircraft been a matter of some debate, with a key
issue being how much stealth and weapons payloadand consequently, how much ability to
penetrate heavily defended airspace and conduct strike missionsthe UCLASS aircraft should
have.132 The issue was the topic of a July 16, 2014, hearing before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW)/Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile


(LRASM)
Some observers have stressed a need for the Navy to proceed with the development and
acquisition of a longer-ranged replacement for the Navys current Harpoon ASCM, which was
first deployed on Navy ships in 1977 and has since been updated a number of times. Some of
these observers view the acquisition of a new, longer-ranged ASCM as key to maintaining the
survivability and mission effectiveness of Navy surface combatants when operating within range
of Chinese surface combatants armed with capable ASCMs. The U.S. Pacific Command has
identified an urgent operational need for a new anti-ship missile.
The Navys effort to acquire a new, longer-ranged ASCM to be fired from both ships and aircraft
is called the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) capability. In March 2014, DOD selected
a weapon called the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM)a modified version of the Air
Forces Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER)as Increment 1
(i.e., the first weapon) for the OASuW effort.133 The Navy plans to hold a competition to select
the Increment 2 missile for the OASuW effort.134

131
See, for example, Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, Commentary: The Next Carrier Air Wing,
DefenseNews.com, February 24, 2014.
132
See, for example, Dave Majumdar, Requirements Debate Continues to Delay UCLASS RFP, USNI News
(http://news.usni.org), March 24, 2014; Mike McCarthy, NAVIAR Chief Says Navy Seeking Optimal Balance On
UCLASS, Defense Daily, March 7, 2014.
133
See, for example, Jason Sherman, DOD Eyes Major Extension Of LRASM Development Contract, Inside the
Navy, March 24, 2014; Lara Seligman, Raytheon, Kongsberg File Protest Of LRASM Follow-On Contract Award,
Inside the Navy, March 24, 2014; Graham Warwick, Darpa Justifies Sticking With Lockheed For Lrasm Follow-on,
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 21, 2014: 1-2; Jason Sherman, Navy Sets $1.3B Plan To Adopt LRASM,
Delays Plan For OASuW Competition, Inside the Navy, March 17, 2014.
134
See, for example, Dave Majumdar, Navy to Hold Contest for New Anti-Surface Missile, USNI News
(http://news.usni.org), March 13, 2014; Jason Sherman, Navy Sets $1.3B Plan To Adopt LRASM, Delays Plan For
OASuW Competition, Inside the Navy, March 17, 2014.

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Next-Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW)


The Navy has begun development work on a Next-Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW)
that is to have more lethality and survivability than the Navys current Tomahawk ship-launched
land attack cruise missile.135 NGLAW is to enter service years from now. In the meantime, the
Navy will continue to manage and recertify its inventory of Tomahawk missiles. A proposal in the
Navys FY2015 budget to reduce the procurement rate of new Tomahawks from 196 missiles in
FY2014 to 100 missiles in FY2015, and to procure no more Tomahawks after FY2015, has
become an oversight issue for Congress.136

Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile


Another potential issue for Congress is whether the Navy should develop and procure a longrange air-to-air missile for its carrier-based strike fighters. Such a weapon might improve the
survivability of Navy carrier-based strike fighters in operations against Chinese aircraft armed
with capable air-to-air missiles, and help permit Navy aircraft carriers to achieve results while
remaining outside the ranges of Chinese A2/AD systems that can pose a threat to their
survivability.
During the Cold War, Navy F-14 carrier-based fighters were equipped with a long-range air-to-air
missile called the Phoenix. The F-14/Phoenix combination was viewed as key to the Navys
ability to effectively counter Soviet land-based strike aircraft equipped with long-range ASCMs
that appeared designed to attack U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. A successor to the Phoenix called the
Advanced Air-to-Air Missile (AAAM) was being developed in the late 1980s, but the AAAM
program was cancelled as a result of the end of the Cold War. The Navy today does not have a
long-range air-to-air missile, and DOD has announced no program to develop such a weapon.

Air-Sea Battle Concept


Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Air-Sea Battle concept (ASB), which
has become a matter of some controversy. While there seems to be little disagreement over the
goal within the ASB effort to improve the joint operating effectiveness U.S. naval and Air Force
units, there is controversy about the effectiveness of the ASB concept as a means of deterring
potential Chinese aggression and reassuring U.S. allies and partners in the region, and about
whether attacking land targets on the Chinese mainlandsomething that some observers believe
to be an element of the ASBwould pose an unwanted degree of risk of escalating a smaller
crisis or conflict into a larger one. As an alternative to ASB, some observers have advocated an
alternative military strategy, which they call Offshore Control, that would not involve attacking
land targets in China.137 Other observers have defended ASB and/or criticized Offshore
Control.138

135
See, for example, Kris Osborn, Navy Seeks Next Generation Tomahawk, DOD Buzz (www.dodbuzz.com), March
27, 2014.
136
See, for example, Adam Kredo, Obama to Kill Tomahawk, Hellfire Missile Programs, Washington Free Beacon
(http://freebeacon.com), March 24, 2014; Sandra I. Erwin, Facing End of Tomahawk Production, Raytheon Plays
Industrial Base Card, National Defense (www.nationaldefensemagazine.org), April 2, 2014.
137
See, for example, T.X. Hammes and R.D. Hooker Jr., Americas Ultimate Strategy in a Clash with China, The
National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org), June 10, 2014. See also Erik Slavin, Analysts: Air-Sea Battle Concept
(continued...)

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Navys Ability to Counter Chinas ASBMs


Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navys ability to counter Chinas
ASBMs. Although Chinas projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a
game changer, that does not mean it cannot be countered. There are several potential
approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in
combination. The ASBM is not the first game changer that the Navy has confronted; the Navy
in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely
exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs.

Breaking the ASBMs Kill Chain


Countering Chinas projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e.,
hard-kill) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e.,
soft-kill) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing
ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack
various points in the ASBM kill chainthe sequence of events that needs to be completed to
carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and
localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM,
and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponents kill chain is an established method for countering an
opponents military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes
Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Forces deputy chief of staff for operations, plans,
and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that Weve taken [Chinas] kill
chains apart to the nth degree.139 In an interview published on January 14, 2013, Admiral
Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
In order for one to conduct any kind of attack, whether it is a ballistic missile or cruise
missile, you have got to find somebody. Then, you have got to make sure it is somebody you
want to shoot. Then, youve got to track it, youve got to hold that track. Then, you deliver
the missile. We often talk about what I would call hard killknocking it down, a bullet on a
bulletor soft kill; there is jamming, spoofing, confusing; and we look at that whole
spectrum of operations.
And frankly, it is cheaper in the left-hand side of that spectrum.140

To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as
controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for
(...continued)
Carries Risks in Possible Conflict with China, Stars and Stripes (www.stripes.com), September 28, 2014.
138
See, for example, Bill Dries, How to Have a Big Disastrous War with China, The National Interest
(http://nationalinterest.org), June 27, 2014. See also Wendell Minnick, China Threat: Air-Sea Battle vs. Offshore
Control? Defense News (www.defensenews.com), June 23, 2014; Chris Mclachlan, The Political Perils of Offshore
Balancing, The Diplomat (http://thediplomat.com), October 21, 2014.
139
David A. Fulghum, USAF: Slash And Burn Defense Cuts Will Cost Missions, Capabilities, Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, September 30, 2011: 6.
140
Interview: Adm. Jon Greenert, Defense News, January 14, 2013: 30. The reference to the left-hand side of that
spectrum might be a reference to soft kill measures.

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China to detect, identify, and track those ships.141 The Navy could acquire weapons and systems
for disabling or jamming Chinas long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for
attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying
and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in
flight include developing and procuring improved versions of the SM-3 BMD interceptor missile
(including the planned Block IIA version of the SM-3), accelerating the acquisition of the SeaBased Terminal (SBT) interceptor (the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV terminal-phase
BMD interceptor),142 accelerating development and deployment of the electromagnetic rail gun
(EMRG), and accelerating the development and deployment of shipboard high-power free
electron lasers (FELs) and solid state lasers (SSLs). Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs
as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic
warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbonfiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBMs terminal-guidance radar.143
An August 9, 2014, press report states that Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander, U.S. Pacific
Fleet, in response to a question about the threat posed to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers by Chinas
ASBMs, stated, We are very well aware of the capabilities that China has and is trying to
develop and Im very confident we would be able to carry out any mission that we have to. The
press report states that Harris said he could not state the nature of the technology used to counter
the ASBM, but that We work in it every day. Im confident of our ability to defeat any Chinese
missile threat and to be able to do whatever we need to do.144
A May 29, 2014, press report states:
When the next-generation aircraft carrier CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford takes to the seas later this
decade, it will face one of the most dangerous threats to the U.S. maritime military
behemoththe Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).
But U.S. Navy officials remain confident that the technological improvements to the Ford as
well as the other ships shielding the carrier from attack should be able to protect the vessel....
141

For a journal article discussing actions by the Navy during the period 1956-1972 to conceal the exact locations of
Navy ships, see Robert G. Angevine, Hiding in Plain Sight, The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations Under EMCON,
1956-1972, Naval War College Review, Spring 2011: 79-95. See also Jonathan F. Sullivan, Defending the Fleet From
Chinas Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deceptions Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense, A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, April 15, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011 at
http://gradworks.umi.com/1491548.pdf; Jon Solomon, Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Reexamining the Late
Cold War Struggle Between Soviet Maritime Reconnaissance and U.S. Navy Countertargeting, Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 27, 2014; John Solomon, Deception and the Backfire
Bomber, Part II, Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 28, 2014; John Solomon,
Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III, Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net),
October 29, 2014; John Solomon, Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV, Information Dissemination
(www.informationdissemination.net), October 30, 2014.
142
For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the SBT, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
143
Regarding the option of systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, Thomas J. Culora, The Strategic
Implications of Obscurants, Naval War College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84; Scott Tait, Make Smoke! U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 58-63. Regarding radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, see 7th Fleet Tests Innovative
Missile Defense System, Navy News Services, June 26, 2014; Kevin McCaney, Navys Carbon-Fiber Clouds Could
Make Incoming Missiles Miss Their Targets, Defense Systems (http://defensesystems.com), June 27, 2014.
144
Greg Sheridan, Chinas Military Provocation in The Pacific An Accident Waiting to Happen, The Australian,
August 9, 2014.

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... zeroing in on a carrier with such a missile is more difficult than it seems, says Rear Adm.
Michael Manazir, director of air warfare.
Eyeing the Ford from the ships flight deck, he notes: People think this is a big target. But
they have to get to the carrier and then discern that it is a carrier.
In addition, the U.S. Navy has a layered network of defensive systems.
Its a series of systems, Manazir explains during a recent exclusive tour of the Ford at the
Newport News Shipbuilding yard in the Tidewater part of Virginia. We want to attack it on
the left side of the kill chain.145

A May 21, 2014, press report states:


When asked whether a new Chinese anti-ship weaponthe DF-21D missilemight render
carriers obsolete in the Pacific, [Admiral Jonathan] Greenert [the Chief of Naval Operations]
said the U.S. is developing countermeasures to protect the prized vessels from the weapon
that is sometimes referred to as a carrier killer.
Its a good weapon that theyve developed. But theres nothing that doesnt have
vulnerabilities, and we continue to pursue ideas in that regard. Were working quite
feverishly on that, and Im pretty comfortable with where we can operate our carriers,
Greenert said.
The Navy chief said the U.S. has lots of intelligence on the Chinese weapon, but wouldnt
elaborate, nor would he discuss what specific steps the military is taking to counter it.
In the future, Greenert said that new electromagnetic weapons, unmanned aircraft and other
standoff weapons will help mitigate the threat of anti-ship missiles.146

An April 24, 2014, press report states that


The U.S. Navy has no silver-bullet concept to defeat the Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic
missile (ASBM), but will rather rely on a network of defensive systems to do the job.
Its a series of systems, Rear Adm. Michael Manazir, director of air warfare, tells the
Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN). We want to attack it on the left side of the
kill chain.
During an exclusive tour and interview this month of the next-generation aircraft carrier
CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford while under construction at the Newport News Shipbuilding yard in
Virginia, Manazir says, People think this is a big target. But they have to get to the carrier
and then discern that it is a carrier.
The Navys various networks of defensive shields aboard the carrier, and other vessels
elsewhere, will make that very difficult, he says.147

145
Michael Fabey, Ford Carriers Sport New Radars To Deflect Threats, Aviation Week & Space Technology
(http://aviationweek.com), May 29, 2014.
146
Jon Harper, Navys Top Admiral: Reducing Carrier Fleet Would Burn Out Sailors, Ships, Stars and Stripes
(www.stripes.com), May 21, 2014.
147
Michael Fabey, U.S. Navy Looks To Series of Systems To Counter Chinese Anti-Ship Missile, Aerospace Daily
(continued...)

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A March 16, 2012, blog entry states:


China has developed a missile that would turn an aircraft carrier into a 2-billion-dollar hulk
of twisted metal, flame, and dead sailors. Publicly, the U.S. Navy downplays its importance.
Privately, the sailors are working out several different options to kill it before it kills them.
Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the Navys top officer, explained to reporters during a Friday
[March 16] breakfast meeting that the Navy has ways of exploiting some of the DF-21D
missiles formidable technical capabilities, even before opening fire and praying.
As Greenert sees it, theres a menu of options. Some involve convincing the DF-21D that the
carrier is in a different place. Others involve masking the electronic emissions of the carrier.
Still others are more traditionallike blasting the missile out of the salty air.
You want to spoof them, preclude detection, jam them, shoot them down if possible, get
them to termination, confuse it, Greenert said. The concept is end-to-end, and the
capabilities therein [are] what were pursuing
First up: the missiles guidance systems. This is where Greenert wants the Navys investment
in jamming and electronic warfare generally to pay off.
If whatever is launched has a seeker, can you jam it? Greenert mused. Yes, no, maybe so?
What would it take to jam it? For now, thats a job for the flying, jamming Growlers which
messed with Moammar Gadhafis anti-aircraft systems in Libya last year. Later on, the Navy
will have a next-generation jammer, also built onto some of its jets, which it wants to use to
infect enemy systems with malware. Alternatively or in supplement, the strike group would
go radio silent, to stop the missile from homing in on its electronic emissions.
Then comes the more popular part, Greenert said: shooting the missile down. The Aegis
missile-defense cruisers included in an aircraft carrier strike group would be tasked with that
over the next decade. Afterward, the Navy wants to use giant shipboard lasers to burn
through incoming missiles. But its by no means clear the Navy really can clear all the
technological obstacles to oceanic laser warfare by its mid-2020s deadline.
And shooting down this new missile isnt a guaranteed proposition. When do you have to
engage it? On the way up? Mid-course? Terminal? Greenert said.
His answer: all of the above. We call it links of a chain, Greenert said. We want to break
as many links as possible. Navy weapons have to be ready to disable the DF-21Deither
through jamming it or shooting itduring all phases of its trajectory.
Theres also something that Greenert didnt mention: he has time on his side.
The Navy conceded in December 2010 that the DF-21D had reached initial operating
capability. But its intelligence chief quickly added that blowing up a carrier is still past
Chinas means. Hitting a moving object is difficult. Testing the thing at sea is too. Then
China needs to integrate the missile into its general surface warfare plans. And after all that
come the countermeasures Greenert outlined. Solving all that takes time.

(...continued)
& Defense Report, April 24, 2014: 5.

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And while China works on that, the Navy will continue its own development. If Greenert is
freaked out by a weapon that can punch through one of the most potent symbols of American
power, hes doing a good job of hiding it in public.148

Endo-Atmospheric Target for Simulating DF-21D ASBM


A December 2011 report from DODs Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)the
DOT&E offices annual report for FY2011states the following in its section on test and
evaluation resources:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Target
A threat representative Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) target for operational open-air
testing has become an immediate test resource need. China is fielding the DF-21D ASBM,
which threatens U.S. and allied surface warships in the Western Pacific. While the Missile
Defense Agency has exo-atmospheric targets in development, no program currently exists
for an endo-atmospheric target. The endo-atmospheric ASBM target is the Navys
responsibility, but it is not currently budgeted. The Missile Defense Agency estimates the
non-recurring expense to develop the exo-atmospheric target was $30 million with each
target costing an additional $30 million; the endo-atmospheric target will be more expensive
to produce according to missile defense analysts. Numerous Navy acquisition programs will
require an ASBM surrogate in the coming years, although a limited number of targets (3-5)
may be sufficient to validate analytical models.149

A February 28, 2012, press report stated:


Numerous programs will require a test missile to stand in for the Chinese DF-21D,
including self-defense systems used on our carriers and larger amphibious ships to counter
anti-ship ballistic missiles, [Michael Gilmore, the Pentagons director of operational test
and evaluation] said in an e-mailed statement....
No Navy target program exists that adequately represents an anti-ship ballistic missiles
trajectory, Gilmore said in the e-mail. The Navy has not budgeted for any study,
development, acquisition or production of a DF-21D target, he said.
Lieutenant Alana Garas, a Navy spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that the service
acknowledges this is a valid concern and is assessing options to address it. We are unable to
provide additional details....
Gilmore, the testing chief, said his office first warned the Navy and Pentagon officials in
2008 about the lack of an adequate target. The warnings continued through this year, when
the testing office for the first time singled out the DF-21D in its annual public report....

148
Spencer Ackerman, How To Kill Chinas Carrier-Killer Missile: Jam, Spoof And Shoot, Danger Room
(Wired.com), March 16, 2012, accessed online at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/03/killing-chinas-carrierkiller/. The word [are], in brackets, as in original. See also Otto Kreisher, Chinas Carrier Killer: Threat and
Theatrics, Air Force Magazine, December 2013: 44-47; and Whos Afraid of the DF-21D, Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 10, 2013.
149
Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Annual Report, December 2011, p.
294.

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The Navy can test some, but not necessarily all, potential means of negating anti-ship
ballistic missiles, without a test target, Gilmore said.150

The December 2012 report from DOT&E (i.e., DOT&Es annual report for FY2012) did not
further discuss this issue; a January 21, 2013, press report stated that this is because the details of
the issue are classified.151

Navys Ability to Counter Chinas Submarines


Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navys ability to counter Chinas
submarines. Some observers raised questions about the Navys ability to counter Chinese
submarines following an incident on October 26, 2006, when a Chinese Song-class submarine
reportedly surfaced five miles away from the Japan-homeported U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty
Hawk (CV-63), which reportedly was operating at the time with its strike group in international
waters in the East China Sea, near Okinawa.152
Improving the Navys ability to counter Chinas submarines could involve further increasing
ASW training exercises, procuring platforms (i.e., ships and aircraft) with ASW capabilities,
and/or developing technologies for achieving a new approach to ASW that is distributed and
sensor-intensive (as opposed to platform-intensive).153 Countering wake-homing torpedoes more
effectively could require completing development work on the Navys new anti-torpedo torpedo
(ATT) and putting the weapon into procurement.154
150
Tony Capaccio, Navy Lacks Targets To Test U.S. Defenses Against China Missile, Bloomberg Government
(bgov.com), February 28, 2012. See also Christopher J. Castelli, DOD IG Questions Realism Of Targets Used To
Simulate Enemy Missiles, Inside Missile Defense, March 21, 2012.
151
Christopher J. Castelli, DOD Testing Chief Drops Public Discussion Of ASBM Target Shortfall, Inside the Navy,
January 21, 2013.
152
Bill Gertz, China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S. Fleet, Washington Times, November 13, 2006: 13; Philip Creed,
Navy Confirms Chinese Sub Spotted Near Carrier, NavyTimes.com, November 13, 2006; Bill Gertz, Defenses On
[sic] Subs To Be Reviewed, Washington Times, November 14, 2006; En-Lai Yeoh, Fallon Confirms Chinese Stalked
Carrier, NavyTimes.com, November 14, 2006; Bill Gertz, Admiral Says Sub Risked A Shootout, Washington Times,
November 15, 2006; Jeff Schogol, Admiral Disputes Report That Kitty Hawk, Chinese Sub Could Have Clashed,
Mideast Starts and Stripes, November 17, 2006.
153
Navy officials in 2004-2005 spoke of their plans for achieving distributed, sensor-intensive ASW architecture. (See
Otto Kreisher, As Underwater Threat Re-Emerges, Navy Renews Emphasis On ASW, Seapower, October 2004, p.
15, and Jason Ma, ASW Concept Of Operations Sees Sensor-Rich Way Of Fighting Subs, Inside the Navy,
February 7, 2005.) Such an approach might involve the use of networked sensor fields, unmanned vehicles, and
standoff weapons. (See Jason Ma, Autonomous ASW Sensor Field Seen As High-Risk Technical Hurdle, Inside the
Navy, June 6, 2005. See also Jason Ma, Navys Surface Warfare Chief Cites Progress In ASW Development, Inside
the Navy, January 17, 2005. More recent press reports discuss research on ASW concepts involving bottom-based
sensors, sensor networks, and unmanned vehicles; see Richard Scott, GLINT In the Eye: NURC Explores Novel
Autonomous Concepts For Future ASW, Janes International Defence Review, January 2010: 34-35; Richard Scott,
DARPA Goes Deep With ASW Sensor Network, Janes International Defence Review, March 2010: 13; Richard
Scott, Ghost In The Machine: DARPA Sets Course Towards Future Unmanned ASW Trail Ship, Janes Navy
International, April 2010: 10-11; Norman Friedman, The Robots Arrive, Naval Forces, No. IV, 2010: 40-42, 44, 46;
Bill Sweetman, Darpa Funds Unmanned Boat For Submarine Stalking, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January
6, 2011: 5; Richard Scott, Networked Concepts Look to Square the ASW Circle, Janes International Defence
Review, January 2011: 42-47; Richard Scott, DARPAs Unmanned ASW Sloop Concept Casts Lines, Janes Navy
International, January/February 2011: 5.) See also Jeremy Page, Underwater Drones Join Microphones to Listen for
Chinese Nuclear Submarines, Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com), October 24, 2014.
154
For articles discussing torpedo defense systems, including ATTs, see Richard Scott, Ships Shore Up, Janes
Defence Weekly, September 1, 2010: 22-23, 25, 27; Mike McCarthy, NAVSEA Seeks Industry Thoughts On Torpedo
(continued...)

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Navys Fleet Architecture


Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the Navys fleet architecture. Some
observers, viewing the anti-access aspects of Chinas naval modernization effort, including
ASBMs, ASCMs, and other anti-ship weapons, have raised the question of whether the U.S. Navy
should respond by shifting over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture featuring a
reduced reliance on carriers and other large ships and an increased reliance on smaller ships.155
Supporters of this option argue that such an architecture could generate comparable aggregate
fleet capability at lower cost and be more effective at confounding Chinese maritime anti-access
capabilities. Skeptics, including supporters of the currently planned fleet architecture, question
both of these arguments.156
Another question bearing on fleet architecture concerns the future role of Navy unmanned
vehicles in countering Chinese anti-access forces. A July 16, 2012, press report states:

(...continued)
Defense Systems, Defense Daily, November 29, 2011: 4-5.
155
See, for example, David C. Gompert, Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific, RAND, Santa
Monica (CA), 2013, 193 pp. (RR-151-OSD)
156
The question of whether the U.S. Navy concentrates too much of its combat capability in a relatively small number
of high-value units, and whether it should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, has been
debated at various times over the years, in various contexts. Much of the discussion concerns whether the Navy should
start procuring smaller aircraft carriers as complements or replacements for its current large aircraft carriers.
Supporters of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that the Navys current architecture,
including its force of 11 large aircraft carriers, in effect puts too many of the Navys combat-capability eggs into a
relatively small number of baskets on which an adversary can concentrate its surveillance and targeting systems and its
anti-ship weapons. They argue that although a large Navy aircraft carrier can absorb hits from multiple conventional
weapons without sinking, a smaller number of enemy weapons might cause damage sufficient to stop the carriers
aviation operations, thus eliminating the ships primary combat capability and providing the attacker with what is
known as a mission kill. A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would make it more difficult for
China to target the Navy and reduce the possibility of the Navy experiencing a significant reduction in combat
capability due to the loss in battle of a relatively small number of high-value units.
Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that large carriers and other large ships are
not only more capable, but proportionately more capable, than smaller ships, that larger ships are capable of fielding
highly capable systems for defending themselves, and that they are much better able than smaller ships to withstand the
effects of enemy weapons, due to their larger size, extensive armoring and interior compartmentalization, and extensive
damage-control systems. A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would be less capable or more
expensive than todays fleet architecture. Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue
could also argue that the Navy has already taken an important (but not excessive) step toward fielding a more
distributed fleet architecture through its plan to acquire 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), which are small, fast surface
combatants with modular, plug-and-flight mission payloads. (For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report
RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
The issue of Navy fleet architecture, including the question of whether the Navy should shift over time to a more highly
distributed fleet architecture, was examined in a report by DODs Office of Force Transformation (OFT) that was
submitted to Congress in 2005. OFTs report, along with two other reports on Navy fleet architecture that were
submitted to Congress in 2005, are discussed at length in CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative
Force Structure Studies of 2005Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The functions carried out by OFT
have since been redistributed to other DOD offices. See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., The New Navy Fighting Machine:
A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the
Composition of the United States Fleet, Monterey (CA), Naval Postgraduate School, August 2009, 68 pp.; Timothy C.
Hanifen, At the Point of Inflection, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 24-31; and the blog entry
available online at http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/06/navy-is-losing-narratives-battle.html.

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The Navy is eying potential investments in revolutionary unmanned systems with greater
autonomy than todays drones to counter advanced Chinese weapons capable of threatening
U.S. warships, according to draft guidance for a new assessment.
Although Defense Department and naval leaders have previously called for drones with
greater levels of autonomy, the specific pathways for the introduction of enabling
technologies have not yet been identified, states the draft terms of reference for the Naval
Research Advisory Committees planned review.157

Legislative Activity for FY2015


FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979)
House
Section 213 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4435) as reported by the
House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 113-446 of May 13, 2014) states:
SEC. 213. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR UNMANNED
CARRIER-LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE SYSTEM.
(a) Limitation- None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2015 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy, for
the unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike system may be obligated or
expended to award a contract for air vehicle segment development until a period of 15 days
has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits the report under
subsection (b).
(b) Report- Not later than December 31, 2014, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that
(1) certifies that a review of the requirements for air vehicle segments of the unmanned
carrier-launched surveillance and strike system is complete; and
(2) includes the results of such review.

Regarding the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS)
addressed in the above provision, H.Rept. 113-446 states:
Unmanned aerial system electronic attack demonstration
The budget request contained $7.8 million in PE 64376M for Marine Air-Ground Task Force
electronic warfare development, but included no funds for an unmanned aerial system (UAS)
electronic attack demonstration.

157

Christopher J. Castelli, Investments In Drone Autonomy Eyed To Counter Chinas A2/AD Weapons, Inside the
Navy, July 16, 2012.

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The committee notes that the Department of the Navy conducted a demonstration of an
unmanned MQ9 Reaper in a weapons and tactics instructor exercise at the Naval Air
Weapons Station China Lake, California, in October 2013, which included 86 aircraft, over
200 aircrew members and over 3,000 ground forces in a realistic threat environment. The
committee understands that the MQ9 was configured with a prototype stand-off jamming
system which was able to defeat early warning threat radars, allowing the F/A18 and AV
8B aircraft to penetrate the simulated enemy air defenses. The committee further notes that
the unmanned MQ9 Reaper would provide over 20 hours of on-station time, which is about
15 hours longer than manned aircraft with similar capabilities, and would require less
logistical support in a deployed location.
Based on the results of the October 2013 demonstration and the ability of a UAS to perform
an airborne electronic warfare mission, the committee encourages the Department of the
Navy to continue to pursue this capability by conducting a more sophisticated demonstration
in fiscal year 2015 that would include multiple UAS electronic attack aircraft with a UAS
mission package that includes electronic attack, electronic support measures and
communication features. (Page 65)

Section 1232 of H.R. 4435 as reported states:


SEC. 1232. MODIFICATIONS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Matters To Be Included- Subsection (b) of section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is
amended
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (10) through (20) as paragraphs (11) through (21),
respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
`(10) The developments in maritime law enforcement capabilities and organization of the
Peoples Republic of China, focusing on activities in contested maritime areas in the South
China Sea and East China Sea. Such analyses shall include an assessment of the nature of
Chinas maritime law enforcement activities directed against United States allies and
partners. Such maritime activities shall include activities originating or suspect of originating
from China and shall include government and nongovernment activities that are believed to
be sanctioned or supported by the Chinese government..
(b) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act and apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under
subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, as so amended, on or after that date.

Section 1234 of H.R. 4435 as reported states:


SEC. 1234. REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MUNITIONS STRATEGY FOR
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND.
(a) Report Required- Not later than April 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report on the munitions strategy for the United States
Pacific Command, including an identification of munitions requirements, an assessment of

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munitions gaps and shortfalls, and necessary munitions investments. Such strategy shall
cover the 10-year period beginning with 2015.
(b) Elements- The report on munitions strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An identification of current and projected munitions requirements, by class or type.
(2) An assessment of munitions gaps and shortfalls, including a census of current munitions
capabilities and programs, not including ammunition.
(3) A description of current and planned munitions programs, including with respect to
procurement, research, development, test and evaluation, and deployment activities.
(4) Schedules, estimated costs, and budget plans for current and planned munitions
programs.
(5) Identification of opportunities and limitations within the associated industrial base.
(6) Identification and evaluation of technology needs and applicable emerging technologies,
including with respect to directed energy, rail gun, and cyber technologies.
(7) An assessment of how current and planned munitions programs, and promising
technologies, may affect existing operational concepts and capabilities of the military
departments or lead to new operational concepts and capabilities.
(8) An assessment of programs and capabilities by other countries to counter the munitions
programs and capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States, not including with
respect to ammunition, and how such assessment affects the munitions strategy of each
military department.
(9) Any other matters the Secretary determines appropriate.
(c) Form- The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or unclassified
form.

Section 1236 of H.R. 4435 as reported states:


SEC. 1236. MARITIME CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO
REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY.
(a) Report Required- Not later than April 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to the congressional
defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that contains the following:
(1) A description and assessment of the posture and readiness of elements of the Chinese
Peoples Liberation Army expected or available to threaten the maritime or territorial
security of Taiwan, including an assessment of
(A) the undersea and surface warfare capabilities of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy in
the littoral areas in and around the Taiwan Strait;
(B) the amphibious and heavy sealift capabilities of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy;

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(C) the capabilities of the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force to establish air dominance
over Taiwan; and
(D) the capabilities of the Peoples Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps to suppress or
destroy the forces of Taiwan necessary to defend the security of Taiwan.
(2) A description and assessment of the posture and readiness of elements of the armed
forces of Taiwan expected or available to maintain the maritime or territorial security of
Taiwan, including an assessment of
(A) the undersea and surface warfare capabilities of the navy of Taiwan;
(B) the land-based anti-ship cruise missile capabilities of Taiwan; and
(C) other anti-access or area-denial capabilities, such as mines, that contribute to the
deterrence of Taiwan against actions taken to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means.
(b) Form- The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or
unclassified form.
(c) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that
(1) the United States, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8), should
continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary
to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(2) the growth and modernization of the Peoples Liberation Army, including its focus on
`preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait [which] appears to remain the principal
focus and primary driver of Chinas military investment, as noted in the 2013 Office of the
Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the Peoples Republic of China, requires greater attention to the needed defense
capabilities of Taiwan; and
(3) the United States should consider opportunities to help enhance the maritime capabilities
and nautical skills of the Taiwanese navy that can contribute to Taiwans self-defense and to
regional peace and stability, including extending an invitation to Taiwan to participate in the
2014 Rim of the Pacific international maritime exercise in non-combat areas such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Section 1237 of H.R. 4435 as reported states:


SEC. 1237. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT ON COUNTERING ANTI-ACCESS AND
AREA-DENIAL STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Assessment Required(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of Defense shall enter into an agreement with an
independent entity to conduct an assessment of anti-access and area-denial strategies and
capabilities that pose a threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region and strategies to mitigate
such threats.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED- The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall
include

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(A) identification of anti-access and area-denial strategies and capabilities;


(B) assessment of gaps and shortfalls in the ability of the United States to address anti-access
and area-denial strategies and capabilities identified under subparagraph (A) and plans of the
Department of Defense to address such gaps and shortfalls;
(C) assessment of Department of Defense strategies to counter or mitigate anti-access and
area-denial strategies and capabilities identified under subparagraph (A); and
(D) any other matters the independent entity determines to be appropriate.
(b) Report Required(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than March 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report that includes the assessment and strategies
required under subsection (a) and any other matters the Secretary determines to be
appropriate.
(2) FORM- The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(c) Department of Defense Support- The Secretary of Defense shall provide the independent
entity described in subsection (a) with timely access to appropriate information, data, and
analysis so that the entity may conduct a thorough and independent assessment as required
under subsection (a).

H.Rept. 113-446 also states:


Next Generation Land Attack and Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare weapon development
The budget request contained $32.4 million in PE 24229N for Tomahawk and Next
Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) development. The budget request also
contained $194.3 million in Weapons Procurement, Navy for procurement of 100 Tomahawk
missiles, which is a decrease of 96 missiles from what had been planned for procurement in
the fiscal year 2014 budget request. The budget request also proposes to terminate
Tomahawk Block IV procurement beginning in fiscal year 2016. In addition, the budget
request contained $203.0 million in PE 64786N for development of Increment I and
Increment II of the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASUW) weapon.
The committee is concerned by the Secretary of the Navys recommendation to terminate
procurement in 2016 of the Nations only long-range, surface-launched land-attack cruise
missile production capability prior to finalizing concept development of NGLAW, which is
not planned to be operationally fielded until 2024 at the earliest. Furthermore, the committee
is concerned that the capability to recertify current inventory Block IV Tomahawk missiles
could be put at risk if the Secretary of the Navy decides to shutter the Tomahawk Block IV
production line in fiscal year 2016. The committee is also concerned that the Secretary has
not clearly articulated a medium- to long-range conventional cruise missile requirements and
capabilities strategy or roadmap that explains the bridge between production of current
missiles to the development, production, and fielding of OASUW and NGLAW. The
Secretary has also not clearly articulated how the missile requirements and capabilities differ
between OASUW and NGLAW in meeting combatant commander requirements, or the
reason that a separate missile is needed for OASUW and NGLAW in order to meet offensive
surface-attack mission requirements. Further, the Secretary has not clearly articulated how
the inventory stock of long-range cruise missiles will be replenished if the current stock of

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Tomahawk missiles is utilized to fulfill test, training, and warfighting requirements between
201624. The committee is also concerned that the Navy is well below all categories of
inventory requirements and is discouraged that the Navy is only using one category of
inventory requirements in stating that there is no risk by terminating Tomahawk Block IV
production in fiscal year 2016.
The recommendation to shutter the Tomahawk Block IV production line is further
compounded by the fact that OASUW Increment I is just beginning to transition to a
program of record, and OASUW Increment II is still in the concept definition and refinement
phase. The committee supports current efforts to develop an OASUW Increment I capability
to fulfill the urgent operational need of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and
encourages the Secretary to aggressively pursue fielding this capability.
Therefore, the committee is skeptical of the Secretary of the Navys decision to cease
production of Tomahawk Block IV in 2016. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to provide a report to the congressional defense committees in conjunction with the
submission of the budget request for fiscal year 2016, that articulates the following: (1) a 15year medium to long-range land attack cruise missile strategy and roadmap; (2) known or
anticipated shortfalls and capability gaps of current cruise missiles; (3) an explanation of
requirement differences between OASUW and NGLAW missile capabilities; (4) a transition
strategy from current production land-attack cruise missiles to recertification of current
inventory cruise missiles that discusses anticipated cost, schedule, and execution risks and
issues; and (5) the cost, schedule, and execution risk associated with replenishment of
current inventory cruise missiles that may be used for test, training, and operational
requirements in order to maintain a sufficient inventory of cruise missiles until NGLAW is
operationally fielded. The report may contain a classified annex or any other information that
the Secretary desires to convey to the congressional defense committees.
The committee recommends $32.4 million, the full amount requested, in PE 24229N for
Tomahawk and Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW) development. The
committee recommends $276.3 million, an increase of $82.0 million, in Weapons
Procurement, Navy for procurement of 196 Tomahawk missiles and to reduce risk to the
Tomahawk missile industrial base. Elsewhere in this Act, the committee includes a provision
that would authorize multi-year procurement authority for Tomahawk Block IV missiles if
the Secretary of the Navy determines during deliberations of the fiscal year 2016 budget
request that it is not prudent to shutter the production line at this time. The committee would
support the Secretarys decision to procure the maximum amount of additional missiles to
fully satisfy inventory requirements and bridge transition to Tomahawk Block IV
recertification and modernization in the most cost-effective manner possible, and especially
during periods of constrained fiscal resources. Finally, the committee recommends $203.0
million, the full amount requested, in PE 64786N for development of Increment I and
Increment II of the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare weapon. (Pages 61-63)

Senate
Section 1064 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2410) as reported by the
Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 113-176 of June 2, 2014) states:
SEC. 1064. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE FORCE
POSTURE OF ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC
COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) Independent Review-

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(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of Defense shall commission an independent review of the
United States Asia-Pacific re-balance, with a focus on policy issues that will be critical
during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, including the
national security interests and military strategy of the United States in the Asia-Pacific
region.
(2) CONDUCT OF REVIEW- The review conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be
conducted by an independent organization that has
(A) recognized credentials and expertise in maritime strategy and military affairs; and
(B) access to policy experts throughout the United States and from the Asia-Pacific region.
(3) ELEMENTS- The review conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the
following elements:
(A) An assessment of the current and planned United States force posture adjustments and
the impact of such adjustments on the strategy to re-balance to the Asia-Pacific region.
(B) An assessment of the risks to United States national security interests in the United
States Pacific Command area of responsibility during the 10-year period beginning on the
date of the enactment of this Act posed by potential adversaries or emerging technologies.
(C) An analysis of the willingness and capacity of allies, partners, and regional organizations
to contribute to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, including potential
required adjustments to United States military strategy based on that analysis.
(D) An evaluation of current and projected wide-area, long-range, persistent intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and capability gaps of the United States and its
partners.
(E) An analysis of regional ballistic missile capabilities and adequacy of regional and United
States missile defense plans and capabilities for the Asia-Pacific region.
(F) An appraisal of the Arctic ambitions of actors in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of
current and projected capabilities, including an analysis of the adequacy and relevance of the
Arctic Roadmap prepared by the Navy.
(G) An evaluation of partner capacity building efforts of the United States Pacific Command
in the context of current and projected threats with a focus on maritime domain awareness,
maritime security, and border security capabilities, including
(i) an examination of the capabilities and naval force posture of allies and partners of the
United States, with specific focus on current and projected submarine capabilities of United
States and regional actors and the implications for maritime security strategy;
(ii) an assessment of the advantages or disadvantages of the formation of an East Asian
maritime security partnership; and
(iii) a description of the role of multilateral organizations, such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, in reducing tensions and negotiating resolution of maritime
disputes.

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(H) The views of noted policy leaders and regional experts, including military commanders,
in the Asia-Pacific region.
(b) Report(1) SUBMISSION TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE- Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the independent organization that conducted the review
pursuant to subsection (a)(1) shall submit to the Secretary of Defense an unclassified report,
along with a classified annex, containing the findings of the review.
(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS- Not later than 90 days after the date of receipt of the
report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional
defense committees the report, together with any comments on the report that the Secretary
considers appropriate.

Section 1245 of S. 2410 as reported states:


SEC. 1245. REPORT ON MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY AND ANNUAL
BRIEFING ON MILITARY TO MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report Required(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that outlines the
strategy of the Department of Defense with regard to maritime security in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea that seeks to balance the interests of the United States, the
Peoples Republic of China, and other countries in the region.
(2) ELEMENTS- The report required by paragraph (1) shall outline the strategy described in
that paragraph and include the following:
(A) A description of any current or planned bilateral or regional maritime capacity building
initiatives in the South China Sea and the East China Sea region.
(B) An assessment of anti-access and area denial capabilities of the Peoples Republic of
China in the region, including weapons and technologies, and their impact on United States
maritime strategy in the region.
(C) An assessment of how the actions of the Peoples Republic of China in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea have changed the status quo with regard to competing territorial
and maritime claims in those seas.
(D) A detailed analysis and assessment of the manner in which military to military
engagements between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China facilitates a
reduction in potential miscalculation and tension in the South China Sea and the East China
Sea, including a specific description of the effect of such engagements on particular incidents
or interactions involving the Peoples Republic of China in those seas.
(E) A description of the naval modernization efforts of the Peoples Republic of China,
including both defense and law enforcement capabilities and the implications of such efforts
for United States maritime strategy in the region.

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(3) FORM- The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
(b) Briefings- Not later than May 15 each year, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the
congressional defense committees a briefing (in classified form, if appropriate) on the
following:
(1) An outline in detail of all of the planned and potential military to military engagements
between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China during the fiscal year
beginning in the year of such briefing, including the objectives of such engagements.
(2) An assessment of the military to military engagements between the United States and the
Peoples Republic of China during the fiscal year ending in the year preceding such briefing,
and during the first fiscal half year of the fiscal year of such briefing, including an
assessment of the success of such engagements in meeting the objectives of the Commander
of the United States Pacific Command for such engagements.

S.Rept. 113-176 states:


Tomahawk
The budget request included $194.3 million to procure 100 Tomahawk missiles. The future
years defense program envisions shutting down the Tomahawk production line after the
fiscal year 2015 procurement.
The Navy has been expending Tomahawk missiles on a fairly regular basis of more than 100
missiles per year. The committee believes that it would be imprudent to ramp down and
close Tomahawk missile production at this time.
Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $82.0 million to keep Tomahawk
production at the minimum sustaining rate of 196 missiles per year.
The committee is concerned about the Navys abrupt decision to truncate production. The
Tomahawk is combat-proven missile, having been used well over 2,000 times in the last two
decades, and has a proven operational track record and capability. The Navy provided some
limited information to support its proposal. However, the analysis supporting projected
inventories and usage rates to be expected during the remainder of this decade was
incomplete.
Prior to making any decision to terminate new production and transition to a mid-life
upgrade, the Navy must ensure the implications on production and recertification are fully
examined and understood.
The committee directs the Navy to provide, prior to submission of the fiscal year 2016
Presidents budget, its complete analysis of alternatives, including an assessment of nearterm and long-term threat analysis, impact on the industrial base and the needed timing of a
mid-life certification/upgrade of the current Tomahawk inventory. This analysis must clearly
show annual projected inventory usage, starting and ending inventory levels by fiscal year
and what is budgeted for Tomahawk, as well as for all related development and production
programs, with specific appropriation and line item/program element detail. The Navy
should provide this information in an unclassified report with an accompanying classified
annex. (Pages 18-19)

S.Rept. 113-176 also states:

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Offensive anti-surface warfare weapon development


The budget request included $202.9 million in PE 64786N for developing an offensive antisurface warfare (OASuW) weapon. This follows on an enacted funding level of $91.0
million in fiscal year 2013. The Navy hopes to use these funds to mature the development of
a science and technology development effort of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) that is seeking to demonstrate a variant of the Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile (JASSM) in an anti-ship mission set. DARPA has called this variant the
Long Range Anti-ship Missile, or LRASM.
In fiscal year 2013, the Navy had planned to release a request for proposal, award one or
more competitive prototyping contracts, and establish a government program office team.
In fiscal year 2014, it became clear that the Navy planned to adopt the DARPA LRASM
program without competition and to continue development of that missile, leading to fielding
of an air-launched version (increment 1) and surface-launched version (increment 2) of
LRASM missiles to be delivered initially by B1 bombers or F/A18 strike fighters. The
Senate report accompanying S. 1197 (S. Rept. 11344) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 directed the Navy to present a plan that would pursue
a more competitive approach, yield a program proceeding to a technology readiness level 6
before deciding on a particular technical solution.
For fiscal year 2015, the Navy plan would continue that same non-competitive approach, but
would field only a limited number of the air-launched version of the missile. The budget
request and the future years defense program (FYDP) envision spending roughly $1.5 billion
to acquire roughly 110 missiles.
The committee is concerned that this program was created to respond to an urgent combatant
commander need, but was done so with insufficient analyses of other available alternatives,
and with insufficient regard for the costs of locking in a long-term commitment under a noncompetitive program.
Therefore, the committee recommends a reduction of $202.9 million for the OASuW
program in fiscal year 2015, and directs the Navy to use available funds to conduct more
thorough analyses of alternatives for meeting combatant commander needs. (Page 41)

Final Version
Section 217 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979) states:
SEC. 217. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR UNMANNED
CARRIER-LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE SYSTEM.
(a) Limitation.None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
made available for fiscal year 2015 for research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy, for
the unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike system may be obligated or
expended to award a contract for air vehicle segment development until a period of 15 days
has elapsed following the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the
congressional defense committees a report that
(1) certifies that a review of the requirements for air vehicle segments of the unmanned
carrier-launched surveillance and strike system is complete; and
(2) includes the results of such review.

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(b) Additional Report.At the same time that the President submits to Congress the budget
for fiscal year 2017 under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of
the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
(1) identifies the cost and performance trade-offs that the Navy made in arriving at the set of
requirements for the air vehicle segments of the unmanned carrier-launched surveillance and
strike system, including with respect to strike capability in an anti-access or area denial
environment;
(2) addresses the derivation of requirements for the overall composition of the future carrier
air wing, including any contribution made to the intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities of carrier strike groups from non-carrier air wing forces, such as
the MQ-4C Triton;
(3) specifies how the Navy derived the plan for achieving the best mix of capabilities for the
carrier strike group air wing to conduct representative joint intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance strike campaigns in the 2030 timeframe, including how the unmanned
carrier-launched surveillance and strike system, F-35C aircraft, EA-18G aircraft, and the
aircraft that is proposed to replace the F/A-18E/F (FA-XX) would contribute to the overall
capability, including in an anti-access or area denial threat environment;
(4) defines the acquisition strategy for the unmanned carrier-launched surveillance and strike
system program and justifies any changes in such strategy from an acquisition strategy for a
traditional program that is consistent with Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02; and
(5) establishes a formal acquisition program cost and schedule baseline to allow the Navy to
track unit costs and provide regular reports to Congress on cost, schedule, and performance
progress.

Regarding Section 217, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979 states:
Limitation on availability of funds for Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance
and Strike system (sec. 217)
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 213) that would prevent obligation of any Navy
research and development funds for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance
and Strike (UCLASS) to award a contract for the air vehicle segment until the Secretary of
Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report that: (1) certifies that a
review of the requirements for air vehicle segments of the unmanned carrier-launched
surveillance and strike system is complete; and (2) includes the results of such review.
The House report accompanying H.R. 4435 (H.Rept. 113-446) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 indicated that the current UCLASS air vehicle
segment requirements would not address the emerging anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
challenges to U.S. power projection that originally motivated creation of what became the
Navy UCLASS program. In particular, the House report indicated that a disproportionate
emphasis in the requirements on unrefueled endurance to enable continuous intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the carrier strike group (CSG), would
result in an aircraft with too little survivability and too small an internal weapons payload
capability.
The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

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The agreement includes this provision with an amendment that would require the Navy to
submit a report with the budget for fiscal year 2017 that would:
(1) Identify the cost and performance trade-offs the Navy made in arriving at the set of
requirements for the UCLASS air vehicle segment to include strike capability in an A2/AD
environment;
(2) Address the derivation of requirements for the overall composition of the future carrier
air wing, including any contribution to CSG ISR capability from noncarrier air wing forces,
such as the MQ4C Triton;
(3) Specify how the Navy derived the plan for achieving the best mix of capabilities for the
CSG air wing to conduct representative joint ISR-strike campaigns in the 2030 timeframe,
including how the UCLASS, F-35C, EA-18G, and the aircraft that is proposed to replace the
F/A-18E/F (FA-XX) would contribute to overall capability, including in an A2/AD threat
environment;
(4) Define the UCLASS programs acquisition strategy, and provide the justification for any
tailoring of that strategy that deviates from that of a traditional program, consistent with
DoDI 5000.02 policy; and
(5) Establish a formal acquisition program cost and schedule baseline, to allow the Navy to
track unit costs, and provide regular reports to Congress on cost, schedule and performance
progress.
We believe that the Secretary of Defense may submit a report that certifies the current set of
requirements and can proceed with the current program, or could decide to revisit the current
UCLASS requirements and conduct another review of costs and capabilities. The Navy may
have made an appropriate set of trade-offs between costs and capabilities in deriving a set of
requirements for UCLASS, but those trade-offs should be evaluated in the context of the
overall CSG capability, not on the basis of individual capabilities of weapons systems or an
unconstrained budget. (pdf pages 22-23 of 513)

Section 1251 of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1251. STRATEGY TO PRIORITIZE UNITED STATES DEFENSE INTERESTS IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) Required Report.
(1) In general.Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that
contains the strategy of the Department of Defense to prioritize United States defense
interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(2) Matters to be included.The report required by paragraph (1) shall address the
following:
(A) United States national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(B) The security environment, including threats to global and regional United States national
security interests emanating from the Asia-Pacific region, including efforts by the Peoples
Republic of China to advance their national interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

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(C) Regional multilateral institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN).
(D) Bilateral security cooperation relationships, including military-to-military engagements
and security assistance.
(E) United States military presence, posture, and capabilities supporting the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region.
(F) Humanitarian and disaster relief response capabilities.
(G) International rules-based structures.
(H) Actions the Department of Defense could take, in cooperation with other Federal
agencies, to advance United States national security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
(I) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate.
(3) Form.The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(b) Resources.The report required by subsection (a)(1) shall be informed by the results of
the integrated, multi-year planning and budget strategy for a rebalancing of United States
policy in Asia submitted to Congress pursuant to section 7043(a) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76; 128 Stat. 533)).
(c) Annual Budget.The President, acting through the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, shall ensure that the annual budget submitted to Congress under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, clearly highlights programs and projects that are
being funded in the annual budget of the United States Government that relate to the strategy
required by subsection (a)(1) and the integrated strategy referred to in subsection (b).

Section 1252 of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1252. MODIFICATIONS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Matters To Be Included.Subsection (b)(14) of section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is
amended by striking ``their response and inserting ``their capabilities, organizational
affiliations, roles within Chinas overall maritime strategy, activities affecting United States
allies and partners, and responses.
(b) Effective Date.The amendment made by this section takes effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act and applies with respect to reports required to be submitted under
subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000 on or after that date.

Section 1254 of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1254. REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MUNITIONS STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND.

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(a) Report Required.Not later than April 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report on the munitions strategy of the United States
Pacific Command to address deficiencies in the ability of the United States Pacific
Command to execute major operational plans.
(b) Elements.The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An identification of current and projected critical munitions requirements, including as
identified in the most-recent future-years defense program submitted to Congress by the
Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code.
(2) An assessment of
(A) significant munitions gaps and deficiencies; and
(B) munitions capabilities and necessary munitions investments to address identified gaps
and deficiencies.
(3) A description of current and planned munitions programs to address munitions gaps and
deficiencies identified in paragraph (2), including with respect to
(A) research, development, test, and evaluation efforts;
(B) cost, schedule, performance, and budget, to the extent such information is available; and
(C) known industrial base issues.
(4) An assessment of infrastructure deficiencies or needed enhancements to ensure adequate
munitions storage and munitions deployment capability.
(5) Any other matters concerning the munitions strategy of the United States Pacific
Command the Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate.
(c) Form.The report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified or
unclassified form.

Section 1256 of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1256. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON TAIWAN AND ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY.
(a) Sense of Congress.It is the sense of Congress that the United States reaffirms its
security commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) as the cornerstone of
United States relations with Taiwan and as a key instrument of peace, security, and stability
in the Taiwan Strait since the enactment of such Act in 1979.
(b) Report Required.Not later than December 1, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to the congressional
defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the self-defense capabilities
of Taiwan.
(c) Elements.The report required by subsection (b) shall contain the following:

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(1) A description of the key assumptions made regarding the impact of the Chinese Peoples
Liberation Army on the maritime or territorial security of Taiwan, including the Chinese
Peoples Liberation Army's
(A) undersea and surface warfare capabilities in the littoral areas in and around the Taiwan
Strait;
(B) amphibious and heavy sealift capabilities;
(C) capabilities to establish air dominance over Taiwan; and
(D) capabilities of the Second Artillery Corps.
(2) An assessment of the force posture, capabilities, and readiness of the armed forces of
Taiwan for maintaining the maritime or territorial security of Taiwan, including an
assessment of Taiwan's
(A) undersea and surface warfare capabilities;
(B) air and land-based capabilities;
(C) early warning and command and control capabilities; and
(D) other deterrent, anti-access and area-denial capabilities, or asymmetric capabilities that
could contribute to Taiwans self-defense.
(3) Recommendations for further security cooperation and assistance efforts between Taiwan
and the United States.
(4) Any other matters the Secretary determines to be appropriate.
(d) Form.The report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in classified or
unclassified form.
(e) Nonduplication of Efforts.If any information required under subsection (c) has been
included in another report or notification previously submitted to Congress as required by
law, the Secretary of Defense may provide a list of such reports and notifications at the time
of submitting the report required by subsection (b) in lieu of including such information.

Section 1257 of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1257. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE ABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL STRATEGIES,
CAPABILITIES, AND OTHER KEY TECHNOLOGIES OF POTENTIAL
ADVERSARIES.
(a) Assessment Required.
(1) In general.The Secretary of Defense shall enter into an agreement with an independent
entity to conduct an assessment of the ability of the Department of Defense to counter antiaccess and area-denial strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies of potential
adversaries.

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(2) Matters to be included.The assessment required under paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A) An assessment of anti-access and area-denial trategies, capabilities, and other key
technologies of potential adversaries during each of the fiscal year periods described in
paragraph (3) that would represent a significant challenge to deployed forces and systems of
the United States military, including an assessment of the extent to which such strategies,
capabilities, and other key technologies could affect United States military operations.
(B) An assessment of gaps and deficiencies in the ability of the Department of Defense to
address anti-access and area-denial strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies
described in subparagraph (A), including an assessment of the adequacy of current strategies,
programs, and investments of the Department of Defense.
(C) Recommendations for adjustments in United States policy and strategy, force posture,
investments in capabilities, systems and technologies, and changes in business and
management processes, or other novel approaches to address gaps and deficiencies described
in subparagraph (B), or to restore, maintain, or expand United States military technological
advantages, particularly in those areas in which potential adversaries are closing gaps or have
achieved technological superiority with respect to the United States.
(D) Any other matters the independent entity determines to be appropriate.
(3) Fiscal year periods described.The fiscal year periods described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Fiscal years 2015 through 2019.
(B) Fiscal years 2020 through 2030.
(C) Fiscal years 2031 and thereafter.
(b) Report Required.
(1) In general.Not later than March 1, 2016, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report that includes the assessment required under
subsection (a) and any other matters the Secretary determines to be appropriate.
(2) Form.The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
(c) Department of Defense Support.The Secretary of Defense shall provide the
independent entity described in subsection (a) with timely access to appropriate information,
data, resources, and analysis so that the entity may conduct a thorough and independent
assessment as required under subsection (a).

Regarding Section 1257, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979 states:
Independent assessment of the ability of the Department of Defense to counter anti-access
and area-denial strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies of potential adversaries
(sec. 1257)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 221) that would require the
Secretary of Defense to task the Defense Science Board or other independent group to

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examine the potential specific challenges to U.S. military technological superiority within
the next 10 years, and the specific planned responses by the Department of Defense (DOD)
to meet these challenges.
The House bill contained a similar provision (sec. 1237) that would require the Secretary of
Defense to enter into an agreement with an independent entity to conduct an assessment of
anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) strategies and capabilities that pose a threat to security in
the Asia-Pacific region and strategies to mitigate such threats.
The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that would require the
Secretary of Defense to task an independent entity to conduct an assessment of the ability of
the DOD to counter A2AD strategies, capabilities, and other key technologies that could be
implemented by potential adversaries.
In the annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the
Peoples Republic of China 2014, the Department of Defense notes that China continues to
sustain investments in key anti-access and area denial capabilities to deter or counter thirdparty intervention in the region. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics has warned that Americas technological superiority is not
assured, and that the Department of Defense is being challenged in ways that I have not
seen for decades, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. We share this concern and believe
that an independent assessment could help focus the Departments investments and strategic
thinking on these challenges.
We remain concerned by questions regarding the relative U.S. advantages in technological
capabilities, which could be undercut as advanced technologies continue to proliferate. The
potential for greater technological parity among adversaries carries the risk of U.S. military
forces operating without the traditional level of overmatch needed to succeed swiftly in a
contingency, which raises further questions about the impact that the loss of technological
superiority would have on the freedom of U.S. action in securing national security
objectives. These questions merit examination in the assessment.
Elsewhere in this Act, we require the Secretary of Defense to report on the Departments
munitions strategy for United States Pacific Command, based on a provision in the House
bill (sec. 1234). However, we believe that some of the reporting elements contained in the
House bill would be better suited to this independent assessment. These include assessing
other countries munitions programs, capabilities, and technologies that could challenge U.S.
deployed forces and military systems, and providing recommendations for how the United
States can counter these challenges or restore, maintain, or expand U.S. military
technological advantages in munitions.
We expect, as part of the information, data, resources, and analyses provided to the
independent entity, the Department also provide a baseline description of the counter-A2AD
policies, strategies, force posture, programs, capabilities, systems and technologies that are
currently in place or funded. (pdf pages 213-215 of 513)

Section 1259 of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1259. REPORT ON MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION.
(a) Report Required.Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives a report that outlines the strategy of the Department of Defense with regard

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to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, with particular emphasis on the South China
Sea and the East China Sea.
(b) Elements.The report required by subsection (a) shall outline the strategy described in
that subsection and include the following:
(1) An assessment of how the actions of the Peoples Republic of China in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea have affected the status quo with regard to competing territorial
and maritime claims and United States security interests in those seas.
(2) An assessment of how the naval and other maritime strategies and capabilities of the
Peoples Republic of China, including military and law enforcement capabilities, affect the
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
(3) An assessment of how anti-access and area denial strategies and capabilities of the
Peoples Republic of China in the Asia-Pacific region, including weapons and technologies,
affect the strategy.
(4) A description of any ongoing or planned changes in United States military capabilities,
operations, and posture in the Asia-Pacific region to support the strategy.
(5) A description of any current or planned bilateral or regional naval or maritime capacitybuilding initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region.
(6) An assessment of how the strategy leverages military-to-military engagements between
the United States and the Peoples Republic of China to reduce the potential for
miscalculation and tensions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, including a
specific description of the effects of such engagements on particular incidents or interactions
involving the Peoples Republic of China in those seas.
(7) Any other matters the Secretary may determine to be appropriate.
(c) Form.The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.

Regarding Section 1259, the joint explanatory statement for H.R. 3979 states:
Report on maritime security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region (sec. 1259)
The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 1245) that would require the
President to submit to the congressional defense committees a report that outlines the
strategy of the Department of Defense with regard to maritime security in the South China
Sea and East China Sea. The provision would also require an annual briefing on the military
to military engagement with the Peoples Republic of China.
The House bill contained no similar provision.
The agreement includes the Senate provision with a clarifying amendment.
We direct that, not later than March 15, 2015, the Secretary of Defense shall provide the
congressional defense committees a briefing (in classified form, if appropriate) on the
following:

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(1) An assessment of the military to military engagements between the United States and the
Peoples Republic of China in the previous 12 months, before March 15, 2015, including an
assessment of the success of such engagements in meeting the objectives of the Commander
of the United States Pacific Command for such engagements; and
(2) A detailed description of all planned and potential military to military engagements
between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China for the next 12 months, after
March 15, 2015, including the objectives of such engagements.

Section 1259A of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1259A. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES AND
EXERCISE PARTICIPATION.
It is the sense of Congress that
(1) the United States should consider opportunities to help enhance the maritime capabilities
and nautical skills of the Taiwanese navy that may contribute to Taiwans self-defense and to
regional peace and stability; and
(2) the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan should be afforded opportunities to
participate in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief portions of future multilateral
exercises, such as the Pacific Partnership, Pacific Angel, and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
exercises, to increase their respective capacities to conduct these types of operations.

Section 1259B of H.R. 3979 states:


SEC. 1259B. MODIFICATION OF MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION IN ANNUAL
REPORTS OF UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW
COMMISSION.
(a) Matters for Discussion.Section 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by P.L. 106-398; 22 U.S.C.
7002(c)(2)) is amended by striking subparagraphs (A) through (J) and inserting the following
new subparagraphs:
``(A) The role of the Peoples Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and other weapon systems (including systems and technologies of a dual use
nature), including actions the United States might take to encourage the Peoples Republic of
China to cease such practices.
``(B) The qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of United States production
activities to the Peoples Republic of China, including the relocation of manufacturing,
advanced technology and intellectual property, and research and development facilities, the
impact of such transfers on the national security of the United States (including the
dependence of the national security industrial base of the United States on imports from
China), the economic security of the United States, and employment in the United States,
and the adequacy of United States export control laws in relation to the Peoples Republic of
China.
``(C) The effects of the need for energy and natural resources in the Peoples Republic of
China on the foreign and military policies of the Peoples Republic of China, the impact of
the large and growing economy of the Peoples Republic of China on world energy and
natural resource supplies, prices, and the environment, and the role the United States can

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play (including through joint research and development efforts and technological assistance)
in influencing the energy and natural resource policies of the Peoples Republic of China.
``(D) Foreign investment by the United States in the Peoples Republic of China and by the
Peoples Republic of China in the United States, including an assessment of its economic
and security implications, the challenges to market access confronting potential United States
investment in the Peoples Republic of China, and foreign activities by financial institutions
in the Peoples Republic of China.
``(E) The military plans, strategy and doctrine of the Peoples Republic of China, the
structure and organization of the Peoples Republic of China military, the decision-making
process of the Peoples Republic of China military, the interaction between the civilian and
military leadership in the Peoples Republic of China, the development and promotion
process for leaders in the Peoples Republic of China military, deployments of the Peoples
Republic of China military, resources available to the Peoples Republic of China military
(including the development and execution of budgets and the allocation of funds), force
modernization objectives and trends for the Peoples Republic of China military, and the
implications of such objectives and trends for the national security of the United States.
``(F) The strategic economic and security implications of the cyber capabilities and
operations of the Peoples Republic of China.
``(G) The national budget, fiscal policy, monetary policy, capital controls, and currency
management practices of the Peoples Republic of China, their impact on internal stability
the Peoples Republic of China, and their implications for the United States.
``(H) The drivers, nature, and implications of the growing economic, technological, political,
cultural, people-to-people, and security relations of the Peoples Republic of Chinas with
other countries, regions, and international and regional entities (including multilateral
organizations), including the relationship among the United States, Taiwan, and the Peoples
Republic of China.
``(I) The compliance of the Peoples Republic of China with its commitments to the World
Trade Organization, other multilateral commitments, bilateral agreements signed with the
United States, commitments made to bilateral science and technology programs, and any
other commitments and agreements strategic to the United States (including agreements on
intellectual property rights and prison labor imports), and United States enforcement policies
with respect to such agreements.
``(J) The implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in the Peoples
Republic of China for its relations with the United States in economic and security policy, as
well as any potential impact of media control by the Peoples Republic of China on United
States economic interests.
``(K) The safety of food, drug, and other products imported from China, the measures used
by the Peoples Republic of China Government and the United States Government to
monitor and enforce product safety, and the role the United States can play (including
through technical assistance) to improve product safety in the Peoples Republic of China..
(b) Effective Date.The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to annual reports submitted under
section 1238(c) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001 after such date of enactment.

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FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113235)


Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 113-211 of July 17, 2014) on the
FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4870), stated:
Counter Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities.The Committee remains concerned about
the ability of U.S. naval forces to confront anti-access/area-denial environments in maritime
domains, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. U.S. Forces face complex and sophisticated
emerging ballistic and cruise missile threats that impact operational access and mission
effectiveness. The Committee urges the Office of Naval Research to conduct research efforts
on technologies that enhance the ability of U.S. naval forces to operate in heavily contested
environments. (Page 210)

S.Rept. 113-211 also stated:


Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike [UCLASS] System.The
Committee supports the request of $403,017,000 to continue the development of the
UCLASS program in three segments: the air segment, the control system and connectivity
segment, and the carrier segment. The Committee is concerned that the Navy is proceeding
with UCLASS development prior to the formal establishment of stable requirements.
For example, earlier this year, the Navy issued a second draft request for proposals for the air
segment, which included changes to the key performance parameters from the original draft.
The changes in requirements forced industry to significantly change their air vehicle designs
to better meet the amended parameters. This could have been avoided if the UCLASS
requirements had been formally established through a Joint Requirements Oversight Council
approved capability development document [CDD] prior to issuing a draft request for
proposal. The Committee is concerned that the Navy is avoiding basic acquisition practices
at the outset of a very large development program. To help ensure key performance
parameters are well established and understood in the future, the Committee directs the
Secretary of the Navy to obtain Joint Requirements Oversight Council approval of the
UCLASS CDD before issuing the final request for proposal. (Page 212)

Final Version
The explanatory statement for the FY2015 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L.
113-235 of December 16, 2014) states:
UNMANNED CARRIER LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE
SYSTEM
The agreement fully funds the fiscal year 2015 budget request of $403,017,000 to continue
the development of the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike
(UCLASS) system in three segments: the air segment, the control system and connectivity
segment, and the carrier segment. However, there is concern that the Navy is proceeding
with the development of the UCLASS system prior to the formal establishment of stable
requirements. The Joint Staff has provided a memorandum to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees stating that the requirements validation process will be
streamlined, where possible, and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will

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approve the capability development document prior to Milestone B. Therefore, the


agreement directs the Secretary of the Navy to confirm JROC validation of the key
performance parameters prior to issuing the final request for proposals for the development
program. (pdf page 244 of 368)

Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act (H.R. 4495)


H.R. 4495, introduced on April 28, 2014, is a bill to strengthen the United States commitment to
the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and for other purposes. The table of contents
of the bill, as presented in Section 1 of the bill, are as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act.
(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Congressional defense committees.
TITLE IMATTERS RELATING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Sec. 101. Report on Department of Defense munitions strategy for United States Pacific
Command.
Sec. 102. Establishment of Department of Defense unmanned systems office.
Sec. 103. Independent assessment on countering anti-access and area-denial capabilities in
the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 104. Assessment of the maritime balance of forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
Sec. 105. Missile defense cooperation.
Sec. 106. Department of Defense Space Security and Defense Program.
Sec. 107. Space situational awareness.
Sec. 108. Sense of Congress on access to training ranges within United States Pacific
Command area of responsibility.
Sec. 109. Sense of Congress on Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii.
Sec. 110. Special easement acquisition authority, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking
Sands, Kauai, Hawaii.
TITLE IIMATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS
Sec. 201. Statement of policy on maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Sec. 202. Sense of Congress reaffirming security commitment to Japan.


Sec. 203. Report on opportunities to strengthen relationship between the United States and
the Republic of Korea.
Sec. 204. Maritime capabilities of Taiwan and its contribution to regional peace and stability.
Sec. 205. Modifications to annual report on military and security developments involving the
Peoples Republic of China.

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Appendix A. January 2014 ONI Testimony


This appendix presents the prepared statement of Jesse L. Karotkin, ONIs Senior Intelligence
Officer for China, for a January 30, 2014, hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission on Chinas military modernization and its implications for the United States.
The text of the statement is as follows:
TRENDS IN CHINAS NAVAL MODERNIZATION
US CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
TESTIMONY
JESSE L. KAROTKIN
Introduction
At the dawn of the 21st Century, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) remained
largely a littoral force. Though Chinas maritime interests were rapidly changing, the vast
majority of its naval platforms offered very limited capability and endurance, particularly in
blue water. Over the past 15 years the PLA(N) has carried out an ambitious modernization
effort, resulting in a more technologically advanced and flexible force. This transformation is
evident not only the PLA(N)s Gulf of Aden counter-piracy presence, which is now in its
sixth year, but also in the navys more advanced regional operations and exercises. In
contrast to its narrow focus a just decade ago, the PLA(N) is evolving to meet a wide range
of missions including conflict with Taiwan, enforcement of maritime claims, protection of
economic interests, as well as counter-piracy and humanitarian missions.
The PLA(N) currently possesses approximately 77 principal surface combatants, more than
60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped
small combatants. Although overall order-of-battle has remained relatively constant in recent
years, the PLA(N) is rapidly retiring legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission
ships, equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors.
During 2013 alone, over fifty naval ships were laid down, launched, or commissioned, with a
similar number expected in 2014. Major qualitative improvements are occurring within naval
aviation and the submarine force, which are increasingly capable of striking targets hundreds
of miles from the Chinese mainland.
The introduction of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles across the force, coupled with nonPLA(N) weapons such as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and the requisite C4ISR
architecture to support targeting, will allow China to significantly expand its counterintervention capability further into the Philippine Sea and South China Sea over the next
decade. Many of these capabilities are designed specifically to deter or prevent U.S. military
intervention in the region.
Even if order-of-battle numbers remain relatively constant through 2020, the PLA(N) will
possess far more combat capability due to the rapid rate of acquisition coupled with
improving operational proficiency. Beijing characterizes its military modernization effort as
a three-step development strategy that entails laying a solid foundation by 2010, making
major progress by 2020, and being able to win informationized wars by the mid-21st
century. Although the PLA(N) faces capability gaps in some key areas, including deepwater anti-submarine warfare and joint operations, they have achieved their strong
foundation and are emerging as a well equipped, competent, and more professional force.

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A Multi-Mission Force
As China began devoting greater resources to naval modernization in the late 1990s, virtually
all of its ships, submarines were essentially single-mission platforms, poorly equipped to
operate beyond the support of land-based defenses. The PLA(N) has subsequently acquired
larger, multi-mission platforms, capable of long-distance deployments and offshore
operations. Chinas latest Defense White Paper, released in 2013, noted that the PLA(N)
endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its forces for comprehensive offshore
operations [and] develop blue water capabilities. The LUYANG III-class DDG (052D),
which will likely enter service this year, embodies the trend towards a more flexible force
with advanced air defenses and long-range strike capability.
China has made the most demonstrable progress in anti-surface warfare (ASuW), deploying
advanced, long-range ASCMs throughout the force. With the support from improved C4ISR,
this investment significantly expands the area that surface ships, submarines, and aircraft and
are able to hold at risk. The PLA(N) has also made notable gains in anti-air warfare (AAW),
enabling the recent expansion of blue-water operations. Just over a decade ago, just 20
percent of PLA(N) combatants were equipped with a rudimentary point air defense
capability. As a result, the surface force was effectively tethered to the shore. Initially relying
on Russian surface to air missiles (SAMs) to address this gap, newer PLA(N) combatants are
equipped with indigenous medium-to-long range area air defense missiles, modern combat
management systems, and air-surveillance sensors.
Although progress in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is less pronounced, there are indications
that the PLA(N) is committed to addressing this gap. More surface platforms are being
equipped with modern sonar systems, to include towed arrays and hangars to support
shipboard helicopters. Additionally, China appears to be developing aY-8 naval variant that
is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) boom, typical of ASW aircraft. Over
the next decade, China is likely to make gains in ASW, both from improved sensors and
operator proficiency.
Chinas submarine force remains concentrated almost exclusively on ASuW, with exception
of the JIN SSBN, which will likely commence deterrent patrols in 2014. The type-095
guided missile attack submarine, which China will likely construct over the next decade,
may be equipped with a land-attack capability. The deployment of LACMs on future
submarines and surface combatants could enhance Chinas ability to strike key U.S. bases
throughout the region, including Guam.
Naval aviation is also expanding its mission set and capability in maritime strike, maritime
patrols, anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning, and logistics. Although it will be
several years before the Liaoning aircraft carrier and its air wing can be considered fully
operational, this development signals a new chapter in Chinese naval aviation. By 2020,
carrier-based aircraft will be able to support fleet operations in a limited air-defense role.
Although some older air platforms remain in the inventory, the PLA(N) is clearly shifting to
a naval aviation force that is equipped to execute a wide variety of missions both near and far
from home.
PLA(N) Surface Force
China analysts face a perpetual challenge over how to accurately convey the size and
capability of Chinas surface force. As U.S. Navy CAPT Dale Rielage noted in [the U.S.
Naval Institute] Proceedings last year, key differences in the type of PLA(N) ships (in
comparison to the U.S. Navy) make it extremely difficult to apply a common basis for
comparing the order of battle. A comprehensive tally of ships that includes hundreds of small
patrol craft, mine warfare craft, and coastal auxiliaries provides a deceptively inflated picture

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of Chinas actual combat capability. Conversely, a metric based on ship displacement returns
the opposite effect, given the fact that many of Chinas modern ships, such as the 1,500 ton
JIANGDAO FFL, are small by U.S. standards, and equipped primarily for regional missions.
To accurately capture potential impact of Chinas naval modernization, it is necessary to
provide a more detailed examination of the ships and capabilities in relation to the missions
they are likely intended to fulfill. For the sake of clarity, the term modern is used in this
paper to describe a surface combatant that possesses a multi-mission capability, incorporates
more than a point air defense capability, and has the ability to embark a helicopter. As of
early 2014, the PLA(N) possesses 27 destroyers (17 of which are modern), 48 frigates (31 of
which are modern), 10 new corvettes, 85 modern missile-armed patrol craft, 56 amphibious
ships, 42 mine warfare ships, over 50 major auxiliary ships, and over 400 minor auxiliary
ships and service/support craft.
During the 1990s, China began addressing immediate capability gaps by importing modern
surface combatants, weapon systems, and sensors from Russia. Never intended as a longterm solution, the PLA(N) simultaneously sought to design and produce its own weapons
and platforms from a mix of imported and domestic technology. Less than a decade ago
Chinas surface force could be characterized as an eclectic mix of vintage, modern,
converted, imported, and domestic platforms utilizing a variety weapons and sensors and
with widely ranging capabilities and varying reliability. By the second decade of the 2000s,
surface ship acquisition had shifted entirely to Chinese designed units, equipped primarily
with Chinese weapons and sensors, though some engineering components and subsystems
remain imported or license-produced in-country.
Until recently, China tended to build small numbers of a large variety of ships, often
changing classes rapidly as advancements were made. In the period between 1995 and 2005
alone, China constructed or purchased major surface combatants and submarines in at least
different 15 classes. Using a combination of imported technology, reverse engineering, and
indigenous development, the PRC has rapidly narrowed the technology and capability gap
between itself and the worlds modern navies. Additionally, China is implementing much
longer production runs of advanced surface combatants and conventional submarines,
suggesting a greater satisfaction in their recent ship designs.
The PLA(N) surface force has made particularly strong gains in anti-surface warfare
(ASuW), with sustained development of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and
over-the-horizon targeting systems. Most PLA(N) combatants carry variants of the YJ-8A
ASCM (~65-120nm), while the LUYANG II-class (052D) destroyer is fitted with the YJ-62
(~120nm), and the newest class, LUYANG III-class destroyer is fitted with a new verticallylaunched ASCM. As these extended range weapons require sophisticated over-the-horizontargeting (OTH-T) capability to realize their full potential, China has invested heavily in
maritime reconnaissance systems at the national and tactical levels, as well as
communication systems and datalinks to enable the flow of accurate and timely targeting
data.
In addition to extended range ASCMs, the LUYANG III DDG, which is expected to enter
the force in 2014, may also be equipped with advanced SAMs, anti-submarine missiles, and
possibly an eventual land-attack cruise missile (LACM) from its multipurpose vertical
launch system. These modern, high-end combatants will likely provide increased weapons
stores and overall flexibility as surface action groups venture more frequently into blue water
in the coming years.
Further enabling this trend, Chinas surface force has achieved sustained progress in
shipboard air defense. The PLA(N) is retiring legacy destroyers and frigates that possess at
most a point air defense capability, while constructing newer ships with medium-to-long

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range area air defense missiles. The PLA(N) has produced a total of six LUYANG II DDG
with the HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile (~55nm), and the LUYANG III DDG will carry an
extended-range variant of the HHQ-9. At least fifteen JIANGKAI II FFGs (054A), with the
vertically-launched HHQ-16 (~20-40nm) are now operational, with more under construction.
Sometimes referred to as the workhorse of the PLA(N) these modern frigates have proven
instrumental in sustaining Chinas counter-piracy presence in the Gulf of Aden.
The new generation of destroyers and frigates utilize modern combat management systems
and air-surveillance sensors, such as the Chinese SEA EAGLE and DRAGON EYE phasedarray radars. While older platforms with little or no air defense capability remain in the
inventory, the addition of these newer units allows the PLA(N)s surface force to operate
with increased confidence outside of shore-based air defense systems, as one or two ships
can now provide air defense for the entire task group. Currently, approximately 65 percent of
Chinas destroyers and frigates are modern. By 2020 that figure will rise to an estimated 85
percent.
The PLA(N) has also phased out hundreds of Cold War-era missile patrol boats and patrol
craft as they shifted from a coastal defense orientation to a more active, offshore orientation
over the past two decades. During this period China acquired a modern coastal-defense and
area-denial capability with 60 HOUBEI class guided missile patrol boats. The HOUBEI
design integrates a high-speed wave-piercing catamaran hull, waterjet propulsion,
considerable signature-reduction features, and the YJ-8A ASCM. While not equipped for
coastal patrol duties, the HOUBEI is an essential component of the PLA(N)s ability to react
at short notice to threats within Chinas exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and slightly beyond.
In 2012 China began producing the new JIANGDAO class corvette (FFL), which, in contrast
to the HOUBEI, is optimized to serve as the primary naval patrol platform in Chinas EEZ
and potentially defend Chinas territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) and East
China Sea (ECS). The 1500-ton JIANGDAO is equipped for littoral warfare with 76mm,
30mm, and 12.7mm guns, four YJ-8 ASCMs, torpedo tubes, and a helicopter landing area.
The JIANGDAO is ideally-suited for general medium-endurance patrols, counter-piracy, and
other littoral duties in regional waters, but is not sufficiently armed or equipped for major
combat operations in blue-water. At least ten JIANGDAOs are already operational and thirty
or more units may be built, replacing both older small patrol craft as well as some of the
PLA(N)s aging JIANGHU I frigates. The rapid construction of JIANGDAO FFLs accounts
for a significant share of ship construction in 2012 and 2013.
In recent years, Chinas amphibious acquisition has shifted decisively towards larger, highend, ships. Since 2007 China has commissioned three YUZHAO class amphibious transport
docks (LPD), which provide a considerably greater capacity and flexibility compared to
previous landing ships. At 20,000 tons, the YUZHAO is the largest domestically produced
Chinese warship and has deployed as far as the Gulf of Aden. The YUZHAO can carry up to
four of the new air cushion landing craft YUYI LCUA (similar to LCAC), as well as four or
more helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops on long-distance deployments. Additional
YUZHAOs are expected to be built, as well as a follow-on amphibious assault ship (LHA)
design that is larger and with a full-deck flight deck for additional helicopters.
The major investment in a large-deck LPD signaled the PLA(N)s emerging interest in
expeditionary warfare and over-the horizon amphibious assault capability, as well as a
flexible platform for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy
capabilities. In contrast, the PLA(N) appears to have suspended all construction of lower-end
tank landing ships (LST/LSM) since 2006, following a spate of acquisition in the early
2000s.

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The expanded set of missions further into the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, including
counter-piracy deployments, HA/DR missions, survey voyages and goodwill port visits have
increased demands on PLA(N)s limited fleet of ocean-going replenishment and service
vessels. In 2013 the PLA(N) added two new FUCHI replenishment oilers (AORs) bringing
the total AOR force level to seven ships. These ships constantly rotate in support of Gulf of
Aden (GOA) counter-piracy deployments.
In addition, the PLA(N) recently added three state-of-the-art DALAO submarine rescue
ships (ASR) and three DASAN fast-response rescue ships (ARS). Other recent additions
include the ANWEI hospital ship (AH), the DANYAO AF (island resupply), YUAN WANG
5&6 (satellite and rocket launch telemetry), three KANHAI AG (SWATH-hull survey
ships), two YUAN WANG 21 missile tenders (AEM), and the large DAGUAN AG, which
provides berthing and logistical support to the KUZNETSOV aircraft carrier Liaoning.
Traditionally, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) has lagged behind ASuW and AAW as a
priority for the PLA(N). Some moderate progress still continues, with more surface ships
possessing modern sonars, to include towed arrays, as well as hangars to support shipboard
helicopters. Given these developments, the PLA(N) surface force may be more capable of
identifying adversary submarines in limited areas by 2020.
Over the past decade, Chinas surface force has made steady proficiency gains and become
much more operationally focused. Beginning in 2009, the Gulf of Aden deployments have
provided naval commanders and crews with their first real experience with extended
deployments and overseas logistics. We have also witnessed an increase in the complexity of
training and exercises and an expansion of operating areas both within and beyond the First
Island Chain. To increase realism, the force engages in opposing force training and employs
advanced training aids. In 2012 the surface force conducted an unprecedented seven
deployments to the Philippine Sea. This was followed by nine Philippine Sea deployments in
2013. Extended surface deployments and more advanced training build core warfare
proficiency in ASuW, ASW and AAW. Furthermore, these deployments reflect efforts to
normalize distant seas training in line with General Staff Department (GSD) guidelines.
Chinas Aircraft Carrier Program
With spectacular ceremony in September 2012, China commissioned its first carrier, the
Liaoning. China is currently engaged in the long and complicated path of learning to operate
fixed wing aircraft from the carriers deck. The first launches and recoveries of the J-15
aircraft occurred in November 2012, with additional testing and training occurring in 2013.
Despite recent progress, it will take several years before Chinese carrier-based air regiments
are operational. The PLAs newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao recently noted, Aircraft Carrier
development is core to the PLA(N), and could serve as a deterrent to countries who provoke
trouble at sea, against the backdrop of the U.S. pivot to Asia and growing territorial disputes
in the South China Sea and East China Sea.
The Liaoning is much less capable of power projection than the U.S. Navys NIMITZ-class
carriers. Not only does Liaonings smaller size limit the total number of aircraft it can carry,
but also the ski-jump configuration significantly limits aircraft fuel and ordnance load for
take offs. Furthermore, China does not yet possess specialized supporting aircraft such as the
E-2C Hawkeye, which provides tactical airborne early warning (AEW). The Liaoning is
suited for fleet air defense missions, rather than US-style, long range power projection.
Although it has a full suite of weapons and combat systems, Liaonings primary role for the
coming years will be to develop the skills required for carrier aviation and to train its first
groups of pilots and deck crews.

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Chinas initial carrier air regiment will consist of the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark, which is
externally similar to the Russian Su-33 Flanker D. However, the aircraft is thought to
possess many of the domestic avionics and armament capabilities of the Chinese J-11B
Flanker. Likely armament for the J-15 includes PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles and
modern ASCMs. Six J-15 prototypes are currently involved in testing and at least one twoseat J-15S operational trainer has been observed.
China is fully aware of the inherent limitations of the mid-sized, ski-jump carrier. While
Beijing has provided no public information on the size and configuration of its next carrier,
there is intense speculation that China may adopt a catapult launching system. Recent media
reports suggest that China recently commenced construction of its first indigenously
produced carrier.
Finally, as China expands carrier operations beyond the immediate region, it will almost
certainly be constrained by a lack of distant bases and support infrastructure. Although
commercial ports can provide some peacetime support, Beijing may eventually find it
expedient to abandon its longstanding, self-imposed prohibition on foreign basing.
PLA(N) Submarine Force
China has long regarded its submarine force as a critical element of regional deterrence,
particularly when conducting counter-intervention against modern adversary. The large,
but poorly equipped force of the 1980s has given way to a more modern submarine force,
optimized primarily for regional anti-surface warfare missions near major sea lines of
communication. Currently, the submarine force consists of five nuclear attack submarines,
four nuclear ballistic missile submarines, and 53 diesel attack submarines.
In reference to the submarine force, the term modern applies to second generation
submarines, capable of employing anti-ship cruise missiles or submarine-launched
intercontinental ballistic missiles. By 2015 approximately 70 percent of Chinas entire
submarine force will be modern. By 2020, 75 percent of the conventional force will be
modern and 100 percent of the SSN force will be modern.
Currently, most of the force is conventionally powered, without towed arrays, but equipped
with increasingly long range ASCMs. Submarine launched ASCMs with ranges well in
excess of 100nm not only enhance survivability of the shooter, but also enable a small
number of units to hold a large maritime area at risk. A decade ago, only a few of Chinas
submarines were equipped to launch a modern anti-ship cruise missile. Given the rapid pace
of acquisition, well over half of Chinas nuclear and conventional attack submarines are now
ASCM equipped, and by 2020, the vast majority of Chinas submarine force will be armed
with advanced, long-range ASCMs.
Chinas small nuclear attack submarine force is capable of operating further from the
Chinese mainland, conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as
ASuW missions. Currently, Chinas submarines are not optimized for either anti-submarine
warfare or land attack missions.
Like the surface force, Chinas submarine force is trending towards a more streamlined mix
of units, suggesting the PLA(N) is relatively satisfied with recent designs. For its dieselelectric force alone, between 2000 and 2005, China constructed MING SS, SONG SS, the
first YUAN SSP, and purchased 8 KILO SS from Russia. While all of these classes remain
in the force, only the YUAN SSP is currently in production. Reducing the number of
different classes in service helps streamline maintenance, training and interoperability.

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The YUAN SSP is Chinas most modern conventionally powered submarine. Eight are
currently in service, with as many as 12 more anticipated. Its combat capability is similar to
the SONG SS, as both are capable of launching Chinese-built anti-ship cruise missiles, but
the YUAN SSP also possesses an air independent power (AIP) system and may have
incorporated quieting technology from the Russian-designed KILO SS. The AIP system
provides a submarine a source of power other than battery or diesel engines while still
submerged, increasing its underwater endurance, thereby reducing its vulnerability to
detection.
The remainder of the conventional submarine force is a mix of SONG SS, MING SS, and
Russian-built KILO SS. Of these, only the MING SS and four of the older KILO SS lack an
ability to launch ASCMs. Eight of Chinas 12 KILO SS are equipped with the SS-N-27
ASCM, which provides a long-range anti-surface capability out to approximately 120nm.
Although Chinas indigenous YJ-82 ASCM has a much shorter range, trends in surface and
air-launched cruise missiles suggest that a future indigenous submarine-launched ASCM will
almost certainly match or exceed the range of the SS-N-27.
China is now modernizing its relatively small nuclear-powered attack submarine force,
following a protracted hiatus. The SHANG SSNs initial production run stopped after just
two launches in 2002 and 2003. After nearly 10 years, China resumed production with four
additional hulls of an improved variant, the first of which was launched in 2012. These six
submarines will replace the aging HAN SSN on nearly a 1-for-1 basis over the next several
years. Following the completion of the improved SHANG SSN, the PLA(N) will likely
progress to the Type 095 SSN, which may provide a generational improvement in many
areas such as quieting and weapon capacity, to include a possible land-attack capability.
Perhaps the most anticipated development in Chinas submarine force is the expected
operational deployment of the JIN SSBN in 2014, which would mark Chinas first credible
at-sea second-strike nuclear capability. With a range in excess of 4000nm, the JL-2
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), will enable the JIN to strike Hawaii, Alaska,
and possibly western portions of CONUS from East Asian waters. The three JIN SSBNs
currently in service would be insufficient to maintain a constant at-sea presence for extended
periods of time, but if the PLA Navy builds five units as some sources suggest, a continuous
peacetime presence may become a viable option for the PLA(N).
Historically, the vast majority of Chinese submarine operations have been limited in
duration. In recent years however, leadership emphasis on more realistic training and
operational proficiency across the PLA appears to have catalyzed an increase in submarine
patrol activity. Prior to 2008, the PLA(N) typically conducted a very small number of
extended submarine patrols, typically fewer than 5 or 6 in a given year. Since that time, it has
become common to see more than 12 patrols in a given year. This trend suggests the PLA(N)
seeks to build operational proficiency, endurance, and training in ways that more accurately
simulate combat missions.
PLA(N) Air Forces
The capabilities and role of the PLANAF have steadily evolved over the past decade. As
navy combatants range further from shore and more effectively provide their own air
defense, the PLANAF is able to concentrate on an expanded array of missions, including
maritime strike, maritime patrols, anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning, and
logistics. Both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will play an important role in enabling
fleet operations over the next decade. Additionally, in the next few years the PLANAF will
possess its first-ever sea-based component, with the Liaoning CV [aircraft carrier].

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Every major PLA(N) surface combatant currently under construction is capable of


embarking a helicopter, increasing platform capabilities in areas such as over the horizon
targeting, anti-submarine warfare, and search and rescue (SAR). The PLA(N) operates three
main helicopter variants: the Z-9, the Z-8, and the Helix. In order to keep pace with the rest
of the PLA(N), the helicopter fleet will almost certainly expand in the near future.
The PLA(N)s primary helicopter, the Z-9C, was originally obtained under licensed
production from Aerospatiale (now Eurocopter) in the early 1980s. The Z-9C is capable of
operating from any helicopter-capable PLA(N) combatant. It can be fitted with the KLC-1
search radar, dipping sonar, and is usually seen with a single lightweight torpedo. A new
roof-mounted electro-optical (EO) turret, unguided rockets, and 12.7 mm machine gun pods
have been observed on several Z-9Cs during counter piracy deployments. There are now
approximately twenty operational Z-9Cs in the PLA(N) inventory and the helicopters are still
under production. An upgraded naval version of the Z-9, designated the Z-9D, has been
observed with ASCMs.
Like the Z-9, the Z-8 is a Chinese-produced helicopter based on a French design. In the late
1970s, the PLA(N) purchased and reverse engineered the SA 321 Super Frelon. This
medium lift helicopter is capable of performing a wide variety of missions but is most often
utilized for SAR, troop transport, and logistical support roles. It is usually observed with a
rescue hoist and a nose radome and typically operates unarmed. The Z-8s size provides a
greater cargo capacity compared to other PLA(N) helicopters, but is limited in its ability to
deploy from most PLA(N) combatants. An AEW variant of the Z-8 has been observed
operating with the Liaoning.
In 1999, the PLA(N) took delivery of an initial batch of eight Russian-built Ka-28 Helix
helicopters. The PLA(N) typically uses the Ka-28 for ASW. They are fitted with a search
radar, dipping sonar and can employ sonobuoys, torpedoes, depth charges, or mines. In 2010
China also ordered nine Ka-31 Helix AEW helicopters.
Fixed-wing Aircraft
Over the last two decades, the PLANAF has significantly upgraded its fighters and expanded
the type of aircraft it operates. As a consequence, it can successfully perform a wide range of
missions including offshore air defense, maritime strike, maritime patrol/antisubmarine
warfare, and in the not too distant future, carrier-based operations. A decade ago, this
modernization was largely reliant on exports from Russia, however, the PLANAF has
recently benefited from the same domestic combat aircraft production that has propelled
earlier PLAAF modernization.
Historically, the PLA(N) relied on older Chengdu J-7 variants and Shenyang J-8B/D Finback
fighters for the offshore air defense mission. These aircraft were limited in range, avionics,
and armament. The J-8 is perhaps best known in the West as the aircraft that collided with a
U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft in 2001. In 2002, the PLA(N) purchased 24 Su30MK2, making it the first 4th generation fighter fielded with the navy. These aircraft feature
an extended range and maritime radar systems, enabling the Su-30MK2 to strike enemy
ships at long distances, while still maintaining a robust air-to-air capability.
Several years later, the PLA(N) began replacing older J-8B/Ds with the newer J-8F variant.
The J-8F featured improved armament such as the PL-12 radar-guided air-to-air missile,
upgraded avionics, and an improved engine with higher thrust. Today, the PLA(N) is taking
deliveries of modern domestically produced 4th generation fighter aircraft such as the J-10A
Vigorous Dragon and the J-11B Flanker. Equipped with modern radars, glass cockpits, and
armed with PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles, PLA(N) J-10A and J-11B aircraft are among
the most modern aircraft in Chinas inventory.

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For maritime strike, the PLA(N) has relied on the H-6 Badger for decades. The H-6 is a
licensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 Badger, which can employ advanced ASCMs against
surface targets. As many as 30 Badgers likely remain in service with the PLA(N). Despite
the older platform design, Chinese H-6 Badgers benefit from upgraded electronics and
payloads. Noted improvements include the ability to carry a maximum of four ASCMs,
compared with two on earlier H-6D variants. Some H-6s have been modified as tankers,
increasing the PLA(N)s flexibility and range. The JH-7 Flounder, with at least five
regiments fielded across the three fleets also provides a maritime strike capability. The JH-7
is a domestically produced tandem-seat fighter/bomber, developed as a replacement for
obsolete Q-5 Fantan light attack aircraft and H-5 Beagle bombers. The JH-7 can carry up to
four ASCMs and two PL-5 or PL-8 short-range air-to-air missiles, providing it with
considerable payload for maritime strike missions.
In addition to combat aircraft, the PLANAF is expanding its inventory of fixed-wing
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), Airborne Early Warning (AEW), and surveillance aircraft.
The Y-8, a Chinese license-produced version of the ex-Soviet An-12 Cub, forms the basic
airframe for several PLA(N) special mission variants. As the navy pushes farther from the
coast, long-range aircraft play a key role in providing a clear picture of surface and air
contacts in the maritime environment.
Internet photos from 2012 suggest that the PLA(N) is also developing a Y-8 naval variant,
equipped with a MAD (magnetic anomaly detector) boom, typical of ASW aircraft. This
ASW aircraft features a large surface search radar mounted under the nose and multiple
blade antennae on the fuselage for probable electronic surveillance. It also appears to
incorporate a small EO/IR turret and an internal weapons bay forward of the main landing
gear. The aircraft appeared in a primer yellow paint scheme, suggesting that it remains under
development.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
In recent years China has developed several multi-mission UAVs for the maritime
environment. There are some indications the PLA(N) has begun to integrate UAVs into their
operations to enhance situational awareness. For well over a decade, China has actively
pursued UAV technology and they are emerging among the worldwide leaders in UAV
development. Chinas latest achievement was the unveiling of their first prototype unmanned
combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), the Lijan, which features a blended-wing design as well as
low observable technologies.
The PLA(N) will probably employ significant numbers of land and ship based UAVs to
supplement manned ISR aircraft and aid targeting for various long-range weapons systems.
UAVs will probably become one of the PLA(N)s most valuable ISR assets in on-going and
future maritime disputes and protection of maritime claims. UAVs are ideally suited for this
mission set due to their long loiter time, slow cruising speed, and ability to provide near realtime information through the use of a variety of onboard sensors. The PLA(N) has been
identified operating the Austrian Camcopter S-100 rotary-wing UAV from several
combatants. Following initial evaluation and deployment of the Camcopter S-100, the
PLA(N) will likely adopt a domestically produced UAV into ship-based operations.
Naval Mines
China has a robust mining capability and currently maintains a varied inventory estimated at
over 50,000 mines. China also has developed a robust infrastructure for naval mine related
research, development, testing, evaluation, and production. During the past few years China
has gone from an obsolete mine inventory, consisting primarily of pre-WWII vintage moored
contact and basic bottom influence mines, to a robust mine inventory consisting of a large

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variety of mine types including moored, bottom, drifting, rocket propelled and intelligent
mines. China will continue to develop more advanced mines in the future, possibly including
extended-range propelled-warhead mines, anti-helicopter mines, and bottom influence mines
equipped to counter minesweeping efforts.
Maritime C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
Chinas steady expansion of naval missions beyond the littoral, including counterintervention missions are enabled by a dramatic improvement in maritime C4ISR over the
past decade. The ranges of Chinas modern anti-ship cruise missiles extend well beyond the
range of a ships own sensors. Emerging land-based weapons, such as the DF-21D anti-ship
ballistic missile, with a range of more than 810nm are even more dependent on remote
targeting. Modern navies depend heavily on their ability to build and disseminate a picture of
all activities occurring in the air and sea.
For China, this provides a formidable challenge. In order to characterize activities in the
near seas, China must build a maritime and air picture covering nearly 875,000 square
nautical miles (sqnm). The Philippine Sea, which could become a key interdiction area in a
regional conflict, expands the battlespace by another 1.5 million sqnm. In this vast space,
many navies and coast guards converge along with tens of thousands of fishing boats, cargo
ships, oil tankers, and other commercial vessels.
In order to sort through this complex environment and enable more sophisticated operations,
China has invested in a wide array of sensors. Direct reporting from Chinese ships and
aircraft provides the most detailed and reliable information, but can only cover a fraction of
the regional environment. A number of ground-based coastal radars provide overlapping
coverage of coastal areas, but their range is limited.
To gain a broader view of activity in its near and far seas, China requires more sophisticated
sensors. The skywave over-the-horizon radar provides awareness of a much larger area than
conventional radars by bouncing signals off the ionosphere. China also operates a growing
array of reconnaissance satellites, which allow observation of maritime activity virtually
anywhere on the earth.
Conclusion
The PLA(N) is strengthening its ability to execute a range of regional missions in a
complex electromagnetic environment as it simultaneously lays a foundation for sustained,
blue water operations. Over the next decade, China will complete its transition from a coastal
navy to a navy capable of multiple missions around the world. Current acquisition patterns,
training, and operations provide a window into how the PLA(N) might pursue these
objectives.
Given the pace of PLA(N) modernization, the gap in military capability between the
mainland and Taiwan will continue to widen in Chinas favor over the coming years. The
PRC views reunification with Taiwan as an immutable, long-term goal and hopes to prevent
any other actor from intervening in a Taiwan scenario. While Taiwan remains a top-tier
priority, the PLA(N) is simultaneously focusing resources on a growing array of potential
challenges.
Chinas interests in the East and South China Seas include protecting its vast maritime
claims and preserving access to regional resources. Beijing prefers to use diplomacy and
economic influence to protect maritime sovereignty, and generally relies on patrols by the
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remain a fundamental mission for the PLA(N). PLA(N) assets regularly patrol in most of
Chinas claimed territory to conduct surveillance and provide a security guarantee to Chinas
Coast Guard.
In the event of a crisis, the PLA(N) has a variety of options to defend its claimed territorial
sovereignty and maritime interests. The PLA(N) could lead an amphibious campaign to seize
key disputed island features, or conduct blockade or SLOC interdiction campaigns to secure
strategic operating areas. Chinas realization of an operational aircraft carrier in the coming
years may also enable Beijing to exert greater pressure on its SCS rivals. Recent acquisitions
speak to a future in which the PLA(N) will be expected to perform a wide variety of tasks
including assuring the nations economic lifelines, asserting Chinas regional territorial
interests, conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and demonstrating a
Chinese presence beyond region waters.158

158

[Hearing on] Trends in Chinas Naval Modernization [before] U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission[,] Testimony [of] Jesse L. Karotkin, [Senior Intelligence Officer for China, Office of Naval Intelligence,
January 30, 2014], accessed February 12, 2014, 12 pp., at http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Karotkin_Testimony1.30.14.pdf.

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Appendix B. Background Information on Air-Sea


Battle Concept
This appendix provides additional background information on the Air-Sea Battle Concept.

October 10, 2013, Hearing


On October 10, 2013, the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee held a hearing with several DOD officials as the witnesses that focused to a
large degree on the Air-Sea Battle concept.159 One of the witnessesRear Admiral Upper Half
James G. Foggo III, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations, Plans and Strategy)
(N3/N5B)provided the following overview of ASB in his opening remarks:
So let me begin by answering the question, what is the AirSea Battle concept? The AirSea
Battle concept was approved by the Secretary of Defense in 2011. It is designed to assure
access to parts of the global commons, those areas of the AirSea, Cyberspace, and Space that
no one necessarily owns but which we all depend on such as sea lines of communication.
Our adversaries Anti-Access/Area Denial strategies employ a range of military capabilities
that impede the free use of these ungoverned spaces. These military capabilities include new
generations of cruise, ballistic, air to air, surface to air missiles with improved range,
accuracy and lethality that are being produced and proliferated.
Quiet, modern submarines and stealthy fighter aircraft are being procured by many nations
while naval mines are being equipped with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Both
space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and contested.
Accordingly, AirSea Battle in its concept is intended to defeat such threats to access and
provide options to national leaders and military commanders to enable follow-on operations
which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster
response. In short, it is a new approach to warfare.
The AirSea Battle concept is also about force development in the face of rising technological
challenges. We seek to build at the service level a pre-integrated joint force which empowers
U.S. combatant commanders, along with allies and partners to engage in ways that are
cooperative and networked across multiple domainsthe land, maritime, air, space and
cyber domains.
And our goal includes continually refining and institutionalizing these practices. When
implemented, the AirSea Battle concept will create and codify synergies within and among
our services that will enhance our collective war fighting capability and effectiveness.
So that's, in a nutshell, what the AirSea Battle concept is. But now, what is it not? Sir, you
pointed out the AirSea Battle concept is not a strategyto answer your question on the
difference between AirLand Battle and the AirSea Battle concept. National or military

159
The title of the hearing as posted on the House Armed Services Committee website was: USAF, USN and USMC
Development and Integration of Air/Sea Battle Strategy, Governance and Policy into the Services Annual Program,
Planning, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process.

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strategies employs ways and means to a particular and/or end-state, such as deterring
conflict, containing conflict or winning conflict.
A concept in contrast is a description of a method or a scheme for employing military
capabilities to attain specific objectives at the operational level of war. The overarching
objective of the AirSea Battle concept is to gain and maintain freedom of action in the global
commons.
The AirSea Battle does not focus on a particular adversary or a region. It is universally
applicable across all geographic locations, and by addressing access challenges wherever,
however, and whenever we confront them.
I said earlier that the AirSea Battle represents a new approach to warfare. Heres what I
meant by that. Historically, when deterrence fails, its our custom to amass large numbers of
resources, leverage our allies for a coalition support and base access or over flight and build
up an iron mountain of logistics, weapons and troops to apply overwhelming force at a
particular space and time of our choosing.
This approach of build up, rehearse and roll back has proven successful from Operation
Overlord in the beaches of Normandy in 1944 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Middle
East. But the 21st Century operating environment is changing. Future generations of
American service men and women will not fight their parents wars.
And so I'll borrow a quote from Abraham Lincoln, written in a letter to this House on 1
December, 1862 when he said, We must think anew, act anew. We must disenthrall
ourselves from the past, and then we shall save our country.
New military approaches are emerging specifically intended to counter our historical
methods of projecting power. Adversaries employing such an approach would seek to
prevent or deny our ability to aggregate forces by denying us a safe haven from which to
build up, rehearse, and roll back.
Anti-Access is defined as an action intended to slow deployment of friendly forces into a
theater or cause us to operate from longer distances than preferred. Area Denial impedes
friendly operations or maneuver in a theater where access cannot be prevented.
The AirSea Battle concept mitigates the threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial by creating
pockets and corridors under our control. The reason conflict in Libya, Operation Odyssey
Dawn in 2011, is a good example of this paradigm shift.
Though AirSea Battle was still in development, the fundamental idea of leveraging access in
one domain to provide advantage to our forces in another was understood and employed
against Libyas modest Anti-Access/Area Denial capability.
On day one of combat operations, cruise missiles launched from submarines and surface
ships in the maritime domain targeted and destroyed Libyas lethal air defense missile
systems; thereby enabling coalition forces to conduct unfettered follow-on strikes and
destroy the Libyan Air Force and control the air domain.
Establishing a no-fly zone, key to interdicting hostile regime actions against innocent
civiliansand that was our mission, to protect civilianswas effectively accomplished
within 48 hours of receiving the execution order from the President. I was the J3 or the
operations officer for Admiral Sam Locklear, Commander of Joint Task Force, Odyssey
Dawn. And I transitioned from U.S.-led coalition operations to Operation Unified Protector
as a taskforce commander for NATO.

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During the entire campaign which lasted seven months, NATO reported in its UN After
Action Report that there were just under 18,000 sorties flown, employing 7,900 precision
guided munitions. Thats a lot. More than 200 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles were used,
over half of which came from submarines.
The majority of the Libyan Regime Order of Battle, which included 800 main battle tanks,
2,500 artillery pieces, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, 360 fixed wing fighters and 85
transports were either disabled or destroyed during the campaign.
Not one American boot set foot on the ground; no Americans were killed in combat
operations. We lost one F-15 due to mechanical failure but we recovered both pilots safely.
Muammar Gaddafi, as you know, was killed by Libyan rebels in October. 2011.
The AirSea Battle Concept, in its classified form, was completed in November 2011, one
month later. I provided Admiral Locklear with a copy of the AirSea Battle concept and we
reviewed it on a trip to United Kingdom. Upon reading it, I thought back to the Libya
campaign plan and I wondered how I might leverage the concepts of AirSea Battle to fight
differently, to fight smarter.
Operation Odyssey Dawn accelerated from a non-combatant evacuation operation and
humanitarian assistance to kinetic operations in a very short period. There was very little
time for build-up and rehearse our forces. To coin a phrase from my boss, this was like a
pickup game of basketball. And we relied on the flexibility, innovation and resiliency of the
commanders of the forces assigned to the joint taskforce.
The Libyan regimes Anti Access Area Denial capability was limited as I said. And we were
able to overwhelm and defeat it with the tools that we had. But we must prepare for a more
stressing environment in the future. AirSea Battle does so, by providing commanders with a
range of options, both kinetic and non-kinetic to mitigate or neutralize challenges to access in
one or many domains simultaneously.
This is accomplished through development of networked integrated forces capable of attack
in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat the adversary. And it provides maximum operational
advantage to friendly joint and coalition forces. I'm a believer and so are the rest of the flag
and general officers here at the table with me.160

DOD Unclassified Summary Released June 2013


On June 3, 2013, DOD released an unclassified summary of the Air-Sea Battle concept.161 The
following pages reprint the document.
160

Source: transcript of hearing.


Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle[:] Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges,
May 2013, 12 pp., accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-SummaryMay-2013.pdf, and at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/files/2013/06/ASB-26-June-2013.pdf. The latter of these two URLs
provided a version with a smaller file size. For a DOD announcement of the documents release, see Jason Kelly,
Overview of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, Navy Live, June 3, 2013, accessed July 5, 2013, at
http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/06/03/overview-of-the-air-sea-battle-concept/.
DOD officials had discussed the ASB concept in earlier statements; for example:
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Mark Welsh, the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, discussed the ASB concept in a May 16, 2013, blog post; see Jonathan Greenert and Mark Welsh, Breaking the
Kill Chain[:] How to Keep America in the Game When Our Enemies Are Trying to Shut Us Out, Foreign Policy, May
(continued...)
161

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(...continued)
16, 2013, accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/16/
breaking_the_kill_chain_air_sea_battle.

General Norton Schwartz, then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of
Naval Operations, discussed the ASB concept in a February 20, 2012, journal article; see Norton A. Schwartz
and Jonathan W. Greenert, Air-Sea Battle, Promoting Stability In An Era of Uncertainty, The American
Interest, February 20, 2012, accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?
piece=1212.

The Air-Sea Battle Office released a statement on the ASB concept on November 9, 2011; see The Air-Sea
Battle Concept Summary, accessed July 5, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=
63730.

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Press Reports
An August 20, 2012, press report stated that the ASB concept has prompted Navy officials to
make significant shifts in the services FY2014-FY2018 budget plan, including new investments
in ASW, electronic attack and electronic warfare, cyber warfare, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF), the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV
(a maritime version of the Global Hawk UAV). The report quoted Chief of Naval Operations
Jonathan Greenert as saying that the total value of the budget shifts was certainly in the hundreds
of millions of dollars, and perhaps in the low billions of dollars.162
An August 2, 2012, press report on the ASB concept states:
When President Obama called on the U.S. military to shift its focus to Asia earlier this year,
Andrew Marshall, a 91-year-old futurist, had a vision of what to do.
Marshalls small office in the Pentagon has spent the past two decades planning for a war
against an angry, aggressive and heavily armed China.
No one had any idea how the war would start. But the American response, laid out in a
concept that one of Marshalls longtime proteges dubbed Air-Sea Battle, was clear.
Stealthy American bombers and submarines would knock out Chinas long-range
surveillance radar and precision missile systems located deep inside the country. The initial
blinding campaign would be followed by a larger air and naval assault.
The concept, the details of which are classified, has angered the Chinese military and has
been pilloried by some Army and Marine Corps officers as excessively expensive. Some
Asia analysts worry that conventional strikes aimed at China could spark a nuclear war.
Air-Sea Battle drew little attention when U.S. troops were fighting and dying in large
numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now the militarys decade of battling insurgencies is
ending, defense budgets are being cut, and top military officials, ordered to pivot toward
Asia, are looking to Marshalls office for ideas.
In recent months, the Air Force and Navy have come up with more than 200 initiatives they
say they need to realize Air-Sea Battle. The list emerged, in part, from war games conducted
by Marshalls office and includes new weaponry and proposals to deepen cooperation
between the Navy and the Air Force....
Even as it has embraced Air-Sea Battle, the Pentagon has struggled to explain it without
inflaming already tense relations with China. The result has been an information vacuum that
has sown confusion and controversy.
Senior Chinese military officials warn that the Pentagons new effort could spark an arms
race....

162
Christopher J. Castelli, CNO: Air-Sea Battle Driving Acceleration Of Key Programs In POM-14, Inside the Navy,
August 20, 2012. POM-14 is the Program Objective Memorandum (an internal DOD budget-planning document) for
the FY2014 DOD budget.

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Privately, senior Pentagon officials concede that Air-Sea Battles goal is to help U.S. forces
weather an initial Chinese assault and counterattack to destroy sophisticated radar and
missile systems built to keep U.S. ships away from Chinas coastline.
Their concern is fueled by the steady growth in Chinas defense spending, which has
increased to as much as $180 billion a year, or about one-third of the Pentagons budget, and
Chinas increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.
We want to put enough uncertainty in the minds of Chinese military planners that they
would not want to take us on, said a senior Navy official overseeing the services
modernization efforts. Air-Sea Battle is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win
this competition.
Inside the Pentagon, the Army and Marine Corps have mounted offensives against the
concept, which could lead to less spending on ground combat.
An internal assessment, prepared for the Marine Corps commandant and obtained by The
Washington Post, warns that an Air-Sea Battle-focused Navy and Air Force would be
preposterously expensive to build in peace time and would result in incalculable human
and economic destruction if ever used in a major war with China.
The concept, however, aligns with Obamas broader effort to shift the U.S. militarys focus
toward Asia and provides a framework for preserving some of the Pentagons most
sophisticated weapons programs, many of which have strong backing in Congress.163

An April 2012 press report that provides a historical account of the ASB concept states: In truth,
the Air Sea Battle Concept is the culmination of a strategy fight that began nearly two decades
ago inside the Pentagon and U.S. government at large over how to deal with a single actor: the
Peoples Republic of China.164 A November 10, 2011, press report states:
Military officials from the three services told reporters during a [November 9, 2011, DOD]
background briefing that the concept is not directed at a single country. But they did not
answer when asked what country other than China has developed advanced anti-access arms.
A senior Obama administration official was more blunt, saying the new concept is a
significant milestone signaling a new Cold War-style approach to China.
Air Sea Battle is to China what the [U.S. Navys mid-1980s] maritime strategy was to the
Soviet Union, the official said.
During the Cold War, U.S. naval forces around the world used a strategy of global presence
and shows of force to deter Moscows advances.
It is a very forward-deployed, assertive strategy that says we will not sit back and be
punished, the senior official said. We will initiate.

163

Greg Jaffe, Real Tensions Over A Theoretical War, Washington Post, August 2, 2012: 1.
Bill Gertz, Chinas High-Tech Military Threat and What Were Doing About It, Commentary, April 2012: 15-21.
The quoted passage is from page 16. See also Yoichi Kato, Japans Response to New U.S. Defense Strategy:
Welcome, But ... Asahi Shimbun, March 9, 2012, accessed online at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/
politics/AJ201203090025.
164

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The concept, according to defense officials, grew out of concerns that Chinas new precisionstrike weapons threaten freedom of navigation in strategic waterways and other global
commons.
Defense officials familiar with the concept said among the ideas under consideration are:

Building a new long-range bomber.

Conducting joint submarine and stealth aircraft operations.

New jointly operated, long-range unmanned strike aircraft with up to 1,000-mile ranges.

Using Air Force forces to protect naval bases and deployed naval forces.

Conducting joint Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force strikes inside China.

Using Air Force aircraft to deploy sea mines.

Joint Air Force and Navy attacks against Chinese anti-satellite missiles inside China.

Increasing the mobility of satellites to make attacks more difficult.

Launching joint Navy and Air Force cyber-attacks on Chinese anti-access forces.165

An October 12, 2011, press report states that


The Pentagon is engaged in a behind-the-scenes political fight over efforts to soften, or
entirely block, a new military-approved program to bolster U.S. forces in Asia.
The program is called the Air Sea Battle concept and was developed in response to more
than 100 war games since the 1990s that showed U.S. forces, mainly air and naval power, are
not aligned to win a future war with China.
A senior defense official said Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta is reviewing the new
strategy.
We want to do this right, the official said. The concept is on track and is being refined to
ensure that we are able to implement it wherever we need toincluding in the Asia-Pacific
region, where American force projection is essential to our alliances and interests.
The official noted that the program is the product of unprecedented collaboration by the
services.
Pro-defense Members of Congress aware of the political fight are ready to investigate. One
aide said Congress knows very little about the concept and is awaiting details.
Officially, the Pentagon has said the new strategy is not directed at China.
But officials familiar with the classified details said it is designed to directly address the
growing threat to the United States and allies in Asia posed by what the Pentagon calls
165

Bill Gertz, Battle Concept Signals Cold War Posture On China, Washington Times, November 10, 2011: 13.

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Chinas anti-access and area denial weaponshigh-technology arms that China has
been building in secret for the past several decades....
The U.S. response in the Air Sea Battle concept is said to be a comprehensive program to
protect the global commons used by the United States and allies in Asia from Chinese
military encroachment in places such as the South China Sea, western Pacific and areas of
Northeast Asia.
The highly classified program, if approved in its current form, will call for new weapons and
bases, along with non-military means. Plans for new weapons include a long-range bomber.
Other systems and elements of the program are not known....
However, defense officials said Chinas government was alerted to some aspects of the
concept earlier this year when the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think tank
presented its own concept for a new warfighting strategy against China.
Andrew Krepinevich, the centers director who recently left the Pentagons Defense Policy
Board, could not be reached for comment.
As a result of the disclosure, China launched a major propaganda and influence campaign to
derail it. The concept was raised in several meetings between Chinese and U.S. officials,
with the Chinese asserting that the concept is a sign the Pentagon does not favor military
relations and views China as an enemy.
Officials in the Obama administration who fear upsetting China also are thought to have
intervened, and their opposition led Mr. Panetta to hold up final approval.
The final directive in its current form would order the Air Force and the Navy to develop and
implement specific programs as part of the concept. It also would include proposals for
defense contractors to support the concept.166

An October 2011 magazine article stated:


AirSea Battle emerged from a memorandum between the air and sea services in 2009. The
Air Force and Navy realized sophisticated threats involving high technology, networked air
defenses, modern ballistic missile, and sea and air capabilities, and anti-space weapons
required the services to marry up many of their respective strengths. The plan, which has
received a great amount of attention since the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, mandated
the creation of an operations concept to protect US and allied access to certain areas in the
world while also protecting forward-based assets and bases....
Both services are said to be fully on board with the plan, and to weed out duplication,
officers from each branch have been cleared to see all the black programs, or classified
projects, of the other service as the ASB plan has matured....
The plan had been vetted by both services by June [2011], and is awaiting blessing from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.... Service officials have been predicting a formal release
of more information on the doctrine for months as well.

166

Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring, Washington Times, October 12, 2011 (item entitled Air Sea Battle Fight).

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As early as Feb. 17 [2011], Lt. Gen. Herbert J. Carlisle, the Air Forces deputy chief of staff
for operations, plans, and requirements, had said a public document explaining the outlines
of ASB in detail would occur possibly within two weeks. The now-retired Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. Gary Roughead told reporters in Washington in March he expected to
release details on ASB in a few weeks, as the service Chiefs of the Marines Corps, USAF,
and Navy were basically done with their work on the concept. The majority of the plan
will remain classified, he added, as it should be.167

A sidebar to this magazine article stated:


The AirSea Battle rollout was repeatedly delayed over the course of 2011. According to
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials, new Secretary of Defense Leon E.
Panetta is reviewing the ASB plana sort of executive summary of the overall operations
concept (which, as of early September, remains classified).
However, then-Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, now the CNO,
told the House Armed Services Committee in late July he expected a release of unclassified
portions of the plan soon.
The AirSea Battle concept was signed by the USAF, Navy, and Marine Corps service Chiefs,
and the Air Force and Navy Secretaries on June 2 and forwarded to the [Secretary of
Defense] for approval, the Air Force said in a brief official statement Aug. 2.
Previous Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who departed July 1, had the document in his
possession and had told senior Air Force officials he would sign it before his departure. In
late July, however, Air Force and DOD officials privately indicated the concept was held up
in OSDs policy shop, and Gates did not sign the document before leaving the Pentagon.
Air Force and defense officials have indicated both publicly and privately that there are
strong international political considerations at play. Spin concern has likely contributed to
the delay in officially rolling out the AirSea Battle concept. In late July, USAF officials
privately indicated that there is a great deal of concern within OSD about how China will
perceive and react to the concept.168

A September 29, 2011, press report on a reported new DOD Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
document quoted a senior defense official as stating: It seems clear that there will be increased
emphasis on [the] AirSea Battle approach going forward.169
A July 26, 2011, press report, stated:
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is reviewing an Air Force-Navy battle concept that was
ordered by the Pentagon last year in response to Chinas military buildup and Irans
advanced weapons, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert said today.
The Navy and Air Force have submitted to Panetta the equivalent of an executive summary
of the battle concept with the intent to release unclassified portions within weeks, depending

167

Marc V. Schanz, AirSea Battles Turbulent Year, Air Force Magazine, October 2011: 32-33.
An ASB Summer, Air Force Magazine, October 2011: 33.
169
Christopher J. Castelli, DOD Aims To Boost Investment In Capabilities For Major-Power War, Inside the
Pentagon, September 29, 2011.
168

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on Panettas reaction, Greener told a House Armed Services readiness panel and a
Bloomberg News reporter after the hearing.
The plan aims to combine the strengths of the Navy and Air Force to enable long-range
strikes. It may employ a new generation of bombers, a new cruise missile and drones
launched from aircraft carriers. The Navy also is increasing funding to develop new
unmanned submarines.170

A June 10, 2011, press report stated that while defense officials publicly insist that the militarys
new AirSea Battle concept, a study meant to reshape the way the U.S. military fights future wars,
is not focused on China, one Navy team is quietly contradicting their claims. The group, called
the China Integration Team, is hard at work applying the lessons of the study to a potential
conflict with China, say sources familiar with the effort. The report also stated that though
sources familiar with the study have said that the first draft of the concept has been completed,
those same sources highlighted that the project is ongoingsomething that official spokesmen
have stressed as well.171 A January 10, 2011, press report stated that the AirSea Battle concept
study, meant to outline the future of Navy and Air Force operations in anti-access environments,
is near completion and is being briefed to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and Air Force Secretary
Michael Donley this month, according to sources familiar with the study.172

170
Tony Capaccio, Panetta Reviewing Air-Sea Battle Plan Summary, Greenert Says, Bloomberg News, July 26,
2011.
171
Andrew Burt and Christopher J. Castelli, Despite Improved Ties, China Weighs Heavily In Pentagons War
Planning, Inside the Navy, June 13, 2011.
172
Andrew Burt, Final AirSea Study Being Briefed To Mabus And Donley This Month, Inside the Navy, January 10,
2011. See also David Fulghum, Money Walks? Service Leaders Fight to Explain, Justify AirSea Battle Strategy,
Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 4/11, 2012: 71; Philip DuPree and Jordan Thomas, Air-Sea Battle: Clearing
the Fog, Armed Forces Journal, June 2012; John Callaway, The Operational Art of Air-Sea Battle, Center for
International Maritime Security (http://cimsec.org), July 18, 2014.

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Appendix C. Article by CNO Greenert on Navys


Rebalancing Toward Asia-Pacific
This appendix presents the text of a November 14, 2012, article by Admiral Jonathan Greenert
that provides an overview of Navy activities associated with the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward
the Asia-Pacific. The article states:
Our nations security priorities, and our military, are in transition. In the Middle East, we
ended the war in Iraq and are reducing ground troops in Afghanistan with the shift of
security responsibilities to Kabul. At home we are reassessing our militarys size and
composition as we seek to align our spending with our resources. And around the world we
face a range of new security challenges, from continued upheaval in the Arab world to the
imperative of sustaining our leadership in the Asia-Pacific. These challenges place a
premium on the flexibility and small ground footprint of naval forces, which are being
deployed longer and more often to advance our nations interests.
The Department of Defenses January 2012 strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership - Priorities for 21st Century Defense, addressed this new environment and our
security priorities in it. Overall, the strategy focuses on important regions and current
readiness and agility, while accepting reduced capacity and level of effort in less critical
missions. In particular, the strategy directed that our military rebalance toward the AsiaPacific while continuing to support our partners in the Middle East. Naval forces will be at
the heart of both efforts.
After two decades of ground conflict in the Middle East, our security concerns and ability to
project power in the region both center on the sea. U.S. ground forces continue to draw down
in Afghanistan and around the region, so our commanders increasingly rely on naval aircraft
to support and protect troops. Meanwhile, Iranian leaders speak provocatively about
impacting maritime traffic throughout the Arabian Gulf. In response, we turned to maritime
forces, doubling our minesweeping forces in the Gulf and deploying an additional carrier
strike group to the region.
The focus of our rebalance, the Asia-Pacific, is fundamentally a maritime region. Our friends
there depend on the sea for their food and energy, while more than 90 percent of trade by
volume makes its way through the region over the water. Maritime security for Pacific
nations is a matter of economic survival. Militarily, the vast maritime distances in the region
make access via the sea essential to deterring and defeating aggression. Our fleet deployed in
the Asia-Pacific will exploit the mobility of being at sea to project power against aggressors
and avoid attacks, while their reinforcements and supplies will arrive via the ocean from the
United States or regional bases.
The importance of the Asia-Pacific, and the Navys attention to it, is not new. Five of our
seven treaty allies are in the region, as well as six of the worlds top 20 economies. We have
maintained an active and robust presence in the Asia-Pacific for more than 70 years and built
deep and enduring relationships with allies and partners there. While we remain present and
engaged in the Middle East to address todays challenges, the Navy will build on its
longstanding Asia-Pacific focus by rebalancing in four main ways: deploying more forces to
the Asia-Pacific; basing more ships and aircraft in the region; fielding new capabilities
focused on Asia-Pacific challenges; and developing partnerships and intellectual capital
across the region.
Deploying more forces to the Asia-Pacific

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The most visible element of our rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region will be an increase
in day-to-day military presence. Although it is not the only way we are rebalancing, forces
operating in the region show our commitment to the Asia-Pacific and provide a full-time
capability to support our allies and partners. About half of the deployed fleet is in the
Pacific50 ships on any given day. These ships and their embarked Marines and aircraft
train with our allies and partners, reinforce freedom of navigation, and deter conflict. They
are also the first responders to large-scale crises such as the Great East Asian Earthquake
and Tsunami in 2011.
The long distance between the continental United States and Asia makes it inefficient to
rotate ships and aircraft overseas for six to nine months at a time. To avoid this transit time
and build greater ties with our partners and allies, more than 90 percent of our forces in the
Asia-Pacific are there permanently or semi-permanently. For example, about half of our 50
deployed ships are permanently home-ported in Japan and Guam along with their crews and
families. Our logistics and support ships use rotating civilian or military crews to obtain
more presence for the same number of ships.
Although we plan to reduce our future budgets, the Navy will continue to increase its
presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The benchmark year of the Defense Strategic Guidance
is 2020, and by then the Navy Fleet will grow to approximately 295 ships. This, combined
with the impacts of our plans for operations and basing, will increase the day-to-day naval
presence in the Asia-Pacific by about 20 percent, to 60 ships by 2020. In addition to growing
the fleet, three factors will allow us to increase the number of ships in the Asia-Pacific by
2020:
First, we will permanently base four destroyers in Rota, Spain over the next several years to
help defend our European allies from ballistic missiles. Today we do this mission with 10
destroyers that travel in rotation to the Mediterranean from the United States. The six
destroyers freed up in the process will then be able to rotationally deploy to the Asia-Pacific.
Second, new Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) under
construction today will enter the fleet and take on security cooperation and humanitarian
assistance missions in South America and Africa, allowing the destroyers and amphibious
ships we use today for those missions to deploy to the Asia-Pacific. These amphibious ships
will begin deploying instead to the Asia-Pacific in the next few years to support Marine
operations, including those from Darwin, Australia. Additionally, the new JHSV and LCS
are also better suited to the needs of our partners in Africa and South America.
Third, we will field more ships that spend the majority of their time forward by using
rotating civilian or military crews. These include the JHSV, LCS, and our new Mobile
Landing Platforms and Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB).
In addition to more ship presence in the Asia-Pacific, we will increase our deployments of
aircraft there and expand cooperative air surveillance operations with regional partners.
Today we fly cooperative missions from Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, where we
build our shared awareness of activities on the sea by either bringing partner personnel on
board or sharing the surveillance information with them. We may expand these operations in
the future to new partners concerned about threats from piracy, trafficking, and fisheries
violations. To expand our surveillance capacity, the Navy version of the MQ-4 Global Hawk
unmanned air vehicle will operate from Guam when it enters the fleet in the middle of this
decade.
Basing more ships and aircraft in the region

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To support our increased presence in the Asia-Pacific, we will grow the fraction of ships and
aircraft based on the U.S. West Coast and in the Pacific from todays 55 percent to 60
percent by 2020. This distribution will allow us to continue to meet the needs of Europe,
South America, and West Africa while more efficiently providing additional presence and
capacity in the Asia-Pacific.
Each ship that operates from an overseas port provides full-time presence and engagement in
the region and delivers more options for Combatant Commanders and political leaders. It
also frees up ships that would otherwise be needed to support a rotational deployment.
Today, we have about two dozen ships home-ported in Guam and Japan. In 2013, with the
USS Freedom, we will begin operating Littoral Combat Ships from Singapore, eventually
growing to four ships by 2017. The LCS will conduct maritime security operations with
partner navies throughout Southeast Asia and instead of rotationally deploying to the region,
the ships will stay overseas and their crews will rotate in from the United States, increasing
the presence delivered by each ship.
Fielding new capabilities focused on Asia-Pacific challenges
We will also bolster the capabilities we send to the Asia-Pacific. Using the approach
described in the Air-Sea Battle concept and in concert with the U.S. Air Force, we will
sustain our ability to project power in the face of access challenges such as cruise and
ballistic missiles, submarines, and sophisticated anti-air weapons. Air-Sea Battles operations
to disrupt, destroy, and defeat anti-access threats will be essential to maintain the credibility
of our security commitments and ability to deter aggression around the world. Our improved
capabilities will span the undersea, surface, and air environments.
Undersea
The Navys dominance in the undersea domain provides the United States a significant
advantage over potential adversaries. Our undersea capabilities enable strike and anti-surface
warfare in otherwise denied areas and exploit the relative lack of capability of our potential
adversaries at anti-submarine warfare. We will sustain our undersea advantage in part
through continued improvements in our own anti-submarine warfare capability, such as
replacing the 1960s-era P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft with the longer range and greatly
improved sensors of the P-8A Poseidon.
We will also field improved platforms and systems that exploit the undersea domain for
power projection and surveillance. In the coming years, newer, multi-mission Virginia-class
submarines with dramatically improved sensors and combat systems will continue to replace
aging Los Angeles-class submarines. With their conversion from Cold War-era ballistic
missile submarines, our four Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGN) are now our
most significant power projection platforms. During Operation Unified Protector, USS
Florida launched over 100 Tomahawk missiles at Libyan air defenses to help establish a nofly zone. When she and her counterparts retire in the mid 2020s, the Virginia-class
submarine payload module will replace their striking capacity with the ability to carry up
to 40 precision-strike cruise missiles, unmanned vehicles, or a mix of other payloads.
Improved sensors and new unmanned systems allow us to augment the reach and persistence
of manned submarines, and are essential to our continued domination of the undersea
environment. These unmanned vehicles will enhance the persistence of undersea sensing,
and expand its reach into confined and shallow waters that are currently inaccessible to other
systems. This will enable detection of threats, for example, to undersea infrastructure.

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Surface
But undersea forces have limited effectiveness at visible, day-to-day missions such as
security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, missile defense, and freedom of navigation.
Surface ships will continue to conduct these operations and show our presence in the AsiaPacific. Our surface fleet and embarked personnel will continue to be the most versatile
element of the naval force, building partner capacity and improving security in peacetime
and transitioning to sea control and power projection in conflict. Their credibility and their
ability to execute these missions depends on their ability to defeat improving threats,
especially anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM).
We will defeat ASCMs at long range using an integrated fire control system that combines
the proven Aegis weapon system and upgraded airborne early warning aircraft with new
long-range anti-air missiles on cruisers and destroyers. To defeat ASCMs at short range, the
Navy is upgrading point-defense missiles and electronic warfare systems to destroy
incoming missiles or cause them to miss by deceiving and jamming their seekers.
Navy forces will defeat ASBMs by countering each link in the operational chain of events
required for an adversary to find, target, launch, and complete an attack on a ship with a
ballistic missile. The Navy is fielding new systems that jam, decoy, or confuse the wide-area
surveillance systems needed to find and target ships at long range. To shoot down an ASBM
once launched, the fleet will employ the Aegis ballistic missile defense system and SM-3
missile. And, to prevent an ASBM from completing an attack, the Navy is fielding new
missiles and electronic warfare systems over the next several years that will destroy, jam, or
decoy the ASBM warhead as it approaches the ship.
To improve the ability of surface forces to project power, we will field new long-range
surface-to-surface missiles aboard cruisers and destroyers in the next decade and improve
our ability to send troops ashore as new San Antonio-class amphibious ships replace their
smaller and less-capable 30-year-old predecessors over the next two years.
Air
The Navy and Air Force will improve their integrated ability to defeat air threats and project
power in the face of improving surveillance and air defense systems. This evolution involves
the blending of new and existing technology and the complementary use of electronic
warfare, stealth, and improved, longer-range munitions. The carrier air wing in Japan
recently finished upgrading to F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet strike fighters with improved
jamming and sensor systems and the new E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. This
air wing will also be the first to incorporate the F-35C Lightning II, which will enable new
operational concepts that combine the F-35Cs stealth and sensor capability with the payload
capacity of the F/A-18 E/F to project power against the most capable air defense systems.
Developing partnerships and intellectual capital
Perhaps most importantly, rebalancing the Navys emphasis toward the Asia-Pacific region
includes efforts to expand and mature our partnerships and establish greater intellectual focus
on Asia-Pacific security challenges.
First, we are increasing the depth and breadth of our alliances and partnerships in the AsiaPacific. Our relationships in the region are the reason for our engagement there and are the
foundation of our rebalanced national security efforts. Our connection with Asia-Pacific
allies starts at the top. Our naval headquarters and command facilities are integrated with
those of Japan and South Korea and we are increasing the integration of our operating forces
by regularly conducting combined missions in areas including anti-submarine warfare and

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ballistic missile defense. We are also establishing over the next year a headquarters in
Singapore for our ships that will operate there.
We build our relationships with operational experience. The Navy conducts more than 170
exercises and 600 training events there every year with more than 20 allies and partners
and the number of events and partners continues to grow. Our 2012 Rim of the Pacific
Exercise, or RIMPAC, was the worlds largest international maritime exercise, involving
more than 40 ships and submarines, 200 aircraft, and more than 25,000 sailors from two
dozen Asia-Pacific countries. This year RIMPAC included several new partners, such as
Russia and India. It also incorporated naval officers from Canada, Australia, and Chile as
leaders of exercise task forces. Like our other exercises, RIMPAC practices a range of
operations, building partner capacity in missions such as maritime security and humanitarian
assistance while enhancing interoperability with allies in sophisticated missions such as antisubmarine and surface warfare and missile defense.
Second, we are refocusing attention on the Asia-Pacific in developing and deploying our
intellectual talent. The Naval War College is the nations premier academic center on the
region and continues to grow its programs on Asian security, while the Naval Postgraduate
School expanded its programs devoted to developing political and technical expertise
relevant to the Asia-Pacific. We continue to carefully screen and send our most talented
people to operate and command ships and squadrons in the Asia-Pacific.
Third, as described above, the Navy is sharpening its focus on military capabilities needed in
the Asia-Pacific. Most important is the ability to assure access, given the distances involved
in the region and our treaty alliances there. Having a credible ability to maintain operational
access is critical to our security commitments in the region and the diplomatic and economic
relationships those commitments underpin. We are developing the doctrine, training and
know-how to defeat access threats such as submarines and cruise and ballistic missiles
through our Air-Sea Battle concept. With Air-Sea Battle, we are pulling together the
intellectual effort in needed areas, including intelligence and surveillance, cyber operations,
anti-submarine warfare, ballistic missile defense, air defense, and electronic warfare. The
Air-Sea Battle Office leads this effort with more than a dozen personnel representing each
military service.
Our credibility in these missions rests on the proficiency our forces deployed every day in
the Asia-Pacific. We increased our live-fire training in air defense and in surface and antisubmarine warfare by more than 50 percent, and expanded the number and sophistication of
training events we conduct in theater with our partners and allies. For example, in RIMPAC
2012, U.S. allies and partners shot 26 torpedoes and more than 50 missiles from aircraft and
ships against a range of targets and decommissioned ships.
A Global Fleet
Even as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the Navy will remain engaged around the world.
We will maintain our presence to deter and respond to aggression in support of our partners
in the Middle East. In Europe we will build our alliance relationships. Our basing of ballistic
missile defense destroyers to Spain is part of this effort, as an element of the overall
European Phased Adaptive Approach. The home-porting of U.S. ships in Europe will yield
greater opportunities for integration with European forces as well.
In South America and Africa we will shift, as the Defense Strategic Guidance directs, to
innovative, low-cost approaches, including JHSV, AFSB, and LCS. In contrast to our
approach today, which is to send the destroyers and amphibious ships we have when
available, these new ships will be better suited to operations in these regions and will be
available full-time thanks to their rotational crews.

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The Asia-Pacific will become increasingly important to our national prosperity and security.
It is home to the worlds largest and most dynamic economies, growing reserves of natural
resources, and emerging security concerns. Naval forces, with their mobility and relevance in
peacetime and conflict, are uniquely poised to address these challenges and opportunities and
sustain our leadership in the region. With our focus on partnerships and innovative
approaches, including new ships, forward homeporting, and rotational crewing, the Navy can
rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific while being judicious with the nations resources. We will
grow our fleet in the Asia-Pacific, rebalance our basing, improve our capabilities, and focus
intellectually on the region. This will sustain our credibility to deter aggression, preserve
freedom of maritime access, and protect the economic livelihood of America and our
friends.173

Author Contact Information


Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610

173

Jonathan Greenert, Sea Change, The Navy Pivots to Asia, Foreign Policy (www.foreignpolicy.com), November
14, 2012.

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