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Jinnahs Role in the Indian Legislative Assembly and National

Politics (1924-1930).

INTRODUCTION
Jinnah began political life by attending the Congress's twentieth annual meeting, in Bombay in
December 1904. He was a member of the moderate group in the Congress, favouring Hindu
Muslim unity in achieving self-government, and following such leaders as Mehta, Naoroji,
and Gopal Krishna Gokhale. They were opposed by leaders such as Tilak and Lala Lajpat Rai,
who sought quick action towards freedom. In 1906, a delegation of Muslim leaders headed by
the Aga Khan called on the new Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, to assure him of their loyalty and
to ask for assurances that in any political reforms they would be protected from the
"unsympathetic [Hindu] majority". Dissatisfied with this, Jinnah wrote a letter to the editor of the
newspaper Gujarati, asking what right the members of the delegation had to speak for Indian
Muslims, as they were unelected and self-appointed. When many of the same leaders met
in Dacca in December of that year to form the All-India Muslim League to advocate for their
community's interests, Jinnah was again opposed. The Aga Khan later wrote that it was
"freakishly ironic" that Jinnah, who would lead the League to independence, "came out in bitter
hostility toward all that I and my friends had done ... He said that our principle of separate
electorates was dividing the nation against itself. In its earliest years, however, the League was
not influential; Minto refused to consider it as the Muslim community's representative, and it was
ineffective in preventing the 1911 repeal of the partition of Bengal, an action seen as a blow to
Muslim interests.
Although Jinnah initially opposed separate electorates for Muslims, he used this means to gain
his first elective office in 1909, as Bombay's Muslim representative on the Imperial Legislative
Council. He was a compromise candidate when two older, better-known Muslims who were
seeking the post deadlocked. The council, which had been expanded to 60 members as part of
reforms enacted by Minto, recommended legislation to the Viceroy. Only officials could vote in
the council; non-official members, such as Jinnah, had no vote. Throughout his legal career,

Jinnah practised probate law (with many clients from India's nobility), and in 1911 introduced
the Wakf Validation Act to place Muslim religious trusts on a sound legal footing under British
Indian law. Two years later, the measure passed, the first act sponsored by non-officials to pass
the council and be enacted by the Viceroy. Jinnah was also appointed to a committee which
helped to establish the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun.
In December 1912, Jinnah addressed the annual meeting of the Muslim League, although he was
not yet a member. He joined the following year, although he remained a member of the Congress
as well and stressed that League membership took second priority to the "greater national cause"
of a free India. In April 1913, he again went to Britain, with Gokhale, to meet with officials on
behalf of the Congress. Gokhale, a Hindu, later stated that Jinnah "has true stuff in him, and that
freedom from all sectarian prejudice which will make him the best ambassador of Hindu
Muslim Unity". Jinnah led another delegation of the Congress to London in 1914, but due to the
start of the First World War found officials little interested in Indian reforms. By coincidence, he
was in Britain at the same time as a man who would become a great political rival of
his, Mohandas Gandhi, a Hindu lawyer who had become well known for advocating satyagraha,
non-violent non-cooperation, while in South Africa. Jinnah attended a reception for Gandhi, and
returned home to India in January 1915.

During the era since 1924 to 1930, Jinnah not only struggled to revive AIML as an active
Muslim political organization, but also tried to revive Hindu-Muslim unity for achieving
dominion status with complete self-government. His basic motif was to started a united
constitutional struggle through legislature assemblies and give such a constitution to the in which
representatives of the people should have control and responsibility over their affairs.
Jinnahs Role in the National Politics (1924-1930)
In December 1906, Jinnah joined active politics when he attended Calcutta session of the
Congress as a delegate and honorary secretary to President Dadabhai Naorji. From the very first
day he struggled from the Congress plat forum for attainment of self-rule in India. Association
with Congress helped Jinnah move quickly to the center of political stage. Later on, when AIML

as a Muslim political organization also agitated for self-government suitable to India, Jinnah
joined it in 1913. Since 1913, Jinnah tried his best to unite Muslim and Hindu for freedom of
India. The achievement of Lucknow Pact in 1916 was an evident instance in this regard which
earned him the title of Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. However the present essay is an
attempt to highlight Jinnahs role as a politician from 1924 to 1930.
Jinnahs effort of keeping both Hindus and Muslims unite for achieving self-government
via constitutional means saw a setback since 1921. The things slipped out of his control when
Congress under Mohandas Gandhi decided to joined hands with the khilafatists and started NonCooperation, to pressurize the British Government in Nagpur session of Indian National
Congress in December 1920. Though Jinnah prepared the ground for the onset of NonCooperation movement, he kept himself aloof from the movement as he was against Gandhis
approach. He was aware of the fact the Khilafat leadership was taking the Muslin to nowhere.
His aim was to start such a movement with much vigor and determination after securing
representation in the council elections held under the Reformed Act of 1919. Jinnah bitterly
opposed the non-cooperation methods promote by Mohandas Gandhi, which among other
things called for triple boycott of law courts, schools and legislature. His main argument on the
basis of which he remained aloof from the Congress agitation politics was that the program of
Gandhi was taking the Muslim to a wrong channel.
Similarly as a matter of fact, Jinnah had more political experience and sagacity than the Gandhi
as the former appeared a decade earlier on the Indian political scene than the latter. In this entire
decade Jinnahs stance was based on the moderate constitutionalism for opposing British
dictatorial policies. For instance, when Gandhi invited him to join his program, Jinnah replied, I
am afraid that it must lead to disaster.your extreme program has for the movement captured
the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and illiterate. All this mean
complete dis-organization and chaos. What the consequence of this may be..?
The reason that Jinnah kept himself aloof from Indian politics till 1923 is that, he was
convinced that the methods of Non-Cooperation had complete lack of touch with realities of
modern politics and had to wait until constitutional politics and methods made a comeback. Even
in 1922, he had made an effort via the All- Parties Conference to bring the government and the
leaders of the Non-cooperation for a round table conference. But, before any positive outcome,

the Chaura Chauri incident changed the entire situation as predicted by Jinnah. Similarly the
Khilafat Non-cooperation Movement received another shock in 1924, when Mustafa Kamal
abolished the institution of khilafat. It was in this backdrop that Jinnahs political acumen proved
true and the Khilafat Movement not only failed to achieve its main objective i.e. restoration of
Khilafat of Turkey but also resulted in end of communal harmony between Muslim and Hindus
built by Jinnah. The result was Jinnahs seclusion from politics. Furthermore, the only office
Jinnah held was the Bombay Home Rule League and that too for a very limited period of time
for the interest of All-India.
The years of political inactivity and setback for Jinnah ended in November 1923. He was
elected as independent member of the Legislative Assembly from Bombay on Muslim seat.
Similarly in May 1924, he was elected President of the Lahore Session of League and re-elected
unopposed as Leagues president on permanent basis in 1928. Furthermore, Jinnah never
believed in the back-door entry into the legislature. He always preferred to be the representative
of the people instead of governments nominee. For instance, in the elections of 1926, he issued
manifesto, addressed public meetings and issued press statements. There were two other
contestants to the Mohamedan seat in the Central Assembly named, Hassanbhai A.Lalji
(Sawarajist) and Salehbhoy K.Barodwala (independent). Despite that dual opposition and
extensive propaganda, the turnout was 41% in which more than 95% voted for Jinnah. Similarly
Jinnah was elected unopposed as member of the Central Legislature against the sane seat in
1930.
Jinnah as a Muslim politician worked for the Communal Settlement between Hindus and
Muslims to reach an agreeable constitutional formula. In this regard as President of AIML, he
gave the Delhi Muslim Proposals in 1927 with the basic concession of giving up Muslims right
of separate electorates. Similarly Jinnah also opposed the British Simon Commission in 1928
owing to the absence of any Indian member to the Commission. Jinnah even suggested the
government to constitute an Indian Commission with the same status, power and initiative of the
Simon Commission. Further, Jinnah in the capacity of an Indian politician and president of the
AIML opposed the Nehru Report for its anti-Muslim provisions and proposed three basic
amendments to the Report in order to be acceptable to the Indian Muslim. Finally when Jinnahs

amendments to the Nehru Report were ignored, he give his famous fourteen points as final
Muslim constitutional formula.
Jinnah and Delhi Muslim Proposals
On Quaid-i-Azams move, the All India Muslim League in its 18th session held in Delhi on 30
December 1926, adopted a resolution for an early appointment of Royal Constitutional
Commission to frame a new constitution for the country on a sound and permanent basis with the
provision for automatic progress to establish responsible government in India. However for that
the AIML was required to cooperate with other political parties of the country. But the British
government was not yet interested to appoint such a commission before 1929. So the Hindu and
Muslim leaders were bent upon working out the essentials of an agreed constitution for India so
that even if the Royal Commission was not appointed for the purpose, a united constitutional
formula on the behalf of all the political parties could be presented to the government for
implantation. The aim of such efforts was to evolve an agreeable settlement of the Communal
issue.
Early attempts were also made in this regard; however, no agreement could be evolved
on the communal issue owing to differences on the issue of Muslim representation in the
assemblies. On the other hand Jinnah who was in search of a scheme that gulf the bridge between
the two communities. But, the greatest hurdle in the way of communal settlement was the right
of separate electorates for the Muslims and other minorities as propagated by the Hindu political
parties. Similarly the Hindu members of Congress and other Hindu political parties had already
favored the proposal of joint electorates with reservation of seats for Muslims on the basis of
Lucknow Pact. Encouraged by this, Jinnah as president of AIML, invited other Muslim political
leaders including Sir Mohammad Shafi, Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Dr.M.A Ansari, Maulvi
Mohammad Yakub etc. to meet at Delhi on 20 March 1927, for settling the issue of electorates
and other matters of Muslim interest so that an advance could be made with other non-Muslim
parties to frame a common constitution. Jinnah presided over the meetings whose proceedings
were held in camera. After seven hours long and protracted discussion it was unanimously
resolved that Muslims should accept a settlement with the Hindus on the basis of the following
proposals better known as the Delhi Muslim Proposals, so far as representation in various
legislatures, in any future scheme of reforms was concerned.

1. Sindh should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into a separate
province.
2. Reforms should be introduced in NWFP and Baluchistan on the same footings as in any
other province in India.
3. Reservation of seats according to the population for different communities in the Punjab
and Bengal.
4. Muslims should be given 1/3rd representation in the Central Legislature.
5. In that case Muslims are prepared to accept joint electorates in all provinces so
constituted and are further willing to make to Hindu minorities in Sindh, Baluchistan and
NWFP, the same concession that the Hindu majorities in other provinces are prepared to
make to the Muslim minorities.
The relinquishment of the right to separate electorate was an unprecedented concession by
the Muslims and it was a major achievement of Jinnah to have convinced his colleagues to
accept this. It was the first time that the Muslim League had agreed to joint electorates and
would not do so ever again. Soon after these proposals were drafted, difference of opinion
increased particularly with reference to joint electorates for the Muslims. Muslim leaders of
Bengal and Punjab particularly resented the abolition of separate electorates for the Muslims.
Sir Mohammad Shafi, the ML leader from Punjab particularly expressed his resentment to
this point. Even late on, the provision of joint electorates made Sir Shafi to form his own
group of All India Muslim League, better known as the Shafi League. Precisely, the Punjab
Muslim League under Sir Mohammad Shafi decided to part away for the Jinnah Group.
However, to clear up misgivings and doubts about the scheme, Jinnah in a press statement
issued to the Associated Press on 29 March 1927, made it clear that,
The offer to accept a settlement on the basis of the proposals therein subject to
conditions precedent, before Musalmans would be prepared to accept joint electorates,
with reservation of seats.

Jinnahs Response to the Simon Commission


The Simon Commission was appointed by the British Government in November 1927 to frame a
new constitution for India. By statutory requirement the Commission was to be appointed in

1929, but due to some crucial political developments that the Government thought it advisable to
appoint it two years earlier. Muslim League was already divided on the issue of right of separate
electorates given up by the Muslims at Delhi for evolving an agreeable formula for the
Communal Settlement in India. Some of the Muslim leaders particularly Sir Mohammad Shafi
accused Jinnah of giving up separate electorates. Even the Shafi League in its meeting held on 1
May 1927 at Lahore passed four resolutions. In its second resolution they asserted that in India
separate communal electorates provided the only effective means for making Indian Legislature
truly representative of the Indian people and that Muslin community could not but to continue to
insist on the retention of communal electorates as an essential element of the Indian constitution.
Furthermore, the Muslim of Bihar and Orissa were also divided on this question. The
Bengal provincial Muslim Conference presided by the sir Abdur Rahim expressed their concerns
for accepting joint electorates. So it was in atmosphere of Hindu-Muslim conflict in which the
Muslims were also divided on the issue of separate electorates, that the Commission headed by
Sir John Simon, a constitutional expert and member of the British Parliament, was announced by
the Viceroy, Lord Irwan. The other six members were also members of the British Parliament
having no Indian member. Before announced of the Commission, Lord Irwan called all Indian
political leaders including Jinnah in November 1927 and expressed his intensions to formulate a
statutory commission. On 7 November, Jinnah issued a press statement from Bombay and made
the following appeal to the political leaders:
Without disclosing any secret, I may say that it is almost certain the Commission will be
announced on or about 8 November. The question is so vital to the interests of India that the
leaders of all the parties must jointly discuss the terms of proposals after they have appeared in
cold print and determine upon a common policy of action. And it this critical moment an
expression of any individual opinion committing the country in any way will be withheld until
the whole scheme is carefully examined.
Thus Jinnah urged all the party leaders for a joint action. After the announced of
Commission, an All Party Conference in Bombay on Jinnahs suggestion was held on 16
November 1927. Accordingly leaders of the Bombay representing different shades of political
thought participated in an informal conference at Bombay to consider what attitude they should
adopt towards the reform Commission. After an hour discussion a draft proposal prepared by

sub-committee headed by Jinnah, was adopted at this conference which protested the exclusion
of Indians from the Commission. In an exclusive interview after the conference, Jinnah declared
that, unless Indians are allowed to have a say in regard to the constitution of India and treated
on equal terms, the Commission will not be acceptable to the people of Bombay and that we
have nothing to do with it in any stage or form. Thus Jinnah announced his policy of boycott
towards the Commission. Jinnah lead was followed by the whole of India. Majority of political
parties in India adopted Jinnahs course to boycott the Commission. He adopted rigid stance at
different public meetings. In a public meeting in Bombay on 19 November 1927, Jinnah declared
that the appointment of a Commission including no Indian was an insult and affront to India.
Furthermore, the Simon Commission landed in Bombay on 3 February 1928, and Viceroy
issued an appeal for cooperation. In retaliation to that appeal certain party leader including
Jinnah issued counter statement urging upon the people not to cooperate with the Commission.
Though, the Shafi League passed a resolution which favored cooperation with the Commission.
Thus the commission was caught in atmosphere of cooperation and boycott during its visit to
different parts of the country. However, in most of the cases wherever it went, it invited strong
protests from the political India.
Moreover, DiwanChamanlal wrote an article in May 1928, in which he disclosed the
secret story of Jinnahs informal discussion of two hours with Simon at Viceroys lodge during
which Jinnah suggested the appointment of Indian Constitution Committee which should enjoy
equal powers and status with the Simon Commission. Simon plea was that the Viceroy has no
authority to appoint such a committee. It shows that Jinnah had even tried to show the right path
to the Government to come out of impasse by accepting his plea to allow the Indian
Committees equal status and power and initiative. The failure of the talks led Jinnah to boycott
the Simon Commission, which instead of resolving disunity among the Hindu and Muslims
political leaders exacerbated the differences in the Indian political world.

Mohammad Ali Jinnahs Response to the Nehru Report


The failure of Simon Commission to receive a total cooperation of India charged the political
situation not only in India but also in England. In his speech in the House of Lords announcing

the appointment of the Statutory Commission for India, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State
for India, had explained why no Indian had been put on the penal and had asserted that no
unanimous report could be expected from a body with all Indian representation. This was
resented by the Congress leaders, who as a challenge immediately decided to draft a constitution
confound the Indian Office. It was the time when Jinnah was in England. During Jinnahs
absence from India, the All Parties Conference including all non-cooperating groups in its
meeting held on 29 May 1928 at Bombay appointed a Committee to draw a constitution for
India. Motilal Nehru presided over these deliberations and gave his name to the Committee as
well as to the Report. There were two Muslim members among its seven members named Sir Ali
Imam and ShoabQureshi. The report drawn by the Committee better known as the Nehru
Report published in August 1928, among others suggested;
1.India should be given the status of a dominion.
2. There should be federal form of government with residuary powers vested in the center.
3. India should have a parliamentary form of government headed by a Prime Minister and six
ministers appointed by the Governor General.
4. There should be bi-cameral legislature.
5. There should be no separate electorate for any community.
6. System of weightage for minorities was as bad as that of separate electorates.
7. Reservation of Muslim seats could be possible in the provinces where Muslim population was
at least ten percent, but this was to be in strict proportion to the size of the community.
8. Muslims should enjoy one-fourth representation in the Central Legislature.
9. Sindh should be separated from Bombay only if the Committee certified that it was financially
self-sufficient.
10. The N. W. F. P. should be given full provincial status.
As for as Muslims reaction to the Report was concerned, almost all important sections of
Muslims rejected the Nehru Report. For instance, Members of the Central and Provincial

Assemblies rejected the Report. The Muslims were particularly perturbed, even those like the
Jinnah group who had gone to the extent of discarding separate electorate for the Muslims in the
hope that one third Muslim representation at the central legislature shall be ensured. At that time
Jinnah was in London. He did not send any cable to the Nehru Committee or any other body
conveying his approval. This was meant that Jinnah did not agree with the recommendations of
the Nehru Report.
Similarly, in a public meeting in Bombay on 24 October 1928 attended by about 5000
Muslim presided by Maulvi Mohammad Yaqub unanimously rejected the Nehru Report, terming
it Hindu Magna Carta.
It was in this highly charged atmosphere that Jinnah landed in Bombay on 20 October
1928. In his interview to the press, Jinnah declared that the Nehru Report was by no means the
last word on Hindu-Muslim relations in the country. Motilal Nehru invited Jinnah to attend the
meeting of the Nehru Committee to be held on 5 November 1928, but Jinnah declined that the
offer by saying: In my opinion the proposals formulated by you relating to the Hindu-Muslim
settlement may be treated as counter proposals which were practically endorsed by the Congress
at Madras and the League at Calcutta in December 1927. For bring unity amongst the Muslims,
Jinnah appealed Sir Shafi to attend the next meetings of AIML and desired: For the sake of
unity and interests of Muslims the past must be buried. In short in the meetings of Bombay
Muslim League held towards the end of November 1928, Jinnah made it clear that he was
opposed to the Nehru Report. Despite opposition from some of his close associates like M.C
Chagla, who was in favor of the Nehru Report, Jinnah in at the All-Parties Convention held at
Calcutta on 28 December 1928 suggested the following amendments to the Report:
1.1/3 seats instead of 1/4th in Central Legislature
2. Proportionate representation for Muslim in Punjab and Bengal for 10 Years
3. Residual Powers to Provinces instead of center
4. Complete independence instead of Dominion Status
Finally when on 12 March 1929, the Report was debated in the Indian Legislative
Assembly all Muslim members including Jinnah rejected it in strong terms that The Times

correspondent reported: The solidity of Muslim feeling in the Assembly was not unexpected, but
certainly disturbing to those trying to represent the Nehru Report as a demand of a united India.
Henceforth such a claim must be manifestly absurd.

Jinnahs fourteen Points: A Muslim Constitutional Formula for India.


Jinnah tried best for amendments in Nehru Report so that it could be acceptable to the Muslims.
However, the refusal to accept any amendments to the Nehru Report, on the part of Congress and
Hindu leaders at the All-Parties National Convention united the different factions of the Muslims
in the All-India Muslim Conference held in Delhi on 1 January 1929. The Muslims via a
resolution demanded some noteworthy proposals including federal system with complete
autonomy, Muslim should not be deprived of the right of separate electorates and that Muslims
should have due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets.
However, Muslim demands were given a more cogent presentation in the famous
fourteen points of Jinnah which had been presented before the AIML Council. In order to counter
the anti- Muslim proposals of the Nehru Report, the League after anxious and careful
consideration laid down that no scheme for the future constitution of the government of India
will be acceptable to the Mussalmans of India until and unless the following basic principles
were incorporated in it.
1. India should have a federal system with all the residuary powers vested in the provinces.
2.Provinces should be given complete provincial autonomy.
3. The principle of separate electorate should be given to the Muslims.
4. There should be effective representation of minorities in the provinces but majority should not
be reduced to minority, give representation to the minority in such a way that the majority
community could not be adversely affected.
5. In the Central Legislature, Muslims must have one-third representation.

6. No change in the boundaries of Punjab and Bengal be made that would adversely affect the
Muslim majority.
7. Religious freedom to all, this was not only for the Muslims but also for all those people who
were living there.
8. No law will be passed if three-fourth elected members of a community declare that, it is
against their interests.
9.Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.
10. Constitutional Reforms should be introduced in NWFP and Baluchistan on the same footings
as in other Indian provinces.
11. Muslims should be given along with other minorities adequate representation in government
jobs.
12. There should be adequate safeguards for the Muslim culture, civilization and their heritage,
language and education.
13. No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of
at least one-third Muslim ministers.
14. No constitutional amendment would be made unless all constituent units of a federation
agree to that, if you want to change the constitution then you must agree all the provinces.
Jinnahs fourteen points was basically Muslims constitutional formula for the communal
settlement in India. Except a few leaders like MulanaAbulKalam Azad, all India Muslim
politicians had realized the importance of Jinnahs fourteen points as the final and logical charter
of protecting Muslims Interest in India. Even it also resulted in the unification of the Jinnah and
Shafi groups of AIML in the next year, when in a meeting of the Council of Muslim League that
was held on 28 February 1930 in Delhi with Jinnah in the chair, in which over fifty Muslim
leaders from both factions participated and announced the re-unification of both the
sections.Similarly, at another meeting of in Delhi on 5 April 1931, in his presidential address
MulanaShaukat Ali made it clear that the All- India Muslim Conference and other Muslim
leaders stood by these fourteen points of Jinnah. Apart from the above mentioned facts,

Jinnahs fourteen points attained historical importance in Indian political-cum-constitutional


history in general and in Muslims in particular as it provided a rational solution to the
constitutional crisis in India.

Jinnah the Reorganizer of Muslim League

Throughout its history, All India Muslim League had to face many challenges and passed
through many crises. However, for the AIML, the most crucial juncture was the year 1927 when
it was divided into two groups: one led by Jinnah and the other by Sir Muhammad Shafi. The
AIML was reunited at Lahore but soon another serious challenge threatened its unity. Before
going into details of split and reunification of the AIML it seem appropriate to shed light on the
facts which led to its division into two groups.
In 1916 Jinnah held negotiations with Indian National Congress and reached an
agreement in order to put more pressure on the British Government with the aim that the
Government should have more liberal approach towards India. Jinnah struggled for joint front of
Muslim and Hindus against the government with the purpose that, the Indians should be given
their due share in the states affairs. Similarly it was at that time that, All India Muslim League
has also changed its earlier stance of loyalty towards the Britishers and decided to make a joint
front against the British government by joining hands with the Congress. The result of their
rapprochement was the famous Luknow Pact in 1916. Before this, the primary objective of the
League was to struggle for the interests of the Muslims only. However, some Muslim leaders
from Punjab led by Sir Mohammad Shafi stood firmly on the stance that the rights of the
Muslims should be preserved without taking any sort of confrontation with the British
Government. So they opposed the Lucknow Pact signed in December 1916 which was made
possible due to the untiring struggle of Jinnah regarding the question of communal settlement.
Sir Mohammad Shafi and his other conservative friends like Maulavi Rafi Uddin, Abdul Aziz

and Syed Ali Raza opposed the cooperation between AIML and INC purely on the grounds that it
would harm the interests of the Muslims in Punjab and Bengal in which they were in majority.
This group also refused the cooperation with other communities and stressed upon the status of
Muslims as a separate entity. According to S. Qalb-i-Abid, these conservative leaders in the
Punjab Muslim League under the leadership of Sir Mohammad Shafi were in collision with the
Punjab administration and revolted against the supporters of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali
Jinnah on various issues from time to time. This revolt against Jinnah resulted in the schism of
Punjab Muslim League in to two groups- the Jinnah group and the Shafi group. Though, the
differences did not come to the surface till the passage of Delhi Muslim Proposals by the
supporters of Jinnah in 1927.These deep divisions had earlier been designed under the British
conspiracy on the eve of culmination of the historical Lucknow Pact of 1916 between Congress
and All India Muslim League. This division reached its epic when an agreement was concluded
between the presidents of Jinnah League and Congress on 20 March 1927, better known as the
Delhi Muslim Proposals. The main bone of contention between the Shafi League and the Jinnah
League was the granting of the system of joint electorates by the Jinnah League to the Congress
in Delhi Proposals. It was during this juncture of history that, the Shafi League emerged as a
separate faction of AIML as they opposed the concession given by Jinnah to the Congress by
abandoning Muslims right of separate electorates on the guarantee of seats reservation for them
in the Central Legislature. Actually the leaders of the Shafi group were not realizing the fact that,
Jinnah had accepted the joint electorates in exchange for the safeguard of the Muslims interests
in all provinces.
Then,come the issue of cooperation with the Simon Commission sent by the British
Government in order to give recommendations about the constitutional reforms in India in
consultation with Indian leaders. The attitude of both factions the League towards the Simon
Commission was in complete diversion. For instance, The Shafi faction of the Muslim League
met in Lahore in 1928 and not onlyrejected the Delhi Proposals but also offered complete
cooperation to the Simon Commission. In retaliation to this behavior of the Shafi League, a
meeting of the Jinnah League was convened at Calcutta in 1928 and disowned the Shafi faction
of All India Muslim League. Moreover,the Jinnah League also adopted the Delhi Proposals and
declared its non-cooperation with the Simon Commission. The passage of Nehru Report, which
included anti- Muslim provisions, was the only opportunity which led towards the re-unification

of the both factions of All India Muslim League. In order to show a united opposition to the antiMuslim nature of the Nehru Report, several meetings of the All India Muslim Conference were
held in different places from time to time. However, it was on 28 February, after the Jumatul
Wida Prayers, a meeting of the Council of the AIML was held in the office of the AIML with
Jinnah as President. Members of both the sections of the AIML were present. Jinnah proposed a
resolution that the two factions of the AIML are now united. It was cordially seconded by Sir
Shafi. The resolution was unanimously adopted. Thus, the two Leagues were united after their
separation over two years ago.

Analysis

No history of the end of British rule in India is complete without discussing the role of Jinnah
and his political struggle.

Several influences shaped Jinnahs personality and political

disposition. These included the British legal education and law practice, association with liberal
politics in India, a deep understanding of the rise and fall of the Muslims in history and
inspirations from egalitarianism, socio-economic justice and reformism in the teachings and
principles of Islam.
The protection and advancement of the Muslim identity, rights and interests became the main
concern of the Muslim leaders. However, they changed their strategies over time for pursuing the
aforementioned goal.
Their major strategies in the 20th century were:
1.

Separate electorate (1906) and the setting up of a separate political party in December
1906, the All India Muslim League, as a forum for articulating demands of the educated
Muslims and presenting them to the British government.

2.

The demands for constitutional safeguards and guarantees for the protection of the
separate identity and interests of the Muslims.

3.

From the late 1920s, the Muslim League demanded federalism with provincial autonomy
for India.

4.

Allama Muhammad Iqbals presidential address to the 1930 Allahabad session of the All
India Muslim League underlined the significance of Islam in the distinct political and
cultural profile of the Muslims. He advocated the setting up of a distinct Muslim political
authority in the Muslim majority areas of northwest India to secure their future. Selfgovernment within the British empire or without the British empire.

5.

Transition from a community to nationhood and the demand for a separate homeland in
1937-1947

Quaid-i-Azam played a key role in pursuing these strategies and changing them over time against
the backdrop of the political interaction with the British government and the Congress Party,
especially the latter.
His influence in both the Muslim League and the Congress led these parties to agree to
constitutional proposals in Lucknow in 1916 that included safeguards for the Muslims
representation in the elected and executive bodies.
The notion of electoral weightage was introduced in these constitutional proposals in order to
improve the political conditions of the Muslims in the non-Muslim majority provinces by
providing slightly more representation than their population.
The same electoral weightage facility was offered to non-Muslims in Muslim majority
provinces.
The Muslim demand for reservation of one-third seats for the Muslims in the central legislature
and a similar representation for the Muslims in government jobs was included in these
constitutional proposals. All this was meant to secure the Muslim rights and interests.
Subsequently, Jinnah advocated the separation of Sindh from Bombay. This demand was
repeated until Sindh became a separate province in 1935. There were also repeated demands for

political and constitutional reforms in Balochistan and NWFP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) to


gradually bring these regions at par with other provinces. Both were Muslim majority areas.
Jinnahs famous Fourteen Points (1929) advocated purely important political and constitutional
demands for the protection and advancement of the Muslim identity, rights and interests in
response to the negative disposition of the Nehru Report (1928) towards the Muslims so far as
constitutional and political reforms was concerned.
These demands were meant to secure the Muslim identity, rights and interests within Indian
federation. However, the political experience of the Muslim League elite during 1928-39
convinced them that their cultural and political future may not be secure in a united India ruled
by the Congress Party because the Congress Party leadership had adopted a dismissive attitude
towards the Muslim League leadership and their political demands.

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