Lab Report #3

Jonathan Leonard & Peter Osunde

December 11, 2014

Important Terms and Definitions

Anthropogenic Brought about by human influence on nature

(environment/ecosystem)

Securitization The process of identifying and responding to risks. In

securitization, actors distribute speech acts thatdeclareariskasathreat
when the audience widely accepts the issue as athreat and condones a
response to it, the issue has been securitized and is now a security
issue

Existential Threat A threat involving risk to the continuedexistence of

thehumanspecies

Design
Context of Research and Relevance
The bulk of the labs research perches atop two central assumptions. These
assumptions are that (1) anthropogenicecologicaldestruction posesan existentialrisk
to all biologicallybased lifeforms, and(2)thatrisksaretransformedintosecuritythreats
through aninherentlypoliticizedprocesswhichisreferredtobytheCopenhagenSchool
as securitization1. For the following investigation to hold any merit, the reader must
accept (orat leasthumor) thesetwoassumptions as foundational contexts uponwhich
theresearchisconducted.

According to Buzan/Hansen,the securitization ofrisksmovesalongaparticularpolitical

spectrum.2 Risks begin as nonpoliticized, meaning that they are not even on the
securitization radar. This is the category that ecosystemic degradation fell into when
1

By talkingsecurity anactortries to move a topicaway from politicsand into anareaofsecurityconcerns

therebylegitimatingextraordinarymeansagainstthesociallyconstructedthreat.
2
Buzan, B & Hansen, L (2009) Widening and deepeningsecurity, The EvolutionofInternational Security
Studies.1sted.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.187225.

many human societies believed that the world and nature were so vast and
inconsumable that human activity wasincapable ofdrasticallyaffecting it. It has since
moved intothe category ofthe political requiring governanceand attention, andoften
becoming the topic of debate. It has not, however, been able totransitiontothe final
phase: securitization a phase where the issue is no longer debated, and a heavy
emphasisisplacedupondirectlyaddressingthethreat.

Perceived security threats in the era of modernInternationalRelations (IR) havebeen

largely military in nature. IR based security is primarily concerned with the physical
defense of the nationstate, its people, and its resources. Through a process called
widening and deepening profound securityrisks outside of traditionalmilitary security
havebeenrealized. Thedegradationoftheglobalecosystemandtherecognitionofthe
securitythreatthatitposesseemstobeexperiencingadelayedsecuritization.

With higher temperatures, changing landscapes, economic losses and wildlife at risk,
scientists3have discoveredthatglobalecosystemicsymptoms,suchasclimatechange,
do pose a serious threat. The emergent symptoms of global ecological damage are
being closely trackedby members of thescientific community.4 5 6Itseemsthatnearly
every scientist who monitors global ecological health has reached a consensus
anthropogenic ecosystem degradation poses an existential risk.7 With such a high
percentage of institutionalized and credibleexpertsmaking declarations ofexistential
risk, one might assume that the securitization of this risk would occur rapidly and
smoothly, and that speech acts seeking to securitizeglobalecosystemicissues would
be widely accepted by members of the nonexpert community as well. However,this
has not been the case. The recognition of ecological damage as an existential threat
has not reached a comparable consensus in the nonexpert community. The very
existenceof damageis a politicallycontested matterandretainsasignificantnumberof
politically influential skeptics8 . This disconnect between expert and nonexpert
communities, and the associated retardation of global ecosystemic securitization, is
3

V. Ramaswamy et. al. Anthropogenic and Natural Influences in the Evolution of Lower Stratospheric
Cooling.Science311(24February2006)11381141
4
B.D. Santer et.al., A search for human influencesonthethermalstructureoftheatmosphere,Naturevol
382,4July1996,3946
5
Gabriele C. Hegerl, Detecting GreenhouseGasInduced Climate Change with an Optimal Fingerprint
Method,JournalofClimate,v.9,October1996,22812306
6
B.D. Santer et.al., Contributions of Anthropogenic and Natural Forcing to Recent Tropopause Height
Changes,Sciencevol.301(25July2003),479483.
7
NASA, Global Climate Change Vital Signs of the Planet. Consensus: 97% of climate scientists agree
http://climate.nasa.gov/scientificconsensus
8
Inhofe, J. (2012). The Greatest Hoax: how global warming conspiracy threatens your future. (Ed),
WashingtonDC.WNDBooks

what inspired the authors of this research to investigate the topic. With reference to
security andsecuritization,UlrichBeck9 calls experts, individualsor groupswhodorisk
assessment and create technological opportunities. In other words, experts are
individuals who provide answers to the question ofwhat constitutesathreat it isthen
the taskof these experts toinformaudiencesonwhatistobeconsidered threatening,
andhowmuchofitposesasubstantialrisk.

Tobetterexamine the characteristicsoftheglobalecologicalthreat,itiscontrastedwith

another anthropogenic existential risk one whose nonexpert community nearly
reached consensus regarding the recognition of the threat Nuclear Holocaust. By
contrasting these two risks, we point to to discrepancies in their characteristics which
mayshedlightonthedifferentiatingspeed,totality,andemphasisoftheirsecuritization.
Research Question
Why have relevant scientific communities reached a consensus about the existential
riskof the global ecological threat,while relevantpoliticalcommunitiesaredividedin its
recognition? How does this uneven process of threat recognition contrast to the
securitization of another anthropogenically manufactured existential risk nuclear
holocaustwhichsharesthepotentialoutcomeofplanetaryuninhabitability?

Ultimatelythefinalquestionis:
whichof the differing componentsofthesetworiskscanbeusedtotheorizeabouttheir
differingprocessesofsecuritization?

Theoretical Premises
In thecontext of this lab,wearelookingtotheorize(generatetheoriesabout)whythere
is a rift in threat recognition between experts and nonexperts on the topic of global
ecological degradation. In constructing our theory, we lean heavily upon a set of
established security studies thinkers and their respective ontological and
epistemologicalfoundations.

The Copenhagen School, drawing from its understanding of the speech act, views
securitization as not just any form ofsocial construction, but thecasting ofan issueas
posing an existential threat10 whichcallsfor extraordinarymeasuresgoingbeyond the
routine of everyday politics and social constructions11 . That being said, Buzan argues
9

Beck, U. (2008).WorldatRisk:ThenewtaskofcriticalTheory.Developmentand Society.Vol 37.No1.Pp

121
10
Collins,A.(2012).ContemporarySecurityStudies.London.OxfordUniversityPress
11
Buzan.B,Waever,O.etal(1998).Security:ANewFrameworkforAnalysis.London.LynneRienner

thatsecuritization isconstructivist12 atitscore.Thatis,securityandthreatsarenotfixed

objectives but rather are a result ofsocialconstructs and perceptions. Insecuritization,
an issue only becomes a security threat when it is accepted as threatening by the
audienceofasecuritizingspeechact.

Ontological Foundations
The very ontological frame of the global ecological threat may be the first clue to
illuminating the different securitization processes. To trulyrecognize globalecological
degradation as a collective threat, one mustconceptualizetheglobalasatightlywoven
web of interconnected and inseverable biological systems. This concept can be
abrasive for those whoaremoreaccustomedtoIRtheorieswhichframetheglobal asa
seriesofgeographicallyboundsovereignentitieswhichcompeteforlimitedresourcesin
arelative gainsscenario. Theprevalenceofthisontologyasthestatusquoforsecurity
framing isapart ofourtheorizationaboutwhy nuclearwarssecuritizationprocesswas
more rapid andsocietallynormalized13 than thatofglobalecologicaldegradationwhich
requiresaglobal systems ontologyin order for the threatsmagnitude andtotalitytobe
recognized.

Epistemological Foundations
Ourtheoriesarelaunchedfromapositivistepistemological foundation, one whichuses
thedataandmeasurementsofexpertstodeterminethatthreatsexist. Thistechnocratic
epistemology ofpositivismisespeciallyapplicabletoglobalecologicalrisk,andexistsin
the form of directly measuring (temperatures/ozone/extinctions/sealevel) and
correlating those measurements with emergent symptoms (frequency of
droughts/storms). The nuclear threat, although able to be positively measured at the
site of a warheads detonation and then extrapolated forscale,doesnt lean so heavily
onpositivisminitssecuritizationprocess.

In the constructivist epistemology, meanings are constructed frameworks rather that

direct reflections of reality14 . Many well established societal constructions, such as
othering and fear mongering, lend weight to the securitizing speech acts of interstate
nuclear war. These emotionally basedsocietalconstructionsseemtohavehadamore
substantial effect upon swaying speech act audiences than the institutionally imbued
expertise of the scientific community, which remains in isolated consensus regarding
12

Balzacq. T, (2012). Constructivismand Securitization Studiesin MyriamDunnCavelty &VictorMauer,

eds.,HandbookofSecurityStudies.London.Routledge.
13
Williamson, Piers R. (2014). Risks andSecuritizationinJapan:19451960. (Pp3336) New York,NY:
Routledgebooks
14
Gordon, M. (2009). Toward A Pragmatic Discourse of Constructivism,: Reflections on Lessons from
practice.EducationalStudiesVol45,Pp3958.AmericanEducationalStudiesAssociation

therecognitionoftheglobalecologicalthreat.

Data Gathering

Our data gathering is centered around the differentiation of our two anthropogenic
existential risks. To do an initial measurement of threat recognition, we categorically
divide the globe into four societal groups and investigate the prevalence of threat
recognition and response in each category. We then develop some basic ways to
guagethelevelofsecuritizationineachcommunity:

Thecategorieswehavechosenare:
(1) Business amount of money businesses are willing tospend mitigatingthe threat
(nuclearbunkers,drills,orcostsassociatedwithgoinggreen
(2)OrganizedcivilsocietynumberofNGOscreatedrelatingtothethreat
(3)Governmentprevalenceofthreatsthemesinlawsandpoliticalelectionplatforms
(4) The global populace prevalence of keyword search terms or social media
viralityfortermsrelatedtothethreat

Therisk componentswhichwe identifyasbeingsignificantly differentfromoneanother

are investigated via data gathering for the purposes of: verification of the their
existence, explorationoftheirpotentialeffectsuponsecuritization,and usefulnessinthe
construction of an exportable hypothesis whichis applicable to other riskssharing this
characteristic discrepancy. Datagatheringis also used tomeasurethe extentto which
thesecuritizationofariskhasbeenachieved.

Analytical Framework

By comparing the two threats and then examining their divergent components, we
construct theories as to how these characteristics affect the securitization process.
Central to our theories is the premise that securitization is based upon threat
perception, which canbedrasticallydifferentthanactualriskcalculus. Perceptionisthe
point where the audience widely accepts (or denies) the speech act promoting the
threat, and recognizes (or denounces/ignores) it as a valid (or invalid) threat for
securitization. In order to explore thesecuritization of each risk, therearecertain units
of analysis thatareidentifiedtohelpguidetheconstructionofa hypothesisandarriveat
aninformedinference.Theseunitsofanalysisinclude:

Distribution of Fear
Huysmans argues that security response policies do not happen instantaneously. He
argues that responses to perceived security threats are part of a continuous
prestructured psychological process based on the distribution and administration of
fear among the people in a society by the securitizing agents.15 Huysmanssresearch
postulates that, unless thereis adequate fearofimminentthreat,the issuewillfailtobe
universallysecuritized (as measured inthe foursections ofsocietyoutlinedabove). An
analysis of fear distribution for each of the threats posed(both ecological degradation
andnuclear war) will provide insights into itsroleinthesecuritizationprocess. Pushing
beyond the recognition of the role of fear, the analysis examines which actors are
activelydistributingfear.

Theconstructionoftheother
Societies have a tendency to rally their preferred security issues around fear and
ostracization of the other16. During the emergence of nuclear risk, was clear exactly
who the other was (the other state). Global ecological damage, in contrast, is
perpetratedsystemicallybyalmosteveryhumanoneartheveryonewhoparticipatesin
the global market. Effectively othering a group of people to serve as targets proves
more difficult when damage is not done directly from human to human, but instead
distributedviatheproxyofecosystemicdegradation.

Despite the complexities associated with isolating accountable individuals or

organizations, prosecuritization groups have made attempts at othering the agents
which they perceives as ecologically damaging or otherwise opposed to speech acts
securitizing the anthropogenic and existential global ecological threat. Here we can
observe an example of a vituperative discourse launched by Amazon Watch (an
organized civil society actor) attempting to other the antisecuritization agent the
Chevron corporation17. At the latest United Nations hosted climate talk in LimaPeru,
negotiators proposed a new carbon plan which ExxonMobil and Shell would cease to
exist in their current forms.18 This example demonstrates the othering which has
beenutilizedbyCSOsandisbeginningtobeadoptedbygovernmentbodies.

Inadvertency of Hazard Production

15

Huysmans,J.(2006).ThePoliticsofInsecurity:Fear,MigrationandAsylumintheEU.Routledge
Huysmans,J.(2004)MindingExceptions:ThePoliticsofInsecurityandLiberalDemocracy. Contemporary
PoliticalTheory.Vol3
17
AmazonWatch,HallofShame?Wehaveawinner!October22,2014
http://amazonwatch.org/news/2014/1022hallofshamewehaveawinner
18
Clark,Pilita.(Dec72014)UNclimatetalkscallfutureofenergymajorsintoquestion.FinancialTimes
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c542393c7dbf11e4bb0a00144feabdc0.html#axzz3LWMbB3Rm
16

The securitization of threats to global ecology can be retarded by the inadvertency of

the hazardsproduction. In the nuclear securitization scenario,thegoaloftheactionis
for humans, states, or civilizations tocause direct damage toother humans, states,or
civilizations. Inregardstotheecosystem,thegoalofpollutantactivityisusuallytoseek
monetary gains on an individual or small group scale. Its much easier to politically
mobilize a risk when its basis is an advertent aggression, rather than an inadvertent
byproduct of negligent and normalized greed. The state, as a well established
securitizing agent, is accustomed toidentifyingaggressions with theaimofneutralizing
the threats posedbybelligerents. Becauseofthiswellestablishedframingofthreats,it
is easier to politicize risks of direct aggression and more difficult to politicize risks of
inadvertent byproduction. The UNDP postulates that new threats are often the
unintended consequences ofsocial, economic, andenvironmental changesrather than
the deliberate threateningactions ofother states19 . This deviates fromtraditionalrealist
thought which see security threats as deliberate intentional attacks uponthesovereign
territory.

Certainecosystemicallydamagingevents havebeeneffectivelypoliticized,likethehigh
profile lawsuit filed by Steven Donzigeron behalf of a group of Ecuadorian villagers in
response to an oil dumping event.20 However, despite the sporadic successful
environmental speech act, most ecological destruction is caused by nonevents. The
averagepedestrianbiproduction of ecologicaldamage canbedifficulttosecuritizedue
to alackofaudienceinterestinnormalizednonevents. Thisadvertencyofnuclearwar,
however, is apparent. Nuclear weapons were developed for the sole purpose of
attacking,threatening,ordeterringotherhumans,states,orinstitutions.

Authority and resources of those producing and opposing the speech act
The term institutional inclusivity refers to the process by which various actors and
referent subjectsareempoweredtoparticipateinandinfluencepoliciesanddecisions21 .
A systemic lack ofwidespreadinstitutionalinclusivity canenableaclass ofpower elite
toactasantisecuritizationagentstopreservetheirownwealthproduction.Thehumans
who actuallysufferbodily harmfromthe symptoms of ecosystemic degradationarethe
same humans who are institutionally excluded from participation in securitization
politics. So long as the power elite forgo any of the personal harm resulting from
ecological degradation, the system of normalized environmental disregard can be
allowed to continue as the dominant political norm. In a society, regardless of how
19

UNDP(1994).NewDimensionsofHumanSecurity.HumanDevelopmentReport
StevenDonziger,http://stevendonziger.com/
21
Lee, T.(2007), The Politicsof Democratic Inclusion (Ed) by Christina Wolbrechtand Rodney E.Hero.
JournalofPolitics,69:590
20

(un)balanced or(un)equal,there exist a power elite22 . Thispaints a picture of asystem

ofunequaldistributionofpowertoaprivilegedfew,creatinglimitedpositionsthathavea
privileged capacity totransform issues into security issues23 . C.WrightMillsstatesthat
the general objective of the power elite is to maintain the status quo, and that they
colludebased on narrow shorttermcollective interests. There isacommoninclination
forthepower elitetoimpedethesecuritizationoftheglobalecosystemwhenitdoesnot
fall within their economic interestssuchaswhenhigherproductioncostsareneededin
order to reduce ecological damage. Global business as usual is a recipe for for
predictableglobalturmoil24 .

Temporality
Its human beings who are undeniably doing the securitizing of issues. Thus, arisks
timeline incomparison tohumanlife spansand organizationshas an immensebearing
upon the securitization process. The longevity of a threat refers to both the
permanence of the hazard and the time it takes before it does significant harmtothe
objectunderthreat. Whenwetalkaboutathreatbeingfastorslow,wearedoingso
from the reference point of the human being. A human being is likely toconsider an
angry mob an immediate threat to their well being, and the habitual consumption of
cigarettes tobe a longtermthreat. Whenthethreatenedobjectisapoliticalparty,the
term of threat isoften boundedbythelengthoftimewhichthatpoliticalparty remainsin
office sometimes limited to a few years. Many state based wouldbe securitizers of
environmental threats aremore interested inreceivingpublicrecognitionforaddressing
threats than they are genuinelyinterested inthemitigation ofthreatsthemselves. The
possibility that the beneficialresults of their hard work couldemergeduring the elected
term of an opponent from a competing political party can dissuade termbased
institutionalizedleadersfromprioritizinglongtermsolutionsandlongtermthreats.

Global ecological degradation is a slow moving and longterm process25 , making a

humanlifespanorgovernmenttermawoefullyinadequatetimeframetouseasametric.
Thus, the delayed initiation of the ecosystemic securitization process becomes
problematic as securitization demands that urgent and immediate action be taken by
22

MillsC.W,(1956).ThePowerElite.OxfordUniversityPress

23

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,
Alternatives:Global,Local,Political27(SpecialIssue):6392
24
Booth, K. (2008). Theory of World Security. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Vol 105.
London.CambridgeUniversityPress
25
Dalby,S. (2009)Securing PreciselyWhat? Global, Environmental, andHumanSecurity, pg36Security
andEnvironmentalChange.Polity.

securitizing actors26. Securityconstructedaroundthetenetsofhumansecuritydoesnot

yetregisterimmediatethreatresultingfromecosystemicdegradation.

Threat Inertia
We refer to the reversibility and cumulitiveness of a threat as its threat inertia.Some
threatscanbe avoided orimmediatelyreversedthosearethreatswhichweprofess
to to have low (or no) threat inertia. Threats which are cumulative and difficult to
reverse are consideredto haveahigh threatinertia. Applyingthisconcepttothethreat
of global ecological damage, we can safely classify it as a high inertia threat with
complex cumulative properties and systemic irreducibility, making the prospects for
immediatereversalofitsinertiaillusive.Furthermore,whenthreatenedobjectsdofinally
become so directly affected by ecological damage that universal threat recognition is
achieved, thethreatinertiamaybetoopowerful,andthesystemicdamagesirreparable.
Nuclear war, in contrast, has almost nothreatinertia (fromapositivist stance). Its an
eventbased, all or nothing scenario where the damage is either nonexistant or wide
sweeping. Toevoke analogy,the nuclearthreatis like a piano hanging fromacord: if
the cord iscut the pianowillbenearlyimpossibletoreverse. Ecologicaldamageislike
a giant boulder rolling down a slight decline it will continue to slowlygain momentum
until it is extremely difficult to reverse but unlike the piano, has already definitively
beguntogaininertia.

Threatcomplexity
The term emergence refers to the fundamental irreducibility of complex systems to
their constitutive parts27 . Threats which suffer from systemic emergence are more
difficult to securitize because the audience to the speechact has a more difficult time
comprehending them, and thus are lesslikely toacceptandrallybehindthem. Infact,
even the attempt to analyze individual elements of metaissues hasbeen criticizedby
thinkers who prefer a moreholistic systemicapproach. The most importantadvantage
of systemic approaches is that they allow us to grasp social (or environmental)
complexityexplicitlyinwaysthateludethemicrobasedstudies28 .

The global ecosystem suffers from this emergencebecause it issystemically complex

andincludes manycomponentswhicharenothumanconstructs,givingitahighdegree
26

Wver,Ole.1995.SecuritizationandDesecuritization.InOnSecurity,ed.
RonnieLipschutz.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
27
Cedarman, L (1997). Emergent Actorsin WorldPolitics:HowStates andNationsDevelopandDissolve.
PrincetonUniversityPress
28
Cederman,L.&Girardin,Luc(2010).GrowingSovereignty:ModelingtheShiftfromIndirecttoDirectRule.
InternationalStudiesQuarterly54(2010)

of macrosecurital complexity. This can inhibit the ability of securitizing agents and
speechact audiences to isolate and address the individual (i.e. regional, categorical,
social) components contributing to the metarisk. Nuclear war, on the other hand, is
more of a technologically advanced version of the realists anarchy model whereby
communities and nation states are invaded by other communities and nation states.
Despite the complexity of theweaponssystems used innuclear war, the threat itselfis
baseduponaverysimplisticandfamiliardesign.

Analysis of Design & Framework

How is our design/framework addressing the global

It develops a framework for addressing key components of threats to the global
ecosystem. The framework investigates anthropogenic risks and their impacts upon
globalecologywithinthecontextofsocial,economic,institutionalandpoliticalforces. In
essence, the study is inherently global because existential risks are threatening to all
humansonearth.

How is design/framework addressing security?

A great deal of human security is linked to human access to resources suchas land,
clean water and fresh air. This causes a great deal of dependency on ecological
compositions. Their deviation from ecological balance can manifest threatening
symptomswhichhave thepotential todisruptdevelopmentandthesustainabilityoflife.
That being said, this research seeks to understand human actions and interactions
whichcanbothcauseecologicaldegradation,butalso potentially mitigate thedamage.
In essence, this research bridges the naturesociety divide that Bruce Brau opined
aboutanddirectlyfuseshumansecuritytoenvironmentalsecurity.

What are the strengths/weaknesses?

Critical security studies concepts and securitization, as coined by the Copenhagen
school, allow us to frame empirical data in a meaningful way. By applying these
approaches, one has a foundation to formulate a hypothesispriorto the research and
then set about testing said hypothesis. But the mostimportantpoint ofstrength inthis
research is its determination of idiographic causation. That is, it seeks to explore the
potential causalfactorsofanevent.Theresearchleanstowardsexploring howandwhy
phenomena occur specifically regarding the securitization of the ecosystem. (or lack
thereof) By running a comparison in search of securitization clues, we can begin to
formulateexportablehypothesisaroundthecontrastingcomponents.

The weaknesses of the model include its selfserving bias whereby it seeks to verify
10

whatitalready suspects. Itthus runs thedangerofcherrypickingselectideastoserve

its predetermined conclusion. Additionally, despite whatever usefulthreatcomponents
it isolates to better understand securitization, these cannot yet be compiled into a
comprehensive hypothesis. Instead we are left with a new set of more detailed
questionswhichprovidethemakingsformorerobustanddetailedstudies.

Conclusion
Whenariskis not perceivedasathreat,evenin the faceofsecuritization speechacts
launched by experts and supported by data,there canbeno mobilization of resources
to counteract the threat.In some cases, threatmay beperceivedandcountermeasures
taken while in others, it may be seen as unworthy of resource allocation or even
fundamentally denied. Theresearch hasalso sought to examine threatperception, not
onlyattheindividuallevel,butalsoatabroadercollectivelevel.

In our comparison of thesecuritization processes fortheanthropogenicexistentialrisks

of nuclear holocaust and global ecological degradation we have outlined a series of
contrasting components which we believe could be related to an observed rift in the
recognition of ecological threat. These elements, which appear to be missing from
ecological risk, (and thus are suspected of causing securitizationretardation) are: the
distribution offear,the construction oftheother, theadvertancyofhazardproduction,
involvement of the power elite, and a temporality of immediate danger. Using these
components of risk, we aim to provide the basic underlying foundation for future
researchers to utilize while addressing the question: what makes for successful
securitization?

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