Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 8 Filed 04/16/13 Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO,
Plaintiff,

v.
MARK T. GOULD,

Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 3:13cv346 (WWE)

JUDGMENT
This action came on for consideration on plaintiffs Complaint filed on March 14, 2013
before the Honorable Warren W. Eginton, Senior United States District Judge and the Honorable
Holly B. Fitzsimmons, United States Magistrate Judge. On March 28, 2013, a Recommended
Ruling entered dismissing the Complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(I). On April
16, 2013, an Order entered approving and adopting the Recommended Ruling.
It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the is dismissed in accordance with 28
U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(i).
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 16th day of April, 2013.
ROBIN D. TABORA, CLERK

EOD:

4/16/2013

By /s/ Kenneth R. Ghilardi

Kenneth R. Ghilardi
Deputy Clerk

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 6 Filed 03/28/13 Page 1 of 6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO
v.
MARK T. GOULD

CIV. NO. 3:13CV00346(WWE)

RECOMMENDED RULING
Plaintiff Kathryn Sorrentino brings this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 1983, pro se and in forma pauperis, against
defendant Mark T. Gould, a Connecticut Superior Court judge.1
Plaintiff alleges that the judge violated her constitutional
right to due process when he issued adverse rulings in
plaintiffs state court actions. Plaintiff alleges the judge
issued his ruling without proper jurisdiction, violating her due
process rights.

Plaintiff also alleges a violation of her

constitutional right to a speedy trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Consideration of whether a pro se plaintiff should be
permitted to proceed under 28 U.S.C. 1915 is a two-step
process.

The court must first determine whether the plaintiff

may proceed with the action without prepaying the filing fee in
full. 28 U.S.C. 1915(a).

Second, Section 1915 requires the

court to conduct an initial screening of the complaint to ensure

1

Plaintiff filed a complaint [doc. #1] and Motion for Leave to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis [doc. #2] on March 14, 2013. Judge Eginton referred the
motion to the undersigned on March 18, 2013. [Doc. #4].

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 6 Filed 03/28/13 Page 2 of 6

that the case goes forward only if it meets certain

requirements.

"[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time

if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous

or malicious; . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief."

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) -

(iii).
An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual
contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations
are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Nance v.
Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct.
1827, 1833, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)). A claim is based on
an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the
claim lacks an arguable basis in law, Benitez v. Wolff, 907
F.2d 1293, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), or a
dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the
complaint. See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.
1995).
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d
Cir. 1998)(internal quotation marks omitted).
construes pro se complaints liberally.
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

The court

See Haines v. Kerner,

Thus, "when an in forma pauperis

plaintiff raises a cognizable claim, his complaint may not be

dismissed sua sponte for frivolousness under 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)
even if the complaint fails to flesh out all the required
details."

Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (quoting Benitez, 907

F.2d at 1295)(internal quotation marks omitted).

The court

exercises caution in dismissing a case under Section 1915(e)

2

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because a claim that the court perceives as likely to be

unsuccessful is not necessarily frivolous.

See Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989).

In addition, "unless the court can rule out any
possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended
complaint would succeed in stating a claim," the court should
permit a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis to
file an amended complaint that states a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d

794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Section 1983,
which creates a federal cause of action against any person who,
under color of state law, deprives a citizen or a person within
the jurisdiction of the United States of any right, privilege,
or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.

42 U.S.C. 1983.

Judges are immune from suit for exercising their judicial

authority.

See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871);

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d

204, 209 (2d. Cir. 2009).

The United States Supreme Court has

further clarified that, in the context of Section 1983 claims,

judges . . . enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for
acts performed in their judicial capacities. Dennis v. Sparks,
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449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) (quoting Supreme Court of Virginia v.

Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1980)).
Judicial immunity protects the finality of judgments,
discourages inappropriate collateral attacks, and promotes
judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious
actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants. Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988).

Furthermore, a judge will not

be deprived of immunity, even when the action he [or she] took

was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his [or
her] authority; rather, he [or she] will be subject to liability
only when he [or she] has acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.2

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978).

judge is also not immune if he or she takes nonjudicial action.3

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227.
Whether an act constitutes judicial action is a question of
law for the court.

Leslie v. Mortgage Electronic Registration

Systems, Inc., 3L05CV1725 AVC, 2006 WL 1980305 (D. Conn. July

12, 2006). A judicial action is one that relate[s] to the
nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial
2

The Supreme Court in Stump emphasized, the scope of the judges discretion
must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge. Id.
at 356.
3
The Supreme Court in Forrester noted, the decided cases . . . suggest an
intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the administrative,
legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned
by law to perform. Id. at 227.

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capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.

Here, the Court finds

plaintiffs claims refer to judicial actions carried out by the

defendant, in his official capacity.

In fact, plaintiff asserts

in section C of her complaint

that the following facts are documented court records at
the Bridgeport Superior Court in the case of Saverio A.
Sorrentino v. Kathryn M. Sorrentino . . . in which the
trial court judge, Mark T. Gould, presided over a series of
hearings from October 15, 2009 to May 20, 2010, in which he
violated Kathryn M. Sorrentinos Constitutional Rights and
incarcerated her.
[Doc. #1 at 2].

Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that her claims

arise out of Judge Goulds rulings in Superior Court. The Court

now turns to the issue of whether Judge Gould acted in the
clear absence of all jurisdiction."

Stump, 435 U.S. at 357.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Gould ruled without

jurisdiction on three occasions, as enumerated in claims two,
three, and five in plaintiffs complaint. [Doc. #1].

The

superior court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction

for all causes of action, except such actions over which the
courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by
statute. C.G.S. 51-164S.

The Court concludes, pursuant to

Connecticut law, that Judge Gould had jurisdiction to rule on

the three issues enumerated in plaintiffs complaint.
Moreover, the Court notes, under the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review
final state court judgments.

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

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U.S. 413, 416.

The United States Supreme Court has exclusive

jurisdiction to review such judgments.

28 U.S.C. 1257.

CONCLUSION
The Complaint [Doc. #1] is DISMISSED. See 28 U.S.C.
1915(e)(2)(i).
Any objections to this recommended ruling must be filed
with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of the
receipt of this order.

Failure to object with fourteen (14)

days may preclude appellate review.

See 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 72.2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate
Judges; Small v. Secretary of H.H.S., 892 F. 2d 15 (2d Cir.
1989)(per curiam); F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assoc., 66 F. 3d 566,
569 (2d Cir. 1995).
ENTERED at Bridgeport, this 27th day of March 2013.

_____/s/______________________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE