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Western Mindanao State University

College of Law
Constitutional Law Two
Second Semester, 2011-2012

Atty. Edilwasif T. Baddiri1

Saturday, 430pm-730pm
United Laboratories v. Isip GR 163858 (June 28, 2005) Abdurajak, Psamiera

Facts:UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon
multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help
of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court
issued a search warrant directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins. No fake
Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of
Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress
evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court,
however, granted the motion of the respondents.
Issue:Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view
Held: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the
warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which
he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes
were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to
prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately
apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes
before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
Malacat v. CA 283 SCRA 159 Abdurajak, Psamiera
Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
stop and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information; and that the seizure of the grenade from
Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section
3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not
more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing
to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January
1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Quezon Boulevard
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then
fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized,
inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a
grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latters front waist line. Yus companion, police officer
Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police
Station 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for
the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866.
At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and
explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns.
Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision
dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin
to a
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.
Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject
to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest
under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section 5(b) has
been described as a hot pursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a stop

and frisk. The concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in
flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the other hand, while probable
cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention
and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the
stop-and-frisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yus claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who
allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacats behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of Malacat, and
from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could
not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution.
People v. Encinada 280 SCRA 72 Abdurajak, Psamiera
FACTS: An information was received that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu City on board a vessel bringing with him
marijuana; Because the information came late, the police were not able to secure a search warrant. On the day of the arrival, they deployed
themselves in the different strategic points at the wharf to intercept Encinada. When they saw the accused walk down the gangplank carrying
two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand, they identified themselves as authorities and found a bulky package in between the two chairs
which were stacked together and tied with a piece of string. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana by making
a small tear in the cellophane cover.
The RTC of Surigao City convicted Roel Encinada of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P.
BIg. 179. The trial court emphasized that the accused was caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search
following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana was admissible in evidence.
Upon conviction he appealed arguing that the search and his arrest without a warrant would not fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as
incident to lawful arrest. Further, he contended that the subject marijuana leaves is not admissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search was valid.
HELD: The conviction could have been affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, the very evidence implicating him- the prohibited drug found
in his possession- cannot be used against him in this case, for that matter, in any proceeding. There was a violation of the constitutional right
of the accused enshrined in Section 2, Article 3 of the 1 987 Constitution. Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if the tip from an informant was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20
in his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the vessel was not expected to dock until 7 a.m. the following day.
Administrative Order No. 13 allows applications for search warrants even after court hours.
The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic ot dangerous drugs. However, quick
solutions of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights.
Mustang Lumber v. CA 257 SCRA 430 Alabata, Cedric
Facts: First Case: On 1 April 1990 acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with
Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, QuezonCity. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2The special Action and
investigation Division of DENR also procured a search warrant from Judge Adriano Osorio of RTC Valenzuela, by virtue of the warrant, the team
seized for truckloads of narra woods including almaciaga and supa. Moreover, the lumberyard of the petitioner was also placed under
administrative seizure. For failure to produce certificates of lumber origins, auxiliary invoices, tallysheets and delivery receipts. Subsequently,
the Sec of DENR Factor an issued an order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard
Thus, the petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari and prohibition contending that the search and seizure operation by the respondents is a
violation under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution for not having a valid search warrant.
Second case: PP vs. Capulong et al
This case deals with whether the Forestry Code where the petitioner allegedly violated refers to either timber or lumber
Issue:Was the warrantless search and seizure invalid?
Held:No. It is a valid warrantless search being one of thestatutory instances that accepted.Search of a moving vehicle is one of the
fivedoctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandatethat no search and seizure shall be made except by a virtueof a warrant. Thus
a search could be lawfully conducted on amoving vehicle without a search warrant.In the case at bar, the conducted search andseizure is indeed
without a valid warrant, however, it wasconducted to search the materials that can be found in amoving vehicle, which is the truck of the first
People v. Gatward 267 SCRA 785 Alabata, Cedric

Facts: U Aung Win, had just arrived from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a travelling bag for examination to Customs Examiner
Busran Tawano. When Tawano was about to inspect his luggage, U Aung Win suddenly left, proceeding towards the direction of Carousel 1,
Tawano became alarmed by the failure of U Aung Win to return and suspected that the bag of U Aung Win contained illegal articles. When
opened, the bag revealed two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its partitions. Representative samples of the
substance were examined and found to be positive for heroin. Immediately, a team of law enforcers proceeded to the Departure Area and
apprehended the accused after he had been identified through his signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation Arrival Card. U Aung Win whispered to customs officer that the two are drug couriers. GATWARD/NRMR listed therein as a
passenger for Amsterdam and accordingly informed his teammates who responded immediately Customs Police Captain Juanito Algenio
requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM airline at the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward disembark from the aircraft and to have his
checked-in luggage,if any, unloaded. The manager acceded to the request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as
the plane was about to depart and to do so would unduly delay the flight. However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would be returned
immediately to the Philippines on the first available flight from Bangkok. Upon his disembarkment. Gatward was invited by the police officers
for investigation. At about 3:00 p.m. of 1 September 1994,Gatwards luggage, was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai
airways, pursuant to the request of Erece. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the presence
of Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance. Inside the bag were two improvised envelopes
made of cardboard each containing the powdery substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the bag, one at the
side in between a double-wall, the other inside a partition in the middle. Upon its examination, the powdery substance contained in the two
cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams, was found to be heroin. Nigel Richard Gatward was charged with violating Section 4
of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Actof 1972 (transporting); while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge when arraigned, while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged
upon his arraignment. On 3March 1995, the trial court found both guilty of the crime charged.
Issue:W/N Gatward and U Aung Wins suitcases may be searched without warrant.
Held: While there was no search warrant obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of
KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict
observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise
unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which
was required by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this country the
heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the international airport. There was, of course, no
showing that he was authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so.
People v. Lacerna 278 SCRA 561 Alabata, Cedric
Facts: On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a member of the Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District
(WPD), was assigned to man the checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones Street. The
assignment to monitor strategic places in the city and barangays of Manila was a direct order from General Nazareno. Thus, he and his
companion PO3 Angelito Camero went about cruising the area in their Mobile Patrolcar, with PO3 Valenzuela at the helm. At about 2:00 p.m.,
appellant and co-accused, who were aboard a taxicab, passed by PO3 Valenzuela's place of assignment, which was then heavy with traffic,
looking suspicious.
The police officers sensing something is a missed asked permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the police officers
went about searching the luggages in the vehicle which consisted of a knapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery that contains 18 blocks of
marijuana which is considered a prohibited drug. Both lacerna were charged for violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (The
Dangerous Drugs Act). MARLON LACERNA Y ARANADOR was convicted while, NORIEL LACERNA Y CORDERO was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. Hence, the Petition of the accused Marlon Lacerna Y Aranador.
Issue: (1) Was appellant's right against warrantless arrest and seizure violated?

The Court answers the questions in the negative.

1.) In the case before us, however, appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the
search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In his brief, appellant explicitly, even if awkwardly, reiterated this:
"Confident that they [the accused] have not done anything wrong, they allowed to be searched." This declaration of appellant is a confirmation
of his intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and

People v. Aruta 288 SCRA 626 Amilbahar, Nurulain

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988 P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large
volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when
the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was. The team approached her and introdunced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked
Aling Rosa abo the content of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked cash katutak.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the
items. In her testimony the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg. While about to
cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag. When she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge
of identity of the old women was nowhere to be found. Also no search of warrant was presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972.

Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.


The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law.



Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Recognized under Sectin 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of court 8 and by prevailing
Seizure of evidence in plain view th e elements of which are: (a) a prior valid insrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which in the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties, (b) thee evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are, (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) palin view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search.
Search of moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government. The vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit n public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity.
Consented warrantless search.
Customs search.
Stop and frisk.
Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the
Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds
bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to produce a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegally and
inadmissible evidence.
Section 5. arrest without warrant when lawful- a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person.
(a)when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offence:
(b) when an offence has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it: and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place
of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after
giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be
delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter
therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

People v. Cuenco GR 128277, Nov. 16, 1998 Amilbahar, Nurulain

FACTS: After the conduct of surveillance operations, a group of police officers reported the result of the same to their commanding officer who
instructed them to apply for a search warrant. The police officers applied for and were issued a search warrant after they hatched a plan that a
buy-bust operation be first conducted on the accused Ferdinand Cuenco. As planned, the police officer conducted the operation by acting as a
poseur-buyer of marijuana. Florida Fajardo, the wife of the accused, got the marijuana and handed the same to the poseur-buyer. After sale has
been consummated, they arrested Cuenco and proceeded with the search, in the course of which, Sarmiento found a box which contained dried
flowering tops of marijuana. The corresponding criminal complaints were filed against the accused Ferdinand Cuenco and Florida Fajardo for the
sale and possession of a prohibited drug. The trial court convicted both accused. Cuenco appealed questioning his conviction because of the

illegality of the search made in his house. Appellant insinuates a frame-up.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the house consequent to a lawful arrest is valid.
The search of the house is valid as the latter is still within the permissible area of search. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty
and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area
within his reach, that is, that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means
of committing violence or of escaping. When the operation took place, it becomes
advisable, for the peace officers to forthwith
undertake a search of the house as being within the permissible area. The arrest was made in the course of an entrapment, following a
surveillance operation, normally performed by police officers in the apprehension of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the absence of
proof of any odious intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime, the court will not allow their testimony to be
overcome by the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of frame-up.

People v. Doria GR 125299, Jan. 22, 1999, Amilbahar, Nurulain

Facts: On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation
of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. [1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected
marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the
buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his
back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom,
gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6)
one hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit
marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3
Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and
Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. [5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI
and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit
forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry,
"Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth." [6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at
Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. [7] SPO1 Badua asked
"Neneth" about theP1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the
dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its
contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and
took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." [8] The policemen arrested "Neneth." They
took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It
was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of
dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. [10]
Whether or Not the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA at "Neneth" having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425
and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of
Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y
BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with
law. Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.

People v. Sevilla 339 SCRA 625 Aripin, Zoraida

FACTS: A team of police officers went to the house of the accused to enforce a warrant of arrest. Some members of the Narcotics
Command joined the team to look for marijuana. Accused was subsequently charged with illegal possession of marijuana.
HELD: The search is illegal. It is not a search incidental to a valid arrest since the Narcotics Command joined the team of police officers
for the specific purpose of conducting a search.

People v. Che Chun Ting 328 SCRA 592 Aripin, Zoraida

FACTS: Standing outside Unit 122, accused handled two transparent bags of drugs to Mabel Po, in full view of NARCOM agents. Police
officers arrested the surprised man and conducted a search of Unit 122 where they found more bags of shabu.
HELD: The search of Unit 122 and the seizure of drugs found therein are illegal. A warrantless search should be limited to the premises
and surroundings that are under the immediate control of the accused. Unit 122 is not even the house of the accused but that of his
People v. Valdez 341 SCRA 85 Aripin, Zoraida
FACTS: Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of the accused where they found marijuana plants being
cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from the house of the accused. They uprooted the plants and arrested the accused. They
asked the accused who owned the plants and the accused admitted that they belonged to him. The prosecution offered the plants and the
admission of the accused as evidence. The accused claimed that the warrantless search was illegal while the police officers claimed that
the plants were found in plain view.
HELD: The marijuana plants were not in plain view. For the plain view doctrine to apply, the following must be present: (a) there was a
valid prior intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they were; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified seizure of the evidence without further search. In this case, the police officers
located the plants before they arrested the accused without a warrant. Also, they were dispatched precisely to look for the marijuana
plants. The discovery was not inadvertent. The confession is also inadmissible. In trying to elicit information from the accused, the
police was investigating him as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel.

People v. Johnson 348 SCRA 526 Arola, Alnashrip

This is an appeal from the decision, dated May 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accused-appellant
Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, a regulated drug, and weighing with the total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.

Whether or not the contention of the plaintiff-appellee is valid?

The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and used in
evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is
involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The trial court held that the constitutional
right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to
the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

Del Rosario v. People, GR 142295, May 31, 2001 Arola, Alnashrip

Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P30,000.00.On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
under his custody and control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license therefor.

Whether or not possession of firearm with an expired license is considered unlawful?

Possession of firearm with an expired license was not considered unlawful, provided that the license had not been
cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294, providing that possession of a firearm with an expired license was unlawful took effect only on July
7, 1997 it could not be given retroactive effect. In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. Possession of any firearm
becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or license therefor is not first obtained. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the
kitchen of petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal. The seizure
without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the Constitution.

People v. Estrada GR 124461, June 26, 2000 Arola, Alnashrip

In a decision promulgated on September 25, 1998, this Court denied the petition questioning the trial court's order which
quashed the search warrant it issued and ordered the return of the seized goods on the ground that the warrant failed to satisfy the
constitutional requirements for issuance of warrants. Petitioner now seeks a partial reconsideration of the said decision arguing that the seized
drugs subject of the void warrant can no longer be returned because the same are contraband goods. In its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner attached annexes purporting to show that the 52 boxes of medicines seized under the void warrant, upon laboratory examinations,
were found genuine but was illegally imported.

Whether or not the decision promulgated on September 25, 1998 is valid under the constitution?

Even if the medicines or drugs seized were genuine and even if they contain the proper chemicals or ingredients for their
production or manufacture, if the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority from the appropriate government agency, the
drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search warrants were declared illegal. However, if there is an allegation that the
possessions of the goods or things seized were illegal for lack of appropriate permit from the duly authorized agencies, the party seeking the
return of her seized properties must show the corresponding permits or authority to manufacture, sell or possess the same.


Searches and Seizuers of whatever nature and for whatever sources.

Material Distributors v. Natividad 84 Phil 127 Atamosa, Richard

FACTS: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking money judgment against petitioner. He filed a motion for the production and inspection of
originals of Cash receipts journals, Cash Payment Journals, all ledgers, letters of exchange between Material Distributors and Harry Lyons (the
partner company of the former in the US), cablegrams, books and papers of the defendant Lyons.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the trial judge violated the petitioners constitutional rights against unreasonable searches.
RULING: The orders in question, issued in virtue of the Provision of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be confused with the
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. Production and inspection of books and documents in question is not tantamount to
search warrant. The inspection of te said documents is not for the purpose of fishing evidence but with a view to enabling the respondent,
Lope Sarreal, to designate with the particularity of the subpoena duces tecum to be obtained in connection with the trial of the case.
Oklahoma Press v. Waling 327 US 186 Richard Atamosa
FACTS: Walling is the US Administrator of Wage and Hour Division. He issued a SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM in the course of investigations t
determine whether the petitioners were violating the fair Labor Standard.
ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the subpoena as directed by the Court of Appeals will violate the petitioners rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment?
RULING: As to the 4th Amendment objection, the records in this case present no question of actual search and seizure but raised only the
question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made. There was no officer or other person has
sought to enter petitioners premises against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books and records without their assent.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Camara v. Municipal Court 387 US 523 Richard Atamosa
FACTS: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an
apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the citys Housing Code. The inspector was informed that the
Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises
because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because
he did not have a warrant.
The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellants apartment a second time two days later, and again the Appellant refused to grant him
access. The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district attorneys office. The Appellant did not appear and a few
weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were again refused because they did not have a search warrant.
A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition.
The court of Appeals held the housing section does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a regulatory scheme which is
essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be
exercised under unreasonable conditions.
Brief Fact Summary. An inspector from the Department of Health entered a home to investigate possible violations of a Citys housing code
without a warrant.
ISSUE: Whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights
are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?
RULING: Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment
guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in [Frank v. Maryland] and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches
are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendments protections.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

Warrantless Arrests
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago 162 SCRA 840 Beldad, Feliciano
In RE Habeas Corpus of Harvey, et. al. Harvey vs. Commissioner Defensor Santiago
[GR 82544, 28 June 1988]

FACTS: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, (both Americans), and Adria Van Den Elshout (Dutch) were apprehended on 27 February 1988 from their
respective residences at Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued
by Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. They were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after 3
months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 2 days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, 17 of the 22 arrested aliens
opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but
for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original 22, only Harvey, et. al. have chosen to face deportation. Seized during their
apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls
engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes. They are presently detained at the CID
Detention Center. On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against Harvey, et. al. for being undesirable aliens under Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case 88-13). On 14 March 1988, Harvey, et. al. filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond
alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for
their provisional release, the Commissioner ordered the CID doctor to examine Harvey, et. al., who certified that the latter were healthy. On 22
March 1988, Harvey, et. al. filed a Petition for Bail which, however, the COmmissioner denied considering the certification by the CID physician
that the accused were healthy. To avoid congestion, the Commissioner ordered Harvey, et. al.'s transfer to the CID detention cell at Fort
Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting then to and from the CID where trial was on-going. On
4 April 1988, Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally
released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board
of Special Inquiry III allowed provisional release of 5 days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the
Manifestation/Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Government has the power to deport foreigners from its territory.
HELD: Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its selfpreservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the
domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against Harvey, et. al., acted in the interests of the

People v. Aminnudin 163 SCRA 402 - Beldad, Feliciano

FACTS: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected
his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accusedappellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was
his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed.
He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the
RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly
ISSUE: Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.
HELD: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of
his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant,
and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.
People v. dela Cruz 184 SCRA 416 - Beldad, Feliciano
FACTS: On May 4, 1987 at about 2:30 pm, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of
T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc.Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and
Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur- buyer with Arnel as his
companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz
whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00worth of marijuana, De la Cruz
instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After
ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his
head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and
effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with
two aluminum foils and containing marijuana. Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case 8754417of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as
amended. The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the costs. From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the Warden, Manila
City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the death of de la Cruz on 21 February1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz
was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September 1989. The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltrans constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure.
HELD: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a male factor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form
of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is
seizure of evidence from ones person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being
incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-handed. There being no violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.
People v. Burgos 144 SCRA 1 Bongabong, Analyn
FACTS: Due to an information given by a person, who allegedly was being forcibly recruited by accused to the NPA, the members of the
Constabulary went to the house of accused, asked about his firearm and documents connected to subversive activities. Accused pointed to
where his firearm was as well as his other documents allegedly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure is deprivation of right to liberty.
HELD: The right of the person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of liberty is a most basic
and fundamental one. The statute or rule, which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.
Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as
provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often
violated and so deserving of full protection.
Umil v. Ramos 187 SCRA 311 (Main); MR Oct. 3, 1991 Bongabong, Analyn
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on
the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are

charged w
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b v

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P e o p l e






ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests and searches of the military is valid/constitutional.
HELD: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion isa f o r m o f a c o n t i n u i n g c r i m e
t o g e t h e r w i t h r e b e l l i o n , c o n s p i r a c y o r p r o p o s a l t o c o m m i t rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to
his arrest. Lastly, thea r r e s t s w e r e n o t f i s h i n g e x p e d i t i o n s b u t a r e s u l t o f a n i n - d e p t h s u r v e i l l a n c e o f N P A s a f e
houses p
right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as
impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint
and after a trial freefromerror.

People v. Sucro 195 SCRA 388 Bongabong, Analyn

FACTS: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three
times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and
later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the
Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in
front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying
the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
ISSUES: Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.
Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.
HELD: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of
the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting
the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.
Go v. CA 206 SCRA 138 Cabanlong, Ariel

FACTS: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner
voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he
was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and signs a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on
the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is
violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was
committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner.

Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful?

RULING: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances
specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein


petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense,
neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not
a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this
connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a
criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of.
On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to
preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The
facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied
answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was
granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation,
declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter
of the crime of murder.
People v. Briones 202 SCRA 708 Cabanlong, Ariel
Facts: On or about the 23rd day of April 1988, at Barangay Dela Paz, municipality of San Simon, province of Pampanga, the above-named
accused MARIO BRIONES y GUINTO, GERARDO 'JERRY' JAVIER y ALLIED and EUSEBIO ALLIED y GALICIO alias 'KIKOY', conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, persons, entered the house of spouses Felicisimo B. Gutierrez and Florencia Diaz-Gutierrez and once inside, steal
and carry away with them cash money amounting to P50,000.00, Philippine currency, and assorted jewelries valued at P50,000.00 or a total
amount of P110,000.00, belonging to the said spouses, to the damage and prejudice of said spouses, in the total amount of P1 10,000.00,
Philippine Currency, and on the occasion thereof, in pursuance of their act of conspiracy, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, strike and hit said spouses on the head, face and different parts of their body with the use of hard
objects and bladed objects or instruments, inflicting mortal and fatal injuries upon said spouses which caused their instantaneous death. It is
eyewitness Francisco who had such personal knowledge
Issues: Whether or not their arrest was illegal because it was made without the warrant of arrest prescribed by law?
Held: Decision affirmed with modification. Illegal warrantless arrest; The illegality of warrantless arrest of appellants cannot deprive the state
of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.Finally, on appellants' claim that since their warrantless
arrest is void, all the other proceedings, including their conviction, are also void, We find such claim undeserving of merit. It is unequivocally
clear that no valid arrest was made on the accused-appellants, the arrest having been made without any warrant at all. Neither can the
appellants' arrest qualify as a lawful arrest without a warrant under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because the police
officer who effected the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime. It is eyewitness Francisco who had such personal knowledge, In like manner, We cannot accept appellee's bare allegation that Briones was
a fugitive from justice at the time of the latter's arrest because it is not supported by the evidence on record. In sum, therefore, the
warrantless arrest of the appellants is illegal. Nevertheless, such unavailing technicality cannot render all the other proceedings,
including the conviction of the appellants, void. It cannot deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record
point to their culpability. In this regard, the case of De Asis v. Romero, 41 SCRA 235 finds application.
People v. Mengote 210 SCRA 174 Cabanlong, Ariel
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as
policemen, where upon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The
weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC
convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which
he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was
licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of
P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because
it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.


Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec
32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely
looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just
been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be
stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.
People v. Simon 234 SCRA 555 Camaingking, Julius
FACTS: Herein accused-appellant MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of RA No. 6425 as amended,
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Brgy. Sto Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00,
when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana. Under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction
rendered by the lower court against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is Affirmed but with the Modification that he should be, as he
hereby is, sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisioncorreccional, as the maximum thereof.

Whether or not the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers a valid ground for a warrantless

RULING: We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse. Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellants
entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was
effected. No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official
duty. Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed,
erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi.
No law or jurisprudence require that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other
civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
People v. Rabang 187 SCRA 682 Camaingking, Julius
FACTS: We have before us on appeal the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41 of the National Capital Judicial Region, Manila,
convicting appellant Eduardo Rabang y Castro of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Henry Cortes y Morris the sums of P30,000.00 and P10,000.00 representing, respectively, the actual and moral
On 26 December 1985, the Assistant Fiscal of Manila filed against the appellant an information for the crime of murder as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October 1984, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
HENRY CORTEZ y MORRIS by then and there stabbing the latter at the back with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said HENRY
CORTES y MORRIS fatal stab wound which was the direct cause of his death.
On 17 December 1984 at around 12:30 a.m., Police office received a telephone call from an unidentified person informing that the suspected
killer of Henry Cortez was roaming in the vicinity of Elcano Street and Recto Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Upon receipt of that call, his office
immediately dispatched three (3) investigators, Patrolman Ansa, Patrolman Juanita Garcia and Sergeant GaudencioQuibuyen. At around 1:30
a.m., the group returned with the appellant.
RTC decided that the accused, Eduardo Rabang, is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Henry Cortez y Morris. The decision of the trial court is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Whether or not the information from a telephone informant who refused to identify himself a valid ground for warrantless arrest?


RULING: The court considered that appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. An examination of the record reveals that
this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant before this court. He had not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial
court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial.
People v. Lopez 246 SCRA 95 Camaingking, Julius
Velasco v. CA 245 SCRA 677 Casil, Cyrile Joy
FACTS: On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkinsfor violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaintaffidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her.
Acting on the basis of the complaint of Desiree, petitioners proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21
November 1994 and arrested the latter. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.
On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for violation of B.P. Blg.22. Judge Padolina
forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release
Larkins from confinement unless otherwise detained for some other cause.

WON the warrantless arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of

Larkins was illegally arrested; still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has
become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when
the public safety requires it. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends, except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED
People v. Sequino 264 SCRA 79 Casil, Cyrile Joy
FACTS: Accused-appellants ErmelindoSequio, Vicente Tumangan and NenitoMelvida appeal from the decision of 24 February 1994
(promulgated on 1 March 1994) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 21, finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide.The witnesses present by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, police fficersElpidio Luna,
Alfredo Mondigo and Mario Remulta, Dr. Arturo Sormillon, Lt. Myrna Areola, Emilio Daclan, Atty. Perpetua Socorro Belarmino, and
Presentacionvda.deBroniola, while Olympio Lozano was presented as rebuttal witness.
That on or about the 24th day of April, 1991 at 12:00 oclock noon, more or less at the Public Highway, SitioLahug, Barangay Antipolo,
Municipality of Medellin, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring
and confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the payroll money in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY (sic) SEVEN PESOS AND 17/100 (P50,577.17), Philippine Currency, belonging to Had. Jose Ancajas Agricultural Corporation to the
damage and prejudice of said corporation in the amount aforestated, and on the occasion thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously taking advantage of their superior number and strength and with intent to kill, attack, assault and shoot Pedro Broniola who was
backriding [sic] a motorcycle, thereby inflicting upon him [a] gunshot wound on the head, and as a result thereof said Pedro Broniola died

Was there a valid warrantless arrest in the case?

There was NO valid warrantless arrest in this case.
Luna had no personal knowledge of facts indicatingMelvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonablesuspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus

After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodialinvestigation. The custodial investigation commencedwhen the police
pinpointed Melvida as one of theauthors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect thereof. His brought into operation paragraph (1)
of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution guaranteeingthe accused's rights to remain silent and to counsel, andhis right to be informed of
these rights.
There was no showing that Melvida was ever informedof these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not assisted by counsel
during the investigation.Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted theseconstitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan anddeliberately
disregarded the rule regarding aninvestigator's duties prior to and during custodialinterrogation.
People v. Nazareno 260 SCRA 256 Casil, Cyrile Joy
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision, dated May 28, 1991, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 136), finding accused-appellants
NarcisoNazareno and RamilRegala guilty of murder for the killing of Romulo Molet Bunye II in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on December 14, 1988
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, the two were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of
the deceased the amount of P50,000.00. Two others, accused with them, Manuel Laureaga and Orlando Hular, were acquitted.

WON the arrests without warrant were illegal.


RULING: The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant NarcisoNazareno was upheld by this Court in 1990 in a petition for habeas corpus. It
appears that, on January 9, 1989, Nazareno filed a motion for bail. As the trial court denied his motion, a petition for habeas corpus was filed on
his behalf with this Court. It was alleged that Nazarenos arrest was illegal because it was made without warrant fourteen days after the killing
of Romulo Bunye II. This Court dismissed the petition in its decision of July 9, 1990. He filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court also
denied on the ground that the warrantless arrest was in accordance with Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Any defect in the arrest of the accused must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, for
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
People v. Mahusay 282 SCRA 80 Dalus, Hazel
FACTS: Six armed men barged into the Bughao residence and introduced themselves as members of the New Peoples Army. After extinguishing
the three oil lamps inside the house, they tied the arms and feet of Troadio Bughao, his wife and househelper Esmarlita Paspos, who is the sister
of appellant Paspos. The group split in two, ransacked the cabinets, and cleaned out the premises of every valuable item they could carry.
Bughaos daughter Maria Luisa (a.k.a. Marilou) was brought upstairs by three men who successively ravished her. The following day, the incident
was reported to the police. A police team2 from the Integrated National Police Station of San Isidro, Leyte led by Sgt. Manuel Bughao was
promptly dispatched to Sitio Sumakab, Barangay Inangatan, Tabango, Leyte to arrest the suspects. The police were able to recover from them a
wall clock, cash amounting to P1,445.00, a ring and two caliber .38 paltik revolvers.During the investigation, appellants allegedly admitted
responsibility for the crime charged. Considering, however, that the searching inquiry was done without the assistance of counsel, the trial court
correctly disregarded the same. Appellants, on the other hand, invoke alibi as their defense and alleged that they went on a trip to Medellin,
Cebu to visit the formers uncle.
ISSUE: WON the arrest made againts appellants was an unjustified warrantless arrest?
RULING: Yes. Appellants were arrested on the sole basis of Bughaos verbal report. The arresting officers were led to suspect that, indeed,
appellants had committed a crime. Thus, the arrest was made in violation of their fundamental right against an unjustified warrantless arrest.
Under Section 5(b) of the aforequoted rule, two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the person to be arrested must
have just committed an offense, and second, the arresting peace officer or private person must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
People v. Alvario 275 SCRA 529 Dalus, Hazel
FACTS: On January 29, 1993, Esterlina Quintero (Ester), a 29-year oldgirl, took her time off as a housekeeper at Pasong Tirad,Makati, to look for
another place of employment. Eventually,she found a house in Bel-Air Subdivision where she wasaccepted by Armando Alvario as a cook and a
laundress .(Alvario was just a caretaker of the house). Based on Esterstestimony, Alvario would barge into her room in the maidsquarter, point
a gun at her and rape her. Also, she testified that Alvario did not allow her to go out of the house and to use the telephone. However, on January
28, she phoned her sister and asked her from her. Subsequently, her sister and 4 Makati police came to the house in Bel-Air. When Alvario and
Ester opened the door, she pointed at Alvario and say that heraped her. Then and there, Alvario was arrested.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest of Alvario is valid?
RULING: No . The arre st of Al vari o viol ated his co nstit uti onal r i g h t a g a i n s t w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t s . A s r e q u i r e d
b y Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person can be arre ste d even wi thou t a warrant when an offe nse h a s i n f a c t b e e n
c o m m i t t e d a n d t h e p o l i c e m a n maki ng th e arre st has perso nal knowled ge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. In this case, the personal knowledge of the arrestin g office rs was culle d from the information
supplied by the victim herself who poin ted to Alvario as the man who raped he r at the time of his arrest.
Larranaga v. CA 287 SCRA 521 Dalus, Hazel
FACTS; On September 15, 1997, some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for
Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted the arrest and immediately phoned his sister and
brother-in-law. Petitioners sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit. Atty. Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the police officers from
carrying out the warrantless arrest and proposed to meet with them at the CIG headquarters in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The police officers
yielded and returned to the CIG headquarters. Petitioner, together with his sister and brother-in-law also went to the CIG headquarters aboard
their own vehicle. Atty. Armovit questioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben Zacarias. After consulting with
his superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the arrest and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an undertaking in writing
that he and petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation. Petitioner Larranaga
was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without
the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he mu st be release d and be sub ject to a
preli mi nary in ve st igati on. Howe ve r p e n d i n g t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u r t f o r t h e p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i ,
p r o h i b i t i o n and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant
of arrest directed to the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the arrest of Petitioner Larraga without a warrant was legal?
RULING: No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace officer or a private person. To be sure, even if
petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the absence of a warrant. It does not appear in
the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense when the police officers tried
to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, petitioner was attending classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that time.
People v. Olivarez GR 77865, Dec. 4, 1998 Delatado, Vanessa Joy


FACTS: Appellants, who are imprisoned, seek their acquittal on the ground that their guilt was not proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. Alternatively, they argued that in case their conviction is sustained, the death penalty should not be imposed on them in the
light of the 1987 Constitution.
Involved in this case is the crime of robbery with homicide committed during the season of yuletide. Prosecution witness Sgt. Eduardo
Marcelo testified that he took the statements of appellant Rafael Olivarez, Jr. and one Purisimo Macaoili and verbal investigation of appellant
Danilo Arellano because the latter refused to give the statement.
That on or about the 26th day of December 1981, in the Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused Rafael Olivarez, Jr. and Danilo Arellano, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did ten
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the persons of Tiu Hu and
Zie Sing Piu alias Sy Sing Kiaw take, rob and carry away with them cash in the amount of P1,800.00, two (2) radio cassettes marked Sanyo,
one (1) wrist watch marked Citron and five (5) tape recorder cassettes, belonging to Tiu Hu. The damage and prejudice to the latter and that
by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the said amount, the hereon
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy with evidence and premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of he superior strength, attack,
assault and use personal violence on the said Tiu Hu and Zie Sing Piua thereby inflicting fatal physical injuries which directly caused their death.
Whether or not verbal or non- verbal obtained in violation thereof as also inadmissible in evidence under Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution.

HELD: Confessions; Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to
conduct an investigation.Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made, the arresting officers testified that appellants were merely
invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however, when construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an arrest
designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is
intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in
effect at that time, any evidence obtained in violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining to invalid warrantless arrests)
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [People vs. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA 635(1998)]

Cadua v. CA 312 SCRA 703 Delatado, Vanessa Joy


The Assistant City Prosecutor accuses petitioner a violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms).
That on or about the second day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of the Court, the above
accused, without any authority in law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and
custody one (1) .38 cal. Revolver Smith and Wesson paltik brown finished and wooden handle with four (4) live ammunitions, without first having
obtained the proper license therefore from the proper authorities.
Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that that the
warantless arrest of the petitioner was based on probable cause and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to his
arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible in evidence.
As between the positive declaration of prosecution eyewitness and only the negative assertion of accused-appellant, the former
deserves more credence and is entitled t greater evidentiary weight. Courts generally give full faith and credence to testimony of police officers
as they are presumed to have acted in the performance of official duty in a regular manner. Moreover, accused-appellant has not imputed any ill
motive on the said prosecution witnesses as to why they would testify against him, except to tell the truth.
This is a petition by certiorari on the decision of the Court of Appeals in GR no. 16312, promulgated on June 30, 1995 and the
subsequent Resolution dated December 15, 1995, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Whether or not his right to be protected from any unlawful warrant less arrest has been violated.

Arrests and Seizures; Words and Phrases; Personal knowledge of facts, in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show
the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5 abovecited. Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of
complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was
directly implicated as a suspect. As explained by a respected authority on criminal procedure: It has been ruled that personal knowledge of
facts, in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . .
Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without
warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in
believing the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the officer.
Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace
officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of
felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and
there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk
about the streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as
commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is
supported by the necessities of life.
Same; Same; Same; Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which the accused attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer.Nothing in petitioners testimony successfully rebuts Burdeos narration. Actual possession of an
unlicensed firearm, which petitioner attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officer
contemplated in paragraph (a), Section 5 of the abovementioned Rule. [Cadua vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 703(1999)]

People v. Elamparo 329 SCRA Delatado, Vanessa Joy


FACTS: On February 12, 1995, at about 5:00 in the morning, prosecution witness Police Officer Romeo Baldonado, while attending to his duties
as supervising policeman of the Caloocan Police Station, received a report from an informant that some people are selling shabu and marijuana
somewhere at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Said informant stated that he himself succeeded in buying said drugs.
Hence, Police Officer Baldonado formed a buy-bust operation team with himself as team leader and Police Officer Ernesto Andala,
Ronielo Reantilo and Bismark Gaviola as members. Upon arrival at the area, prosecution witness Gaviola, together with the informant asset
stood at the corner of P. Gomez Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, since the spot was identified to be the market or where the buyer s of
marijuana await a runner, Thereafter, a runner later identified to be Erwin Spencer approached the poseur- buyer, Gaviola. Spencer then left
and returned after five minutes with the marijuana. Gaviola then handed over the marked money and arrested Spencer, but who freed himself
and ran.
Spencer and appellant were later taken to the precinct where they were delivered to the inquest fiscal for further investigation. The
arresting officers then executed an affidavit on the incident and made a request for the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct examination
of the drugs seized. The NBI report confirmed the drug seized to be marijuana weighing five (5) kilos.
Defense, presented borders as their witnesses stating that, Elamparo was at their house when a police officer knocked at their door.
His father opened the same and was informed that somebody was looking for him. He went out and sighted Spencer with handcuffs, in the
company of three policemen. Elamparo, persistently questioned Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting officer got mad at him
prompting them to likewise bring him to the police stationed where he was detained. The arresting officers demanded the amount of PHP
15,000.00 for his release. Thus, Regional Trial Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A.
6425 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS. Elamparo

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and disregarding the theory of the defense was the
correct assessment.
2. Whether or not the arrest of the appellant was valid.
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by the trial court was correct.
HELD: Searches and Seizures; Arrests; Exceptions to the Right Against Warrantless Searches and Seizures.As to the warrantless search, Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits a search and seizure without a judicial warrant. Further, Section 3 thereof provides that any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, not being absolute, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to exceptions. Thus, for example, Section 12 of Rule 126, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant. Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have also been
judicially formulated, viz.: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches,
and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Hot Pursuit; The members of a buy-bust team, hot in the heels of a fleeing seller of prohibited
drugs, are justified in running after him and entering the house where he fled even without a search warrant.When Spencer wrenched himself
free from the grasp of PO2 Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buybust team were justified in
running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house,
the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from him. They also caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the
marijuana bricks which were in full view on top of a table. [People vs. Elamparo, 329 SCRA 404(2000)]

People v. Cubcubin 360 SCRA Falcatan, Gary

Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person
had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1
Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his
tricycle which was then parked on the road. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene showing the victim slumped on the
handle of the tricycle. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin Jr. and
the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a
kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a
food server/waitress in Sting Cafe. Garcellano described Cubcubin as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white tshirt and brown short pants. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellanos description fitted a
person known as alias Jun Dulce. Armando Plata, who knew where Cubcubin lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to
Cubucubins house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the door for about 3 minutes before it was opened by a man who
answered the description given by Danet Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The police operatives identified themselves and
informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery. Cubcubin denied involvement in the incident. PO3
Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he
noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the brand name Hanes and the name Dhenvher written in the inner portion of the shirts hemline, placed
over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found it to be bloodied. When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38
caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin while he conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, Cubcubin was positively identified by
Danet Garcellano as the victims companion. The police investigators asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin
refused to tell him where he hid the gun so he sought the latters permission to go back to his house to conduct a further search. Thereupon,
SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. Inside the
house, they saw Cubcubins 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the bathroom a
homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number. He found the gun loaded with five live bullets. PO3
Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials RDE (for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3
Estoy, Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in the sala. The .38 caliber gun, the white Hanes
t-shirt, and the two spent .38 caliber shells were all photographed. Cubcubin was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed


along with the things seized from him. Cubcubin was charged for the crime of murder. On 5 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Cavite City, found Cubcubin guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the
crime, to allow them to conduct the latters warrantless arrest.
Held: Arrests and Seizures; For a warrantless arrest to be valid, two conditions must concur; Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant must be based upon probable cause.Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender
has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
Same; Same; The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly; Waiver by
implication cannot be presumed.To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish
the right. A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For as Justice Laurel
explained in Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard for the
supremacy of the law.
Same; Same; Peace officers who conduct a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented.Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the
search was unconsented. It is noteworthy that the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the search
show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to search his house. At every turn, even when they were not
being asked, they said the search was made with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, the lady doth protest too much,
methinks. Indeed, not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he ever consented to the search of his dwelling but the prosecution has
not shown any good reason why accused-appellant might have agreed to the search. [People vs. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA 690(2001)]

People v. Compacion 361 SCRA 540

Posadas v. Ombudsman 341 SCRA
People v. Buluran 325 SCRA 476 Fernandez, Ellaine Joy
FACTS: On May 16, 1993, shortly before 7:15 in the evening, the Meyer family was celebrating the birthday of their mother at their residence in
Area 4, Barangay Amaparo, Capri, Novaliches, Quezon City. It appears that Dominador Meyer, Jr., had an altercation with a cousin. The victim,
Edilberto Meyer, Sr., tried to pacify them, and brought Dominador outside the house to cool-off. However, while the victim and Dominador, were
talking outside their residence, Reynaldo Danao approached them and warned them not to make any trouble because the community was
celebrating its fiesta. The victim denied making any trouble and said that the matter was a family problem. Suddenly, Reynaldo boxed the victim
who also retaliated with a fistblow. The two exchanged blows and grappled with each other. Reynaldo managed to run away but returned after
about two minutes. Jurissc
Now, accompanied by his barkadas or gangmates (Cielito Buluran, Leonardo Valenzuela and Jaime Danao), Reynaldo was armed with a 12-inch
stainless knife. Cielito had also a knife. Leonardo and Jaime each carried slingshots, with sharp-pointed arrows made of five-inch nails with
abaca tails. Without warning, Reynaldo stabbed the victim at the left side of his lower back. All the while, his three companions were pointing
and brandishing their weapons at the Meyer brothers and the other people present in order to prevent them from interfering. Cielito poked his
knife at the Meyer brothers and stood guard to prevent other people from rendering help to the victim. Leonardo likewise held his slingshot
against the Meyer brothers and prevented people from going near the victim by pointing his loaded slingshot at them. Thereafter, the four
barkadas fled. The victim died that same night.
On May 20, 1993, appellant Cielito Buluran and three (3) John Does were charged with the crime of murder under the information that three (3)
other persons, whose true identities, whereabouts and other personal circumstances of which have not yet been ascertained, and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified with treachery and evident
premeditation, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EDILBERTO MEYER, SR Y JAVIER.
The Information was later amended when Leonardo Valenzuela was identified as one of the assailants. Upon arraignment, both accused entered
pleas of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented three eyewitnesses to the stabbing incident, namely Artemio Avendao, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria
Castillo. All were neighbors of the victim. The prosecution likewise presented PO1 Roberto C. San Miguel of Station 2, Sangang Daan, Novaliches,
Quezon City, who "invited" appellant Buluran to the precinct, and Chief Inspector Florante F. Baltazar, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted
the autopsy on the victim. Baltazar testified that the cause of death was the "penetrating stab wound at the posterior left lumbar region." The
victims widow, Mrs. Erlinda C. Meyer, testified as to the actual damages sustained as a result of the death of her husband.
For the defense, appellants denied any participation in the affray and testified that at the time of the incident, they were both asleep in their
respective houses. The father of appellant Buluran confirmed that his son was asleep in their house from 5:00 in the afternoon until the
policemen came to arrest him at around 8:00 that same evening. Manuel Valenzuela testified that his brother Leonardo, appellant herein, was
drunk and asleep inside their house from 5:00 in the afternoon until the following day. Contrary to the version of the prosecution, Manuel
testified that he saw a fight erupt between Reynaldo Danao on one hand, and the victim, one "Boyet," and one "Amang," on the other hand. The
victim, Boyet and Amang stabbed Reynaldo three times with their knives. Reynaldo retaliated by stabbing the victim and fleeing afterwards.
Thereafter, people from the Meyer house came out and started throwing empty bottles in front of the store, causing all the bystanders to


scamper away. Manuel was even hit by a flying bottle at his left eyebrow, which left a scar, because he was mistaken for his brother. At around
7:45 a.m., Manuel tried to wake up his brother, appellant Leonardo Valenzuela, from his drunken stupor but the latter would not budge.
Thereafter, Manuel went to the house of appellant Buluran, but Buluran was also drunk and asleep at that time.
To bolster their version, the defense presented Dr. Feliciano Bornales, who testified that two (2) days after the incident, or on May 18, 1993, he
treated one Reynaldo Danao for two stab wounds and an incised wound. Dr. Bornales testified that did not know who inflicted such wounds.
On February 4, 1994, the trial court, finding conspiracy and treachery, rendered judgment convicting appellants of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an irregularity of appellants arrest;

Whether or not there is a violation of their constitutional rights during custodial investigation for lack of counsel;
Whether or not there is invalidity of the proceedings in the trial court sans preliminary investigation.

HELD: First. Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their respective arrests since they never raised this issue before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived
Second. There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed an
extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the recordsshow that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during the custodial
investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. In this case, the basis of the conviction by the trial
court was the testimonies of the three eyewitnesses, Artemio Avendao, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria Castillo. It is noteworthy that appellants
never attempted to impeach their testimonies during trial. Neither do they assail the credibility of said witnesses on appeal.
Third. The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information nor affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court. While the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the
accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a pleaat arraignment. It appearing that appellants only raised the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during appeal, their right to
a preliminary investigation was deemed waived when they entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists
if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution In this case, the presence
of appellants, both armed with deadly weapons, at the locus criminis indubitably shows their complicity in the criminal design of Reynaldo
Danao to kill the victim.
However, we find that no treachery attended the killing. On numerous occasions, we have held that where a killing was preceded by an
argument or quarrel, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery can no longer be appreciated since the victim could be said to have been
forewarned and could anticipate aggression from the assailants.
We find, however, that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing. "To appreciate abuse of superior
strength as an aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that there were three, four or more assailants of one victim, but
whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. It is therefore necessary to show that
the attackers cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their superiority in strength."
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants are hereby found guilty of the crime of Homicide, and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years ofreclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P8,000.00 as actual
damages, and P20,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellants.

People v. Rodriguez 232 SCRA 227 Fernandez, Ellaine Joy

FACTS: The facts, as found by the trial court and presented by the Solicitor General, are as follows:
On July 21, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon, the Tabaco Police Station received a report from an unidentified
telephone caller that somebody was selling marijuana inside the Wonder Dog Circus. Forthwith, Pats. Rogelio Gonzales and Benito
Bongalos proceeded to the Wonder Dog Circus near the public market of Tabaco, to verify the report. Arriving at the place, they
spotted appellant Pablo Rodriquez and Gregorio Abrera acting suspiciously. Abrera was putting marijuana inside his pocket (tsn., June
11, 1985, pp. 3-4).
Accordingly, Pats. Gonzales and Bongalos approached appellant and Abrera and, after introducing themselves as police officers, placed
the two under arrest. Pat. Gonzales found a small packet containing marijuana (Exhibit "B") inside the right side pocket of appellant's
pants (tsn., June 11, 1985, pp. 4-5). Upon the other hand, Abrera voluntarily handed over a plastic tea bag containing marijuana
(Exhibit "C") to Pat. Gonzales (tsn., October 15, 1985, pp. 6, 8).
Appellant and Abrera were then brought to the police station where they, as well as the items confiscated from them, were turned
over to Cpl. Santos Colarina, Chief Investigator of the Tabaco Police Station (tsn., June 11, 1985, p. 5).


When investigated, Abrera voluntarily admitted having possessed the marijuana confiscated from him but pointed at appellant as the
one who gave him the marijuana and blamed appellant for it (Exhibit "D"). Even as appellant heard Abrera making said statements,
appellant kept silent and failed to react (tsn., October 15, 1988, p. 41).
Lt. Lorlie Arroyo, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, conducted an examination on the
items seized from the appellant and Abrera and found them to be positive of marijuana (tsn., May 7, 1985, pp. 11, 28).
Consequently, appellant was charged with violating Section 4, Article II, of R. A. No. 6425, as amended. Abrera, upon the other hand,
was not similarly charged presumably because he was a user. Anyway, it was allegedly the Station Commander of the Tabaco Police
Station who opted not to press charges against Abrera (tsn., October 15, 1985, pp. 19-20)" (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 3-5; Rollo,
p. 96).
On the other hand, appellant gave the following version of the incident:
. . . . On June 21, 1984 at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he and a certain Rogelio "Lilio" Cardano were at the "Wonder Dog
Circus" at the bus terminal of Tabaco, Albay, as they were selling an amplifier. Suddenly, they were searched by Patrolman Gonzales
and Bongalos, without any warrant, due to alleged information that they were selling marijuana (TSN, May 12, 1986, p. 4). But the
policemen did not find any marijuana. Instead, they found in his bag three (3) fifty-peso bills (P150.00), the price of the amplifier,
which was already in the possession of the buyer the owner of the circus (TSN, id., p. 5). Pat. Gonzales took the amount and returned
it to the operator of the circus (TSN, id., p. 7). Subsequently, the accused and Abrera were brought to the Police Station, where the
accused was locked-up and mauled inside the prison cell (TSN, id., p. 5). While in prison, the accused was approached by Pat.
Gonzales, who told him that he also had marijuana for sale at P200.00 which he showed him (TSN, id., p. 7). The amplifier was
brought to the police station and returned to the accused by investigator Colarina (TSN, id., pp. 7-8). The accused was detained for
one-and-a- half months, while Abrera was not (TSN, id., p. 6) (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10).
HELD: We have held that ". . ., when a party has it in his possession or power to produce the best evidence of which the case in its nature is
susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart
his evil or fraudulent purpose.
The sworn statement executed by Abrera, (Exh. D) pointing to appellant as the person who gave him a tinfoil of marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence and has no probative value. The failure of the prosecution to present Abrera in court although he was named as one of the prosecution
witnesses deprived the accused the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. ". . . [C]ross-examination is an indispensable instrument of
criminal justice to give substance and meaning to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show that
the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm".
Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales searched appellant without a warrant. It is contended however that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The arrest of appellant itself was also made without a warrant of arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be justified only if there was a
crime committed in the presence of the arresting officers.
The cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
"If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law,
merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only
the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as being "the fruit of the poisonous three" (Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA
623 [1990]; People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]; U.S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853 [1917]; U.S. v. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514 [1912]). In that event, any
evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding".
The marijuana supposedly confiscated from appellant is therefore inadmissible in evidence for having been taken in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the offense
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Acol 232 SCRA 406 Fernandez, Ellaine Joy

FACTS: The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990,
when Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together
with two other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where the other
passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the
Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime.
A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with the responding police officers, upon
seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost
said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso
Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber
revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who
ganged up on the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit I) issued by the Firearms and
Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed firearm holders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library


On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them, proferring a general
denial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that after establishing his residence at Pasay City for about six months, he engaged in
the business of vending "balut". During the incident in question, he recalled that while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly acosted
him, took his money, "balut" and "penoy", and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was forced to confess ownership of one gun
which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the hold up.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having resided in Metro Manila for about two months, recollected that he spent the night at
his cousin's house in Paraaque on September 28, 1990, and that he left Paraaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According
to him, the jeepney he was then riding developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was arrested for no apparent reason. When he was
brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting possession of the other gun. Just like his co-accused, he too, denied knowledge of
the hold up.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on the person of the accused et al valid as the officers earlier claimed it was done without a search

Whether or not the items seized from the person of the accused et al inadmissible as evidence?

HELD: First. The Supreme Court Held that: with respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, we are of the view that the
search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest: When an offense
has in fact been committed, and the has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; in as much as
the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of the information related by Percival
Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed. And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
incidental thereto was valid. Also, items subject to seizure are:

1) object of the offense;

2) Items gained or profited from the commission of the offense,; and
3) items used for the commission of the offense.
Second. Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs.
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police officersshould happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded fromperforming their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti
Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the lower court must be modified to read only
as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the slight modification that the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. Further, the court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine National Police to
be disposed of in accordance with law.
No pronouncement is made as to costs.

III. Section 3
Exclusionary Rule
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111 Florendo, Katherine
FACTS: On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortaez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortaez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of
the petitioner.
Private respondent formally offered in evidence exhibits among which were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the cassette tapes.
From the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of
HELD: The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in
such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.


In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including
tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private
respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondents trial court and the
Court of Appeals failed to consider the provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that
both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Zulueta v. CA 253 SCRA 699 Florendo, Katherine
FACTS: Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and papers consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours.
The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, decided in favor of private respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties
described and ordering petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of
the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Consti) is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as provide by law.(Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Consti) Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art.III, 1987 Consti)A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law ensures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule130, Rules
of Court). Petition DENIED.
Ramirez v. CA 248 SCRA 590 Florendo, Katherine
FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious
mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorneys fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610, 000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trials courts discretion.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 applies to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to
the conversation.
2.) Whether or not the substance must be alleged in the information.
3.) Whether or not R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication, not a private conversation.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statutes
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under the provision of R.A. 4200.
Ople v. Torres 293 SCRA 141 Guisadio, Redentor
People v. Marti 193 SCRA 57
Doctrine: Bill of rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures from private individuals, the constitutional
proscription restraint only against the government and its agencies tasked with enforcement of the law. However, it may be possible to find
remedy in the Civil Code.
People v. Artua 288 SCRA 626
Gaanan v. IAC 145 SCRA 112 Hassan, Absar
Facts: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding
P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since


Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of
the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line.
HELD: NO, An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the
law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel.
IV. Section 4

Prior Restraint
Near v. Minnesota 238 US 697 Hassan, Absar

Facts: Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were implicated with
gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his newspaper under a state law that allowed such action
against periodicals. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and
lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined (stopped) from
further committing or maintaining the nuisance.
Issue: Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment?
Held: The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection
against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and
hence was invalid under the First Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow
exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be
punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding.

Freedman v. Maryland 380 US 51 Hassan, Absar

Facts: Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were
obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman
challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was
Issue: Did the Maryland law violate the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?
Held: The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly
suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial
participation in the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue
inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors,
(2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."
New York Times Co. v. US 403 US 713 Hussin, Nurham
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance GR 115444, Oct. 30, 1995
Alexander v. US 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441
INC v. CA 259 SCRA 529 (1996) Isnani, Omar

Subsequent Punishment
People v. Perez 45 Phil. 599 Jaafar, Kaizer

Facts: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the
morning of April 1, 1922, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General
Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted
thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The question presented for decision is, what crime, if any, did the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while holding
a discussion with several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable Leonard Wood
was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by word, without his presence,
said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following phrases: "Asin an
manga filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot con
Filipinas," which in English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a
bad thing for the Philippines.


Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.

At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the
first witness for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has recommended a bad administration
in these Islands and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this
reason, we have not obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of
Pilar, in a written statement, and Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness.
Cresencio understood that Perez invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and
throw it into the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated.
But they endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to
the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a
peaceful manner, and that what he wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness
stand, he stated that his words were the following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into account
that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats
may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay
Issue: WON the accused should be convicted for violation of section 8 of Act No. 292.
Held: Yes. Here , the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of
the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment,
seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
of the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the GovernorGeneral to be exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of
the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty.
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to
meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or
do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United
States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed
to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based
upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the
defendant stands charged is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may be found
guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of
the information, and is afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No.
292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the
lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered
Dennis v. US 341 US 494 Jaafar, Kaizer
Facts: The Petitioners, Dennis and others (Petitioners) were convicted for (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist
Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and
knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was
Synopsis of Rule of Law: For an impediment on free expression to be permissible, the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability of
coming about, must sufficiently outweigh the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the danger.
The Smith Act (the Act) made it a criminal offense for a person to knowingly or willfully advocate the overthrowing of any government in the
United States by force or to attempt to commit or conspire to commit the crime the same. The Petitioners were brought up on charges under
the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members
advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the
same. It was clear from the record that the leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a revolution when the opportunity came. The
Trial Court found the Petitioners guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were


Issue: Was the statute invalid by its own terms because it prohibited academic discussions on topics such as that of the merits of MarxismLeninism?
Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) We must apply the clear and present danger test. Accordingly, we note that the overthrow of the
Government by force is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Obviously, clear and present danger does
not mean the government may not act until the Putsch has been plotted and on is the verge of being executed.
On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite danger to act existed here: (1) the formation by the Petitioners of a highly organized
conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders (the Petitioners) felt it was time for action; (2) the inflammable
nature of world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries; and (4) the touch and go nature of our relations with other countries with
Justice Hugo Black (Justice Black) While it is true that unfettered communication of ideas does entail danger, the benefits in the eyes of the
Justice William Douglas (Justice Douglas) If this were a case where the speaker was teaching techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the
President, or the planting of bombs, I would concur in the judgment. But, the reality is that no such evidence was introduced at trial.
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) An individual cannot claim the constitutional protections of the First Amendment in advocating or teaching
the overthrow of government by violence. I think such conduct can be made a crime, even without requiring a showing of an extremely high
Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) The results we have reached are the product of a careful weighing of the following factors: (1) that
social value of the speech being prohibited; (2) the chilling effect on legitimate speech that the punishment of any form of speech may have;
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) is essentially allowing the prohibitions of advocacy of a particular doctrine in this case
the overthrow of the government by force. In later opinions the Supreme Court will adopt a more rigid test that focuses on whether a speaker
is advocating actions.
Gonzales v. COMELEC 27 SCRA 835 Jaafar, Kaizer
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free
press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he
was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of
Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of
election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among
themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners
meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment
however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being
debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.







Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom
of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The
danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above
decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency
rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It
is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of
votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command.


Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. 137 SCRA 628 Jajurie Fatima

Facts: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on
grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure.
Issue: WON the closure, without hearing, violative of the freedom of the press
Held: YES. All forms of media are protected by the speech freedom clause under a reasonable application of the clear and present danger test.
Due process must be followed before a radio station may be ordered closed.
Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. V. Judge Capulong 160 SCRA 865 Jajurie Fatima
Facts: Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and filming of the projected motion picture The Four
Day Revolution, which relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion upon the formers
right to privacy.
Petitioners contend that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and the subject matter of the
motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent senator.
Issue: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.
Held: Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of public interest. Private respondent is a public figure due
to his participation in the culmination of the change of government. The right of privacy of the public figure is necessarily narrower than that
of an ordinary citizen.
Kelley v. Johnson 425 US 238 Jajurie Fatima
Facts: The Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department had promulgated Order No. 71-1, which established hair-grooming standards
applicable to male members of the police force. The regulation was directed at the style and length of hair, sideburns, and mustaches. The
regulation was attacked as violative of respondent patrolman's right of free expression under the First Amendment and his guarantees of due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
Issue: WON the regulations so irrational that they can be deemed arbitrary, and therefore a deprivation of liberty protected by the 14 th
Amendment Due Process clause?
Held: No, there is no protected liberty. There is no substantial claim of infringement on the individuals freedom of choice with respect to
certain basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life.
Similarity in appearance of police officers is a desirable trait and serves as a rational reason for the law.

Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 US 444 Isnani, Omar


Speech and the Electoral Process

Sanidad v. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 Jimenez, May

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree
1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.
On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27
September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force
and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,


insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October
1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power
to propose amendments to the new Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National
Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after
the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call
by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1)
regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of
all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority
vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had
already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was
given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim
National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the
Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated,
because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the
interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In
sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual
function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating
body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative
of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or
adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

National Press Club v. COMELEC 207 SCRA 1 Jimenez, May

Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for
political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming
May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is
being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional
guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's
role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners
contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would


bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing













Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office,
without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state
policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the
assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution,
Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and
programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or
broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least
as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to
be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Adiong v. COMELEC March 31, 1992 Jimenez, May
(Constitutional Law Right to Free Press)
FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit
their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as
it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print political advertisements.
ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.
HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobileplaces whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the

Osmena v. COMELEC 288 SCRA 447 Kinang, Jezrill

FACTS: Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the Constitution
A. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday
of May 1992;
B. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials
shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article
XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
C. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on
the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the
provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title Commission on Elections of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set
by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the
second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the
parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the selfcorrecting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that the question is political in
nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there
being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by
Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution which provides for the
synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating
that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously as


the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30,
1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus JurisSecundum, states
that it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day
on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail
to qualify within the time.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective local
officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056,
those to be elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a
different campaign period, as follows:
a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days
before the day of the elections.
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811 Kinang, Jezrill
FACTS: This case is about the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc
Resolution No. 98-1419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to
stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same."
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of
the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the
exit survey.On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and
desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto,
ISSUE: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit
polls during the May 11 elections."
In his Memorandum, the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2)
prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.
HELD: Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots,"
as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State
in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case.
The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the
credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in general be
manipulated easily. He insists that these polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes
conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.
Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the
Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the
freedoms of speech and of the press.
The Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed
Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SWS v. COMELEC 357 SCRA 496 Kinang, Jezrill
FACTS: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the
media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media,
valid and constitutional?
HELD: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought
to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation
directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.


Commercial Speech
Rubin v. Coors Brewing 131 L. Ed. 2d 532 Larete, Aries


FACTS Because of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA or Act) prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol content, the federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) rejected respondent brewer's application for approval of proposed labels that disclosed such content.
Respondent filed suit for relief on the ground that the relevant provisions of the Act violated the First Amendment's protection of commercial
speech. The Government argued that the labeling ban was necessary to suppress the threat of "strength wars" among brewers, who, without the
regulation, would seek to compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their beer. The District Court invalidated the labeling ban, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the latter court found that the Government's interest in suppressing "strength wars" was "substantial"
under the test set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban violates the First Amendment because it fails to advance that interest in a direct and material way.
HELD: Section 5(e)(2) violates the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech.
(a) In scrutinizing a regulation of commercial speech that concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, a court must consider whether the
governmental interest asserted to support the regulation is "substantial." If that is the case, the court must also determine whether the
regulation directly advances the asserted interest and is no more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson, supra, at
566, 100 S.Ct., at 2351. Here, respondent seeks to disclose only truthful, verifiable, and nonmisleading factual information concerning alcohol
(b) The interest in curbing "strength wars" is sufficiently "substantial" to satisfy Central Hudson. The Government has a significant interest in
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength, which could
lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs. Cf. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341,
106 S.Ct. 2968, 2976, 92 L.Ed.2d 266. There is no reason to think that strength wars, if they were to occur, would not produce the type of social
harm that the Government hopes to prevent. However, the additional asserted interest in "facilitat[ing]" state efforts to regulate alcohol under
the Twenty-first Amendment is not sufficiently substantial to meet Central Hudson's requirement. Even if the Government possessed the
authority to facilitate state powers, the Government has offered nothing to suggest that States are in need of federal assistance in this regard.
(c) Section 205(e)(2) fails Central Hudson's requirement that the measure directly advance the asserted government interest. The labeling ban
cannot be said to advance the governmental interest in suppressing strength wars because other provisions of the FAAA and implementing
regulations prevent 205(e)(2) from furthering that interest in a direct and material fashion. Although beer advertising would seem to
constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war than labels, the BATF regulations governing such advertising prohibit statements of
alcohol content only in States that affirmatively ban such advertisements. Government regulations also permit the identification of certain beers
with high alcohol content as "malt liquors," and they require disclosure of content on the labels of wines and spirits. There is little chance that
205(e)(2) can directly and materially advance its aim, while other provisions of the same Act directly undermine and counteract its effects.
(d) Section 205(e)(2) is more extensive than necessary, since available alternatives to the labeling banincluding directly limiting the alcohol
content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength, and limiting the ban to malt liquors, the segment of the beer
market that allegedly is threatened with a strength warwould prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's protections for commercial speech.
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network 123 L. Ed. 2d 99 Larete, Aries
In 1989, petitioner city authorized respondent companies to place 62 freestanding newsracks on public property for the
purpose of distributing free magazines that consisted primarily of advertisements for respondents' services. In 1990, motivated by its interest in
the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and sidewalks, the city revoked respondents' permits on the ground that the magazines were
"commercial handbills," whose distribution on public property was prohibited by a pre-existing ordinance.
Whether or not this categorical ban violated the First Amendment under the "reasonable fit" standard applied to the regulation of
commercial speech in Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388.
HELD: The city's selective and categorical ban on the distribution, via newsrack, of "commercial handbills" is not consistent with the dictates of
the First Amendment.
(a) The record amply supports the conclusion that the city has not met its burden of establishing a "reasonable fit" between its
legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and the means it chose to serve those interests. The ordinance's outdated prohibition of handbill
distribution was enacted long before any concern about newsracks developed, for the apparent purpose of preventing the kind of visual blight
caused by littering, rather than any harm associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing devices. The fact that the city failed to address
its recently developed concern about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it has not "carefully
calculated" the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. See Fox, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct., at
3034. The lower courts correctly ruled that the benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks out of a total of 1,500-2,000 on public
property was small.
(b) The Court rejects the city's argument that, because every decrease in the overall number of newsracks on its sidewalks necessarily
effects an increase in safety and an improvement in the attractiveness of the cityscape, there is a close fit between its ban on newsracks
dispensing "commercial handbills" and its interests in safety and esthetics. This argument is premised upon the distinction the city has drawn
between commercial speech such as respondents', which is viewed as having only a low value, and the assertedly more valuable noncommercial
speech of "newspapers," whose distribution on public land is specifically authorized by separate provisions of the city code. The argument
attaches more importance to that distinction than the Court's cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech.
Moreover, because commercial and noncommercial publications are equally responsible for the safety concerns and visual blight that motivated
the city, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the admittedly legitimate interests asserted by the city and is an impermissible
means of responding to those interests. Thus, on this record, the city has failed to make a showing that would justify its differential treatment
of the two types of news racks.
(c) Because the city's regulation of newsracks is predicated on the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial
speech, it is not content neutral and cannot qualify as a valid time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech.
City of Laduc v. Gilleo 129 L. Ed. 2d 36 Larete, Aries
FACTS: A City of Ladue ordinance prohibited homeowners from displaying any signs on property except for residence identification, for sale signs
and signs warning of safety hazards. The police advised Respondent that signs such as her war protest sign were prohibited in the Petitioner City.
The City Council denied Respondents petition for variance. The Respondent moved her sign to the window, so that it wouldnt be on her
property. The Petitioner City enacted a replacement ordinance in order to expand the definition of signs that would be prohibited in the City
and also to add an explanation of the legislative purpose of the ban on signs. The Petitioner City enacted a replacement ordinance, which
included a sweeping definition of signs (window signs were among those prohibited) and also extended an explanation of findings, policies,
interests, that described among other things that the signs would clutter, tarnish beauty and impair property values. The replacement ordinance















HELD: The ordinance is an unconstitutional abridgement of 1st Amendment constitutional rights. The regulation treated commercial speech
more favorably than non-commercial speech and totally foreclosed a means of communication with a sweeping definition of signs. The ordinance
was more than just a time, place and manner restriction, since the speech could not be switched to an alternate medium. Further, residents
self-interest in property values will probably prevent the danger of unlimited proliferation of signs. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) felt a more temperate regulation could meet the Petitioner Citys concerns.

Policarpio v. Manila Times 5 SCRA 148 Latip, Lynette

FACTS:Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Natl Commission.As such, she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her
subordinates in the Commission, & caused the latter to beseparated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-chargeswhich were referred
for investigation. Pending completion, Reyesfiled a complaint against Policarpio for alleged malversation of public funds & another complaint for
estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for publishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items
inSaturday Mirror and in the Daily Mirror. The articles contain news on Reyes charges against Policarpio for having malversed public property and
of having fraudulently soughtreimbursement of supposed official expenses. It was said thatPolicarpio used several sheets of government stencils
for her private and personal use. The other charge refers to the supposedreimbursements she had made for a trip to Quezon andPangasinan.
Reyes complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when she had actually madethe trip aboard an army
plane. Policarpio was said to be absentfrom the Bayambang conference for which she also sought arefund of expenses.
CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had notproven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing
thearticles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having publishedlibelous/defamatory articles?
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court said newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion indetermining the manner in which a given event
should bepresented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto,as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner
isnot per se illegal. Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truthwith respect to such proceedings.But, to enjoy immunity, apublication
containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith andwithout any comments or
Art. 354, RPC provides:Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if itbe true, if no good intention & justifiable
motive for making it isshown, except, A fair and true report, made in good faith, w/oany comments or remarks.
In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory tothe plaintiff, the Aug 11 article presented her in a
worsepredicament than that in which she, in fact was. Said article was nota fair and true report of the proceedings therein alluded to. What
ismore, its sub-title PCAC raps Policarpio on fraud is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatoryimputations
contained in said article are presumed to bemalicious.
In falsely stating that the complaints were filed by PCAC, either defendants knew the truth or they did not. If they did, then
thepublication would actually be malicious. If they did not, or if theyacted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence
in making said statement.We note that the Aug 13 article rectified a major inaccuracy in the1st article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the
PCAC had filedthe complaints. It likewise indicated the number of stencil sheetsinvolved. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe
out theresponsibility arising from the publication of the Aug 11 article,although it should mitigate it.
HELD: Decision reversed. Defendants ordered to pay plaintiff moraldamages, attys fees plus cost.

Lopez v. CA 34 SCRA 116 Latip, Lynette

FACTS: This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle published a series of articles in January, 1956 about the Hoax of the Year. It also erupted in
the earlier part of that month. The story goes that Fidel Cruz was a sanitary inspector in the Babuyan Islands. He sent out a distress signal to a
US air force plane who relayed it to Manila. Another US plane dropped emergency supplies together with a two-way radio. Cruz told of killings
committed since Christmas, 1955 which terrorized the populace. The Philippine army was sent out only to find Cruz who only wanted
transportation home to Manila.
The army branded it as a hoax. The series of articles published the photo of Fidel Cruz. However, it was not the sanitary inspectors
photo that was published but that of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor. As soon as the error was
noticed, a correction was immediately published. Fidel G. Cruz sued and the trial court awarded him damages which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners abused the freedom of the press.
RULING: YES, though the standard is actual malice, in weekly magazines there is little excuse for errors in data.
The Supreme Court said that no liability would be incurred if the petitioners couldprove that their actions are embraced by press
freedom.Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day as long as theyare relevant to a matter of
public interest, the insistenceon the requirement as to its truth yielding at times tounavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers andother
publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If there is no such showing, there is a quasi-delict. Libel has both a criminal and civil
aspect becauseit induces breach of the peace by the defamed personand it deprives him of his good reputation.Libel was defined in the old libel
law as a maliciousdefamation expressed either in writing, printing or bysigns or pictures or like exposing [someone, dead oralive] to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule. Newell(Slander and Libel) states that libel is incurred when the wrong persons photograph was published with
alibelous article. Holmes points out that publishing aportrait by mistake was no excuse. The publisher tookthe risk in publishing a libelous article
and he publishesat his peril. Learned Hand states that when a photoexposes a person to ridicule it is libelous. Cardozo statesthat though words
dissolve, writings persevere and writings include any symbol as long as it is intelligible.


Criticism, however, is justified in the interest of societyand the maintenance of good govt. Liberty to commenton public affairs
creates a full discussion and publicofficers should not be too thin skinned that they canttake it. Newspapers have the legal right to have
andexpress opinions on legal questions. Debate on publicissues should be uninhibited, robust, wide-open, evenallowing vehement, caustic and
sharp attacks. Criticismturns to libel when actual malice is used when astatement was made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard that it was false or not (US SC,NY Times vs Sullivan).Paras as ponente in Quisumbingvs Lopez states thatnewspapers should not
be held to account for honestmistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. Howeverthis is not the case here. A weekly magazine is
notoppressed by the tyranny of deadlines as much asdailies. There is no need to act in haste.Retractions do not absolve one from pecuniary
liability. There is still responsibility arising from the publicationof the first article.
New York Times Co. c. Sullivan 376 US 254 Latip, Lynette
FACTS: A landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, (1964), extended the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech to libel cases brought by public officials. The Supreme Court sought to encourage public debate by changing the rules involving libel
that had previously been the province of state law and state courts.
New York Times v. Sullivan grew out of events occurring during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement in Alabama. In 1960, Martin Luther King
Jr., and other Civil Rights leaders conducted protests against Segregation in Montgomery, Alabama. Their efforts met fierce resistance from
Montgomery public officials. Civil rights leaders placed a full-page advertisement in the New York Times seeking contributions for civil rights
causes in the South. Signed by sixty-four prominent leaders in public affairs, religion, trade unions, and the performing arts, the advertisement,
entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," stated that thousands of southern African American students were engaging in nonviolent demonstrations in
positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity. The ad went on to charge that these demonstrations had been met with a "wave of
terror" by state and local governments. Alleged events that backed up this charge were described, but no particular public official was named.
L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner responsible for supervising the city police department, filed a libel suit against four
African American clergyman and the New York Times in Alabama state court. Sullivan alleged that the advertisement implicitly libeled him. Libel
is a civil tort and consists of injuring someone's reputation by reporting falsehoods about that person.
At trial Sullivan proved that the advertisement contained a number of minor inaccuracies about described incidents. The jury had to
determine whether the statements in the advertisement were "of and concerning" Commissioner Sullivan. The judge instructed the jury that
under Alabama law, if the statements were found libelous, falsity and malice were presumed, and damages could be awarded without direct
proof of financial loss. The jury concluded that the statements did concern Sullivan and awarded him $500,000 for injuries to his reputation and
ISSUE: Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as
untruthful due to factual errors, unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections?
RULING: YES. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Rule of Law applied by Alabama violated the First Amendment. Justice William
J. Brennan Jr., in his majority opinion, placed the legal issues in the context of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." Brennan maintained that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and must be protected
if freedom of expression is to have the "breathing space" it needs to survive.
The advertisement was squarely a public expression and protest, and fell within constitutional protection. Neither the allegedly
defamatory content of the ad, nor the falsity of some of its factual statements, nor the Negligence of anyone in preparing or publishing it
forfeited this protection. Brennan dismissed the idea that courts were free to conclude that libelous statements were made "of and concerning"
a particular person when the statements on their face did not make even an oblique reference to the individual. Brennan stated that there is "no
legal alchemy" by which a court constitutionally can establish that "an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an
official responsible for those operations."
Brennan then set out the rule that reshaped libel law. A public official could recover in a libel action only if and when a court found
that the libelous statement about the official was made with 'actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." As long as the press has an "absence of malice," public officials are barred from recovering damages for the
publication of false statements about them.
In separate concurring opinions, Justices Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas differed with Justice Brennan over whether the press
should ever be held liable in defamation of public officials. They concluded that the First Amendment provided an absolute Immunity for
criticism of the way public officials do their public duty. Anything less than absolute immunity encourages "deadly danger" to a free press by
state libel laws that harass, punish, and ultimately destroy critics.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 US 254 Marcial Roel

Gerts v. Robert Wlech 418 US 323 Marcial Roel
Facts: In 1969, the Respondent, Robert Welch, Inc. (Respondent), publisher of American Opinion, a monthly outlet for the views of the John
Birch Society, ran an article in which it accused the Petitioner of being the architect of a frame-up of Nuccio. The article stated that the
Petitioner had a criminal record and a long history of communist affiliation. The Petitioner filed the instant case for libel and, after trial, the
jury returned a verdict in his favor in the amount of $50,000. The trial court, nevertheless, entered Judgment N.O.V., concluding that the New
York Times v. Sullivan standard applied to any discussion of a public issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue: Whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public
figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements?
Ruling: A private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by [New York Times v. Sullivan]
may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.
Hustler v. Magazine 485 US 46 Marcial Roel
Facts: The November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a parody of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that had the name and picture
of Respondent, and was entitled Jerry Falwell talks about his first time. The parody was designed to mimic other Campari ads, which pointed


to the idea of the first time someone tasted Campari Liqueur. The parody depicted Respondents first time as a drunken, incestuous encounter
with his mother in an outhouse. Respondent brought suit against Petitioners, alleging invasion of privacy, libel and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found for Petitioner on the defamation and
invasion of privacy claims, on the basis that no reasonable person would consider the parody as true. The same courts held for Respondent on
the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
Issue: This case considers whether an award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress to the victim of a parody is consistent
with the First Amendment freedom of the press.
Ruling: When an advertisement parodying a public figure depicts facts which no reasonable person could take as true, that figure cannot prevail
under a theory of emotional distress.
In Re Jurado AM No. 90-5-2373, 4 LR 19 Aug09 Maruhom, Ebno
In Re Jurado 243 SCRA 299
Vasquez v. CA GR 118971 Sept. 15, 1999
Borjal v. CA GR. 126466 Jan. 14, 1999 Oliveros, Jinnefer
FACTS: BORJAL and SOLIVEN were charged for the case of libel. They allegedly wrote and published articles derogatory and offensive against
Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he sent to support a conference to be launch concerning resolving matters
on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities but Francisco Wenceslao was never named in the Article. The court ordered
petitioners to indemnify the private respondent. A petition for review was filed before Supreme Court alleging that respondent was not
identified to be the subject in the article.


The court ruled that to maintainlibel suit it is essential that the victim is identifiable although not named. It is also not sufficient that
the offended party recognized himself as the person defamed, it must be shown that third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication and also the court held that though respondent is also deemed to be a public figure the freedom of expression is
constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media members to practice ethical standards in the exercise thereof;
Petitioners counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
Vicario v. CA GR 124491 June 1, 1999 Oliveros, Jinnefer
FACTS: Roque Vicario y Mendez was charged with libel by Judge ProcesoSidro, that Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in the vicinity of
Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page 7 of March 20, 1992 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer. In the content therein
was SAMAR JUDGE WHO POCKETED BOND CHARGED WITH GRAFT, Ombudsman Vesquez yesterday filed with Sandiganbayan graft charges
against a Northern Samar judge who pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by respondent in one several cases pending in his sala. In the
investigation showed that Judge Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk of court and refused to return the money even after the
accused who filed the bond was already acquitted in the case.
Judge Sidro alleged that it was greatly prejudiced his reputation as member of bench and caused him distress, the court finds
petitioner guilty of libel and sentenced him of a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Then it was on appeal.
The court ruled that Vicario is acquitted of the crime charged. The court stresses the word malice. The law presumes that malice must
be present in every defamatory imputation, exemption is a qualifiedly privileged communication, the character of which is a matter of defense
that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the accused. To constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the ill will is
engendered by ones sense of justice, such feeling negatives actual malice. The anger observed by trial court to have been shown by petitioner
toward private complainant at the time former offered his testimony in defense of libel cannot constitute as malice, either in fact or in law,
that accompanied the dissemination of an alleged libelous publication.
Pader v. People 325 SCRA 117 Oliveros, Jinnefer
FACTS: Atty.Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor in Morong, Bataan. That on April 20, 1995 at 8:00 p.m. in Atty. Escolango
residence. While he was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house, RogelioPader appeared at the gate and shouted
putanginamo Atty. Escolango, napakawalanghiyamo!, respondent was embarrassed and on June 16 on the same year filed a complaint against
Pader for grave oral defamation. MCTC of Bataan rendered decision finding Pader guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Then on March the RTC
affirmed the decision and thereafter the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals for review. But the judgment was modified.
The court ruled that petitioner Pader is guilty only of slight oral defamation. Ruling was based on the doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatically significance and
accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between
the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. The expression putanginamo is a
common enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure(Reyes vs.


Miller v. California 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 Saladaga, Sherlyn



The appellant, Marvin Miller, operator of one of the West Coast's largest mail-order businesses dealing in sexually explicit
material, had conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books, labeled "adult" material. He was
found guilty in the Superior Court of Orange County, California of having violated California Penal Code 311.2 (a),
a misdemeanor, by knowingly distributing obscene material. The said decision was affirmed by the California Court of


(1) Whether or not the sale and distribution of obscene material was protected under the First Amendment's guarantee
of Freedom of Speech?
(2) What is the test for obscenity?


(1) The court held that the sale and distribution of obscene material was not protected under the First Amendment's
guarantee of Freedom of Speech.
(2) The Court, devised a set of three criteria which must be met in order for a work to be legitimately subject to state
regulation: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.

Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak 137 SCRA 717419 Saladaga, Sherlyn


PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television. In a resolution of a
sub-committee of respondent Board, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification For Adults Only,
with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. Petitioners then filed for a motion for reconsideration stating
that the said classification was without basis and a restraint of artistic expression. Later, respondent Board released its
decision, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film, affirming in toto the ruling
of the subcommittee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct
the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied. Hence the


What is the test to determine whether a motion picture exceeds the bounds of permissible exercise of free speech?


The court held that the test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of
an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present.
Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.

Pita v. CA 178 SCRA 362419 Saladaga, Sherlyn



Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special
Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila,
seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, news-stand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized
materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several
officers and members of various student organizations, among the publications seized, and later burned, was Pinoy
Playboy magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Petitioner filed a case seeking to enjoin and/or restrain
respondents and their agents from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is valid?
The court held that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Undoubtedly, immoral lore or literature comes
within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent
danger that would justify adverse action against such lies on the authorities. In the present case, the Court is not convinced
that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature.
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

Barnes v. Glen Theater 498 US 439 Sali, El Shal

On certiorari, the US Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the US Court for the seventh circuit.
FACTS: Respondents, two Indiana establishment wishing to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment and individual dancers employed at
those establishments, brought suit in the district court to enjoin enforcement of the state public indecency law, which requires respondent
dancers to wear pasties and a G-string, asserting that the laws prohibition against total nudity in public places violates the first Amendment.


The court held that the nude dancing involved here was not expressive conduct. The court of appeal reversed, ruling that non-obscene nude
dancing performed for entertainment is protected expression, and that the statute was an improper infringement of that activity because its
purpose was to promote the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers.

ISSUE: Does the enforcement of Indianas public indecency law to prevent totally nude dancing violate the First Amendments guarantee of
freedom of expression?
HELD:The UC Supreme Court held that the enforcement of Indianas public indecency law to prevent totally nude dancing does not violate the
First Amendments guarantee of freedom of expression.
The law is clearly within the states constitutional power. And it furthers a substantial government interest in protecting societal order and
The states traditional police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety and morals, and such a basis for
legislation has been upheld. This governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since public nudity is the evil the
state seeks to present, whether or not it is combined with expressive activity.
Finally, the incidental restriction on First Amendment Freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government interest.
Since the statutory prohibition is not a means to a greater end, but an end itself, it is without cavil that the statute is narrowly tailored.
The US Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the US Court for the seventh circuit judgment.
FCC v Pacifica Foundation 438 US 726 Sali, El Shal
FACTS: In 1973, a father complained to FCC that his son heard the George Carlin Filthy Words broadcast one afternoon over WBAI, a Pacifica
Foundation FM radio station in New York City. Pacifica received censure from FCC, in the form of a letter of reprimand, for allegedly violating
FCC regulations which is prohibited broadcasting indecent materials.
ISSUE:Does the censure issued by FCC to Pacifica Foundation violate the First Amendments guarantee of freedom of expression?
HELD: The US Supreme Court upheld the FCC action in 1978 by a vote of 5 to 4, ruling that the routine was indecent but not obscene. The court
accepted as compelling the governments interests in 1) Shielding children form patently offensive material, and 2) Ensuring that unwanted
speech does not enter ones home. The court stated that the FCC had the authority to prohibit such broadcasts during hours when children were
likely to be among the audience, and give the FCC the broad leeway to determine what constituted indecency in different context.

Renton v. Playtime Theater 475 US 41 Sali, El Shal

FACTS: In early 1982, respondents acquired two existing theaters in downtown Rentor, with the intention of using them to exhibit feature-length
adult firms. The theaters were located within the area proscribed by the ordinance by Ordinance No. 3526. Respondents filed lawsuit
challenging the ordinance on First and Fourteenth Amendments grounds, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
In November 1982, the Federal Magistrate recommended the entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Rentor Ordinance and
denial of Rentors motion to dismiss and for summary judgment.
The district court adopted the magistrates recommendation and entered the preliminary injunction and respondents began showing adult films
at their two theaters in Renton. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to submit the case for final decision on whether a permanent injunction
should be issued on the basis of the record as already develop. The district court then vacated the preliminary injunction, denied respondents
requested permanent injunction, and entered summary judgment in favor of Renton.
ISSUE: Does a city ordinance that prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within the area proscribed by Ordinance No 3526 violate
the First and/or Fourteenth Amendments?
HELD: The Rentor ordinance does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1000 feet
of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church, park, or school. The ordinance thereby properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation.
In sum, we find that the Rentor Ordinance represents a valid governmental response to the admittedly serious problems created by adult
theaters, Renton has not used the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression, but rather has sought to make some areas available for
adult theaters and their patrons, while the same time preserving the quality of life in the community at large by preventing those theaters from
locating in other areas. This after all is the essence of zoning.

Bethel School District v. Fraser 478 US 675 Salih, Hasim

FACTS: On April 26, 1983, respondent Matthew N. Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in Pierce County, Washington, delivered a speech
nominating a fellow student for student elective office. Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were 14-year-olds, attended the
assembly. Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to the study hall. The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational


program in self-government. Students who elected not to attend the assembly were required to report to study hall. During the entire speech,
Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.
During Fraser's delivery of the speech, a school counselor observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some students hooted and
yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's speech. Other students appeared to be
bewildered and embarrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the day following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a
portion of the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the class.

Whether or not the respondents speech contained obscene language?

RULING: No. What the speech does contain is a sexual metaphor that may unquestionably be offensive to some listeners in some settings. These
fundamental values of "habits and manners of civility" essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political
and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these "fundamental values" must also take into account consideration
of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Even the most heated political discourse in a democratic society requires consideration for the
personal sensibilities of the other participants and audiences.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 484 US 260 Salih, Hasim

FACTS: This case concerns the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced
as part of the school's journalism curriculum.
The practice at Hazelwood East during the spring 1983 semester was for the journalism teacher to submit page proofs of each
Spectrum issue to Principal Reynolds for his review prior to publication. On May 10, Emerson delivered the proofs of the May 13 edition to
Reynolds, who objected to two of the articles scheduled to appear in that edition. One of the stories described three Hazelwood East students'
experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.
Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used false names "to keep the identity of these girls a secret," the
pregnant students still might be identifiable from the text. He also believed that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control
were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the
divorce story had complained that her father "wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I" prior to the divorce, "was always out
of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys," and "always argued about everything" with her mother. Reynolds believed that the
student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to these remarks or to consent to their publication. He was unaware that
Emerson had deleted the student's name from the final version of the article.

Whether or not the school publication containing pregnancy and divorce issues is indecent?

RULING: No. The Court opens its analysis in this case by purporting to reaffirm time-tested proposition that public school students "do not 'shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'" That is an ironic introduction to an opinion that denudes
high school students of much of the First Amendment protection that itself prescribed. Instead of "teaching children to respect the diversity of
ideas that is fundamental to the American system," and "that our Constitution is a living reality, not parchment preserved under glass," the
Court today "teaches youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." The young men and women of Hazelwood
East expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches them today.


Assembly and Petition

Navarro v. Villegas 31 SCRA 73 Salih, Hasim

FACTS: Respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further
offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the demonstration.

What is the extent of the authority of the state to regulate public assemblies?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Mayor possessed reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of
disorder and maintain public safety and order.
Civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society. The right to freedom of assembly is not denied; but this
right is neither unlimited nor absolute. It is not correct to say that the Mayor has refused to grant the permit applied for; he offered an
alternative which, in my opinion, is not unreasonable. There being no arbitrary refusal to grant permit, petitioner is not entitled to the writ.

PBM Employees v. PBM 51 SCRA 189 San Luis, Lyka

Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner
Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against


alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 am to 2 pm) as well as those in regular second
and third shifts (from 7 am to 4 pm and from 8 am to 5 pm respectively) and they informed the respondent company there proposed
demonstration. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because
it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly, the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third
shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees
who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners rights to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammeled
enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis--vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester
and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised
tissues. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence
of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment
of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech"
and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the
Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally.
Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate
their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and
right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court Industrial Relations dated
September 12 and October 9, 1969.
JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553 San Luis, Lyka
Facts: Petitioner retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the
front gate of the Units State embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing.
The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. Respondent
Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and other purpose. Respondent Mayor Bagatsing
pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a constitutional right is being violated by the mayors ordinance.

HELD: Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention
is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the
Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance
issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right/s. it is quite
reassuring such that both on the part of the national government and the citizens, reason and moderation have prevailed.
WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.

Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359 San Luis, Lyka


Facts: The failure to accord respect to the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech is the grievance alleged by
petitioners, prohibition and mandamus proceeding. The principal respondents are Anastacio Ramento, Director of the National Capital Region of
the Ministry of Education. The nullification of the decision of respondent Ramento Affirming the action taken by respondent Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation finding petitioners guilty of illegal assembly and suspending them is sought in this petition. The validity thereof was
challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondent
and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region,
found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated, their holding illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit
granted resulting in the disturbance of class and oral defamation. This petition may be considered moot and academic if viewed solely from
the fact that by virtue of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court petitioners were allowed to enroll in the ensuing semester, with
three of them doing so and with the other two equally entitled to do so. Moreover, there is the added circumstance of more than a year having
passed since October 20, 1982 when respondent Ramento issued the challenged decision suspending them for one year. Nonetheless, with its
validity having been put in issue, for being violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and free speech, there is
need to pass squarely on the question raised.
Issue: Whether or Not their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. .
Held: therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative
of constitutional safeguards. . The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of
dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision dated October 20, 1982 of respondent Ramento imposing a one-year suspension is nullified
and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in the resolution of November 18, 1982 is made permanent. As of that date,
petitioners had been suspended for more than a week. In that sense, the one-week penalty had been served. No costs.

BAYAN v. Ermita GR 169838, April 25, 2006 Sarita, Kirsty

FACTS: It is provided in the Constitution that it is a the basic right of every Filipino individual to voice out or express himself, whether for personal reasons or common good itself
.However, certain acts must be discontinued although it gives body to a right, especially if it harms the good for the greater mass. Batas Pambansa 880 is an example of a delimiting
law that provides boundaries on the free expression of persons. Such in the case of three petitioner groups, first of Bayan, secondly of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al
and third of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), all of whom are recognized as taxpayers and official residents who allege themselves to best aging a peaceful mass assembly when police
forces under the rule of BP 880forcibly and violently dispersed them much to their dismay, which incurred their members injuries and arrest. These groups of concerned citizens are
attesting that such manner of dispersal of abiding by no permit, no rally policy, and that delegation of powers in the local government (specifically by the Mayor Lito Atienza)in the
said dispersal were unconstitutional, as well as the implementation of BP 880 itself. They seek to stop such policies of ruthless dispersals, as it violates their basic right to freedom
of expression, redress of grievances and most of all their right to peaceably assemble.
ISSUE: Whether Batas Pambansa 880 is constitutional or not.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and
respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions are
DISMISSED in all other respects, and the CONSTITUTIONALITY of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

V.Setion 5

Free Exercise of Religion

Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 US 296 Sarita, Kirsty

Facts: Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The
Cantwells distributed religious materials by travelling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an antiRoman Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for
violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of the peace.
ISSUE: Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise
ruling:Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious
grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the


First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be
used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of
"bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.
US v. Ballard 322 US 78 Sarita, Kirsty
Facts. Respondent was convicted of using the mail to defraud the public. He organized a religious group. He claimed that he had supernatural
powers to heal the sick and diseased. The charge indicated that Respondent knew that these claims were false.
Issue. Is Respondent being unconstitutionally persecuted for his religious beliefs?
Held. Yes. Although Respondents religion seems incredible to most, it is not the role of a jury to determine its veracity. If this religion were
subject to such a trial, then all organized religions would need to be treated similarly.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila 104 Phil. 386 Solatorio, Jo Ann
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the
Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila .
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof .
On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise
since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license
fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45.
Plaintiff protested against this requirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles.
Issue: Whether or not the act of the City of manila to require the plaintiff to secure necessary permits and licenses amounted to religious
censorship and restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession.
Held: Yes. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot
mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be
applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Ebranilag v. Divison Superintendent 219 SCRA 256; (MR) 251 SCRA Solatorio, Jo Ann
Facts: The petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan,
Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some
100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265, and by Department Order No. 8 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they
believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion.
Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioners from school for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony constitutes limitation on the exercise of religious freedom.
Held:The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest',
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not
Exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious
beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them
a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
Ebranilag v. Divison Superintendent
(MR) 251 SCRA
Facts: The State moves for a reconsideration of the Courts decision dated March 1, 1993 granting private respondents petition for certiorari
and prohibition and annulling the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents therein on the ground that the said decision created an
exemption in favor of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovahs Witnesses, in violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the public respondent contended that the issue here is not curtailment of religious belief but regulation of
the exercise of religious belief.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court annulling the expulsion orders of the public respondent violates the free exercise
Held:No. As to the contention that the exemption accorded by the Courts decision benefits a privileged few, it is enough to re-emphasize that


the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil
immunity. The essence of the free exercise clause is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because
of religious dogma.
Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 US 205 Solatorio, Jo Ann
Facts: Respondents in the case were members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. For declining to
send their children to public or private school after they had graduated from the eight grade, they were convicted of violating Wisconsins
compulsory school attendance law which required a childs attendance until age 16. The respondents contended that high school attendance was
contrary to their religion and way of life and would endanger their own salvation and the salvation of their children.
Issue:Whether or not the Wisconsins compulsory school attendance law violates the respondents freedom to exercise religion.
Held:Yes. Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion. However strong the States interest in universal compulsory education, as it by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of
all other interests.
Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 Taga-oc, Allan R.
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on the basis of section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on the
ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not Section 2175 of Administrative Code violative of the constitution?
HELD: Administrative Code declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for election or appointment to municipal office is inconsistent with and violative of
religious freedom under the Constitution and provision on non-requirement of religious test of the Constitution. Administrative Code provision
declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for election or appointment to a municipal office is inconsistent with and violative of the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution and that to so bar them from office is to impose a religious test in violation of the Constitutional mandate that
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
McDaniel vs. Paty 435 US 618 Taga-oc, Allan R.
Facts: Appellee Paty, a candidate for delegate to a Tennessee constitutional convention, sued in the State Chancery Court for a declaratory
judgment that appellant, an opponent who was a Baptist minister, was disqualified from serving as delegate by a Tennessee statutory provision
establishing the qualifications of constitutional convention delegates to be the same as those for membership in the State House of
Representatives, thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision barring "[m]inister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination
whatever." That court held that the statutory provision violated the First (freedom of religion and religious belief) and Fourteenth Amendments
(due process/equal protection clause). The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that the clergy disqualification imposed no burden on
"religious belief," and restricted "religious action . . . [only] in the law making process of government -- where religious action is absolutely
prohibited by the establishment clause. . . ."
Issue: Whether or not 1st and 14th amendment is not violated?
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
1. The Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily not at religious belief, but at the status, acts, and conduct of the clergy. Therefore, the
Free Exercise Clause's absolute prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to believe" is inapposite here. (which invalidated a state
requirement that an appointee to public office declare his belief in the existence of God), distinguished.
2. Nevertheless, the challenged provision violates appellant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his religion on the surrender of his right to seek
office. Though justification is asserted under the Establishment Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that, if elected to public
office members of the clergy will necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart those of another contrary to the anti-establishment
principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process have not
lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed.

Goldman vs. Weinberger 54 LW 4298 Taga-oc, Allan R.

Free exercise of Religion:

Facts: Petitioner, an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, was ordered not to wear a yarmulke while on duty and in uniform as a commissioned
officer in the Air Force at March Air Force Base, pursuant to an Air Force regulation that provides that authorized headgear may be worn out of
doors but that indoors "headgear may not be worn . . . except by armed security police in the performance of their duties." Petitioner then
brought an action in Federal District Court, claiming that the application of the regulation to prevent him from wearing his yarmulke infringed


upon his First Amendment freedom to exercise his religious beliefs. The District Court permanently enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the
regulation against petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the prohibition in the use of headgear (yarmulke-worn by orthodox Jew) a violation of the free exercise of religion.
Ruling: The First Amendment does not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner even though its effect is to restrict
the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices as
wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations. Here, the Air Force has
drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and that which is not and the challenged regulation reasonably and
evenhandedly regulates dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for uniformity.
German v. Baranganan 135 SCRA 514 Tamayao, Allan
Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoined Malacaang. Respondent barred them
for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom?
Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti- government demonstration since they
wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom,
the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his
family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure
the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification
for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the
existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the
capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang.
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance 249 SCRA 628 Tamayao, Allan
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing
the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is
averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?

Held: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press
is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling
goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious
books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher.
It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is
imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for
revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax
or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos 236 SCRA 197 Tamayao, Allan

Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive
for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for
violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged
therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not
those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.
Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?
Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree
No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to
include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.
Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeach No. 91-948, June 11, 1993 Tanjusay, Katrina
FACTS: Petitioner church and its congregants practice the Santeria religion, which employs animal sacrifice as one of its principal forms of
devotion. The animals are killed by cutting their carotid arteries, and are cooked and eaten following all Santeria rituals except healing and
death rites. After the church leased land in respondent city and announced plans to establish a house of worship and other facilities there, the


city council held an emergency public session and passed, among other enactments Resolution 87-66, which noted city residents' "concern" over
religious practices inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety, and declared the city's "commitment" to prohibiting such practices.
Ordinance 87-52, which defines "sacrifice" as "to unnecessarily kill . . . an animal in a . . . ritual . . . not for the primary purpose of food
consumption," and prohibits the "possess[ion], sacrifice, or slaughter" of an animal if it is killed in "any type of ritual" and there is an intent to
use it for food, but exempts "any licensed [food] establishment". This religious exercise has been targeted is evidenced by Resolution 87-66's
statements of "concern" and "commitment," and by the use of the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" in Ordinances 87-40, 8752, and 87-71. Moreover,
the latter ordinances' various prohibitions, definitions, and exemptions demonstrate that they were "gerrymandered" with care to proscribe
religious killings of animals by Santeria church members but to exclude almost all other animal killings. They also suppress much more religious
conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends.
The law was enacted soon after the city council of Hialeah learned that the Church of Lukumi, which practiced Santera, was planning
on locating there. Santeria is a religion practiced in the Americas by the descendants of Africans; many of its rituals involve animal sacrifice. The
church filed a lawsuit in United States district court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking for the Hialeah ordinance to be declared


Whether or not said ordinances violate the petitioners rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?

RULING: YES. The court reversed the judgment rendered by the district court because under the Free Exercise Clause (First Amendment, U.S.
Constitution), a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general
applicability. It was found out that ordinances' texts and operation are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's
central element, animal sacrifice.
The states cannot restrict religiously-mandated ritual slaughter of animals, regardless of the purpose of the slaughter.
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IIA-1, II-A-3, II-B, III, and IV, concluding that the laws in question
were enacted contrary to free exercise principles, and they are void.
Lambs Chapel v. School Disctrict No.91-2024, June 7, 1993 Tanjusay, Katrina
FACTS: New York law authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations permitting the after-hours use of school property for 10
specified purposes, not including meetings for religious purposes. Pursuant to this law, respondent school board (District) issued rules and
regulations allowing, inter alia, social, civic, and recreational uses of its schools (Rule 10), but prohibiting use by any group for religious
purposes (Rule 7). After the District refused two requests by petitioners, an evangelical church and its pastor (Church), to use school facilities
for a religious-oriented film series on family values and childrearing on the ground that the film appeared to be church-related, the Church filed
suit in the District Court, claiming that the District's actions violated, among other things, the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause. The
court granted summary judgment to the District, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It reasoned that the school property, as a "limited public
forum" open only for designated purposes, remained nonpublic except for the specified purposes, and ruled that the exclusion of the Church's
film was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.

Whether or not New York Law is valid?

RULING: No. That Rule 7 of New York Law treats all religions and religious purposes alike does not make its application in this case viewpointneutral, however, for it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint by permitting school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and childrearing except those dealing with the subject from a religious standpoint. Denial on this basis is plainly invalid under the
holding in Cornelius, supra, 473 U.S. at 806, that the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

Estrada v. Escritor AM P-021651 (August 4, 2003) Tanjusay, Katrina

FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of
Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in
said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related
either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Pias City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as
he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed
therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.
She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But
as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness". Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the such declaration to avoid
punishment for immorality. The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio,
and ten years before she entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah's Witnesses' practice
of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents right will prevail in her plea of religious freedom?


RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Office of the Court Administrator, and the Solicitor General was ordered to
intervene in the case. Although government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which
he/she may be held administratively liable, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the "compelling state interest" test because the court
deems sufficient on respondent's evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith. Moreover, this approach is
directed toward the protection of religious liberty. On reconsideration, the clerk of courts right was upheld on the basis of benevolent


Non-Establishment of Religion
Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 Phil. 201 Tubo, Mark

Facts: In May 1963, Juan Ruiz who is Director of Posts, announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration of City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress which is organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, protested the order through his counsel
Atty. Vicente Sotto. In spite of the protest, the respondent publicly announced having sent to United States the designs of the postage stamps.
The petitioner alleges that the respondent violated the Constitution under Sec 23 subsection 3 of Article IV which provides: No public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium. The petitioner seek the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent from issuing and
selling postage stamps in question.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution by issuing and selling the postage stamps.
Decision: No. The respondent issued the postage stamps under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which provides:
The Section 2 of the Act states that it authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing
and issuance of the postage stamps appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines dated September 1, 1936.
The Act contemplates no religious purpose in view. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked
with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of
the Government. The petition is denied.

Garces v. Estenzo 104 SCRA 510 Tubo, Mark

Facts: On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City passed Resolution No. 5 "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition
of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be
obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. It also pass Resolution No. 6 Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman
or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for
one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day and it also provided that the image would be made available
to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day. These were ratified by the barangay assembly which consists of two
hundred seventy-two voters on March 26, 1976. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of
Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. After the mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea
refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for
its acquisition. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay
captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. This provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city
court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the
city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of
authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. On May 12, 1976, the council enacted Resolution No. 10 authorizing the
hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image. On June 14, 1976, the council passed Resolution
No. 12 appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City, after which the
barangay council posted cash bond, Father Osmea turned over the image to the council. Later, petitioners filed against the barangay council
and its members (excluding two members) a complaint praying for the annulment of the said resolutions. The court dismissed the case.

Whether or not the resolutions passed by the barangay council violated the Constitution.

Decision: No. Petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the
kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions. Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render
the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed. The resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall
any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. The image in question belongs to the barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right
to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action
would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. Not every governmental


activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding
separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
School District v. Schempp 394 RS 203 Tubo, Mark
At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at
least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's
Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the school.
Issues: Whether or not the practice of Abingtons policy is constitutional.
Decision: The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so."
Furthermore, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the
school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.

Board of Education v. Allen 392 US 236 Ynawat, Alzher

FACTS: A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school
students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education,
requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute
unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school
they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.
Whether or not the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment forbid New York from requiring that public school
boards loan textbooks to parochial school students without cost.
No. The Court applied the test constructed in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative
purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First
Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the Court reasoned, "The financial
benefit is to parents and children, not schools."
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 US 602 Ynawat, Alzher
FACTS: This case was heard concurrently with two others, Earley v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved
controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments to
teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes did violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making state
financial aid available to church- related educational institutions.
Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be
constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and
it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a
process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the laws would
inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning
legislation which appropriates support to religious schools.

Tilton v. Richardson 403 US 672 Ynawat, Alzher

FACTS: The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions.
The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had
been given; schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.

Did the Act violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?


In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. The Court invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would
have the effect of advancing religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had not used their federally-funded
facilities for religious activities, and that the facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The Court also held that
the Act did not excessively entangle the government with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious indoctrination,
that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state surveillance.

Country of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union 57 LW 504 Ottong, Jailon

Zobrest v. Catalina No. 92-94 June 18, 1993
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinetter & Ku Klus Klan US No. 94-780, June 29, 1995
Manosca v. CA 252 SCRA 412 Orbecido, Maria Fatima
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred
ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia
Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42The National Museum and the National Historical Commission are
hereby vested with the right to declare other such historical and cultural sites as National Shrines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in R.A. 484... of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.
The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
was asked on the legality of the measure.
Issue: whether or not the public use requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-squaremeter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national historical landmark, is constitutional and valid?
Held: Yes, That only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use.The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true
but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from
the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
Lee v. Welsman US No. 90-1014, June 24, 1992 Orbecido, Maria Fatima
Facts:For many years it was customary for the principals of middle and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island to invite religious leaders to
give nonsectarian prayers as invocations and benedictions at school-sponsored graduation ceremonies. The school system had, in fact, prepared
guidelines for clergy delivering such prayers, to insure that the prayers would not include any direct references to specific deities or saints.
Despite this effort of the schools to make the prayers innocuous and all-inclusive, a middle school student, Deborah Weisman, and her father,
Daniel, objected to the use of any prayer at her 29 June 1989 graduation ceremony. Four days prior to the ceremony, the Weismans sought a
temporary restraining order from the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island to prohibit the use of prayer at Deborah's graduation.
This motion was denied due to a lack of time to fully consider the case, and the graduation ceremony was conducted as planned. Daniel
Weisman then filed for a permanent injunction against the use of prayers at future graduation ceremonies from the district court.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's inclusion of the nonsectarian prayers offered as invocation and benedictions at public school graduation
of Providence school represent an infringement of the Establishment Clause suggesting separation of church and state.
Held: Yes. Affirmed rulings of the district court and court of appeals, which held that, regardless of their content, the offering of prayers at
public school graduation ceremonies constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause.
VI. Section 6
Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 Ombra Jhemhar
Silverio v. CA 195 SCRA 760
Santiago v. Vasquez 217 SCRA 633 Lagbas Lormalyn
Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order
of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her
arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, byreason of the announcement she made that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right











Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to
pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners


pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to
preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth
court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan 247 SCRA 127 - Lagbas Lormalyn
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division
denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of
oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the
Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment
in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests
were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote
him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied
all of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration."
Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and
those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives requestingthe court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied
bythe Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions,
decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical
findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that
there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion
and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her
physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel.
What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in
deciding a case against them.
In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the
fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending
reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to
health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states that the required medical treatment was
available here in the Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The
heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as Dr. Anastacio reported that.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still
desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event, joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution
should make the determination of her medical condition.


VI. Section 6
Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668
Silverio v. CA 195 SCRA 760
Santiago v. Vasquez 217 SCRA 633
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan 247 SCRA 127
VII. Section 7
Right to Information
Legaspi v. CSC 150 SCRA 530 Manalo, Carmelo
Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information.
The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any
allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit
Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by
its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party
in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.The
petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the
public right.
Bantay Republic Act v. COMELEC GR 177271, May 4, 2007 Manalo, Carmelo
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007
elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to
Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent
petition has yet to be resolved.
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups
named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the
ISSUE: 1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the
ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified?
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to
information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it
seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus
advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of
judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and
the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is


there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence
reads: [T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny
the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the Certified List of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed
judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples right to know
is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. 170 SCRA 256 Manalo, Carmelo
Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the)
Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished
with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due
to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS,
Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to
breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
1. On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing,
Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First
Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts
payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.]
Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of
the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds
for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and
that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the
present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato 203 SCRA 515 Orbecido, Maria Fatima
Facts: The herein petitioner is a member of respondent MTRCB ( Movie & Television Review & Classification Board , who, wrote its records
officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the boards records pertaining to the noting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banne, cut or classified
accordingly. Thereafter the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as
chairman of MTRCB so as to gain acces to the records sought to be examined by the petitioner. However, the request of said petitioner was
denied by the respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgement over a film, their decisions as
reflected in the individuals noting slips partake the nature of conscience notes and these are purely and completely private and personal. Thus,
request would be illegal if no consent was secured for said respondent.
Issue: WON respondents refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review
committee as well as the individual noting slips of its members, as molative of petitioners constitutional right to access to public records.
WON petitioner was deprived of right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution.


Held: Yes it is molative of petitioners constitutional right of access to public records.Although this constitutional provision is self-executory and
supplies the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the legislature.
Moreover the legislature provided reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must declared State Policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.The decisions of the Board and the individual noting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made persuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public
in character.They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.Being a public right , the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion of the agency charged with the custody of the
official records sought to be examined.The constitutional recognition of the citizens right to access to official records cannot be made
dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.

Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice GR 132601, Oct. 12, 1988

Chavez v. PCGG GR 130716, Dec. 9, 1988 Sing, Marc
FACTS: These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from
privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any greement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard";
and (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to
or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs." 1
Francisco I. Chavez the petitioner, a citizen, a taxpayer, and a former government official who was the initiator of the prosecution of
the cases of the Marcos. TheMarcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic
subjugation of the country's economy, sometime in September of 1997 bannered number of broadsheet which include the Marcos has billions of
dollars deposited in the Swiss Bank, and the compromise execution between the Marcos and the PCCG, including the splits of the assets.
The petitioner as invoking his constitutional rights for information and correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its
transactions involving the national interest and demanded that all negotiation and all transaction entered by PCGG in recovering the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses be made to be open for the public. Chavez claims that any compromise on the alleged ill-gotten wealth involves an issue
of paramount public interest, since it has a great deal of effect in the countrys economic progress that would be greatly prejudicial to the
national interest of the Filipino people. Filipino people will be greatly affected by it.
On the other hand the petitioner do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. Even if he did it
will not be good, because the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to theRespondents further aver that the
Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of
Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or
even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply
with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11,
1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact 2.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum to then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo,
categorically stated: This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you
to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had
they been submitted to me. The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize you to approve said Agreements,
which I reserve for myself as President of the Republic of the Philippines 3.
ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement entered into is valid?
The Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5
cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the
Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent,
defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case 4. The General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties
to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the ConstructionPCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases,
cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole
power and discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the
Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and
all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to
cost 5.
Chavez v. PEA GR 133250, July 9, 2002 Sing, Marc
FACTS:This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition
seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay 1.


By November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay.
By On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA
"to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On
the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore
of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)2.
After being granted PEA gratned to reclaimed areas of lands, years later the PEA or Public Estate Authority entered with AMARI for
development thru joint venture agreement. Later joint venture agreement was declared as mother of all scam in the priviledge speech of
Senator Maceda. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the
public domain. The certificates for freedom land were declared as void.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the joint venture agreement us illegal and that if Joint Venture Agreement push thru longer
there will be a great deal of money lost.
ISSUES:whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events.
whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed
Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public
disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have
already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28,
1999.Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the
Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit
of judicial review3.
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources
are owned by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
It is also stated in their agreement that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the
other reclamation costs to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and other natural resources
and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or
quasi-public use 4.
RE: Request for Radio-TV Coverage 365 SCRA 248 Sing, Marc
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration denying the petitioners request for the permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of the
former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. Motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, claiming that there is no conflict between the
right of the people to public information and the press freedom, if there be conflict it must be resolved in favor of the people because people as
a repository sovereignty are entitled to be informed and live media coverage will be the guard and can fight against other who will use the court
of pursuit of selfish interest.
Joseph Estrada reiterates his objection on live tv and radio coverage on the ground that it will violate sub judice rule. If there be a live tv and
radio broadcast there be many rooms for so called expert commentary which can triggers massive demonstration which may pressure
sandiganbayan. People can be informed in other way according to Estrada. In the live telecast of the trial justices voted 9- 6 in favor of denying
the motion for reconsideration, but in the presence of camera which be for documentary and learning Justices voted 8-7 in favor of having it
recorded but showed after the decision given by the Sandiganbayan. Movement of the media crews will be regulated and consistent dignity and
solemnity be observed in respect for the court. Recorded tapes can never be release for public showing and broadcasting is hereby declared
ISSUE: Whether or not Joseph Estradas right to privacy was violated?
Held: Media coverage will be for purposes of learning and for public information; the people deserve to know what is going on inside the court
room. How is the trial of the Estrada? The mere recording of the trial can be beneficial to the stenographer for they can get detail which they
miss during the trial.
The Court is not all that umnindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a
hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a
price too high to pay (
The court now hereby grants the recording of the trial entirely but not for public showing and no live broadcast can be done.
RE: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage 365 SCRA 62
Senate v. Ermita GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Neri v. Senate GR 180643, March 25, 2008; MR Sept. 4, 2008
Akbayan v. Aquino GR 170516, July 16, 2008
VIII. Section 8
Right to Association
TUCP v. NBC- 173 SCRA 33
SSS Employees v. CA 175 SCRA 686
UPCSU v. Laguesma 286 SCRA 15