Abakada Guro v.

Purisima
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9335 (rewards and incentives to BIR
(Bureau of Internal Revenue) and BOC(Bureau of Customs) officials to optimize tax
collection) on the following grounds:
-establishing a system of rewards and incentives transforms BIR and BOC
officials and employees into mercenaries and bounty hunters
-violates equal protection as the rewards system only applies to officials and
employees of BIR and BOC where it should apply to all govt. agencies
-unduly delegates power to the Pres. To fix revenue targets since it does not
provide such target. Pres. May fix unrealistic target to dismiss personnel (personnel
to be dismissed if they do not reach the 7.5% min. collection threshold
-create a congressional oversight committee w/c permits legislative
participation in implementation and enforcement of law violation of separation of
powers
Issues:
1. WoN petition is premature?
No. Enactment of the law makes it ripe (La Bugal Case)
2. WoN petitioners have standing?
Yes. Failed to show possible damage to themselves w/ the laws enactment
BUT it is a matter of public interest.
3. WoN establishing a system of rewards and incentives would turn the BIR and BOC
officials into mercenaries and bounty hunters?
No. presumption of constitutionality of law
turning into mercenaries and bounty hunters purely speculative
public officers may be rewarded for exemplary performance (US v
Matthews, Dorsheimer v US)
4.WoN RA 9335 violates equal protection?
No. among all govt. agencies, BIR and BOC are the ones tasked to collect
taxes hence its classification is arbitrary
RA 9335 incentives are for optimization of tax collection the ones
affected will be BIR and BOC
5. WoN there was undue delegation of legislative power to Pres.set unrealistic
standards to dismiss employees?
*2 tests to determine validity of delegation of legislative powers (completeness test
sets forth policy to be executed by delegate; sufficient standard test adequate
guidelines to map out delegates authority)
Yes RA adequately states the policy and standard to guide President in
fixing revenue targets
law specifies limits (Sec. 4 the revenue targets that the president sets
undergoes scrutiny of the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC)

 does not violate security of tenure cannot be dismissed for any reason
not provided by law; lays down reasonable measure for removal (if tax collection
falls below 7.5% which is analogous with inefficiency Sec. 7)
6. WoN Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (Sec. 12) violates separation of
powers?
*Issue is moot as Committee has ceased to exist since it was just created to
approve IRRs of Dept of Finance, Dept. of Budget and Management, National
Economic Devt Authority, BIR, BOC, and Civil Service Commission
BUT
Yes. Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se since it is
integral to checks and balances but any post-enactment congressional measure
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation, if anything else like approval and
veto of IRRs are an encroachment of executive power
Held: Petition partly granted. Sec. 12 is unconstitutional and since there is a
separability clause (Sec. 13) w/c says that if a section of said RA is struck down, all
other sections will remain in force.