Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 135945

March 7, 2001

THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC.,

represented by its President RODRIGO S. MACARIO,
SR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS,
represented by its Commissioner, RUFINO V. MIJARES; MARIO
PADILAN, PONCIANO BASILAN, HIPOLITO ESLAVA, WILLIAM
LUMPISA, PACITO MOISES, DIONISIO ANAS, NOLI DANGLA,
NAPOLEON BALESTEROS, ELSIE MOISES, SEBIO LACWASAN,
BEN FLORES, DOMINGO CANUTAB, MARCELINO GABRIANO,
TINA TARNATE, ANDREW ABRAZADO, DANNY LEDDA,
FERNANDO DAYAO, JONATHAN DE LA PENA, JERRY PASSION,
PETER AGUINSOD, and LOLITA DURAN, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief
seeking the annulment of a status quo order1 dated
September 29, 1998 issued by the public respondent
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP,
for brevity) in COSLAP Case No. 98-253.
The facts are:
The property being fought over by the parties is a 10.36hectare property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills,
formerly registered in the name of Diplomat Hills, Inc. It
appeared that the property was mortgaged to the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) which eventually foreclosed
the mortgage thereon and acquired the same as highest
bidder. On April 11, 1983, it was donated to the Republic of

the Philippines by UCPB through its President, Eduardo

Cojuangco. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican
Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects,
activities in human settlements and economic development
and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, the then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 85 abolishing the Office of Media
Affairs and the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies
under the latter's supervision as well as all its assets,
programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential
Management Staff (PMS).2
On October 18, 1988, the PMS received an application from
petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC.
(UNITED, for brevity), a community housing association
composed of non-real property owning residents of Baguio
City, to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. On
February 2, 1990, PMS Secretary Elfren Cruz referred the
application to the HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY
CORPORATION (HIGC). HIGC consented to act as originator
for UNITED.3 Accordingly, on May 9, 1990, a Memorandum of
Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and
UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS
to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which would, in
turn, sell the same to UNITED. The parties agreed on a selling
price of P75.00 per square meter.
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the
property to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided
that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid
upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one
year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final
payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.

Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private

respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated
to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was
able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.4

Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of

Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public
respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the
parties to maintain the status quo.

Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private

respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO
RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for
brevity) filed an action5 for injunction docketed as Civil Case
No. 3316-R, in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
4. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary
restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction was later denied in an Order dated March 18,
1996.6

Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the

aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION,

this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries
Association, Inc. (BENEFICIARIES, for brevity), filed Civil Case
No. 3382-R before Branch 61 of the same court. The
complaint7 prayed for damages, injunction and annulment of
the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and
HIGC. Upon motion of UNITED, the trial court in an Order
dated May 27, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3382-R.8 The
said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court
of Appeals.9
Demolition Order No. 1-96 was subsequently implemented by
the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of
Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private
respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished
structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order,
private respondents filed on September 29, 1998 a
petition10 for annulment of contracts with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, docketed as COSLAP Case No.
98-253, in the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City

The issues we are called upon to resolve are:

1
IS THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS [COSLAP] CREATED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 561 BY THE OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES [sic]
EMPOWERED TO HEAR AND TRY A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT
OF CONTRACTS WITH PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND THUS, ARROGATE UNTO ITSELF
THE POWER TO ISSUE STATUS QUO ORDER AND CONDUCT A
HEARING THEREOF [sic]?
2
ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
LAND PROBLEMS [COSLAP] HAS JURISDICTION ON THE
MATTER, IS IT EXEMPTED FROM OBSERVING A CLEAR CASE
OF FORUM SHOPPING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS?
To the extent that the instant case is denominated as one for
declaratory relief, we initially clarify that we do not possess
original jurisdiction to entertain such petitions.11 Such is
vested in the Regional Trial Courts.12Accordingly, we shall
limit our review to ascertaining if the proceedings before
public respondent COSLAP are without or in excess, of its
jurisdiction. In this wise, a recounting of the history of the
COSLAP may provide useful insights into the extent of its
powers and functions.

The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order No.

561 dated September 21, 1979. Its forerunner was the
Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP)
founded on July 31, 1970 by virtue of Executive Order No.
251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked "to
expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of
land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land
problems, and/or recommend other solutions." It was given
the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad
testificandum and to call upon any department, office,
agency or instrumentality of the government, including
government owned or controlled corporations and local
government units, for assistance in the performance of its
functions. At the time, the PACLAP did not exercise quasijudicial functions.

applications in order to relieve the small man from the

complexities of existing laws, rules and regulations;

On March 19, 1971, Executive Order No. 305 was issued

reconstituting the PACLAP.13 The committee was given
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and
other lands of the public domain and accordingly was tasked:

Thereafter, the PACLAP was reorganized pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 832 dated November 27, 1975.14Its
jurisdiction was revised thus:

1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land

disputes, streamline administrative procedures, and in
general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve
problems involving public lands and lands of the public
domain;
2. To coordinate and integrate the activities of all government
agencies having to do with public lands or lands of the public
domain;
3. To study and review present policies as embodied in land
laws and administrative rules and regulations, in relation to
the needs for land of the agro-industrial sector and small
farmers, with the end in view to evolving and recommending
new laws and policies and establishing priorities in the grant
of public land, and the simplification of processing of land

4. To evolve and implement a system for the speedy

investigation and resolution of land disputes;
5. To receive all complaints of settlers and small farmers,
involving public lands or other lands of the public domain;
6. To look into the conflicts between Christians and nonChristians, between corporations and small settlers and
farmers; cause the speedy settlement of such conflicts in
accordance with priorities or policies established by the
Committee; and
7. To perform such other functions as may be assigned to it
by the President.

xxx

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xxx

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute

brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member
agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, that when the
Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution,
order or decision thereon, shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall
be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the
member agency having jurisdiction thereof;
xxx

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Notably, the said Presidential Decree No. 832 did not contain
any provision for judicial review of the resolutions, orders or
decisions of the PACLAP.

On September 21, 1979, the PACLAP was abolished and its

functions transferred to the present Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems by virtue of Executive Order No.
561. This reorganization, effected in line with Presidential
Decree No. 1416, brought the COSLAP directly under the
Office of the President.15 It was only at this time that a
provision for judicial review was made from resolutions,
orders or decisions of the said agency, as embodied in
section 3(2) thereof, to wit:
Powers and functions. The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation
work, of the various government offices and agencies
involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and
streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers
and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the
expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution
of such problems or disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute
referred to the Commission: Provided, that the Commission
may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension
or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government
reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or

applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude.
The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as
will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above
cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on
any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of
a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and
shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the
agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution,
order or decision shall become final and executory within
thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be
appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the performance of its functions and discharge of its

duties, the Commission is authorized, through the
Commission, to issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum for the appearance of witnesses and the production of
records, books and documents before it. It may also call upon
any ministry, office, agency or instrumentality of the National
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and local governments for assistance. This
authority is likewise, conferred upon the provincial offices as
may be established pursuant to Section 5 of this Executive
Order.
In Baaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems,16 we characterized the COSLAP's jurisdiction as
being general in nature, as follows:

Petitioners also contend in their petition that the COSLAP

itself has no jurisdiction to resolve the protest and counterprotest of the parties because its power to resolve land
problems is confined to those cases "which are critical and
explosive in nature."
This contention is devoid of merit. It is true that Executive
Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take
cognizance of cases which are "critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate
action." However, the use of the word "may" does not mean
that the COSLAP's jurisdiction is merely confined to the
above mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive
Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of
providing a more effective mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently
the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and
cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over
from the abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its
jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and
resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed
by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said
provision, being enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot
affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial
Committee of Koronadal on September 29, 1978. Neither can
it affect the decision of the COSLAP which merely affirmed
said exercise of jurisdiction.
Given the facts of the case, it is our view that the COSLAP is
not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. As
matters stand, it is not the judiciary's place to question the
wisdom behind a law;17 our task is to interpret the law. We
feel compelled to observe, though, that by reason of the
ambiguous terminology employed in Executive Order No.
561, the power to assume jurisdiction granted to the COSLAP

provides an ideal breeding ground for forum shopping, as we

shall explain subsequently. Suffice it to state at this stage
that the COSLAP may not assume jurisdiction over cases
which are already pending in the regular courts.
The reason is simple. Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561
speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as
having the "force and effect of a regular
administrative resolution, order or decision." The qualification
places an unmistakable emphasis on
the administrative character of the COSLAP's determination,
amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or
decisions "shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon
the agency having jurisdiction over the same." An agency is
defined by statute as "any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein."18 A department, on the other hand, "refers to
anexecutive department created by law."19 Whereas, a
bureau is understood to refer "to any principal subdivision of
any department."20 In turn, an office "refers, within the
framework of governmental organization, to any major
functional unit of a department or bureau including regional
offices. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by
individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or
regulation."21 An instrumentality is deemed to refer "to any
agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and governmentowned or controlled corporations."22 Applying the principle
in statutory construction ofejusdem generis, i.e., "where
general words follow an enumeration or persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general

words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are

to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned,"23 section 3(2)
of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAP's
dispositions are binding
on administrative or executiveagencies. The history of the
COSLAP itself bolsters this view. Prior enactments
enumerated its member agencies among which it was to
exercise a coordinating function.
The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."24
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an
administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are
they deemed judicial tribunals.25 The doctrine of separation
of powers observed in our system of government reposes the
three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each
department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in
its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may
not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own
agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."26

There is an equally persuasive reason to grant the petition.

As an additional ground for the annulment of the
assailed status quo order of COSLAP, UNITED accuses private
respondents of engaging in forum shopping. Forum shopping
exists when a party "repetitively avail[s] of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely by some other court."27 In this
connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
dated February 8, 1994 provides:
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994, applies
to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the
multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same
issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum
shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the
following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall
be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions,
applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and
agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals and shall be subject to the sanctions provided
hereunder.
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal part seeking
relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or

agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or

proceedings is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any
such action or proceeding which is either pending or may
have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and
(d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original
pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have
been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and
subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint,
or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein
a party asserts his claim for relief.
2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However,
any clearly willful and deliberate forum shopping by any
other party and his counsel through the filing of multiple
complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable
action shall be a ground for the summary dismissal thereof
and shall constitute contempt of court. Furthermore, the
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the
undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to
disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of
a criminal action against the part. [emphasis supplied]
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The said Administrative Circular's use of the auxiliary verb

"shall" imports "an imperative obligation . . . inconsistent

with the idea of discretion."28 Hence, compliance therewith

is mandatory.29
It bears stressing that there is a material distinction between
the requirement of submission of the certification against
forum shopping from the undertakings stated therein.
Accordingly,
x x x [f]ailure to comply with this requirement cannot be
excused by the fact that plaintiff is not guilty of forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
concluding that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 did not
apply to private respondent's case merely because her
complaint was not based on petitioner's cause of action. The
Circular applies to any complaint, petition, application, or
other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party
filing it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party
filing a complaint or any other initiatory pleading is required
to swear under oath that he has not committed nor will he
commit forum shopping. Otherwise, we would have an
absurd situation where the parties themselves would be the
judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of said
Circular, and compliance therewith would depend on their
belief that they might or might not have violated the
requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would
defeat the very purpose of Circular 04-94.
Indeed, compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from, and independent of, the
avoidance of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference
in the treatment in terms of imposable sanctions
between failure to comply with the certification requirement
and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. The
former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without prejudice,
of the complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a
ground for summary dismissal thereof and constitutes direct
contempt.30

A scrutiny of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and

the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents'
propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the
certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel.31 Hence,
one can deduce that the certification is a
peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that
there are no other pending cases involving basically the
same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar,
private respondents' litany of omissions range from failing to
submit the required certification against forum shopping to
filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself.
First, the petition filed before the COSLAP conspicuously
lacked a certification against forum shopping. Second, it does
not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION informed
Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before
which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another
action, Civil Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of
the same court. Another group of homeless residents of
Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES
ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case. The aforesaid
plaintiff, however, does not hesitate to admit that it filed the
second case in representation of private respondent, as one
of its affiliates. In the same manner, the certification against
forum shopping accompanying the complaint in Civil Case
No. 3382-R does not mention the pendency of Civil Case No.
3316-R. In fact, the opposite assurance was given, that there
was no action pending before any other tribunal. Another
transgression is that both branches of the trial court do not
appear to have been notified of the filing of the subject
COSLAP Case No. 98-253.

recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain

the writ of injunction they so desperately desired. "The willful
attempt by private respondents to obtain a preliminary
injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same
from the original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial
process."32

It is evident from the foregoing facts that private

respondents, in filing multiple petitions, have mocked our
attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby
upset the orderly administration of justice. They sought

Thus, while we might admit that the causes of action before

the Makati court and the Paraaque court are distinct, and
that private respondent cannot seek civil indemnity in the
contempt proceedings, the same being in the nature of

In this connection, we expounded on forum shopping in Viva

Productions, Inc. v. Court of Appeals33 that:
Private respondent's intention to engage in forum shopping
becomes manifest with undoubted clarity upon the following
considerations. Notably, if not only to ensure the issuance of
an injunctive relief, the significance of the action for damages
before the Makati court would be nil. What damages against
private respondent would there be to speak about if
the Paraaque court already enjoins the performance of the
very same act complained of in the Makati court? Evidently,
the action for damages is premature if not for the preliminary
injunctive relief sought. Thus, we find grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Makati court, being a mere coequal of the Paraaque court, in not giving due deference to
the latter before which the issue of the alleged violation of
the sub-judice rule had already been raised and submitted. In
such instance, the Makati court, if it was wary of dismissing
the action outrightly under Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
should have, at least, ordered the consolidation of its case
with that of the Paraaque court, which had first acquired
jurisdiction over the related case x x x, or it should have
suspended the proceedings until the Paraaque court may
have ruled on the issue x x x.
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criminal contempt, we nonetheless cannot ignore private

respondent's intention of seeking exactly identical reliefs
when it sought the preliminary relief of injunction in
the Makati court. As earlier indicated, had private respondent
been completely in good faith there would have been no
hindrance in filing the action for damages with the regional
trial court of Paraaque and having it consolidated with the
contempt proceedings before Branch 274, so that the same
issue on the alleged violation of the sub judicerule will not
have to be passed upon twice, and there would be no
possibility of having two courts of concurrent jurisdiction
making two conflicting resolutions.
Yet from another angle, it may be said that when
the Paraaque court acquired jurisdiction over the said issue,
it excluded all other courts of concurrent jurisdiction from
acquiring jurisdiction over the same. To hold otherwise would
be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction
might have conflicting orders. This will create havoc and
result in an extremely disordered administration of justice.
Therefore, even on the assumption that the Makati court may
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action for
damages, without prejudice to the application of
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, it cannot nonetheless
acquire jurisdiction over the issue of whether or not
petitioner has violated the sub judice rule. At best, the Makati
court may hear the case only with respect to the alleged
injury suffered by private respondent after theParaaque
court shall have ruled favorably on the said issue.
We also noted several indications of private respondents' bad
faith. The complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3316-R was
prepared by the ASSOCIATION's counsel, Atty. Conrado
Villamor Catral, Jr. whereas the complaint filed in Civil Case
No. 3382-R was signed by a different lawyer, Atty. Thomas S.
Tayengco. With regard to the petition filed with the COSLAP,
the same was signed by private respondents individually. As

to the latter case, we noted that the petition itself could not
have been prepared by ordinary laymen, inasmuch as it
exhibits familiarity with statutory provisions and legal
concepts, and is written in a lawyerly style.
In the same manner, the plaintiffs in the three (3) different
cases were made to appear as dissimilar: in Civil Case No.
3316-R, the plaintiff was ASSOCIATION of which private
respondent Mario Padilan was head, while the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 3382-R was the BENEFICIARIES. Before the COSLAP,
private respondents themselves were the petitioners, led
again by Padilan.34 Private respondents also attempted to
vary their causes of action: in Civil Case No. 3382-R and
COSLAP Case No. 98-253, they seek the annulment of the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by and among UNITED,
the PMS, and HIGC as well as the transfer certificates of title
accordingly issued to petitioner. All three (3) cases sought to
enjoin the demolition of private respondents' houses.
It has been held that forum shopping is evident where the
elements of litis pendentia or res judicata are present. Private
respondents' subterfuge comes to naught, for the effects
of res judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by
varying the designation of the parties or changing the form of
the action or adopting a different mode of presenting one's
case.35
In view of the foregoing, all that remains to be done is the
imposition of the proper penalty. A party's willful and
deliberate act of forum shopping is punishable by summary
dismissal of the actions filed.36 The summary dismissal of
both COSLAP Case No. 98-253 and Civil Case No. 3316-R is
therefore warranted under the premises. We shall refrain
from making any pronouncement on Civil Case No. 3382-R,
the dismissal of which was elevated on appeal to the Court of
Appeals where it is still pending.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The status

quo order dated September 29, 1998 issued in COSLAP Case
No. 98-253 by respondent Commission On The Settlement Of
Land Problems (COSLAP) is hereby SET ASIDE; and the
petition filed in COSLAP Case No. 98-253 and the complaint
in Civil Case No. 3316-R are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction and forum shopping. Costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145951

August 12, 2003

On November 12, 1999, respondent Ramiscal filed with the

Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of
Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest."2 He
argued, inter alia, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The
said Urgent Motion was later adopted by respondents Alzaga
and Satuito.
The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution promulgated on January 6, 2000.3Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on
May 12, 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained respondents'
contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 25741. Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
I

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIV.), and JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR.,
JULIAN ALZAGA, ATTY. MANUEL SATUITO, ELIZABETH LIANG
and JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9,
2000 INSOFAR AS IT DISMISSED THE CASE FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

II

Respondents Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel

Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all charged
with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents
before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25741. The
Information alleged that respondents misappropriated and
converted for their personal use the amount of
P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFPRSBS).1

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED JUNE 1, 2000, SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED JULY 10, 2000 AND
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DATED MAY 12, 2000.4
Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
dismissed Criminal Case No. 25741 was a final order which

finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy therefrom is a

petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.5 Section 1 of said Rule 45 explicitly provides:
Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
Moreover, Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7975, states:
Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be

appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Basic is the rule that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules may be availed of only where there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.6Certiorari cannot be availed of as a
substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.7
The foregoing rule, however, may be relaxed where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency. In such cases, certiorari is allowed
notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy
of appeal. Certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate and insufficient.8 If the strict
application of the Rules will tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the
rules, or except a particular case from its operation.9

We now come to the substantive issue of whether the AFPRSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation or a
private corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds are
public or private. The Sandiganbayan based its ruling that
the AFP-RSBS is a private entity on its findings that the
Government does not provide counterpart contribution to the
System; that the employees of the AFP-RSBS do not receive
any salary from the Government and are not covered by the
salary standardization law; that their remittances and
contributions were made to the Social Security System and
not to the Government Service Insurance System; and that
the contribution to the System of the sum of
P200,000,000.00 under Presidential Decree 361 can not be
deemed as equity of the government in the System but
rather, a donation or "seed money" which was never
increased thereafter.10
Generally, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are
conclusive on us. This rule, however, admits of exceptions,
such as where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on a want of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record.11
The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its
purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the
SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement
and pension funds of those in the military service. Members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police are expressly excluded from the coverage of
The GSIS Act of 1997.12 Therefore, soldiers and military
personnel, who are incidentally employees of the
Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for
their retirement, pension and separation benefits. For this

purpose, the law provides that the contribution by military

officers and enlisted personnel to the System shall be
compulsory, thus:
Officers and enlisted personnel in the active service shall
contribute to the System an amount equivalent to four per
cent (4%) of their monthly base and longevity pay, which
contribution shall be deducted from their pay from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and paid to the
System: Provided, however, That any officer or enlisted
person who is due for compulsory retirement or is optionally
retirable and actually elects to retire within one year from the
approval of this Act, shall no longer be required to contribute
to the System: Provided, further, That any officer or enlisted
person who is separated through no fault of his own and is
not eligible for either retirement or separation benefits shall
upon his separation, be refunded in one lump sum all his
actual contributions to the System plus interest at the rate of
four per cent (4%).13
Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be
administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board,
which may be created and organized by him and subject to
such rules and regulations governing the same as he may,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense,
promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of
funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense.14
In connection with the Sandiganbayan's finding that the
funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money,
come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof
come from appropriations, Section 2 of P.D. 361 states:
SECTION 2. The System shall be funded as follows:

(a) Appropriations and contributions;

(b) Donations, gift, legacies, bequest and others to the
System;
(c) All earnings of the System which shall not be subject to
any tax whatsoever.
Indeed, the clear import of the above-quoted provision is
that, while it may be true that there have been no
appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS,
the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the
funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in
uniform.
The above considerations indicate that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest.
As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and
its funds are in the nature of public funds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated May 12, 2000 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 25741 is ordered REINSTATED, and
the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to resume proceedings
thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 97149 March 31, 1992

FIDENCIO Y. BEJA, SR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE REINERIO O. REYES, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications; COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in
his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD; and
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Administrative Action Board, DOTC, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and/or its Administrative Action
Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving personnel
below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said
Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. 1 was first employed by the
PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port
Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in
1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of
the PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A.
Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against
petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty,
grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed
storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of
the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for
the charges. After a preliminary investigation conducted by

the district attorney for Region X, Administrative Case No. 1104-88 was "considered closed for lack of merit."
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed against Beja by
the PPA General Manager also for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and for being notoriously undesirable. The charge
consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative
offenses including fraud against the PPA in the total amount
of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPAAAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA general manager
indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action." At the
scheduled hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground
that he needed time to study the charges against him. The
AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20,
1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental. 2 Two days later, he filed with the AAB a
manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB
denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of
the certiorari case below and proceeded to file before this
Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. 87352 captioned "Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon. Reinerio
0. Reyes, etc., et al." In the en banc resolution of March 30,
1989, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for

"appropriate action." 3 G.R. No. 87352 was docketed in the

Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in
Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the
following, namely:
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz
are exonerated from the charge against them;
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the
service;
c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are declared
forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the
government service;
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled.
Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the
Court of Appeals also rendered a decision 4 in CA-G.R. SP No.
17270 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an
"appeal by certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order."
We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases
for arriving at a decision and hence, the filing of memoranda
has been dispensed with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having
"decided questions of substance in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions" of this

Court. 5 Specifically, Beja contends that the Court of Appeals

failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due process; (b) the
PPA general manager has no power to issue a preventive
suspension order without the necessary approval of the PPA
board of directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power
to refer the administrative case filed against him to the
DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the
DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body,
have no jurisdiction to try the administrative case against
him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the
preventive suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC
Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear administrative
cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant
General Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general
manager cannot subject him to a preventive suspension on
the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree
No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
(d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the
Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board
of Directors and not the PPA General Manager is the "proper
disciplining authority. 6
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner
erroneously equates "preventive suspension" as a remedial
measure with "suspension" as a penalty for administrative
dereliction. The imposition of preventive suspension on a
government employee charged with an administrative
offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil
Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer

or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if

the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that
the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative
investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself.
It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee
who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from
the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being
investigated. 7 Thus, preventive suspension is distinct from
the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the
one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D. No 857. While the former
may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of
the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may
only be meted upon him at the termination of the
investigation or the final disposition of the case.
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who
may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of
Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are
sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted,
but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of
agencies the "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees"
in the PPA.
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is
limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authority has
not finally decided the administrative case provided the
ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive
suspension has been exhausted. The employee concerned
may then be reinstated. 8 However, the said ninety-day
period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also

mandates that any fault, negligence or petition of a

suspended employee may not be considered in the
computation of the said period. Thus, when a suspended
employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order
or a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an
administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should
be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period of the
preventive suspension. 9
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC
Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear
administrative cases against PPA Personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager, the Court qualifiedlyrules in favor
of petitioner.
The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July 11,
1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were
vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the
Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree
gave the Council the power "to appoint, discipline and
remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff
of the Authority and other personnel."
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D.
No. 857, See. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports
Authority which would be "attached" to the then Department
of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When
Executive Order No. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was
issued, the PPA retained its "attached" status. 10 Even
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of
Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that
the agencies attached to the DOTC "shall continue to operate
and function in accordance with the respective charters or

laws creating them, except when they conflict with this

Code."
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three
administrative relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7
of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being
supervision and control and administrative supervision.
"Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship
between the Department or its equivalent and the attached
agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of
the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as
a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted
by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect
the progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general policies through
its representative in the board, which shall serve as the
framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall he left to the discretion
or judgment of the executive officer of the agency or
corporation. In the event that the Secretary and the head of
the board or the attached agency or corporation strongly
disagree on the interpretation and application of policies, and
the Secretary is unable to resolve the disagreement, he shall
bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to
a department shall submit to the Secretary concerned their
audited financial statements within sixty (60) days after the
close of the fiscal year; and

(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements,

the corporation shall continue to operate on the basis of the
preceding year's budget until the financial statements shall
have been submitted. Should any government-owned or
controlled corporation incur an operation deficit at the close
of its fiscal year, it shall be subject to administrative
supervision of the department; and the corporation's
operating and capital budget shall be subject to the
department's examination, review, modification and
approval. (emphasis supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence
from the Department to which it is attached than one which
is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral
relationship" between the Department and the attached
agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program
coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from Departmental
control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that
even an agency under a Department's administrative
supervision is free from Departmental interference with
respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in
accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions"
under the Administrative Code of 1987. 11 Moreover, the
Administrative Code explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of
Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to
chartered institutions attached to a Department. 12
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the
management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a
certain extent, free from Departmental interference and
control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which
provides:

Sec. 8. Management and Staff. a) The President shall, upon

the recommendation of the Board, appoint the General
Manager and the Assistant General Managers.
(b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be
selected and appointed on the basis of merit and fitness
based on a comprehensive and progressive merit system to
be established by the Authority immediately upon its
organization and consistent with Civil Service rules and
regulations.The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and
dismissal of all personnel of the Authority, including
temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
(c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the
Board, determine the staffing pattern and the number of
personnel of the Authority, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fix their salaries and emoluments. For
professional and technical positions, the General Manager
shall recommend salaries and emoluments that are
comparable to those of similar positions in other
government-owned corporations, the provisions of existing
rules and regulations on wage and position classification
notwithstanding.
(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the
Board, appoint and remove personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager.
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for
a mechanism for an administrative investigation of
personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring employees
on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board
of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant

Manager who may be charged with an administrative

offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager,
as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to
preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec.
38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only after gathering sufficient facts
may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in
accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors. 14
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and
the Board of Directors, the employee concerned mayelevate
the matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise,
he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. The
permissive recourse to the Department Secretary is
sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) under the
following provisions:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (a) The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with
the Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the
case or it may deputize any department or agency or official
or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results
of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission
with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or
other action to be taken.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. The decisions shall be final in case the penalty

imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in

an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the
decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to
the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty
is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only
after confirmation by the department head.

25, 1987. 15 Its special nature as a quasijudicial administrative body notwithstanding, the AAB is not
exempt from the observance of due process in its
proceedings. 16 We are not satisfied that it did so in this case
the respondents protestation that petitioner waived his right
to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that
petitioner was precisely questioning the AAB's jurisdiction
when it sought judicial recourse.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the power of the PPA General
Manager to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and
REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC
and/or the AAB to act on Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1049-89 and rules that due process has been accorded the
petitioner.

(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by
the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA
General Manager should have first conducted an
investigation, made the proper recommendation for the
imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board
of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein
petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary
Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary
Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was
designed to act, decide and recommend to him "all cases of
administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of
corruption in the Department." Composed of a Chairman and
two (2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the President on May

The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and

VOID and the case in REMANDED to the PPA whose General
Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless
after a determination of its duration, it is found that he had
served the total of ninety (90) days in which case he shall be
reinstated immediately.
SO ORDERED.