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Emmanuel N. Zarogiannopoulos
The impact of
demographic explosion in N. Africa
on the EU labour market
(Prospects and future strategies)
EZ, 2005
IUKB-NYC MBA
The impact of the demographic explosion in N. Africa on EU labor market Prospects and future strategies
CURRICULUM VITAE
Colonel Emmanuil N. Zarogiannopoulos was born in 1960 in
the city of Piraeus, Greece, where he finished the high school and
Lyceum. He was admitted to the Air Force Academy in 1978, and,
after a four year course of studies and a high-graded degree study
(with subject Satellite Systems as an Aid in Air Traffic Control),
he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant of the Hellenic Air Force.
As a junior officer, he was assigned to high-readiness units with the duties of
Air Defense Controller, Fighter Allocator and Master Controller. In 1987, he started
his flight training with T-37 training-jets ending up with his operational phase flight
training with fighter-jet aircraft. In 1988, he was commissioned as a combat-ready
PHANTOM F-4E co-pilot, and started his service in an all-weather & multi-role
Fighter Squadron.
He was promoted to the rank of 1st Lieutenant in 1985 and in 1989 to Captain.
In 1996, he was promoted to the rank of Major, in 2001 to Lieutenant Colonel and in
early 2005 to full Colonel.
He has served in various National and International Units, as well as in Formations in
commanding and staff positions, such as: Controller and Master Controller in various
CRCs and ACCs, Staff Officer of Technology Research Division of the Air Force
General Staff, Current Operations Officer of the Regional Air Operations Center of
the NATO Headquarters in Naples-Italy, Current Operations Officer of the Air Desk
of the International Stabilization Forces Headquarters in Sarajevo, Air Force Chiefs
Executive Officer in the European Air Chiefs (EURAC) forum and International
Relations Section Chief of the Hellenic Air Force General Staff.
During his career, training has been of paramount importance, in both the
operational and academic fields, as follows:
- Air Interception School (Greece, USA)
- Air-to-Surface/Surface-to-Air Operations School (Greece)
- Weapons and Tactics School (Honored graduate, as instructor/1st in
course)
- Escape and Evasion/Evacuation School (Greece)
- Sea Survival School (Greece)
- Electronic Warfare Staff Officers School (USA)
- Air Force Staff Officers School (Greece)
- RADAR expertise training course (MARCONI College/England)
- Command & Control School (NATO training center/Germany)
- ERIEYE Mission Crew Training program (Sweden)
- Air Force Air and Ground Trainers School (Greece)
- AWACS Mission Crew Ground Trainer
- AWACS Mission Crew Air Trainer
-
His flight experience is considered remarkable, since he has flown more than
1.200 hours with fast double-jet engine fighter aircraft (PHANTOM F-4E), 150 hours
with EW (Electronic Warfare) aircraft as an EW specialist and, more than 300 hours
with AEWACS as Mission Commander.
During his 27-year career, Colonel Zarogiannopoulos has been decorated with
the following distinctions:
- Knight Commanders High Cross of the Order of Merit (National).
- Knight Commanders High Cross of the Order of Phoenix (National).
- Medal for Military Valor, B Class (National).
- Meritorious Command Commendation Medal, C Class (National).
- Staff Officer Service Commendation Medal, B Class (National).
- Commendation Medal for Operation on Peace Keeping Missions (NATO).
- Medal of Observer of European Union for the United Nations (UN).
Additionally, he has been the official National Representative in several
Working Groups, in the frames of NATO and EUROPEAN UNION.
Colonel Zarogiannopoulos is married to Mary Harrison (Australian) and they
have two daughters, Marietta and Agnes, who are in the 3rd year of Marketing and
Communication Department of the Athens Economic University and the 1st year of
Shipping and Maritime Operations of the University of Piraeus, respectively.
He has dealt with sports, possessing a sixth (6th) position award (Parallel bars)
in the 1977 Pan-Hellenic Gymnastic Games. Until the age of 22, he was an athlete of
the swimming team of ETHNIKOS Piraeus, as well as the swimming team of the Air
Force. For the last ten (10) years he has been daily practicing the art of KUNG FU,
possessing the distinction of the BLACK BELT / 1 DAN. He is a lifetime member of
the WBBB (World Black Belt Bureau).
He plays guitar and enjoys particularly reading, listening to the music and
touring with his motorcycle.
Due to the extreme length of his surname, his friends and colleagues use to
call him ZARO and this has been officialized as his nickname.
In March 2005, he retired from the Air Force and moved to Tirana/Albania,
after the acceptance of MT Construction & MT Fidias Group of companies, proposal
to undertake the responsibilities of the Vice President & Quality Manager.
Updated: May 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
METHODOLOGY
10
1.1
Introduction
10
1.2
Global market
12
1.3
Competitiveness
14
1.4
Macroeconomic preconditions
19
1.4.1
Stabilization
19
1.4.2
Export promotion
20
1.4.3
Government expenditure
21
1.5
21
1.5.1
Introduction
21
1.5.2
22
1.5.3
23
1.5.4
Environmental sustainability
27
1.6
28
1.6.1
28
1.6.2
Sources of demand
29
1.6.3
Savings
30
1.6.4
32
1.7
35
1.8
Policy guidelines
36
1.8.1
Restructuring industry
36
1.8.2
Developing agro-industries
37
1.8.3
37
1.8.4
38
1.8.5
38
1.8.6
38
1.8.7
39
1.8.8
39
40
40
41
41
42
43
45
50
50
51
53
55
57
58
60
62
CONCLUSIONS
66
TABLES FIGURES
69
BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES
82
IIN
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North Africas performance has always been connected to the one of Europe.
The two sides of Mediterranean are today different in several sectors, such as
economy, development, culture, employment and religion and, at this point, the
demographic perspective of last years plays an important role. North Africa was
demographically stable in the past, but today is characterized by a sudden
demographic explosion, especially in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. In Europe, we
notice the opposite phenomenon. This differential demographic dynamic in the two
shores of Mediterranean causes an intense phenomenon of migration from the
countries of North Africa to the ones of South Europe. This leads to unemployment,
increase of criminality, explosion of xenophobia and racialism, thus creating the
circumstances for destabilization of the whole area.
Up to today there have been made several efforts for the cooperation of
Mediterranean. According to the declarations of Barcelona and Cairo, Europeans are
willing to provide economic motives in the countries of North Africa and create
cooperation in political, economic and cultural sector. However, these efforts have not
lead to any important results, so it is necessary for Europe to make some emergent
decisions concerning the demographic explosion of North Africa, like creating
investment motives for the companies, providing continuous education to their
workers and performing cultural infiltration in the area.
the countries of South Europe and the countries of North Mediterranean are the fault
line between these two shores.
b.
unpredictable threats and risks that may not give enough time for mobilization.
Europe has realized the above and thats why is deeply interested in Northern
Africas area. Everything starts from the European countries of Mediterranean that are
in direct connection to the Southern Mediterranean. Egypt is the main country of
Africa that is responding to this interest. Special programs are included in all the
cooperation levels and cover a huge area of economy, like industry, information
technology, energy, tourism, water resources, health and education. By this way,
Europe provides the knowledge and practical experience to the workers of North
Africa, in order to create an effective function of enterprises that invest in these
countries.
Except for the last century, migration was without physical borders, and the
movements of individuals from one place to another - were not restricted by national
or regional borders, visa systems, or national security fears. In the past, migration was
restricted by other kinds of borders such as the lack of information, weakness of
migration networks, natural hazards, tribal systems, and the primitive means of
transportation. In the era of globalization, information technology, abundance of
knowledge and information, increasing terrorism threats, the rise of national identities
and the claimed clash of civilizations, migration became a major political issue.
Developed countries regard migration as a threatening factor that affects their
sovereignty and national identities, while developed countries regard it as a possible
escape from their political, economic, and social and overpopulation problems.
industries for labour and relief the economic and demographic burdens in North
Africa.
In this study we examine several issues that cover the above themes, beginning
with the first chapter, where the performances of North Africa in the global economy
are analysed in terms of exports, competitiveness, firms activities, investment,
savings, and industrial growth and so on. Next, we provide the meaning of global
change and culture, where it is underlined that understanding culture helps us to
interpret how people realise things in different cultures and places. Then, a complete
analysis of the Mediterranean environment and relations between European and
African countries follows and we finally conclude with a detailed presentation of the
phenomenon of migration and how Mediterranean countries deal with it. Several
figures, tables and useful conclusions complete the presentation of the assignment.
M
MEETTH
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Data may be described as Primary or Secondary. The first are collected by the
researcher himself, while the second are collected by others to be "re-used" by the
researcher.
Secondary Sources can be used at several ways. Firstly, they can be used at
getting ideas about the analysis of a subject, the definitions and the sampling frame of
a research. Also, they can be used as Supplement to Main Research and as main mode
of the research. Finally, they apart a very useful element when Direct Data Collection
is not complete or even impossible.
The data used in this study was mostly secondary information. The content
was extracted from various books, articles, periodicals and magazines that referred to
relevant information for both European and Northern African business relations, the
Mediterranean cooperation and the phenomenon of migration and the way it affects
the future of the Mediterranean environment. The author also used some data from the
Statistical Services of Europe and Africa in order to provide several tables and figures
that amplify the readers will to get a more stable idea on the attitudes expressed
throughout this study.
CCH
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1.1
Introduction
The countries in the world economy, which have grown most rapidly, are
those that have been the most active participants in globalization 1 . East Asian, and
subsequently South-East Asian, economies have accelerated their industrialization
based on manufactured exports. South Asian countries too have become major
exporters of manufactures.
10
Industrial policy also needs to focus on how to spread the benefits of industrial
expansion to bring about true economic development. In particular, the incomes of
both the rural and the urban poor must be raised. Food security and employment
opportunities are essential features of the spread of the benefits to the poor. The fastgrowing economies of East Asia all started on their path of accelerated growth with
relatively even income distributions. This creates effective demand and wide markets
for consumer goods; moreover, with growing agricultural incomes absorbing
industrial output, the integration of agriculture and industry is fostered.
11
1.2.1
Global market
African countries, therefore, are faced with the need to strengthen their
industrial competitiveness to establish a presence in global markets as exporters of
manufactured goods, and at the same time they need to avoid further falls in their
existing shares of world primary commodity markets (table A). They also need to
defend themselves against erosion of their domestic manufacturing as they lower their
trade barriers and integrate into the global economy.
One common feature is that many African countries still impose substantial
protection against imports. Nineteen sub-Saharan African countries for which data on
trade barriers were available maintained in the mid-1990s an average unweighted
level of tariff protection of 26.8 % compared with 6.1 % in OECD countries. Over
one-third of the imports into these African countries were also covered by non-tariff
barriers, compared with fewer than 4 % into the OECD. There is little reason to
suppose that those countries in Africa for which data were not available had significantly lower levels of protection.
4
12
The growth of demand for the products, which it exported in the initial period:
this shows changes in exports, which would have occurred if there were changes in
demand only.
Changes in its exports of those products other than the changes, which can be
less the changes, which can be accounted for by demand growth, and changes in
competitiveness.
Sub-Saharan Africa's market shares for its major export products fell during the
period studied, and these products experienced a decline in their importance in
world trade, as well. With the exception of North Africa, all other developing
country groupings increased their exports over and above what could be expected, as
a result of growth in demand. Over the same period, sub-Saharan Africa's exports
also became less diversified. Sub-Saharan Africa's disappointing export performance
cannot be blamed on increases in protective measures imposed in its export markets.
The period saw moves from a less to a more favourable tariff environment, with the
implementation of the tariff concessions of the European Union's Lome Convention
and the Generalized System of Preferences schemes in major markets. Sub-Saharan
Africa received more favourable treatment over the period than other developing
countries in respect of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The study concludes that
Africa's poor export performance cannot be blamed on external factors but on
inappropriate domestic policies, including the anti-export biases associated with its
high levels of protection against imports.
13
The longer that many African countries maintain protection against imports,
the longer it will take to their domestic industries to learn how to compete in their
own domestic markets, although in countries with long and porous land borders,
smuggling may circumvent such barriers. Long-run protection against imports makes
for inefficiency but the gradual phasing-in of reductions in tariffs and non-tariff
barriers does give domestic enterprises a vital breathing space. During a managed
phase-in period, governments, in cooperation with the private sector, can focus on
policy to improve the general competitiveness of the economy and encourage the
development of crucial technological capabilities among sectors and firms 7 .
1.2.2
Competitiveness
African countries typically have small industrial sectors and a short history of
manufacturing. They have poor physical infrastructure and limited human capital
endowment, with low levels of primary and secondary education, and shortages of
industrial skills. This constitutes a weak basis on which to develop the necessary
competitiveness in manufacturing production that would diversify export earnings
beyond traditional primary commodities. Any comparative advantage for African
countries, therefore, almost inevitably lies in agro-related industries: industries using
either agricultural products as their main raw material, or those producing agricultural
S. Lall, 1992.
14
inputs. The further processing of agricultural products can also make an important
contribution to the efficient replacement of imports. Over 70 % of total employment
in Africa and 60 % of manufacturing value-added (table B) is in agro-related
industries. These industries include many labor-intensive activities such as sub sectors
within food processing, as well as textiles and clothing, leather processing and
footwear.
M. Roemer, 1999.
International Trade Centre, 2001.
15
Sector
1970
1980
1990
2000
311
Food
21.7
17.5
21
22.4
313
Beverages
14.7
12.1
13.2
13.1
314
Tobacco
8.5
4.4
4.4
4.7
321
Textiles
8.4
10.2
9.2
8.7
322
Apparel
2.4
2.2
2.8
3.5
323
Leather
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.8
324
Footwear
2.1
1.2
1.3
1.1
331
Wood
3.9
2.7
2.9
332
Furniture
1.7
1.8
1.1
369
Non-metallic minerals
3.6
2.9
3.8
4.3
Total
Agro-related
70.6
56.8
60.2
62.7
Turning
country-level
comparative
advantage
into
enterprise-level
10
16
Europe, North America and Asia. Attracting such investment is vital to African export
competitiveness. Non-traditional agricultural exports such as vegetables, fruit and
flowers also require high standards of grading and quality. These have been pioneered
by, for example, Kenya and Zimbabwe in cooperation with retail chains in the United
Kingdom.
palm oil and rubber appears clear, yet sub-Saharan Africa's declining share of world
exports since the 1960s can be attributed mainly to a loss of competitiveness in
primary commodities, particularly in comparison with South-East Asia. There is no
incompatibility between strengthening existing commodity exports and developing
other sectors to diversify, away from primary commodities. In this, Malaysian
experience is a guide 11 . Malaysia has increased yields and labor productivity in its
traditional rubber and palm oil exports, and developed new export crops such as
cocoa. The additional export earnings arising from these products, yields foreign
exchange for the capital goods and technology imports necessary for upgrading
domestic manufacturing activities.
11
12
18
Sub-Saharan Africa's average freight costs are more than 20 % higher than those
of other countries. For some goods, such as clothing, textiles and footwear, in which
Africa is potentially competitive, average transport costs are between 15 and 20 % of
the value of output.
Once the terms of the Uruguay Round Agreement are fully implemented, the
Ten landlocked countries in the early 1990s faced net transport and insurance costs
1.4
Macroeconomic preconditions
1.4.1
Stabilization
19
Inflation causes the real exchange rate to appreciate and stabilization policies
require the inclusion of a corrective devaluation. The greater the supply response to
devaluation, the less is macroeconomic restriction needed to correct current account
deficits. In this sense, adjustment for a "flexible" economy is less painful 13 . The
freeing of import restrictions can ease the constraint on industrial growth by giving
manufacturers better access to imported spares and intermediate products.
Once initial stabilization has been achieved, policy should center on maintaining a
stable macro environment with a broadly expansionary focus, keeping a stable and
competitive real exchange rate, and adjusting macro policy quickly in the face of any
external shocks.
1.4.2
Export promotion
Free access for exporters to inputs at world prices does raise the danger that
export activities will develop as enclaves. In fact, this may be desirable at an early
stage of export development. Access to free-trade inputs releases exporters from
13
C. Morisson, 1991.
20
domestic supply constraints, and from quality defects in domestic inputs. It puts
pressure on domestic input suppliers to be competitive, while mapping out a market
for them if they eventually become so. In time, however, overseas component suppliers may move to the new location and deepen the economic structure.
1.4.3
Government expenditure
1.5
1.5.1
Introduction
Sustainable development centers on the notion that meeting the needs of the
current generation should not endanger those of future generations 16 . This is a
14
Levy, 1993.
S. Lall, 1995.
16
R.M. Auty, K. Brown, 1997.
15
21
complex concept, since the preferences of later generations are not known, and nor do
we know what technologies will be available in the future. Raising living standards in
the immediate future will reduce the damage to the environment that results from
pressure on livelihoods when people live in poverty. Social sustainability requires
human populations to continue to function in the face of physical shocks such as
drought or flood and in the face of economic stresses such as fluctuations in crop
prices. The notion of Sustainable livelihoods highlights the interrelation between
sustainability and poverty reduction. Livelihood diversification allows families to
reduce risk and raise incomes. Off-farm employment is a major aspect of rural
households' livelihood diversification.
1.5.2
Food security is an essential part of raising the welfare of both the rural and
the urban poor. In Africa, only about 10-15 % of food production is processed
compared with 80 % in developed market European economies. A higher degree of
processing would contribute to food security, as also would improve storage facilities
and increased production of agricultural inputs, especially if food-marketing systems
were strengthened at the same time.
22
1.5.3
23
employment and unemployment has risen, particularly among unskilled workers. SubSaharan manufacturing employment started to decline during the 1980s and in many
countries, this is associated with declines in manufacturing value-added. Small and
medium enterprise (SME) development is often seen as a way of generating
employment-intensive industrial growth but SMEs are not, invariably, more intensiveintensive than larger firms 17 .
Many of the small enterprises in Africa are micro enterprises. African firms
with more than 50 workers are often considered as large 19 . Micro enterprises employ
only a handful of workers, who in many cases are family members or relatives. In
Uganda, for example, one survey in 1988 found that enterprises with more than four
workers accounted for only one-quarter of the industrial workforce 20 . Such micro
enterprises face many different constraints than "proper" small and medium firms and
require somewhat different policies. Policies regarding micro enterprises should be
concerned as much with supporting household livelihood diversification as with
supporting industrial development in the more conventional sense (see Table E).
17
I.M.D Little.
M.J. Piore and C.F. Sabel, 1987.
19
I. Livingstone, 1991.
20
Industrial Development Review Series, 1997.
18
24
Micro enterprises are often more like households than. They may switch between
activities, and be concerned more with household survival than with growth.
Profits may be invested in assets such as land rather than in the enterprise, if such
Micro enterprises may hesitate to "grow into formality" if this increases the risk
that they will be subject to burdensome regulation or to the predations of the state.
Much "credit" in Africa takes a non-monetary form, such as the lending of labor
or tools.
25
Larger firms in the 1990s were generally those, which had started with larger capital,
The period 1990-93 saw a decline in Kenyan per capita income. This inhibited the growth
of firms selling to urban consumers more than that of firms selling to rural markets.
Firms were more likely to have grown if their proprietor had had some secondary
Many firms had access to credit, but only three of those without credit succeeded in
growing.
Although many of the firms studied were situated in the same location within the city,
there was little evidence of "clustering" in the sense of subcontracting or other interfirm
contractual relations although firms did sometimes help each other with repairs and in
preparing designs.
26
1.5.4
Environmental sustainability
1.6
21
28
policy
exerts
much
influence:
stable,
low-inflation
1.6.2
Sources of demand
29
that even the markets of the most populous countries are small at present. Nigeria's
domestic market in 1995 (in terms of GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates)
was only one-tenth that of Belgium, one of Europe's smallest countries. These small
market sizes compound the need to develop exports.
Domestic demand depends on GDP growth and macro policy. The short-term
credit and other macro restrictions associated with bringing domestic inflation under
control will need to be replaced by steady macro-economic expansion compatible
with maintaining price stability. Such expansion would help to increase capacity
utilization and thereby lower costs and create employment. Capacity utilization would
also be aided by the increased availability of imported spare parts and intermediate
products that would result from the additional foreign exchange earnings generated by
manufacturing expansion. Employment creation would help to create the broad-based
demand necessary to stimulate new investment.
1.6.3
Savings
African savings are low by the standards of other developing countries and,
for most of the 1990s, they were around half those of Asia when measured as a
proportion of GDP 25 .
25
30
26
31
effective if provided along with other services to small businesses, such as business
incubators, small-firm industrial estates, maintenance and training centers and
marketing and procurement assistance. However, the advantages of such
arrangements need to be partially offset against the difficulty of an institution
simultaneously offering help and collecting loan repayments.
1.6.4
27
33
and financed by compulsory levies on firms, to avoid some firms free riding on the
training financed by others.
At the firm level, there is scope in the formal sector for bringing the
productivity of existing firms up to the level of the best in 'the domestic economy.
There is considerable evidence of productivity differences between firms using
similar technologies, both within national economies and internationally 28 . Since in
African economies there tend to be fewer of the informal contacts and less skilled
labor mobility between enterprises than is the case in industrial countries, it may be
necessary to import foreign technological skills in the form of foreign technicians to
improve local labor, technical and management practices. There is also an important
role for encouraging multinational FDI in order to establish international best-practice
production methods. There is now little evidence that multinationals use
"inappropriate" capital-intensive technology when they invest in developing
countries 29 .
H. Pack, 1990.
R. O. Jenkins, 1990.
34
SMEs of Brazil or China. They are even less likely to become as the SMEs of Japan,
whose export competitiveness is, in any case, indirect because their growth has been
associated with the Japanese system of highly outsourced "lean production" now
widely copied in the West. Industrial policy towards clustering in Africa should focus
on the more formal small and medium enterprises.
1.7
Inflows of FDI into sub-Saharan Africa more than doubled between 1993 and
1996, rising to US$4.02 billion from US$1.95 billion and increased again by more
than 30 per cent in the following two years to total US$5.29 billion in 1998. Although
this rate of increase is much less than the more than threefold increase between 1993
and 1998 in FDI for developing countries as a wholeand consequently causes a
substantial fall in Africa's relative share of that inflowthe rise partly reflects the
large increase in direct investment in China.
Mineral resources continue to attract foreign investment. High-value agricultural products have also attracted the attention of foreign investors and cut flowers,
which can be air freighted to market, are another area, which has expanded. Although
fruit and vegetables can be grown by smallholders, capital requirements for
internationally competitive products can be substantial, and foreign investors have
taken the lead in such developments. Floriculture too has heavy capital requirements.
30
35
countries with very small populations and low per capita incomes, offer domestic
markets that are scarcely as large in terms of purchasing power as those of European
provincial towns. They need to attract export-oriented FDI, including FDI in tourism.
1.8
Policy guidelines
1.8.1
Restructuring industry
Since the mid-1990s, African economies have started to grow fast enough to
produce a rise in real incomes per head, but there is little sign yet that manufacturing
value-added too is growing consistently. Some de-industrialization during the first 15
31
32
36
years of structural adjustment was probably inevitable, with the reduction in support
given to inefficient firms that had developed under the import-substituting
industrialization policies of the 1960s and 1970s. More of these firms may have to be
given up in the future. Internationally competitive export and import-competing
industries must be built on African countries' existing industrial base, so that Africa
can prosper in an increasingly open international economy. The industrial base
consists overwhelmingly of agro-related sectors. In a continent where agriculture
employs nearly two-thirds of the workforce but produces less than a quarter of GDP,
the use of industrial development to raise agricultural productivity could accelerate
growth and raise living standards. Agricultural output could be stimulated by the
production of inputs such as fertilizer and simple machinery, and by the further
processing of agricultural products.
1.8.2
Developing agro-industries
1.8.3
a relative absence of corruption. Incentives for textile and garment investment will be
weakened by the phase-out of the MFA by 2007, although low labor costs will remain
an important attraction.
1.8.4
In the search for export products, it is important not to overlook the need to
raise productivity in many traditional agricultural exports, as this is low by
international standards. Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, which became
successful exporters of manufactures in the 1980s, also invested in their commodity
exports and have seen their primary commodity market shares rise at Africa's
expense. These shares could be recouped. New agricultural products, such as Kenya's
horticultural exports, face high-income elasticity of demand in industrial countries,
and the markets will become more competitive, with the entry of new producers such
as Zimbabwe. Shrimps are another fast-growing world export market in which Africa
could expand its existing share.
1.8.5
Raising the rate of economic growth requires savings and investment to rise.
Rising investment is a vehicle for the embodiment of technical change. To stimulate
domestic savings and investment, macroeconomic stability is needed. Households and
firms must also believe that policies will be sustained. Equally important is the
strengthening of the framework of property rights within the rule of law so that
contracts can be enforced and savers and investors can make long-term plans. An
economic climate, which stimulates domestic savings and investment, is likely also to
attract foreign investment. Industrial "visions are useful frameworks for long-term
policy and are particularly useful if firms and households can be persuaded that they
are credible and use them to form their own long-term plans.
1.8.6
1.8.7
The livelihoods of both the rural and the urban poor will depend heavily also
on the employment growth generated by micro enterprises. There are many constraints on the expansion of micro enterprises, and not just the lack of access to credit.
There is also little evidence that micro enterprises are graduating into small and
medium firms. Policy on micro enterprises needs to focus firstly on how to strengthen
livelihood security. In the more "formal sector", SMEs have other concerns, such as
the need for credit for fixed capital investment. Industrial policy at the sector level
could enhance the competitiveness of such SMEs by facilitating their development
into the clusters, which have made developing countries in other continents more
competitive.
1.8.8
39
C
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ULLTTU
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REE
2.1
Global has become a popular adjective in recent years. There are two main
reasons for this:
9 The first is simply the lack of an alternative way of indicating the whole
world. The expression 'worldly change' would carry quite different
connotations. A basic one is about the promotion of moral values.
9 The second reason for the choice of the word 'global' relates to this integration.
We recognize that there are ideas and practices that may be main-tamed over
long chronicle periods, from generation to generation, but culture is always contingent
upon historical processes. It is also influenced by, influences and generally interacts
with, contemporary social, economic and political factors. Geography too is
significant. For example, it is not just about where you are on the world map, but
about the ways in which space and place interact with understandings about being a
person. Moreover, any one individual's experience of culture will be affected by the
multiple aspects of their identity - 'race', gender, age, sexuality, class, caste position,
religion, geography and so forth - and it is likely to alter in various circumstances.
Culture is not just about high and low, not about product and audience, not just
about ways of doing things. It is of course all of these things. There needs to be an
inclusive and representative understanding of culture, which becomes part of
development discourse. The ways in which the 'development machine' (Ferguson
1990) analyses the world have to be fundamentally challenged and transformed.
40
2.2
For a decade or two after the Second Word War a single theory was dominant
- what was later called 'modernisation theory'. For Rostow economic development
required not only appropriate economic, technological and demographic conditions,
but also appropriate social institutions and value-systems (Rostow I960: 2). Only
when all of these were present would development be possible. Similar ideas were to
be found in the writings of the West Indian and Nobel Prize-winning economist,
Arthur Lewis (Lewis 1954).
Although Rostow and Lewis recognised the importance of ideas and values,
most development practitioners and academics did not pay much attention to this
aspect of it. To the extent that attention was paid to culture, the basic assumption was
that what was needed was to provide ideas and values crucial to modernisation.
2.3
41
which environmental and development concerns are no longer in opposition but need
to be considered together. For many, the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) epitomised this new way of thinking.
The cultural basis of dissent is very different for southern as opposed northern
environmentalists. Environmentalism as a global political movement contains
fissures, which weaken its potential as a threat to the European culture of
industrialisation and modernisation. To be politically effective in the long-run, global
movement based on a new concept would have to be built on people's aspirations in
both north and south and would have to communicate across the gap between those
for whom the environment means global habitat and wilderness and those for whom it
is their everyday source of livelihood.
2.4
The idea of being or becoming 'modern' finds a place in both the normative
and the analytical approaches to development. In the first place, it implies a whole
bundle of cultural values and attributes likely to appear desirable particularly to those
living in less modern or less 'developed' societies or communities. Obvious examples
range from the ubiquitous Coca-Cola to private motorcars, piped domestic water and
modern curative health care. In this sense, to become modern epitomises a particular,
42
very widespread and powerful, normative view of development, which goes deeper
than simply a desire for the products of industrialisation to include a rather uncritical
acceptance of the role of science, the market, and urbanisation and so on. In a world
dominated by advanced capitalist economies, all aspects of European society are
elevated to represent the ideal of what development is trying to achieve (Potter and
Thomas 1992: 119).
To say that this view is 'powerful', leads to the place of the idea of modernity
in the other approach. Here it is argued that modern aspirations and the adoption of a
modern approach, for example in turning an informal economic activity into a
'modern' business enterprise, are driving forces, which form crucial parts of the
historical process of development. Thus, one of the central arguments of the European
'modernisation theorists' was that development in the south required the adoption of
more 'achievement motivation' by its people (McClelland 1963).
2.5
Technologies are seen to be embedded in, and to carry, social values, institutional forms and culture (Andersen 1985: 57).
Knowledge its self is a cultural construction and what one culture considers valuable,
another may dismiss.
These points are illustrated when we consider the gender consequences that
arise from the adoption of new technologies. A study for the United Nations on the
impact of scientific and technological progress on employment and work conditions
in various trades reported that in every case where machinery was introduced in
activities traditionally done by women, men either completely replaced women or the
activity became sub-divided and men took over the tasks that used the technology and
required greater skill while women were relegated to less skilled, menial tasks. These
shifts were accompanied by loss of income-earning opportunities or marginalisation
and lower income for women (Anderson).
Underlying these processes are assumed beliefs that men work with
technology and women do not, or that men do 'modern' work while women only work
in the subsistence sectors. Nevertheless, the transferred technologies are also 'blind' to
values of the recipient societies, values that may, for example, determine whether
women may work outside of their homes or not.
44
2.6
of North Africa
found
that an unusually high number of laborers had been able to set up business
themselves and become successful entrepreneurs. The study cites the example of the
man
who
never
attended
school
seven. In 1986 he set up his own business. Most of his laborers were relatives who
worked for him because of friendship and kinship. (Mayoux 1993).
Networks based on ascribed trust (i.e. those based on kin, caste, ethnicity or
religion) can, however, act as impediments to further economic growth of the
enterprise because of the mutual obligations involved. A manufacturing enterprise
may find it difficult to acquire and use new machinery that will improve productivity
because it may displace workers. This will be particularly difficult if there are kinship
ties between owners and workers, but the issue of whether work is primarily about
productivity or people and their well-being tends to surface wherever there are cooperative forms of work organisation.
For poor people, the knowledge is often undervalued, and they have neither
access to, nor the power to exploit, valuable new knowledge. Poor people do react
46
creatively, using the knowledge that they possess, to changing opportunities and
threats to their livelihoods. Several studies of farming in sub-Saharan Africa showed
how it has changed as economic options for rural people have changed, and in
particular how small-scale farmers have responded to market opportunities: They
have adopted new cash crops (cocoa, groundnuts, maize, vegetables) and new technologies (ploughs, irrigation, hybrid maize and fertiliser), migrated to new areas and
even switched to new foods (maize, cassava and rice) in pursuit of these
opportunities (Woodhouse 1992a: 181).
Appleton draws the distinction between technical changes that are 'defensive'
responses to deteriorating livelihood situations (and which are likely to be risk-averse)
and those that are 'more proactive - creating or taking advantages of opportunities to
improve livelihoods' (Appleton 1995: 301). Nevertheless, whatever the response,
people use and adapt their prior knowledge and assimilate new knowledge, the latter
then becoming part of their body of knowledge. Thus, the distinction frequently made
between 'indigenous' and 'imported' knowledge is blurred. Local knowledge
accumulates over time due to the interaction with one's close environment and with
the rest of the world. (Wilson 1995a, 1995b, 1996).
The danger in this part lies in assuming that knowledge (and the shared meanings that
go with it) flows only one way - from the 'knowledge-rich' in the Europe to the largely
'ignorant' poor people in the N. Africa. But this assumption is changing, especially in
Africas agriculture, where farmers have increasingly been recognised as themselves
innovators and experimenters ... and perhaps most decisively, farmers have again and
again been found to be rational and right in behaviour which at first seemed irrational
and wrong to outside professional observers. (Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp \ 989).
47
Poor people engaging in new enterprises usually have little but their previous
knowledge upon which to draw. They typically enter businesses that require little or
no capital, and which require no new knowledge to start (although a willingness to
learn is crucial if their businesses are to survive). In the communal areas of
Zimbabwe, for example, it has been reported that women predominate in beer
brewing, basket making, tailoring, knitting, crochet and pottery; men in grain milling,
leather tanning and products, brick making, housing construction, carpentry and metal
products (Helmsing 1991: 262-3). Therefore, production driven by what people can
do (rather than by what they can sell) and widespread copying of one another's
products leads to a mismatch between supply and demand. Very little is sold.
The introduction of industrial production methods does require new knowledge, the technical aspects of which arc relatively easy to acquire because of their
repetitive nature, each worker typically performing a single task on a machine within
a strict division of labor. The gender implications of adopting industrial techniques
have been discussed earlier, but even in terms solely of providing technical additions
to knowledge, such techniques are limited. There are few opportunities to develop
and acquire skills that go beyond the specific piece of equipment on which the worker
has been trained (Bhagavan 1990).
48
role in making a living, in that they are meeting places for people engaging in
widespread and varied social interactions.
C
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3.1
The Mediterranean ideal involves more than a dialogue among states but less
than complete integration. It aspires to a condition of peace, harmony, cooperation
and mutually beneficial exchange throughout the Mediterranean region. The
attractiveness of Mediterranean ideal remains, but can be achieved only in the long
term.
Tovias Alfred, The Mediterranean Economy, in Ludlow, P. (ed) Europe and the Mediterranean,
2004.
50
North Africa where labor costs are only a quarter of those in Europe. North Africa
continues its dependence on the EU as a market and source of aid and this
dependency can bring the benefits of economic growth. The Southern Mediterranean
security has been affected by Europe, as well.
3.2
34
European Commission, The European Community and the Mediterranean Countries, Luxembourg,
1995.
51
that have included the poor treatment of immigrant workers from North Africa in
some countries of Europe.
The generation of the first Mediterranean agreements ran into many problems
over trade. In particular, exports of agricultural products, textiles and processed foods
were troublesome and the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was designed to
improve it. It was supposed to create a free trade area in industrial goods between the
Community and each Mediterranean country by 1977, with Tunisias successful
industrial development policies being based on the expectations created by GMP. The
GMP offered financial aid and the prospect of a common approach to immigrant
labour. Despite the good intentions of GMP, the results were disappointing. Several
continuing agreements added few benefits to the Mediterranean countries and North
Africans were disillusioned with Community threats of restricting migrant workers
entry to the Community. The uncertainty on Community Mediterranean relations,
has been extended beyond the ostensibly economic agreements into the political
sphere. In 1990, new protocols were signed and the New Mediterranean Policy
(NMP) offered 4,405 million ecus grants and loans over five years to eight
Mediterranean countries. Over half of the aid was allocated to Morocco, Algeria and
Tunisia. These funds were to be spent in support of structural adjustment, to
encourage private investment, to increase Community financial aid, to facilitate
access to the European market, to strengthen economic and political dialogue and so
on. By NMP, Europe had increased its aid to the region and developed a more
coherent picture of the types of economies it wishes to support.
35
Tovias Alfred, The Mediterranean Economy, in Ludlow, P. (ed) Europe and the Mediterranean,
2004.
52
One of the main trends of last years is the growth of environmental awareness
in governments, organizations and populations. From 1990, EU tried to establish a
European Environment Agency (EEA) to supply reliable data on the state of the air,
water, soil, flora, fauna, waste disposal, noise and toxic wastes of Europe. A series of
programmes are made up to today and affect the management of Mediterranean.
3.3
they became countries if immigration. Although the worlds main receiving countries
are outside of Europe, the immigrants from the southern Mediterranean consist a real
threat of a sudden influx. The demographic trends in the Mediterranean region
indicate that substantial changes are under way. In 1950 two thirds of the population
lived in the northern side, but by 1995 the majority lived in the south. With continuing
growth, two thirds will live in the south by the end of 2010. These trends could
increase unemployment and poverty in the southern Mediterranean. Even
development aid has been enlisted as a tool to prevent immigration. The major
problems in Mediterranean are political, environmental and social (emigration). Aid
should be increased and refocused on family planning programs. Also, improving the
economic position of developing countries can be a way of easing migratory pressure.
A great deal has been made concerning the changes that should be made in the
south and that could prevent emigration to the north. As well as family planning on
the southern shore, such changes include:
political measures, like making aid more conditional on human rights, with the
effect that southern countries would treat dissenting views more tolerantly
economic measures, like reducing income differentials on the north and the
south, stimulating employment in the south by investing in lab our intensive
industries, opening Europes markets to labour intensive manufacturers and
agricultural products in order to create jobs in the south and finally pressuring
southern countries to open their markets to imports to prevent shortages from
driving emigration.
3.4
Europe. This may be understood for an activity in which the R&D element represents
a considerable amount of work - and where the human potential of the young
engineers is an asset - while the production itself - on the basis of heavy capital
investments is largely automated in Europe.
56
C
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3366
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Y 36
4.1
Introduction
It has been estimated recently that there are currently over 100 million
international migrants in the world today (Castles and Miller, 2004). This means that
nearly two per cent of the world's people do not live in their country of origin. Many
of these are refugees - at least 19 million, according to the UNDP (2004). Migration
across frontiers is nothing new. Many polities were built on migrations from
kingdoms of Africa to the modern republics of the Europe. Yet the volume of national
and international migration is increased greatly, continuing up to the present. Why has
there been this increase, or to put it another way: why too many people are living as
'foreigners' in the world, mostly in the advanced industrial economies? What are the
characteristics of this migration, who are the migrants and where do they come from
and go to? Why do these people uproot themselves to live in an alien, often-hostile
environment? How do they make the move and how do they 'make out' when they
reach their destination?
36
Chris Martin
57
4.2
International migration
The growth of international migration was notable after World War II
principally from the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) to the Developed Market
Economies (DMEs) of Europe, North America and Australia. Workers arrived in
response to active recruitment policies by advanced industrial countries, whose labor
demands outstripped local supply during the post-war period of economic
reconstruction and growth. Some measure of the growth of immigration in Europe is
indicated in the growth of the minority populations of the period. Between 1950 and
1975 the ethnic minority population tripled from 5 to 15 million in Western Europe
(the UK, Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland
combined) (Castles and Miller 1993: 87-8).
Underlying the movements of labor is not just the active recruitment for labor
by the DMEs, but also the increasingly precarious living conditions in Third World
agriculture. The growth in markets for land and labor releases workers from
personalised obligations to former landholders but also dispossess these workers from
previous rights to land and its use. In addition, as industrialization and trade increase,
terms of trade for agricultural products decline, impelling the mechanisation of
agriculture, this in turn reduces labor requirements. Increasing people-land ratios
caused by land subdivision accentuates the flight from the land among the smallest
landholders. The exodus of the rural dispossessed or the under-employed provides
industrialists with abundant supplies of cheap labor, if not in the home country, then
across national borders. As Wolf explains, from the migrant's point of view, a sharp
distinction between national and international migration may be irrelevant to the
overriding need to make a living (1982: 361).
The explicit relation between demands for labor from industrialised nations
and its acquisition through labor recruitment from LDCs in the period 1945-75
appeared to corroborate the view among scholars of migration that movement was a
direct response by the poor in the LDCs to economic opportunities in the north. The
58
basis of this argument is that the disparity between the EDCs and the DMEs is the
pivot of migration flows. These movements are produced by a combination of 'push'
factors such as rural dispossession and urban unemployment in the LDCs, and the
'pull' factors, particularly economic opportunities in the DMEs (see, for example,
Jackson 1969). Some studies within this framework concentrate particularly on
income differentials to assess the strength of migration flows (Lewis 1954). Individual
migrants are thus seen as rational decision-makers responding to the forces of supply
and demand. Todaro (1989) refines this model by adding in the subjective component
of perceptions. Thus migration flows represent expected opportunities, which may
diverge from actual ones.
The first is that aggregate demand and potential supply from LDCs are poor predictors of international migration because they obscure changes in the specific types of
occupations taken by immigrants. Secondly, supply and demand factors assume a
notional interrelation between donor and receiver economies, which simply may not
exist because local and subjective economic and non-economic factors influence
decisions.
59
them especially vulnerable to abuse in the workplace (Burawoy 1976; Legassik and
Wolpe 1976).
The non-economic factors, which interfere with the smooth operation of push
and pull, include immigration control, geographical proximity, traditions of
migration and historical ties. One final non-economic influence on migration is the
mismatch between the rhythms of migration and of the labor market. The build-up of
migration experience spans large parts of individual lives and even generations,
increasing the facility for finding work, as educational attainment does. Migration
flows therefore transcend the more immediate staccato rhythms of supply and demand
in the wider economy and sustain themselves for longer time periods through
fluctuations in supply and demand. They can also help redirect that movement into
new areas of demand obscured by aggregate trends, but discernible to those whose
livelihood depends on sensitivity to new opportunities. It is as if labor market signals
are picked up by means of self-made receivers built from the accumulated and updated practical knowledge, relationships and resources of the migrant community.
This counterpoint of experience, social relations and market forces is what guides
action, creating migration flows. Informal knowledge and ties have special
significance in the most recent migrations. Thus, the economic dimension of
migration is embedded in the accumulation and mobilisation of cultural resources;
'cultures of migration' give the specificity to the population movements just outlined.
4.3
the 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent world recession, what should have happened is
for migration from the less to the more developed countries to tail off, as a result of
shrinking labor demand in the DMEs and increased immigration controls in many
countries. In fact, flows to Europe remained fairly steady and slowly increasing
(Harris 1995: 13). Migration movements to the advanced industrial countries have
ridden roughshod over the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s.
In spite of the 1973 oil shock, overall growth in the LDCs was high - higher,
in fact, than that of the DMEs. In the 1970s, when recession and unemployment were
60
Recently, industrialization has been the main engine of growth, and industry
tends to create jobs rather than shed them. Yet not only does labor emigration from
the industrialising countries continue, it is women as well as men (with urban
employment experience and with some education} who are migrating and not just
displaced non-literate rural workers.
Why and how are relatively well-endowed workers with reasonable resources
abandoning areas with opportunities for the ever more hostile and restrictive
conditions in the advanced industrial countries? Sassen (1987, 1988, and 1989)
explains the seemingly perverse migration flows by arguing that it is, on the one hand,
the kind of industrialisation occurring in the LDCs and, on the other, the kind of
economic restructuring occurring in the DMEs, which accounts for current labor
flows. The particular nature of export manufacturing is such that it creates sudden,
large demands for labor, much of which is for women. The classic cases are the
Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The loss of labor to the already fast-changing rural
areas dislocates what remains of the household economy - particularly the social
reproduction of the family. Cultural and social bonds with the rural economy are lost.
Given the 'flexible' labor requirements, pay and conditions typical of export
manufacturing, there is a high turnover of the workforce. Departing workers do not
necessarily regard a return to their regions of origin as desirable or even possible.
High turnover not only means departure from jobs, but entry into new hopefully,
better ones.
This restlessness leads to mobility beyond national borders, into the DMEs.
Here, synonymous with the dislocation of workers in the south, is the rise of new
opportunities for migrant workers in the north. Whereas in the 1970s, immigrants
61
4.4
62
European community, and also one of the major industrial areas in the world.
Immigrant labour suited some of the new labour demands of the region, particularly in
the high-tech assembly plants, where female workers were considered particularly
able (Soja 1987: 192). Apart from the attributed dexterity and patience of women in
performing fiddly but repetitive tasks, they were not unionised, and adapted more
easily to the labour-saving, part-time and casual 'flexible' requirements of the hightech companies (Storper and Scott 1990: 587).
African workers do not only respond to external demand, they also help form
it. One of the characteristics of the rise of the high-paid jobs in business services finance, insurance and real estate - is that they have spawned a demand for
customized personal services. These services are being provided, often informally, by
immigrants, the goods and services of who have become increasingly attractive and
status conveying among the upwardly mobile. In addition, ethnic undocumented
workers are unable to barter over pay and terms; yet they can rely on some degree of
social support from family and friends at home and abroad. What this means is that in
the context of an increased potential demand for customised services, Africans are not
63
simply replacing existing labor, much less displacing it, but are creating new
niches.
map of their
future
destination, communicated to
them through friends and relations. Migration has both generated, and has been
generated by popular culture. It is also notable how the culture of migration is planted
in the deepest layers of personal relationships in family and friendship groups. Family
ties are the most important source of information and support for migrants, but
friendship groups are the foundation for other basic networks. This is how they form
and operate. Initial neighborhood groups of friends eventually get pared down to tiny
'trust groups' of two or three lifelong friends. Today they help prepare the young for
the contemporary endeavour of adulthood - international migration. This is achieved
through the intra-generational bonds formed among the young people, in concert with
the inter-generational ties with adults and older generational groups.
What migrants lack in formal education and training (human capital), and
material and financial resources (economic capital), they make up for in social capital,
which is the 'know-how' necessary to make a living and possibly even a business
success. Fortes and Zhou (1992) identify two main relational characteristics of
migrant 'social capital', explaining small business success in the EU. The first is
'bonded solidarity' - the sense of common nationhood and cultural identity, which
helps focus the groups resources. The second is 'enforceable trust' which controls the
mutual assistance supplied and demanded, permitting a higher degree of resource
sharing than would be conceivable through more informal channels.
century. They are in the economy but not of it; they define themselves not by their
working lives, but according to the world beyond, in the migrants' case, in the
traditions, which their family and friendship networks perpetuate.
65
C
CO
ON
NC
CLLU
USSIIO
ON
NSS
Some aspects of human existence are more 'cultural' than others and all
behaviour and relationships are informed by ideas and beliefs, in any society,
anywhere, at any time. We can say that culture is either a discrete sphere or a residual
category. In this kind of thinking, behaviour is thought of as governed by economic or
political principles, or by cultural 'factors' (for example, people's religious beliefs or
their conceptions of their own ethnicity and that of others). This is a trap - we should
not fall back on this concept of culture as a separate sphere only to be resorted to
when we find that other kinds of explanation, economic, political etc., prove
inadequate. Rather, we need to see culture as a dimension of all social action,
including economic and political.
nature and function of work. Productive efficiency may be lost because of the need to
accommodate nonproductive functions, or it may sometimes be enhanced because the
changes introduce cooperative flexibility into labor processes. Europeans who decide
to establish themselves in Mediterranean countries can offer technological know-how.
The spread of technology, in fact, plays an essential role in increasingly competitive
markets.
All the players in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership are aware of it: success
of integration constitutes a key component of success for the whole of the region,
especially because it would be likely to create scale economies which would
compensate the small size of the local markets (taken separately) and which would in
this way favour the entry of investments to the Southern shore of the Mediterranean.
The efforts of Europe for the approach of Europe and North Africa have not
solved the problems that the demographic explosion of Southern Mediterranean has
created. Not all European countries have dealt by the same way concerning this
phenomenon. Countries of Europe that are not directly interested in Mediterranean
cooperation are creating a barrier of rules and laws in order to make impossible for
North African migrants to enter into European countries of Mediterranean. Several
countries of North Europe consider this migration as a threat. On the other hand,
African countries believe that African migrants are necessary in order to replace the
working force of EU, which is believed to decrease in the next 50 years. In fact,
French experts predict that in the next 35 years Europe will need about 56 million
migrant workers.
67
European Union should take seriously in mind the education level of African
labor force. Special educational programs can increase the low level of knowledge in
order to make easier the entrance of migrant workers in European countries, as then
they will be viewed as equal labor members and not as a threat. Science, art and other
sectors can be a focus concerning this point.
North African countries are involved into political situations that require great
amount of budget for military expenses and so it is difficult to create an environment
of stability and security. Thats why the stable environment of European Union is
desirable in this point.
Finally, we conclude that even if European Union has not achieved to manage
with this situation in an effective way, today is trying to follow a strategic direction
that would help both shores of Mediterranean.
68
TABLES - FIGURES
69
70
71
72
Agricultural capital stock per agricultural worker (at constant 1995 prices)
Figure 9: Agricultural capital stock per agricultural worker (at constant 1995 prices)
*Not including South Africa
73
Figure 12: Rates of Economic Growth, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-3
2000
Algeria
19.8
29.9
Egypt
8.6
7.9
Iran, I.R. of
11.6
15.8
Jordan
16.8
13.7
Morocco
12.11
13.7
Pakistan
3.1
7.8
Tunisia
16.2
15.9
Average
12.7
15.0
75
Algeria, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia.
Percent of
Percent of
Percent of
Percent of
total
nonagricultural
total
nonagricultural
employment
employment
employment
employment
Algeria
25.7
32.0
31.3
39.0
Egypt
28.2
56.6
34.9
70.3
Iran
...
...
28.4
36.6
Jordan
33.9
39.5
36.1
42.1
Morocco
8.5
18.6
9.5
20.7
Pakistan
8.4
15.0
9.6
17.1
Tunisia
14.9
19.1
21.9
28.2
MENA7
...
...
20.0
33.1
76
Figure 17: FDI inflows to Africa, top 10 recipients, 2003, 2004 (Billions of USD)
77
Figure 18: Global GDP Growth and Net Financial Flows from the private sector
78
Table 21: Estimated number of persons from Maghreb living in major receiving
European countries circa 2000
79
Table 22: Basic data on Egypt and the Maghreb countries: demographic, economic
and social indicators
80
81
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