A.M.

No.
RTJ-09-2200
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

April

2,

2014

ANTONIO
M.
LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints 1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana
(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of
the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as
SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was
the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course
of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance
of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge,
Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver
over SCPs objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly
appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal
counsel of most of SCPs creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative
meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction
(i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and
where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the
rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the
meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what
the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her
authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receivers
exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be offrecord so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank
(EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss
the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionzas financial
adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation
and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCPs expense.
Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,
leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so

that SCP could confront EPCIBs witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a
need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCPs
requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCPs counsel,
Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for
permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules (the courts power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to
amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIBs favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised
concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest
and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also
posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was
worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement 4 dated March 18, 2008,
referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she
did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings.
She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a
mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature because
judicial remedies were still available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and
conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in
view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section
21, Rule 4 of the Rules 6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the
creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority
to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it
was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold
these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she
approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the
matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules 7 pertains not to
the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that
her denial of the complainants motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on
her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated

to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did)
promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty.
Gabionza as SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the
complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that
the rest of the complainants allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by
evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other
documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven
and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing
improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos
she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar
or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under
contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition
against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v.
Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, 10 insisting that the respondents acts of
posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of
impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01, 11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The CAs Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted
a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010
Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly
meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondents appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of
SCPs financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing
proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCPs interests; the
complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule
on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge
and is primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCPs creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondents explanation in
approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondents unnecessary

bickering with SCPs legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were
reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with
what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls
below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done
recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in
all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial
decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this
regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held
liable.16
On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal
social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a
magistrate in the account) even during these changing times when social networking
websites seem to be the trend constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the publics acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and
the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge
and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision 17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional
incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and
recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her
office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable
Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison
be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas
City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will
be dealt with more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondents explanation in
the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary

action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA
shared Justice Gonzales-Sisons observations that the respondents act of posting seductive
photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the
Code.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain
Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent
ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary
hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.
On
the
Charges
of
Grave
Irregularity
in
the
Performance
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

Abuse
of

of
Duty;

Authority;
Grave

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. 20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish
the respondents bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to
circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however,
are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official
acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions,
these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not
the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge
where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial
remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless.
The truth about the respondents alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying
on the complainants verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light
especially of a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without
respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. 25 There should be clear
and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The
complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondents predisposition to decide
the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare
allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted
regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainants failure to establish
with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.
On
the
Charges
and Gross Ignorance of the Law

of

Grave

Incompetence

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. 27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous." 28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of Section 23, Rule
4 of the Rules, which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan
even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if,
in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors
is manifestly unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment." 30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by
bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant
failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was
actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find
the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross
ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution
demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to
prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of the debtor-companys assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to
the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public. 33 The
rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously
deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a management
receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no
judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006
decision, found that the respondents act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the
grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing
the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care
in the performance of his/her official functions. 35 When a basic principle of law is involved
and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. 36 On this basis, we conclude that the

respondents act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the
benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable
professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On
the
Ground
the Reglementary Period

of

Failure

to

Observe

On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we
find the respondents explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the
lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may
grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling
evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall
the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day
period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether
the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still
required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year
from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to
secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondents
approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On
the
Unbecoming of a Judge

Ground

of

Conduct

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. 39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. 40 He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge should
be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always
keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered
petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, 43 the Court declared that
"although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of
court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."
Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks,
as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are
displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe
judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the
decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a
judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be
so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof,
or any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated
Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet
a new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other. 45 While
judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social
networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as
judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that
every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we
judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner
viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge
from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions
without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom of expression.
The respondent judges act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always
conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must
bear in mind that what they communicate regardless of whether it is a personal matter or
part of his or her judicial duties creates and contributes to the peoples opinion not just of
the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when
the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but
by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she
wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public
consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a
judge, may be the object of the publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule
necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As
the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of
conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1wphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and
their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach. 48 Judges necessarily accept this
standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of
the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3),
but not exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any
of the following: (1) A fine of not less thanP1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found
liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and
proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from
CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002]

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is
not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary
action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint
is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
x x x

xxx

xxx

That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,

sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at
21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a
money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand
letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch,
however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I
file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as
Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt
attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;

That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty.
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to
inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I
asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court
personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the
Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the
Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he
personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he
came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the
Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the
progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as
Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts
of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and
E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct;
xxx

xxx

x x x.[1]

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of
complainant for being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a
service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this
time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so.
Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the formers law
office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to
settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by
complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all
the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter
instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had
never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and

legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was
almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary
and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment,
the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need
to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was
told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should
give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime
the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill
Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any
agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing
the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response,
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondents
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of
the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their
law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were
not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant,
and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees
for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created
and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client,
the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the
filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of
the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly
dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to
impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. [4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing
of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money
given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges
that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys
fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence

and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice.
They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal
profession.[5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. [6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The
former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for
the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward
handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. [7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers
fees.[8] Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of
respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor
to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare
-- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the clients
interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should
not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of
a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in them.[9]They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their
utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client,
save by the rules of law legally applied.[10]
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his
office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that
it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client
to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon
discovering the mistake -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately
taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainants
attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct
purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [12] The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. [13] Duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a
noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained
without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by
the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that
lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their
professional capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that

lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their
possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [16] It may be true
that they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully
come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of
such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
clients interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar,
and to the public.[18]Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal
fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint
promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his
breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from
the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a
copy in respondents file.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

MILLARE, petitioner,

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty
of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the
Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises
subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel,
appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She
neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to
comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
(CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and
not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in
CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void
for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the
rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal
instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion
and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered
the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690),
insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On

December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that

. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule
38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final
and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the
litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due
process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no
allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the
former cases were secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis
supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the
motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April
14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in
a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February
12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084)
questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a
Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late
on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration
from such resolution was likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July
6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground
that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the
motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC
affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was
issued on October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC,
Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction
against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of
execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged
that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No.
11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation
of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved.
The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null
and Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order,
respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP
No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent
his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to

allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer
is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable
construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed
to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot
prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions
(Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits
on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same
cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
a judgment or misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of
dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory
Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista
and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and
her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But
respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of
the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became
executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a
supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition
for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No.
11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that
the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments
in the former cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has
been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew
very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for
execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is
merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no
jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of
the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No.
844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court,
Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also
with the Court of Appeals; and,
(6)
SP
Civil
Action
No.
624

Petition
For Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the
same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists
when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a
more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA
272 (1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless
to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which
obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects
himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or
for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to
the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and
are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he
perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]).
As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings,
actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and
disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in
whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat
ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline,
p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO
CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound
effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,

or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and

there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is
to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members
of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of
the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal
talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of
the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

and
this
the
the

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most
firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623,
626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and
the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery
should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that

work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as
the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money
and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only

for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered
this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who
perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds
of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge
of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing

the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of

NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod,
in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia MuozPalma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance
of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article
C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times

a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over
ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming
lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is
the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the

man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error
so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar,
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied
with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of

knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law,

or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice
of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes
an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in
the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,
however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells
us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice
law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that
he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the tenyear period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations
in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963:
Pennsylvania

M.A.

in

Economics

(Ph.

D.

candidate),

University

of

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;

Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle
East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation
and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup
Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service
by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition
of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially
correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business,
he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen
times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number
of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked
if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing
deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the
books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed
by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an

attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with
care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice
of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may

not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error
so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by
this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar,
I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole
vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally
decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in
relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod
did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that
the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been
met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,
ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral
Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied
with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law,
or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the
same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other
than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA,
M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E.
522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum
it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity
constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice
of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988
ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C.
Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes
the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes
an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client
relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot
be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten
(10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR
AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I
am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of
law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in
the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the
Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be
subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be
reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack
of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee
simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the
term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law,

however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could
come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to
become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated
by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the
businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer
does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can
be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If
he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which
tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent
pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in
the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice
law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and

arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms
of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that
he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the
law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail
to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will
we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active
involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be
"engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is
the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the
enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the tenyear period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's
law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also
working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during
that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations
in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963:
Pennsylvania

M.A.

in

Economics

(Ph.

D.

candidate),

University

of

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;

Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle
East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco
Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation
and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup

Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the
following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for
him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of
this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of
advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined.People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d
693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of
what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service
by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition
of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially
correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive.
He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered:
"Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business,
he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen
times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the
statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number
of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked
if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing
deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in
instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't
believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the
broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the
books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a
lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and
the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the
years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed
by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single
word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an

attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict.
"Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of
a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court
on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true
to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with
care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his
business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to
be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The
transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as,
to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as
a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to
practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession
of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a
circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice
of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme
Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a
habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1
27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law
was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active
and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual
transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify
for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may

not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less
than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of
discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.

[G.R. NO. 161070 : April 14, 2008]

JOHN HILARIO y SIBAL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
John Hilario y Sibal (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated August
19, 20031and November 28 20032 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75820.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts 3 of Murder in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted by
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over
representing petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.
On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision 4 finding petitioner and his co-accused
Alijid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal in each count.
On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a Petition for
Relief5from the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his
petition, petitioner contended that at the time of the promulgation of the judgment, he was
already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be committed to the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus
he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full
trust and confidence to his lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary
motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on May 2, 2002, he was already
incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and learned from the grapevine of
his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that believing that the notice of
appeal filed by his counsel prevented the Decision dated December 5, 2001 from becoming
final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his representative to get a copy of the notice of
appeal from the RTC; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear
instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his counsel on
February 1, 2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon.

Petitioner claimed that he had a meritorious defense, to wit:

1. The Decision dated December 5, 2001, on page 16 thereof states an imprisonment term
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of Reclusion Temporal - a matter which ought to be rectified;
2. The undersigned is a first time offender;
3. No ruling was laid down on the stipulated facts (Decision, p. 3) relative to the (1) absence
of counsel during the alleged inquest, and (2) absence of warrant in arresting the accused
after ten (10) days from the commission of the crime;
4. Absence of a corroborating witness to the purported lone eyewitness, as against the
corroborated testimony of accused-petitioner's alibi;
5. The Commission on Human Rights investigation on the torture of the accused-petitioner;
6. and others.6
Petitioner argued that he was meted a total of 16 years imprisonment or almost equal to the
previous capital punishment of 20 years which was given an automatic review by the
Supreme Court, thus it is of greater interest of justice that his case be reviewed by the
appellate court; and that no damage will be sustained if the appeal is given due course since
he continues to languish in jail while the Petition for Relief is pending.
The Assistant City Prosecutor filed his Comment on the Petition for Relief where he
contended that the petition should no longer be entertained; and that perfection of appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law was not only mandatory but
jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal rendered the judgment final and executory.
The records do not show that the RTC required petitioner's counsel to whom petitioner
attributed the act of not filing the notice of appeal to file his comment.
On September 30, 2002, petitioner's counsel filed a Withdrawal of Appearance 7 from the
case with petitioner's consent. Again, the documents before us do not show the action taken
by the RTC thereon.
In an Order8 dated December 13, 2002, the RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for relief with
the following disquisition:
After a careful study of the instant petition and the arguments raised by the contending
parties, the Court is not persuaded by petitioner/accused's allegation that he was prevented
from filing a notice of appeal due to excusable negligence of his counsel.
Accused's allegation that he indeed specifically instructed his counsel to file a notice of
appeal of the Decision dated [sic] and the latter did not heed his instruction is at best selfserving and unsubstantiated and thus, unworthy of credence. At any rate, even if said
omission should be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of
counsel is binding on the client. x x x Besides, nowhere does it appear that
accused/petitioner was prevented from fairly presenting his defense nor does it appear that
he was prejudiced as the merits of this case were adequately passed upon in the Decision
dated December 5, 2001.
It must also be pointed out that in his petition for relief, he stated that he
instructed his counsel to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of
appeal of the Decision dated December 5, 2001, whereas in his affidavit of merit,
he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal
thereof.9 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner, again by himself, filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA on the ground that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his petition for relief. He claims that
the delay in appealing his case without his fault constitutes excusable negligence to warrant
the granting of his petition for relief.

In a Resolution dated August 19, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition in this wise:
It appearing that petitioner in the instant petition for certiorari failed to attach the following
documents cited in his petition, namely:
1. The December 5, 2001 Decision;
2. Comment of the City Prosecutor;
3. Manifestation of petitioner's counsel de oficio signifying his withdrawal as petitioner's
counsel.
The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 2, Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and as prayed for by the Solicitor General. 10
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2003
for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, in violation of Section 1, Rule
52 of the Rules of Court and for failure to attach to the petition, the relevant and pertinent
documents. The CA also stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Hence, herein recourse filed by petitioner, still unassisted by counsel, raising the following
issues:
Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance of the petitioner's
counsel de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to
entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?cra lawlibrary
Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and
executory judgment?
Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for
the latter's defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary
relationship between counsel-client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced;
that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation considering that it was a
counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed
CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his
petition for relief; that reliance on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving
14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an affront to the policy promulgated
by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it will
result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best interest of justice for the CA to
have directed the petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition
outright.
In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the
review of an appeal from a final and executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and
failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed final and not
appealable; and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an
exercise in futility, thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from
judgment. The OSG further claims that notice to counsel is notice to clients and failure of
counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute excusable
negligence and therefore binding on the client.
We grant the petition.
The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Rule 46, on the ground that petitioner failed to attach certain documents which
the CA found to be relevant and pertinent to the Petition for Certiorari.
The requirements to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1, Rule 65 is read in
relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Section 1, Rule 65 provides:

SECTION. 1. Petition for certiorari .'

xxx
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto x x x.
Section 3, Rule 46, provides:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements.'
xxx
[The petition] shall be x x x accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions
of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto x
x x.
xxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or orders are relevant and pertinent
to the petition rests on the petitioner. If, upon its initial review of the petition, the CA is of
the view that additional pleadings, documents or order should have been submitted and
appended to the petition, the following are its options: (a) dismiss the petition under the last
paragraph of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required
additional pleadings, documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the
petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the required pleadings, documents
or order within a fixed period.11
The RTC Decision dated December 5, 2001, finding petitioner guilty of two counts of
homicide, the Comment of the City Prosecutor as well as the counsel's withdrawal of
appearance were considered by the CA as relevant and pertinent to the Petition
for Certiorari, thus it dismissed the petition for failure to attach the same. However, the CA
failed to consider the fact that the petition before it was filed by petitioner, a detained
prisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to
know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the
web of procedure.12 We have held in a civil case that to demand as much from ordinary
citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into
an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not
because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such
right.13 This finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we held
in Telan v. Court of Appeals:
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so
when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of
the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.
Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.
xxx
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as
much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn
the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his
property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know
how to establish such right.

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an
on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the
lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that
the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right
ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.14 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
The filing of the Petition for Certiorari by petitioner without counsel should have alerted the
CA and should have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel.
Although the petition filed before the CA was a Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC Order
dismissing the petition for relief, the ultimate relief being sought by petitioner was to be
given the chance to file an appeal from his conviction, thus the need for a counsel is more
pronounced. To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be
as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that
thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. 15 It is even more important to note
that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from
judgment with the RTC.
It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an
accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would
be a grave denial of due process.
Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation
of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. 16
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed late. It appears
that the CA Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari was received at the address
written in the petition on September 1, 2003, and that petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration on September 18, 2003, or two days late.
While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within
the 15-day reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we
have on some occasions relaxed this rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla17 we held:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules
can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco, had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be guided by
the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language
of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.18

Moreover, in Basco v. Court of Appeals,19 we also held:

Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice,
the former must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that:
SECTION 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.20
Petitioner claims that he actually received the CA Resolution dismissing his Petition
for Certiorari only on September 4, 2003 even as the same Resolution was earlier received
on September 1, 2003 at the address written in his petition, i.e., c/o Robert S. Bacuraya, No.
9 Iris St., West Fairview, 1118, Quezon City, by a certain Leonora Coronel. Apparently,
Bacuraya is not a lawyer. Ordinarily, petitioner being detained at the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa, the CA should have also sent a copy of such Resolution to his place of detention.
Considering that petitioner only received the Resolution on September 4, 2003, we find the
two days delay in filing his motion for reconsideration pardonable as it did not cause any
prejudice to the other party. There is no showing that petitioner was motivated by a desire to
delay the proceedings or obstruct the administration of justice. The suspension of the Rules
is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of petitioner.
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be
avoided.21
In dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed before it, the CA clearly put a premium on
technicalities and brushed aside the issue raised before it by petitioner, i.e., whether the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition for relief thus
preventing him from taking an appeal from his conviction.
Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the
accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 22 However, instead of
remanding the case to the CA for a decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as
not to further delay the final disposition of this case.
The RTC denied the petition for relief as it found petitioner's claim that his counsel did not
heed his instruction to file an appeal to be unsubstantiated and self serving; and that if there
was indeed such omission committed by the counsel, such negligence is binding on the
client.
Petitioner insists that the failure of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his
judgment of conviction despite his explicit instruction to do so constitutes excusable
negligence and so his petition for relief should have been granted.
We find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's petition
for relief from judgment.
Petitioner was represented in the RTC by Atty. Rivera of the PAO. Section 1, Article IV of PAO
Memorandum Circular No.18 series of 2002, the Amended Standard Office Procedures in
Extending Legal Assistance (PAO Memorandum Circular), provides that all appeals must be
made upon the request of the client himself and only meritorious cases shall be appealed;
while Section 2, Article II of PAO Memorandum Circular provides that in criminal cases, the
accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven,
hence cases of defendants in criminal actions are considered meritorious and therefore,
should be appealed, upon the client's request.
In this case, petitioner claims he had instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal. Under the
PAO Memorandum Circular, it was the duty of the latter to perfect the appeal. Thus, in
determining whether the petition for relief from judgment is based on a meritorious ground,

it was crucial to ascertain whether petitioner indeed gave explicit instruction to the PAO
lawyer to file an appeal but the latter failed to do so.
To determine the veracity of petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon the RTC to have
required the PAO lawyer to comment on the petition for relief. However, it appears from the
records that the RTC only required the City Prosecutor to file a comment on the petition.
The RTC Order dismissing the petition for relief did not touch on the question whether the
PAO lawyer was indeed negligent in not filing the appeal as it merely stated that even if said
omission, i.e., not filing the appeal despite his client's instruction to do so, should be
considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of counsel is binding on the
client.
While as a general rule, negligence of counsel may not be condoned and should bind the
client,23 the exception is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. 24 In Aguilar v. Court of
Appeals,25 we held:
x x x Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the
fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The established jurisprudence
holds:
xxx
The function of the rule that negligence or mistake of counsel in procedure is imputed to and
binding upon the client, as any other procedural rule, is to serve as an instrument to
advance the ends of justice. When in the circumstances of each case the rule desert its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors
must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice.
xxx
The court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever
the purposes of justice require it.
xxx
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error
committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause,
is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client
another chance to present his case. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was
not presented because of counsel's error or incompetence, the defendant in order to secure
a new trial must satisfy the court that he has a good defense and that the acquittal would in
all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence. What should guide
judicial action is that a party be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
action or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities.26
The PAO lawyer, Atty. Rivera, filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on September 30, 2002,
almost three months before the RTC rendered its assailed Order dated December 13, 2002,
dismissing the petition for relief. The RTC had ample time to require the PAO lawyer to
comment on the petition for relief from judgment, before issuing the questioned Order. Had
the RTC done so, there would have been a factual basis for the RTC to determine whether or
not the PAO lawyer was grossly negligent; and eventually, whether the petition for relief
from judgment is meritorious. If there was no instruction from petitioner to file an appeal,
then there was no obligation on the part of the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as stated in the
PAO Memorandum Circular and negligence could not be attributed to him. However, if
indeed there was such an instruction to appeal but the lawyer failed to do so, he could be
considered negligent.
Thus, there was no basis for the RTC to conclude that the claim of petitioner that he
instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as self-serving and unsubstantiated. The RTC's

dismissal of the petition for relief was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an
undue denial of the petitioner's right to appeal.
The RTC faulted petitioner for claiming in his petition for relief that he instructed his counsel
to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; while in his affidavit of
merit, he claimed to have told his counsel to simply file a notice of appeal. We do not find
such circumstance sufficient ground to dismiss the petition considering that he filed the
petition for relief unassisted by counsel.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner
prescribed by law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been
emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals27 where we ruled that an appeal is an essential
part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from
the constraints of technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by
law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right
guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's
loss of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to
petitioner.
However, we cannot, in the present Petition for Review on certiorari, make a conclusive
finding that indeed there was excusable negligence on the part of the PAO lawyer which
prejudiced petitioner's right to appeal his conviction. To do so would be pure speculation or
conjecture. Therefore, a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the
merits of the petition for relief from judgment is just and proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 19, 2003 and
November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
dated December 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76,
is SET ASIDE. The RTC is hereby ordered to require Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's
Office to file his comment on the petition for relief from judgment filed by petitioner, hold a
hearing thereon, and thereafter rule on the merits of the petition for relief from judgment,
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION
MEDADO, Petitioner.

TO

SIGN

IN

THE

ROLL

OF

ATTORNEYS

MICHAEL

A.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
in 19791and passed the same years bar examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.2cralaw
virtualaw
library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation. 6cralaw virtualaw library

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice
to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll,
and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.7cralaw
virtualaw
library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation
practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken
the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as
a lawyer;8 and the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion,
and
was
subsequently
forgotten.9cralaw
virtualaw
library
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be
credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying
that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. 11cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on
21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4
February 2013.13The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioners
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It explained that, based on his
answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence
in
signing
in
the
Roll
of
Attorneys. 15cralaw
virtualaw
library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant petition,
subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from
the
practice
of
law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be
akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In

this

case,

the

records

do

not

show

that

this

action

is

warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed
the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who
called this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by
the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly
replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung
anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same time, its a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And, finally its the right
thing to do. I have to come here sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the
practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the
profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to
be
a
member
of
the
Philippine
Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office, 18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court will not unwarrantedly
withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand
the
rigors
of
the
profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his
years
of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than
30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. 21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and
an
honest
error
of
judgment.22cralaw
virtualaw
library
We

disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive, 24 a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia
facti
excusat;
ignorantia
legis
neminem
excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that
what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest
mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was
not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in spite
of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to
complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized
practice
of
law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be an
attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect
contempt of court,27which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. 28 Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal
charge
pertaining
thereto
has
been
filed
against
him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyers duty to
prevent
the
unauthorized
practice
of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of
the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of
the
legal
profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him
a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year
after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000.
During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the
practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1)
YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of
P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this
Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO

ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
andLeonen,
JJ.,
concur.
Brion,
and Villarama,
Jr.,
JJ.,
On
leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.

JONAR SANTIAGO,

A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
- versus Morales,* JJ
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent.

Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and
Carpio
Promulgated:
October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
N
otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which
are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out
appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
*
On leave.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint [1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The
Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 [2] of the Rules of Court; and
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 [3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the
allegations of the complainant in this wise:
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others,
that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed
and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in
violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in
favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he
was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a
certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of
his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats. [6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, [7] Atty.
Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the
affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint . He believed, however, that
the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits
was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents
acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases
pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the
affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some
of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the
documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule
112[9] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the
affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it

was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of
the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers
could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their]
testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents clients
with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the
alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his
clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4,
2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day,
January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident
and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two
police officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to
harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases
filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.
Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the
afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the
scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was
unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.
[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer
of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also
received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it
granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner
Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within
fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The
CBD
received
complainants
2001. Respondent did not file any.

Memorandum[18] on

September

26,

The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the

execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of
Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the
fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and
Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. [21] They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized
by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
[them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page
or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded. [22] Failure to perform these
duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. [23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of
notarization as follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It
is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties
pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are
never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of
their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that
he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence
certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not
mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the
requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these
formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is
appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly
because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an
acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint
Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their
witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by
complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the
basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to
certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with
respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the
affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. [26] They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by
reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. [28] No custom or age-old practice provides
sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this
case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. [29] Disbarment
will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a
sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo
Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients,
allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, except:
a)
on formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;
b)
on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,
except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an
attorney-client relationship.[32]
[31]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of
dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses
are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are
partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client
will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the
lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a
plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will
have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it
with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon
as partial and untruthful.[33]
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same
time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management
of the case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty.
Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the
latters life and liberty are at stake. [35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be
afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all
those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure
that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was
thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the
duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life,
liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his
clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his
clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged
against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give
their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. [37] Not being a trial of the
case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing
innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them
from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and
anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.

[38]

The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial

proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from
accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he
may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which
his testimony may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the
profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and
veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a
bare charge cannot be equated with liability. [39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant
but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations
are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the
Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a
warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997

TRADERS
ROYAL
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
CRUZ, respondents.

BANK
RELATIONS

EMPLOYEES
COMMISSION

UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner,
and

EMMANUEL

NOEL

A.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel
A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement
on February 26, 1987 whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly
retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to render the
services enumerated in their contract. 1 Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was
terminated by the union on April 4, 1990. 2
During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the
claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer,
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). After the appropriate complaint was filed by private respondent,
the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on March 24, 1987 and docketed as NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466. 3
On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the
employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and yearend bonus differential. 4 The NLRC, acting on a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
filed by private respondent as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to Labor Arbiter
Oswald Lorenzo. 5
However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution, TRB challenged
the decision of the NLRC before the Supreme Court. The Court, in its decision promulgated
on August 30, 1990, 6 modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year
and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. 7
The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay
differential to be in the amount of P175,794.32. Petitioner never contested the amount thus
found by TRB. 8 The latter duly paid its concerned employees their respective entitlement in
said sum through their payroll. 9
After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court on September
18, 1990, 10 he notified the petitioner union, the TRB management and the NLRC of his right
to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay differential through
a letter dated October 8, 1990. 11
Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo
for the determination of his attorney's fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of the total

award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount of
P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney's fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay
and remit said amount to him. 12
The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did not wish to oppose
or comment on private respondent's motion as the claim was directed against the
union, 13 while petitioner union filed a comment and opposition to said motion on July 15,
1991. 14 After considering the position of the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order 15 on
November 26, 1991 granting the motion of private respondent, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the TRADERS
ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION with offices at Kanlaon Towers, Roxas
Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to pay without delay the attorney's fees due
the movant law firm, E.N.A. CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount of P17,574.43
or ten (10%) per cent of the P175,794.32 awarded by the Supreme Court to
the members of the former.
This constrained petitioner to file an appeal with the NLRC on December 27, 1991,
seeking a reversal of that order. 16
On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the
order of the labor arbiter. 17 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by
the NLRC in a resolution dated May 23, 1995, 18hence the petition at bar.
Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in upholding the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P17,574.43, or ten
percent (10%) of the P175,794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its members, in
violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is null
and void, 19 for the reasons hereunder stated.
Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for
attorney's fees, it contends that the award for attorney's fees should have been incorporated
in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon
the decision of the NLRC. Since the claim for attorney's fees by private respondent was
neither taken up nor approved by the Supreme Court, no attorney's fees should have been
allowed by the NLRC.
Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of
attorney's fees, as said act constituted a modification of a final and executory judgment of
the Supreme Court which did not award attorney's fees. It then cited decisions of the Court
declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be altered or
modified even by the court which rendered the same.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to determine attorney's
fees was just an incident of the main case where petitioner was awarded its money claims.
The grant of attorney's fees was the consequence of his exercise of his attorney's lien. Such
lien resulted from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the
favorable judgment was obtained. To include the award of the attorney's fees in the main
case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party. All that the noninclusion of attorney's fees in the award means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB
to pay the opposing party attorney's fees in the concept of damages. He is not therefore
precluded from filing his motion to have his own professional fees adjudicated.
In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and private respondent
on this score, it appears necessary to explain and consequently clarify the nature of the
attorney's fees subject of this petition, in order to dissipate the apparent confusion between
and the conflicting views of the parties.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. 20 In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of
this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the
court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases
provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208,
Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that
the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorney's fees which private respondent demanded before the labor
arbiter. Also, the present controversy stems from petitioner's apparent misperception that
the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorney's fees only before its judgment is reviewed
and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longer
entertain claims for attorney's fees.
It will be noted that no claim for attorney's fees was filed by private respondent before the
NLRC when it acted on the money claims of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it
reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It was only after the High Tribunal modified the judgment
of the NLRC awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the
NLRC for a percentage thereof as attorney's fees.
It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance
and for the Supreme Court thereafter to make an award for attorney's fees when no claim
therefor was pending before them. Courts generally rule only on issues and claims presented
to them for adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment of
attorney's fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR
Certified Case No. 0466, private respondent's present claim for attorney's fees may be filed
before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been
reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney's fees may be
asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a
separate action. 21
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of
the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. 22 Attorney's
fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of
the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fees only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. 23
While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held
in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise
has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be
premature. 24 Of course, a petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment in
favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. 25
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file
his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he
made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential,
instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may
file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher
tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing
pronouncements of this Court.
Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner union insists that it is not
guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorney's fees due to private respondent were
covered by the retainer fee of P3,000.00 which it has been regularly paying to private
respondent under their retainer agreement. To be entitled to the additional attorney's fees
as provided in Part D (Special Billings) of the agreement, it avers that there must be a
separate mutual agreement between the union and the law firm prior to the performance of
the additional services by the latter. Since there was no agreement as to the payment of the
additional attorney's fees, then it is considered waived.
En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the attorney's fees
contemplated for and commensurate to the services he rendered to petitioner. He asserts
that although there was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees for services

rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants
this omission by providing for an award of ten percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor
case as attorney's fees.
It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As
long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests
of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. 26 It will thus be
appropriate, at this juncture, to determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional
remuneration under the retainer agreement 27 entered into by him and petitioner.
The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:
xxx xxx xxx
The Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services under the parameters of the
following terms and conditions:
A. GENERAL SERVICES
1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be
available on a day-to-day basis depending on the Union's needs;
2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or
anticipatory situation confronting any matter within the client's normal course
of business;
3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered
into by the Union in its day-to-day course of business;
4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to
which the union is a party signatory thereto but prepared or caused to be
prepared by any other third party;
5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any
court of law or quasi-judicial body subject to certain fees as qualified
hereinafter;
6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with
any government agency and/or any private institution which is directly related
to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.
B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES
1. Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents
arising and/or required by your Union which do not fall under the category of
its ordinary course of business activity but requires a special, exhaustive or
detailed study and preparation;
2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the
Union;
3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table
negotiations with TRB management or any other third person(s), juridical or
natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except
CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific agreement (pursuant to
PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 & 227);
4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and
in behalf of the Union;
5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,

6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the
particular member must give his/her assent and that prior consent be granted
by the principal officers. Further, the member must conform to the rules and
policies of the Law Firm.
C. FEE STRUCTURE
In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above
when required or necessary, your Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or before
the fifth day of every month.
An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.
Any and all Attorney's Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a
successful litigation shall belong exclusively to the Law Firm.
It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our
claim for reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses covering filing fees,
transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or
authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or
that which redound to the benefit of the Union.
D. SPECIAL BILLINGS
In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B,
the Union shall pay the Law Firm an amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to
the performance of such services. The sum agreed upon shall be based on
actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance and
magnitude of the matter referred to by the Union. However, charges may
beWAIVED by the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the
particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly
reserved for the Law Firm.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is
required to be done in the instant controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which
petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter actually
rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part
C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law
firm'scommitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part B
(Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.
The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a
remuneration for legal services actually rendered can better be appreciated with a
discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general
retainer,
or
a
retaining
fee,
and
a
special
28
retainer.
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services
as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of
the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are secured
and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee
which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid
whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is
that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing
party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the
lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases demanding special or individual
attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorney's fees,
each fee is considered a special retainer.

As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept
in Hilado vs. David 29 in this wise:
There is in legal practice what is called a "retaining fee," the purpose of which
stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel
for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party,
even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of
the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the
rigid observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for
consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a
preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future
services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity
of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the
payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the
contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services
contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to
pay his attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform."
(Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union
and the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers
only the law firm's pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its "commitment to render the
legal services enumerated." The fee is not payment for private respondent's execution or
performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications
or permutations stated there.
Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid contract
fixing the compensation for the attorney, such contract is conclusive as to the amount of
compensation. 30 We cannot, however, apply the foregoing rule in the instant petition and
treat the fixed fee of P3,000.00 as full and sufficient consideration for private respondent's
services, as petitioner would have it.
We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent and different from the
compensation which private respondent should receive in payment for his services. While
petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latter's promise to extend
services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firm's actual performance
of services in favor of the union. Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control the measure
of remuneration for private respondent's services.
We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private
respondent had already waived his right to charge additional fees because of their failure to
come to an agreement as to its payment.
Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the
additional charges in consonance with Part D of the agreement. Secondly, the prompt
actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion
to determine attorney's fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to
compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted by the union. And, lastly, to adopt
such theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondent's right to attorney's fees, as the
former may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special agreement with the
latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm had relinquished its right because of the
absence of the same.
The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with
regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will not absolve the former of
civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. 31 One of the sources of extra-contractual
obligations found in our Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim
that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our law, 32 certain
lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the
end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's
lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioner's cause without awaiting the latter's
consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private respondent's
efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the
union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to
private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondent's actual rendition
of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the
interest of petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer
fee he received monthly from petitioner. The law firm's services are decidedly worth more
than such basic fee in the retainer agreement. Thus, in Part C thereof on "Fee Structure," it is
even provided that all attorney's fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a
successful litigation shall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside from petitioner's
liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses
enumerated therein.
A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and
by the principles of absolute justice. Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a
person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at
the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us
under the same circumstances. 33
As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter,
notwithstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the
basis of quasi-contract. 34 Hence, it is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee
for the special services rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be
obligated to pay compensation to the former. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner
should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from private
respondent's services.
We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no knowledge of, nor consented
to, or protested against the lawyer's representation may not be held liable for attorney's
fees even though he benefited from the lawyer's services. 35 But this doctrine may not be
applied in the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondent's appearance
before the NLRC in the case for differentials.
Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondent's legal
services and assistance regarding its claims against the bank, only they did not enter into a
special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give). 36 This rule of law, likewise founded on the
principle against unjust enrichment, would also warrant payment for the services of private
respondent which proved beneficial to petitioner's members. In any case, whether there is
an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should
receive for their professional services. 37 However, the value of private respondent's legal
services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. Said
article provides:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of
the amount of the wages recovered.
xxx xxx xxx
The implementing provision

38

of the foregoing article further states:

Sec. 11. Attorney's fees. Attorney's fees in any judicial or administrative

proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount
awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning
party.
In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorney's fees recoverable
as indemnity for damages sustained by and payable to the prevailing part. In the second
place, the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code

and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award
that may thus be granted. 39 Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney's
fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it
does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%)
ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it. 40
The measure of compensation for private respondent's services as against his client should
properly be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this
jurisdiction. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the basis for
determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, 41but recoverable by
him from his client.
Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts
shall fix the amount onquantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive
what he merits for his services. 42
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the
benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as
reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit
without paying for it. 43
Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in
ascertaining the real worth of a lawyer's services. These factors are now codified in Rule
20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered in fixing
a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum
meruit. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d)
the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance
of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees
of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of
compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorney's fees in favor of private respondent.
Instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the
amount of attorney's fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied
on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorney's fees at
P17,574.43. 44 Observe the conclusion stated in his order. 45
xxx xxx xxx
FIRST. Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movant's right
to a ten (10%) per cent of the award due its client. In addition, this right to ten
(10%) per cent attorney's fees is supplemented by Sec. 111, Rule VIII, Book III
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party.
It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to
the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum
allowable amount of attorney's fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic
award of attorney's fees in such maximum limit.
It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the
case at bar, involving a conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines
in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and
to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees. The criteria found in
the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in

assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly
heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private respondent's fees.
It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. 46 Ordinarily,
therefore, we would have remanded this case for further reception of evidence as to the
extent and value of the services rendered by private respondent to petitioner. However, so
as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem
it just and equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in
favor of private respondent. For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the accepted
guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this
case which are assistive in that regard. On such premises and in the exercise of our sound
discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for
the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and
the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
affirming the order of the labor arbiter is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to
pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees to private
respondent for the latter's legal services rendered to the former.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118746 September 7, 1995

ATTY.
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
AL., respondents.

WILFREDO
RELATIONS

COMMISSION,

TAGANAS, petitioner,
MELCHOR

ESCULTURA,

ET

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Atty. Wilfredo E. Taganas represented herein private respondents in a labor suit for
illegal dismissal, underpayment and non-payment of wages, thirteenth-month pay,
attorney's fees and damages conditioned upon a contingent fee arrangement granting the
equivalent of fifty percent of the judgment award plus three hundred pesos appearance fee
per hearing. 1 The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered Ultra Clean
Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI) respondents therein,
jointly and severally to reinstate herein private respondents with full backwages, to pay
wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's
fee, but disallowed the claim for damages for lack of basis. 2 This decision was appealed by
Ultra and PTSI to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and subsequently by PTSI
to the Court but to no avail. During the execution stage of the decision, petitioner moved to
enforce his attorney's charging lien. 3 Private respondents, aggrieved for receiving a reduced
award due to the attorney's charging lien, contested the validity of the contingent fee
arrangement they have with petitioner, albeit four of the fourteen private respondents have
expressed their conformity thereto. 4
Finding the arrangement excessive, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reduction of petitioner's
contingent fee from fifty percent of the judgment award to ten percent, except for the four
private respondents who earlier expressed their conformity. 5 Petitioner appealed to NLRC
which affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's order by ruling that the ten percent
contingent fee should apply also to the four respondents even if they earlier agreed to pay a
higher percentage. 6Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition
for certiorari.
The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee is
warranted. Petitioner argues that respondent NLRC failed to apply the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence on the factors to be considered in determining whether or not the stipulated
amount of petitioner's contingent fee is fair and reasonable. Moreover, he contends that the
invalidation of the contingent fee agreement between petitioner and his clients was without
any legal justification especially with respect to the four clients who manifested their
conformity thereto. We are not persuaded.
A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement laid down in an express contract between a
lawyer and a client in which the lawyer's professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of what
may be recovered in the action is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. 7 This
arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. 8 It is, however, under the supervision and scrutiny
of the court to protect clients from unjust charges. 9 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics states that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness". Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of
the subject-matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation but
may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
When it comes, therefore, to the validity of contingent fees, in large measure it
depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances of
each case. The reduction of unreasonable attorney's fees is within the regulatory
powers of the courts. 10

We agree with the NLRC's assessment that fifty percent of the judgment award as attorney's
fees is excessive and unreasonable. The financial capacity and economic status of the client
have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 11 Noting that
petitioner's clients were lowly janitors who receive miniscule salaries and that they were
precisely represented by petitioner in the labor dispute for reinstatement and claim for
backwages, wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay
and attorney's fees to acquire what they have not been receiving under the law and to
alleviate their living condition, the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee is proper. Labor
cases, it should be stressed, call for compassionate justice.
Furthermore, petitioner's contingent fee falls within the purview of Article 111 of the Labor
Code. This article fixes the limit on the amount of attorney's fees which a lawyer, like
petitioner, may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings since the labor suit
where he represented private respondents asked for the claim and recovery of wages. In
fact, We are not even precluded from fixing a lower amount than the ten percent ceiling
prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it. 12 Nonetheless, considering the
circumstances and the able handling of the case, petitioner's fee need not be further
reduced.
The manifestation of petitioner's four clients indicating their conformity with the contingent
fee contract did not make the agreement valid. The contingent fee contract being
unreasonable and unconscionable the same was correctly disallowed by public respondent
NLRC even with respect to the four private respondents who agreed to pay higher
percentage. Petitioner is reminded that as a lawyer he is primarily an officer of the court
charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the
parties. When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and
subjects his professional fees to judicial control. 13
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion the assailed NLRC decision is hereby
affirmed in toto.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and
TRINIDAD
NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray
that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be
discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an
Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No.
CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid
Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our
attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and
negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the
aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why
and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either
abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil
complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in
order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the
incessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us.
Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because according to
him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated
August 17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost
the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is
only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his
profession.
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants'
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion
for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case
No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the
expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA)
which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he
unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather

imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein
defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr.
Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him
because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for
them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit,
since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument
that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to
submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate
compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad
Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the
FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050)
to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal
Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name
in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This
resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on
grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-9010-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue
cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the
dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered
the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their
answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal
of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition
for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the
respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence,
upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador
was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the exparte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's
fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his
services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in default and
judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was
received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject,
however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. 4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only
to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his
duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He
justifies his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he]
instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed
the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake
and because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest
mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal
disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set
aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure of legal
work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has
given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the
respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his
Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his
overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on
the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the
respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless,
he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or
grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of
Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second
ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not
comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was
compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse
of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court

of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further
assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither
was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants
had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not
even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default
or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to
exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer
accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in
fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based
on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador
from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If
indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should
have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why
he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and
lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this
Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to
simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not
entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff
was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could
ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the
sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be,
henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 6125

September 19, 2006

SIMON
D.
vs.
ATTY. PEPITO A. SANCHEZ, respondent.
DECISION

PAZ, complainant,

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Simon D. Paz ("complainant") against Atty. Pepito A.
Sanchez ("respondent") for representing conflicting interests and violation of the lawyer's
oath.
The Facts
In his complaint dated 23 July 2003, complainant stated that sometime in 1995, complainant
and his partners, Alfredo Uyecio and Petronila Catap, engaged the services of respondent to
assist them purchase, as well as document the purchase, of several parcels of land from
tenant-farmers in Pampanga. Respondent was also tasked to defend complainant's claim on
the properties against the claim of a certain George Lizares ("Lizares").
The complaint arose because respondent, allegedly after the termination of his services in
May 2000, filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Board ("DARAB
case") in behalf of one Isidro Dizon ("Dizon") for annulment of Transfer Certificate Title No.
420127-R ("TCT No. 420127-R") in the name of complainant and his partners. 1 Complainant
explained that Dizon's property, covered by Emancipation Patent No. 00708554/Transfer
Certificate Title No. 25214 ("TCT No. 25214"), was among those properties purchased by
complainant with respondent's assistance. Complainant alleged that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests when he represented Dizon in a case involving the same
properties and transactions in which he previously acted as complainant's counsel.
Complainant added that respondent filed the DARAB case with "malicious machination"
because respondent used complainant's old address to serve the complaint and summons,
enabling respondent to obtain a judgment by default in Dizon's favor.
Complainant also stated that on 23 June 2003, respondent, despite knowledge of
complainant's pending petition for review of judgment in the DARAB case, filed a civil case
("RTC case") against complainant and Sycamore Venture Corporation 2 ("Sycamore") before
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, for annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 483629-R ("TCT No. 483629-R"). 3 Complainant pointed out that respondent should
be punished for forum shopping and preparing a false certification of non-forum shopping
because respondent failed to disclose complainant's pending petition before the DARAB.
Complainant also charged respondent with violation of the lawyer's oath because, "with
malice and full knowledge of the real facts," respondent filed groundless and false suits
against complainant, his partners and Sycamore.
In his comment dated 2 October 2003, respondent stated that he has been representing the
tenant-farmers, including Dizon, in their cases before the DARAB and the courts since 1978.
Respondent also represented the tenant-farmers against the claims of Lizares, who filed
cases for the cancellation of their emancipation patents.
Respondent confirmed that in 1995, complainant and his partners expressed interest in
acquiring Dizon's property. Respondent also explained that complainant and his partners, as
buyers of the tenant-farmers' properties, were impleaded as defendants in the Lizares cases.
Respondent came to represent complainant and his partners because they "did not get a
lawyer of their own and allowed respondent to represent them too." 4
On the DARAB case, respondent clarified that the complaint 5 was filed on 15 May 1997 and
not, as complainant claimed, after respondent's services was terminated in May 2000.
Respondent declared that he was compelled to file the case because he felt responsible for
the cancellation of TCT No. 25214. Respondent explained that he lent Dizon's title to
complainant and his partners enabling them to transfer the title in their names. Denying that
there was "malicious machination" in the filing of the DARAB case, respondent stated that
the address he placed was the address of complainant in 1997. The 20 August 2002 DARAB
decision6 specifically stated that a copy of the complaint, summons and notices were duly
served and received by complainant and his partners. However, complainant and his
partners ignored the complaint, summons and notices, which led to the issuance of a
judgment in Dizon's favor. Moreover, there was entry of judgment 7 on 21 November 2002
and the writ of execution8 was issued on 10 December 2002.

On the RTC case, respondent explained that he was compelled to file the case when he
discovered that TCT No. 420127-R, in the name of complainant and his partners, was
transferred in the name of Sycamore. Respondent pointed out that unless TCT No. 483629-R
is nullified, the Register of Deeds cannot execute the DARAB decision. Respondent denied
that he violated the prohibition on forum shopping. 9 Respondent also maintained that the
cases he filed were "justifiable, tenable and meritorious."
In a Resolution dated 12 November 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation.
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") set the case for mandatory
conference on 4 March 2004. Both parties appeared and were given ten days to submit their
position papers. Both parties complied.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2005-78 dated 12 March 2005
adopting, with modification,10 Commissioner San Juan's Report and Recommendation finding
respondent guilty of violating the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law with a warning that a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the case to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds insufficient evidence to hold respondent liable for forum shopping and for
filing groundless suits. However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of the
prohibition on representing conflicting interests.
On
Respondent's
on Non-Forum Shopping

Violation

of

the

Rules

Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties to secure a favorable judgment. 12 Forum shopping
exists if the actions raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. 13 The mere
filing of several
cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. 14
The Court notes that the certification against forum shopping did not form part of the
records of the case. However, a comparison of the two cases reveal that there was no forum
shopping. Although both cases are related because Dizon's property is involved, the reliefs
prayed for are different. In the DARAB case, Dizon prayed for the cancellation of TCT No.
420127-R in the name of complainant and his partners. In the RTC case, Dizon's widow
prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 483629-R in the name of Sycamore. Respondent
cannot be held liable for forum shopping.
On Respondent's Violation of the Lawyer's Oath
Lawyers take an oath that they will not wittingly or willingly promote any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. The Court notes that the cases are still
pending before the DARAB and the RTC. The Court, therefore, does not have any basis for
ruling if there was a violation of the oath.
On
Respondent's
Violation
Representing Conflicting Interests

of

the

Prohibition

against

Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the facts." Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires

them to oppose.15 The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a

situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action.16
By respondent's own admission, when he filed the DARAB case on Dizon's behalf against
complainant, both complainant and Dizon were respondent's clients at that
time. Respondent was representing complainant in the cases against Lizares where
respondent was duty-bound to defend complainant's title over the properties against the
claims of Lizares. While it is not clear from the records that the Lizares cases included
Dizon's property, it is undisputed that respondent acted as complainant's counsel in the
Lizares cases. At the same time, respondent was also representing Dizon before the DARAB
for cancellation of lis pendens17 involving Dizon's property, which cancellation was needed
for complainant to purchase the Dizon property. In filing the second DARAB case on Dizon's
behalf, respondent was duty-bound to assail complainant's title over Dizon's property, which
complainant had purchased from Dizon. Respondent was clearly in a conflict of interest
situation.
The Court notes that respondent did not specifically deny that he represented conflicting
interests. Respondent merely offered to justify his actuations by stating that he felt it was his
"duty and responsibility" to file the case because he felt responsible for the cancellation of
TCT No. 25214 and its subsequent transfer in complainant's name. 18 Respondent stated that
he "will forever be bothered by his conscience" if he did not file the case. 19However, good
faith and honest intentions do not excuse the violation of this prohibition. 20 In representing
both complainant and Dizon, respondent's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his clients
was placed under a cloud of doubt. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
representing Dizon against complainant in the DARAB and RTC cases to avoid conflict of
interest.
In Maturan v. Gonzales, the Court said:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all
the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of
the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred
and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the
client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. 21
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent
In cases involving representation of conflicting interests, the Court has imposed on the
erring lawyer either a reprimand,22 or a suspension from the practice of law from six
months23 to two years.24
In this case, we deem it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year
as recommended by the IBP.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Pepito A. Sanchez GUILTY of violating Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS respondent from the
practice of law
for ONE YEAR and WARNS respondent that the commission of a similar act in the future
will merit a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed
the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967
and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition
averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June
and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953,
when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded
to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael
Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. [1] It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than
twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latters

birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses
by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in failing
to file the earlier comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the
present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. [2] Respondents third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. [3] In 1988,
respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as
reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees. [5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June
1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill
his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on
his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that
to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [6] It is
a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang [8] quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily
carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. [9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even after she
had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship
and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately,
respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and
perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and
it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted
into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.
[10]
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly,
to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave

[A.C. No. 5916. July 1, 2003]

SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law.
The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit [1] filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W.
Medel was charged therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an
attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:
The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four (4)
RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored
checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks issued to the
complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it appears that
[respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith effect immediate
settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest
possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again, in a letter dated July 3,
2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from June
30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to
Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary to
his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he
paid his indebtedness.[2]
In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals
to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise to pay
complainant. Respondent maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for
disciplinary action because of the following:
(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney for a party to
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present case, it
is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the complainant, is
merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a special law,
and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident
therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a violation of Article 315,
paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment of an
obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent
acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which is a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a preexisting obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a
cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court would not countenance;
(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows
beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P.
22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a member of the Bar, to warrant
his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does
NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law profession swings
on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated
immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney,
by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is
inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of the doubt. [4]

On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply. [5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD
Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for
investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on October 4, 2001. After several
cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that hearing, respondent
acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for
his principal debt and P20,000 for attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him until
July 4, 2002 to settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys
fees in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled
hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on
leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency. Complainants counsel objected and
Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing in another case, ordered him to
wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my
family is more important.[6] And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly
left. He made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before
leaving.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In his September 19, 2002 Report,[7] Commissioner Cunanan found respondent guilty of
violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The former
explained that, contrary to the latters claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved
moral turpitude. Further, he observed that [w]hile no criminal case may have been
instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one
(1) but four counts of violation of BP 22. [8] The refusal [by respondent] to pay his
indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude towards complainants counsel and
the [commission sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against him. [9] Thus, the
investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from
the practice of law for two years. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was
transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but
reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal
system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [11] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence
in the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay his
debts and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from complainant. While
acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless checks, he contends that such act
constitutes neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that he
made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation
despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and
transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused
to accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no
obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier
payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the
payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real intention to

settle them is evident from his unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in
incurring debts without any intention of paying for them puts his moral character in serious
doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their
financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations,
the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing
them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.[12]
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless
checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order. [13]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically
provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. In Co v. Bernardino,[14] the Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as a
violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct
outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on
him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In
Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of
the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find
him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the
complainant, albeit very much delayed.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal services
of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this
Court.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)]
the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not
involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr.
Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private
capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the
trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and
attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him x x x.
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from
the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated
that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties which show him to be an
unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same
time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are
fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects

as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
courts retain the power to discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified
support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with
Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to
settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of
respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by
virtue of his membership therein.[15]
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to
investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to attend to,
he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating commissioner and
asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior
by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. [16] It demands a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. [17] In this case, respondent fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. [18]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two
years. However,
in
line
with Co v. Bernardino,[19] Ducat
Jr. v. Villalon
Jr.
[20]
[21]
and Saburnido v. Madroo
-- which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers -- we find
the suspension of one year sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP,
as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

[A.C. No. 6183. March 23, 2004]

EDISON
G.
CHENG, complainant,
AGRAVANTE, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ALEXANDER

M.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed with the Integrated Bar of Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.
The following facts have been established by the evidence.
Respondent Atty. Alexander M. Agravante served as counsel for The Rogemson Co., Inc.
(hereinafter, Rogemson) in a case filed against it before the National Labor Relations
Commissions (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in Davao City by its former
employee, a certain Beaver Martin B. Barril. On June 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Newton R.
Sancho rendered a decision in favor of the complainant, and ordered Rogemson to pay Barril
separation pay and backwages.[1] A copy of said decision was received by respondents law
office on September 8, 1998. However, respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the
NLRC only on September 22, 1998. Consequently, the NLRC dismissed Rogemsons appeal
in a Resolution dated May 27, 1999, and made the following incisive observation:
In the case at bar, respondents through counsel were duly served with a copy of the decision
(Vol. 1, pp. 67-70) of Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho, dated 18 June 1998, declaring

complainant illegally dismissed from employment and awarding him with separation pay and
backwages in the total sum of P130,000.00 on September 8, 1998, Tuesday, said date being
indicated in the mailed decisions registry return receipt which is attached to the records
(Vol. 1, p. 75). Consequently, respondents had ten (10) calendar days but not later than
September 18, 1998, Friday to perfect their appeal therefrom. However, the records
similarly bear that this present appeal was filed belatedly by way of mail on 22 September
1998. It is necessary to state these facts candidly given the inaccurate certification by
respondents counsel that he received the decision being assailed on September 10, 1998.
(Vol. 2, p. 7)
The complainants terminated the services of Atty. Agravante. Through their new
lawyers, complainants wrote Atty. Agravante, demanding that they be compensated for the
pecuniary damages they had suffered as a result of his negligence. [2]
When it appeared that Atty. Agravante had no intention of responding to their letter,
Edison G. Cheng, General Manager of Rogemson, filed an affidavit-complaint with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.[3] The case was then assigned to Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay for investigation.
Allan P. Abelgas, Rogemsons Regional Sales Manager for Cebu, testified that he only
learned of the decision of the Labor Arbiter when a secretary of Atty. Agravante informed
him that a bond was required in filing an appeal to the NLRC. Abelgas was then about to
take an emergency leave of absence, so he delegated the task of securing the bond to his
sister Sheila A. Balandra, another Rogemson employee.[4]
Balandra testified that on September 18, 1998, she called up Cheng in Manila by phone,
who then authorized her to procure the bond. Balandra then called the office of Atty.
Agravante to ask if she can submit the bond on Monday, September 21, 1998. She was told
to stay on the line while the secretary consulted with one of the other lawyers in the
office. When the secretary came back, she informed Balandra that she could submit the
bond on Monday, September 21, 1998 as long as it reached the law office before 5:00 p.m. [5]
On September 21, 1998, Balandra arrived at the office of Atty. Agravante with the bond
at 4:00 p.m. She learned that Atty. Agravante had just returned from out of town and had
just opened the envelope containing the adverse decision.[6]
Not surprisingly, Agravante tells a different story. He neither admitted nor denied
receiving the decision of the Labor Arbiter on September 8, 1998. Instead, he alleges that
he was out of town on said date and only returned to his office on September 10,
1998. Upon arriving at the office, his secretary handed to him all the correspondence
addressed to him, including the envelope containing the Labor Arbiters decision. He alleges
that there were several markings on this particular envelope, one of which was the date
September 10, 1998, and he allegedly assumed that this was the date of receipt by his
office.[7] He then informed Abelgas of the result of the case and the period within which to
file a Memorandum of Appeal.[8] The instruction for Rogemson to proceed with the appeal
came a full six (6) days later. He offered the services of his law office for procuring the
appeal bond, but he was informed that Rogemson would take care of it. He alleges that
Rogemson furnished them with the bond only in the morning of September 22, 1998,
although the bond documents were notarized on September 21, 1998. [9]
On July 23, 2003, Commissioner Dulay submitted his Report recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) months with an admonition
that a similar offense would be dealt with more severely.[10]
On August 30, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-200397, approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The investigating commissioner found that Balandras testimony that she furnished
Agravantes law office with the appeal bond on September 21, 1998 and not on September
22, 1998, was not sufficiently rebutted by Agravante, who did not even cross-examine
her. More importantly, the fact that the Memorandum of Appeal was filed four (4) days
beyond the reglementary period for filing the same, which resulted in its dismissal by the
NLRC, shows that Agravante was guilty of negligence.[11]

With regard to the date of receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision, the registry return card
indicated that respondent received the same on September 8, 1998. [12] Thus, Commissioner
Dulay concluded that Agravante misled the NLRC when he certified in his Memorandum of
Appeal that he received the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter on September 10, 1998. [13]
Before lawyers are admitted to the bar, they must first solemnly swear to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. [14] This oath, to which all lawyers
subscribe in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a
mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable
at all times.[15] This duty is expressed in general terms in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
CANON 10--- A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
It is codified further in the following rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 10.01 ---A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
In the case at bar, Agravante lied when he said he received the Labor Arbiters decision
on September 10, 1998 in order to make it appear that his Memorandum of Appeal was filed
on time.
It cannot be stressed enough how important it is for a lawyer as an officer of the court to
observe honesty at all times, especially before the courts. [16] A lawyer must be a disciple of
truth,[17] and Agravante has clearly failed to live up to this duty.
Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
CANON 18 --- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 18.03 --- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in
the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can
be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He must present
every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his clients cause,
regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the
lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general
public.[18]
In this case, respondents filing of the Memorandum of Appeal four (4) days after the
deadline proves that his efforts fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer. His failure to
perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.[19]
Agravantes insistence that it was not his place to file an appeal without express
instructions from his client to do so is not persuasive. He could easily withdraw the appeal if
his client should later decide not to pursue the same.[20]
Furthermore, the belated filing of the Memorandum of Appeal cannot in any way
mitigate respondents liability; on the contrary, it shows ignorance on his part. As a lawyer,
he ought to know that his Memorandum of Appeal, having been filed beyond the
reglementary period, would surely be struck down for late filing. [21]
In sum, respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and
well as to protect the rights and interests of his client. [22]

A word regarding the imposable penalty. In the case of Perea v. Almadro,[23] the
respondent therein was similarly punished for negligence in the discharge of his duty as well
as misrepresentation committed before the court. In said case, the respondent lawyer failed
to file a demurrer to the evidence after asking for leave to file the same. He compounded
this transgression by spinning concocting stories about the loss of the file of his draft, which
somehow led him to believe that the pleading had already been filed. Finding him guilty of
serious neglect of his duties as a lawyer and of open disrespect for the court and the
authority it represents, as embodied in Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 and Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court suspended the respondent therein
from the practice of law for one (1) year and imposed a fine in the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, with warning that any similar acts of dishonesty would be dealt with
more severely.[24] Evidently, this case seems to be on all fours with the case at bar, so we are
thus constrained to increase the penalty recommended by the IBP.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Alexander M. Agravante
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and is FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]

IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene
Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro
Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for
members of the bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then
85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for
safekeeping. Respondent told her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will
be excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded
from inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits
with the Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he
was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs
of her husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent
deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in trust
for seven beneficiaries, including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22,
1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return
the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit for
another month and promised to return the whole amount including interest on June 25,
1985. Respondent, however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only
return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's
proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement
stating:
"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to (respondent)
the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum of
money was withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine National Bank on said date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of
(complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby agree
on the following terms for the purpose of disposing of the above sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum
of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid postdated
checks fall due, the same should be backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges the same
as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the former when able or at his
option. (Complainant) however assures (respondent) that she will not institute any collection
suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit the same by way of testamentary
succession to her heirs, neither are (respondent's) heirs liable.

4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their previous
cordial filial relationship."[2]
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to complainant
the following checks:
1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored due
to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check
because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only guaranteed that the
checks shall be "backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the
other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the brewing dispute between
the two. They begged respondent to pay his obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea,
respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and
another forP35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first check but not the second
because it was dishonored by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No.
487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack
of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and
a corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable settlement. To
pay his debt, respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting
toP40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed cash to provide for her
daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against
complainant. It appears that respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of land
owned by complainant that she had promised to sell them the land and that she had
authorized him to negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance payment for
the lots they were occupying. Respondent then prepared a special power of
attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the land and asked complainant to sign it. Complainant,
however, refused to sign because she did not intend to make respondent her attorney-infact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent for estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant
for estafa for allegedly reneging on her promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of
Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings
No. 5544 for the settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. [4] Respondent filed the pleading although he
was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for
allegedly making untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as administratrix of
the estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent
on two grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud complainant, and
(2) that respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited four causes of action: (1) assisting client

to commit tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and
(4) subornation of perjury.[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also recommended the
dismissal of the complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit. [7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-96-22
stating:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled
case, hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]
On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to
Administrative Case No. 2884.[9] The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied the
motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for
Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for
disbarment.[11]
We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:
"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man's cause."
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an
attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and
later refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was
aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to
withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct
makes him unworthy of membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of a
lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is
essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession. [12]
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent's privilege to
practice law not only for two years, but for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. [13] This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary

proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
[14]
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the
instant case, it has been sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful
conduct, in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all
our courts.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5235. March 22, 2000]

FERNANDO C. CRUZ AND AMELIA CRUZ, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO C.
JACINTO, respondents. Juris
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In their sworn complaint, spouses Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Manimbo Cruz seek the
disbarment of Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through
Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo of the Commissioner on Bar discipline, conducted an
investigation. Thereafter, he submitted his Findings and Recommendation, thusly:
This is a disbarment case filed by the spouses Fernando and Amelia Cruz
against Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. This case was filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline last 30 January 1991.

The evidence of the complainants show that sometime in June 1990, Atty.
Ernesto Jacinto, lawyer of the couple in an unrelated case, requested the Cruz
spouses for a loan in behalf of a certain Concepcion G. Padilla, who he claimed
to be an old friend as she was allegedly in need of money. The loan requested
was for PhP 285,000.00 payable after 100 days for PhP 360,000 to be secured
by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located at Quezon City. Sc juris
The spouses, believing and trusting the representations of their lawyer that
Padilla was a good risk, authorized him to start preparing all the necessary
documents relative to the registration of the Real Estate Mortgage to secure
the payment of the loan in favor of the Cruz spouses.
On 4 July 1990, the complainants agreed to the request of Atty. Jacinto and
were presented by the latter with a Real Estate Mortgage Contract and a
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127275 in the name of Concepcion G. Padilla.
The amount of PhP 285,000.00 was given by the spouses to the respondent in
cash (PhP 270,000.00) and a PBCom check no. 713929 for PhP 15,000.00.
Upon maturity of the loan on 15 October 1990, the spouses demanded
payment from Concepcion G. Padilla by going to the address given by the
respondent but there proved to be no person by that name living therein.
When the complainants verified the genuineness of TCT No. 127275 with
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, it was certified by the said office to be a
fake and spurious title. Further efforts to locate the debtor-mortgagor likewise
proved futile. Juris sc
In their sworn affidavits given before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the spouses claim that they relied much on the reassurances made by
Atty. Jacinto as to Concepcion G. Padillas credit, considering that he was their
lawyer. It was also their trust and confidence in Atty. Jacinto that made them
decide to forego meeting the debtor-mortgagor.
The complainants evidence also included the sworn statements of Estrella
Ermino-Palipada, the secretary of the respondent at the Neri Law Office, and
Avegail Payos, a housemaid of Atty. Jacinto. Ms. Palipada stated that:
1. she was the one who prepared the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the
Receipt of the loan upon the instruction of the respondents;
2. she was a witness to the transaction and never once saw the person of
Concepcion G. Padilla, the alleged mortgagor; and that
3. she was instructed by Atty. Jacinto to notarize the said contract by
signing the name of one Atty. Ricardo Neri.
Avegail Payos, the housemaid of the respondent, in turn stated that she was
the one who simulated the signature of one Emmanuel Gimarino, the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Quezon City upon the instruction of Atty. Jacinto. This was
done to make it appear that the real estate mortgage was registered and the
annotation to appear at the back of the TCT as an encumbrance.
On 14 November 1997, a case for Estafa thru Falsification of Public documents
under Art. 315 was filed against Atty. Jacinto. He was arrested and detained by
the NBI.
The defense of the respondent, on the other hand, was embodied in his
Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Therein, he alleged that the criminal information for estafa thru falsification
filed against him had already been dismissed because of the voluntary
desistance of the complainants. Misj uris
In his version of the facts, Atty. Jacinto averred that while he indeed facilitated
the loan agreement between the Cruz spouses and Concepcion G. Padilla, he
had no idea that the latter would give a falsified Certificate of Title and use it

to obtain a loan. He claimed that he himself was a victim under the

circumstances.
Respondent further alleged that he had not been remiss nor negligent in
collecting the proceeds of the loan; that in fact, he had even advanced the full
payment of the loan due to the complainants from his own savings, even if
Concepcion G. Padilla had not yet paid, much less found.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is every lawyers sworn duty to obey the laws of the land to promote respect
for law and legal processes. The Code of Professional Responsibility command
that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
(Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility) Jj lex
In the instant case, there was a clear yet unrebutted allegation in the
complaint that the Respondent had ordered his secretary and housemaid to
falsify the signatures of the notary public and the Deputy Register of Deeds
respectively to make it appear that the real estate mortgage contract was
duly registered and thus binding.
While it may be true that the complaint for Estafa thru Falsification filed
against the Respondent had been dismissed, the dismissal was because of the
complainants voluntary desistance and not a finding of innocence. It neither
confirms nor denies Respondents non-culpability. Furthermore, it is wellsettled that disciplinary proceedings are "sui generis", the primary object of
which is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the professions persons whose
disregard of their oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the
trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Thus, disciplinary cases may still
proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or criminal cases against a lawyer.
A lawyer who does any unlawful fraudulent or dishonest act may and should
be held administratively liable therefor. In the case at bar, the Respondent
should not be made an exception. While it may be shown that he indeed
advanced the payment due to his erstwhile clients, such will not exempt him
from administrative liability. At best it can only mitigate. Respondent is
recommended to be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
(Findings and Recommendation, pp. 1-4) New miso
On February 28, 1998, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution XIII-97-199
adopting and approving the Findings and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for his unlawful,
fraudulent or dishonest act.
(Notice of resolution [dated Feb. 28, 1998]).
In his Comment and Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent averred that complainants
have no cause of action against him as the same has been waived, settled, and extinguished
on account of the affidavits of voluntary desistance and quitclaim executed by them in the
criminal case filed against him. Ncmmis
The assertion must necessarily fail. The practice of law is so intimately affected with public
interest that it is both a right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in

this Court. Since the practice of law is inseparably connected with the exercise of its judicial
power in administration of justice, the Court cannot be divested of its constitutionally
ordained prerogative which includes the authority to discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit
and unworthy member of the Bar by a mere execution of affidavits of voluntary desistance
and quitclaim (par. [5], Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution).
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity
and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court (Maligsa
vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 [1997]), and the complainants who called the attention of the
Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct are in no sense a party, and have generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice (Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]).
Undeniably, respondent represented complainants in the loan transaction. By his own
admission, he was the one who negotiated with the borrower, his long-time friend and a
former client. He acted not merely as an agent but as a lawyer of complaints, thus, the
execution of the real estate mortgage contract, as well as its registration and annotation on
the title were entrusted to him. In fact, respondent even received his share in the interest
earnings which complainants realized from the transaction. His refusal to recognize any
wrongdoing or carelessness by claiming that he is likewise a victim when it was shown that
the title to the property, the registration of the real estate mortgage contract, and the
annotation thereon were all feigned, will not at all exonerate him. Scncm
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. However, the measure of good
faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with this client is a much
higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length.
Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by
the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to be sure that no
advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is
considered in an attorneys favor (Nakpit vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758 [1998]). Further, his
fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be evermindful of the responsibilities that
should be expected of him.
Verily, a lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for
a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client. The reason for the prohibition
is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence at the
highest degree (Maturan vs. Gonzales, 287 SCRA 943 [1998]). Sdaamiso
Respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to
protect the rights and interests of his clients and by his deceitful actuations constituting
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibilities must be subjected to disciplinary
measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a
whole.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the resolution of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and orders respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months with the warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Sdaad
SO ORDERED.

[CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITIES,
INC., complainant, vs.
ATTY.
ROSENDO
MENESES
III,respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was initiated by
a complaint-affidavit[1] filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, the
Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. Herein
complainant charges respondent Meneses with the following offenses, viz.: (1) malpractice
and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by violating his
oath to do everything within his power to protect his clients interest; (3) willful
abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to account
for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the
amicable settlement of a pending case.[2]
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a
group of companies which includes Pan Asia International Commodities, Inc., through its
Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of respondent Atty.
Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled various cases and was
properly compensated by his client in accordance with their retainer agreement. [3] One of
the litigations handled by him was the case of People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai,
and Arthur Bretaa, pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of Makati. On
December 24. 1993, respondent received the sum of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the
accused in said case, to be given to therein offended party, a certain Gleason, as
consideration for an out-of-court settlement and with the understanding that a motion to
dismiss the case would be filed by respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client the
receipt acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A verification made with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or any pleading in
connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable settlement was not
finalized and concluded. Despite repeated demands in writing or by telephone for an
explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents pertaining to the aforementioned case,
respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of herein complainant.
The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for
investigation. Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit his answer to the complaint
pursuant to Section 5, rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. [4] Two successive ex parte motions for
extension of time to file an answer were filed by respondent and granted by the
Commission.[5] On November 14, 1994, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, [6] instead of an
answer.
In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality to sue him
for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. because his legal services were
retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.; that Navarro had not represented
Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case nor had been authorized by its board
of directors to file this disbarment case against respondent; that the retainer agreement
between him and Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of
December 31, 1993 according to the verbal advice of its Administrative Officer Estrellita
Valdez; that the case of Arthur Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement, and
Bretaa was not an employee of Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained

him as its legal counsel; and that the settlement of said case cannot be concluded because
the same was archived and accused Bretaa is presently out of the country.
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, [7] stresses that
respondent Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to account
for the amount of P 50,000.00 entrusted to him; that the respondents arguments in his
motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission; and that he was fully aware
of the interrelationship of the two corporations and always coordinated his legal work with
Estrellita Valdez.
On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez resolved to
deny said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to file his answer. [8] On
January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he was adopting the allegations in his
motion to dismiss his answer.[9] When the case was set for hearing on February 9, 1995,
respondent failed to attend despite due notice. He thereafter moved to postpone and reset
the hearing of the case several times allegedly due to problems with his health.
On the scheduled hearing on June 15, 1995, respondent again failed to attend. The
commissioner accordingly received an ex parte the testimony of complainants sole witness,
Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary evidence.[10] Thereafter, complainant rested its
case. Respondent filed a so-called Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Recall Complainants Witness for Cross-Examination [11] which was granted by the
Commission.[12] Estrellita Valdez was directed by the Commission to appear on the scheduled
hearing for cross-examination.
Several postponement and resetting of hearings were later requested and granted by
the Commission. When the case was set for hearing for the last time on May 31, 1996,
respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated warnings. Consequently, the
Commission considered him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense and
declared the case submitted for resolution.[13]
On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, submitted its Report and Recommendation [14] to the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Commission ruled that the
refusal and/or failure of respondent to account for the sum of P50,000.00 he received from
complainant for the settlement of the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur Bretaa
proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that he misappropriated the same, hence he
deserved to be penalized.
The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from the
practice of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to return
the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with such requirement would
result in his disbarment.[15] The Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in its Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated
July 26, 1997.[16]
On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this case through
the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B. [17] It
appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of said resolution, with the
investigating commissioners report and recommendation annexed thereto.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that respondent Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him and
which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated demands
therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness for the confidence
and trust reposed on him, or showing such lack of personal honesty or of good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action extending to disbarment.[18]
Respondent Meneses misconduct constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer
which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely holding in trust the money he
received from his client to used as consideration for amicable settlement of a case he was
handling. Since the amicable settlement did no materialize, he was necessarily under
obligation to immediate return the money, as there is no showing that he has a lien over
it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is
exacted.[19]
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is
unavailing. Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified complainant of any
person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary
that
the
person
complaining
suffered
injury
from
the
alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by
complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and
recommended sanctions.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish
to become his client. He has the right to decline employment[20] subject however, to the
provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [21] Once he agrees to take
up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed to him. [22] Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation
to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his
clients request for information. Respondents failure to communicate with his client by
deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial
of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case.
On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the letter of Atty.
Augusto G. Navarro, dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that although a copy of the
aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally delivered to respondents address and
received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he had failed to restitute the amount of P50,000.00
to complainant within the 15-day period provided therein. Neither has he filed with this
Court any pleading or written indication of his having returned said amount to
complainant. In line with the resolution in this case, his disbarment is consequently
warranted and exigent.
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive
portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he
received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n his DISBARMENT. [23]
In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment,
depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed
from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition that
he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal
cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the
alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, [24] not can such penalty be
subject to a condition.[25] There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should not
apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive
sanctions.
Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only possible
and equivalent rule is in malversation cases holding that the restitution of the peculated
funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was immediately and voluntarily made
before the case was instituted.[26] The evidently is not the situation here. Also the
implementation of the penalty provided in the resolution will involve a cumbersome process

since, in order to arrive at the final action to be taken by this Court, it will have to wait for a
verified report on whether or not respondent complied with the condition subsequent.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to respondents personal records in this Court and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with all courts in the county.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s
during their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness
extended to their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and
accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
Street, Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained
two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to
purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on
July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was
appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It
appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate.

On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages
against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership
over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this
administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated
professional ethics when he:
I.

Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap)

which belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.

II.

Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties
he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan
secured to purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate,
all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family
corporation.

III.

Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained
him as its counsel and auditor.[2]

On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve
as lawyer and auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a
petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran
property in the estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his
corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused
respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong
to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property
belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences [3] with the Baguio City Treasurer and the
complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes
and Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet
included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which
respondent represented as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase of a
house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes
and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while
respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate
and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when
his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
against her husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant
averred that there is no distinction between respondents law and auditing firms as
respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same
building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent
initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended
on the result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of
ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance
case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute
owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from
him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of
Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the
estate which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and
renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that

the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name
were applied probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as
the phrase probably for the purchase did not imply a consummated transaction but a
projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit
H) of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the
Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error
or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own
the Moran property for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities
did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the
Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting
firms in the settlement of her husbands estate. [5] However, he pointed out that he has
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty.
Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate
proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law
firm represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J.
Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his
thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc.
is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant
Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the latters death, became the
President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting
firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting
interests was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there
was no conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged
a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full payment of
the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks claims. Complainant did not assert that their
claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes and Co. as
common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and
accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms
as early as August 15, 1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He
submitted as proof the SECs certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended
Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J.
Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the
claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent
alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he
committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common
auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another
forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. [7] She maintained that the
pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment
complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran
property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of
Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that
complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes
and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C. J.
Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not
proofs that respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to
remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant
alleged that she signed the documents because of the professional counsel of respondent
and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with

greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself
prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of
claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the
Moran property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other
documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that
respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and
communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9,
1976 to several years later. She alleged that none of the documents submitted as
evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated
his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his
action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondents
accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is
not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for
both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm
but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they
were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized
that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure
of respondents law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution, [9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case
until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue
of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the
ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint
which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPAlawyer. We granted her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. [10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled
that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant
waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that
respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this
Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the
OSG submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the
decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that
respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over the property. It opined that
there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the
absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family
corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late
Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in
connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. [12] The measure of good faith
which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher
standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms
length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to

assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public
policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of
wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These
findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for
reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
aforementioned reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship
dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the
lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late
Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To
place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent
later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected
the trust nature of the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to
his family corporation is well discussed in this Courts Decision, [17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the
lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it.
x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of
properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can
be bolstered by Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate
proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared
by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit I-2,
which
is
a
list
of
the
application
of the
proceeds
of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x
x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If
ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded to Valdes,
these loans should not have been included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the
arrangement outlined in Exh. J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take
over the total loan ofP140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the
notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the
disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular
maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of
the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his
advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically assume ownership
of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and
Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late
Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary
evidence (Exhibits H, J and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case,
should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and
not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate
which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If
respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least
informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership,
respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of
transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the

judge in the estate proceedings. Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his
client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by
respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity
in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the
loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the
information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from
respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the
accounting firm in charging respondents loans against the estate could not have been
committed without respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat
it too and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent
violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer
owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. [19] The
proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter [20] and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions
and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. [21] However, representation of
conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation, after
full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their
informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature
and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his
clients.[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it
creditors are adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets
and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of
the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the
debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one
instance, respondents law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the
estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the
intestate proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he
did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the
records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and
accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of
the intestate case) is unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of resignation from his law firm
is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show
respondents resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents
reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been terminated. It
does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation
on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the
succession of events shows that respondent could not have been totally ignorant of the
proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates
was the legal counsel of the estate [25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was
the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. [26] The fact, however, that
complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as
there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal
situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement
does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.

We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate
the conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per
se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against
her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate
proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a
position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty
of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims
were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a
conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was
respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability
of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could
not be charged before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting
practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both
professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In
the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the
common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his
law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The
act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondents and his law
firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct refers to
his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member
of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar,
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective
from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more
severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]

ROMANA
R.
MALIGSA, complainant,
CABANTING, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ARSENIO

FER

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavitcomplaint for disbarment with conduct unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a
Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992 [1] over a piece of property subject of a pending civil
case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case
No. U-5434.[2]
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to
comply despite service upon him of our Resolution together with copy of the complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting
to file his comment as waiver of his right to do so and directed the case submitted for
decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient
legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for making it appear in
the Acknowledgmentof the Deed of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein signed the
document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May
1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did not and could not have done so.
The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly
executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in
Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[3] The subject document was notarized by respondent on
the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a
pending civil case for annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order plus damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and
notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen
(16) days earlier.[4] Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document because
she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she
entered." [5]
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103

[6]

provides

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that
he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document specifically
provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" [7] Clearly, the
party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary Public or any other person
authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant
Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have

personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before respondent notary public on the
same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary
public to require the personal appearance of the person executing a document to enable the
former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act
of malpractice in violation of his oath as a lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[8] the Court suspended
respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months from the practice of law. In those
cases respondent purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil
Code and Art. II of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a recollection
of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of law is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The
bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. [9]
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a
substantial degree and protection of the interest requires preventing those who are not
qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the
courts and the administrative offices generally. [10] Notarization of a private document
converts the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof
of its authenticity.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the
sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity
of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate
consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or
spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in
an Acknowledgment.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [11] Considering the
serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore
mentioned for which he was penalized with a six (6) month suspension from the practice of
law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly
degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of
grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of his continued membership in the legal
profession; consequently, he is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 1474. January 28, 2000]

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARBRAHAM A. SULLER, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on
grossly immoral conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham
A. Suller went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him
in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she
protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At
that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When
he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.
[1]
She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other
leg, preventing her from defending herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a
criminal complaint[2] for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court
of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.

On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.[3]
On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from
notice.[4]
On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication. [5]
On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation.[6]
From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both
parties appeared with their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978,
respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of Criminal
Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.
[7]

On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case
having been referred to him previously.[8]
In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to
both parties.[9]
On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and
considering the case submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved
while respondent failed to appear despite due notice.[10]
On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
resolution recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent. [11]
The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not
determinative of this administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant
suffice to show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal
knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court."[12]
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his
neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member
of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. [13] "Good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be
possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity."[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his
name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4369. November 28, 1997]

PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Particularly, complainant avers that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 24, 1993[1] making it appear that some of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T.
Bonilla, Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and signatories thereto when
in truth and in fact, all three were already dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died on August 22, 1992 [2] while Leonardo P. Toledano died on
November 1, 1992.[3] Edelina T. Bonilla allegedly died on or about June 11, 1992.
In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before
affixing his notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the
identities of the signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its execution. Satisfied
with all of the above, it was only then that he certified the document.
Curiously, on September 9, 1996, complainant had a complete turn-around and moved
for the dismissal of his complaint. He alleged that the instant case is only a product of
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything
is in order.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended the dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines adopted the above recommendation and resolved to dismiss the
instant case after finding no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment proceedings.
This Court cannot agree.
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a)
The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the party acknowledging must appear before the
notary public or any person authorized to take acknowledgment of instruments or
documents.[4]Aside from being required to appear before the Notary Public, it is similarly
incumbent upon the person acknowledging the instrument to declare before the same
Notary Public that the execution of the instrument was done by him of his own free will.
In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale, respondent certified: BEFORE ME, this
24th day of March, 1993 at Dumaguete City, Philippines, personally appeared x x x Jesus
Bonilla; x x x Leonardo Toledano; x x x. [5] Respondent claims that as a Notary Public, he
asked the signatories whether the signatures appearing above their respective names were
theirs, and whether they voluntarily executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. In order to
ascertain their identities, respondent asked for their respective residence certificates.
Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged death was not evidenced by a death
certificate, respondent certified in the acknowledgment that Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P.
Toledano personally appeared before him. Respondents acts require the presence of the
vendors to be able to verify the authenticity of their signatures, the identities of the
signatories and the voluntariness of the execution of the Deed. It defies imagination and
belief how these could have happened. It would have been impossible, both physically and
legally, for Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano to have personally subscribed and
sworn before respondent as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Sale as they had
already passed on to the Great Beyond prior to the execution of the said documents.
Yet, respondent certified to this effect. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private document into a public
document. By certifying the Deed, respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all
the parties therein personally appeared before him; (2) that they are all personally known to
him; (3) that they were the same persons who executed the instruments; (4) that he
inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they acknowledged
personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested
with substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public
one making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. [6] A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries
public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined.[7]
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge
his sacred duties which are dictated by public policy and, as such, impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. [8]
It is for the above reason that this Court is most concerned about the explanation given
by complainant for withdrawing his complaint against respondent. In his Motion to Dismiss
dated September 9, 1996, complainant declares:
xxx

xxx
xxx

That he is now fully convinced that everything was in order, and that nobody was ever
prejudiced by the acts of the respondent. Herein complainant has realized that he himself,
or any other legal practitioner, would have done similarly as the respondent, if confronted
with such an urgent voluntary transaction in an emergency situation; x x x.

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged
urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the
legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the
integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to promote respect to his profession AT ALL TIMES,
and to act with justice AT ALL TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly disregarded the requirements and
solemnities of the Notarial Law simply to accomodate his clients. Not only did he commit an
illegal act but also did so without thinking of the possible damage or prejudice that might
result from non-observance of the same.
As a lawyer, respondent breached his professional responsibility by certifying under
oath an instrument fully knowing that some of the signatories thereto were long dead. This
Court cannot countenance this practice, especially coming, as it does, from respondent who
formerly served as president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Negros Oriental
Chapter, President of the Dumaguete Lions Club and City Councilor of Dumaguete. If indeed
respondent had taken steps to verify the identities of the signatories, he would have easily
known that the signatures were fake as they purported to be those of his former clients.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [9] [M]embership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. There being no lifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the privilege and
right to practice law only during good behavior and can be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded him.[10]
Pursuant to the foregoing, it is primarily required of lawyers to obey the Constitution and
laws of the land.[11] They must refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[12]
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties
as an attorney and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. [13]
Respondents act of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of
the vendors were already dead, they being his former clients, constitutes misconduct. But
this being his first administrative offense, such should not warrant the supreme penalty of
disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of
misconduct. Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective immediately, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the
personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C.

No.

3248.

September

18,

1992.]

DOMINGO R. MARCELO, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ADRIANO S. JAVIER, SR., Respondent.

Vicente Peala for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; A LAWYER SHOULD MAINTAIN A HIGH STANDARD OF LEGAL PROFICIENCY
AS WELL AS OF HONESTY AND FAIR DEALING. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor
to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and
integrity
of
the
profession.
2. ID.; SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT; PURPOSE. It bears stressing that membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and it declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded
him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law
may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him. based on conduct rendering him
unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and
those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.
3. ID.; ID.; GROUND THEREFOR MAY COVER ANY MISCONDUCT OF A LAWYER IN HIS
PROFESSIONAL OR PRIVATE CAPACITY. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor which include the
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory
grounds are so broad as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than
those specifically provided in the law. Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to en joy the privileges and to manage
the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring,
reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can
be no doubt, of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and
from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.
4. ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION THEREOF INVOLVES THE EXERCISE OF A SOUND JUDICIAL
DISCRETION. In all cases, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, mindful
always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action and should
be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct
wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards. In cases of lighter offenses or of
first delinquency, an order of suspension, which is correctional in nature, should be inflicted.
In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due
process, as in other judicial determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of
innocence in favor of the lawyer. Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant to
overcome such presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint 1 dated May 19, 1988, complainant Domingo R. Marcelo
charges respondent Atty. Adriano S. Javier, Sr. with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in

connection with a transaction over complainants residential lot as security for a loan.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court en banc of April
12, 1988, the present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation.
The said letter-complaint, along with complainants affidavit 2 required in the order dated
April 5, 1989 of the said IBP commission, set forth complainants material allegations on his
plaint. It appears that on November 13, 1984 complainant mortgaged his unregistered land
consisting of 1,045 square meters located at Cambaog, Bustos, Bulacan to mortgagee Sy
Hun Tek as security for a loan in the alleged amount of P80,000.00 payable on November 15,
1985 with legal interest, with the deed of mortgage having been prepared and notarized by
respondent
as
the
family
lawyer
of
the
mortgagee.
Of the alleged amount of the loan, complainant only received P50,000.00 from which was
deducted P2,500.00 as first installment or the loan for the month of December, 1984, and a
further amount of P5,000.00 was taken by respondent for the titling of said property under
Act. No. 496. In effect, complainant only received the actual amount of P42,500.00.
As of the filing of the instant administrative case, respondent had not yet caused the
mortgaged property to be duly titled. Complainant was not given a copy of the mortgage
deed, much less the chance to read the same, and he learned of the contents of said deed
only when he secured a certified true xerox copy thereof from the Records Management and
Archives
Office
in
Manila.
Upon complainants default on two months installments on the loan, respondent went to the
house of complainant at a time when the latter was sick and asked him to sign some papers
which respondent told complainant were merely to confirm the latters obligation to Sy Hun
Tek. Relying thereon and because of his confidence in respondent, complainant signed the
papers
without
being
given
copies
thereof.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
A few weeks thereafter, complainant learned that the mortgaged property had been
foreclosed and sold to one Enrico Perez, a resident of the place where the land is situated.
There was no public auction nor the posting of appropriate notices thereof as prescribed by
law. Moreover, the sale of the mortgaged property by Sy Hun Tek to Perez was within the
redemption
period.
Complainant, with the assistance of his present counsel, wrote to Enrico Perez indicating his
desire to redeem the property but the letter was never answered. He likewise approached
respondent to solicit the latters help to redeem said property but respondent refused to
extend any help and told complainant not to worry because his obligation to Sy Hun Tek had
already
been
settled
thereby.
The pertinent portions of the mortgage contract 3 adverted to above further provide as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . ., the MORTGAGOR hereby by these presents, cede(s), assign(s) and transfer(s) all his
rights, interests, and participation, by way of FIRST MORTGAGE, unto herein MORTGAGEE,
his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interests (sic), the above-described parcel of land
subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the MORTGAGOR shall pay in full the loan obligation on or before November 15,
1985,
with
the
legal
rate
of
interest;
2. That MORTGAGOR shall caused (sic) to be paid the loan of P80,000.00 by way of
installments in accordance with the following schedule, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1st

December

15,

1984

2,500.00

2nd

January

15,

1985

2,500.00

3rd

February

15,

1985

2,500.00

12,500.00
4th

March

5th

April

6th

15,

1985

2,500.00

15,

1985

2,500.00

May

15,

1985

2,500.00

June

15,

1985

2,500.00

12,500.00
7th

8th

July

9th

15,

August

1985

15,

2,500.00

1985

2,500.00

12,500.00
10th

September

11th

October

12th

November

15,

1985

15,
15,

2,500.00

1985

2,500.00

1985

2,500.00

12,500.00
_________
P80,000.00.
Plus

the

issuance

expenses
of

for
title

the
5,000.00

___________
TOTAL P85,000.00
x

"3. That provided, however, that if I, DOMINGO R. MARCELO, MORTGAGOR, shall pay or
cause to be paid to the said SY HUN TEK, MORTGAGEE, his heirs or assigns, the said sum of
EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00), within the period of ONE (1) year from and after the
execution of this mortgage, together with the legal rate of interest, then this MORTGAGE
shall be discharged and of no effect; otherwise, I hereby agree that the said MORTGAGEE,
may enforce his rights herein without judicial proceedings by causing the above-described
property to be sold at Provincial Capitol after giving notice of sale for 20 days posted in at
least three public places of the Municipality of Bustos, Bulacan, said sale to take place on a
business day between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. at the municipal building at said
municipality, under the direction of a notary public of said municipality, the justice or
auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality, or the provincial sheriff, in accordance with
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118;"
x

For his part and in compliance with the order dated August 15, 1988 4 of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent filed his verified answer 5 specifically denying
that he was the one who prepared the deed of real estate mortgage, contending that the
same was merely acknowledged before him by the parties thereto. He alleged that under
the mortgage deed. complainant was under obligation to pay P80,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for
titling of the subject property upon maturity, but despite receipt of said amount in cash from
the mortgagee through the latters brother, Sy Hun Kiong, as evidenced by cash vouchers
dated November 12, 1984, 6 complainant did not pay the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of
documentation and notarization of the mortgage deed. Respondent took two (2) copies
thereof, one for himself and another for the Clerk of Court, while the rest of the copies were
given
to
complainant
and
Sy
Hun
Tek.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Complainant having thereafter defaulted in his installment payments. he approached Sy Hun
Kiong, brother of the mortgagee, offering to sell his mortgaged property in payment of the
loan obligation and, together, they sought respondents legal advice on the effects of a
dation in payment. After a week, or on August 26, 1985, Sy Hun Kiong. Sy Hun Tek and
complainant returned to respondents law office and requested respondent to prepare the
dation in payment which, inter alia, provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the VENDOR MORTGAGOR hereby by these presents, waives, cedes, and assigns, all his
rights, interest and participation (i)n the above-described property by way of DACION EN
PACO (DATION IN PAYMENT), unto herein VENDEE-MORTGAGEE, his heirs, assigns and
successors-in-interests (sic) subject to the following terms and conditions to wit:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
1. That upon the signing of this agreement the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall be free and
release(d) of all his existing obligation to the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE in the amount of
P80,000.00
including
interest
and
other
such
charges;

2. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall pay and shoulder the corresponding documentation
and
notarization
expenses;
3. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR likewise waive(s) and transfer(s) all his rights, interests
and participations over the subject property to the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE, including the right
to take physical possession of the same;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
4. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall guarantee the peaceful possession and enjoyment of
right of the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE from any cause of action adversely (a)ffecting the
mortgage rights and interests of the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE and assume to pay all expenses
that
may
be
incurred
in
connection
with
the
said
documents;
5. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall upon the signing of the AGREEMENT pay all the
necessary
taxes
and
assessment
covering
said
property;
6. The parties bound themselves that the deed of Real Estate Mortgage shall be considered
without
force
and
effect
by
virtue
of
this
AGREEMENT;
7. It is understood that this AGREEMENT was executed for the purpose of liquidating the
obligation of the VENDEE-MORTGAGOR (sic) TO THE VENDEE-MORTGAGEE in the amount of
P80,000.00 by way of selling the property described above to the latter so as to relinquish or
as
(sic)
extinguish
said
obligation
of
VENDOR-MORTGAGOR."
7
Respondent similarly took two (2) copies of said document and gave the rest of the copies to
complainant
and
Sy
Hun
Tek.
Further, respondent avers that there were no foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged
property, either judicially or extrajudicially, precisely because of the previous settlement of
the account as a consequence of the dation in payment at the instance of complainant.
Additionally, respondent argues that there is no occasion to speak of a redemption period as
there was no foreclosure to begin with. The sale of the property to Enrico Perez was valid
since Sy Hun Tek had become the owner thereof as a result of the dation in payment and
Perez cannot be compelled to have the property redeemed by complainant because the
former acquired it through a legitimate and voluntary transaction. Respondent denies that
he was ever approached by complainant for the supposed redemption and contrarily
charges complainant with false and fraudulent misrepresentations because, although he was
fully aware of the acquisition of said property by Perez, complainant continued to receive
rental
payments
thereon
from
one
Johnny
Loo.
In a subsequent affidavit, 8 respondent stressed his earlier averments and insisted that all of
complainants allegations were "fabricated, well-orchestrated, bereft of legal and factual
basis, biased and unreasonable." Moreover, according to him, it was the mortgagee who
insisted on having the property titled to secure his mortgage lien thereover, at the expense
of the mortgagor; that the present complaint was filed as a leverage against the dismissal of
complainants petition for mandamus to compel redemption of the subject property; and
that all of complainants allegations in his affidavit could only have been possible through
the inducement of some other persons and were founded only upon hearsay evidence and
self-serving
statements.
Annexed to respondents answer was an affidavit executed by Sy Hun Kiong 9 substantially
to the effect that he was personally approached by complainant to seek his assistance in
obtaining a loan of P80,000.00 from Sy Hun Tek, offering as security therefor the aforestated
unregistered parcel of land. On November 10, 1984, complainant and said affiant requested
Atty. Javier to prepare the deed of real estate mortgage. Upon approval of the terms of the
deed by Sy Hun Tek, Atty. Javier notarized the same on November 10, 1984, the original and
two (2) copies thereof being retained by Sy Hun Tek with another copy given to complainant.
Said affiant further avers that it was complainant who offered the mortgaged property in
settlement of his indebtedness, which the mortgagee accepted due to the formers
insistence. Atty. Javier was requested to prepare the document embodying the dation in
payment, but for which legal services complainant likewise failed to pay the stipulated
amount of P5,000.00, as well as the costs of documentation and registration of the
document,
realty
taxes
and
other
assessments.chanrobles
law
library
Complainant, in his reply, 10 challenged the veracity of respondents statements in his
answer and branded the letters allegation that he merely acknowledged the mortgage deed
as a brazen lie. He reiterated his previous allegations in his complaint and assailed the
authenticity of the cash vouchers presented in evidence as proof of his supposed receipt of
the proceeds of the loan by disclaiming having signed the same. While admitting that he
filed the earlier petition for mandamus in an attempt to effect redemption, he denied having
proposed, much less insisted on, the dation in payment as a means to settle his
indebtedness.
In addition to his testimony, complainant presented Arthur Liqueron, an employee of

Security Bank and Trust Company, to testify on the withdrawal made by Sy Hur Kiong from
his current account deposit with said bank relative to the loan agreement, and Sy Hun Kiong
who testified on the incidents surrounding the loan and mortgage contracts.
Following the submission of the parties respective affidavits and memoranda and upon
admission of all exhibits and testimonies of the witnesses, the case was submitted for
resolution on the following issues: (1) whether the amount of the loan was P50,000.00 or
P80,000.00, with complainant receiving either the net amount of P42,000.00 or P77,500.00:
(2) whether or not complainant was informed of the contents of the mortgage contract and
furnished a copy thereof; and (3) whether or not complainant was fully apprised that what
respondent made him sign was a dacion en pago and given a copy thereof after its
notarization
by Respondent.
On the first issue, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found sufficient evidence to sustain
complainants claim that with regard to the obtention of the loan and the preparation,
execution and notarization of the deed of real estate mortgage, he only dealt with the
mortgagees brother, Sy Hun Kiong, also known as Achiong, and that respondent, as family
lawyer of the mortgagee, actually prepared and notarized the deeds of real estate mortgage
and dacion en pago. Thereafter, Sy Hun Kiong accompanied complainant to the Security
Bank and Trust Company where a withdrawal from the current account of New Manila
Panasahan Marketing owned by Sy Hun Kiong was made by a check in the amount of
P50,000.00 from which P2,500 plus P5,000.00 were deducted as advance payment of the
first installment on the loan and expenses for the titling of the mortgaged property,
respectively,
leaving
a
net
sum
of
P42,500.00
for
complainant.
The

IBP

commission

extensively

and

correctly

observed

that

"From the context and on the face of the deed of real estate mortgage, it can also be
gleaned that the actual loan obtained by the complainant from Achiong or Sy Hun Kiong but
placed in the mortgage in the name of the latters brother Sy Hun Tek, is only P50,000.00
and the sum of P30,000.00, which is the total amount of the consideration of the mortgage
is obviously for interest for one year on the loan of P50,000.00. This is quite evident from the
schedule and the amount of installment payable by the complainant as stipulated in the
mortgage, which schedule of installments is already hereinabove reproduced on page 3
hereof. Why is the sum of P30,000.00 as stipulated in the mortgage made payable in 12
equal monthly installments at the rate of P2,500.00 beginning December 15, 1984 up to
November 15, 1985? And why is the sum of P50,000.00 made payable in four quarterly
equal installments at the rate of P12,500.00? It is therefore quite very obvious that what the
complainant received from Achiong or Sy Hun Kiong is a net amount of P42,500.00, which is
the balance of the P50,000.00 after deducting the first installment of P2,500.00 and another
sum of P5,000.00 either for the respondent or for expenses for the titling of the mortgaged
property. And still on top of the one year interest of P30,000.00, the complainant, as
stipulated in the mortgage, still had to pay interest at the legal rate on the total sum of
P80,000.00.
"The conclusion therefore is that, indeed, the complainant actually received as loan under
the
deed
of
real
estate
mortgage
only
the
sum
of
P50,000.00."
11
We also find merit in its following findings on the second and third issues, and we
accordingly
approve
and
adopt
the
same:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"As to the second and third issues, there are tell-tale indications in the record that the
complainant, was not apprised in full by the respondent of the total amount stated in the
deed of real estate mortgage as his obligation thereunder, as well as of the terms and
conditions stipulated therein. What respondent merely told him was that he had to pay
P2,500.00 per month under the mortgage (TSN, Testimony of complainant, Hearing on April
12, 1989, pp. 42-43). And neither was the complainant given by the respondent a copy of
the deed of real estate mortgage as well as a copy of the dacion en pago contrary to the
claim of both respondent and Achiong (par. 8-Affidavit of Complainant, Exhibits D, D-1 to D4; TSN, testimony of complainant, Hearing of April 12, 1989, p. 18). This finding is strongly
corroborated by the fact that sometime before he filed his petition (captioned For
Mandamus already quoted above) with the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, the
complainant had to secure a copy of the mortgage from the Bureau of Records Management.
This certified copy of the mortgage was allegedly attached to the letter-complaint as Annex
A thereof but it is nowhere to be found in the record. A copy of the certified copy of the
mortgage was produced by the complainants counsel during the hearing before
Commissioner Pineda, but the same was not submitted nor attached to the record, obviously
because a xerox copy the said mortgage was already marked and offered as evidence as
Exhs. 4, 4-A, 4-D of Respondent. Had the complainant been given a copy of the deed of real
estate mortgage as claimed by the respondent and by Achiong, he would not have taken the
trouble of securing a certified copy thereof from the Bureau of Records Management.
"It is also quite relevant to note that said petition For Mandamus was filed with the Regional
Trial Court on September 26, 1986, which is less than one year from November 15, 1985,

after which later date the mortgage as stipulated therein, could be extra-judicially
foreclosed. So that complainants petition to compel redemption of the mortgaged property
was timely instituted because the mortgage could be foreclosed only after November 15,
1985. However, because of the failure of the complainant and his counsel to amend the
petition as ordered by the RTC, the petition was dismissed by the Court (Annex 2 of
respondents
Answer,
p.
26,
Record).
"The complainant was not also informed by the respondent that what he was made by the
respondent to sign when he failed to pay several overdue installments is the dacion en pago,
nor was the complainant given by the respondent a copy of the dacion en pago. This finding
could be gleaned from the fact that complainants petition filed with the Regional Trial Court
only referred to the deed of real estate mortgage. It was only sometime in September 1988
that the complainant had knowledge for the first time of the dacion en pago when he
received a copy of the respondents answer to which was attached, among other documents,
a copy of the dacion en pago as Annex 3 thereof. For, if the respondent gave the
complainant a copy of the dacion en pago after it was notarized by the respondent, the
complainant and his lawyer, Atty. Vicente Peala, would not have missed to file at the start a
complaint for annulment of the dacion en pago on the ground of fraud, instead of filing the
petition for mandamus to compel the mortgagee Sy Hun Tek and his vendee Enrico Perez to
allow
the
redemption
of
the
mortgaged
property.
"For another thing, there are also some indications in the record that the respondent
purposely maneuvered, obviously upon the instigation of his clients Sy Hun Tek and the
latters vendee, Enrico Perez, the signing by the complainant of some blank long bond which
turned out to be the dacion en pago. In this connection, it is important to note once again
that the mortgage, as stipulated therein, could only be foreclosed after November 15, 1985.
According to the complainant, when he failed to pay several overdue installments on the
mortgage, the respondent made him sign some blank long bond paper while he was sick in
his house, without the respondent telling him the real purpose of his signing. What the
respondent told the complainant on that occasion was that it was merely a document
wherein the complainant recognized that he was already in arrears in the payment of the
installments on his mortgage obligation. (TSN, Hearing, June 9, 1989, pp. 23-24; Hearing,
April 12, 1989, pp. 28-30). But there is nothing in the mortgage which stipulates that the
mortgage could be foreclosed upon mere failure of the complainant to pay any installments
on their respective due dates. It is hardly credible that the complainant could have agreed to
sign the blank bond paper had he been informed by the respondent that it was to be a
dacion en pago. This is because the mortgage could not yet be foreclosed when he was
made by the respondent to sign the blank bond paper on April 26, 1985, for the mortgage,
as stipulated therein, could only be foreclosed after November 15, 1985. It is therefore quite
reasonable that had the respondent informed him of the real purpose of his signing the
document, the complainant would naturally NOT agree to sign the document, for not only he
still had six (6) months and 18 days within which to pay in full his mortgage obligation but
also he had one year from the foreclosure of the mortgage within which to redeem the
property, which he tried to do but failed, not knowing then that what he was made to sign by
the
respondent
turned
out
to
be
the
dacion
en
pago.
"From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded that the failure of the complainant to
recover his mortgaged property is because of respondents deliberate failure to furnish
timely the complainant copies of the deed of real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago
which he prepared and notarized and in concealing from the complainant the true context
and purpose of the said documents. In one word, the respondent is guilty of deceit." 12
At this juncture, a brief resume of the relevant principia on ethics in the legal profession
would
be
apropos.chanrobles
law
library
:
red
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 13 The
trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard
and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. 14 The
bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 15 To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.
16
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 17 A
lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and it declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. 18 Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend or disbar him. based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. 19 It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities

belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with
the
administration
of
justice,
rather
than
to
punish
the
attorney.
20
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as
an attorney and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover practically
any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. 21 It is a settled rule that
the enumeration of the statutory grounds for disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer
may be disciplined on grounds other than those specifically provided in the law. 22
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, 23 in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, 24
or an unfit or unsafe person to en joy the privileges and to manage the business of others in
the capacity of an attorney, 25 or for conduct which tends to bring, reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. 26 Any interested person or
the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt, of the
right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 27
In all cases, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, 28 mindful
always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action and should
be resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct
wholly inconsistent with approved professional standards. In cases of lighter offenses or of
first delinquency, an order of suspension, which is correctional in nature, should be inflicted.
29 In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due
process, as in other judicial determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of
innocence in favor of the lawyer. 30 Consequently, the burden of proof is on the complainant
to overcome such presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of
evidence.
31
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondents failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby occasioning
unwarranted inconvenience and hardship on complainant. A lawyers responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled
by
ill
motives
and
malicious
intentions
against
the
other
party.
While complainant should have been more discerning and less gullible in his business
dealings, nonetheless respondent lawyer should likewise have been conscientious in seeing
to it that justice permeates every aspect of a transaction for which his services have been
engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. If respondent
was indeed the reasonably prudent and respectable attorney that he represents himself to
be, instead of taking undue advantage of the naivate and lack of education of complainant,
he should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject
transaction as would aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was
plainly incumbent upon him; failing therein, and with his advanced age duly considered, he
must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion, albeit
apparently
his
first.chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Adriano S. Javier, Sr. from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from notice, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this resolution be spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 3637. January 24, 2001]

RURAL
BANK
OF
SILAY,
PILLA, respondent.

INC., complainant,

vs. ATTY.

ERNESTO

H.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. (complainant) filed with this Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla (respondent) alleging deceit and gross misconduct
on the part of the latter. The complaint alleges as follows:
1. That on July 23, 1975 the respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the
complainant over a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Sagay, Negros Occidental,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55380, purportedly as Attorney-in-Fact of the
registered owners thereof, Pedro N. Torres and Oscar D. Granada. A copy of this Real Estate
Mortgage is herewith attached as Annex A.
2. That together with the aforesaid Real Estate Mortgage the respondent submitted a
Special Power of Attorney by virtue of which he was purportedly authorized and empowered
by the registered owners Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the aforesaid
parcel of land in favor of the complainant. A copy of this Special Power of Attorney is
herewith attached as Annex B.
3. That on the security of, among others, the aforesaid parcel of land over which the
respondent represented that he is authorized to mortgage, complainant extended and
released a loan to the respondent in the amount of P91,427.00.
4. That complainant subsequently and much later learned that the respondent was not at all
authorized and empowered by the registered owner Oscar D. Granada to mortgage the
aforesaid parcel of land when it was joined as a defendant in a complaint filed by the
aforesaid Oscar D. Grananda for removal of cloud on title with preliminary injunction and
damages. A copy of this complaint is herewith attached as Annex C.
5. That in the aforesaid complaint as well as in the hearing conducted in connection
therewith Oscar D. Granada specifically and categorically denied having executed and
signed the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, submitted by the respondent to the
complainant in support of his application for a loan.
6. That the aforesaid civil case, Civil Case No. 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 60, was subsequently decided against the respondent wherein the
aforesaid Court found that the Special Power of Attorney, Annex B, was indeed forged and
falsified because the spouses Oscar D. Grananda and Lolita L. Granada have not signed the
same and wherein the Court also made the finding that the defendant, considering that he
has benefited from the said falsified document, is presumed to have a hand in the
preparation of the same. A copy of this Decision is herewith attached as Annex D.

7. That the respondent has not appealed from the aforesaid Decision thereby making the
findings of fact made therein final as against him.
8. That the foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the complainant Bank a forged
and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a loan is a betrayal of his oath as
a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right to
continue further in the practice of law.[1]
Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of
deceit and gross misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing any deceit or
misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural bank. According to
respondent, he did not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of
attorney appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of
attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay,
Negros Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if
indeed said document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery. He cited the findings of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, thus:
Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the signatures of
the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually benefited from the said
falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same. (Decision, p. 20-annex
D.)[2]
Respondent maintained that he obtained the loan from complainant rural bank without
depriving it of the opportunity to investigate his financial capacity as well as to ascertain the
genuineness of the special power of attorney under which he acted as the mortgagor. Thus,
respondent is of the view that, under the circumstances, it cannot be said that he employed
deceit and gross misconduct against complainant rural bank.
After receipt of respondents comment, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties adduced their respective evidence
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Upon agreement of the parties, the
matter was resolved on the basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached
thereto. From these pleadings, the IBP, through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, established
the following uncontroverted facts:
Purportedly acting as attorney-in-fact of a certain Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada, by
virtue of a special power of attorney, respondent applied for a loan and concomitantly
executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of the complainant bank covering the property of
Pedro Torres and Oscar D. Granada. With such security, complainant extended to the
respondent his loan in the amount of P91,427.00. In view of the failure of the respondent to
pay the loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed by the complainant bank. Later, Oscar
Granada, the real registered owner of the mortgaged property filed a complaint against the
respondent and the complainant for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Special
Power of Attorney. After the trial, the court declared null and void the said Special Power of
Attorney as well as the Real Estate Mortgage for being products of forgery. This decision was
not appealed by the defendants.
There is no showing that respondent, despite the adverse decision, returned or offered to
return the money he took from the complainant bank. The bank then instituted this
disbarment proceeding against the respondent.[3]
The IBP found from the above facts that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer to do
no falsehood, thus:
This office believes that the actuation of the respondent constitutes a betrayal of his oath as
a lawyer. The findings of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental has persuasive effect
in this proceeding.
As found by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in its decision in Civil Case No. 1-C,
entitled Spouses Oscar D. Granada and Lolita L. Granada vs. Ernesto H. Pilla, et al, the
plaintiffs Granada spouses have not signed the questioned Special Power of Attorney in favor
of the respondent and the said spouses signatures as appearing in the Special Power of
Attorney are not their true and genuine signatures for actually they have not executed nor

granted a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein respondent authorizing him to

mortgage the one-third (1/3) share of the said spouses in the mortgaged property. The trial
court stressed that:
Although there is no showing that Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla has actually falsified the
signatures of the spouses, Atty. Oscar D. Granada, yet considering that he actually
benefited from the said falsified documents, he is presumed to have a hand on the same.
Defendant Antonio Pura testified and in fact he admitted that he notarized the said
documents, Exhibit A and B, with the assurance of Atty. Pilla that the signatures
appearing in the said documents were the signatures of Atty. Oscar D. Granada and of Pedro
Torres, registered owners of the property in question.
Antonio G. Pura, the notary public who notarized the questioned Special Power of Attorney in
favor of the respondent, testified in said Civil Case as follows:
Q Now, compaero, will you please relate to this Honorable Court the
circumstances under which you notarized this Special Power of Attorney now
marked as Exh. A on April 21, 1975?
A Yes, sir. I remember that on the same day, April 21, 1975, defendant Atty.
Ernesto H. Pilla personally appeared before me and he brought along with him
this Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor. He told me to notarize it. I
asked him about the signature of Atty. Oscar D. Granada if this is his signature
and he said Yes. I also asked him about the signature of the other principal
and he said also Yes. With that assurance and being a brother lawyer I
accommodated him. Knowing that he will not do anything that is illegal and I
have confidence in him considering that he is a lawyer and he knows what he
was doing, I accommodated him.
(TSN, Hearing March 15, 1993, pp. 22-23, Civil Case No. 1, RTC, Branch LX, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental)
If indeed, respondent is not responsible for the falsification of the Special Power of Attorney,
why did he not explain before the trial court or before this office the circumstances on how
he obtained the same. He did not even bother to identify his alleged client who provided him
the forged Special Power of Attorney. Instead, respondent is banking on his defense that the
complainant bank has not introduced any evidence to prove that he forged the Special
Power of Attorney. He relied on the argument that his transaction with the complainant bank
was purely commercial business and did not involve his capacity as a lawyer. Further, if it is
true that the respondent maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity as he
asserted, why did he represent before the notary public that the signatures appearing in the
Special Power of Attorney were the signatures of the real owners if he was not actually
aware that the signatures were that of the real owners.
The office is convinced that the actuation of the respondent is misrepresentation
constituting gross misconduct at the very least. This is a violation of his oath as a lawyer to
do falsehood to no man.[4]
In conclusion, Commissioner Elamparo recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for five (5) years. The IBP, through Resolution No. XIV-00-175, dated
7 April 2000, of its Board of Governors, substantially adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo but modified the penalty. The IBP RESOLVED as
follows:
to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, said
recommendation is with modification that Respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for THREE (3) years for misrepresentation.[5]
We fully agree with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since respondent actually
benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of
the same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial
that he had no knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondents
negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney issued in his favor
was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a public
document must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the same is their
own free act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special
power of attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary
public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in order to
obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of
the document especially considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed,
the settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession
of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of
falsification.[6] Further, if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification.[7]
Respondents acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The fact that the conduct
pertained to respondents private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or
good demeanor.[8] Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent
to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. [9]
Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Ernesto H. Pilla guilty of
misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years
effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be more severely dealt with.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999]

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as
lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.

The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),[1] in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was
referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for
complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of
the respondent for which a receipt was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the
respondent regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing,
respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and
prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued
Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand
Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said
amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S.
Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during
interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will
be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales
manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to support her
assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded
the return of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to
worry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise
that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee
which was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it
will be given to her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said
date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P.
Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also
recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo
and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel
documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone call and
informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was
detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and
respondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres
Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainants passport with a promise
that he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to
pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00;
P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to
respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos
(P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.

Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife
informed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that
the respondent had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to
evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by
complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews;
receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant together with
demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos
(P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent. [2]
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on
the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled
hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by the respondent. [3] As a result
of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the
orders of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case,
finding that:
It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a
visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or
employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal
recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under
an assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the
respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid
by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address
indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE,
it
is
respectfully
recommended
that ATTY.
DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the fees
paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar Discipline
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.[4]
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was
elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution[5] dated
December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with amendment the recommendation of
the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an
amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for having been found
guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained
in its Resolution dated December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the
resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of
the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not established because
complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she did not mention
any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service of

the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the United
States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her
visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would
happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees
and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship
with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words,
drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. [6] The nature of
the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. [7] This
requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. [8] We have sternly warned
that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts
his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to
continue in the practice of law.[9]
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of
complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of
unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because
they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal
safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are
respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His utter
lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of
justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege.[10] We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. [11]
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the
orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous
acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing
respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and
unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she
paid the respondent is in order. [12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the
complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding on to it,
unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and
the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal records of respondent. Respondent is
likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the amount of One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from her.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3808. February 2, 2000

RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on March 17, 1992,
complainant Raymundo T. Magdaluyo accused respondent Atty. Enrique T. Nace of acts
amounting to deceit and gross misconduct.
Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in Antipolo,
Rizal. In 1991, he conducted dialogues with squatters - among them respondent - living on
said land and offered to relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused,
and on August 21, 1991, filed a complaint against complainant before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB). They claimed to be tenants on complainant's land and,
thus, could not be forcibly ejected.
Almost three months later on November 14, 1991, the squatters - again including
respondent - also filed a case against complainant before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. This time, they claimed to be
owners, not mere tenants, of the land. They traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish
title.

In view of the conflicting causes of action in the agrarian and the civil cases, the DAR
Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the squatters' complaint before the PARAB for lack of
jurisdiction. At the same time, the civil case was also dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The RTC ruled that the squatters' claim of ownership based on an old Spanish title could not
defeat complainant's claim under a Torrens title.
Complainant filed this complaint against respondent inasmuch as he was a party to both the
agrarian and civil suits. He accused respondent of having deliberately committed a
falsehood and of forum-shopping, and prayed that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed
against respondent.
Respondent denied complainant's allegations. He stated that the agrarian case was filed not
by him but by a federation of farmers and, therefore, not his personal responsibility. He
denied having committed forum-shopping since, according to him, the two cases involved
different causes of action.
This matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the proper investigation,
report, and recommendation.
In its report, the IBP notes that respondent failed to appear during any of the hearings of the
case, prompting complainant to present his evidence ex parte and thereafter submit the
case for resolution.
Said the IBP in its investigation report:
"...while it may be true at different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total
inconsistency, nay, total opposition with each other which raises doubts about the
respondent's sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can,
in good faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next.
Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the
law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior
dispute had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus deceiving the court
and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of facts.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as
appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It
has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet
respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered
certificate of title. Any lawyer would know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to
stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of
land."1crlwvirtualibrry
The IBP recommends that respondent be reprimanded for his unprofessional and improper
acts. Being fully supported by the evidence on record, we concur with the IBP's findings and
recommendation.
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 2 He was, indeed, less than
sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he
knew not to be his. What made matters worse was his participation in bringing such claims
to court, knowing them to be contradictory and therefore cannot both be true, though both
could be totally false. In this he is guilty of consenting to if not actual commission of a
falsehood before a court, again in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:3crlwvirtualibrry
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath to do no falsehood or consent to its
commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for
suspension, disbarment,4 or other disciplinary action.5 Respondent's acts are clearly in
violation of his solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.

WHEREFORE , as recommended, respondent Atty. Enrique L. Nace is hereby REPRIMANDED

for his misconduct, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be more
severely dealt with.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000]

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT,

MELANIA
MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG,
EMILIANO
CATUBIG,
LADISLAO
SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA
MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated
13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952.
Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to
exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which originally formed part of Lot
No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was
no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a
unique situation where there is an order for partition but there is no showing that the
sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or
that a decree or order was registered in the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Korte
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of
Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of
Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and
Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927.[1] On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the
registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot
No. 1639.[2]Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an
order[3] directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as follows: Rtcspped
a) Hermogenes Olis - lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis - lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot - lot 1639-C
d) Roberto (Alberto) - lot 1639-D
Maglucot
e) Anselmo Lara - lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot - lot 1639-F.[4]
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot
in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built
houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per
annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners
predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying
rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a
quo. Sdaadsc
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the
existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis (purported
owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) [5] as indubitable proof that there was a
subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents
predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in fact, who
commenced the action for partition.[6] The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code
which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive

upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no court order showing
that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or
respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an approved partition
against the other co-owners who claim that there was one. [7] Said court, likewise, ruled that
the tax declarations[8] over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are
constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of
the ownership of the subject lot by the latter. [9]
The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows: Missdaa
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:
1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and
deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs; Slxmis
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorneys
fees;
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual
damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they
actually vacate the premises in question; Sclaw
4. To pay the costs.[10]
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of
partition.[11] The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639. Slxsc
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the
following reversible errors:
I
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING
POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS
AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN
LOT 1639-D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF
WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE
CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE
UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE
CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY
STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL
PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF
PROCEDURE;[12]
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided
among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the
subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by

Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.[13] Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot
himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition,
he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to
the partition.[14] Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax
declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land of
Roberto Maglucot."[15]Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are
estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement
in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents acquiescence because they
themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the
present.[16]
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they
emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised or
notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently
confirmed the same.[17] Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were unable to show
any court approval of any partition. [18] Third, they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain
undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing
no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever.[19]
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record,
we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is
whether there was a valid partition in 1952. Scslx
Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before
it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record."[20] This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of
the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence
on record to determine whether indeed there was partition. Slx
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for
partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is
proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the
parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. [21] The first phase
of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a
co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership
does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question
is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition
and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be
done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their

just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure,
final and appealable.[22]
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing
partition is that it is final and appealable. [23] The order of partition is a final determination of
the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof.
Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned
by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot now be
disturbed. Mesm
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?
If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is
when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. [24] An order for partition
is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the
parties upon the issue submitted.[25]
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling
in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,[26] which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was
controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the
trial court are not binding.[27] In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed
sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the
interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they
cannot thereafter question the decree, [28]especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the commission. [29] Respondents
in this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision
plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to
question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs.
Cinco.[30] In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties " to
submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order
appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan already
existing and tentatively followed by the parties. Calrky
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by
the court are not binding upon the parties. [31] However, this rule does not apply in case
where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision
plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this
case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented the
sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was
filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not to be
taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that
the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of
the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan. Kycalr
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to
tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. [32] By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. [33] It was only in 1952 when the petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis
and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates
of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves
and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this case arose, or
about forty (40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision
plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that said court was aware
that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, said court ordered the partition and
appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would
not be unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having occupied specific portions
of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that

same sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the commissioners for approval.
There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued
their possession of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision
plan. Kyle
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts
the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be
subsequently permitted to avoid partition. [34] It follows that a party to a partition is also
barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided
land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their
share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted
to another party.[35] A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. [36] In
other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot
accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none. [37] Parties
who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking
its validity of any part of it.[38] Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their
predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan.
This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question
the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot
1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan. Exsm
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead
his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he
would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to
estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary, and this is called,
ratification or election by acceptance of benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that he
is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge,
and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his own.
[39]
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to
some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be
binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification
of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so
making the ratification.[40]
The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they
would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting an
uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the amount so paid to
Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were for the payment of real
property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that the parties would be
unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so long a time.
Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot
No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax declarations for specific
portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents would not be aware of this. With
due diligence on their part, they could have easily verified this fact. This they did not do for
a period spanning more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the
possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of
an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right
which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. [41] Since the
possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without
saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from
1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Msesm
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption.
[42]
Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. [43] It has
been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made
thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence
that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate

court, which had been lost and were not recorded. [44] And where a tract of land held in
common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and called
by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent
claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and
that such lot was set off to him whose name it bears.[45]
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any
partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that
no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is shown in the title
of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the annotation in the title is
the sole evidence of partition. Esmso
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the
interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the nonregistration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of
their obligations thereunder.[46] As originally conceived, registration is merely a species of
notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order to give it legal effect as
between the parties.[47] Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to
prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that
recorded instruments exist and are genuine.[48]
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement
was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral
partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the
subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners refused to
have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was
issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in the
possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of
partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to
conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the
bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the
order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition
in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such
possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral
partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In Espina vs. Abaya,[49] we
declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal,[50] reiterated in Tan vs. Lim,
[51]
this Court has ruled, thus:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts
of equity have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed. Esmmis
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition has
actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an
oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity
will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with
the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to
be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,

exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the

existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance,
or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition
out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there
was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a
court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the
parties. Esmsc
Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First, respondents
Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot.
Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the houses of respondents were built
on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot. Esm
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents
were informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto
Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house of
said witness and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. [52] Aida Maglucot further
testified that they refused the offer because they also intend to use the lot for a residential
purpose.[53] This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and the CA did
not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the
unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at
least a co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the
petitioners and that they are not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639D. Chief
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio
Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot, [54] Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo
Maglucot and Regina Barot,[55] Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the names of Severo Maglucot
and Samni Posida[56] showing that the houses of the above-mentioned persons are
constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot [57] constitute incontrovertible evidence of
admission by the same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax
Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents
therein are presumed to be true and accurate. [58] The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that
Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respective
declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not
supported by any other evidence. Jksm
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot
No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of
the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said lot showing
the partition into six portions.[59]
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their
petition for review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference
to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of
study of the law "by the researcher." [60] Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having
"sweepingly stated without reference to the record" [61] that "[w]e have scanned the records
on hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the
CA decision, stating that "this will only show that there was no proper study of the case by
the researcher."[62]
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an
institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and
not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly
improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal.
Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession
regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and
admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the
courts.[63]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. h Y
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN,
REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.: JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics,
specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should
not undertake to advise him as to law." barth
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan
and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D.
Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel
of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case
No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that
respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions,
without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of
his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds
of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all
civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such

an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting
either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had
taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various ReAdmission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time
with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed,
had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the
sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of
AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo,
Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael
Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who
apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper.
The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of
hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use
of the student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against
the erring students. Jksm
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President,
gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending,
letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in
behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of
Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997
with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De
Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with
the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her
mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10
October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of
Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997
with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for
defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution,
dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon
dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,'
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado
Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for
being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other
Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case." Chief
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements
were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students
in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that
the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter
to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable
violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a
colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a
member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation [1] which, among other
things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom
assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission
Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt
for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising
from their previous dismissal. Esm
"x x x......x x x......x x x
"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from
Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them."
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would
appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt
of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney
and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3324

February 9, 2000

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO,

SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION
BUENA, J.:
Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays
that administrative sanctions be imposed on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not
having observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of his duties as notary public.
In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty. Eduardo
D. Estores, they filed a complaint against Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091,
Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.
Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To Villarin's Et. Al.,
Complaint To The Securities and Exchange Commission" 2 prepared and notarized by Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading reads:
V E R I F I C AT I O N
REPUBLIC
OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.

THE

PHILIPPINES)

WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI
PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn in
accordance with law depose and say:
1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;
2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are
true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February,
1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz

(Sgd.) Camagay

(Sgd.) M Donato

By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate

(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan

(Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of
February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
Notary Public3

RESTITUTO

B.

SABATE,

JR.

Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a certain
Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the signatures of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it
was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it
appear that said persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so.
Complainants averred that respondent's act undermined the public's confidence for which
reason administrative sanctions should be imposed against him.
In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado
swore to the correctness of the allegations in the motion to dismiss/pleading for the SEC
through their authorized representatives known by their names as Lilian C. Diaz, wife of
Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded
every signature of said representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the interest
of his client backed-up by their authorization5; and Lilian Diaz was authorized to sign for and
in behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written authority. 6 Respondent alleged that on
the strength of the said authorizations he notarized the said document.
Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and
Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the word "By" which suggests that he did not in

any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact
that his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of
their place of residence to that of the respondent and the reglementary period in filing said
pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent further alleged that the complaint is malicious
and anchored only on evil motives and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court
losses, for respondent is only a lawyer defending a client and prayed that the case be
dismissed with further award for damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as a
consequence thereof.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. be suspended from his Commission
as Notary Public for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the
respondent's Commission for six (6) months for failure to exercise due diligence in upholding
his duty as a notary public.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized
the Motion to Dismiss With Answer prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in
behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz signed for her husband
Pastor Diaz), three of the respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their
signatures, because he was their counsel in said case and also because he was an officer of
the religious sect and corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.
But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that the
same cannot be condoned. He failed to state in the preliminary statements of said
motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by their designated attorneysin-fact. Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he
appeared before himself as Notary Public.1wphi1.nt
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements.7 That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity
thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an
inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud, would be thwarted.8
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state.9
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated
therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not
through any representative. Otherwise, their representative's names should appear in the
said documents as the ones who executed the same and that is only the time they can affix
their signatures and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of said
document.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the
sacred duties pertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed
with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is
incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences
of his professional indiscretion.10

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent
situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal
profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times. 11 For notarizing the
Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not
before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories,
he failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty.
Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one
(1) year.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.
CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the
workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based
- the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a
counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and
confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no
recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31,
1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in
the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."[1]
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin,
Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who
all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law
Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in
the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in
blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their

personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of
the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.[2]
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government
(hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant. [3] Respondent PCGG
based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that
he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.[4]
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the
following allegations:
14.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.
Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala
and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and
confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB
as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately
1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.[5]
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged
that:
4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendantsACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U.
Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective
names in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring
stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares
of stock.
4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not
related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago
transferred any material interest therein and therefore denies that the shares appearing in
his name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. [6]
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate
answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten
wealth.[7]
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION"
dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.
[8]
The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing
onOctober 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings.[9]
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance
by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by
the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco,
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in
behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or reexamination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No.
33.[10]
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute
petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in
PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.[11]
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to
comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:
x x x.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify
their
clients,
considerations
of
whether
or
not
the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of
the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco
has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of
cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the
rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and
joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to
Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit.[12]
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was
denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition
forcertiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:

I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA
lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict
application of the law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering
petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial
distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor
of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that,
under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the
PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged
matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds
and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the
equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the
March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a
separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent
Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R.
No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to
divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same
footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that
such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited
from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as
lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyerclient relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected,
because they are evidence of nominee status.[13]

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in
excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had
therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by
filing a notice of dismissal,'"[14] and he has undertaken to identify his principal.[15]
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to
force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after
petitioners but the bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from
the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange
for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for
whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis
for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division,
entitled Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government
respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December
5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their so called client is
Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A of the Third Amended
Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some
in the name of particular persons, some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers
that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed
deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the
nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment
and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our
claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that
most of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say
that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have
no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now
are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of
the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called
themselves.[16]
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in
the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as
co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name
their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the
case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should
exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts
of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his
services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to
be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire,
[17]
and mandato(contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed
makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person
who requested him.[18]But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principalagent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a
mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence
reposed on him by his client. [19] A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court,
thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.
[20]
Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office"
since he is in fact an officer of the Court [21] and exercises his judgment in the choice of
courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and
duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith,[22] that is required by reason of necessity and public interest [23] based on the
hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal
to the administration of justice.[24]
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from
any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of
established and stable tradition.[25] In Stockton v. Ford,[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than
that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully
discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding
spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be
used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. [27]
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted
by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically
forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the
client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
employment.[28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client
privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity.[29]
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear
of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his
duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust
of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or
any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his
client.
Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve
several constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives
flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a
client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication
and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be
compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose
the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self
incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right
practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right,
the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a
whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited
information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is
largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client
which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and
flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the
lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery.
Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is
that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.[31]
[30]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent
is.[32] He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. [33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some

important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought
the lawyers advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor,[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a
lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the
relationship was so closely related to the issue of the clients identity that the privilege
actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his
attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he
had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had
advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember
whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her
refusal to reveal his clients identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts
contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case,
and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is
privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the
client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers
legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of
the Sandino Gang, a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United
States. The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including
the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to
Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment
received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to
divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding nondisclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:
A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be privileged
where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that
disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for
which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe
enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal
law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorneyclient privilege. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients,
the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence,
the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore,
supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the clients identity and the nature of
his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. [36]
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v.
Terminal Cab Corporation,[37] prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow
a lawyers claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding,
owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was
unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the
second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the
attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was
somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab
when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came
to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the

circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held
that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had
hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is
clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him. [38]
xxx

xxx

xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional
advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated,
or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication
made, relates to a matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to
afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged
from disclosure. xxx.
It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the
attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the
courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending
against him as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on
which the court reserved decision are sustained.[39]
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,[40] the lawyer involved was required
by a lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain
transaction. The purpose of the courts request was to determine whether the unnamed
persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the
action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme
Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he
represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in
establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for
certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such
employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer,
but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made
the basis of a suit against his client.[41]
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by
revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is
privileged.
In Baird vs Korner,[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of
certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed
taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably incorrect and
the taxes understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they
violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they
had. No
investigation
was
then
being
undertaken
by
the
IRS
of
the
taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of
$12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of
money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to
the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his
clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients
involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to
name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A
petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to
name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to
pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income
taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that clients income
tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a clients name is privileged
when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure
of the clients identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general
rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted
they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the
past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose - to
ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for
that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by
the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid,
if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal
guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling
of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed - to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done.[43]
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks
legal assistance.[44] Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of
the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in
disclosure of the entire transaction.[45]
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences. [46]
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general
rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which
there would be no attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies
in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to
non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients
indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn,
petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned
deeds of assignment covering their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and
parcel of petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral
part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying
their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been

sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned

corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a... crime."[47]
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the
services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law
for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might
have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first
case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for
purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act
for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the
disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to
possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or
used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not
have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client
relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.
[48]
The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded
on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under
such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the
instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client.[49]"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal
employment, relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn
out in consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to each other, are under the
seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged communications." [50] Where the
communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible
criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution
which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up
other privileged information which would substantiate the prosecutions suspicions, then the
clients identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within the
protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings[51] and Tillotson v. Boughner.[52] What these cases unanimously seek to
avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by
the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which
do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available
source of information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of
the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench
amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we
cannot and will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by
disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. [53] It
follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an
obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the
privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if
the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon
evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled
testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably
reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The
logical nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it

would be difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as
much "communication" as information revealed directly about the transaction in question
itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal
such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which forms
the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a
strict liability for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including
confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients
informed and protect their rights to make decisions have been zealously
sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,[54] the US Second District Court
rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by
helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court
instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special
breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages,
and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v.
Scheller[55] requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent
fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought
payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired
for cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during
the interregnum, events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally
offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v.
Salmon[56] famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court
found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the
relationship.[57]
Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the
law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, [58] "xxx is
an exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The
Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents position without denigrating the noble
profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of
life - so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x
x x But that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united - this abstraction called
the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of
all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to
speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be
won with sustained and lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by which
man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their
clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of
the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is
not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under
the circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would
expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict
fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including
herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up
through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures

that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means
and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute
gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust
enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to
submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that would inevitably form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private
respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted
merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and
circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes... the identity of the
principal."[59]
First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to
state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in
their Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that
their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering. [60] Being "similarly situated" in
this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and
circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his
promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to
show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar - that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking
happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an
undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting
the private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required
proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent
did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which were mere requests for reinvestigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers)
were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both petitioners and private
respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and were not
the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. [61]
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in
the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr.
Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such
substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal
protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against
uneven application of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. [62] Those who fall within a particular
class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities
imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges,
those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.[63]
We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners
for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. [64] It is grossly
unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same
exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question
of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions,
not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free
ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorneyclient confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait
until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence
before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are coprincipals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their
position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be
compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full
course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further
litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged
attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of
their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip
the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation
which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a
proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a
day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we
will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against selfincrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude
petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, *Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.".
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses
WILFREDO and LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, J.:
In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as
counsel for the petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively
for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility considering:
. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read
the petition as borne out by the following statement:

". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had

read the petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold
that the same has "failed to sufficiently show that the
respondent Court had committed a grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the questioned judgment". . .
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further
his use of intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified by his
characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been
"crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in
plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it";
or one with "perfidious character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs
therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal
therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused
with that confusion which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured
and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied
class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar
had not owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his Honor was
already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; in one scale of the balance, a
311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers
from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brandnew car, impeccable attire, and dignified "mien"; and his charge that the
respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a scheme to
unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property for
the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30 May 1994, by
describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and
"blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and
blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that the
undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber" (Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14
bottom), a "rotten manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft
and shady deals (Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13 top); On the other hand, if the
undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed
cross-eyed particularly when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8)
letter-word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and
therefore stands in dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who
truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this Honorable
Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains,
the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt
with administratively or otherwise.
and prays:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of
this Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning the undersigned
into a martyr to his principles.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE
(Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be
dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all
read the petition in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show
that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he
tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious,"
and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the intemperate
words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the
incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he

volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the
respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and
"cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following
reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read
the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he
failed to address squarely the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the
resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their
intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon which his defense of
truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and
phrase to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did
not at all read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect
to and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First
Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them
with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby creating or promoting
distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of "encouraging discontent
which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation on which
rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against
the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition
and whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor
of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by
the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his
disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence
in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of
justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a
lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers"; and his duty under the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really,
there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out
one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's
oath solemnly binds him to conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . .
to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts "can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any

disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs.

Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment.
That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others'
lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board vs.Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60
A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the
courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration
in the administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice
"is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160].
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice." [People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In
re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]).
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot
criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the
court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re:Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right.
No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a
scrutiny into the official conduct of the judge, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best
opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of out judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, or no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board of
Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216).
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges
is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might
consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W.
196)).
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential

to the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of their client's
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it
was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe
ech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression
needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration justice. There is no antimony between free expression and
the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members
of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil.
595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107
[1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]);
or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or
in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the
resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177
SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false
and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division,
and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such
could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or
hate could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he
considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own
opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views"
(Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with
haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his
petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and
with seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him]
into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL
APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more
can extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional
Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B. Tiongco in this Court.
Padilla, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.

[A.C. No. 4058. March 12, 1998]

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
FLORES, respondent.

INC. complainant,

vs. ATTY.

ERNESTO

B.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no
violation of its code of conduct. Accordingly, a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes,
engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in his pleadings must be sanctioned.
The Case

This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) before this Court on July 5, 1993, seeking his removal or
suspension from the bar for forum shopping, which amounted to grave misconduct, x x x
unduly delaying the administration of justice, and violating with impunity his oath of office
and applicable laws and jurisprudence.[1]
After the respondent submitted his Comment, dated August 21, 1993, we referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 27, 1993 for investigation,
report and recommendation. On August 15, 1997, we received a resolution from the IBP
Board of Governors, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six months, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-149
Adm. Case NO. 4058
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
Atty. Ernesto B. Flores
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, hereinmade [sic] part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the
recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Ernesto Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months for violating the provision of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]

The Facts

Because the parties[3] agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence,
the case was submitted for resolution on the basis of their documentary evidence. As found
by Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, the facts are as follows:
x x x. On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando of the National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative
Region, Baguio City, issued a Writ of Execution (x x x) in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84
to enforce the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1992 in G.R. No.
89070 (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55). The Writ of
Execution was issued on motion of Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO for short) to
collect the amount of P344,000.00 which it paid to Peter Cosalan during the pendency
of the case before the Supreme Court, on the basis of its decision ordering the
respondent board members to reimburse petitioner BENECO any amount that it may be
compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter
Amado T. Adquilen.
After issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent, as new counsel for the
losing litigant-members of the BENECO Board of Directors, filed a Motion for Clarification
with the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070, the minute resolution to
wit: to note without action the aforesaid motion.
Thereafter, the respondent instituted a suit docketed as Civil Case NO. 2738-R (x x
x) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City, seeking to enjoin the defendants
Clerk of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the said writ of
execution. That case, however, was dismissed by the Presiding Judge Clarence
Villanueva in his Order dated March 18, 1993 (x x x).
Accordingly, the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC, Baguio City, through Sheriff III
Wilfredo Mendez, proceeded to levy on the properties of the losing board members of
BENECO. Thus, a sale at public auction was set on June 1, 1993, at 10:00 oclock in the
morning in front of the Baguio City Hall, per Sheriffs Notice of Sale dated May 4, 1993
(x x x), of the properties of Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping[,] two of the losing
members of the Board of Directors of BENECO in the aforementioned case.
Respondent claims in his comment (x x x) that Branch 7, motu proprio, dismissed
Civil Case No. 2738-R for lack of jurisdiction on March 18,1993, which dismissal was [sic]
became final due to respondents failure to perfect an appeal therefrom which claim
according to the complainant, constitute[s] deliberate misrepresentation, if not
falsehood, because the respondent indeed interposed an appeal such that on May 11,
1993, the RTC 7 of Baguio City transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 2738-R to
the Court of Appeals per certified machine copy of the letter transmittal of same date (x
x x).
While respondent never essentially intended to assail the issuance by the NLRC of
the Writ of Execution x x x nor sought to undo it (x x x) the complaint in Civil Case No.
2738-R which he filed prays for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary writ of injunction for defendants Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio City
Sheriff to cease and desist from enforcing the execution and levy of the writ of
execution issued by the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action in said court (x
x x) which complainant likewise claims as an unprocedural maneuver to frustrate the
execution of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070 in complete disregard
of settled jurisprudence that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide
questions which arise and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders and
awards rendered in labor cases citing the case of Cangco vs. CA, 199 SCRA 677, a
display of gross ignorance of the law.
On May 26, 1993, respondent again filed for Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet, separate complaints for Judicial
Declaration of Family Home Constituted, Ope Lege, and thus Exempt from Levy and
Execution the subject properties with Damages, etc. docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 93-F0414 (x x x) and 93-F-0415 (x x x), which are essentially similar actions to enjoin the
enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84. He also filed

an urgent Motion Ex-parte (x x x) praying for temporary restraining order in these two
(2) cases.
The complainant further alleges that respondents claim for damages against the
defendant Sheriff is another improper and unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a
violation of respondents oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said Sheriff was
merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job.
Recommendation of the IBP

As noted earlier, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended, and the IBP
Board of Governors concurred, that respondent be suspended from the bar for six months
for:
1. Falsehood, for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R was not appealed on time
2. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping
Commissioner Jose ratiocinated:
A cursory glance of (sic) x x x the complaint filed by the respondent in Civil Case No. 2738-R
before the RTC of Baguio City, which complaint was signed and verified under oath by the
respondent, reveals that it lacks the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. 2891 which took effect on January 1, 1992 to the effect that to the best of his knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different
divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency. If there is any other action pending, he must
state the status of the same. If he should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or
any tribunal or agency[,] he should notify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days
from such notice.
Among the other penalties, the said circular further provides that the lawyer may also be
subjected to disciplinary proceedings for non-compliance thereof.
In sum, it is clear that the respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility under which the lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court and exert[s] every effort and consider[s] it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.[4]
This Courts Ruling

We adopt and affirm the recommendation of the IBP suspending the respondent from
the bar, but we increase the period from six (6) months to one (1) year and six (6) months.
Forum Shopping

Circular No. 28-91,[5] dated September 4, 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992,
requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before this
Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994. The IBP
found that the respondent had violated it, because the complaint he filed before the RTC of
Baguio City lack[ed] the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. [6]
We distinguish. Respondents failure to attach the said certificate cannot be deemed a
violation of the aforementioned circular, because the said requirement applied only to
petitions filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals. [7] Likewise inapplicable is
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994 which extended the requirement of
a certificate of non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasijudicial agencies other than this Court and the Court of Appeals. Circular No. 04-94 became
effective only on April 1, 1994, but the assailed complaint for injunction was filed on March
18, 1993, and the petition for the constitution of a family home was instituted on May 26,
1993.

Be that as it may, respondent is still guilty of forum shopping. In Chemphil Export and
Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[8] this Court declared that (t)he rule against forum
shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars [9] of this Court merely
formalized
the
prohibition
and
provided
the
appropriate
penalties
against
transgressors. The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of Rule 16 and Section 4 of Rule 2 of
the 1964 Rules of Court, which provide:
SECTION 1. Grounds. -- Within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be
made on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx
(e)

xxx

That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

xxx xxx

xxx[10]

SEC. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action. -- If two or more complaints are brought
for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in
abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1 (e) of Rule 16, and a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others. [11]
The prohibition is also contained in Circular No. 28-91. This circular did not only require
that a certification of non-forum shopping be attached to the petitions filed before this Court
or the Court of Appeals; it also decreed that forum shopping constituted direct contempt of
court and could subject the offending lawyer to disciplinary action. The third paragraph
thereof reads:
3. Penalties.
(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple
petition or complaint.
(b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer wit the filing of
multiple petitions and complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt
of court.
(c) The submission of false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute
contempt of Court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty
party. The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The foregoing were substantially reproduced in Revised Circular No. 28-91 [12] and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.[13]
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another,[14] or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[15] The most important factor in determining the existence of forum
shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs.[16]
After this Court rendered its Decision [17] in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al. [18] and upon motion of BENECO, Labor Arbiter
Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of execution [19] ordering the clerk of court and ex officio
city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction
personal and real property of the members of the Board of Directors of BENECO.
On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members
Victor Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an
injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to preserve
the status quo as now obtaining between the parties, as well as a writ of preliminary
preventive injunction ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of

Baguio to cease and desist from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from
the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action raised in court. [20]
When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores filed with another branch of
the RTC two identical but separate actions both entitled Judicial Declaration of Family Home
Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc., docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415. [21] The said complaints were supplemented by an
Urgent Motion Ex Parte[22] which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff
Wilfredo V. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of plaintiffs property to avoid
rendering ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment of the court later in this [sic] cases,
until further determined by the court.

[23]

Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. Modequillo vs. Breva,
reiterated in Manacop vs. Court of Appeals,[24] shows the frivolity of these proceedings:

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially
or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises,
it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.
xxx.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the
family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Adhering to the Courts declaration in said cases, the subject properties are deemed
constituted as family homes by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code.
The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and
unnecessary; they were clearly asking for reliefs identical to the prayer previously
dismissed by another branch of the RTC, i.e., to forestall the execution of a final judgment of
the labor arbiter. That they were filed ostensibly for the judicial declaration of a family
home was a mere smoke screen; in essence, their real objective was to restrain or delay the
enforcement of the writ of execution. In his deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief in
two different courts, Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a friendly forum which
would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction and was thereby trifling with the
judicial process.[25]
We remind the respondent that, under the Code of Professional Responsibility, [26] he had
a duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. [27] The Code also enjoins
him from unduly delaying a case by impeding the execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.[28]
In consonance with Millare vs. Montero[29] and Garcia vs. Francisco,[30] respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law for one year. In Millare, the respondent filed
with different courts a total of six appeals, complaints and petitions which frustrated and
delayed the execution of a final judgment. Holding that respondent made a mockery of the
judicial processes and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating
the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered [and], thus,
abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice, [31] this Court suspended
the respondent from the practice of law for one year.
In Garcia, the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law, for
violating the proscription against forum shopping. This Court held that he deserve[d] to be
sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other
lawyers who may be influenced by his example.[32]
Falsehood

The investigating commissioner also held respondent liable for committing a falsehood
because, in this administrative case, he stated in his comment that he had not perfected an

appeal on the dismissal of his petition for injunction. In his said comment, the respondent
stated:
Branch 7 (of the RTC) motu proprio, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on March 18,
1993. Not having perfected an appeal on the dismissal, the order of dismissal became final
under the Rules 15 days after its receipt by respondent on record, or before April 6,
1993. So that today this case is no longer pending.
xxx.
It should be noted that when Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 for family homes and
damages were filed in the court below on May 26, 1993, Civil Case NO. 2378-R which seems
to give basis to the present Complaint was deemed terminated, there being no appeal
formally taken and perfected in accordance with the Rules.
xxx.
And that precisely was the primal reason why respondent decided not to appeal any further
anymore [sic] the order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the court below in Civil Case
No. 2738, and let it be deemed final by the Rules and jurisprudence. [33] (Underscoring
supplied.)
The indelible fact, however, is that respondent did file an appeal which was perfected
later on. The original records of the injunction suit had been transmitted to the appellate
court.[34]Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dismissing the appeal. [35] Thus, in
denying that he had appealed the decision of the RTC, respondent was making a false
statement.
Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his appeal means that no appeal was made
under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The pertinent provisions of Rule 50[36]read:
SEC. 2. Effect of dismissal.-- Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk
shall return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the seal of the
court showing that the appeal has been dismissed. Upon the receipt of such certificate in
the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had ever been taken, and the
judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional costs allowed by the
appellate court upon dismissing the appeal.
xxx xxx

xxx

SEC. 4. Withdrawal of appeal.-- An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before
the filing of appellees brief. x x x. The withdrawal of an appeal shall have the same effect
as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this rule.
Respondents explanation misses the point. True, he withdrew his appeal. But it is
likewise true that he had actually filed an appeal, and that this was perfected. False then is
his statement that no appeal was perfected in the injunction suit. Worse, he made the
statement before this Court in order to exculpate himself, though in vain, from the charge of
forum shopping.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. [37] He shall neither do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any. He also has a duty not to mislead or allow the courts to be
misled by any artifice.[38]
For this offense, we suspend the respondent from the practice of law for another
year. True,
in Ordonio
vs.
Eduarte,[39] Porac
Trucking,
Inc.
vs.
Court
of
[40]
Appeals
and Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC,[41] we imposed a suspension of only six months for a
similar malfeasance. But in Flores case, his falsehood is aggravated by its brazenness, for it
was committed in an attempt, vain as it was, to cover up his forum shopping.
Before we close, we note that this simple case was referred to the IBP on September 27,
1993. It was deemed submitted for resolution per the investigating commissioners order
dated May 10, 1995. However, the investigating commissioner submitted his report only on

May 5, 1997. Moreover, the IBP transmitted its recommendation to the Court only through a
letter dated July 31, 1997, which was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on August
15, 1997. Why it took the IBP almost four years to finish its investigation of the case and
over two years from the date the parties filed their last pleadings to resolve it escapes
us. After all, the case did not require any trial-type investigation, and the parties submitted
only documentary evidence to prove or rebut their respective cases. Thus, we find it
opportune to urge the IBP to hasten the disposition of administrative cases and to remind it
that this Court gives it only ninety days to finish its investigation, report and
recommendation. Should it require more time, it should file with the Court a request for
extension, giving the reason for such request.
WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping,
Respondent Ernesto B. Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR and, for violating his oath and the Canon of Professional Responsibility to do
no falsehood, he is SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1) YEAR, resulting in a total
period of TWO (2) YEARS, effective upon finality of this Decision. He is WARNED that a
repetition of a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in his files which are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.