Case No.

1
G.R. No. 189776

December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed

guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P.
ARELLANO, Petitioner, vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.

FACTS:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of Administration," on April 28, 2000 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, and alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land located
in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may
be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
The probate court found the Deed of Donation as valid and went on to hold that it
is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property donated by decedent to Amelia is subject to
collation?
HELD:
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being
to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The purposes of collation are to secure
equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the
free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be
reduced.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime. The decedent
not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblingscollateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was
valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free
portion of the estate.There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.

Case No. 2
DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER
GR NO. 187056
SEPTEMBER 20, 2010
FACTS:
Spouses G executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" the terms of which are as follows:

It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that J and E will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by
them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way
affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors
whether testate or intestate and where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right,
ownership, possession and administration of this property herein donated and
accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective
upon the death of the DONORS.
ISSUE:
Whether the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa (effective
upon death), as in fact designated, or actually a donation inter vivos (effective
during the lifetime of the Donors)?
HELD:

IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS.

That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis
Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is
inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis
causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where
"revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the
following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,
ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the
donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation
inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation
Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse."
The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso
that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.
Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their
death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in
the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with
their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property
while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which
acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only
for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida, in case of doubt, the
conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in
order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

Case No. 3
MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN
June 5, 2002

FACTS:
Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in
favor of his brother. Also, she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the
petitioners. The deeds provided that it shall take effect upon the donors death.
Conchita died. Respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground
that it is void for failure to comply with the formalities of a will.

ISSUE: WON the deed is a donation mortis causa.

HELD:
Yes, it is.
The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that
the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary
rights to petitioners prior to Conchitas death.
Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with
the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments.

Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not
executed in the manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is
void.

Case No. 4
MAGAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
337 SCRA 298
FACTS: Private respondent Santiago A. Guerrero was President and Chairman of
"Guerrero Transport Services", a single proprietorship. Sometime in 1972, Guerrero
Transport Services won a bid for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs within the Subic
Naval Base, in Olongapo. As highest bidder, Guerrero was to "provide radio-controlled
taxi service within the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, utilizing as demand requires . . . 160
operational taxis consisting of four wheel, four-door, four passenger, radio controlled,
meter controlled, sedans, not more than one year . . . "
On September 22, 1972, with the advent of martial law, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Letter of Instruction No. 1.
On September 25, 1972, pursuant to the aforequoted Letter of Instruction, the Radio
Control Office issued Administrative Circular No. 4: Subject: Suspending the acceptance
and processing of applications for radio station construction permits and for permits to
own and/or possess radio transmitters or transceivers.
On September 25, 1972, Guerrero and Victorino D. Magat, as General Manager of
Spectrum Electronic Laboratories, a single proprietorship, executed a letter-contract for
the purchase of transceivers at a quoted price of US$77,620.59, FOB Yokohoma.
Victorino was to deliver the transceivers within 60 to 90 days after receiving notice from
Guerrero of the assigned radio frequency, "taking note of Government Regulations. The
contract was signed and Victorino contacted his Japanese supplier, Koide & Co., Ltd.
and placed an order for the transceivers.
On September 29, 1972, Navy Exchange Officer, A. G. Mason confirmed that Guerrero
won the bid for the commercial transportation contract. On October 4, 1972, middle
man and broker Isidro Q. Aligada of Reliance Group Engineers, Inc. , wrote Victorino,
informing him that a radio frequency was not yet assigned to Guerrero and that
government regulations might complicate the importation of the transceivers. However,
in the same letter, Victorino was advised to advise his supplier "to proceed (with)
production pending frequency information." Victorino was also assured of Guerrero's
financial capability to comply with the contract. On October 6, 1972, Guerrero informed
Aligada of the frequency number assigned by Subic Naval Base authorities. Aligada was
instructed to "proceed with the order thru Spectrum Electronics Laboratories." On
October 7, 1972, Aligada informed Magat of the assigned frequency number. Aligada

also advised Victorino to "proceed with the order upon receipt of letter of credit." On
January 10, 1973, Guerrero applied for a letter of credit with the Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company. This application was not pursued.
On March 27, 1973, Victorino, represented by his lawyer, Atty. Sinesio S. Vergara,
informed Guererro that the order with the Japanese supplier has not been canceled.
Should the contract be canceled, the Japanese firm would forfeit 30% of the deposit and
charge a cancellation fee in an amount not yet known, Guerrero to bear the loss.
Further, should the contract be canceled, Victorino would demand an additional amount
equivalent to 10% of the contract price.
Unable to get a letter of credit from the Central Bank due to the refusal of the Philippine
government to issue a permit to import the transceivers, Guerrero commenced
operation of the taxicabs within Subic Naval Base, using radio units borrowed from the
U.S. government. Victorino thus canceled his order with his Japanese supplier.
On May 22, 1973, Victorino filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati a complaint for
damages arising from breach of contract against Guerrero. On June 7, 1973, Guerrero
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. On
June 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On July
11, 1973, Victorino filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the
dismissal of the complaint.
On April 20, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the complaint sufficiently averred a
cause of action. The Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. On November 27, 1984, the trial court ordered that
the case be archived for failure of Victorino to prosecute. On March 11, 1985, petitioners,
Olivia, Dulce, Ma. Magnolia, Ronald and Dennis Magat, moved to reinstate the case and
to substitute Victorino in its prosecution. Apparently, Victorino died on February 18,
1985. On April 29, 1985, the trial court granted the motion.
On July 12, 1991, the trial court decided in favor of the heirs of Victorino and ordered
Guerrero to pay temperate, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. On
August 21, 1991, Guerrero appealed to the Court of Appeals. However it was dismissed.
On October 26, 1995, the heirs of Victorino filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration. On March 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the transceivers were contraband items prohibited by the LOI
and Administrative Circular to import; hence, the contract is void.
2. Whether or not the contract was breached.
RULING: Anent the 1st issue, NO. The contract was not void ab initio. Nowhere in the
LOI and Administrative Circular is there an express ban on the importation of

transceivers. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render radios and
transceivers illegally per se. The Administrative Circular merely ordered the Radio
Control Office to suspend the acceptance and processing of application for permits
to possess, own, transfer, purchase and sell radio transmitters and transceivers
therefore; possession and importation of the radio transmitters and transceivers was
legal provided one had the necessary license for it. The LOI and Administrative Circular
did not render the transceivers outside the commerce of man. They were valid objects of
the contract.
Anent the 2nd issue, NO. The contract was not breached. Affirming the validity of the
contract, the law provides that when the service (required by the contract) has become
so manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released
there from in whole or in parts. Here, Guerreros inability to secure a letter of credit and
to comply with his obligation was a direct consequence of the denial of the permit to
import. For this, he cannot be faulted. Even if the Court assumes that there was a breach
of contract, damages cannot be awarded. Damnum absque injuria comes into the fore.

Case No. 5
Heirs of Juan and Felipe Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-6600, July 30,
1954, 95 Phil 481)
FACTS:
On the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been
induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor
of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to
them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated
in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having
been duly accepted in the same act and documents.
Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the
requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring
that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past
services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely
without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the
dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.
The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter
was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter
vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the

donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired
during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were
only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.
In the Court of Appeals, majority of the justices declared that the aforesaid donations to be
null and void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the
testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to
surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two
justices, however, dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as
donations inter vivos.
HELD:
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or
else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the
widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the
Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed
the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by
merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus
suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary successions.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in
favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked)
and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67
Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed
by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the
owner's share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the
ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of
stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly

declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of

conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a
testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New
Civil Code, Art. 828).

Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990
RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as
Special Administrator, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch
VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents.
Facts:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was
survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1)
Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P.
Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto
Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro
Dalusong.
On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed a special proceeding for the
administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to
exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles
thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2,
1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are
included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and
therefore should be excluded from the inventory.
ISSUE:
Was the donation valid?
RULING:
The title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the
donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al.,
(44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donationwhether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the
deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed.

There is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation
inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula
Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services
rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties
donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The
provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation
to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to
give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of
the deed of donation.

CASE NO. 7
VITUG vs. CA
183 SCRA 755
FACTS:
Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico
Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death
of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.
ISSUES:
WON the survivorship agreement is a will.
WON it is valid.
RULING:
Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were
married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property.
The cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they
merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other. Since the wife predeceased her husband, the
latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the
savings account.

Case No. 8
G.R. No. 165554 : July 26, 2010LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO vs.
HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN, represented by CRESENCIA DE
GUZMAN-PRINCIPE
FACTS:
The present petition began with a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages filed
onDecember 13, 2000 by respondents, the heirs of Filomena de Guzman, represented by
Cresencia deGuzman-Principe, against petitioners Lauro Pasco and Lazaro Pasco. The
case was filed before theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan, and docketed
as Civil Case No. MM-3191.In their Complaint, herein respondents alleged that on
February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a loan inthe amount of 140,000.00 from
Filomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners loan, Lauro executed a chattel
mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her death, her heirs sought
tocollect from the petitioners, to no avail. Despite numerous demands, petitioners
refused to either paythe balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the
respondents. Thus, respondents wereconstrained to file the collection case to compel the
petitioners to pay the principal amount of 140,000.00 plus damages in the amount of
5% monthly interest from February 7, 1995, 25% attorneys fees, exemplary damages
and expenses of litigation.
ISSUES:
WON the Special Power of Attorney did not validly authorize Cresencia to enter
into theCompromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs.
RULING:
No. it is undisputed that Cresencias co -heirs executed a Special Power of
Attorney, dated April6, 1999, designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and
empowering her to file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her
estate. Consequently, Cresencia entered into the subject Compromise Agreement in
order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco from Filomena. In so doing,
Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-heirs pursuant
to the Special Power of Attorney given to her.

Case No. 9
CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS G.R.No. 168970 January 15,
2010 Peralta, J.:
Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo
and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land,
which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo,
Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property
was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction
held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed
by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff
executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was
issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific onethird portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The
Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted
knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the
Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein
respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a
Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of
respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed
petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but
the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his
share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the
respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with
the CA. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the
subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their coownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject

property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto
transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the
respondents from the Bank.
Held: The court is not persuaded.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the
fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was
stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on
October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor
of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is
neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo
died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive
ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.
In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case,
since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only
follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed
part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner
and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to
continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the
provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested
their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning
to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same.
Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of
each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and
giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference
from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

CASE NO. 10

DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED

February 25, 1999

FACTS:
Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land.
At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs.

On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, executed an
extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a
share of (1/3) pro-indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late
Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be
included to share in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the
heirs of Francisco.
ISSUE:
WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evaristas
estate.
HELD:
No. Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is
not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a
legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision
of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the
latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister,
Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is
Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother
Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs.
Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the
estate of Evarista.
Case No. 11
OPULENCIA VS CA
FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for Specific Performance against

Petitioner on the basis of a Contract to Sell of a lot in Sta. Rosa Laguna
wherein a downpayment of P300,000 was received by the Petitioner.
Petitioner admits these but claims that the subject property formed
part of the estate of her father in respect of which a petition for
probate was filed in the RTC. This was allegedly known by the
Respondents.
Petitioner claims that the same should be approved by the probate
court and upon realization of the nullity of the contract, she wanted to
have the contract rescinded and was willing to give back the
downpayment.
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner citing Rule 89 Section 7 which
allows the sale of properties subject of a probate proceeding provided
that it is beneficial to the estate and complies with the requirements of
the law. It further stated that where the administratrix realizes the
nullity of the transaction entered into, she is not estopped from
interposing the contracts nullity.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Courts decision. Hence, the
appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether a contract to sell a real property involved in an estate proceeding

valid and binding without the approval of the probate court?
HELD: YES
Contract to Sell Valid

Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because

petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of
the subject parcel of land.
The Supreme Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the
heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner,
therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her
father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell
the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
Administration of the Estate not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is

contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will
Testament of her father." 19 Consequently, although the Contract to Sell
was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during
the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the
sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private
respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to
the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore,
there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell
may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of
the estate.
Estoppel

Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her

valid Contract to Sell with private respondents, from whom she had
already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price.
Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the
prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them.
Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will
extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she
entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of
its consequences.

Case No. 12
CORONEL V. CA (October 07, 1996)
FACTS:
Coronel et al. consummated the sale of his property located in Quezon City to
respondent Alcaraz. Since the title of the property was still in the name of the deceased

father of the Coronels, they agreed to transfer its title to their name upon payment of the
down payment of 50K. and thereafter an absolute deed of sale will be executed.
Alcarazs mother paid the down payment in behalf of her daughter and as such, Coronel
made the transfer of title to their name. Notwithstanding this fact, Coronel sold the
property to petitioner Mabanag and rescinded its prior contract with Alcaraz.
ISSUE:
WON the rescission of the first contract between Coronel and Alcaraz is valid.
HELD:
The case is a contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition in which consummation
is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of
petitioners' father, to their names. Thus, the contract of sale became obligatory.
With regard to double sale, the rule that the first in time, stronger in right should apply.
The contention of the petitioner that she was a buyer in good faith because the notice of
lis pendens in the title was annotated after she bought the property is of no merit. In
case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the
second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers
such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the
property sold.
The ruling should be in favor of Alcaraz because Mabanag registered the property two
months after the notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title and hence, she cannot
be a buyer in good faith.

CASE NO. 13
PAULMITAN V. CA- CO-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other coowners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer.

FACTS:

The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona
Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascuals (7) children (Alicio,
Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato
and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself
Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was
cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot
1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was
forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Govt of Negros Occidental,
however, Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the
children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to partition
the land plus damages. Petitioners defense was that the action has already
prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and
that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by
redeeming the said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to
Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to of Lot
1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. The
land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the
respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the
redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of
their
mothers
lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property

HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states
that Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of
the deceased. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are
co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the coownership of the property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same

thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that
each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division
upon
the
termination
of
the
co-ownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana)
a co-owner.
(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The
right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share
alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of
the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.

Case No. 14 and 24

RIOFERIO vs. CA
January 13, 2004

FACTS:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and
real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom
he had seven children who are the herein respondents.
Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are
petitioner Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased)
discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City.
Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration.
Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents
are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada,
Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate
pending the appointment of an administrator.

HELD:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without
doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code
"that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the

heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This
is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules
on party representation.

Case No. 15
EMNACE vs. CA
November 23, 2001
FACTS:
Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a
business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986,
they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and
distribution of the partnership properties among them.

Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and

liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances.
Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3
share in the total assets of the partnership. Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action
for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
ISSUE:
WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner.
HELD:
No. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or
administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are
complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned
were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and
petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.
Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the
moment Vicente Tabanao died.
Case No. 16
Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the

said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under
the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person
for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted
that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights
involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case
No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality
and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning
and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is
so adjudged and decreed.

Case No. 17
BASILIA ARAYATA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-28067
March 10, 1928

VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS
Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the
right of lease to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon, municipality
of Tanza, Province of Cavite. On June 4, 1906, Cecilio Joya married the herein
plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land,
Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine Commission. While
married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had
been leasing, on installments, from the Government, under said Act No. 1120,
which were designated as lots Nos. 1031, 1058, 1086, 1153, 2352 and 547. As the
number of lots which a purchaser could acquire under the law was limited, lots

Nos. 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for sale. In order not to lose them,
Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary
funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio
Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the Director of Lands and
noted in the proper registry book. On April 24 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his
right to lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya consideration of the sum of P2,000 said
conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the
proper registry book. On May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot No.
547 to Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of P450,
conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the
proper registry book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will devising lot
No. 1058 to Florentino Joya, lot No. 1086 to Pablo Joya, lot No. 1031 to Delfin
and Felicisima Blancaflor, lot No. 1153 to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya,
lot No. 2352 to Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and lot No. 547 to Marcelina
and Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed
the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government.
All the lots in question except lot No. 547, are in the possession of the defendants,
who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 lots Nos. 2352, 1086, 1153 and 1031,
were transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Cecilio Joya.
On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his executor, the
herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper proceedings. In
March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary proceedings, the executor
Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the legatees,
which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's
opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.

ISSUES
(1)Has the plaintiff-appellant, as the surviving spouse, exclusive right to all the
lots in question?
(2) In case she has, is she entitled to the possession and products thereof?
HELD
(1) YES. [H]older[s] of a certificate of sale of friar lands, who has not fully
paid the purchase price may transfer and convey his rights, but that the
transferee or grantee is not subrogated to all the transferor's right until the
transfer has been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the registry
book in the Bureau of Public Lands. In other words, in order that a transfer of the
rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is
necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law
authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of

sale of friar lands. If, as it was held in the case of Jocson vs. Soriano, the right
conferred by Act No. 1120 on the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands in
similar to that conferred on the holder of a "homestead," and if the latter has no
right to dispose of said certificate by will to the prejudice of his surviving spouse
and for his children (29 C. J., 930, par. 342), then by analogy, the holder of a
certificate of sale of friar lands cannot dispose of his rights to said lands by will to
the prejudice of his widow and children.

(2) YES. The defendants, who are in possession of the said lands, cannot
invoke the provisions of the Civil Code relative to possession in good faith,
inasmuch as the principle on which the right of a holder in good faith is based is
the belief that his possession is with just title under claim of ownership.
While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the property
given them in the will and may taken possession of their respective portions upon
the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an administrator, the
latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the
property of estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless he consents to the
heirs continuing in possession thereof. (Pimentel vs. Palanca; Fernandez vs.
Tria).
Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead ignorance
of the fact that until a judicial partition of the property left by Cecilio Joya is
made, said property belongs to the lather's estate and it together with its
products, is subject to the payment of the testator's debts, if any. Only after
judicial partition has been made do they acquire the title to their respective
legacies, if the latter are valid. (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
Caceres, 45 Phil., 895.)
In conclusion, the defendants are not entitled to the possession of the
lands in question or their products, and they are bound to return them to the
herein plaintiff-appellant, after deducting the necessary expenses for cultivation
and preservation. (Art 453, Civil Code.)

Case No. 18
ALVAREZ vs. IAC
May 7, 1990
FACTS:

Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B. Aniceto Yanes
was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the
other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora
was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his
children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World
War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not
visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there
to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato
Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After
Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to
Rosendo Alvarez.
On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a
complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession
of Lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for
P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo
Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots.
ISSUE:
WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A
and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners
without violation of law and due process.
RULING:
The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility
of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and
heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered
by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is

ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in
fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative
position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners
being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences
of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

Case No. 33

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

111 SCRA 82

FACTS:
Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle
Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2
parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2 nd part to the grandnephews the naked
ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2 nd part, 1/3 was given to the
widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed
on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

ISSUE:
WON the ground for the opposition is correct.

HELD:
No, it is not correct.
The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens
to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession
for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld
the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Case No. 71
RABADILLA vs. CA
June 29, 2000

FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner,
Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil
provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to
give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil.
ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his
heirs.
HELD:
Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form
part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.

CASE NO. 115

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA
January 31, 2005
FACTS:
Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in 1940. It was asserted that the will
of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the
testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles
804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
What law shall govern the validity of the will?

HELD:
The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil
Procedure. Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act
No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the
enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of
the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is
not necessary in the execution of any will. Abadas will does not require
acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its
form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.

Case No. 127

ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA
September 14, 1993

FACTS:
The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in
the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The
latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that
time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and

revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did
not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who
read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses
(same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using
their own copies.
ISSUE:
Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?
HELD:
Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who,
for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the
will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness. However,
the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was
substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose
of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary
privilege.
In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior
and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement
take place.

CASE NO. 166

RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA
17 SCRA 41
FACTS:
In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding
instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died
without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding was
instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is
settled if that person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was
instituted ahead of the other.
ISSUE:

Which proceeding should be preferred?

RULING:
As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed
later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be
given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The
wishes of the testator must be given such preference first. Probate of the will is needed
in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will
was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the
testator executed it with a sound mind.
If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly
executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate.

Case No. 178

ACAIN vs. IAC
October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The
will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to
his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property
shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the
latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

Insofar as the

widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no

mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or

real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest
in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of
respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not
an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left
by the deceased.

CASE NO. 191

VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO
4 SCRA 550
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina of all his real and personal
properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.
Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the
widows death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed
under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.
ISSUE:

WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death
of Dona Faustina.
HELD:
The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his
wife Doa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the
properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any
children with the deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired ownership
over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the
property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those properties actually
belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator
wanted to give the properties to Doa Fausta then he should have
specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doa Fausta
without mentioning any condition.

Case no. 192.

MICIANO vs. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in
accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever would
oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine
laws would forfeit their inheritance
ISSUE:
Will there be forfeiture?

HELD:
Even if the testators wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes
of the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in
a will should not be given effect. A persons will is merely an instrument which is
PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions of the
Philippine laws.
The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his
national law. He cannot provide otherwise.
The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because
that provision is not legal.

Case No. 205

MANINANG vs. CA
June 19, 1982
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be
inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the
last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted
son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia
Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?

HELD:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the
terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited,
and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for
a cause authorized by law.
By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court
was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face
of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The
Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.

Case No. 263

NON vs. CA
February 15, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to
coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her
brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its
annulment.
ISSUE:

Was preterition present that would warrant annulment?

HELD:
When Virginia died intestate, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog
property included, was transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their
children. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent,
remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition.
Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud, forgery and undue influence
occurred.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of
extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition,
however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral
attack on the TCT issued. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the
effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the
value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper
valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia
Viado.