Previous Page

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

ACCIDENT Bellows fail due to surge pressure!!!

An export pump was started with its discharge valve fully open and the suction
valve at the tank closed. The resulting pressure surge wave caused the tie-bar
mounted lugs on the suction line bellows to fail, ripping open the outlet pipe
from a storage tank. This resulted in the spillage of 50,000 litres (13,200 US
gallons) of ultra low sulphur petrol/gasoline, which was contained within the
tank bund/dike. A layer of foam was applied to the spill area to prevent ignition.

Details of bellows failure

5.10 Emergency release coupling (ERC)

ERC is also termed Dry Break Coupling. The ERC where fitted forms an
important part of an emergency release system for marine loading arms, and is
designed to safely disconnect the arm from the ship with minimum spillage in
an emergency.
Schematic of typical ERC
1) Ball valve loading arm side
2) Ball valve ship side
3) Clamping system
4) Double acting hydraulic cylinder
5) Ball valve actuating lever
6) Push rod system
7) Lock nut
8) Shear pin (ball valve)
9) Shear pin (disconnection)

97

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

Loading arm
side isolating
ball valve
Disconnection
clamp
Ship side isolating
ball valve

Connection
to ships
manifold

Main elements of an ERC

A picture of an ERC
Taken from Schwelm Verladetechnik GmbH

The ERC as shown in the diagram above is operated by one hydraulic cylinder
that closes the ball valves and subsequently separates the clamp connection.
The most important feature of the ERC is to ensure full closure of the valves
before disconnection. Special tools are normally required to re-open and
reassemble the ERC after disconnection.

In an emergency ball valves close and coupling disconnnects

Taken from Liquefied Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals, McGuire
and White

98

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

Good practice

The design of the system must undergo a Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis to prove inherent integrity.

The ERC mechanism should be protected from interference by jetty

personnel.

The staff involved in operation and maintenance of loading arms need to

understand exactly how the ERC works.

The system should not be used in normal operations to shut off flow.

Full ERC separation tests should be performed annually.

Maintenance/troubleshooting should be authorized through the Permit-toWork system.

Functional tests where the ball valves shut and the ERC is stroked should
be performed prior to each shipment.

No maintenance or troubleshooting of the ERC should be carried out

unless it is disarmed and bolted with safety bolts.

ACCIDENT Failure of
emergency release coupling
at jetty!!!
An ERC inadvertently activated
disconnecting the loading arm
without prior closing of the
isolating valves, resulting in the
release of approximately 8.5 tons
of propylene which fortunately
did not ignite.

View as propylene cloud develops. The aft of

the LPG carrier is the only apparent part of
the vessel.

ERC must only be released if isolating ball valves are SHUT first.
The integrity of the interlock mechanism must be guaranteed.

Lessons learned

Operating and maintenance manuals on ERCs should identify all safety

critical items with their inspection, maintenance and testing requirements.

Competency assessment should be an integral part of any quality training

and refresher training program for jetty operators.

Location and testing of ESD at jetties is critical for a quick and reliable
effective response to an emergency.

99

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

5.11 Quick connect/disconnect couplers (QC/DC)

A QC/DC is either a manually or hydraulically operated device used to clamp
the loading arm flange to the ships manifold without the use of bolts. The
QC/DC must be provided with an interlock to prevent any possibility of an
inadvertent release.
All QC/DC devices should be designed, tested and maintained in accordance
with OCIMF specification for marine loading arms.

A QC/DC and ERC located on a loading arm

100

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

ACCIDENT Failure of ship/shore couplers(QC/DC)Case 1!!!

A component within a ship/shore quick connect/disconnect (QCDC) coupler
failed during operation, causing a coil spring to eject violently.
The key lessons are as follows:

Pre-load on the QC/DC coupler springs could be accidentally altered,

increasing the operating load on the knuckle joints to an unacceptable
degree, if the grub screws that fix them to the spring struts become
loose.

Some ships may carry thicker flanges that could exceed the operating
tolerance of the coupling. Jetty operators need a simple template to
check the thickness and diameter of flanges on ships manifold before
attempting to operate a QC/DC device.

Gaskets should not be used on the joint as QC/DC devices are generally
designed to seal metal to metal with a fixed O-ring insert.

ACCIDENT Failure of ship/shore couplersCase 2!!!

The ram shaft of a coupler failed when the pivot
point seizedthe shaft being subjected to
extreme pressure when it was in the open
position. All moving parts require periodic
lubrication (greased).

101

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

5.12 Inert gas

Where ships are required to be fitted with operational inert gas or nitrogen
systems, the following conditions must be maintained:

Closed gauging systems that are normally fitted with vapour locks to
permit sampling without reducing the inert gas pressure.

Positive pressure in the cargo tanks and slops tanks to prevent any air
being drawn in. Failure of the inert gas system requires immediate
attention by the ships master.

General layout of inert gas system on a ship

Inert gas systems must remain fully operational during the

discharge of cargo.
When a ship is fitted with an Inert gas system, it should be used,
whatever the product being handled.

102

SAFE TANK FARMS AND (UN)LOADING OPERATIONS

ACCIDENT Crew member is overcome by inert gas and H2S when

opening gauge hatch!!!
A ship was discharging with the cargo tanks inerted and under positive
pressure. A crew member was on the ships deck engaged in cleaning the
sensor on a cargo tank measurement gauge. Some five minutes after going
to attend to the task, the crew member was found dead beside a tank gauge.
The cargo tank was fitted with a vapour lock arrangement to facilitate
cleaning of the sensor but this was not used. Instead an inspection plate had
been removed from the side of the gauge exposing the deceased to a high
concentration of H2S and N2 from the cargo vapour space.

The measurement cargo gauge on the ship

There was a failure to transmit the H2S hazard of the cargo and precautionary
measures through procedures such as the ship/shore safety checklist at
loading and discharge ports. However, by breaking containment, the crew
member was also exposed to a local environment deficient in oxygen.
Exposure to an atmosphere containing less than 10% oxygen content by
volume inevitably causes unconsciousness irrespective of the H2S content.
Death can result unless the victim is removed to the open air and resuscitated
quickly. Refer to BP Process Safety Booklet Hazards of Nitrogen and Catalyst
Handling.
Pyrophoric iron sulphide is formed when H2S reacts with rusted steel in the
absence of oxygen. Iron sulphide deposits will heat and autoignite when
coming into contact with air. Crude oil ships must therefore ensure that a
failed inert gas system is repaired and restarted before discharge or
deballasting is allowed to continue.

103