Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Le Cong Dinh’s Subversion
Trial
Carlyle A. Thayer
January 18, 2010
[client name deleted] 
QUESTION: Why is the Le Cong Dinh case unique and/or important?  
ANSWER:  The  Le  Cong  Dinh  case  is  important  because  it  involved  one  of  the  most 
high‐profile members of the elite in Vietnamese society to be charged not only with 
spreading  anti‐state  propaganda  but  with  subversion.  Dinh  received  a  privileged 
education in the United States on a Fulbright scholarship where he received an M.A. 
from  Tulane  University.  On  return  to  Vietnam  he  served  as  deputy  head  of  the  Ho 
Chi Minh Bar Association and was praised in the state media. He gained publicity for 
defending  Vietnamese  fishermen  in  the  catfish  case.  But  Le  Cong  Dinh  gained 
notoriety in 2007 when he defended pro‐democracy activists who were put on trial.  
Influential members of Vietnam’s part elite saw this as an act of apostasy. 
Le  Cong  Dinh  also  doesn't  fit  the  normal  mold  for  a  pro‐democracy  dissident  in 
Vietnam.  He  has  not  confined  his  political  writings  to  calls  for  greater  democratic 
freedom,  political  pluralism  and  multiparty  democracy  but  has  written  on  a  wide 
variety  of  topics  including  bauxite  mining,  the  South  China  Sea  and  corruption  by 
senior leaders, reportedly including the Prime Minister himself. 
QUESTION: What does the Le Cong Dinh case say about politics in Vietnam today? 
ANSWER:  Le Cong Dinh’s case has provided the opportunity for party conservatives 
and  those  charged  with  ideological  rectitude  and  public  security  to  seize  the  high 
ground as Vietnam approaches the run up to the eleventh national party congress. In 
the  past  forthcoming  party  congresses  have  been  the  lightning  rods  for  those 
advocating  greater  internal  party  democracy  and  greater  political  liberalization  in 
society at large.  
In the past, party progressives have called for the dropping of the term “dictatorship 
of the proletariat” and even “communist” from the name of the Vietnam Communist 
Party. At the last congress in 2006 party delegates demanded that they be given the 
right to elect the party secretary general rather than be given only one choice. 
Party conservatives see Vietnam under threat from  the  global  financial crisis.  Their 
default position is to argue that political stability should take precedence. They have 
raised the stakes in the Le Cong Dinh case to pre‐empt those in the party who would 
push for greater inner‐party democratization and political liberalization in society. 
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QUESTION: Vietnam has jailed plenty of pro‐democracy lawyers in the past, does Le 
Cong  Dinh  stand  out?  And  what  do  think  is  significant  politically  about  the  more 
serious  subversion  charge  (as  opposed  to  spreading  anti‐state  propaganda),  if 
anything? 
ANSWER:  Le  Cong  Dinh  moved  from  advocacy  to  organizing.  The  real  hot  button 
issue in his case is the drafting of a political program setting out a strategy to attain 
political  power  in  Vietnam  and  drafting  a  state  constitution  to  replace  the  present 
one. Dinh’s Democratic Party of Vietnam sought to use non‐violent means to achieve 
their  objectives.  This  set  off  alarm  bells  among  the  security  establishment  and 
provided  evidence  that  their  fears  of  peaceful  evolution  and  “colour  revolution” 
were well‐grounded. 
Obviously  the  Le  Cong  Dinh  case,  with  the  possibility  that  the  draconian  death 
penalty  might  be  imposed,  is  designed  to  intimidate  non‐party  members  in  society 
from  using  the  party  congress  process  as  a  launch  pad  for  further  pro‐democracy 
agitation, whether on the internet, blog sites, leaflets or public demonstrations. 
 
 
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Political Dissidents and
Human Rights
Carlyle A. Thayer
August 24, 2009
[client name deleted}
Context: are there any reasons in particular why Hanoi would be pursuing these cases now,
as opposed to last year or just letting the situation simmer for a while longer?
The current government of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is under fire for his handling of
the bauxite mining controversy and the related issue of Vietnam’s relations with China. The
recently arrested political dissidents have extended their activities from advocating democracy
to criticizing the government for its handling of these issues. One refrain in the attacks in the
state media is that they have distorted state policy (relations with China) and defamed the
prime minister (alleging corruption).
The recent arrests may be explained, first, by stating the obvious: the Ministry of Public
Security had accumulated enough evidence to take action. After it made one arrest it followed
upon “information given” to make further arrests. The key date is late March this year when Le
Cong Dinh and associate made contact with Vietnam Democratic Party representatives in
Phuket, Thailand. Approximately three months passed from this meeting until the first arrest.
I have developed a second interpretation for the timing. In mid-year the Central Committee
held a plenum which announced that planning had begun for the eleventh party congress in
early 2011. This means that sub-committees will be set up to review a range of policy
documents and make recommendations for leadership change. It is almost certain that party
secretary general Nong Duc Manh will retire. The conservatives view him as lack luster and
over shadowed by the prime minister.
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung is widely viewed as having taken too prominent a role in the
bauxite mining issue to his detriment. It may be that he will not serve another five year term.
One final piece of the puzzle before I try to pull this together: Vietnam has quietly ratcheted up
defence relations with the United States. Military officials were flown to a US aircraft carrier in
the South China Sea to observe operations, a US navy ship was permitted to enter
Vietnamese territorial waters for the first time to search for pilots who may have been lost at
sea. And recently the 13th air force held talks about future cooperation with their Vietnamese
counterparts. Unconfirmed rumours report that the Vietnamese defence minister may visit
Washington later this year.
Party conservatives are always concerned when there is a potential for political instability.
The current global financial crisis has heightened their concerns. Conservatives prefer close
relations with China and are likely to be anxious about growing anti-China sentiment among
the elite public and the warming in US-Vietnam defence ties. The political dissidents were an
obvious target. Prime Minister Dung is not really a political reformer and it wouldn’t have
taken much of an effort to get him to sign off on the arrest of political dissidents. Political
reformers in the party have been snookered because the political dissidents have been linked
with plots to overthrow the socialist state in a “coup d’etat”. Some state media have blatantly
linked the political dissidents to a long-standing U.S. desire to overthrow communist one-party
rule. Party reformers can hardly advocate more opening up in this climate.
 2

Party conservatives are seeking to influence policy deliberations in preparation for the
eleventh party congress. They hope to elevate one of their ranks to top leadership of the
party, and to influence policy documents to limit the scope of political liberalization. Party
reformers are on the defensive given the weak position of prime minister Dung.
Human Rights: Also keen to get your thoughts on measures the U.S. or other outside
countries have or haven't been taking to encourage human rights in Vietnam lately; in
particular, does this appear to have been on the Obama Administration's radar screen at all?
There are no major western democracies pushing a strong human rights line in Vietnam at
the moment, not the US and not Australia. When the issue of human rights/religious freedom
was raised in the Congress, both the US Ambassador in Vietnam and the State Department
went on record stating there was no justification for putting Vietnam back on the list of
Countries of Particular Concern.
I believe that the US sees Vietnam as an emerging strong regional player and possible
strategic partner. The Obama Administration appears to be moving to step up relations with
Vietnam. Testimony by the Assistant Secretary of Defence to the Senate Foreign Relations
sub-committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stating that the US would assert freedom of
navigation on the high seas, reject maritime territorial claims not based on lad and resist
Chinese intimidation of lawful US commercial interest (in dealing with Vietnam’s oil sector),
must have been music to Hanoi’s ears. 
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Crackdown on Dissent
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 12, 2009

[client name deleted]

Subsequent to your Background Brief on Le Cong Dinh (July 2, 2009) there have been the
further arrests of Tran Anh Kim and Nguyen Tien Trung. Could you offer an assessment of
the following:
Q1) To what extent could all these arrests be seen as part of an ongoing crackdown since
2007 or even earlier ?
ANSWER: The current spate of arrests is definitely a continuation of repression of pro-
democracy activists who were part of emerging pro-democracy network exemplified by Bloc
8406 but also involving a disparate groups of other activists. Specifically, the arrests of Le
Cong Dinh and Tran Anh Kim are connected to Bloc 8406, while Nguyen Tien Trung is part of
a crackdown on the larger network of pro-democracy activists.
Q2) You mentioned that "the Dinh case is aimed at intimidating and silencing domestic critics
who might have become emboldened to become more politically active." So, to what extent is
there both domestically and externally a GROWING movement of dissent, criticism against
Party rule ?
ANSWER: The current group of activists who have been arrested do not represent a growing
movement of dissent so much as a revival of dissent after the repression of 2007. Le Cong
Dinh had been given quite a bit of leeway to express and propagate his views, and his short
lived success inspired others. This current crackdown demonstrates the importance of both
the internet and overseas connections in sustaining the pro-democracy network and the
Vietnamese regime’s extreme sensitivity to such dissent.
3) You also said "The Le Cong Dinh case will most definitely cast a chill over party members
who would like to see greater political liberalization." To what extent are there differences
within the Party leadership over how to respond to domestic/external critics of the Party ?
ANSWER: One can find inside the Vietnam Communist Party today the entire spectrum of
political views aired by non-party political dissidents. But party members who hold progressive
views keep themselves within ‘acceptable bounds’ when expressing their viewpoints. Most
party members whom I have spoken to are not particularly sympathetic towards pro-
democracy activists. The dissidents are seen as individualists who make common cause with
overseas Vietnamese. Party members who are progressive and reform-minded see political
liberalization as party-led and they dismiss the pretensions of pro-democracy activists to
speak on behalf of the people.
The debate within the party, insofar as I can discern, is over how to be more sophisticated in
treating dissidents. In other words, how to convey in propaganda and information activities
that the regime is acting legitimately within the law.
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing: Nguyen
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Tien Trung and Tran Anh
Kim
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 9, 2009

[client name deleted]

QUESTION: the arrests of Nguyen Tien Trung and Tran Anh Kim have been announced.
Could you offer an assessment of these additional arrests? How you analyze the logic behind
all the arrests that happened over the past weeks?

ANSWER: It is impossible to know the exact reasons for the timing of the current round of
arrests of pro-democracy activists. It could be that the Ministry of Public Security finally
completed its investigation and persuaded the leadership to act. It is also possible to
speculate that internal party politics played a role. The recent tenth plenum marked the start
of the ‘political season’ between now and the next party congress. It is the half way point and
the party will be busy setting up policy sub-committees and determining the new leadership
line up. It is early days. but party conservatives may feel that the multiple pressures of
renewed pro-democracy activism coupled with the bauxite issue and Chinese assertiveness
in the South China Sea call for a united home front. This has naturally led to repression of
those who are vocal critics of the party-government policy.

The arrests of Nguyen Tien Trung and Tran Anh Kim are a sign that the security authorities
are rounding up a revived pro-democracy movement after the repression against Bloc 8406.
In the cases of Le Cong Dinh and Nguyen Tien Trung pro-democracy activism has spilled
over into criticism of China and the government’s handling of relations with Beijing. The
government has censored the newspaper Dan Tri for its support of the patriotic students who
demonstrated in late 2007. The newspaper Du Lich has also been suppressed for its criticism
of China. And finally, the joint website between the Chinese and Vietnamese trade ministries
has been temporarily shut down following posting of messages by China critical of Vietnam
on the South China Sea.
 Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:
ABN # 65 648 097 123
Le Cong Dinh
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 2, 2009

[client name deleted]

About lawyer Le Cong Dinh case. since the arrest, we have seen a lot of details in the
Vietnamese media and I would have been interested in getting your comments on the
following points:
Q1-Would you describe the whole case as unusually publicized ?
ANSWER: The Le Cong Dinh case represents an unprecedented use of ‘information warfare’
by the communist regime. Le Cong Dinh’s arrest was announced by simultaneous press
conferences in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and an orchestrated propaganda campaign in the
state-controlled media including the press, radio and television. Details of his affidavit were
termed a confession and released publicly. Le Cong Dinh has been effectively tried and
convicted even before appearing in court.
Q2-If yes, how do you explain this ? Could it be linked to increased criticism against the
government in the bauxite case, in the country relation with China ? Do you think the
Vietnamese authorities are trying to send a signal to people who have openly criticized them
recently ? Could it also be linked to the approach of the next congress (2011 but they seem to
have started preparing it already).
ANSWER: There are a number of interrelated issues which explain the reaction of Vietnam’s
one-party state with respect to Le Cong Dinh. First and foremost is that he made contact with
overseas so-called reactionary organizations including the Viet Tan that planned political
activities in Vietnam. In sum, the communist regime and its security apparatus clearly view
Dinh as a subversive.
Second, Le Cong Dinh has written numerous articles and blogs under various pseudonyms.
He has commented on a wide number of issues. But it was his blogs relating to the PSI case
involving misuse of Japanese ODA and alleged corruption in the award of the bauxite
contract, which reportedly traced back to Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, that landed him in
hot water. This demonstrates that even so-called reformers or progressives in the
establishment cannot countenance independent criticism.
Third, up to now only General Vo Nguyen Giap has had the temerity to raise the question of
China and national security in the bauxite case. Virtually all critics of bauxite mining used
arguments that stressed environmental, economic and social impacts. They shied away from
the China factor. Not so Le Cong Dinh. Relations with China are always a sensitive issue and
from the point of view of the government, Dinh crossed a red line. The current party
leadership is so sensitive to any criticism that questions their stewardship of national security
and Vietnamese nationalism that their default position is to strike out and suppress such
criticism.
Fourth, the current party Central Committee plenum was planned long ago and is meeting
according to an established schedule. It is now the mid-point between five yearly congresses
and the party will begin making preparations for the eleventh congress. Over the next
eighteen to twenty months internal party tensions over various policy issues will surface as
sub-committees work on the party’s platform, long-term socio-economic development
 2

strategies, and most importantly, new leadership. The Le Cong Dinh case will most definitely
cast a chill over party members who would like to see greater political liberalization.
Q3-Would you say the way the Vietnamese authorities are handling this case since the lawyer
was arrested reveals something special, more general, about Vietnam now, its political
system, the human rights situation, the way the authorities are handling those issues ?
ANSWER: The most important aspect of the Le Cong Dinh case is that it demonstrates the
ruthless application of the government’s recently approved policy of using ‘information and
propaganda’ to project its case in a more sophisticated and targeted manner by acting more
proactively.
Recall the case of Father Nguyen Van Ly which was broadcast on closed circuit television to
foreign diplomats and observers. This attempt to manipulate his trial to serve the ends of the
state backfired when Father Ly was physically muzzled and his photo was sent around the
world. Vietnam, instead of retreating, has developed a new playbook to manipulate
information to justify its actions.
The Le Cong Dinh case illustrates several aspects about contemporary Vietnam. First, it
demonstrates that the regime will repress any person who makes contacts with overseas pro-
democracy parties, whom the regime brands as ‘terrorist’ and ‘reactionary’. Second, the Dinh
case is aimed at intimidating and silencing domestic critics who might have become
emboldened to become more politically active. As Vietnam moves to convene the eleventh
party congress, the public will be invited to make comments on key policy documents. The
response in 2006 was overwhelming. The communist regime is demonstrating that it will
suppress any criticism that questions its legitimacy to rule. Third, the Dinh case may be
viewed as a kind of shadow play directed by conservative forces within the party, mainly
centred in the public security bloc and information ministry and departments, to demonstrate
their strength as Vietnam enters the political season in the lead up to the eleventh national
party congress. They want to preempt the discussion on the future nature and shape of
political reforms in Vietnam.