/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

13:48:00 PM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
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13:48:00 PM

RobertGrosseteste
on IJght,Truthand Experimentm
SIMON OLIVER

In outliningthe major shiftsin the practiceof naturalphilosophywhich

contributedto the rise of modernscience,one mightpoint to two developmentsas being of particularimportance:the increaseduse of experiment, namely the contrivedobservation of nature rather than mere
Aristotelianempdria'and the wider deploymentand increasingsophistication of mathematics.Is it possible to findany traces of such practices
in the mediaeval schools?1It has been argued that in the work of two
OxfordFranciscans,Robert Grosseteste(c. 1170-1253) and Roger Bacon
(c. 1220-c. 1292),2 one findsboth the practiceof experimentalobservation
or scientia
in the confirmation
and falsification
(theexperimentm
experimentalis)
of hypotheses,and the more ready use of mathematicalanalysis.3This
1 The relationship
between
mediaeval
natural
andmodern
natural
science
philosophy
is muchcontested.
P. Duhem,
Le Systme
duMonde:
Histoires
desdoctrines
See,forexample,
dePlaton
Copernic
Duhemfocuses
on
cosmologiques
(10vols),Paris1913-1959.
particularly
thecontinuity
between
Aristotelian
scienceand earlymodern
Fora prcisof
physics.
Duhem's
in:P. Duhem,
R. Ariew
and
view,seehisessayHistory
ofPhysics
(ed.andtrans.
P. Barker),
inthe
andPhilosophy
Ofthose
, Indianapolis
Essays
1996,163-221.
History
ofScience
whocontest
the'continuity
a prominent
is A. Maier(ed.andtrans.
S. D.
thesis',
example
OntheThreshold
Science:
selected
Maier
onlatemedieval
natSargent),
ofExact
writings
ofAnneliese
uralphilosophy
1982.Fora recent
discussion
ofmanypertinent
see
, Pennsylvania
issues,
M.J. Osler(ed.),Rethinking
theScientific
Revolution
2000.
, Cambridge
2 Although
Grosseteste
wasclosely
associated
withtheFranciscans,
their
first
becoming
Lectorin Oxford
around1230in theyearsbefore
theSee ofLincoln,
he never
taking
Robert
Grosseteste:
joinedtheOrder.Bacontookthehabitaround1257.See R. Southern,
TheGrowth
Mind
inMedieval
Introduction:
, Oxford
ofanEnglish
1986,ch.4 andA. Little,
Europe
OnRoger
Bacon's
in:'A. Little(ed.),Roger
Bacon:
contributed
LifeandWorks,
essays
byvarious
writers
onthecommemoration
, Oxford
oftheseventh
century
ofhisbirth
1914,1-32.
3 The suggestion
thatBacon,in particular,
wasthefounder
ofexperimental
science
is
foundin thecomments
ofthenineteenth
mathematician
and scientist
William
century
Whewell
whowrote
that'RogerBacon'sworks
arenotonlyso farbeyond
hisagein the
whichtheycontain,
butso different
in thetemper
ofthetimes,
in hisasserknowledge
tionofthesupremacy
ofexperiment,
andin hiscontemplation
ofthefuture
of
progress
thatitisdifficult
toconceive
howsucha character
couldthenexist.'
knowledge,
(W Whewell,
Science
, 2 vols,NewYork1858,3rded.,vol.1,245).It becamecomoftheInductive
History
in thelaternineteenth
andearlytwentieth
centuries
todevelop
thisassessment
monplace
ofBaconwhich
wasitself
derived
from
thepraisegivenbyhisnamesake
Francis
Bacon,
a writer
whowasotherwise
aboutmediaeval
natural
Forparticudisparaging
philosophy.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,2

13:48:11 PM

152

SIMONOLIVER

theirapproach fromthe variousAristotelianisms

of the later
distinguishes
middleages and suggeststhatmodernnaturalsciencemay have identifiable
originsprior to the Oxford Calculatorsor nominalistsof the fourteenth
century,and long beforeKepler, Galileo or Newton.
From where does this emphasison mathematicsand the experimentm
emerge?It has its conceptual originsin the Neoplatonicimage of light
as a 'formativepower and form'of nature and a means of knowledge
by illumination.4This Hellenistictraditionis the source of vivid light
imagerydeployed throughoutearly mediaeval Christian,Muslim and
Jewishtheology,forexample in the worksof St. Augustine,St. Basil, alFarabi, Avicennaand Avicebron.5With scripturalprecedent,lightis associated with the life of God, emanationfromdivine being in the act of
creationand the formof truth.Given that Grossetesteand Bacon were
steeped in thistradition,particularlythroughthe worksof St. Augustine
and the mysticaltheologyof the Franciscans,6it is unsurprising
to find

ofRogerBaconas an experimental
scientist,
see,forexample,
larlyenthusiastic
appraisals
theintroduction
to Robert
translation
ofBacon'sOpusMajus:TheOpusMajusof
Bridges'
Bacon
Bacon:
Sa vie,sesouvrages
, 3 vols,London1900;E. Charles,
, sesdoctrines
,
Roger
Roger
Paris1861,102if.;C. Singer,
TheDarkAgesandtheDawn
, in:F. S. Marvin
(ed.),Science
andCivilization
TheFather
not
, London1923,139-43;
ofEmpiricism:
JosephKupfer,
Roger
Francis
Bacon
onScientia
22 (1974),52-62;
, in:Vivarium,
J. Hackett,
Roger
Experimentalis,
in:idem(ed.),Roger
Bacon
andtheSciences
: commemorative
For
, Leiden1997,277-315.
essays
theviewthatBaconis nota precursor
ofmodern
see,forexample,
science,
experimental
D. Lindberg,
A Critical
Bacon's
Edition
, with
Translation,
Roger
ofNature:
Philosophy
English
andNotes,
andDe speculis
Introduction,
comburentibus,
ofDe Multiplicatione
Specierum
Oxford
W. Lovitt),
TheQuestion
1983,liiiff.andM. Heidegger
(trans.
Concerning
Technolog))
andother
theexperimentm
, NewYork1977,122:'If,now,RogerBacondemands
essays
andhe doesdemand
it- he doesnotmeantheexperiment
ofscience
as research;
rather
he wantstheargumentum
exreinstead
oftheargumentum
exverbo
of
, thecareful
observing
i.e. Aristotelian
ofthediscussion
ofdoctrines.'
Bacon
themselves,
, instead
things
empeiria
wasdeeply
indebted
to theworkofGrosseteste
whohashimself
beenunderstood
as a
forerunner
ofmodern
science.
Thisviewreceives
itsmostsustained
defence
experimental
inA. C. Crombie,
Robert
Grosseteste
andtheOrigins
Science
1100-1700
, Oxford
ofExperimental
1953.Crombie's
hasproved
in detailbelow.Forfurthesis
controversial
andis discussed
thercomments,
A. Koyr,
ANewInterpretation
TheOrigins
Science:
see,forexample,
,
ofModern
in:Diogenes,
16 (1956),1-22.
4 See,forexample,
DeDivinis
Nominibus
, IV.697cff.;Plotinus,
Enneads,
Pseudo-Dionysius,
1.6.3;III.8.5and 11;IV.3.11;V.5.7;VI.7.41,etpassim.
5 See,forexample,
St. Augustine,
De Trinitate
, II.2, IV.27,VII.3 to 5, VIII.2 and 3,
XII.15;St.Basil,Hexameron
Fora detailed
ofAugustine's
, II.7 ff.,
VI, etpassim.
description
usesoflightimagery,
seeF.-J.Thonnard,
La notion
delumire
enphilosophie
, in:
augustinienne
Recherches
andR. A. Markus,
Reason
andIllumination
1962,124-75
,
Augustiniennes,
Augustine:
in:A. H. Armstrong
Greek
andEarly
Medieval
(ed.),TheCambridge
History
ofLater
Philosophy
,
Cambridge
1970,362-73.
6 On theimportance
oflightin Franciscan
anditsrelationship
to
spiritual
mysticism

13:48:11 PM

ON LIGHT,TRUTHANDEXPERIMENTM
GROSSETESTE

153

lightas a centraland unifyingtheme in theirwritingson natural phiAn emphasison the natureand meanand theology.7
losophy,metaphysics
a
between
of
bond
observation, natural philosophy,
ing
light forges
and theologyfora numberof reasons.Initially,
mathematics,
metaphysics
fourof thesemeritparticularmention.First,lightwas implicatedin many
naturalphenomena:the rainbow,
of the most fascinatingand mysterious
the halo surroundingthe atmosphereand light'spresencein the uncorrupted and perfectlymoving celestialbodies. Secondly,it is lightitself
which is the formof truthand which makes all thingsboth visibleand
knowable.8Thus observation,the experimentm
, is intimatelylinkedto the
attainmentof truththroughthe mediationof light,both spiritualand visinto the behaviour
ible. Thirdly,througha long traditionof investigation
in
of light(perspectiva
the
works
of
Euclid
and
), exemplified
Ptolemy'streatiseson optics,it was knownthatvisiblelightacts accordingto the strict
patternsof a yet more real and abstractmathematicalgeometry.In true
Platonicfashion,mathematicscould then mediate betweenthe Supreme
Lightor HighestTruth,and the weakerlightreflectedin creatednature
an emanationfromthatHighestTruth.At the beginwhichis nevertheless
et Figuris,
Grossetestewritesa much
, Angulis,
ning of his treatiseDe Lineis
quoted exhortationto the use of mathematicsin naturalphilosophy:"The
usefulnessof consideringlines,angles and figuresis the greatest,because
it is impossibleto understandnaturalphilosophywithoutthese."9Finally,
and perhaps most importantly,
the ChristianscripturesdescribeGod as
light,and Christ as the lightof the world.10On these groundswriters

andA. Cunningham,
Science:
TheInvention
laternatural
seeR. French
Before
of
philosophy,
theFriars'
Natural
1996,chs9 and 10.
, Aldershot
Philosophy
7 Fora general
oflightanditsrelation
to metaphysics,
overview
seeD. C. Lindberg,
TheGenesis
Plotinus
andKepler
, in:Osiris2nd
ofKepler's
Theory
ofLight:
Light
from
Metaphysics
series
(1986),5-42.
8 Robert
De Ventate
etiamcreataostendit
Grosseteste,
, 137:"Veritas
id,quodest,
igitur
sicutcolorostendit
sednon
sednonin suolumine,
sedin luceveritatis
summae,
corpus,
nisiin lucesuperfusa.
. . . Similiter
estlucissummae
veritatis,
potentia
quae sicillustrt
veritatem
ostendit
remveram."
Grosseteste's
creatam,
twentyquodipsaetiamillustrata
inDiephilosophisevenphilosophical
De Ventate
andDe Luce
works,
, areavailable
including
schen
Werke
desRobert
vonLincoln
i. W., 1912
Grosseteste,
, ed. L. Baur,Mnster
Bischofs
In references
at http://www.grosseteste.com/).
toDe LuceandDe Ventate
, I fol(available
lowthepagination
ofBaur'sLatintext.
9 Grosseteste,
De Lineis,
etFiguris,
con59-60,ed. Baur(n. 8 above):"Utilitas
Angulis
siderations
et figurarum
estmaxima,
estsciri
linearum,
angulorum
quoniam
impossibile
naturalem
sineillis."
philosophiam
10Forexample,
Genesis
8.12and9.5;Acts22.6f.;1Timothy
1;Isaiah60.19;
John1.1-18,
22.5.
6.16;1John1.5;Revelation
21.23;Revelation

13:48:11 PM

154

SIMONOLIVER

such as the Pseudo-DionysiusunderstoodGod to be the uncreatedLight,

and visiblelightto be God in action.11For Grosseteste,and later Bacon,
to studylightwas to studyGod and all thingsin relationto God.
on the thoughtof Robert Grossetesteand beginFocussingparticularly
with
a
brief
, this
ning
expositionof his treatisesDe Luce and De Ventate
articleseeksto place the experimentm
and use of mathematicsin the wider
contextof his understandingof truthand illumination.Is mathematics
merelya convenientlanguage which encapsulatesthe natural?I will suggestthatmathematics,forGrosseteste,draws togethernaturalphilosophy
and metaphysicswithina Platonic frameworkof participationin such a
and vagariesof natureare not confinedwholly
way that the fluctuations
withinthe strictures
of mathematicalformulae.Why was the experimentm
,
the
observation
of
the
motions
of
to
Grosseteste?
nature,
namely
suggested
AgainstAlistairCrombie, the most vigorousdefenderof the view that
Grosseteste's
science,I will argue
thoughtanticipatesmodernexperimental
that the practiceof experimentalobservationis not introducedinto natural philosophyto mitigatean inductivescepticism.Instead, it will be
seen that,forGrosseteste,therecould neverbe a 'problemof induction'
as therewas forthe earlymodernscientists.12
Because of his Neoplatonic
understandingof truthin which all thingsare ultimatelyilluminatedin
the eternallightof the Trinity,there is no dark, unilluminatedlogical
gap between the observationof singularsand the postulationof universal firstprinciplesof naturewhichmustbe traversedby a baselessinductive intuition.Rather, for Grosseteste,the experimentm
is of theological
it
us
to
the
effects
of
the
Fall on human
importance: may help
assuage
it
will
be
seen
that
divine
illumination
is not someknowledge.Crucially,
thingadded to the kind of inductivereasoningassociated with the systematic,experimentalobservationof nature; rather,both belong to a
single,divine guaranteeof truth.Whereas our contemporarydiscussions
of science and religionseek to reconcileapparentlyconflicting
authorities
11See Pseudo-Dionysius,
TheDivine
Names
, 693bff.
12The'problem
ofinduction',
stated
classically
byDavidHume(seehisEnquiry
Concerning
Human
IV.2),concerns
thelegitimacy
oftheinference
ofuniversais
from
Understandings
particulars.
Forexample,
is itrational
toinfer
from
a single
observation
thatA causesB, that
thisis universally
thecase,particularly
oneonlyobserves
the
giventhat,as Humestated,
ofevents
andnotactualcausalprocesses?
is itrational
to assume
Moreover,
conjunction
inthesamewayinthefuture
thatnature
willbehave
as ithasinthepast?Science
appears
an affirmative
toassume
answer
tobothquestions.
Thepractice
oftheconstantly
repeatinwhich
ableexperiment,
instances
ofcausalconnections
areobserved
overand
particular
to assuagean apparent
The problem
ofinduction
over,seemsto be an attempt
aporia.
willbe discussed
further
below,
pp.XXX.

13:48:11 PM

GROSSETESTE
ON LIGHT,TRUTHANDEXPERIMENTM

155

and epistemologies
religionis foundedin narrative,traditionand comauthoritative
texts,whereasscienceis foundedon supposedobsermunally
- in the work of Grossetesteone
vational factsand syllogisticdeduction
findsnaturalphilosophyand theologylyingunder a single,transcendent
truth.Finally,I will suggestthat Grosseteste'sthoughtremainsinteresting not because he is a proto-modernexperimentalscientist,but for a
much more suggestivereason: he offersa view of the sciencesas distinct
but unifiedin theirparticipationin the one divineand transcendent
light.
I begin, however,with the broader and crucial contextof Grosseteste's
thought,namelyhis cosmogonyof light.
A Cosmogony
ofLight
How does Grossetesteunderstandthe natureof light,and what is light's
place in his cosmogony?"The firstcorporealform",writesGrossetesteat
the verybeginningof his treatiseDe Luce^"which some call corporeityis
in my opinion light."13Of its own accord, lightspreads itselfinstantly
froma singlepoint in everydirection(unlessobstructed)and so formsa
and
sphere.Light is dynamicand possessesan instantaneousself-motion
with
a
consideration
of
the
nature
of
corself-propagation.14
Continuing
poreityand matter,Grossetestepresentstwo propositions:corporeityis
that which necessarilyaccompanies the extensionof matterinto three
matterand corporeityare simple substances
dimensions,yet in themselves
dimension.
However,a considerationof matteron its own could
lacking
be
only
conceptual:it cannot be separate fromform,and the formof
matterwe observein the universeis diffusion
into threedimensions.That
which,of its own accord, diffusesitselfin thisfashionis light.Therefore,
concludesGrosseteste,lightis the firstbodilyform,which some call corporeity;it necessarilyaccompanies and enables the diffusionof matter
into threedimensions.15
Because it is the firstbodilyform,lightis thereforethe mostnoble and comparableto formswhichexistseparatelysuch
13Grosseteste,
De Luce
, 51: "Formam
primam
corporalem,
quamquidamcorporeitatem
lucemessearbitror."
theimportance
ofGrosseteste's
De Luce
vocant,
, McEvoy
Marking
comments
thatthisworkis 'oneofthefewscientific
andperhaps
theonly
cosmologies,
scientific
written
between
theTimaeus
and modern
times.'
The
cosmogony,
(J. McEvoy,
Grosseteste
Philosophy
ofRobert
, Oxford
1982,151).
14Thisis not,according
to Grosseteste,
a localmotion,
forifit werewe wouldperceiveillumination
to occurin stages.
See Grosseteste,
Hexameron
, II.10.1.
15See Grosseteste,
De Luce
inmateria
, 52: "Luxergo,quaeestprimaforma
primacreinfinities
et in omnem
ata,seipsam
perseipsam
undique
multiplicans
partem
aequaliter

13:48:11 PM

156

SIMONOLIVER

as intelligences.
Withinthe cosmologicalhierarchy,lightas the firstcorporeal formstands at the hinge betweenthe physicaland separate substances,sharingmore intenselyin the nobilityand greaterbeing of the
higherrealms.Through the mediationof lightas its firstform,matteris
therebyexalted to share in a greaterbeing.
Having outlinedtheprimacyand excellenceof light,Grossetestedeploys
the mathematicsof relativeinfinities
to explain the finiteextensionof the
universe from a simple point. How could a finitecorporeal universe
emergefroma simplepointlackingdimension,namelythe pointof light?
Referringto the authorityof Aristotle,Grossetestestatesthat the 'quantity'of the cosmos could not be the resultof a merelyfinitemultiplication of a simplethingsuch as lightbecause the ratiobetweensomething
Therefore,because a finite
simpleand somethingfiniteis itselfinfinite.16
the primordiallightmustbe multhingexceeds a simplethinginfinitely,
of timesin orderto extendmatterand produce a finite
tipliedan infinity
corporealuniverse.
However,does thismean thatthe cosmoswillbe one spatiallyhomogenous and undifferentiated
mass? No, because the infinities
by whichlight
is multipliedmay vary. For example, Grossetestestatesthat the sum of
all numbersis infiniteand yet is greaterthan the sum of all even numbers even thoughthislatteris also infinite.
therecan be proImportantly,
portionsbetween infinities:the sum of numbersdoubled from one to
is an infinite,
as is the sum of half of all these doubled numbers,
infinity
"the
sum
of
these
halves must of necessitybe half the sum of their
yet
doubles."17
From these propositionsconcerningthe mathematicalproportionsof
various infinities,
Grossetesteclaims that lightextendsmatterinto larger
or smallerdimensionsaccordingto the proportionateinfinities
by which
it is multiplied,

in tantam
nonpotuit,
secumdistrahens
materiam,
molem,
porrigens,
quamrelinquere
in principio
extendebat."
machina,
quantaestmundi
temporis
16It is notcleartowhichofAristotle's
texts
Grosseteste
is referring.
McEvoy
suggests
De Celo
1982(n. 13),152).
, I.5.271bl5ff.(McEvoy
17Grosseteste,
DeLuce
necesse
estessesubdu, 53:"Quorum
subduplorum
aggregationem
suorum."
Grosseteste's
finalproposition
to
plamad aggregationem
duplorum
relating
infinities
is thattheinfinite
sumofall doubled
numbers
is notrelated
bya rational
prototheinfinite
sumofcorresponding
halves
from
which
hasbeensubtracted
a finite
portion
number
whichremains
willonlybe expressible
as an
(forexample,
1). The proportion
irrational
number.

13:48:11 PM

GROSSETESTE
ON LIGHT,TRUTHANDEXPERIMENTM

157

foriflightthrough
theinfinite
ofitself
extends
matter
intoa dimenmultiplication
sionoftwocubits,
ofthissameinfinite
it extends
it
bythedoubling
multiplication
intoa dimension
offourcubits
. . .18
Thus the extensionof matterin increasingsparsitythroughthe universe
is explainedby the mathematicsof different
infinities
by which the point
of primordiallightmay propagateitself.
It is possible to see in this sectionof De Luce a Platonic understanding of mathematics.Grossetestebegins with a primordiallightwhich is
whollysingle and one. Considered mathematically,
unityor the one is
not the firstnumber,but the principleof all number. Multiple entities
of a unitywhich is their
participatein unity,fortheyare multiplications
conceptualand ontologicalbasis. In an analogous fashion,light,as the
firstbodilyform,is not merelythe firstbody: it is the basis, conceptual
and ontological,of all materialextension.This materialextensioninto
multipleproportionsparticipatesin the single unityof the firstbodily
formwhich is light.This is to say that the advent of the materialrealm
which is Grosseteste'ssubject matterin De Luceis a participationin the
mathematicsof the one and the many,wheremathematicsformsa mediatorybridge between metaphysics,which is concernedwith the higher
being of unchangingsimplicity(into which would fall lux),and physics
whichis concernedwiththe multiplicity
of differentiated,
complex,movin
the
cosmos
which
would
fall
The
ing beings
(into
lumeri). one and the
lux
and
lumen
in
are
not
dualistic
,
many,
opposition:the latterparticipates
in the former.19
Having outlinedin more detail a cosmogonyof light,describingthe
hierarchical
structure
of the heavens,theformation
of the elementsthrough
the various rarefactionsof matterand derivingthe different
motionsof
18Ibid.:'Si enimluxmultiplicatione
suiinfinita
extendit
indimensionem
materiam
bicuearnin dimensionem
extendit
tetracubitam,eademinfinita
multiplicatione
duplicata
bitam
. . As an aside,Grosseteste
remarks
thatthisprinciple
waswellknown
to both
Atomists
andPlatonists.
Theformer
understood
allthings
tobe composed
ofatomic
units,
whilethelatter
believed
all things
to be composed
ofsurfaces,
linesandpoints.
19See Plato,Republic
lineofthought
, 524aff.Grosseteste's
mayhaveinteresting
origins
in Pythagorean
science.
OfthePythagoreans,
that,'WemayconJacobKleincomments
thatthey[Pythagoreans]
sawthegenesis
oftheworldas a progressive
jecture
partitioning
ofthefirst
'whole'one
it seems,
werenotableto
, aboutwhoseorigins
theythemselves,
conclusive
. . . Thisfirst
'ones'whichwere
sayanything
'one',as wellas thesubsequent
theresult
ofpartition,
as having
i.e.,the'numbers'
themselves,
theytherefore
regarded
extension
. . .' in: Greek
Mathematical
andtheOrigin
bodily
, Cambridge,
Thought
ofAlgebra
Massachusetts
1968,67.

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SIMONOLIVER

the cosmos, Grossetesteconcludes his treatiseby adducing the unityof

the cosmos throughcertainmathematicalproportions.These are, once
Platonicand reminiscent
of the cosmologyof the
again, characteristically
Timaeus.The highestbody containsfourconstituentparts:form,matter,
compositionand the composite.In otherwords,the form,being totally
simpleand devoid of composition,is akin to mathematicalunity.By contrastto this fundamentalunity,matterconstitutesthe dyad on account
to impressionsreceivedfromwithout
of a two-foldpotency:a receptivity
is
also
there
and divisibility.
However,
composition,thisbeing akin to the
numberthree,forin compositionwe findinformedmatter,materialized
formand the order between these two. Finally,the quaternaryis the
The cosmos
compositeproper,over and above these threeconstituents.20
a unitybecause it possessesall theseprincipleswhich
therefore
constitutes
and necessaryfor completeness:
togetherare sufficient
. . . corresponding
toform
andunity,
andsomething
tomatcorresponding
something
andsomething
to composition
andtrinity,
terandduality,
something
corresponding
to thecomposite
andquaternity.21
corresponding
of being withinthe cosThere is a fundamentalunityin the multiplicity
in
the
of
seen
most
mos,
multiplicity motionswhich emerge
particularly
fromthe simplecircularmotionof the firstheaven. Moreover,thiswhole
is one of five harmoniousproportionsfound in the firstfour numbers
thesepro(the numbersthemselvesplus the whole whichtheyconstitute),
in
and
in
"musical
melodies, bodilymovements, in rhythducingharmony
mic measures."22
Thus Grossetesteis able to formulatea cosmogonybased on lightwith
mathematicsprovidingnot just a conceptualhinge betweenmetaphysics
and cosmology,but also the ontologicalmediationbetween the simple,
of the firstbodily formand the movingmultiplicmotionlesssingularity
ity of an extended,materialcreation.Mathematicsis more than a convenientlanguage for describingthe cosmos, because numberis integral
to the being of the materiallyextended,movingand harmonicallyunified
creation.

20Grosseteste,
De Luce
, 58.
21Ibid.:"Ex hispatet,quoddenarius
universitatis
sitnumerus
perfectus,
quia omne
et unitatem,
et aliquidsicutmateet perfectum
totum
aliquidhabetin se sicutformam
et aliquidsicutcomposiet ternarium,
et aliquidsicutcompositionem
riamet binarium,
tumetquaternarium."
22Ibid.:". . . in musicis
et rythmicis
modulationibus,
temponbus.
gesticulationibus

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159

It is clear fromotherwritings,
however,thatforGrossetestelightdoes
not merelyrelate to the firstcorporeal formor to visible lightin creation,but supremelyto God himself.In his Hexameron
, a meditationon
the six days of creation,Grossetesterelateslightanalogicallyto the life
of the Trinityin a fashionreminiscentof the Neoplatonic emanationist
doctrineof creation.He writesthat,
FromthefactthatGodis a Trinity
ofpersons,
itfollows
thatGodis light:
notbodOr rather
. . . beyond
butnon-bodily
either.
hasbynature
ilylight
light.
Every
light
and essence
thischaracteristic,
thatit begetssplendour
from
The lightthat
itself.
ina mutual
andthesplendour
thatisbegotten
arelocked
embrace,
begets
necessarily
andbreathe
outtheir
mutual
warmth.23
Thus his cosmologyand cosmogonyare linkedwiththe doctrineof God
throughanalogical participationin the supremelightof the Trinity.
's deploymentof lightin describingthe lifeof
However,is Grosseteste
God and the formationand motionsof the cosmos merelya convenient
whichalso encommetaphor?Or is lightthe basis of a widermetaphysics
of truthand science?To answerthese
passes a theologicalunderstanding
, before considering
questions,I turn initiallyto the treatiseDe Ventate
Grosseteste
's commentary
on Aristotle'sPosterior
and his advocacy
Analytics
of the experimentm.
Lightand Truth
GrossetestebeginsDe Ventate
withno less than seven argumentsin favour
of the propositionthat there is a truthother than the supreme truth.
Having adduced fiveargumentsto the contrary,he marshalsthe authorwhich is knownto be
ityof St. Augustinein postulatingthat everything
trueis observedto be truein the lightof the supremetruth.24
However,
does the lightof thissupremetruthobliterateall othertruth,just as the
lightof the sun is able to wipe out the power of otherilluminaries?
Just

23R. Grosseteste,
Hexameron
London1982,
, VIII.3.1,ed. R. C. Dale andS. Gieben,
indesequitur
220,1-6:"QuodautemDeussitinpersonis
trinus,
quodDeusestlux,non
sedincorporea;
immo
sedsuprautrumque.
corporea
magis
nequecorporea
nequeincorporea,
Omnisautemluxhochabetnaturaliter
et essencialiter
suumsplendorem.
quodde gignit
Luxautemgignens
et splendor
necessario
seseamplectuntur
et spirant
de
mutuo,
genitus
se mutuum
fervorem."
Unlessotherwise
alltranslations
arefrom
R. Grosseteste,
indicated,
Hexameron
trans.
C. F.J. Martin,
Oxford
1996.
, (On theSixDaysofCreation),
24Grosseteste,
De Ventate
estigitur,
sicuttestatur
, 137:"Verum
Augustinus,
quodnulla
Veritas
nisiin lucesummae
veritatis."
conspicitur

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SIMONOLIVER

as in the case of De Luce, Grossetesteis posing the problemof unityand

how is the unityof the supremetruthrelatedto the possimultiplicity:
bilityof genuinelyother,multipletruth?In order to answer this question, Grossetestefirstenquiresinto the natureof truth.
Grossetesteoutlinestruthas inheringin the eternalspeech
Immediately,
of God. Rather than being a mere adequation of speech and thing,truth
is found fundamentallyand eternallyin the 'interior'speech of God,
namely the emanation of the Son from the Father.25Not only is the
speech of the Father adequated in the highestmanner to the thingof
which it speaks,it is that veryadequation of itselfto the thingit states.
This speech formsthe 'exemplars'of all thingsin such a way that "the
of thingsto thiseternalspeakingis the rightnessof themand
conformity
the obligationto be what theyare."26For Grosseteste,followingthe tradition of the convertibility
of the transcendentais,
truth,goodness and
being are convertiblein that somethingis true in so far as it is what it
should be accordingto its idea in the divinemind which emanatesfrom
the divinebeing in the eternalspeech of the Father.27Grossetesteclaims,
A treeis a truetreewhenithastheplenitude
ofbeingtreeandlacksthedeficiency
ofbeingtree,andwhatis thisplenitude
ofbeingexceptconformity
to thereason
oftreein theeternal
Word?28
If truthconsistsin the conformity
of each thingto its reason or idea in
the eternalWord, thisimpliesthatin order to obtain truthone mustbe
able to observe both the created object and its eternal exemplar. For
createdtruthis attainablein so far as the lightof
Grosseteste,therefore,
eternal reason is presentto the person observing.29
Therefore,created
truthis attainedin so far as the light(lux)of the divine reason is present to the observer.Justas a body cannot be seen to be colouredwith25Ibid.,134.Aquinas
waslaterto adopta verysimilar
to truth.
Grosseteste
approach
hereprioritises
'interior'
truth
to be
speechoververbalspeechbecausehe understands
inwhicha moreimmanent
on a hierarchy
ofemanation
emanation
a
predicated
implies
morereplete
andcomplete
communication
ofbeine:.
26Ibid.,135:"Ipsaquoqueconformitas
rerum
ad hancaeternam
dictionem
estearum
rectitudo
et debitum
essendi
quodsunt."
27Ibid.:"Sedinquantum
estresut debet,intantum
veraest.Igitur
Veritas
rerum
est
earumesseproutdebent
et conformitas
esse,et earumrectitudo
Verbo,quo aeternaliter
dicuntur."
28Ibid.:". . . tuncenimestveraarbor,
cumhabetplenitudinem
essearboris
caretque
defectione
essearboris,
et haecplenitudo
essendi
rationi
arboris
quidestnisiconformitas
in Verboaeterno?"
29Ibid.,137.

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161

out the presenceof an extrinsiclight,so too somethingcannot be known

withinits created truthalone.
At thispoint in his treatise,Grossetestemakes a subtlealterationto a
basic simileconcerningknowledgeand illuminationin orderto show how
created truthis not renderedredundantby divine illumination,but is
The familiar
insteadmade possible by a participationin eternaltruth.30
similelikensthe divinelightto the lightof the sun which makes created
objectsvisible.However,the sun obliteratesand rendersinvisibleall other
sourcesof illumination.Grossetesteclaims that a more appropriatecomparison mightbe drawn. The highest,eternaltruthis not to the other
created truthsas the sun is to other luminariesin the sky.Rather, the
highesttruthis to created truthas the sun is to colour. The sun illuminates colour which, by 'participating'in this light, reveals the body.
it is not a deficiencyof the lightof the sun which makes
Importantly,
colour necessaryto the illuminationof a body, but a hierarchyof illuminationensuresthatcreatedbodies are drawn to reveal themselves:the
sun draws the colour to be colour and reveal itselfas such, while the
colour in turn,because it is integralto the being of the body and not a
While
mere 'secondaryquality',reveals that body as, say, a strawberry.
it is true that no truthis perceivedexcept in the lightof the supreme
truth,neverthelesscreated being participatesin this truthand therefore
is said to reveal itselfin a secondarybut real sense. This is reminiscent
of a particularlyNeoplatonic account of causation: the created lightis
the secondarybut immediate'cause' of created truth,while the supreme
lightis the primaryand most potent 'cause' of truth,being and goodness.31Meanwhile, a final addition to this simile of the supreme truth
and the sun bringsfurtherclarityto Grosseteste'snotionof truth.Justas
the weak eye is not able to see colour except in the lightof the sun, but
cannotlook directlyupon the sun, so the createdmind can only see created truthin the light of the supreme truth,but cannot look direcdy
upon the lightof the supremetruth.The supremetruthis always mediated to created being.
This familiarand Platonicsimileof the visionof the sun and the vision
of the supremetruthallows Grossetesteto make a briefspeculationon
therelationship
betweentheknowledgeand truthattainableby the 'impure'

30Ibid, 137-8.
31See Aquinas,
Librum
De Causis
1.
Super
Exposition
proposition

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SIMONOLIVER

and the knowledgeand truthattainableby the 'pure in heart'.32This disand mundicordes

tinction,expressedhere in termsof the immundi
, might
also be the distinctionbetween pagan philosophyand the truthwhich
can be seen in the lightof Christianrevelation.However,it is clear from
Grosseteste'swritingthatpagan learning(by which we may assume that
he is thinkingparticularlyof the newly circulatedwritingsof Aristotle
upon which Grossetestewill later compose commentaries)has a measure
of truth,albeit thoroughlymediatedthroughreflectionin created being,
that is, at one removefromthe trulyreal. And yet,of course,this 'one
remove' is by no means offthe mark: thereis no one who knows any
truth,who does not also know in some manner,knowinglyor ignorandy,
the supremetruthitself.33
The pagan learningof the philosophershas its
own value and is, in a more indirectfashion,a knowledgeof the supreme
truth.However, there is a genuine differencebetween the illumination
attainedby Christianrevelationand that attainedby pagan learning.It
is a differencewhich is in turn based upon an ontologicaldifference
betweenthe lightof the supremetruth(lux),whichis eternal,unitaryand
whichis created,mulsimple,and thatlightreflectedin creatures(lumen)
and
less
certain.
The
of
the
tiple
thereby
light
supremetruthis different
fromthe createdlight,and yet the latteris not autonomous;it is depenIn a similarfashion,for Grosseteste,it appears
dent upon the former.34
thatthe sciencesotherthan Christiantheologyare different
, but not understood as autonomous
, any more than createdbeing is autonomousfromthe
supremetruth,or lumenfromlux.
A crucial issue now arises which relatesto human knowing.To what
extentis Grossetesteadvocatingwhat was laterto be termed'ontologism',
namely,the view that the mind directlyintuitsknowledgeof God in all
its acts of knowledge,beforereachingheaven? In otherwords,is human
knowledgethe resultof a directilluminationof the human intellective
soul by the lightof the divine?If this were the case, knowledgewould
be akin to God's timelessknowledgebecause we would have a vision of
the eternal and unchangingdivine ideas themselves.Or, is motion an
in whichwe come
integralpart of the attainmentof truthforGrosseteste,
32Grosseteste,
De Ventate
in Grosseteste's
attention
, 138.Thisissuereceives
greater
Commentaiius
inPosteriorum
Libros.
Fora discussion
intheCommentary
ofthismatter
Analyticorum
seeMcEvoy1982(n. 13),323and332-4.
33Ibid.
34Thiswelearnfrom
Grosseteste
whenhe likens
thedependence
ofcreated
beingon
God'seternal
Wordtothedependence
ofwater
onitscontainer
foritssupport
andform.
De Ventate
, 141-2.

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163

to knowledgein mediated formthroughtime? In what follows,I will

argue thatGrossetestedoes not rule out intuitedknowledgeof God even
withinthe temporallife,yet he acknowledgesthat,because of our weakened post-lapsarianstate,we requiremotionand time in order to come
to truth,and this necessitatesthe observationof corporeal being which
eventuallysuggeststhe importanceof the repeated observationsof an
.
experimentm
Illumination
, theSensesand theMotionofKnowing
In his discussionof Grosseteste
's understandingof truth,James McEvoy
is anxious to exoneratehis subject of the charge of ontologismbecause
thistheoryof illuminationrendersthe difference
betweenthe knowledge
attainedby the blessedand the knowledgeattainedby the viatores
'a matter merelyof degree'.35With referenceto the Commentary
on theCelestial
outlines
Grosseteste's
belief
that
the
direct
intuitionof
,
Hierarchy
McEvoy
God in thislifehas been attainedby only a veryfew privilegedmystics
(forexample,Moses and St. Paul36)who may then be referredto as the
mundicordes
or perfecte
This is a momentaryand anticipatorysharpurgati.
in
the
beatific
vision.
contrast,
ing
By
knowledgethatwe ordinarilyattain,
whetherof God or creatures,is of a different
order.Thus the attainment
of truthis understoodas a hierarchyextendingfromthe weaknessof prescientificopinion to the direct vision of God. How mightwe identify
more preciselythe differencebetween knowledgeattained throughthe
mediationof createdlightand the knowledgeof the blessed in the direct
vision of God? To answer this question,it is necessaryfirstto consider
Grosseteste'sunderstanding
of universaisbeforeprogressing
to the importance of sensationand theirlink with the hierarchyof the elements.
In his commentaryon Aristotle'sPosterior
, Grossetestemakes
Analytics
a distinction
betweenfourkindsof universal.37
The firstkindare the ideas
35McEvoy
fulldiscussion
1982(n.13),326.ForMcEvoy's
ofGrosseteste
andthecharge
ofontologism,
see324ff.Whileconcurring
withmuchofMcEvoy's
itwillbe
discussion,
evident
from
whatfollows
thatI avoidhisdescription
ofGrosseteste's
as 'dualistic'
theory
ofGrosseteste's
De Ventate
is towards
thedelineation
(328).It seemsthatthewholethrust
ofan account
oftruth
which
anddifference
without
this
recognises
multiplicity
juxtaposing
withthesimplicity
ofthedivine
luxin anyproto-modern,
dualistic
fashion.
36See,forexample,
Hexameron
Grosseteste,
, 1.6.1.
37Grosseteste,
Commentarius
inPosteriorum
Libros
, 1.7,96 ff.,ed. P. Rossi,
Analyticorum
Firenze
thisworkis citedas 'Grosseteste,
Commentarius
'. See also
1981,139-41.
Hereafter,
P. Duhem,
Le Systme
duMonde:
histoires
dedoctrines
dePlaton
Copernic
, vol.V,
cosmologiques
Paris1958,345-51;
William
andRobert
McEvoy1982(n. 13),327-9;S. Marrone,
ofAuvergne
Grosseteste:
intheEarlyThirteenth
NewIdeasofTruth
, Princeton
1983,167-71.
Century

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SIMONOLIVER

in the mind of God which are contemplatedin the supreme lightby

intellectsseparated fromphantasms.These are the principlesof knowledge and being. The second kind of universalresidesin the angelic intelor luxcreatawhose knowledgeof all subsequentcreaturesis derived
ligentia
froma prior and direct contemplationof the divine ideas. These universaisexistwithinthe thoughtof the intelligentia^
illumination
of the human
which
is
not
able
to
the
mind,
contemplateimmediately supremelight,
comes fromthe light of this intelligentia.
The thirdvarietyof universal
residesin the celestialbodies. A mind which is not capable of the contemplationof the supremelightor the angelic lux creatamay findin the
lightof the celestialbodies the principlesof the sublunaryrealm which
is subject to motion. The fourthvarietyof universalis to be found in
formwhich, in its turn,is able to illuminatethe materialin which it
resides and with which it constitutesa composite.It is here that one
mightfindthe immediateformalcause of thingsand theiruniversalprinciples. Finally,in addition to the fourvarietiesof universal,Grosseteste
commentson the verylowestformof 'knowledge'(moreproperlytermed
debilis.The 'knowledge'attainedhere
'opinion') attainableby the intellectus
does not concentrateupon universaisat all, but is arrivedat throughthe
observationof accidents.38The link between knowledge and being is
undone in such a way that the principlesof this 'knowledge'are merely
the accidentsof thingsand not theiressence{principia
Such 'knowlessendi).
is
uncertain
and
be
more
edge'
therebywholly
might
properlytermed
'opinion'.
Throughoutthis hierarchyof universais,the latterare dependenton
the former,and each mediateslightto the lower levels of createdbeing.
This is a hierarchyof knowledgeattainableby human beings which is
also a hierarchyof being. In extendingGrosseteste
's immediatedescriptive termswe mightalso understandthis in termsof a hierarchyof the
'motion' or 'change' that is involvedin the attainmentof truth.At the
highestlevel of contemplation whichis the beatificvisionand the high- we findthe universaisin the
est level of knowledge
actualityof the eternal emanationof the Word of God. The contemplation
of theseuniversais
or 'divineideas', whichthe blessedsharewiththe angelicintelligentia
, takes
the formof immediateintuition.This mighteven be understoodas akin
to Aristotelianenergei.
this knowledgeis fullyactual and 'all at once',
being replete and contained withinits own limitsfor it seeks nothing
38Grosseteste,
Commentarius
, 1.7,141ff.

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165

The principlesof this knowledgeare 'the uncreatedreabeyond itself.39

sons of things'40
and the pure and intuitiveintellectcan grasp thesewith
completecertaintywithoutthe mediationof time.The nextlevel of conThis lux
templationis through(ratherthan with) the angelic intelligentia.
creatais a reflectionof the supremelightof the divine mind,yet it contains withinitselfthe firstintimationsof motion proper,for this knowledge is not necessaryand has proceeded into being. Moreover,we learn
fromDe Lucethatthe intelligentia
of the supreme
, whichis the firstreflection
is
the
which
moves
the
celestial
light,
incorporealmovingpower
spheres
witha diurnalmotion.41
So at the nextlevel of the universalwe findthe
celestialsphereswhich contain withinthemselvesthe lightor principles
of everything
thatoccurs below withinthe cosmic hierarchy.These bodies possessa diurnalrotationwhich is a motionmost akin to the created
and the truthof the supreme light.
actualityof the angelic intelligentia
Why? Because this diurnal rotationcan be regardedas the most comlocal motionfor,unlikerectilinearmotion,it does
pleteand self-contained
not seek an end outside its own self-delineated
limits.Finally,the universaisof the celestialsphere impartmotion to the lowest level of universal, namely the formsof created beings. This final motion may be
rectilinearto a greateror lesser extentdependingon a created being's
to condensationand rarefaction.42
particularsusceptibility
In additionto thishierarchyof universaisand motion,thereis also an
importanthierarchyof the elementsand the senses. The cosmic hierarchy of elementsbeginsat its heightwiththe serenityof the heavens and
the lightof the cfire'of the celestialbodies, and descendsthroughthe air
to water and earth.43Coupled to the elementsis the hierarchyof sense.

39AtMetaphysics
IX.5-6ff.,Aristotle
drawsa distinction
between
or
energeia
(actuality
whichis notorientated
to an extrinsic
andkinesis
whichhasa
operation,
telos)
(motion,
telos
outside
Fordetailed
discussions
ofthisdistinction
see,forexample,
itself).
J.L. Ackrill,
Aristotle's
Distinction
Between
andKinesis,
in: R. Bamborough
in
Energeia
(ed.),NewEssays
Plato
andAristotle,
London1965,121-41;
S. Menn,TheOrigin
ofAristotle's
ofEnergeia:
Concept
andDunamis,
in:Ancient
14(1994),
D. Graham,
TheDevelopment
73-114;
Energeia
Philosophy,
Comments
ona Reconstruction
Menn
, in: Ancient
ofAristotle's
Concept
ofActuality:
byStephen
15 (1995),551-64;and G. A. Blair,Unfortunately,
It Is a BitMoreComplex:
Philosophy,
onEnergeia,
in:Ancient
15 (1995),565-80.
Reflections
Philosophy,
40Grosseteste,
Commentarius,
1.7,102-3.
41Grosseteste,
De Luce
virtus
vel animae,
, 57: "Quapropter
incorporalis
intelligentiae
etsupremam
motudiurno,
movet
omnes
caelestes
quaemovet
sphaeram
primam
sphaeras
inferiores
eodemdiurno
motu."
42See ibid.,57-8.
43Grosseteste,
Hexcmeron
, VI.1.1-3.

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Grossetestequotes Augustineto the effectthat in sensationwe do not

find simplythe action of an object on the passive senses of a subject.
The encounterbetweena sentientcreatureand the creaturewhichis perceived is one in which the action of one upon the other is reciprocal.
The sensitivesoul, we are told,
actsintheeyesthrough
thepureshining
fire"whenitsheatis suppressed
andmade
Butin hearing
thefirepenetrates
intoitspurelight.
byitsheatintothemoreliquidair.In smellthepureaircomesthrough
andreaches
themoistexhalation
...
In tasteitcomesthrough
andreaches
themoisture
thatis morebodily:
anditgoes
theheaviness
oftheearth,
andmakes
intothisandthrough
thiswhenitreaches
the
lastsense,thatoftouch."44
Whereas thispassage puts forwardthe notionthat the sensitivesoul acts
throughthe senses on the bodies sensed, elsewhereGrossetesteoudines
what was later to be known as the doctrineof 'the multiplicationof
in the sublunaryworldacts on itssurroundings
species':everything
through
an emanationof a likenessof itself.45
Grossetestestatesthat
A natural
itself
to therecipient,
itspowerfrom
whether
it actson
agentmultiplies
arediversified
. . . Buttheeffects
oftherecipient.
senseor matter
bythediversity
an effect
Forwhenitspoweris received
itproduces
thatis somehow
bythesenses,
whenitis received
itproduces
a mateandnoble;bycontrast,
bymatter,
spiritual
rialeffect.46

44Ibid.,VI.1.3,quoting
De Genesi
ad litteram
, III.5-6:"AgitenimanimasenAugustine,
lucidum
caloreeiususquead lucemeiuspuram.In
tiensin oculisperignum
'represso
In olfactu
autemtransit
auditoverousquead liquidiorem
aerem,caloreignispntrt.
exalacionem
... In gustuautemet hanc
aerempurumet pervenit
usquead humidam
trantransit
et pervenit
usquead humorem
corpulentiorem;
quo eciampenetrato
" atque
ultimum
sensum
cumad terram
siecto,
gravitatem
pervenit,
tangendi
agit.' Moreparofvision
Grosseteste
heldtotheextramission
Aristode,
theory
propounded
byPlato,
ticularly,
from
andEuclid.On thisview,theactofvision
includes
forth
the
rayspouring
Ptolemy
DeIride
1953(n.3),
Commentarius
, II.4,464ff.;
, 72-3,citedinCrombie
eye.See Grosseteste,
sawconsiderable
the
thethirteenth
debateaboutwhether
118.AsCrombie
states,
century
in spaceor merely
ofperception.
theresult
oflightis a realmovement
multiplication
addingthat
explanation,
RogerBacon(c. 1220-c.1292)appearsto optfortheformer
we cannotperceive
witha motion
time,and therefore
lightpassesin an imperceptible
Bacon
Robert
BelleBurke,
1928,Part
, ed. andtrans.
[TheOpus
Philadelphia
MajusofRoger
V, distinction
9, chapter
3, 488 ff.).
45On thisdoctrine,
in theworkof
whichreceived
morecomprehensive
enunciation
thatthisdoctrine
hasitsori1983(n. 3). Lindberg
remarks
RogerBacon,see Lindberg
in particular
al-Kindr
ginsin theworkofArabicphilosophy,
(Iii).
46Grosseteste,
1983(n. 3),Iii:"Agens
De lineis,
etfigures
, 60; citedin Lindberg
angulis,
suama seusqueinpatiens,
siveagatinsensum,
siveinmatenaturale
virtutem
multiplicat
In sensuenimistavirdiversificantur
effectus.
riam. . . Sedpropter
diversitatem
patientis
incontrario,
etnobiliorem;
sivein
facit
tusrecepta
spiritulem
quodammodo
operationem
..."
facitoperationem
materialem
materia,

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Withinthisexchangebetweensentientcreatureand thatwhichis sensed,

one findsfidelityto the principlethat 'like knows like5:sightperceives
'fire' or the rarefiedlumen
, hearingperceivesthe relativelyrarefiedair,
smellperceivesthe thickerair, tasteperceivesliquid or water,and touch
perceivesearth.However,as we mightexpect,all sensationis linkedanaof the soul in sensingthrough
logicallyto light,for'lightis the instrument
the senses of the body.'47Again, Augustineis quoted to the effectthat
lightis that by which the soul acts in all the senses. Thus sensationis
integratedinto a general lightmetaphysics,forjust as each of the elementsis a more or less dense formof light,so too the sensitivesouls of
animals in theiractivityof sensinguse a formof lightwhich is akin to
the elementwhich is being sensed. Both the sentientcreatureand that
whichis perceivedby the senses are constitutedand relatedin the activityof light.Moreover,thisemanationof species fromall things,in being
a formof light,acts in accordance with the principlesof geometrical
mathematics.Thus Grossetestecan claim thatall causes of naturaleffects
can be discoveredby lines, angles and figures.48
However,it is importantto note that,just as the lower universaisare
analogouslyrelatedto the higherby participation,so too are the senses.
For Grosseteste,the lowest sense is that of touch because this is concerned with inertearthwhich,amongstthe elements,is the most dense
and least actual formof light.The sense of touch is analogouslyrelated
to taste,then smell,hearingand finallysight.Yet sightitself,the highest
of the bodilysenses,is analogouslyrelatedto the visionof the innermind
possessedby those who contemplatethe angelic luxcreataand the divine
lightitself.At the highestlevel of knowledgeand 'sight' in the beatific
vision,we 'see' the lightof the supremetruthwiththe purifiedand unencumbered eye of the mind. This vision of God is the culminationby
grace of the restorationof humanityin the image and likenessof God.49
Because thisknowledgeis fullyreplete,actual and unmediated,it involves
no motion or temporality.
This beatificvision is an activityof the soul
which no longerrequiresthe mediationsof bodily sensation.
A link is establishedbetween,on the one hand, the universaisand
motion,and, on the other hand, the elementsand the senses. Before
comingto a conclusionabout how we mightdraw a distinctionbetween

47Grosseteste,
Hexameron
, II.10.1.
48See n. 9 above.
49See McEvoy1982(n. 13),94 n. 73.

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SIMONOLIVER

knowledgeattained throughthe mediationof created lightand knowledge in the beatificvision,it is firstnecessaryto clarifybrieflyone more
connectionbetween motion and the particularknowledgeachieved by
corporealsensation.Initially,one can note that sensationis the resultof
the motionof the species or likenessof a creatureto reside in the sensitivesoul of an animal. Sensationis, therefore,
alreadya kindof abstraction, because "the outward sense is a power of receivingand grasping
sensiblespecieswithoutmatter."50
The variousspecieswhicharrivein the
sense organs are then collated in the 'common sense' (sensuscommunis)
to
forma less fragmented
and more integratedsense impression.From here,
the united 'likenesses'of the perceivedobject are passed into the memory.Properlyspeaking,it is the imaginationwhichretainsthe formswhich
have been sensed,whilethe memoryproperincludesthe estimativepower
ofjudging the formsreceived.The motionsfromthe sensesto the memory are shared by all rational animals. The final motion involvesthe
excitementof reason by many memoriesthatare held in the soul. These
motionsinvolvedin sensingare describedin thefinalchapterof Grosseteste's
:
commentaryon the Aristotle'sPosterior
Analytics
In thosewhohavethissenseas wellas retention,
there
is a gathering
ofonememandthisis common
tobrute
animals
andrational
oryfrom
manysensations
beings;
butin rational
itis already
thecasethatfrom
oncereason
beings
manymemories,
is excited,
an experience
is formed;
thisis notthecasewithnon-rational
animals.
fromsensecomesmemory,
fromtherepetition
ofmanymemories
an
Therefore,
andfrom
theexperimentm
theuniversal
which
is apartfrom
theparticuexperimentm
from
theparticulars
butthesameas them,
as theprinlars,yetnotseparate
namely
cipleofbothartandscience.51
This whole systematic
procedureof sensation,whichis alreadya formof
abstraction
made possibleby the emanationof speciesdue to thedynamism
of lightwhich constitutesthe more or less rarefiedsensibleelementsof
fire,air, waterand earth,was to yielduniversalprinciplesof nature,what
Grossetestecalled universalia
, 'complex experimental
complexa
experimentalia.
universais'.

50Grosseteste,
Hexameron
vissusceptiva
et apprehensiva
, VII.14.1:"Estautemexterior
sensibilium
sinemateria."
specierum
51Grosseteste,
Commentarius
cumhacretentiva,
, II.6, 33-40:"Inquibusautemestsensus
estcolligere
ex multis
sensibus
unammemoriam,
et hoccommune
estbrutis
cumratiosedin rationalibus
iamcontingit
ex multis
memoriis
excitata
ratione
fieri
nalibus;
experiin brutis
verononesthoc.Ex sensuigitur
fitmemoria,
ex memoria
entiam;
multiplicata
ex experimento
nontarnen
universale,
experimentm,
quodestpreter
particularia,
sepaa particularibus,
ratum
sedestidemillis,artis,
et seiende
scilicet,
principium."

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The hierarchiesof universais,elementsand sensationsin which the

highermediatelightto the lower also featureever more perfectmotions
as one ascends towardsthe supremelightwhichis the source of all goodbetweenthe knowledge
ness,being,truthand knowledge.The distinction
attainedin the mediationof the created lightand that attainedin the
beatificvision mightthereforebe made in termsof motion. The latter
featuresan immediate and intuitivegrasp of truthwhich requires no
movementor change. As was claimed above, we mighteven consider
this akin to Aristotelianenergeia
, for this knowledgeis replete and not
mediated by time. Yet as a resultof the Fall, we do not share in the
beatificvision.The sin whichresultsfromthe Fall is understoodas a disordereddesirein which the human soul seeks firstaftercorporealthings
ratherthan the higherlightof God himself.Grossetestearguesthatif the
intelligencewere not weighed down by the body it would receive complete irradiation,and thereforeknowledgeand fullyactual being, from
the supremelight.Because thispurityis obscuredby corruptdesires,
allthepowers
ofthisrational
soulbornin manarelaidholdofbythemassofthe
actandso in a wayareasleep.Accordingly,
wheninthe
bodyandcannot
process
of
time
thesenses
actthrough
ofsensewithsensible
thereamanyinteractions
things,
is awakened
andmixedwiththeseverysensible
andis takenin the
soning
things
senses
to sensible
as in a ship.52
things
reminiscentof the Platonic doctrineof
Therefore,in a fashionstrikingly
recollection,Grossetestestates that our souls require awakeningby the
repeated 'motions'in time of our corporeal senses. Withinthis context,
the order of being and intelligibility
is the reverseof ourorder of knowfor
fallen
must
ing,
humanity
begin with knowledgeof the less intelligible created and corporeal being by means of the motionsof sensation
beforeachievingthe visionof the supremelyintelligible
lightof the divine
ideas.53Thus the lower one descends towards corporeal sensation,the
or motioninvolvedin knowing.Is there,then,a
greaterthe temporality
dualism between the knowledgeattainedin the beatificvision and that
attainedby fallenhumanity?
Justas thereis no dualismbetweenPlatonic
and
and
Aristotelian
and kinesis
, so too thereis
being
becoming
energeia
52Ibid.,1.14,235-41,(myemphasis),
1953(n. 3), 73: ". . . omnes
quotedin Crombie
viresipsius
animerationalis
inhomine
natooccupate
suntpermolem
nepossint
corporis,
Cumitaqueprocessu
agere,etitaquodammodo
sopite.
temporis
agantsensus
permulticumsensibilibus,
sensus
ratioipsissensibus
admixta
et
plicemobviationem
expergiscitur
in sensibus
quasiin navidelataad sensibilia."
53Ibid.,1.17,340-65.

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SIMONOLIVER

no dualism between Grosseteste'sbeatificvision and the knowledgethat

is attainablein this life,because amidst all these distinctions
the former
in
In
the
latter.
the
case
of
all
levels
of knowlGrosseteste,
participate
can be made between
edge are analogicallyrelatedin light.Yet distinctions
kindsof knowledge,and these
the different
scienceswhichdeliverdifferent
distinctions
may be delineatedby the need to be awakenedfrompotency
to act.
In Grosseteste'scommentaryon Aristotle'sPosterior
, directly
Analytics
afterhis descriptionof the need forsensationto awaken the soul to the
cite as the
lightof truth,the authordescribeswhat many commentators
a
an
from
of
descended
experimentalprocedure. Having
description
the supremelightof God to considerthe place of corporealsensationin
we now turnto examine in greaterdetail the
Grosseteste'smetaphysics,
in
of
the
the methodologyof his naturalphilosophy.
experimentm
place
The Experimentm
Commentingon Aristotle'smethodologyin natural science, Grosseteste
describeshow scientificreasoningis found in the syllogisticdemonstration of the links between causes and effects,premisesand conclusions.
There is a distinctionbetween,on the one hand, the knowledgeof facts
('that' or quia),and, on the other hand, knowledgeof the cause or reason for the fact ('why' or propter
quid). There is thereforea distinction
betweenscience which accumulatesfacts(scientia
quia) and that which is
more properlycalled 'science' and gives a more genuine knowledge,
namely the enquiry which seeks explanation and demonstrationwith
propter
quid), thosecauses beingthefourAristotelian
respectto causes (scientia
Aristotleuses the followingsyllogismas
varieties.As Crombie indicates,54
:
what
does
not twinkleis near, planetsdo not
an example of scientia
quia
are
near.
This
does not produce the reason for
therefore
twinkle,
they
the fact,but onlythe fact.Planetsare not near because theydo not twinkle, but because they are near they do not twinkle.We can arrive at
scientia
properquid by rearrangingthe syllogismso that the cause, nearthe middle term:the planetsare near, thereforetheydo
constitutes
ness,
not twinkle.This providesthe proximatecause (nearness)and therefore
the reason for the fact that planets do not twinkle.For Grosseteste,
therefore,science is properly a search for abstracted universal or
54Crombie
1953(n. 3),53 n. 4.

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171

principlecauses, or reasons,for effects,that knowledgecoming through

demonstration.
How was knowledgeof theseprinciplecauses to be achieved?Aristode
maintainedthat the attainmentof the knowledgeof these principleswas
throughan inductive(or abstractive)and then deductiveprocess.55The
enquirerwas to begin withwhat was firstin the orderof our knowledge,
namelyfacts(quia)whichwere observedin experience.From this,inductive inferenceswere to be made to more general principlesor formsof
causes which were removedfromthe experienceof singulars.However,
thesemore generalprinciplesare the causes of particularexperiencesand
thereforetheyare prior in the order of nature. These principles,being
priorin the orderof nature,could thenbe the basis fora deductiveinference to the explanationand demonstration
of observedfacts(propter
quid).
On the role and importanceof sense perceptionwithin this scheme,
Aristotlecommentsthat,
. . . demonstration
from
universais
andinduction
from
butitis
proceeds
particulars;
togaina viewofuniversais
induction
. . . andwe cannot
impossible
except
through
induction
ifwe lacksense-perception,
becauseit is senseperception
which
employ
apprehends
particulars.56
Coupled to thisprocessof inductionand deductionis one of 'resolution'
and 'composition'.57
As an example of this method at work, Crombie
describeshow Grosseteste's
successors,amongstthemRoger Bacon, sought
to describethe 'commonnature'of the coloursof the spectrum.58
Beginning
withthe enumerationof 'composite'phenomena in which the colours of
the spectrumwere observed(forexample, rainbows,water spray,lenses,
iridescentfeathers,and so on), these were 'resolved'into the simplerset
of attributescommon to them all. Thus the 'common nature' of rainbows, spraysand transparentcontainersof water producingthe colours
of thespectrum
was 'coloursproducedby differential
refraction'.
Meanwhile,
the more general common nature of the various phenomena producing
the colours of the spectrumwas found to be 'colours produced by the

55Aristotle,
Posterior
1.2.
Analytics,
56Ibid.,1.18.8
lb1-1
6. Alltranslations
arebyH. Tredennick
intheLoebClassical
Library
Edition
that"scientific
knowl(Cambridge
1989).See also1.31whereAristode
explains
be acquired
edgecannot
bvsense-DerceDtion."
57Grosseteste,
Commentarius
, II.4,256ff.
58Crombie
1953(n. 3),64 ff.Grosseteste
himself
in investigating
adoptsthismethod
the'definition'
or nature
common
to horned
animals.
See Grosseteste,
Commentarius
, II.4,
381ff.

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SIMONOLIVER

weakening of white light.'59This process of resolutionis essentiallya

By contrast,beginningwiththis'resolvedhypothprocessof simplification.
esis', the process of 'composition'formsa more complex hypothesis.For
example, in the case of the colour of the spectrum,the rainbowwas a
member of that most general class which produces the colours by the
refraction.It is now possible to
weakeningof white lightin differential
be more specificand add that in the rainbowthis differential
refraction
occurs throughsphericaldrops of water,and moreoverthat these drops
occur in very large numbersthroughrain. This process continuesuntil
"the aggregateof differentiae
become convertiblewith the rainbowitself',
and one arrivesat an appropriatecausal definition.60
However,Crombie claims that Grossetestewas well aware thatwithin
the process of resolution,broadlycoterminouswith inductivereasoning,
thereare two relatedassumptionsor intuitiveleaps at work.61First,there
is the assumptionthatwhen one phenomenonis observedto precede and
be connectedto a second phenomenon,the formeris in truththe cause
of the latter.Secondly,thereis the assumptionthatgeneralprinciples(for
example,thatthe appearance of the coloursof the spectrumis the weakening of white light)apply in all particularinstances(forexample, the
With referenceto the difficulty
appearance of thisparticularrainbow).62
raised by thisfirstvarietyof inductiveleap, Grossetestewritesas follows:
Can thecausebe arrived
at from
oftheeffect
withthesamecertainty
knowledge
as theeffect
canbe shown
to follow
from
itscause?Is itpossible
foroneeffect
to
Ifonedeterminate
havemany
causes?
causecannot
be reached
from
theeffect,
since
thereis no effect
whichhasnotsomecause,it follows
thatan effect,
whenit has
onecause,mayhaveanother,
andso there
causesofit.63
maybe several
Crombie goes on to claim that Grosseteste introduces experimental
verificationand falsification
to mitigatethese difficulties.
Having begun

59Crombie
1953(n. 3),65.
60Ibid.,66.
61Ibid.,71 (andn. 3).
62The first
a link
oftheseassumptions
refers
to 'intuitive
induction'
(onehasto intuit
Thesecondrefers
between
causeandeffect).
to 'enumerative
induction'
(onecannot
proexhaustive
account
ofthelinkofcauseandeffect
between
observed
videa fully
particuofnature).
larsandso mustassume
theuniformity
63Grosseteste,
Commmtarius
suacausa,sicutexcausa
, II.5,9-14:"anexcausato
sequatur
nonsequitur
an contingat
uniusplures
essecausas.Si enimexcausato
causatum,
sequitur
cumnonsitcausatum
causaunadeterminata,
aliquam,
sequitur
quod
quinhabeatcausam
habeatunamcumcausaalia,etitaquodilliussintcause
cumhabeatcausam,
causatum,
in Crombie
1953(n. 3),81).
(citedandtranslated
plures."

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173

with 'facts'given by the senses, and having reasoned about those facts
throughresolutionand then compositionto arriveat the reason for the
facts,it is stillnecessaryto returnonce again to observationto eliminate
false causes or confirmtrue causes. Aristotlehad himselfadmittedthe
of theorywhen he wrote that "creditmust be
need for the verification
than to theories,and to theoriesonlyif what
rather
to
observation
given
facts."64
CrombieclaimsthatGrosseteste
affirm
with
the
observed
agrees
they
as well as verification,
adds to Aristode'sthoughtin advocatingfalsification
and in the developmentof the method of verificationand falsification
into 'a systematicexperimentalprocedure'which assumes,first,that the
formsof naturealwaysact in a uniformway so that the same cause will
and, secondly,thatthe principleof econalwaysproduce the same effect,
in
of
the
propter
quid naturalphenomena is a real principle
omy seeking
This method was developed and utilisedin investigaof nature itself.65
tionsinto the natureof starsand comets,optics and astronomy.66
It is withinthe theologicalcontextof the implicationsof the Fall for
human knowledgethat Grosseteste,in his commentaryon the Posterior
, advocates what Crombie regardsas an experimentalmethod.67
Analytics
He arguesthatan abstractionfrommany singularsmustbe made before
one can arriveat a universalconcept.For example,"when someonemany
timessees the eating of scammonyand the accompanyingdischargeof
red bile and he does not see that scammonyattractsand draws out red
bile, then fromthe frequentperceptionof these two visiblethings[he/
she] begins to forma notion of the third,invisibleelement,that is [in
this case] that scammonyis the cause that draws out red bile.'68Once
the reason is awakened, the memoryleads the reason to conduct an
experimentby givingsomeone scammonyto eat afterall othercauses of

64Aristotle,
Alltranslations
arebyH. Tredennick
Generation
III.10.760.b31.
ofAnimals,
intheLoebClassical
Edition
Aristotle
1953).In thePosterior
Library
(Cambridge
Analytics,
in grasping
wehadsucceeded
writes
that"... ifbyobserving
instances
theunirepeated
ofparticular
we shouldhaveourproof;
becauseit is from
therepetition
versal,
experiencesthatwe obtainourviewoftheuniversal."
(1.31.88aif.).
65Crombie
1953(n. 3),84 ff.
66Grosseteste,
indetailinCrombie
De Generatione
Stellarum
andDe Cometis
1953
, discussed
(n.3),87-90.
67Grosseteste,
Commentantes,
1.14,247-271.
68Ibid.,1.14,256ff.:". . . cumvidetquisfrequenter
comestionem
scammonee
etcomitantem
cholee
rubeeetnonvidetquodscammonea
attrahit
eteducit
rubeam
egestionem
exfrequenti
visione
horum
duorum
visibilium
estimare
tertium
cholerm,
invisibile,
incipit
estcausaeducendi
cholerm
rubeam."
scilicet,
quodscammonea

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SIMONOLIVER

red bile have been isolatedand removed,"and thisis the way by which
universalprinciple."69
one proceeds fromsensationto an experimentad
Grossetestehere outlines an experimentalprocedure which requires
both the exclusionof possible causes not includedin a centralhypothesis,and repeatedobservation.Althoughthisexample of experimental
procedure which refersto scammonywas derivedfromAvicenna,Crombie
sees in Grosseteste'smethodan attemptto overcomea 'logical hiatus' in
of modernHumean conscientific
procedurewhich is highlyreminiscent
cerns. Crombie claims that Grossetesteknew that a gap had to be traversedbetween,on the one hand, the assertionof a formaldefinitionor
a regularlyoccurringseriesof events,and on the otherhand, the asserand causal connection.He writesthat
tion of a theorystatinga universali
ofinduction
he envisaged
an actofintuition
to leapthisgapin thelogicalprocess
toAristode's
themindreflecting
orscientific
nous,
bywhich
corresponding
imagination,
a universal
or
on theclassification
offacts
byinduction
suddenly
grasped
produced
between
them.70
or theory
theconnection
explaining
principle
However, as Eileen Serene has argued, thereare some significant
problems in Crombie's analysis of Grosseteste'sthoughtconcerningexperiIn outliningthese difficulties,
it will be seen both
ment and induction.71
to the doctrineof Neoplatonicilluminationin
that Grossetesteis faithful
his scientificmethodology,and that experimentalpractice,when appropriatelyplaced withinthe hierarchyof sciences,is highlyconducive to
his theologicalcosmology.
In her analysisof Crombie's readingof Grosseteste,Serene notes that
inductionwithinAristotelian
thereare two distinctways of understanding
science.72The firstshe calls the orthodoxview which holds that inducconditionfor the apprehensionof
tion is a necessarybut not sufficient
firstprinciples.This is to say that somethinghas to be 'added' to inductionin orderto arriveat firstprinciples.Typically,thosewho read Aristotle
as holdingthisview of inductionclaim that nousis that which is added
to intuitiveinductionin order to arrive at firstprinciples.However, a
scepticismarises (anticipatingthat of Hume) because thisleap of nousis
and its contentis not clear. By contrast,Serene prefers
not self-justified
69Ibid.,1.14,270-1:"Et hecestvia qua pervenitur
universale
a sensuin principium
experimentale."
70Crombie
1953(n. 3), 71.
71E. Serene,
40 (1979),
Science
andDemonstrative
Grosseteste
onInduction
Robert
, in:Synthese,
97-115.
72Ibid.,100.See Aristotle,
Posterior
11.19.
Analytics,

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175

to ascribe to Aristotlethe 'empiricist'view of the inductiveprocedure

which statesthat inductionis a sufficient
conditionin the apprehension
of firstprinciples.On thisunderstanding,
inductionrequiresnothingadded
to it, but is insteada stateof the enquirer.Therefore,an alternativereading of Aristotle'sview of thismatterwould not regardnousas something
added to induction,but ratheras a state of the knower.Serene quotes
Barnes to the effectthat "nous,the state or disposition,standsto induction as understanding
standsto demonstration.
{episteme}
Understandingis
not a means of acquiringknowledge.Nor, then,is nous"73
Serene rightlysuggeststhat Crombie ascribes the so-called orthodox
view of inductionto Grosseteste,in which somethingis added to induction in orderto arriveat firstprinciples.74
In the orthodoxinterpretation
of Aristode,thatwhich is added is understoodas nous
, and it is, accordin
to
's
Grosseteste
divine
illumination.75
ing Crombie,replaced
thoughtby
makesa distinction
described
Moreover,accordingto Crombie,Grosseteste
above betweenintuitiveand enumerativeinduction.76
The formerrelates
to the suppositionthat actual causal connectionscannot in practice be
observed:all we observeare the conjunctionsof phenomena,so in addition to our observationswe must add a leap of intuitionto formfirst
universalprinciplesrelatingcause to effect.The latterenumerativeinduction relatesto the suppositionthat one can forma generaliseduniversal
principleabout a genusor speciesfroma limitedset of observations.This
formof inductionthereforerequiresthe assumptionthat nature is uniform.It seems that Grossetestedid indeed hold to this assumptionof
nature'suniformity.77
Because the assumptionof the uniformity
of naturemitigatedthe problem of enumerativeinduction,Crombie argues that for Grossetestethe

73Ibid.,101,quoting
Aristotle's
Posterior
J. Barnes,
(Oxford
1975),256-7.See
Analytics
alsoL. M. de Rijk,Aristotle:
Semantics
andOntology
637if.,
, Leiden2002,esp.vol.I, 140-159,
648ff.
74See,forexample,
Crombie
1953(n.3),71: "To leapthisgapin thelogicalprocess
ofinduction
he [Grosseteste]
an actofintuition
or scientific
corenvisaged
imagination,
to Aristotle's
on theclassification
offacts
vou,bywhichthemindreflecting
responding
a universal
orprinciple
ortheory
the
produced
byinduction
suddenly
grasped
explaining
connexion
between
them."
75See Crombie
1953(n. 3),57.
76See n. 62. Serene1979(n. 71),105-6arguesthatneither
Aristode
norGrosseteste
makethisdistinction.
withhercriticism
ofCrombie's
distinction
willbe
Myconcurrence
evident
shordy.
77SeeGrosseteste,
De Generatione
Stellarum
1953(n.3),85.
(ed.Baur,32)citedinCrombie

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problem of inductionwas focussedprincipallyon the intuitivevariety

where one could not directlyobserve the connectionslinkingsupposed
causes withcertaineffects.
notion
Also, CrombieunderstandsGrosseteste's
of inductionto consistin a 'leap' which requiressomethingin addition
to intuitiveinductionin orderto arriveat firstprinciples,thisbeing divine
illuminationin Grosseteste'sthought.Withinthiscontext,a verymodern
lookingscepticismapparentlyarises concerningthe validityof this leap
and the conclusionswhich may be reached. Given that the action of
cause on effectcannot be directlyobserved,the natural philosopheris
faced withthe need to distinguish
betweena numberof causes which in
could
be
linked
to
a
To mitigatethis scepticism,
theory
given effect.78
Grossetesteapparentlyadopts two strategies.The firstand most important is to include positivelyby verificationand exclude by falsification
some possible causes of given effects.This is the purpose of the experimentam
moveby Grosseteste
and, accordingto Crombie,thisis thesignificant
towardsa modern scientificapproach to nature.However, a numberof
so a
possible explanatorycauses may survivethe process of falsification,
secondstrategy
mustbe adoptedin orderto assuagethe apparentinductive
scepticism.This strategyis the invocationof the principleof parsimony
wherebyone always opts for the simplestexplanatorycause available.79
to achieve the
However, these strategiesare not in themselvessufficient
Aristoteliangoal of providingthe uniquelynecessitating
causes of particular effects.
conclusionsare alwaysrevisableand probTherefore,scientific
able, and experimentmust forevercontinue in order to mitigateboth
intuitiveand enumerativeinductivescepticism.
Followingthe criticismsof Serene, it is now possibleto examine some
of the weaknessesof Crombie's account. First,and perhaps most importandy,if Crombie is correctin ascribingto Grossetestethe orthodoxview
- he uses the words
of induction(or 'abstraction
then
interchangeably),
Grossetestehas abandoned a thoroughgoing
of
as
divine
theory knowledge
illumination,and, at the same time, provided the means of separating
naturalphilosophyfromtheology.This is because, accordingto the orthodox view of induction,somethinghas to be addedto the inductiveinference in orderto arriveat firstprinciples.This establishesa dualismwhich
separates observationby the senses and the induction in the human
mind- whichwe mightreferto as scientia
quia fromthe explanatorycon78See n. 63 above.See Grosseteste,
Commentarius
, II.5,9-14.
79See Crombie,
1953(n. 3),85 ff.

13:48:11 PM

ON LIGHT,TRUTHANDEXPERIMENTM
GROSSETESTE

177

- what we
elusionswhich may be attained
propter
may referto as scientia
from
outside
to an
as
an
addition
is
invoked
illumination
So
divine
quid.
otherwiseautonomous abstractionfromobserved phenomena. In other
words,the theologicaldoctrineof truthas irradiationin the divine light
and autonomousform
is introducedto mitigatea weaknessin a distinctive
of knowingwhich otherwisemakes no referenceto divine illumination.
betweenthe intuitiveor abstractivegrasp
Having made thisdistinction
Serene
ofphenomenaand thatwhichis added, namelydivineillumination,
between
make
a
further
distinction
is
able
to
that
Crombie
out
points
Grosseteste'ssupposed theoreticaland practicalresponsesto the problem
The theoreticalresponse is to suppose that all
of intuitiveinduction.80
certainknowledgeis provided by divine illuminationand this was the
as thislightwas added to our induccertainty
onlysourceof metaphysical
tive grasp of phenomena. The practical responsewas to engage in an
experimentm
(such as that relatingto scammonyand red bile described
of natureand the principleof parabove) which assumed the uniformity
and
as
to
as
well
falsifyexplanatoryhypotheses
simony
seeking verify
withincontrolledobservations.Once again, this appears to constitutea
tacitseparationof naturalphilosophyfromtheologicalaccountsof truth:
the formeradopts a 'practical' response and the latter a 'theoretical'
response.
Could this be Grosseteste'sview? Surelynot. Serene is rightto resist
the ascriptionof the orthodoxview of inductionto Grosseteste.Divine
illuminationcannot be addedto observationand inductiveor abstractive
knowledgeof particulars,because the latter,as we have seen, is just as
much the resultof irradiationby the divine light. All knowledgeand
being are formsof lightwhich have theiroriginin the supremelight
the ideas of God. The knowledgewhich comes fromthe inductiveor
abstractiveprocess is itselfthe effectof the species which emanate from
everycreature,each creatureitselfbeing a more or less rarefiedfromof
light.The soul, into which sense perceptionsenter to be gatheredinto
the memory,is a formof dynamic and spirituallight.All of this is a
more or less spiritualformof divine illumination,so divine illumination
could not be 'added' to inductiveor abstractiveknowledgeof particulars
as if it were something
juxtaposed. As Serene tacitlysuggests,divineilluminationcould onlybe the stateof knowledgewhichone has aftera successfulinduction.To paraphrase Barnes, divine illuminationstands to
80Serene1979(n. 71),102.See Crombie
1953(n. 3), 134.

13:48:11 PM

178

SIMONOLIVER

standsto demonstration.
is not
inductionas understanding
Understanding
a means of acquiring knowledge.Nor, then, is divine illumination,for
divine illuminationis knowledge.
Serene makes some interestingdistinctionsbetween Aristoteliannous
and divine illuminationwhich mightclarifyGrosseteste'sview further.81
As has been seen, Crombie equates these two in his analysis.However,
Aristotlemerelyclaims that we are in a state of nousif we have a genuine grasp of a firstprinciple,but not everysuch impressionof a sure
grasp of a firstprinciplemightbe termednous.In the case of divineillumination,all knowledgeis somehow analogicallyrelatedto the firstand
supremelight,so, as Serene claims,thisadmitsof degreesin a way that
nousdoes not. In the above analysisof the distinctionbetweenillumination by the supremelightin the beatificvision and illuminationby the
lux creata
, the degrees of illuminationor knowledgewere described in
and motion.Here thereis no dualism,but a clear
termsof temporality
between
distinction,
knowledgeand ignorance.This suggestssomething
Because
about
Grosseteste's
conceptionof naturalphilosophy.82
important
forGrossetesteall knowledgewill always
of thisdoctrineof illumination,
be provisionaland corrigibleuntilwe finallyarriveat the beatificvision.
This includesknowledgeof naturebecause completeknowledgeof creaturesis foundin contemplationof theirexemplarsin the divine ideas.83
, which is the highBy contrast,Serene points out that Aristoteliannous
est formof knowledge,is possible more immanentlyin such a way that
our
our knowledgeis onlycorrigiblewhen it is mistaken.For Grosseteste,
when
it
is
because
or
is
correct,
especially,
knowledge corrigibleeven,
thisknowledgecan always be furtherirradiatedby the supremelightof
God to which it is analogicallyrelatedby participation.
is Grosseteste'sschema? If
What, then,is the place of the experimentm
we
we are to understandthe role of experiment, mustfirstrememberthe
contextin which Grossetesteproduces the much-quotedexample of the
eating of scammonyand the productionof red bile. In thispassage, he
has just consideredthe effectsof human sin and weaknesson knowledge
and illumination.The soul requiresawakeningby the motionsof sense
perception.This suggeststhe importanceof consideredor controlledobservationof phenomena.It is the temporalmotionsof repeatedobservations
which awaken the soul to formuniversalprinciplesfromobserved sin81Serene1979(n. 71),110-2.
82Thefollowing
pointis madebySerene1979(n. 71),111.
83See Grosseteste's
ofthisin De Ventate
beautiful
illustration
, 142.

13:48:11 PM

ON LIGHT,TRUTHANDEXPERIMENTM
GROSSETESTE

179

gularsby the lightof the divine.Repetitionof experimentis not importantbecause of the need to overcomethe problemof enumerativeinduction,but simplybecause our soulsare asleep and requirerousing.However,
althoughthisinvolvesthe motionfromignoranceto knowledge,it is analogouslyrelatedto the changelessand intuitivegrasp of all thingsin the
beatificvision.The experimentm
is not then a different
kindof knowledge,
but a different
of knowledgewhich will pass away once the effects
degree
of the Fall are assuaged by divine grace. Experimentalpracticeprovides
a knowledgewhichis stillanalogicallyrelatedto illumination
in the beatific
vision in such a way that naturalphilosophyand theologyare not separated.Moreover,theexperimentm
is notthecriterion
of truthforGrosseteste,
but merelythe firstand veryimportantstep on the way to a fullerand
more scintillating
illumination.It providesa knowledgewhich,although
correctand true(but,importantly,
not merelyprobable),is corrigibleand
capable of being filledwith ever greaterlight.Grossetesterightlyplaces
in an appropriatecontext:
knowledgefromthe senses in experimenta
It is notin sensation
thatweknow;
butitis as a result
ofsensation
thatknowledge
oftheuniversal
comesto us. Thisknowledge
comesto us via thesenses,
butnot
from
thesenses.84
makes supremesense
Finally,it is importantto note thatthe experimentm
withina theologicaldoctrineof divine illumination.Under the so-called
orthodoxview of inductionin which somethingmust be added to an
inductiveinferenceand that processjustified,a Humean scepticismwill
always remain concerningthe legitimacyof this reasoning.This scepticism is due to an unbridgeddualism between the inductiveabstraction
of universaisfromsingulars(sense perception),and the knowledgethatis
gained fromthat perception.Under Grosseteste'sdoctrineof illumination, the inductiveabstractionis analogicallyrelated to knowledgeand
being throughthe mediationof light.There is no 'chasm' of dark ignorance to be traversedbetweensensationand knowledge,forthe whole is
filledwith light.Thus the practice of experimentalobservationis integratedinto thistheologicalvision,yet its appropriateplace is maintained
in the hierarchyof analogicallyrelated science. Its truthis a resultof
irradiationfroma higherlight,and yet it will pass away at the eschaton.

84Grosseteste,
Commentarius
sedoccasione
, 1.18,205-7:"nonergosentiendo
seimus,
ipsius
in nobiscognitio
sensus
coaccidit
et scientia,
universalis
nongratia
sensus."

13:48:11 PM

180

SIMONOLIVER

Conclusion
In one importantrespect,therefore,
Grossetesteis not a proto-modern
his
scientist:
motivation
for
There
experimental
advocatingthe experimentm.
is not a problemper se with observation:it is not as if observationis
deficientor plagued by the aporiaof induction.On the
untrustworthy,
is advocated as the very means of assuagingour
observation
contrary,
to
see
with
inability
greaterintuitionthe truthwhich shines in every
aspect of creation.
Moreover,Grossetestedoes not advocate the use of mathematicsin a
of nature (oftenassociway that anticipatesthe later 'mathematization5
ated with the Oxford Calculatorsin the fourteenth
centuryand Galileo,
Newtonand Descartesin the sixteenthand seventeenth
centuries),namely
the emphasison quantityratherthanquality,and indeedthe quantification
mathematics
formsa mediatory
of qualities.For Grosseteste,
bridgebetween
the observations of moving nature and the science of metaphysics.
Mathematicsis not principallyconcerned with quantities,but with the
withrelation,harmonyand
qualityof proportionand ratio and therefore
in
as
for
the
relative
infinities
which describethe
seen,
beauty,
example,
extensionof a simplepoint of lightinto a diverse.
of interestnot because he is curiously
Grosseteste'sthoughtis therefore
avantgarde
, but because, througha doctrineof creationand understanding of truthwhich place lightat theircore, he offerslightas an anasciences.Whereascontemporary
discussions
logicalmeansof relatingdistinct
of the relationshipbetweenscience and religiontend to focusupon their
common narrativestructureor upon religion'sforaysinto the mysteries
view: a conwhich science leaves behind, Grossetesteoffersa different
- which is common
to
by analogy physicsand theolcept namely,light
ogy. Other such conceptswhichnow belong more exclusivelyto a wholly
autonomousscience were once understoodin more explicitlytheological
terms:space, time or motion,for example. Each science offersits own
distinctaccount of each, and yet each is analogicallyrelatedto a transcendentsource. So the bond between naturalphilosophyand theology
of practiceor structure,
but in a sinmightlie not in chance similarities
understood
as
illumination.
of
truth
gle guarantee
Universityof Wales, Lampeter
and Religious
Studies
of Theology
Department

13:48:11 PM

WalterBurley(?), Fragmentmde dictione exclusiva

toti integraliaddita: Eine Edition
MISCHA VON PERGER

In seinem nur zu Teilen ausgearbeitetenlogischenHauptwerk:De puntateartislogicaetractatus

, hat Walter Burley (1275/76-1344/45) ein
longior
ausfhrliches
der
Kapitel
Bedeutungvon Ausschlieungswrtern
(wie ,nur'
oder ,einzig') gewidmet.1Im Zuge dieses Kapitels erwhntBurley zwei
fr solche Wrter.2Seine
althergebrachteBedeutungsunterscheidungen
dieser
ist
eigene Einschtzung
Unterscheidungen ambivalent:Gem der
Gestalt
virtute
sprachlichen
(de
sermonis")von ausschlieendenAussagen
die von den ungenanntenlteren
gebe es die Bedeutungsalternativen,
Semantikern
ins Spiel gebrachtwordenseien,gar nicht;andererseits
msse
man bei der Interpretation
von Texten damit rechnen,dass ihreAutoren
sich nicht an die Eindeutigkeitder Sprachformhielten, sondern die
Bedeutungder ausschlieendenAusdrckefaktischabgeschwchtwissen
wollten,ohne dies sprachlichzu signalisieren.
Laut der tradiertenLehre kann, so Burley,eine Aussage der Form:
,Nur X ist Y', in bestimmtenFllen gem den folgendenAlternativen
verstandenwerden:
(1) Steht X frein Individuumoder fr eine Art, dann kann die Ausschlieungallgemein"oder speziell"erfolgen.AllgemeineAusschlieung
bei einem Individuumheit,alles andere auer diesem Individuumwird
ausgeschlossen;spezielleAusschlieungheit,nur alle anderenIndividuen
derselben Art, der X angehrt, werden ausgeschlossen. Allgemeine
alles andere auer dieser
Ausschlieungbei einerArtheitentsprechend,
Artwirdausgeschlossen;spezielleAusschlieungheithier,nur alle anderen ArtenderselbenGattung,der X angehrt,werden ausgeschlossen.

1 Walter
De Puntate
Artis
Tractatus
With
a Revised
Edition
Burleigh,
Logicae
Longior.
ofthe
Tractatus
Brevior
St. Bonaventure
, ed. Philotheus
Boehner,
(NewYork)-Louvain-Paderborn
1955,131-64(tertia
secundus,
pars,tractatus
cap. 1).
2 Bisher
istesmirnicht
frdieseUnterscheidung
zu finden.
gelungen,
mgliche
Quellen
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,2

13:48:22 PM

182

MISCHA
VONPERGER

(2) Steht X fr ein integralesGanzes, so kann die Ausschlieungaufgrunddes Stoffs"oder aufgrundder Form" erfolgen.Ausschlieungaufgrundder Form heit,es wird all das ausgeschlossen,was nichtan der
Form von X teilhat,d.h. all dasjenige,frdas X nichtals Prdikattaugt.
Ausschlieungaufgrunddes Stoffsheit, es wird nur das ausgeschlossen, was weder ein integralerTeil von X ist noch an der Form von X
teilhat.
Was die erste Unterscheidungsmglichkeit
angeht,so wrde ein heuAnnahmefhrte,anerkenihrer
das
zu
wohl
das
Bedrfnis,
tigerLogiker
flexiblere
eine
nen, jedoch
Lsung vorschlagen.Wer etwa sagt: ,Nur
Sokratesluft',der will damiteher seltenausdrcken,dass auer Sokrates
nichtsund niemand laufe- also auch etwa keine Ameise- , und wohl
keinMenschauer Sokrateslaufe.Doch durchdie Unterscheidung
hufiger,
Weisen
der Ausschlieungmag man das Problemzwar in vielen
zweier
Fllen in den Griffbekommen,es ist aber so noch nichtumfassendgelst.
Stattdessenwird man heute bei der Analysejener Aussage verlangen,es
msse klar sein oder klargemachtwerden, ber welche Gruppe von
Gegenstndenhierimplizitgesprochenwird:ber ailles,was laufenkann?
ber dieMenschen?Oder ber die Sportler,die sich zu einerbestimmten Zeit in einem bestimmtenStadion befinden?
Die zweite,auf ein integralesGanzes bezogene Unterscheidungsmglichkeithat insofernihr Recht, als es Aussagengibt,deren Prdikatesich
nichtnur auf das Subjektals ganzes, sondernauch auf
selbstverstndlich
und andere Aussagen,wo dies ebenso selbstverdessen Teile erstrecken,
stndlichnichtgilt.Wer sagt: ,Nur das Haus ist wei', dem werdenwir
er meine, dass kein Teil des Hauses,
normalerweisenicht unterstellen,
sondern nur das Haus im ganzen wei sei. Vielleichtwre auch hier,
statteine einfacheBedeutungsalternative
anzunehmen,eher der Bereich
der Gegenstndeabzustecken,ber die gesprochenwird.Bei einerAussage
wie etwa der, dass eine bestimmteGre nur dem Haus zukomme,
auch die Teile des Hauses von dem
bestndezwar keine Schwierigkeit,
Ausschlussbetroffenzu sehen. Aber ist dies die Deutung, die von der
sprachlichenGestaltder Aussage her am nchstenliegt?Hat der Sprecher
es in der Regel so gemeint?Oder betrafseine Aussage nichteher eine
Gruppe von tatschlichoder mglicherweise nebeneinanderauftretenden Gegenstnden,unterdenen das besagte Haus ist?
nachdem
Unterscheidungen,
jene althergebrachten
Burleyselbsterklrt
er sie referierthat, fr nicht tunlich:Gem der sprachlichenGestalt
kommejeweils nur eine Bedeutungder Ausschlieungin Frage, nmlich
die generelle,aus der zweiten die
aus der erstenUnterscheidungsregel

13:48:22 PM

DEEXCLUSIVA
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
WALTER

183

auf der Form grndende.Zwar knne es vorkommen,dass jemand bei

einerAussage eine Bedeutungim Sinn habe, die der speziellenoder der
auf dem Stoffgegrndeten
Ausschlieungentspreche,doch handle es sich
dann um eine lediglichintendierte,nicht um eine sprachlichrealisierte
(angezeigte)Bedeutung;der Sprechersprechein solchen Fllen in uneigendichemSinne.
Exkurs
Um das bisherGesagte zu belegen,ist ein kleinerphilologischer
ntig.PhilotheusBoehners 1955 erschieneneEdition des De puntateartis
logicaetractatus
longiorbedarf der Revision schon allein deshalb, weil
des Werkskannte,whrendheute deren
Boehnernur sieben Abschriften
Die besagte
23 bekannt sind (darunterfreilichvier fragmentarische).3
frexcluPassage ber die beiden tradiertenBedeutungsunterscheidungen
sivaeweist im ediertenText eine deutliche Lcke und einige kleinere
Fehler auf. Ich gebe hier die ntigstenKorrekturenan und kann mich
Abschrift
aus dem
dabei z.T. auf eine ihrerseits
durchkorrigierte
sorgfaltig
14. Jahrhundertsttzen,die Boehner nicht kannte: London, Lambeth
Palace, ms. 70, fol. 85-109v, hier fol. 103r a-b (im Folgenden: L");
manchmalstimmtdamit auch die MnchenerHandschriftclm 4379, fol.
97v-130v,berein,die aus demJahr 1347 stammt(im Folgenden:M").4
Ed. Boehner,143, 29, aliquid" (so auch LM), lies: alicui" (Paul Vincent
3 (1)Assisi,
Biblioteca
ms.690,fol.197-202,
s. xv.(2)Berlin,
Staatsbibliothek
comunale,
Preuischer
ms.Lat.qu. 195,fol.113-64,
s.xiv/xv.
Kulturbesitz,
Stadsbibliotheek,
(3)Brgge,
ms.501,fol.l-69v,s. xiv.(4)Erfurt,
UniversittsundForschungsbibliothek,
cod.Amplon.
F. 120,fol.74-98v,
s. xiv.(5)Ebd.,cod.Amplon.
ca. 1340.(6)Ebd.,
Q. 259,fol.159-208,
cod.Amplon.
ca. 1330.(7) Ebd.,cod.Amplon.
(unvollst.),
Q. 276,fol.147-54v
Q. 291,
fol.51-64v,
s. xiv.(8) Florenz,
Biblioteca
MediceaLaurenziana,
ms.S. Croce,Plut.XII
sin.2, fol.167-203,
s. xiv.(9) Florenz,
Biblioteca
nazionale
ms.Conv.Soppr.I.
centrale,
X. 12,fol.248 (Fragment),
s. xiv.(10)London,
Lambeth
Palace,ms.70,fol.85-109v,
s. xiv.(11)Madrid,
Biblioteca
de la universidad,
ms.105,fol.45-7lv,s. xv.(12)Madrid,
ms.1565,fol.83-104v,
s. xiv.(13)Mnchen,
Biblioteca
nacional,
Staatsbibliothek,
Bayerische
clm4379,fol.97v-130v,
a.d. 1347.(14)Padua,Biblioteca
ms.536,scaff.
Antoniana,
XXII,
fol.1-17v (unvollst.),
s. xiv.(15)Paris,Bibliothque
ms.Lat.6441,fol.l-18v,
nationale,
s. xiv.(16)Ebd.,ms.Lat. 16130,fol.80-1lOv,s. xiv.(17)Treviso,
Biblioteca
comunale,
ms.377(S. 3-104-G),
fol.97-117,
s. xv.(18)Biblioteca
cod.Vat.Lat.
Vaticana,
Apostolica
a.d. 1349.(20)
2146,fol.21l-34v,a.d. 1397.(19)Ebd.,cod.Vat.Lat.3066,fol.34-50v,
s. xiv.(21)Ebd.,cod.Vat.Lat.4269,fol.
Ebd.,cod.Vat.Lat.3092,fol.94-5(Fragment),
s. xv.(22)Venedig,
Biblioteca
nazionale
ms.Z. Lat.261(Valentineiii
200-236v,
Marciana,
Cl. X, cod.77),fol.31-70,s. xiv.(23)Wien,Dominikanerkloster,
ms.160/130,
fol.61nocheinegekrzte
Redaktion
vonfremder
Hand:Erfurt,
74v,s. xiv.Hinzukommt
UniversittsundForschungsbibliothek,
cod. Amplon.
O. 67, fol.125v-34v,
ca. 1339
zu densiebenAbschriften,
dieBoehner
auflistete).
(gehrt
4 BeiBoehner
undmanchen
anderen
Autoren
heitderMnchener
Kodexfalschlich
clm1060".

13:48:22 PM

184

MISCHA
VONPERGER

Spade pldiertebenfallsfurdiesenderungund folgtdabei der Handschrift

BibliotecaApostolicaVaticana, cod. Vat. Lat. 3066).5
143, 30, speciei soli, excludunturspecies",lies mit LM: speciei,solum
excludunturspecies"6(Spade, loc. cit., erwgt,eben diese nderungvorzunehmenoder soli" ersatzloszu streichen).
143, 33-4, excludunturoppositaespeciessub animali",lies mitL: excludunturindividua alia speciei humanae. Similitersic dicto: ,Solus homo
curri,factaexclusionegeneraliexcludituromne quod non est homo, sed
facta exclusionespeciali excluduntursolum aliae, oppositae species sub
animali contentae".
144, 12, ponitur"(so auch L), lies mit M: apponitur"(bei Boehner als
varialectioim Apparat).
144, 21, inclusae" (so auch L; inclusivae"M), lies: inclusi".
144, 23, excludat",lies mit L: excludit".
Auerdemist 145, 8, quando sic solitisumus dicere",als Zitat zu markieren;die Quelle ist Aristoteles,Soph.el. 4, 166a 17.
Wenn man diese nderungenan Boehners Text vornimmtund zudem
die Interpunktion
gezielt einsetzt,um die Schrittedes Argumentsdeutlich zu machen,ergebensich frdie Einleitungdieses Abschnittsfolgender Text und folgendebersetzung:
>
<1. Regulae antiquorum.
ab
Adhuc aliae regulae distinguentes
ponuntur antiquis.
(1) Una regula est, quod, quando dictio exclusiva addituralicui individuo vel alicui speciei,multiplexest locutio ex eo, quod potestfieriexclusio generalisvel specialis.
quodlibetde quo non
(1.1) Facta exclusionegeneraliexcluditurgeneraliter
vere diciturinclusum.
de quo non vere
(1.2) Facta exclusionespeciali quodlibetnon excluditur7
diciturinclusum,sed,
(1.2.1) si <alicui> addatur individuo,solum individuaalia contentasub
eadem specie excluduntur,
3s Text Walter
5 PaulVincent
artislogicae:Some
Bur
's De puntate
of
ley
Spade,Boehner
P.V. Spade)1998,7.
Internet
Corrections
andQueries,
(website
6 In M wirddas solum"
wiederholt.
falschlich
nachexcluduntur"
7 WieSpadein einerAnmerkung
kannhiernatrlich
zu seiner
bemerkt,
bersetzung
universale
nureinenegierte
intendiert
keineuniversale
sein,sondern
Behauptung
negative
L weistdennauchdieunverfnglichere
Die Handschrift
non
Wortstellung:
Behauptung.

13:48:22 PM

DEEXCLUSIVA
WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM

185

(1.2.2) et, si alicui addatur speciei, solum excludunturspecies oppositae

contentaesub eodem genere.
< Exempla.> Verbi gratia sic dicto: ,Solus Socrates curri, facta exclusione generaliexcludituromne et quodlibet quod non est Socrates; sed
facta exclusionespeciali solum excludunturindividuaalia speciei humanae. Similitersic dicto:,Solus homo curri,factaexclusionegeneraliexcludituromne quod non est homo; sed factaexclusionespeciali excluduntur
solum aliae, oppositae species sub animali contentae.
(2) Alia regula est, quod, quando dictio exclusiva additur toti integrali,
multiplexest locutio ex eo, quod potestfieriexclusiogratiamateriaevel
gratiaformae.
(2.1) Si fiatexclusiogratiaformae,sic excluditurquodlibetquod non participaiformaminclusi,et per consequensexcluditurquodlibetde quo non
diciturinclusum.
(2.2) Sed facta exclusionegratiamateriaeexcluditurquodlibetquod non
est pars inclusinec de quo diciturinclusum.
<Exempla.> Verbi gratia:,Tantum domus est alba.' Facta exclusionegratia formaeexcluditurquodlibet quod non participaiformamdomus; et
sic excludunturpartesintegralesdomus. Sed factaexclusionegratiamateriae excluditurquodlibetquod non est domus nec pars eius; unde facta
exclusionegratia materiaenon excludunturpartes integrales.
<11. Obiectio auctoris.>
stas tarnendistinctiones
non teneo nec approbo, sed dico quod, ubicumdictio
exclusiva
alicui termino,de virtutesermonisexcluque apponitur
dit generaliteromne illud de quo non diciturille terminusinclusus;et
ideo excluditomne illudquod non participtformamilliusterminiinclusi,
et de virtutesermonissemperfitexclusiotantumgratiaformae.Non enim
est aliqua ratio,quare dictioexclusivadebeat quaedam excludereet quaedam non. . . .
<1. Regeln der alten Autoren.>
AuerdemwerdenweitereUnterscheidungsregeln
von den alten Autoren
aufgestellt.

excluditur
de quo. . auf,ebensodieauchvonBoehner
benutzte
Handschrift
quodlibet
M. SieheWalter
OnthePurity
TheShorter
andtheLonger
Treatises
,
Burley,
oftheArtofLogic.
transi.
PaulVincent
2000,234,n. 265.
Spade,NewHaven-London

13:48:22 PM

186

MISCHA
VONPERGER

(1) Eine Regel lautet: Wenn ein ausschlieenderAusdruckzu irgendeinem Individuumoder irgendeinerArt hinzugesetztwird,ist die Aussage
dadurchvieldeutig,dass die Ausschlieungallgemeinoder speziellausfallen kann.
(1.1) Macht man die Ausschlieung
generell,wirdjedwedes ausgeschlossen,
von dem man das Eingeschlossenenichtwahr als Prdikataussagenkann.
(1.2) Macht man die Ausschlieungspeziell,so wird nichtjedwedes ausgeschlossen,von dem man das Eingeschlossenenichtwahr als Prdikat
aussagen kann, sondern,
(1.2.1) wenn man sie zu <irgendeinem> Individuumhinzusetzt,werden
nurdie anderenIndividuen,die unterderselbenArtstehen,ausgeschlossen,
(1.2.2) und wenn man sie zu irgendeinerArt hinzusetzt,werden nur
die entgegengesetzten
Arten,die unterderselbenGattungstehen,ausgeschlossen.
Wenn man z.B. sagt: ,Nur Sokratesluft',und dabei die allgemeine
Ausschlieungvornimmt,dann wird alles und jedes, was nicht Sokrates
ist, ausgeschlossen;nimmtman dabei aber die spezielle Ausschlieung
vor, dann werdennur die anderenIndividuender menschlichenArt ausgeschlossen.hnlich,wenn man sagt: ,Nur der Mensch luft',und dabei
die allgemeineAusschlieungvornimmt,dann wird alles ausgeschlossen,
was nichtMensch ist; nimmtman dabei aber die spezielleAusschlieung
Arten,die unter<der
vor, so werdennur die anderen,entgegengesetzten
Gattung> ,Sinnenwesen'stehen,ausgeschlossen.
Ausdruckzu einem
(2) Eine zweiteRegel lautet:Wenn ein ausschlieender
ist
die
dadurch
Ganzen
hinzugesetztwird,
Aussage
vieldeutig,
integralen
dass die Ausschlieungaufgrunddes Stoffsoder aufgrundder Form vorgenommenwerdenkann.
(2.1) Wenn die Aussschlieungaufgrundder Form vorgenommenwird,
was nichtan der Form des Eingeschlosso wirdjedwedes ausgeschlossen,
senen teilhat,und folglichwirdjedwedes ausgeschlossen,von dem man
das Eingeschlossenenichtals Prdikataussagen kann.
(2.2) Wenn die Ausschlieungaber aufgrunddes Stoffsvorgenommen
was keinTeil des Eingeschlossenen
wird,so wirdjedwedes ausgeschlossen,
ist und von dem man das Eingeschlossenenicht als Prdikataussagen
kann.
Z.B. ,Nur das Haus ist wei.' Macht man die Ausschlieungaufgrund
der Form, wird jedwedes ausgeschlossen,was nicht an der Form des
Hauses teilhat,und so werden die integralenTeile des Hauses ausgeso wird
schlossen.Macht man aber die Ausschlieungaufgrunddes Stoffs,
was nichtdas Haus und nichtein Teil von ihm
jedwedes ausgeschlossen,

13:48:22 PM

WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
DEEXCLUSIVA

187

ist; wenn man also die Ausschlieungaufgrunddes Stoffsmacht,werden

die integralenTeile nichtausgeschlossen.
<11. Einwand des Autors.>
Diese Unterscheidungenaber bernehmeund besttigeich nicht,sondern sage: Wo auch immer ein ausschlieenderAusdruckirgendeinem
Satzterminusbeigelegtwird, schlieter von der sprachlichenForm her
Terminusnicht
allgemeinalles aus, von dem man jenen eingeschlossenen
als Prdikataussagenkann; und deshalb schlieter all das aus, was nicht
an der Form jenes eingeschlossenenTerminus teilhat,und wird gem
der sprachlichenFormjede Aussschlieung
allein aufgrundder Form vorgenommen. Denn es gibt keinen Grund, warum der ausschlieende
Ausdruckdas eine ausschlieensollte,das andere nicht.. . .
Der historischeVerlauf der Diskussion,in die Burley hier eingreift,
ist
noch zu erforschen.
Das Folgende soll nur ein kleinerBeitragdazu sein.
Unter BurleysNamen und unterdem Titel Tractatusde formis"ist
ein Konglomerataus mindestensdrei nicht unmittelbarzusammenhnDer Herausgeber,FrederickJ. Down Scott,
genden Texten berliefert.
hat eine pars prior" und eine pars posterior"unterschiedenund auf
mehrereBefundeaufmerksam
gemacht,die dagegensprechen,in den beiden partesein zusammenhngendesWerk zu sehen.8Auerdemhat, wie
Scott ebenfallsbemerkte,der Schlusspassusdes berlieferten
Textes (71,
8 Frederick
Treatise
Mnchen
,DeFormis'
J. DownScott(ed.),Walter
1970,4
Burley's
Akademie
derWissenschaften,
derKommission
frdie
(Bayerische
Verffentlichungen
Texteaus dermittelalterlichen
Herausgabe
ungedruckter
Geisteswelt,
IV).- Mancheder
des Textes,die Scott(4-5)auflistet,
beruhen
freilich
bloaufMissUngereimtheiten
verstndnissen
desHerausgebers.
So schreibt
sitde anima
(27,19-23):
Burley
Quidautem
de potentia
sed estde foris,
id estab extrnintellectiva,
materiae,
quae noneducitur
secoagente
nontransmutante
secundum
decimosextoDe animamateriam,
Philosophum
libus<i.e. De generatone
animalium
II 3, 736b28> dicentem
est,deforis',
quodintellectus
id esta Deo secundum
videtur
[exponentes
vel]expositores,
postea."Scott(4) liestdas
als eineAnkndigung,
aufjenetheologische
wolleBurley
Aristoteles-Interpretation
spter
- wasjedoch
zu sprechen
kommen
in keinem
derbeidentractatus
Tatschlich
geschieht.
aberbetrifft
dieAnkndigung
das Thema:,dieVerstandesseele
als eineForm,dienicht
ausdemVermgen
desStoffes
unddiesesThemabehandelt
wird',
hervorgebracht
Burley
in derTat an einerspteren
Stelledesersten
tractatus
imersten
(33-6).Wennes ferner
Traktat
heit:propositio
nonmutatur
a veritate
in falsitatem
nisipermutationem
rei,
utpatetex praedictis,
de substantia"
auf
capitulo
(47,22-3),so istdieskeinRckverweis
einefrhere
dersichnichtverifizieren
liee(so Scott,5), sondern
einVerweis
Passage,
"
aufAristoteles,
Cat
. 5, 4a 34-b13;imTextmusses exPraedkamentis
nichtex
heien,
praedictis".

13:48:22 PM

188

MISGHA
VONPERGER

- der Sache nach

der Intention
15-32) eine kurzeDarlegungzum Begriff
zu tun,sondernweistallenfallseine Beziehung
nichtsmitder parsposterior
zurparspriorauf (vgl.32), und selbstdas ohnejeden formalenAnhaltspunkt
die am
freine Verknpfung.
Entgegendem Zeugnis der Handschriften,
Ende stetsexplicittractatusde formis"schreiben(und nichtexpliciunt
tractatusde formis"),mchte ich im Folgendenvon zwei verschiedenen
Textstckals
deformissprechensowie von einem versprengten
Tractatus
zweiten.9
des
Anhang
Zu diesen drei disparaten Textstcken kommt in einer der vier
in denen sie berliefert
sind, noch ein viertes.Es geht den
Abschriften,
anderen dreien voran und ist mit ihnen durch eine berleitendeFloskel
fehlt.Der Anfangdes ersten
verbunden,die in den brigenAbschriften
deformislautetin der blichenFassung wie folgt:
Tractatus
comremotissima
estmateria
cuiuscumque
respectu
Notandum,
prima
quodmateria
ex materia
et forma.
in quolibet
composito
reperitur
positiex ea. Et talismateria
Quodpatetsic:..."
In dem Kodex Oxford,Bodleian Library,Add. A 370,10beginntauf fol.
eines Textes, dessen erstesThema die ausschlieenden
143 die Abschrift
Ausdrckesind. Sie stammtaus dem Jahr 1425 und von der Hand eines
des besagtenTextes wurde
gewissenIohannes de Gelria. Die berschrift
anscheinendvon andererHand auf den oberen Seitenrandgeschrieben:
Burleus de formis". Es handelt sich zunchst um eine semantische
Abhandlung ber diejenigen Aussagen, in denen ein ausschlieender
Ausdruckein integralesGanzes bestimmt(wie in ,Tantum homo est albus',
,Nur der Mensch ist wei'). Einer kurzenErklrungdarber,wie solche
Stze auszulegen sind, folgenzwei Probleme,die gegen diese Regelung
die Auslegung,nach
zu sprechenscheinen[dubia).Das erstedavon betrifft
der die Ausschlieungauf den Formaspektdes integralenGanzen bezogratiaformae).In der Antwortunterscheidetder Autor
gen wird (exclusio
zunchstverschiedeneBedeutungendes Ausdrucks,Form',um dann mit
9 AuchScott(op.cit.,obenFn. 8), 1, hatteschonvonzweiverschiedenen
treatises"
Redevonzweipartrennscharfe
Maierdieweniger
dannabervonAnneliese
gesprochen,
- Mindestens
sich
Das ergibt
istnureinFragment.
derzweitetractatus
tes"bernommen.
zwischen
dassBurley
u.a.daraus,
potmUnterscheidung
(71,13)aufeineoben"dargelegte
keine
sichvorher
II findet
ImTractatus
verweist.
absoluta
undpotentia
mrespectiva
Differenzierung
stattdessen
sondern
diebesagte,
I gibtes zwareine,jedochnicht
im Tractatus
vonpotentia;
subiectiva
undpotentia
obiectiva
zwischen
dieUnterscheidung
(7-8).
potentia
10DerVerwaltung
einesMikrofilms
seihierfurdiebersendung
derBodleian
Library
wurde.
Textedition
dieuntenstehende
dessen
angefertigt
aufgrund
gedankt,

13:48:22 PM

DEEXCLUSIVA
WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM

189

Hilfeder passendenBedeutungdas Problemzu lsen. Das zweiteProblem

betrifft
die Auslegung,nach der die Ausschlieungauf den Stoffaspekt
des integralenGanzen bezogen wird (exclusio
hnlichwie
gratiamateriae).
zuvor bei der Form, nimmt der Autor hier eine Differenzierung
des
Stoff'
vor.
Doch
dann
bricht
der
ab.
Statt
die
Begriffs,
Gedankengang
des zweiten Einwands
passende Bedeutungvon ,Stoff' zur Entkrftung
zu den
heranzuziehen,gehtder Text mitder besagtenberleitungsfloskel
ber
die
erste
in
Materie'
mit
denen
der
,
ber,
Errterungen
sonstigen
der erste Tractatus
deformisbeginnt:
berlieferung
estde materia
remota,
sciendum,
Quialocutum
quodmateria
primaestmateria
remotissima
..."
In beiden Tractatus
deformis
fehltjeglicherBezug auf das Thema der ausschlieendenAusdrcke;es handeltsich hieralso eindeutigum eine sekundre Textklitterung,
nichtum einen authentischeneinheitlichenText.
Die OxforderHandschrift
istaus zweijeweilsvon andererHand geschriebenen Kodizes zusammengefgt.
Der hier interessierende
zweiteTeil (fol.
126-226) war am Ende des 15. Jahrhundertsim Besitz des Ferrareser
Karmelitermnchs
und MagistersGiovanni BattistaPanetti.11Es finden
sich hierin fast ausschlielich12
Werke zweier Autoren, die jeweils im
Inhaltsverzeichnis
und in den Kolophonen der Texte genanntwerden.
Iohannes Sharpe OCarm (ca. 1360-nach 1415) ist durch den Traktat
Formalitates
vertreten:
Dieser erffnete
den ursprnglich
Kodex
selbstndigen
nimmt
er
fol.
und
sein
128-41 ein),
(heute
Anfangspassusist wohl aus
Versehenan sptererStellenoch einmalabgeschriebenworden(fol.203v).
Zehn oder elf Texte stammenvon Walter Burley.13Von diesem Autor
11Vgl.ClaudiaAndreasi,
La biblioteca
difiateGiovanni
Battista
Panetti
Carmelitano
, in:
Medioevo
14= n.s.11 (2000),183-231,
e rinascimento,
hier214.
12OhneZuschreibung
an einenAutor
istalleinderdreizehnte
undletzte
Text(fol.219et praedestinatione"
De praescientia
21),einFragment
(inc.:Abinitioveronascentis
ecclesiae
homines
. . ."). Zurproblematischen
desdritten
Textesan Burley
Zuschreibung
siehediefolgende
Fn.
13(2) Tractatus
de formis."
secundis."
(3) De intentionibus
(4) De tribus
agentibus
in universo."
(5) De mododefiniendi."
(6) De quattuor
speciebus
(7) De
qualitatis."
divisione
entisin decern
(8) De totoetparte."
praedicamenta."
(9) De duplici
potentia,
activascilicet
etpassiva."
animae."
libros
(10)De potentiis
(11)Expositio
superAristotelis
Meteororum.
de universalibus
diversae
de universali(12)Tractatus
(Diversorum
opiniones
- Einerdieser
buseditaeetcompilatae
Walterum
de Burley").
perreverendm
magistrm
Texteistnichtnurnochunediert
1
1
auch
fur
Nr.
sondern
auch
sonstunbe(was
gilt),
kannt:
Nr.3 (inc.:Circanomina
secundarum
cuiusmodi
sunt,genus',
intentionum,
speestdubium,
utrum
huiusmodi
nomina
cies',,genusgeneralissimm',
,species
specialissima',
sintcommunia
de quibuspraedicantur.").
omnibus,

13:48:22 PM

190

MISCHA
VONPERGER

werdenauch sonstviele kleineAbhandlungenber einzelneBegriffe

oder
sie
meist
mit
.
.
. . ."
Sciendum .", Intelligendum
tradiert; fangen
Streitfragen
oder Notandum..." an,14also mit einem formelhaften
Ausdruck,wie
und
er in greren Werken- vor allem in Aristoteles-Kommentaren
- zur
eines
Exkurses
oder
einer
Einleitung
Grundlegungfr
Qustionen
ein Argumentdient. Bei allem Vorbehalt,zu dem die unsichereberlieferungzwingt,ist es daher doch naheliegend,auch in dem Oxforder
deformis
solch eine kleine,versprengte,
Plus-Stckzu den beiden Tractatus
hier zudem unvollstndig
berlieferte
AbhandlungBurleyszu sehen. Der
- beabSchreiberIohannes de Gelria- oder schon einerseinerVorgnger
des Formbegriiis
unterdem thematischen
Gesichtspunkt
sichtigte
womglich,
vonJohannesSharpe mit einem Konglomerat
eine Qustionensammlung
aus Texten Walter Burleyszusammenzustellen.
so wre weitereinzuschrnSollte die AutorschaftBurleyszutreffen,
ken, dass jener Kleintraktatzu BurleysfrhenWerkengehrenmsste.
Inhaltlichlsst er sich zwischendie beiden sehr frhen,etwa 1302 entund De consequentiis
einerseitsund
standenenLogik-TraktateDe exclusivis
1
De
Growerk
aus
den
unvollendete
320er
Jahren, puntateartisbgijenes
coe tractatus
, andererseitseinordnen.In den frhenTraktatenlegt
bngior
exclusio
und exclusio
Ausschlussweisen
die
beiden
gratiaforrnae
gratia
Burley
als selbstverstndliche
semantischeLehre dar.15In dem Oxforder
materiae
Fragment wird diese Lehre gegen Einwnde verteidigt,die aus der
entstehen.
der Bezeichnungenfrjene Ausschlussweisen
Mehrdeutigkeit
Der Autor will offenbardeutlichmachen, dass der Ausschlussaufgrund
der Form und derjenigeaufgrunddes Stoffspraktikabelsind,wenn man
14Vgl.etwaausderListedervorigen
Fn.dieTexte4, 5, 6, 8 und9. Sie sindunter
wiefolgt
ediert:
fehlerhaftem
undin z.T. uerst
anderen
Wortlaut,
Titeln,
(4) Herman
et humanistica,
15
De Deo, Naturaet Arte,in:Medievalia
Burley's
(ed.),Walter
Shapiro
Text
in:
Scott(edd.),Walter
Frederick
, De Diffinitione,
Burley's
(1963),86-90;(5) Shapiro,
Mediaeval
27 (1965),337-40;(6) H. undCharlotte
Studies,
(edd.),De qualitatiShapiro
Scott
45 (1963),256-60;(8) Shapiro,
busdesWalter
Studien,
, in: Franziskanische
Burley
et littraire
du
d'histoire
doctrinale
De Totoet Parte,in:Archives
Burley's
(edd.),Walter
De
Scott(edd.),Walter
Burley's
(9) Shapiro,
MoyenAge,Bd. 33,Jg.41 (1966),299-303;
- Text8 {De
43 (1966),179-82.
in:The ModernSchoolman,
Potentia
Activaet Passiva,
Pasticcio
ausvierkurzen
toto
etparte)
isteinunebenes
Fragmenten.
15L. M. de Rijk(ed.),Walther
De exclusivis.
AnEdition
Tract
23
, in:Vivarium,
Burley's
De
Green-Pedersen
(ed.),Walter
Burley's
(1985),23-54,hier37-8( 38-41);NielsJorgen
40 (1980),102-66,
hier120(cap.2, 40).AnEdition
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
consequentiis.
ein( 38:
als
blich
die
betreffende
In De exclusivis
fuhrt
Unterscheidung
allgemein
Burley
Einwand
unddiskutiert
keinen
. . ."),underreferiert
estcommunis
Aliadistinctio
gegen
sehrwohltut.
sie,waserbeianderen
Unterscheidungen

13:48:22 PM

WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
DEEXCLUSIVA

191

von ,Formcund
sich dabei nurjeweils an einen ganz bestimmtenBegriff
Stoff
hlt.
,
Dass in dem einzigenbisherbekanntenTextzeugendie kleineAbhandlung
abbricht,bevor der Zweifelan der zweiten,auf den Stoffgegrndeten
Ausschlussweise
ausgerumtist,kann Zufall sein. Aber passt es nichtgut
mitdiesemBefundzusammen,dass es in De puritate
keineEinwndegegen
die exclusio
, sondern gerade gegen die exclusio
gratiaformae
gratiamateriae
sind, die Burley dazu fhren,diese alte Unterscheidungzu verwerfen?
Eine genauere Analyse des kleinenTextes zeigt, dass sich seine Unvollwohl nichtin diesem Sinne interpretieren
lsst.
stndigkeit
nichtzu erkennen,dass er selbstfrherdie
Burleygibt in De puritate
nun abgelehntenDifferenzierungen
vertreten
habe (tatschlichhatteer sie
einfachals gegeben referiert).
Die in De puritate
vorgetrageneLsung des
Problemsist mit derjenigenOckhams der Sache nach identisch.16
Nun
ist Burleyim allgemeinenja alles andere als ein willigerOckham-Schler;
Ockham gilt ihm, dem lteren,oftgenug als Gegner,nichtals Lehrer.
Wenn Burleydennoch in diesem Punkt(wie auch in manchen anderen)
seine Theorie so nderte,dass sie derjenigenOckhams hnlichwurde,so
muss es sachlicheGrnde dafrgegebenhaben. Das OxforderFragment,
in dem die Rede von Interpretationen
gratia
formaeund gratiamateriae
problematisiert
ist
aber
kein
Schlssel
zu BurleysSinneswandel
wird,
jedenfalls
ob es nun tatschlichvon Burley stammt oder aus der Abhandlung
De exclusiviseines anderen, noch zu identifizierendenAutors. Denn
wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll, kann der Abbruch des Fragmentswohl nichtals Zeichen der Kapitulationdes Autorsvor dem behandelten Problem gedeutetwerden, sondern lsst die intendierteLsung
klar erkennen.
Ein Satz wie: ,Nurdas Haus istwei4,liee sich,solltedie Einschrnkung
auf die (unteilbare)Form des Hauses bezogen sein, so verstehen:,Das
Haus ist wei, und nichtsanderes als das Haus ist wei.' Bei der Weie
soll es sich nicht um eine Eigenschaft handeln, die sich aus dem
Zusammenwirken
der Teile nur frdas Ganze ergibt,sondernum eine,
die dem Ganzen nur zukommenkann,indem sie auch Teilen zukommt.
Somit lsst sich aus der erstenTeilaussage folgern,dass auch Teile des
16So auchJanPinborg,
Walter
onExclusives
C.H. Kneepkens,
, in:H.A.G.Braakhuis,
Burle))
L.M.de Rijk(edd.),English
andSemantics
theEndoftheTwelfth
totheTime
Logic
from
Century
andBurleigh.
Actsofthe4thEuropean
onMediaeval
andSemantics,
ofOckham
Symposium
Logic
23-27April
1979, Nijmegen
hier319.
1981,305-29,
Leiden-Mjmegen,

13:48:22 PM

192

MISCHA
VONPERGER

Hauses wei sind (und nichtnur das Haus als ganzes). Aus der zweiten
Teilaussage folgtaber, dass kein Teil des Hauses wei ist (sondernnur
das Haus als ganzes).Die beiden Teilaussagenstehenalso im Widerspruch
zueinander. Sollte die Einschrnkungaber auf den (teilbaren)Stoffdes
Hauses bezogen sein, dann wre sie so zu verstehen:,Das Haus ist wei,
und nichtsanderes als das Haus und Teile des Hauses ist wei.'
Will man die Aussage im Sinne einermglicherweise
wahrenauffassen,
so kommtnur die zweiteAuslegungin Frage: Es ist kaum denkbar,dass
ein Haus wei wre, ohne dass wenigstenseinigeseinerTeile wei wren;
ein Teil des Hauses ist aber nur in materiellerHinsicht,nichtin formaler Hinsicht das Haus. Laut De puntateist dieser Befundjedoch kein
zuzulassen,sonderner msste
formae
Argumentdagegen,eine exclusio
gratia
der Anlass dafr sein, eine ungenau formulierte
Aussage wie: ,Nur das
Haus ist wei', zu przisierenzu dieser: ,Nur das Haus und einige seiner integralenTeile sind wei.'
betrifft
auch der Einwand,der in dem OxforderFragment
Entsprechend
die
exclusio
gratia
formae
gegen
vorgebrachtwird,nichtetwa den Umstand,
dass dadurchAussagendes Typs: ,Nur der Mensch ist wei', smtlichso
werdenmssten,dass die beiden Teilaussagen,durchdie sich
interpretiert
ihr Sinn widergebenlsst,im Widerspruchzueinanderstnden.Vielmehr
wird gefragt,wie eine derartigeAusschlieung,ohne Rcksichtauf eine
derartigeWidersprchlichkeit,
berhauptzu verstehenwre. Der Versuch,
X der betreffenden
sie so zu verstehen,dass anstelledes Subjektausdrucks
Ausdruck:
X'
der
Form
von
einzusetzenwre
,die
Aussage przisierend
den
also:
Form
des
Hauses'
anstellevon ,das
,die
(in
obigen Beispielen
Haus', und ,die Form des Menschen' anstellevon ,der Mensch'), kommt
offensichtlich
nichtin Frage, denn z.B. steht:,Nur der Mensch ist wei',
nicht fr: ,Nur die Form des Menschen = die Seele des Menschen ist
wei.'
ist anders gelagert.Auch
Der Einwand gegen die exclusio
gratiamateriae
der Subjektausdruck
der betreffenden
hierwirdzwar versuchsweise
Aussage
durch einen prziserenersetzt:statt,X' soll es heien: ,der Stoffvon X'.
Aber die Schwierigkeit,
die derartprzisierteAussage zu verstehen,ergibt
sich hier nicht schon vor deren Zerlegung in die beiden erklrenden
gratia
Teilaussagen,sondernerstaufgrundsolcherZerlegung:Die exclusio
zu fuhmateriae
scheintnun in genau den Typ von Widersprchlichkeit
ren,vor dem sie (andersals die exclusio
) solche Aussagenwie:
formae
gratia
sollte.
Z.B. istdie Aussage:
Haus
ist
doch
bewahren
das
,Nur
wei',
gerade
,Nur der Stoffdes Menschen ist wei', zu zerlegen in: ,Der Stoffdes
Menschen ist wei' und ,Nichts anderes als der Stoffdes Menschen ist

13:48:22 PM

WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
DEEXCLUSIVA

193

wei'; aus der erstenTeilaussage folgtaber, dass auch der Mensch als
ganzer wei ist, und aus der zweiten,dass auch der Mensch als ganzer
nichtwei ist.
Den ersten Einwand weist der Autor des Fragments durch eine
des Formbegriffs
zurck. Demnach wre die Ersetzung
Differenzierung
von ,X' durch ,die Form von Xe durchausim Sinne der exclusio
gratia
formae'jedoch drfe,Form' hier nichtim Sinne des integralenTeils eines
Ganzen verstandenwerden (komplementrzu ,Stoff), sondern als das
Ganze selbst.,Die Form des Menschen' ist dann nichtgleichbedeutend
mit ,die Seele des Menschen (komplementr
zu seinemKrper)',sondern
mit ,der Mensch als Ganzes'.
Wie der Autor beabsichtigte,die Differenzierung
des Stobegriffs
fr
die Lsung des zweitenProblemszu benutzen,deutet er in dem erhaltenenFragmentzwar mit keinemWort explizitan, wohl aber durch die
Zunchstfhrter die Unterscheidung
Abfolgeder Unterscheidungsschritte.
zwischendem ,inneren'und dem ,ueren' Stoffvon etwasein, und unterteiltbeide Glieder noch weiter.Der Leser wird verfhrt,
dieses Schema
als erschpfendanzusehen, doch dann folgtberraschendeine weitere
wonach ,Form' einfachdas Bestimmende,,Stoff'das
Begriffsauslegung,
Bestimmbarewre. Das Bestimmbareumfasstder Mglichkeitnach das
Bestimmendeund Bestimmte,
so wie etwa die Gattung,Sinnenwesen'der
nach
die
und die Art
Mglichkeit
spezifischeDifferenzvernunftbegabt'
in
,Mensch' umfasst.Wenn nun der Aussage: ,Nichtsanderesals der Stoff
des Menschenist wei', der Ausdruck:,Stoff'nichteinen integralenTeil
(komplementrzur Form) des Menschen, sondern das zum Menschen
Bestimmbarebezeichnete,dann drfteaus dieserAussage nichtgeschlossen werden,dass der Mensch als ganzer nichtwei sei, denn der Mensch
als ganzerwreja der Mglichkeitnach vom Stoffdes Menschenumfasst.
So wre der Widerspruchvermieden,der laut dem zweitendubiumzwischen den beiden erluterndenTeilaussagen einer Aussage wie: ,Nur X
ist wei', auftrte, wenn wir dabei eine auf den Stoffgegrndete
Ausschlieungannhmen.Wir knnensomitannehmen,dass der Autor
des Fragmentsdafrpldierenwollte,in der exclusio
sei der
gratiamateria#
im
Stoff'
Sinne
des
Bestimmbaren
zu
,
interpretieren.
Dass Burley in De puntatevon der Lehre abrckte,grundstzlichsei
zwischenexclusio
zu unterscheiden,
gratiaformaeund exclusio
gratiamateriae
war nach seineneigenenWortendarin begrndet,dass sie keinenAnhalt
in der sprachlichenGestaltder ausschlieendenAussage hat- wie die folgende berlegungzeigt:X soll ein integralesGanzes sein. Wer dann den
Ausdruck:,nur X', benutzt,gibt dadurch nicht zu erkennen,dass die

13:48:22 PM

194

MISCHA
VONPERGER

Ausschlielichkeit
eingeschrnktzu denken wre, etwa im Sinne einer
die
sich
auf den Stoffstattauf die Form sttzte.
Auslegung,
Nun ist es aber eine Sache, semantischeDifferenzierungen
eng an die
zu
und
eine
eine
solche
Intention
als starandere,
Sprachform koppeln,
kes Argumentgegen eine berkommeneDifferenzierung
einzuschtzen.
Ein Sprecher,der den Satz: ,Nur das Haus ist wei', uert,knntedie
er wolledamitdurchausauch die Weiheitvon Bestandteilen
Interpretation,
des Hauses zugelassenwissen,als selbstverstndlich
ansehen, so dass es
besondererformalerAnzeichen dafr,dass diese Interpretation
gefragt
sei, nichtbedrfte.Das Fehlen solcherAnzeichenknntedann kein hinreichendesArgumentdafr sein, dass jene beiden Interpretationsweisen
nicht gegeben wren. Burley hat denn auch in De puntateausdrcklich
miteineruneigentlichen
Ausdrucksweise
sei bei der Interpretation
vermerkt,
stets
zu
von Ausschlieungsaussagen
rechnen.Doch scheinter von der
- wonach die
einfachenformalenLsung des Problems
sprachlicheGestalt
nur die allgemeine,auf der Form gegrnder Ausschlieungsausdrcke
dete Ausschlieungzulsst- so eingenommengewesen zu sein, dass er
sich um diejenigenAussagen,bei denen wir jener sprachlichenGestalt
zuwidersprechen,im einzelnennichtweiterkmmerte.
Burleyidentifizierte
zwar, unter Rckgriffauf Aristoteles5Sophisticielenchi
, den Typ von
zu
dem
solche
nicht
aber
thematisierte
Aussagen gehren,
Amphibolie,
denen die Ausschlieungen,
er mglicheverschiedeneModifizierungen,
die auf die Weise der Amphibolieerfolgen,unterworfen
werdenknnen.
Vielleichtwollte er einfachdie spezielle Ausschlieungund die auf den
StoffgegrndeteAusschlieung,
wie sie die lterenAutorenvorsahen,auf
die Seite der uneigentlichen
Ausschlieungsetzen.
was aufseitender
Ockham hingegenhatte durchaus genau festgelegt,
sei.
Zunchst
sei
es
Ausschlieungmglich
mglich,durch
uneigentlichen
Gebrauch
der
Ausschlieungsausdrcke
przise dasjenige
uneigendichen
auszuschlieen,was weder die besagte Sache, noch ein Teil von ihr ist,
was also etwas uerliches(extrinsecum")
gegenberder Sache besagt.
Der Beispielsatz:,Nur Feuer machtwarm',zeige dann, dass wir gelegentlich sogar etwas der Sache uerlichesvon der Ausschlieungausnehwill damitwohl nichtsagen,
men wollen:Wer diese Behauptungaufstellt,
Wrme mache nichtwarm; er will also die Wrme in den Ausdruck:,nur
Feuer', eingeschlossenwissen,obwohl Wrme nichtsdem Feuer als solchem Zukommendes,sondernetwas ihm uerlichesist. Solchen Fllen
der uneigenichenAusschlieungteiltOckham eine eigene Kategoriezu:
schlietdann genau das aus, was etwasuerder Ausschlieungsausdruck
liches an die Sache herantrgt,nicht aber ein Akzidens,das der Sache

13:48:22 PM

WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
DEEXCLUSIVA

195

formaleinwohnt(ut. . . dictioexclusivapraeciseexcludatilla quae important aliquid extrinsecumnec accidens inhaerensformaliter").17

Bei anderen Themen, etwa der Suppositionslehre,
hat Burley in De
semantische
flexibel
puntateversucht,
Regeln
gegenber verschiedenen
Theorien
zu
Im
Gebrauchs
ontologischen
gestalten. Falle des ,uneigentlichen'
von Ausschlieungsausdrcken
zog er es offenbarvor, entsprechende
dem Leser zu berlassen.
Differenzierungen
D-86356 Neusss
Am Himmelreich51

17Guillelmus
de Ockham,
Summa
Gedeon
, I), edd.Boehner,
logicae
(Opera
philosophica
St.Bonaventure,
NewYork1974,300-1(parsII, cap. 17,lin.132Gi,Stephen
Brown,
eineexclusio
cuiuslibet
4). Die ersteModifikation
dagegen
besagte
generell
importantis
- Imedierten
extrinsecum"
Textsteht
inlin.133vorimportant"
flsch(ebd.,299,97-8).
licheinnec".

13:48:22 PM

MISCHA
VONPERGER

196
Codex manuscriptus
O

Oxford,Bodleian Library,ms. Add. A 370, fol. 143r l-144r 6.

Libri adhibiti
6
, ed. William David Ross, Oxford 1950, corr. 1977.
Aristoteles,
Physica,
5
, ed. DJ. Allan, Oxford 1936, corr. 1973.
, De caelo
librosMetaphysicorum
in Aristotelis
, in: Aristotelis
Averroes, Commentarium
et epitomae.
in
eosdem
XIV.
Cum
Averrois
libri
commentants,
Metaphysicorum
liber
Iunctae
1562
(Aristotelis
opera,
Theophrasti
Metaphysicorum, Venedig:
VIII).
commenta
, ed. Samuel Brandt,Wien-Leipzig
Bothius,In Isagogen
Porphyrii
1906 (Corpus scriptorumecclesiasticorum
Latinorum,XXXXVIII).
ArtisLogicaeTractatus
(Gualterus Burlaeus) Walter Burleigh,De Puritate
, ed. Philotheus
Longior.Witha RevisedEditionof the TractatusBrevior
1955.
Boehner,St. Bonaventure(New York)-Louvain-Paderborn
commentaet
In
Aristotelis
in:
,
Categorias
Isagoge
Porphyrii
Porphyrius,Isagoge
in
Aristotelem
rium,
, ed. AdolfBusse, Berlin 1887, 1-22 (Commentaria
Graeca, IV 1).
, ed. Lorenzo
, translatioBothii,in: Categoriarum
, Isagoge
supplements
1-31
G.
Bernard
Dod, Bruges-Paris
1966,
Minio-Paluello,
(Aristoteles
coop.
Latinus,I 6-7).
libros
De caeloetmundo
inAristotelis
Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium
, in: idem,
et corruptione
de caeloet mundo
Commentaria
in librosAristotelis
, de generatione
edd. fratresordinisPraedicatorum,Rom 1886, 1-257
etMeteorologicorum,
(Opera omnia, iussu impensaque Leonis XIII. P.M. edita, III).

13:48:22 PM

WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
DEEXCLUSIVA

197

<Gualterus Burlaeus (?): Fragmentmde dictione

exclusivatoti integraliaddita>

10

15

20

25

<1. De propositione,quando exclusivadictio toti integraliadditur,

distinguenda>
Notandum est: Quando exclusiva dictio additur toti integrali,talis
propositiosoletdistinguiex hoc, quod potestfieriexclusiogratiaformae vel gratia materiae.Si fiatexclusio gratia formae,tunc excluditurquodlibet de quo non praedicaturinclusumin recto.18Si fiat
exclusiogratiamateriae,sic excluditurquodlibetde quo non dicitur
inclusumin recto nec aliqua pars inclusi.
Verbi gratiaista propositio:,Tantum homo est albus', <si fiatexclusio gratia materiae,tunc exponitursic: ,Homo est albus>, et nihil
aliud ab homine vel a parte hominisest album.' Et sic est possibilis: ,Tantum homo est albus', ,Tantum domus est alba.' Si <autem>
fiatexclusio gratia formae,tunc exponitursic: ,Homo est albus, et
nihil aliud ab homine est album.' Et sic haec propositioest impossibilis et includens opposita, quia exponentesrepugnant.Sequitur
enim: ,Homo est albus, ergo aliqua pars hominisest alba'; et ulterius: ,Ergo aliud ab homine est album'; et per consequens oppositumconsequentisrpugntantecedenti,et ita istae repugnant:,Homo
est albus', et: ,Nihil aliud ab homineest album.' Et sic quaecumque
propositioexclusivaexponitur,et omnes tales exponentesincludunt
opposita.
<2. Dubia. >
2.1 Sed dubitatur,qualiterfitexclusiogratiaformaein ista: ,Tantum
homo est albus.' Si enim foretexclusio gratia formae,cum forma
hominissit anima hominis,denotaretur,quod tantumanima hominis foretalba- quod non est verum.

18Burlaeus
alibiillamregulam
declarat
sic:Si fiatexclusio
sicexcludiformae,
gratia
turquodlibet
formam
etperconsequens
excluditur
inclusi,
quodnonparticipt
quodlibet
de quo nondicitur
inclusum."
Cf.Depuntate
artis
tractatus
, 144,1-3(parsIII,
logicae
longior
tract.
II, cap. 1).
5 exclusiva]
etc.add.O 7 fiat]fuerit
O 8 fiat]fuerit
O 20 homo]tantum
O
praem.
21 aliud]contingit
add.Oac

13:48:22 PM

MISGHA
VONPERGER

198

2.2 Item dubitaturde intellectudictae exclusivaesecundum,quod

fitexclusiogratiamateriae.Videtur quod intellectusin ilio sensu sit
iste: ,Tantum materiahominisest alba;et est impossibileincludens
opposita,quia exponentesrepugnant,quia sequitur:,Materia hominis est alba, ergo homo est albus, ergo aliud a materiahominisest
album'; et per consequens oppositumconsequentisrpugntantecedenti.Et sic exponenteshuius: ,Tantum materiahominisest alba',
repugnant.

<3. Responsio.>
<3.1 Ad primumdubium.>
dieta.>
<3.1.1 De ,forma'multipliciter
Ad primumdicendumquod ,forma'diciturmultipliciter:
Quaedam
est formaintrinseca,et quaedam est formaextrnseca.
(1) Forma extrnsecaest duplex: quaedam exemplariset quaedam
15 extrinsecuscontentiva.(1.1.1) Primo modo deus est formaexemplaris omnia excedens et inadaequata, (1.1.2) et species sive forma
domus in anima est forma exemplarisdomus extra adacquata in

10

20

25

30

repraesentando.
Et sic formaexemplarisdividiturin formamexemplareminadaequatam et formamadaequatam exemplaremin repraesentando.
Et diciturquod deus est forma exemplarisinadaequata, quia non
repraesentatunam rem tantum,sed omnes res existenteset possibiles, quia in essentiadivina,ut dicunttheologi,relucentomnes creaturae veriuset expressiusquam in naturispropriis.
(1.2) Et formaextrnsecaexteriuscontentivasecundumPhilosophum,
secundo et quarto libroDe caelo
, est corpussimplexlocansnaturaliter
Et sic caelum dicitur,formaignis'
ab
eo.19
locati
simplicis
respectu
et ignis ,formaaeris' et aer ,formaaquae' et aqua ,formaterrae'.
(2) Forma intrinsecaest duplex:
materiam,
(2.1) quaedam, <quae> est pars,et ilia estformaperficiens
ilia
est
et
est
et
totum,
duplex, quia
(2.2)
quaedam, quae
(2.2.1) quoddam est totumintegralerespectusuarum partiuminte;20
graliumsecundumPhilosophum,secundo Physicorum

19Cf.Aristoteles,
sedcf.
librinoninveni,
De caeloIV 4, 312a 13-21;locumsecundi
n. 22.
infra,
20Cf.Aristoteles,
II 3, 195a16-21.
Phys.
O
contentativa
25 contentiva]

13:48:22 PM

WALTER
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
DEEXCLUSIVA

10

15

20

25

30

199

(2.2.2) et quoddam est totumuniversale,et talisformadicitur,forma

declaransquidditatemsui per se infrions'
secundumCommentatorem,
21
septimoMetaphysicae.
3.1.2 Per hoc ad primumdubium:
Dicendum, quod in ista: ,Tantum homo est albus', secundum,quod
fitexclusiogratiaformae,fitexclusio gratia formaequae est totum
integrale,et non fitexclusio gratia formae quae est pars. Et ideo
per istam: ,Tantum homo est albus', excludituromne illud de quo
non affirmatur
in recto hoc totum,scilicethomo. Et sic excluduntur partes integrales,quia pars integrlishominisnon est homo. Et
ita patet, quod intellectushuius secundum,quod fitexclusio gratia
formae,non est iste: ,Tan tum anima hominisest alba.'
3.2 <Ad secundumdubium.>
3.2.1 <De ,materia' multipliciter
dicta.>
Pro secundo dubio est sciendumquod, sicut ,forma' diciturmultipliciter,ita et ,materia',quoniam quaedam est materiaintrinsecaet
quaedam extrnseca.
3.2.1.1 Et extrnsecaest duplex: Quaedam est exemplata et quaedam locata.
3.2.1.1.1 Primo modo quaelibet creaturadicitur,materia'in comparationead divinamessentiam,quae est formaexemplarisomnium.
Unde, licet angeli et anima intellectivanon habeant materiamin
qua fiunt,sed sunt in se formae,tamen in comparationead divinam essentiam,quae est formaexemplarisomniumet formapurissima, sunt materiaeexemplatae.
3.2.1.1.2 ,Materia locata' diciturcorpus locatum respectucorporis
ipsum naturaliterlocantis.Et sic elementminferiusdiciturgatera' respectuelementisuperiorissecundum Philosophum,tertioDe
caelo
.22
3.2.1.2 Materia intrinsecaest duplex: quaedam propinqua et quaedam remota,materiaremota ut materiaprima, materiapropinqua
ut pars respectutotius.
3.2.1.2.1 Et talisest duplex: Quaedam est integrliset quaedam subiectiva.

21Cf.Averroes,
InMetaph.
VII 10,1034b33-1035b
VII, 34 (adMetaph.
2),fol.184r
F: forma
formam
secundum,
praedicatur
perse de habente
quoddeclarai
quidditatem
eiussubstantialem".
22Cf.Aristoteles,
De caeloIII 8, 306b9-22;et cf.supra,n. 19.

13:48:22 PM

200

MISCHA
VONPERGER

3.2.1.2.1.1 Partesintegralessunt materiapropinqua totiusintegrlis,

quod dicitur,totum'respectusuarum partiumintegralium.
3.2.1.2.1.2 Et partessubiectivaedicuntur,materiapropinqua'respectu
totiusuniversalisindicantisquidditatemearum.
5 3.2.1.2.1.1a Exemplum primi: Paries, tectum,fundamentumsunt
materiapropinqua domus.
3.2.1.2.1.2a Exemplumsecundi:ut Socrateset Plato dicunturgatera propinqua' respectuhominis,quia homo descenditimmobiliter
in Socratem et in Platonem. Et hoc est, quod dicit Bothiussuper
10 Porphyrium:quod ,species' dicit formam,,individuum'vero materiam.23Hoc etiam dicit Commentatorprimo De caelo: quod, qui
dicit: ,caelum', dicitformam,et, qui dicit: ,hoc caelum', dicit materiam.24Hoc etiam est, quod communiterdicitur:quod subiectumin
se habetper modummateriaeet praedicatumper modum
propositione
15 formae;et, quia superbisvere et proprie praedicaturde suo inferiori,ideo superiusdicituresse formarespectusui per se inferioris.
3.2.1.3 Sciendum est quod omne determinabiledicituresse materia
et determinansdicitur,forma'.Et sic dicit
respectusui determinantis,
habet
se per modum materiaeet differentia
Porphyriusquod genus
20 per modum formae,quia genus est determinabileper differentiam
et differentia
determinatet specificaigenus contrahendoipsum ad
certam speciem.25Et, quia genus est determinabileper differentias
et indifferens
ad quamlibet illarum,cum nullam actu ponat, ideo
bene dixitPorphyrius,
quod genusplus continetpotestatequam spe25 cies, et species plus continetactu quam genus. Nam genus continet
differentias
contrariaspotestate,ut animal continetrationalitatem
et
irrationalitatem
sed
solum
continet
unam
de
conpotentia;
species
trariis,ut homo rationale. Species tamen plus continetactu quam
constituentes
genus,quia actu continetgenus et differentiam
ipsam,
30 et genusnon continetillam differentiam
actu quae dividitillud.Verbi
23Cf.Bothius,
In Isagogen
commenta
III 2 (200,2-7):Dicit. . .
, ed. secunda,
Porphyrii
<scil.Porphyrius>
vocariuniuscuiusque
formam
primum
quidemspeciem
quae ex accidentium
. . . Quae. . . unicuique
individuo
forma
est,ea . . . specongregatione
perficitur.
cies... ex accidentibus
venit."
24Locumnoninveni;
I 9, 278a 11-15;ThomasAquinas,
sedcf.Aristoteles,
De caelo
In
De caelo
in primo
De caelodicit,
, prooemium
(lb): Philosophus
quod,qui dicit:,caelum',
dicitformam,
in materia".
dicitformam
qui autemdicit:,hoccaelum',
25Porphyrius,
., cap.3 (De differentia),
11,12-17;transi.
Both.,
18,9-15.
Isag,
3 materia
O 21 determinat]
determinatum
O 29 ipsam]
propinqua]
partes
propinquae
ipsumO 30 quae]quiaO

13:48:22 PM

DEEXCLUSIVA
BURLEY(?),FRAGMENTM
WALTER

201

gratia homo actu continet rationale,et animai non continetratioad rationaleet ad irranaie nisi sola potestate,cum sit indifferens
tionale;26ergo etc.
<3.2.2 Per hoc ad secundumdubium.>
<Continuatio deest.>

26Cf.ibid.,10,18-12,1; transi.
Both.,17,11-19,4.

13:48:22 PM

GuillaumeOckhamet la suppositio materialis

CLAUDE PANACCIO& ERNESTO PERINI-SANTOS

est qu'il y a, pour

L'ide de base de la thoriemdivalede la suppositio
deux
sortes
de
terme
d'un
propritssmanlangage quelconque,
chaque
tiques:celles qu'il possde en lui-mme,avant touteinsertionpropositionest l'exempleparadigmatique;et cellesqu'il acquiert
nelle,dontla significatio
dans le cadre d'une phraselorsqu'ily est employcomme sujetou comme
sous ses diversesvariantes.Selon les thorieset
prdicat,c'est la suppositio
selon les contextes,l'cart entreles unes et les autrespeut tre plus ou
moins grand. Pour les smanticiensralistes,un termecomme cheval
signifieen lui-mmela nature chevaline et dans son usage normal
Pour le nominasuppose en contextepour certainschevaux singuliers.1
liste Guillaume d'Ockham qui nous intresseraici , le mme terme
cheval signifie(au sens large) tous les chevaux singulierspossibles2etdans son usage normal,la suppositio
personalissuppose en contextephrastiquepour certainsd'entreeux, ceux,par exemple,qui existentau moment
de l'nonciationsi le verbe principalest au prsent.3La thorie,de faon
et de
gnrale,essaie de thmatiserdans un jeu complexede distinctions
la
d'un
terme
en
de
fonction
rfrentielle
les
variations
pris contexte,
rgles
par rapport ce que l'on appelleraitaujourd'huison extensiontotale,
c'est--direl'ensemblede toutesles choses prsentes,passes, futuresou
mme seulementpossiblesauxquelles le termes'applique.
Les cas les plus spectaculairesde tels cartssont ceux o le terme,en
contexte,tientlieu de (ou supposepour) certaine(s)chose(s)qui n'appartiennentpas du tout son extension.C'est notammentce qui arrive
materialis
la plupartdu temps lorsque le termeest pris en suppositio
(ou
1 Cf.parexemple
Pierre
Tractatus
, VI, 1-9,d. L. M. de Rijk,Assen1972,
d'Espagne,
inlogicam
Introductions
de Sherwood,
, V, d.C. H. Lohr,dans: Traditio,
79-83;Guillaume
d.
dialectices
en particulier
39 (1983),219-99,
, 2.2,415-423,
265;RogerBacon,Summulae
etlittraire
du Moyenge,53 (1986),
doctrinale
dans:Archives
d'Histoire
A. de Libera,
en particulier
265-6.
139-289,
2 Cf. Guillaume
Summa
d'Ockham,
SL),I, 33, d. Ph. Boehner,
(dsormais
logicae
I (dornavant
OPhI),
de Ockham
dans:Guillelmi
G. Gi et S. Brown,
Opera
Philosophica,
N.Y. 1974,95-6.
St-Bonaventure,
3 Cf.SL I, 72,OPhI, 215-8.
Vivarium
42,2

BrillNV,Leiden,2004
Koninklijke
online- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable

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suppositionmatrielle),comme dans chevalest un nom, parleest au

a cinq lettres,dans lesquelles les termescheval,
prsentou homme
et
homme
tiennentlieu d'eux-mmes(ou de leurs occurrenparle
comme
termes
oraux
ou crits.Contrairement
ce que pose aujources)
- et
d'hui l'approche tarskienne,selon laquelle un mot ainsi mentionn
plac entreguillemets devientpar le faitmme une nouvelleexpression
qui est le nomdu mot en questionet non pas le mot lui-mme,l'approche mdivale,en cela plus proche de l'intuitioncommune,voit la supmot: dans chevalest
positionmatriellecomme un usage spcial du mme
un nom, nous avons bien affaire,selon cette thorie, une occurrence
du mot cheval lui-mme,pluttqu' son nom. L'usage en supposition
matrielleapparat alors comme un cas particulierde ces variationsde
la fonctionrfrentiellequi intressent,globalement,la thorie de la
supposition
La tche, cependant,de caractriserde faon prcise cet usage autonymiqueet d'en fournirles rglessoulventplusieursdifficults
dlicates,
particulirement
pour une thorienominalistecomme celle de Guillaume
d'Ockham, qui n'admet comme rfrents
possiblesque des entitssingulires.Il se trouveque certainscommentateurs
rcents,excellentsconnaisseurs d'Ockham, ont soulev, sur cet aspect de sa doctrine,des apories
qu'ils tiennentpour graveset qui rendentncessaires,pour certainsd'entre eux, de rviserou mme de rcuser la smantiqueockhamisteen
certainspointsimportants.Nous voudrionsici rvaluerles critiquesqui
ont t avances cet gard par Elizabeth Karger, Calvin Normore et
Stephen Read surtout.5Telles qu'elles ont t formules,ces critiques,
ratentla cible. Elles n'en pointentpas moins,cepensoutiendrons-nous,
et pour
dant,verscertainsproblmesrelsque nous essaieronsd'identifier
nous
voudrions
montrer
la
ockhamiste
recle
des
lesquels
que
smantique
ressourcesprometteuses,
sans qu'il soit ncessairede renoncer ses thses principalesau sujet de la suppositio
materialis.

4 Pourun bonaperugnral
de la thorie
mdivale
de la suppositio
materialis
, voir
IrneRosier-Catach,
La suppositio
materialis
etla question
de l'autonymie
au Moyen
ge,
au colloque
Le faitautonymique
dansleslangues
etlesdiscours,
octobre
prsent
Paris,
2000,publication
lectronique:
http//www.cavi.univ-paris3.fr/ilpga/autonymie/themel
rosiercatl.pdf.
5 Cf.Elizabeth
La supposition
matrielle
comme
Paul
Karger,
supposition
significative:
de Venise,
Paulde Prgula,
dans:English
inItalyinthe14thand15thCenturies
, sous
Logic
la dir.deA. Maier,
CalvinG. Normore,
Material
and
Naples1982,331-41;
supposition
themental
ofOckham's
Summa
, dans:Topoi,16(1997),27-33;Stephen
language
Logicae
dans:Medieval
andTheology,
Read,Howis material
supposition
possible?,
Philosophy
8 (1999),1-20.

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1. Les thses
d'Ockham
Ockham, dans la Sommede logique,
pose qu'il y a suppositionmatrielle
le
ne
terme
mais suppose pour un
lorsque
suppose pas significativement
son vocal ou pour un signe crit.6La premireclause- que le terme
- a
ne suppose pas significativement
pour fonctiond'exclurede la suppositionmatrielleles cas o un termedonn supposeraitdanssonemploi
normalpour un son vocal ou pour un signe crit,comme mot, par
exemple,dans certainsmotssont des noms. Elle offre,cependant,dans
sa formulationmme, une thse fortequi, on le verra,peut tre tenue
pour litigieuse:
(Tl) la suppositionmatrielleest un usage non-significatif.
Cette proprit,selon Ockham, est partage aussi par la suppositio
simplex
aux
cas
o
le
terme
tient
non
lieu,
qui
(suppositionsimple),
correspond
il
du
comme
dans
cheval
significativement, concept
auquel
correspond,
est un concept d'espce naturelle.Elle permetd'opposer la supposition
matrielleet la suppositionsimple la suppositio
personalis
(supposition
du terme pour tenir
personnelle),qui constitue,elle, l'usage significatif
lieu des choses qui en sontles signifis,
que ces choses soientelles-mmes
des signes (comme pour le mot mot) ou non (comme pour le mot
cheval).
La deuxime clause de la dfinitionstipuleque:
(T2) un termeprisen suppositionmatriellesupposetoujourspour des
occurrencesorales ou crites.
Cela permet de distinguer,maintenant,la suppositionmatriellede la
elle, que lorsque le termesuppose
suppositionsimple qui n'intervient,
une
intention
de
l'me
[c'est--direun concept] sans tre pris
pour
Cette clause laisse voir, d'autre part, qu'il y a diversignificativement.7
ses varitspossiblesde suppositionmatrielle,selon que le termetient
d'occurrencesorales seulement(comme chelieu (non significativement)
val dans cheval
rimeavec narval),
d'occurrencescritesseulement(comme

6 SL I, 64, OPhI, 196:Suppositio

nonsupponit
materialis
estquandoterminus
la traduction
est
sedsupponit
velprovocevelproscripto;
utilise
franaise
significative,
d'Ockham.
Somme
delogique.
Premire
celledeJolBiard,Guillaume
, 2e d.,Mauvezin
partie
1993,202.
7 SL I, 64, OPhI, 196:Suppositio
estquandoterminus
prointensimplex
supponit
tioneanimae,
trad.Biard1993(ci-dessus
n. 6),201.
sednontenetur
significative;

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GUILLAUME

205

dans chevala six lettres)ou des deux la fois (comme dans chevalest
un mot franais).8
Ockham prcise,au demeurant,que n'importequelle unit linguistique peut tre prise en suppositionmatrielle,qu'il s'agisse d'un catgorme (comme un nom) ou d'un syncatgorme
(comme un adverbe,une
conjonctionou une prposition),d'une expressionsimple (comme dans
cheval
est un nom) ou complexe(commedans chevalblancest une expression bien formeou les chevaux
sontdesmammifres
est une phrasevraie).
Cette gnralisationdonne lieu une troisimethse, souventconsidre, elle aussi, comme problmatique:
(T3) toutesquence orale, criteou mentalesusceptiblede figurerdans
une propositionpeut tre prise en suppositionmatrielle.9
- d'un
Ainsi un mot oral qui tient lieu- non significativement
signe
crit sera-t-ilpris en suppositionmatrielle,et inversement.Et surtout:
un conceptmental,est-ilici clairementaffirm,
peut galementtre pris
en suppositionmatrielle.Non pas, certes,quand il tientlieu de lui-mme
comme concept (ce serait un cas de suppositionsimple),mais quand il
- du mot oral ou crit
tientlieu- non significativement
qui lui est subordonn: je peux utiliserdans des propositionsmentalesmon concept de
chevalpour tenirlieu du mot franaiscorrespondant.Certainscommentateursont vu l une difficult
majeure pour la thorieockhamistedu
mental.10
langage
Il est admis, en outre,que:
(T4) un termeen suppositionmatriellepeut tenirlieu d'occurrences
de la sienne propre.
ayant des formesgrammaticalesdiffrentes
L'exempleparadigmatique,ici, concernela dclinaisondes noms: un nom
au nominatifpeut tenirlieu d'occurrencescorrespondantesqui sont au
gnitif, l'ablatif,etc., et inversement{homopeut tenirlieu de hominis, homine
Mais la thse excde les limitesdes
, etc., et inversement).

dclinaison.
Un
verbe

l'infinitif
langues
peut supposermatriellement
l'indicatif
ou
le
pour
subjonctif
(commeaimer dans aimer
correspondant
est le verbe principalde la phraseJean aimeMarie), un singulierpour
8 Cf.SL I, 67, OPhI, 206:Potest
autemdividisuppositio
materialis
f.. .1.
9 Cf.SL I, 67, OPhI, 205-6:Circaquodsciendum
materialis
cuiliquodsuppositio
betquodquocumque
modopotest
esseparspropositionis
competere
potest.
10Parexemple,
PaulVincent
ruleofsupposition:
in
twoconflicts
Spade,Ockham's
histheory,
dans:Vivarium,
12 (1974),63-73,en particulier
63-7.

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PERINI-SANTOS

un pluriel(comme cheval dans chevalest le sujet de la phrase les chevauxsontdesmammifres

), et ainsi de suite.
Comment dtermine-t-on,
maintenant,si une expressiondonne est
ou
non
en
matrielle
dans un contextedonn? Il faut
prise
supposition
l'a
on
soit
en
d'abord,
dit, qu'elle
positionde sujet ou de prdicatdans
une proposition,c'est--direqu'elle en soit,dans le vocabulairemdival,
l'un des extrmes.11La rgle que Guillaume propose, partirde l,
est la suivante:
(T5) Un termesujetou prdicatne peut treprisen suppositionmatrielle que si l'autre extrmeest une expressionqui a (normalement)
pour signifisdes sons oraux ou des signescrits.12
Ainsi cheval ne peut pas treen suppositionmatrielledans tout che- mammifreen
val est un mammifre,parce que l'autre extrme
l'occurrence n'a pas lui-mmepour signifisnormaux des sons oraux
ou des signes crits,mais il peut l'tre dans chevalest un mot parce
La thse T5, il
que mot, lui, est une telle expressionmtalinguistique.
fauty insister,n'entendfournirqu'une conditionncessairede la suppositionmatrielle,et pas une conditionsuffisante.
Quelle que soitla nature
de l'autre extrme,un termecatgormatique,selon Ockham, peut toujours trepris en suppositionpersonnelle( moins que les locuteursn'en
dcidentautrementet pourvu,bien sr, que la phrase ainsi obtenue soit
Ainsi Socrate n'est pas obligatoirement
correcte).13
grammaticalement

11 strictement
exclut
aitelleOckham
parler,
qu'unepartiede sujetou de prdicat
mmeunesupposition
(cf.SL I, 72, OPhI, 220).Pourlesquestions
qui nousoccupent,
de laisser
nonthmatiss
lescas commeceluide
l'inconvnient
celaprsente
important
Il estclair,de faongnrale,
dansLe pluriel
de cheval
estchevaux.
cheval
quele traid'trecomplt
dessujets
etdesprdicats
ockhamiste
de la supposition
tement
requerrait
ou de prdicats.
Maisnouslaisserons
icice problme
de sujets
desparties
parunethorie
de ct.
12Cf.SL I, 65, OPhI, 197-9.
13Cf.SL I, 65, OPhI, 197:Notandum
in quacumestetiamquodsemper
terminus,
nisiexvolntate
utenhabere
personalem,
ponatur,
potest
suppositionem
quepropositione
tiumarctetur
ad aliam[. . .]. Notons
que dansla mesure
que celane vaut,cependant,
estverbum
estrespecte.
Ainsidansiegit
o la grammaticalit
, legit
peutbientrepris
estunterme
mta T5 (puisque
l'autre
extrme
matrielle
conformment
ensupposition
treprisen supposition
en l'occurrence),
maisil ne saurait
verbum
personlinguistique,
incorrecte
surle plangrammatical
ainsiforme
serait
nelleparcequela phrase
(incongrua)
Cf.SL I, 2, OPhI, 10:Undeistaoratio'legitestveret parconsquent
inintelligible.
si autemsignificative
estetverasi hocverbum
bum'congrua
materialiter,
'legit'sumatur
'omnisestnomen';
Similiter
estde talibus
nonintelligibilis
esset.
sumeretur
[= personaliter]
'ab estpraepositio'
'si estconiunctio';
'olimestadverbium';
(c'estnousqui soulignons).

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207

en suppositionmatrielledans Socrate est un nom, dontl'autreextrme,

La phrase pourraitvouloirdire,au regard
pourtant,est mtalinguistique.
de la smantiqueockhamiste,
que l'individuSocratelui-mmeest un nom.
Cela seraitfaux,certes,mais c'est tout de mme une interprtation
possible,alors qu' l'inverseSocrate ne peut pas treen suppositionmatrielledans Socrate est un humain,l'autre extrme,ici, n'tantpas une
La raisonde cetteasymtrie,
mme si Ockham
expressionmtalinguistique.
ne le dit pas explicitement,
est que la suppositionpersonnellecorrespond
l'usage normal,alors que la suppositionmatrielleet la suppositionsimple ne peuventtrequ'exceptionnelles.En outre,une phrase dont le sujet
seraiten suppositionmatrielleet dont le prdicatn'auraitpour signifis
que des choses qui ne sont pas des signes,ne pourraitjamais tre vraie.
Tandis que l'inversene vaut pas: certainesphrasesayantun sujeten supsont on ne peut plus
positionpersonnelleet un prdicatmtalinguistique
vraies,certaineschoses sont des noms par exemple.
Il dcoule de ces derniresconsidrationsqu'une phrase bien forme
dont l'un des extrmesest une expressionmtalinguistique
ayant pour
rfrents
normauxdes sons oraux ou des signescrits,est toujours
ambiselon
la
l'autre
extrme
ockhamiste,
gu
smantique
puisque
peut alors
tre pris en suppositionmatrielleaussi bien qu'en suppositionpersonnelle.En l'absenced'autresindicationscontextuelles,
Socrate est un nom
peut vouloirdire que l'individuSocrate est un nom (suppositionpersonnelle) ou que le mot Socrate est un nom (suppositionmatrielle).
2. Troisproblmes
Ce jeu de thses,a-t-onremarqu,soulveun certainnombrede difficults.
Nous nous intresserons
ici troisd'entreelles,qui ont t soulevespar
des commentateurs
rcentset qui, certainsgards,sont interrelies.
La premire est signale dans un article d'Elizabeth Karger, dont
Il s'agissaitpour elle de
l'objectiftait caractrehistoriquesurtout.14
rendrecompte de l'apparitionde certainesdoctrinespost-ockhamistes
de la suppositionmatrielle,celles notammentde Paul de Venise et de
Paul de Prgula. Elle le fait,cependant,en identifiant
ce qui dans son
texte mme apparat comme une aporie de la positionockhamiste.La
difficult
en questionconcernela thse T1 ci-dessus,qui pose la suppositionmatriellecomme un usage non significatif.
Selon la smantique
14Karger1982(ci-dessus
n. 5).

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ockhamiste,remarque Karger, un termedonn doit entreteniravec ses

rfrents
possiblesdeux relationsqui ne sontpas relativesau contextede
l'nonc, et que nous appelleronspour cette raison pr-propositionnelles. Il y a d'abord la signification
premireau sens d'Ockham, qui relie
le terme tout ce dont il peut tenirlieu lorsqu'ilest pris en supposition
personnelle:ainsi cheval signifietous les chevaux et lorsqu'ilest pris en
suppositionpersonnelle,comme dans tout cheval est un mammifre,
suppose pour certainsd'entreeux (ou peut-trepour tous dans certains
reconnuepar Ockham,
cas). La deuximerelationn'estpas explicitement
mais elle est indispensable son approche: elle associe le terme tout
ce dont il peut tenirlieu lorsqu'il est pris en suppositionmatrielle(ou
De mme que les rfrents
du termeen suppositionpersonnelle
simple).15
sont prlevsparmi ses significata
de mme ses rfpr-propositionnels,
rentslorsqu'il est pris en suppositionmatrielledoivent-ilstre prlevs
dans un ensemblepr-propositionnellement
dtermin.
Ce qui faitproblme,selon Karger, c'est que cettedeuximerelation,
ncessaire l'ockhamismesans y trereconnue,ne doit pas tre,en vertu
de Tl, une varitde signification
. Il en dcoule, pense-t-elle,une consquence inacceptable,qu'elle appelle l'implicationde non-grammaticalit.16Considronsdes phrasescomme quelqueest un quantificateur
ou
bubaa quatre lettres.Ni quelque ni buba n'ont de signification
au
Mais
comment
une
tre
le
sens ockhamiste.
expressionpeut-elle
sujet
Pour tre le sujet d'une phrase,
d'une phrase sans avoir de signification?
une expressionne doit-ellepas appartenir une catgoriegrammaticale
dont les membressignifient
quelque chose? Si quelque n'taitjamais
il ne pourraitjamais jouer le
dpourvude signifis,
qu'un syncatgorme
en tantque tel ne rfre rien.
rle d'un sujet puisqu'un syncatgorme
Et le problme se pose de faon encore plus dramatiqueselon Karger
dans le cas d'un non-motcomme buba: puisqu'unephrasecommebuba
a deux syllabes est bien formeen franais,buba doit appartenir
C'est
une catgoriegrammaticaledont les membresont une signification.
15Karger
ne nous
la dnotation,
maisce choixterminologique
appellecetterelation
etlesformes
le verbedenotare
Ockham
utilise
engnral
semble
appapastrsheureux.
de
rentes
ce qui estditparuneproposition
entire,
usagequi, dfaut
pourindiquer
stable.
Voir
unedfinition
etpourainsidiretechnique,
n'enestpasmoins
recevoir
prcise
OPhI, 218-9;SL II, 27,lignes170-8,OPhI, 339;ou
entre
autres
SL I, 72,lignes120-30,
nidanscelui
dansnotre
SL III-1, 2, lignes
41-50,OPhI, 363.Rien,cependant,
argument
de la philodansla description
de Karger,
ne dpendde l'usagede ce terme
particulier
sophieockhamienne.
16Karger1982(ci-dessus
n. 5), 336.

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MATERIAUS
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209

un raisonnement
semblable,d'ailleurs,qui conduitles thoricienscontemporains tenir qu'un mot entre guillemetsdevient ipsofactoun nom,
Tel est donc leproquelle que soit sa catgoriegrammaticalehabituelle.17
blmede la non-grammaticalit
de
la
thse
ockhamiste
Tl. Les
, qui surgirait
successeursd'Ockham qui ont identifice problmen'auraienteu d'autre
choix, selon Karger, que de bannir compltementla suppositionmatrielle(comme Pierrede Mantoue apparemment)18
ou alors de rcuserla
ockhamiste
en
le
sens
donnpar Ockham
elle-mme, particulier
smantique
'significato
'.19
StephenRead, dans un articleplus rcent,s'inspiredu textede Karger,
mais le problmepos par Tl est, ses yeux, encore plus radical pour
l'ockhamismeet tient l'incohrencede la notion mme de supposition non significative.20
Il faut bien, en effet,comme le notait Karger,
que quelque chose dtermined'une faon ou d'une autre l'ensembledes
occurrencessonores ou critesparmi lesquelles serontprlevs,dans le
contexted'une phrase,les rfrents
d'un termepris en suppositionmatrielle.Lorsque le termeest en suppositionpersonnelle,tout le monde en
Dans
convient,ce rle est jou par sa signification
pr-propositionnelle.
le cas des mots oraux ou crits,explique Read, cela revient dire que
l'ensemble en question correspond l'extensiondu concept auquel ils
sont subordonns.Mais s'il en est ainsi pour la suppositionpersonnelle,
il doit en aller de mme, mutatis
mutandis
, pour la suppositionmatrielle:
l'ensembledes choses du monde dont un terme donn peut tenirlieu
aussi l'extenlorsqu'ilestprisen suppositionmatrielledoit correspondre
sion d'un certainconceptauquel ce termeest associ; et ce genred'association,prcisment,doit tre considr,lui aussi, comme une sorte de
L'ockhamismeest alors plac devant le dilemmesuivant:
signification.
Si la signification
taitrellement
la supposition
requise
pourexpliquer
personnelle,
alorscomment
la supposition
matrielle
s'enpasser?
si la supInversement,
peut-elle
- pourconvoquer
matrielle
estpossible
uneclasseentirement
nouvelle
de
position
- alorsil semblerait
de la signification
soiten ralit
nonpersupposita
quela thorie
tinente
de la supposition
et la thorie
de la vrit.21
pourla description
personnelle
C'est ce que nous appelleronsle problme
de l'incohrence.
17Cf.parexemple
Le mtalangage
64 ss.
, 2ed.,Paris1997[19781,
Josette
Rey-Debove,
18Cf.Karger1982(ci-dessus
n. 5), 337.Kargerfaitrfrence
ici ce qui parattre
uncompte
rendu
de la position
de Pierre
de Mantoue
parPaulde VenisedanssonTrait
dessuppositions
N.Y. 1971;voirnotamment
(d.parA. R. Perreiah,
St-Bonaventure,
p. 52).
19Karger1982(ci-dessus
n. 5),337.
20Read 1999(ci-dessus
n. 5), 19.
21Read 1999(ci-dessus
n. 5), 7 (notre
traduction).

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- de la difficult
Read insisteparfoissurun autreaspect- complmentaire
de l'usagecapricieux.
Plus que la
qu'il soulve: nous l'appelleronsle problme
cohrenceinternede l'ockhamisme,ce qui est en cause ici, c'est l'absence
de rglesprcisesdans la thorieockhamistepour dterminer,
dans chales
d'un
terme
en
contexte
que
particulier, supposita
pris suppositionmatavec un conceptcapable
rielle.En l'absence d'une connexionsystmatique
les rfrents
du termeprisen suppositionmatrielle,
de circonscrire
l'approche ockhamiste,base sur Tl, suggreque les mots peuventaussi tre
Calvin Normore,dans un articleantrieur
employscapricieusement.22
mais que Read ne cite pas , avait insistsur une difficult
apparente.23
Normore,lui, est plus intrigupar T4 que par Tl. La similitudenaturelle entrel'occurrenceprise en suppositionmatrielleet les unitsorales ou critesdontelle tientlieu ne suffit
pas, remarque-t-il,
pour dterminer
l'ensemblede ces dernires,non seulementparce qu'un mot oral peut,
mais
en suppositionmatrielle,tenirlieu d'un mot critet inversement,

s'en
tenir

un
medium
on
ne
voit
mme
unique,
pas bien
parce que,
matrielle.
o s'arrte,selonOckham,le grappinde la supposition
Normore,
dans ce contexte,faitgrand cas du dernierexemplede suppositionmatrielle offertpar Ockham dans le chapitrede la Sommede logiquequ'il y
consacre:[. . .] dans 'la qualit se prdique au concretde son sujet' [quain concreto
litaspraedicatur
de subjecto
], critOckham, 'qualit' 'qualitas]suppose pour les concretsqui sont prdicablesdu sujet.24Normorepense
que qualitasdans cet exemple doit tenirlieu de termesconcretsqui ne
lui ressemblentpas du tout et qui n'en sont mme pas des variantes
comme blanc, etc.25Puisque l'exemgrammaticalesou morphologiques,
ple est donn pour un cas de suppositionmatrielle,il en ressort,apparemment,que le lien entrele termeet les choses dontil tientlieu lorsqu'il
est pris en suppositionmatriellereposepour une bonne part sur des dictais arbitrairesde la part des locuteurs.

22Read 1999(ci-dessus
n. 5),9 (notre
traduction).
23Normore
1997(ci-dessus
n. 5).
24SL I, 67, OPhI, 207:Similiter
in concreto',
li
de subiecto
hic'qualitas
praedicatur
de subiecto.
praedicabilibus
proconcretis
qualitas
supponit
25Normore
n. 5), 30.
1997(ci-dessus

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211

3. Critique
de la critique
Telles qu'elles sont prsentespar leurs auteurs,ces troiscritiquesde la
positionockhamistenous semblentinappropries.Voici pourquoi.
Le problmede la non-grammaticalit,
d'abord,ne se pose qu'au regard
d'une conceptiondu rle des catgoriesgrammaticalesqui n'est pas, en
gnral,celle des mdivauxet qui, c'est le moins que l'on puisse dire,
ne s'impose pas. Selon cette conception,deux expressionsqui peuvent
dans une phrase doiventpour cela
jouer le mme rle logico-syntaxique
appartenir la mme catgoriegrammaticale.Tout ce qui peut tresujet
d'une phrase, notamment,doit appartenir la mme catgorie,qu'on
appellera,disons,la catgoriedes noms.Il suitde cetteconception,comme
dans l'orthodoxietarskienne,qu'un adverbe, par exemple, qui, pris en
suppositionmatrielle,
joue le rle de sujet grammaticaldans une phrase
devient
quelconque,
ipsofactoun nom. Autrementdit: aucun adverbe
- ne
ni aucun autre syncatgorme
peutjamais tre au sens strictle sujet
d'une phrase. Cela est incompatible non seulement avec la position
d'Ockham, pour qui la suppositionmatrielleconvient n'importequel
termequi peut, de quelque faon,fairepartie d'une proposition26
(c'est
la thse T3), mais aussi avec l'inspirationprofondede la thoriemdivale de la supposition
terme
pour laquelle, en gnral,c'est le mme
qui figure
tantten suppositionmatrielleet tanttnon, sans qu'aucun changement
de catgoriegrammaticalene soit peru comme ncessaire.27La faon
dont Guillaume d'Ockham et la plupartde ses contemporainsse reprsentent
implicitementle rle des catgoriesgrammaticalesprsuppose
que la catgoried'un termen'en rgitde faon distinctiveque les usales cas o le termen'est
ges normauxseulement,c'est--dire,
prcisment,
ni en suppositionmatrielleni en suppositionsimple.Un nom,par exemple, est un termeincomplexequi, prisen supposition
, peut figurer
personnelle
comme sujet d'une phrase grammaticalement
acceptable.
Cela ne laisse pas pour autantla grammaireincomplteet dpourvue

26SL I, 67; textecitci-dessus

n. 9; trad.Biard1993,211.
27II estvraiqu'onpeuttrouver
cela quelquesexceptions,
en particulier
au xiie
sicle.Ablard,
critdanssa Dialctica
courtdans
parexemple,
que les motsSocrate
'Socrate
court'estvraine constituent
maisle nom
d'uneproposipas uneproposition,
tion(Sicquoqueet cumdicimus:
'Socrates
currit
verum
est','Socrates
curri,
quodin
subiecto
nonest,sednomen
eiuscuiverum
Dialctica
proferimus,
propositio
attribuitur,
,
d. L. M. de Rijk,2e d.,Assen1970,150).Maiscettefaonde parlertend disparatre partir
du moment
o s'labore
vraiment
la thorie
de la suppositio
materialis
au xiiie
sicle.

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S
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& ERNESTO

de ressourceseu gard la suppositionmatrielle.Il suffitde postuler,

comme Ockham le fait trs clairement,une rgle unique et trs gnrale, en vertude laquelle touteexpressiond'un langage quelconque, quelle
, peut, lorsqu'elleest prise en supposition
grammaticale
qu'ensoitla catgorie
matrielle,figurercomme sujet ou prdicatd'une phrase grammaticalement bien forme.La rgle peut mme tre tendue sans problmec'est un de ses grandsavantages- toute squence quelle qu'elle soit,y
compriscelles qui n'appartiennent aucune catgoriegrammaticale.La
phrase buba a quatre lettressera alors tenue pour grammaticalement
correcte,bien que buba n'appartienneen franais aucune catgorie
grammaticale.Il n'y a alors aucun besoin d'imaginerun changementde
catgoriegrammaticaleselon les contextes,mme si l'on admet des chan.28La grammairene s'en trouvepas complique,bien
gementsde fonctions
au contraire.Mme si l'on admet, ds lors,comme le faitOckham, une
et certainescatgoriesgrammaticonnexiontroiteentrela signification
cales celle du nom, surtout , il n'en suit pas qu'une expressionqui
n'appartientpas ces catgorieset qui ne signifieaucun objet spcial
ne puissejamais figureren positionde sujet
(comme un syncatgorme)
correcte.L'aporie de
une
dans
de
ou
phrase grammaticalement
prdicat
est un faux problme.29
la non-grammaticalit
Le problmede l'incohrencesoulevpar StephenRead n'est pas non
plus, en lui-mme,trs menaant. Comment,demande Read, Ockham
est requise pour dterminer,
peut-ilsoutenir la foisque la signification
avant toute insertionpropositionnelle,quels individuspeuvent tre les
du termelorsqu'ilest pris en suppositionpersonnelle,et qu'elle
rfrents
ne l'est pas pour dterminerceux qui peuventtre ses rfrents
lorsqu'il
est pris en suppositionmatrielle?La rponse est simple: c'est que les
l'une de l'autre.
relationsrequisesdans les deux cas sont trsdiffrentes
la premire
Ockham rservetoutsimplementle nom de signification
d'entreelles, comme c'est son droitle plus strict.Comme Read l'a trs
28Notons
avecune
estcompatible
grammaticales
quecettefaonde voirlescatgories
sontde la mmecatselonlaquelledeuxexpressions
rpandue
aujourd'hui
conception
sans
danstouslescontextes
si ellessontintersubstituables
si et seulement
goriesyntaxique
la
Introduction
de la substitution
du rsultat
la grammaticalit
affecter
(DanielLaurier,
et
un
un
nom
Selon
cette
Bruxelles
du
adverbe,
1993,
,
128).
conception,
langage
philosophie
contextes
danscertains
salvacongruitate
bientreintersubstituables
peuvent
par exemple,
l'unquel'autre,
la mmecatgorie
sansappartenir
enposition
pourautant
sujet)
(comme
contextes
o ilsne le sontpas.
d'autres
pourpeuqu'ilse trouve
29Cesconsidrations
de l'argument
trsgnrale
la version
enmmetemps
neutralisent
toute
n. 17),100-1,adresse
1997(ci-dessus
de la non-grammaticalit
que Rey-Debove
matrielle.
de la supposition
autonymique
conception

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GUILLAUME
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213

bien vu, la suppositionpersonnelled'un termequelconque se dtermine

d'un
en gnral,chez Ockham, partirde l'extensionpr-propositionnelle
comme
naturel.
Si
le
terme
est
un
mot
considr
lui-mme
concept
signe
oral ou crit,le concept en questionest celui auquel le termeest subordonn (directement
ou indirectement),30
et si le termeest d'ordremental,
alors il est lui-mmele concepten question.L'extensionpr-propositionnelle du conceptest ce que Ockham appelle sa signification
premire.31
La subordination
, dans son vocabulaire,est une oprationconventionnelle
les propritssmantiquesd'un terme
qui a pour effetde transmettre
un autre: le mot franaischeval, par exemple,acquiertsa signification
en tant conventionnellement
subordonnau concept mental de cheval. Les rfrentsd'un termeen suppositionpersonnelleensuite
qu'il
soit oral, crit ou conceptuel sont toujoursprlevsparmi ses signifis
premiers.Les relationsde subordinationet de signification
permettent
ainsi une approchesimple,unifieet gnosologiquement
fonde, la suppositionpersonnelle.
Mais ce qui est requispour la suppositionmatrielleest d'un toutautre
ordre.Certes,Read a raisonde dire qu'il fautpostulerici aussi une relation pr-propositionnelle
partirde laquelle on puisse prleverles rfrents du terme lorsqu'il est pris en suppositionmatrielle.Mais cette
relationest tout faitdiffrente
de la prcdente.On le verra mieux en
attentivement
le
cas des termesoraux. Tenons-nous en
reprenantplus
- afinde
- ceci
l'instant
la discussion
pour
simplifier
qu'une occurrence
orale de cheval peut, en suppositionmatrielle,tenirlieu de n'importe
quelle occurrenceorale qui lui est quiforme.La relationpr-propositionnelle pertinentesera donc ici l'quiformit,
c'est--diredans le cas pr- ou
sentla similitude
l'quivalence phonologique.Mais qu'une occurrence
donne entretiennecette relationavec une autre ne tientpas en gnral
au conceptauquel elle est subordonne.Si les locuteursdu franaisdcidaient conjointementde subordonnerdornavantle mot oral cheval
au conceptde rhinocros,cela en modifierait
radicalementla supposition
personnelle,certes,mais a ne changeraitrien l'ensembledes occurrences qui sontquiformes une occurrencedonne du mot cheval. Nous
ne voulonspas dire que la suppositionmatriellen'exploitejamais la sub- nous verronsau contraire
ordination
qu'elle le faitparfois,et de faon
systmatique.Mais l'exemple montre tout le moins que la relationou
30Lessignes
sontdirectement
subordonns
desconcepts,
etles
oraux,
pourOckham,
leurtour,sontsubordonns
dessignes
oraux.Cf.SL I, 1, OPhI, 7-8.
crits,
signes
31Paropposition
la signification
seconde
de certains
termes,
qu'ilappelleaussila
connotation
(cf.SL I, 10)et donton peuticine pas tenir
compte.

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& ERNESTO
CLAUDEPANACCIO

les relationsrequisespour la suppositionmatriellene reposentpas tousur la subordination un conceptindpenjours, comme la signification,

La situation,ici, est analogue celle
abstraction.
obtenu
damment
par
que nous avons reconnue propos du problmede la non-grammatica- dtermined'un
lit: la mme rglegnrale- ou le mmejeu de rgles
admissiblespour un
seul coup pour tous les cas l'ensembledes rfrents
convention
sans
en
termepris
spciale de
qu'une
suppositionmatrielle,
subordinationsoit chaque foisrequise.Il y a bien une relationpr-proentreun termedonn et ce dont il peut
positionnellequi doit intervenir
tenirlieu quand il est en suppositionmatrielle,mais cetterelationest si
de la signification
differente
qu'il serait quivoque et trompeurde les
appeler toutesdeux du mme nom.
Le problmede la rfrencecapricieuse,finalement,
pourra tre vit
si l'on peut avancer un jeu de rgles gnralespermettantde dtermiqui est ici
ner, d'une part, quelle est cette relationpr-propositionnelle
requise,et d'autre part, commentl'ensembleglobal ainsi circonscritdoit
tre restreintdans chaque contexteparticulier.Il est vrai, sans aucun
n'a pas fourni, cet gard, une thorie
doute, que le venerabilis
inceptor
voit
trsdtaille,mais on ne
pas que l'une ou l'autre des thsesT1-T5
ait besoin pour cela d'tre abandonne; et la smantiqueockhamiste,on
essaiera de le montrerdans les sections subsquentes,comporte cet
gard des ressourcesintressantes.
Encorefaut-ilsoulignertoutde suiteque la margede manuvreouverte
par Ockham pour la suppositionmatrielleest beaucoup moinslarge que
ce que Calvin Normore a pu croire sur la base de l'exemple qualitas
donn par Ockham dans la Sommede logiin concreto
de subiecto
praedicatur
que, I, 67. Normore,rappelons-le,pense que le mot qualitasest pris en
suppositionmatrielledans cettephrasepour tenirlieu d'adjectifsconcrets
comme albus(blanc),fortis
(courageux),etc., qui n'ont avec lui aucun
affinitmorphologique.Mais rien n'est
ni
aucune
similitude
de
rapport
Normore
de
moins sr. Le raisonnement
repose sur l'ide que le mot
, pour Ockham, n'a pour signifisque des qualits relles,qui ne
qualitas
peuventpas en gnraltreprdiquesde quoi que ce soit.32Or Ockham
, soit
, comme substantia
peut trsbien admettreque le terme qualitas
utilisparfoiscomme un termemtalinguistique
ayant pour signifisdes
32Cf.Normore
realsubn. 5), 30: [. . .] theterm[qualitas]
1997(ci-dessus
signifies
icilessubstances
inclut
Normore
andnoneofthosearepredicates.
andqualities
stances
il
estsansconsquence:
dansle contexte,
de qualitas
, maisce point,
parmilessignifis
ne signifie
sonargument
relles,
suffirait
, pourOckham,
que desqualits
que qualitas
etc.
lesvertus,
lesblancheurs,
comme

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GUILLAUME
D'OCKHAM

215

mots ou des concepts.33C'est ce qu'il aurait facilementpu dire en tout

tiennelieu de termesqualitatifsconcrets
cas s'il avait voulu que qualitas
de subjecto
in concreto
dans qualitaspraedicatur
; le terme,alors, aurait t
en
matrielle.
pris suppositionpersonnelle,pluttque
L'exemple, notre
est
donn
comme
un
cas
de
matrielle
avis,
supposition
parce que qualitas, dans cette phrase, tientlieu, aux yeux de Guillaume,non pas de
albus, fortis,
etc., mais de quale, qualia ou leurs drivsgrammasont
les formesconcrtes du terme qualitaslui-mme.
ticaux, qui
L'nonc veut dire ceci: le terme qualitaspeut se prdiquer sous ses
formesconcrtes;en d'autres mots: les formesconcrtesde qualitas
c'est--direquale et qualia peuventtreemployescomme prdicats,
par exemple dans une chose qui est blanche est un quale. Le principe
d'ailleurspeut trevu comme une matricegnralisable n'importequel
termequalitatif:on pourraitdire albedopraedicatur
in concreto
(le terme
blancheur se prdique sous sa formeconcrte
par exemple dans ce
cheval est blanc), et ainsi de suite. Cette lecturefaitcomprendrepourquoi l'exempleen question,introduitpar similiter
(de la mme faon),
est donn comme une simplevariantedes cas o le termepris en supcomme
positionmatriellesupposepour un de ses drivsmorphologiques,
homotientlieu de hominis
dans homopraedicatur
de asinoin obliquo
; et
elle faitcomprendresurtoutpourquoi Ockham n'a pas sentile besoin de
d faires'il avait voulu
l'expliquerdavantage,ce qu'il auraitcertainement

dans
en
tienne
lieu
de albus, <<
,
,
que qualitas
l'exemple question,
fortis
etc. La suppositionmatriellen'excde pas, dans ce cas, le genrede rapports de ressemblanceou d'affinits
morphologiquesque ses prcdents
exemplesvoquaient dj. On ne saurait conclure,avec Normore,que
- ou
l'ide d'un emploi autonymique
approximativement
autonymique
ait t, dans cet exemple particulier,compltementabandonn par
Ockham.34
33Ockham
la choseen dtailpourle terme
substantia
dansSL I, 42, OPhI,
explique
au passagedanssoncommentaire
121-2.Il prcise
desCatgories
que celavautaussipour
inlibrum
Praedicamentorum
Aristotelis
, d.G. Gi,inOPhII, St-Bonaventure,
qualitas
(.Expositio
N.Y. 1978,164,lignes
56-8).
34JeanBuridan,
dessuppositions
beletbienquelestermes
lui,danssonTrait
, considre
substantia
sontprisen supposition
comme
ou accidens
matrielle
dansdesphra, qualitas
sescomme
homo
estsecunda
substantia
ou album
estaccidens
destermes
, o ilsrfrent
dela catgorie
extrieures
elles-mmes
correspondante
plutt
qu'auxchoses
(JeanBuridan,
Summulae
desuppositionibus
, 4.3.2.,d. R. Van derLecq,Nimgue
1998,43).Cettethse
- assezcurieuse,
il fautl'admettrene saurait,
treattribue

smantique
cependant,
nonseulement
nullepart,
maisaussiparcequ'ellecontreOckham,
parcequ'ilnel'endosse
la rgleque nousavonsci-dessus
vient
nepeuttreprisen supappeleT5: unterme
matrielle
a normalement
extrme
dessonsorauxou
position
que si l'autre
poursignifis

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PERINI-SANTOS

4. Le problme
de la relation
pr-propositionnelle
Cela dit, il est vrai- mais pour d'autres raisons- qu'un terme pris en
suppositionmatriellene tientpas toujourslieu d'occurrencesqui lui sont
morphologiquement
apparentes.Il arrive Ockham le reconnaten toutes lettres,on l'a vu qu'un mot oral tiennelieu d'occurrencescritesou
et qu'un concept,mme,tiennelieu d'occurrencesorales ou
inversement,
crites.Read et Karger,de surcrot,ont certainement
raison de dire que
l'ensemble de toutes les occurrences,orales ou crites,dont un terme
donn puisse tenirlieu lorsqu'ilest pris en suppositionmatrielledoit tre
fixavant son insertionpropositionnelle.
Les thsesT2 (que le termeen
suppositionmatriellesuppose pour des occurrencesorales ou crites)et
T4 (qu'il peut supposerpour ses propresvariantesmorphologiques)laissent devinerles contoursde cet ensemble,mais ne rvlentpas encore
de faonsuffisamment
prcisequellessontau juste les relationsqui l'engendrent.Une occurrencecritedu mot franaisblanc, par exemple,peut
tenirlieu en suppositionmatrielledes occurrencescritesqui lui sont
quiformeset de toutes celles qui en sont des variantesgrammaticales
(comme blancs, blanche, blanches), ainsi que de toutesles occurrencesorales correspondantes.
Mais jusqu'o cela va-t-il?On seraitport
croire,bien que Guillaume ne le prcisepas, que blanc puisse parfoistenirlieu des occurrencesorales ou critesdu mot anglais whiteou
du mot latin albus. Le vritableproblme que soulventles rflexions
de Karger, de Normoreet de Read sur la thorieockhamistede la suppositionmatrielleest le suivant:quelle est ici, exactement,la rglegnrale sous-jacente?
Sans prtendrefournirnous-mmes cet gard une thoriecomplte,
nous voudrionssuggrerque la smantiqueockhamistecomporteles lments ncessairespour aborder ce problme de faon fructueuse,sans
qu'il soit ncessaireni de renoncer la suppositionmatrielle( l'instar
de la smantiquetarskienne),
ni d'abandonneraucune des thsesT1-T5
(commele voudraientKarger et Read). Il s'agitd'exploiterpour cela trois
relationsqui sont de toute faon indispensables l'ockhamismeet qu'il
n'a d'ailleursaucune rserve reconnatre.Ce sont:

dessignes
crits.
Cettergle,en effet,
exclutque deuxexpressions
dontla signification
n'estpas mtalinguistique
tretoutes
lesdeuxprises
en supprpropositionnelle
puissent
matrielle
face titre
de sujetetde prdicat
d'unemmeproposition
quandellesse font
comme
celasemble
trele cas danslesexemples
de Buridan.
position,
(Nousremercions
Elizabeth
notreattention
surce passagede Buridan).
Kargerd'avoirattir

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GUILLAUME
D'OCKHAM
ET LA SUPPOSITIO
MATERIAUS

217

- la ressemblance
morphologique
- la drivation
grammaticale
- la subordination.
La premired'entre elles est ce que nous avons parfoisappel plus
haut, la suite de Karger, l'quiformit.C'est le rapportqui permetde
dire de deux occurrencesorales qu'elles sont des instancesdu mmemot
oral, ou de deux occurrencescrites(cheval et cheval, par exemple)
qu'elles sont des instancesdu mme mot crit.Que ce rapportsoit indispensable l'ockhamismetombe sous le sens. Comme son nominalisme
- celle
ne peut reconnatrel'existenceindpendantedes typeslinguistiques
du mot cheval en lui-mme,disons , il lui faut bien admettre,pour
rendrepossiblela thoriedu langage- qu'elle soit logique ou grammaire,
entre elles de
que certainesoccurrencesorales ou critesentretiennent
tels rapportsd'quiformit
gnralementreconnaissablespar les locuteurs
On peut donc poser une premirergle:
comptents.35
(RI) une occurrenceorale ou crite prise en suppositionmatrielle
peut tenirlieu de toutesles occurrencesqui lui sont quiformes.
- et la
La thse T4 ci-dessus
pratique courante du langage nous obligent aller plus loin en intgrantun second rapport,celui de drivation
grammaticale,qui unit,par exemple,le gnitifd'un certainmorphme
son nominatif,le subjonctifd'un certainverbe son infinitif,
le pluriel
au singulier,etc. Les limitesde ce rapportsont assez floues,bien sr (voir
la discussionci-dessussur qualitaset quale)et ellespeuventvarierd'une
langue l'autre, mais il n'y a aucun doute que l'ockhamismeadmette,
en plus de RI, une nouvellergle comme la suivante:
(R2) une occurrenceorale ou critepriseen suppositionmatriellepeut
tenirlieu des occurrencesorales ou critesavec lesquelleselle est dans
un rapportde drivationgrammaticale.
RI et R2 ne permettentencore une occurrenceorale en supposition matrielleque de supposer pour d'autres occurrencesorales, et
une occurrencecriteque de supposerpour d'autresoccurrencescrites.
Il fautmaintenantfaireintervenir
la subordination.Dans le vocabulaire
ockhamiste,on l'a dit, la subordinationest la relationconventionnelle
qu'un ou plusieurslocuteurstablissententreun nouveau signequ'ils instituentet un autre qui existaitdj, et en vertu de laquelle le nouveau
35C'estce quia galement
tadmisparplusieurs
nominalistes
comme
contemporains,
NelsonGoodman,
IsraelScheffler
ou Richard
Martin.

13:48:29 PM

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CLAUDEPANACCIO
& ERNESTO
PERINI-SANTOS

du prcdent(s'il en a une), de ses prosigne hritede la signification

dans
certains
cas, de quelques autrestraitsgalement.
pritslogiques et,
Un signe crit, au dire d'Ockham, reoit sa significationd'tre ainsi
subordonn un signe oral pralable, et le signe
conventionnellement
oral reoit la sienne d'tre subordonn un signe mental naturel (un
concept).36Telle est donc la relationqu'il faut exploiterpour permettre
les limitesd'un mediumdonn.
la suppositionmatriellede transgresser
Ockham prsupposela rgle suivante:
(R3) une occurrencequelconque prise en suppositionmatriellepeut
tenirlieu de toutesles occurrencesorales ou critesavec lesquelleselle
est dans un rapportde subordination(directou indirect).
doiventtoujourstre des occurrencesorales ou criQue les rfrents
T2) empche d'appeler suppositionmatrielleles cas
tes (conformment
o un mot oral suppose non significativement
pour le concept auquel il
est subordonn(c'est ce que Guillaume appelle la suppositionsimple).
la subordination(dans une
Mais les autrescas de figurefaisantintervenir
directionou dans l'autre) peuvent maintenanttre admis: un mot crit
en suppositionmatriellepeut tenir lieu des occurrencesdu mot oral
auquel il est subordonn,et inversement;et un concept peut tenirlieu
des signesoraux ou critsqui lui sontsubordonns.On peut mme admettre dornavant,en exploitantla clause entreparenthses(directou indirect
), qu'un mot oral en suppositionmatriellepuisse tenirlieu, en vertu
de R3, d'autres occurrencesorales qui sont subordonnesau concept
auquel il est lui-mmesubordonn.Il en dcoulera que cheval puisse
tenirlieu de horse
, equusetc., ce qui parat conforme la pratique
linguistiquerelle.
L'ensemble de tous les rfrents
possiblesd'un termepris en supposition matriellecorrespondra,au bout du compte, l'union des trois
ensemblesdterminspar RI, R2 et R3. La relationpr-propositionnelle
que cherchaientKarger et Read n'est pas une varit de signification,
et dont chamais la disjonctiondes troisrapportsqu'on vientd'identifier
cun peut tre,sans dommage,reconnupar l'ockhamisme.37
36SL I, 1. On dira,aussi,dansle vocabulaire
qu'unsyncatgorme
que nousutilisons,
sa signification
nonparcequ'ilreoit
mental
unsycatgorme
oralestsubordonn
pralable,
maisparcequ'il
selonOckham),
dtermine
n'ontpasde signification
(lessyncatgormes
aux
la faondontil peutcontribuer
c'est--dire
sesautres
en reoit
logiques,
proprits
il figure.
danslesquels
desnoncs
de vrit
conditions
07On aurabesoin,
entre
occurrend equivalence
d un rapport
il lautle noter,
semantique
Un motoral,en
elle-mme.
de la subordination
ces conceptuelles
pourla construction

13:48:29 PM

GUILLAUME
ET LA SUPPOSITO
D'OCKHAM
MATERIAUS

219

5. Le rledu contexte
Une fois dtermin,par R1-R3, quels sont les rfrentsadmissiblesdu
termeen suppositionmatrielle,la thoriedevraitprcisercommentle
contexte,linguistiqueou extralinguistique,
permetde prleverdans le lot
ceux dont le termetienteffectivement
lieu dans une situationdnonciation particulire.Certaines rglesproposes par Ockham sont ici pertinentes,mais la question est complexe et il y a lieu de se demander
commentelles pourraienttre compltes.
Il y a d'abord des rgles de restrictionrelativesau temps du verbe.
Guillaumeles voque propos de la suppositionpersonnelle,38
mais puisles
rfrents
d'un
terme
en
matrielle
sont
aussi
des
entits
que
supposition
- des occurrencessonores ou crites
situes
singulirestemporellement
,
ces rglesdoivents'appliqueraussi la suppositionmatrielle.Elles sont
bien connues,39contentons-nous
ici de les rappelerbrivement:un verbe
au prsentrestreintle sujet et le prdicat ne tenirlieu que d'entits
qui existentau momentde l'nonciation;un verbe au pass ou au futur
permetau sujet de tenirlieu d'trespasss ou futurs(selon le cas) aussi
bien que d'tresprsents,et restreintle prdicat tenirlieu d'tresqui
existaientou existeront
au tempsindiqupar le verbe;une copule modale,
- comme
- tend la rfrence
enfin
tre
ou est ncessairement
peut
tous les mondes possibles.Il faut reconnatre,en outre,que les noncs de grammaireou de logique dont le sujet est en suppositionmatrielle utilisentsouventen pratique un verbe au prsent,sans oprateur
modal apparent,pour rfrer toutesles occurrencesd'un certainmot,
indpendammentdu momentprcis de l'nonciation(par exemple dans
chevalest un nom franais).Il y aurait donc tout lieu d'admettrepour
doittretenupoursubordonn
nonseulement
l'occurrence
de celui
effet,
conceptuelle
mais toutes
lesautres
occurrences
institu,
qui l'a originalement
conceptuelles
qui sont
celles-l,
cellesdesautres
locuteurs
enparticulier.
smantiquement
quivalentes
Comme,
ce rapport
n'intervient
dansla thorie
dela supposition
matcependant,
qu'indirectement,
il n'a pas besoind'ytrementionn
part,l'appel la subordination
tantdj
rielle,
En revanche,
suffisant.
la subordination
ne pourrait
au profit
de
pas,elle,trelimine
caused'exemples
commebubarimeavecabba
l'quivalence
smantique,
, o le mot
critbubatient
lieud'occurrences
oralesauxquelles
il estsubordonn,
sansquece rap unequivalence
le
porticise rduise
(sil'quivalence
smantique
suffisait,
smantique
motcritbuba,quinesignifie
danscettephrase,
tenir
lieudumorphme
rien,
pourrait,
oralbadabou,
riennonplus!).
qui ne signifie
38Cf.SL I, 72,ad. 1, OPhI, 215-6.
39Voirparexemple
C. Panaccio,
La philosophie
dulangage
de Guillaume
d'Occam,
dans:Geschichte
derSprachtheorie
inSptantike
undMittelalter
, vol.3: Sprachtheorien
, sousla dir.
de S. Ebbesen,
en particulier
197-8.
1995,184-206,
Tbingen

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CLAUDEPANACCIO
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PERINI-SANTOS

les noncs de ce genre,mme si Ockham ne le faitpas explicitement,

un prsentintemporelcomme celui que Jean Buridan,un peu plus tard,
assigne aux noncs scientifiqueset qui permetau sujet et au prdicat
de tenirlieu en mme tempsd'trespasss, prsentsou futurs.40
Une deuxime srie de rglesockhamistesqui peuventtre adaptes,
peu de frais, la tche de restreindreen contexteles rfrentsd'un
termeen suppositionmatriellesontcelles par lesquellesle venerabilis
inceptorentend dcider si un termepeut dans un contextedonn avoir une
suppositionsimple ou matrielleen plus d'une suppositionpersonnelle,
toujoursreconnuecomme possible.41Cela tient,souvenons-nousen, la
significationde l'autre extrme.Un prdicat mtalinguistiquedont les
signifissont des mots oraux ou crits,par exemple, permet au sujet
d'tre pris en suppositionmatrielle.On peut maintenantenvisagerde
d'un terme
prcisercette dernirergle pour dterminersi les rfrents
en suppositionmatrielledans un contextedonn sont des mots oraux
ou des signescritsou les deux. Ockham a bien vu en effetque la supposition matriellepeut tre subdivise selon que le terme suppose
pour de l'oral ou de l'crit.42On dira donc que le termeen supposition matriellene tientlieu que d'occurrencesorales si l'autre extrme
dont les signifisnormaux sont des
est une expressionmtalinguistique
sons ou des motsoraux (par exempledans chevalrimeavec narval),
qu'il
ne tientlieu que d'occurrencescritessi l'autre extrmea pour signifis
normauxdes marques crites(par exemple dans chevala six lettres)et
qu'il peut tenir lieu des unes ou des autres si l'autre extrmea pour
normauxdes signesoraux ou crits(par exempledans chevalest
signifis
un nom franais).On aura dans ce derniercas une tripleambigut
smantiquepuisque le termeen suppositionmatriellepourra alors tenir
lieu soit de sons oraux seulement,soit de marques critesseulement,soit
des deux.
Ces deux jeux de rgles- celles qui tiennentau tempsdu verbe et cel- ne suffisent
de l'autre extrme
les qui tiennent la signification
pas,
bien entendu, dterminerdans chaque cas l'ensembleprcis des rfrentsdu termeprisen suppositionmatrielle.Le plus souvent,au contraire,
une ambigutpossible.Mais cela n'a rien
leur effetnet sera d'identifier
d'tonnant.Les rgles envisagesjusqu'ici dans la prsentesectionsont
40C'estce que Buridan
4.3.4
Cf.Summ,
desuppositionibusi
naturalis.
appellela suppositio
n. 34),45-9.
(ci-dessus
41Cf.SL I, 65, OPhI, 197-9.
42SL I, 64, OPhI, 197.

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ET LA SUPPOSITIO
GUILLAUME
D'OCKHAM
MATER1ALS

221

cellesqui ne prennenten considrationque les lmentslinguistiques

internes la proposition.
Leur rle est de rendremanifestel'ventaildes interIl
prtationspossibles indpendammentdu contexteextralinguistique.43
faudraitexaminer,pour aller plus loin, la faon dont les facteursexternes peuvent leur tour restreindre
ou tendre,dans une situationdonla
la
de
matrielle.
Sans les exclure, Ockham,
ne,
porte
supposition
dans la Sommede logique
, ne s'aventuregure dans ce type de considrations.Anticipant,par exemple,l'ambigutsmantiqued'une proposition
dont un termepeut trepris soit en suppositionpersonnelle,soit en suppositionmatrielle,soit en suppositionsimple,il se contentede renvoyer
sans autre explicationau rle possiblede restriction
que peutjouer dans
une situationde ce genre la volont des utilisateurs[voluntas
utmtium).
On peut y voir une mtonymiepour voquer d'un seul coup tous les
facteursextrapropositionnels
de dsambigerun nonc donn,
susceptibles
commencer,bien sr, par l'intentiondu locuteur.44
Les rglesexplicites jusqu'ici demeurentpurementsmantiqueset nous n'essaieronspas
43Les ambiguts
trelevesdansce genrede cas par
certes,
smantiques,
pourraient
- ou plutt
l'institution
d'unsignespcial
de plusieurs
aux
signes
spciaux
correspondant
diffrents
de supposition
matrielle
de guillemets,
Cette
types
(diffrents
types
parexemple).
solution
a tau moins
au Moyenge,avecla particule
partiellement
envisage
ly(ou
matrielle
li),souvent
employe
pourindiquer
quele motquila suitesten supposition
commelyhomo
estnomen).
Certains
auteurs
tardifs
ont
(dansunephrase,
parexemple,
d'ailleurs
avancd'intressantes
considrations
au sujetde ce signum
materiale
thoriques
Paul de Venise,Logica
desuppositionibus),
d. A. R.
(voirpar exemple:
magna
(Tractatus
N.Y. 1971,4-41).Des rgles
assezexplicites
surl'usagede cette
Perreiah,
St-Bonaventure,
se trouvent
notamment
chezPaulde Prgula.
Pourcetauteur
duxvesicle,
particule
ly
constitue
unecontrainte
l'intrieur
du groupe
phrastique
agissant
sujet(ou du groupe
et commandant
la supposition
contrainte
comme
matrielle,
prdicat)
qui estconsidre
l'autre
extrme
2 5 pourlestypes
de supplusforte
quecellequ'exerce
(voirlesrgles
dansPaulde Prgula,
N.Y. 1961,
, II, 1,d.M. A. Brown,
position
St-Bonaventure,
Logica
ne modifierait
la thorie
25).Cet artifice
thorique,
cependant,
pas de faonessentielle
destypes
de supposition:
dansla prsentation
de modifier
T5 pour
ici,il suffirait
adopte
les nouvelles
contraintes
Il estvraique la varit
contextuelles.
des situations
y inclure
commeon vientde la dcrire,
au boutdu compte
des rgles
possibles,
pourrait
exiger
assezcomplexes.
Maisil estpossible
aussid'adopter
unesolution
avecun
intermdiaire,
indicateur
ly ou lesguillemets)
matrielle
et la dtermiuniquede supposition
(comme
nation
ou parl'intention
du locuteur
de ce pourquoiau
parle contexte
extralinguistique
le terme
despossibilits
ouvertes
justesuppose
parmil'ventail
parlesfacteurs
explicites.
Cettedernire
a l'avantage
de rester
au
stratgie
plusprochedes solutions
envisages
du reste,
mmes'iln'offre
lui-mme,
MoyenAge.Ockham
pas de rgles
explicites
pour
sonusage,utilise
le signum
materiale
l'extrait
de SL I, 67 cit
parfois
ly(voirparexemple
ci-dessus
la n. 24).
44Cf.SL I, 65, OPhI, 197.Ce renvoi
au contexte
mtonymique
parl'idede volont
desutilisateurs
se retrouve
aussichezOckham
dansl'explication
du fonctionnement
des
du locuteur
dmonstratifs,
pronoms
dit-il,
qui ne sontsignificatifs,
que parl'intention

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PERINI-SANTOS

non plus d'aller plus loin que notre auteur ce chapitre.Qu'il nous
suffised'avoir indiqu ainsi en quel point exactementla thorieockhamisteouvre la voie une pragmatiquede la suppositionmatrielle.
Au dire de Calvin Normore,cependant,cette ouverturemme vers
l'intentiondu locuteurcomme facteurde dsambigiiationsoulvepour
La difficult
est que
l'ockhamismeun nouveau problmede cohrence.45
la suppositionmatrielleest admise par Ockham dans le langage mental
mme, et que cela, comme on l'a vu, risque d'y introduiredes ambiguts.46Normorea bien remarquque la solutiond'Ockham est de recoucettevolont
rir la volontdu locuteur.Mais comment,demande-t-il,
rle
des
de la
Elle
ne
doit
le
ici
intervenir?
guillemets
pas
jouer
peut-elle
alors
le
terme
car
elle
transformerait
originalen
smantiquetarskienne,
un autre (qui en seraitle nom), ce qui est contraire l'orientationgnrale de la thoriede la supposition.Normore conclut,comme nous le
faisonsnous-mmes,que l'intentiondu locuteurdoit ici tre tenue pour
un lmentdu contexte.Mais commentcet lmentpeut-iltre apprhend par le locuteurlui-mme?Ne lui faudra-t-il
pas pour cela former
une autre phrase mentale (dnue, elle, de toute possibilitde supposition matrielle)?Et s'il en est ainsi, ne compromettra-t-on
pas, du coup,
le paralllismestrictque la smantiqueockhamisteprtendaitdcouvrir,
phrase phrase, entrele discoursmental et la parole extrieure?
La rponse cela, nous semble-t-il,est que l'lmentcontextuelen
par l'agent luiquestion n'a nul besoin pour jouer son rle d'tre dcrit
mme dans une nouvellephrase (mentaleou non). Il lui suffitd'tre l
dans l'espritde l'agentsous une formeou sous une autre.N'oublionspas
laissesouvertespar R1-R3 est beaud'abord que l'ventaildes possibilits
Normore
avait imagin sur la base de
ce
moins
que
large que
coup
nisiex intentione
nonestsignificativum
demonstrativum
proferentis,
([.. .] pronomen
deOckham
, II, 19,d.J. C. Wey,in Guillelmi
Opera
Quodlibeta
QuodL]
[dornavant:
septem
dontil estiei
N.Y. 1980,193).Commedanslesambiguts
, IX, St-Bonaventure,
Theologica
la dtermination
du sensde
cettestratgie
permet
quantau typede supposition,
question
donne(plutt
uneoccurrence
li en propre
la phraseparun lment
qu' la phrase
dansla dterdeslocuteurs
le rlecentral
ellereconnat
etsurtout
jouparl'intention
type)
facteurs
sous-dtermine
destermes,
de la supposition
mination
pertinents.
parlesautres
45Normore
n. 5), 30-3.
1997,(ci-dessus
46SL I, 64,OPhI, 197:Sicutautemtalisdiversitas
terpotest
competere
suppositions
termino
itaetiampotest
minovocaliet scripto,
mentali,
potest
quiaintendo
competere
etprovoce
[= supp.pers.]etprose ipsa[= supp.simpl.]
supponere
proilioquodsignificai
sontde nous).CfaussiSL I, 67,OPhI, 206:Et
etproscripto
[= supp.mat.](lesitaliques
etparti
vocisedetiamscripto
nontantum
istasuppositio
competere
[= materialis]
potest
admet
sontde nous).Ockham
mentalis
explicitement
quedesambi(lesitaliques
propositionis
le langage
mental
ainsiaffecter
de supposition
(cf.SL III-4,4, OPhI, 763).
peuvent
guts

13:48:29 PM

ET LA SUPPOSITIO
GUILLAUME
D'OCKHAM
MATERIALIS

223

. . ., qui lui avait laiss croireque n'importe

l'exemple qualitaspraedicatur
ou
tait
admissible
quoi
presque
pourvu que le locuteuren dcide ainsi.
Dans le pire des cas, les ambigutsau sujet de la suppositionmatrielle
peuventconcernerquatre dimensionsseulement:
- a-t-il
y
suppositionpersonnelle,simple ou matrielle?
suppositionpour le prsent,le pass, le futurou tous les mondes possibles (ou une quelconque combinaisonde tout a)?
suppositionpour l'oral, l'critou les deux?
suppositionpour les occurrencesquiformes,celles qui sont en rapport
de drivationgrammaticaleou celles qui sont en rapportde subordination (ou une quelconque combinaisonparmi tout a)?
La dsambigationexigera donc que le sujet soit capable, par un acte
intentionnel
spcifique,de s'orienterdans chacune de ces quatre dimensions,comme il est capable, par exemple,sans avoir besoin de recourir
des descriptionspropositionnelles,
de s'orienterdans l'espace ou dans
le temps.Pensons la faon dont la positionphysiquedu locuteurdsla rfrencede
ambige en contextepour lui et pour ses interlocuteurs,
certainsdictiquescomme en avant, en arrire, droite, gauche, etc. L'acte intentionnel
par lequel le sujet opte, par exemple,pour
la suppositionpersonnelleou la suppositionmatriellequand la propositionmentale,priseseule,lui en laisse le choix peut trevu comme l'adoption d'une certaineposturedans un registresomme toute assez limit,le
sujet se mettant,disons,en mode de suppositionmatrielle,en mode de
est assez
suppositionpour l'crit,et ainsi de suite.La situation,finalement
semblable ce qu'elle est dans beaucoup de cas o la rfrenceprcise
d'une expressionorale ou crite dpend de la position assume par le
locuteurdans un espace ou une dimensiondonne. On ne voit gure
pourquoi l'ockhamismeauraitbesoin d'un paralllismeplus strictentrele
discoursmentalet la parole extrieure.47
47Le rapprochement
la n. 44 ci-dessus
entre
le cas de la supposition
matsuggr
rielle
etceluidespronoms
dmonstratifs
de renforcer
encore
cetargument.
permet
Quand
Ockhamnousditque les conditions
de vrit
d'uneproposition
avecun dmonstratif
de ce que le locuteur
entend
ainsitelleou tellechose([ . . .] ex hoc
dpendent
dsigner
vocaliter
demonstrativum
intendit
diversimode
demonstrare
unum
quodproferens
pronomen
velaliud[. . .], Quodl.
, II, 19,OThIX, 193),on ne peutpas comprendre
que la dtermination
de ce pourquoisuppose
le dmonstratif
doivetenir
la prsence
d'unedescription
de la choseen question
dansl'esprit
du locuteur.
La rfrence
icin'estfixequepar
le faitde visertelleou tellechoseetnonpasparla formation
d'unenouvelle
proposition
Il en va de mmemutatis
mentale.
mutandis
matrielle.
pourla supposition

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CLAUDEPANACCIO
& ERNESTO
PERINI-SANTOS

La question de l'autonymieet des usages linguistiquesapparentsse

retrouveaujourd'hui,comme elle le futau xive sicle,au cur de nombreusesdiscussionsphilosophiques,sur la vrit,par exemple,sur les atticomme le savoir ou la croyance,sur le statutdes
tudes propositionnelles
entitsabstraiteset des universaux,sur l'pistmologiedes sciences du
materialis
mise en
langage, et ainsi de suite. L'approche par la suppositio

et
en
particulierpar les
place par les mdivaux ce sujet, exploite
nominalistes,
peut encore, bien des gards,se prsenter nous comme
- si
une alternativesrieuse la thorie
peu intuitive des noms de mots
qui a t dominanteau cours des derniresdcennies.Faut-ilvraiment
concderaux tarskiensque cheval (entreguillemets)est un autremot
? Ou n'y a-t-ilpas lieu d'envisager
que cheval et qu'il en est le nom
avec le plus grand soin l'ide qu'il y a pour chaque expressiondu langage certainsusages autonymiquesspciaux,qui ne deviennentpossibles
que dans certainscontexteset sous certainesconditions?La versionnominalistede cetteapprochequi a t sommairement
dveloppepar Guillaume
d'Ockham ne rgle pas elle seule tous les problmes,loin de l, mais
elle rsistedu moins,nous avons essay de le montrer,aux critiquesprcises et stimulantesqui lui ont t rcemmentadressespar certainsde
nos minentscollgues.Resterait voir- en dtails- commentelle peut
assumerjusqu'au bout le pari de n'accepterjamais pour rfrentsdes
spatioexpressionsen suppositionmatrielleque des occurrencessingulires
localises.Telle est sans doute pour le nominalismeraditemporellement
Notre ambitionici
la plus difficile.
cal la question qui est vritablement
n'a t que de dblayerle terrain cet gard, en cartantcertainsfaux
et gnraleproblmeset en mettanten lumireles aspectsprometteurs
ment mconnusde cette trsbelle thorie.
du Qubec Montral
Universit
Montral,Canada
du Minas Gerais
Fdrale
Universit
Belo Horizonte,Brsil

13:48:29 PM

Ockhamand Wodehamon DivineDeception

as a Skeptical
Hypothesis*
ELIZABETHKARGER

Both William of Ockham and Adam Wodeham1grantedthat God can

deceiveus about the existenceof externalthings.But, disagreeingon how
God could bringthisabout,theydisagreedon the importsuch a possibility
has. As Wodeham viewed it, thispossibilityof divinedeceptionhas skepticalconsequences,but as Ockham viewedit, it is epistemologically
harmless. But was Ockham entidedto his view? I shall argue he was not.2
1. TheApparent
ofPerception
Infallibility
Ockham and Wodeham shared an understandingof intuitivecognition
accordingto which intuitivecognitionincludesperceptionbut does not
coincidewithit. Because, in thislife,all our intuitivecognitionsof external thingsare obtainedthroughthe senses,theyare perceptions.3
But, by
* I wishto thank
ClaudePanaccio
forstimulating
discussions
oftheviewssetforth
in
thispaperas they
weretaking
ofthe2004MoodyConference
shapeandtheparticipants
in Medieval
"LiesandLiars",heldat theUCLA Center
forMedieval
and
Philosophy,
Renaissance
andRegaWood,fortheir
warm
Studies,
organized
byCalvinNormore
receptionofthepaperandpertinent
whichhelpedmesharpen
itsfinalversion.
comments,
1 AdamWodeham,
itwillbe recalled,
wasa brilliant
student
ofbothWilliam
Ockham
andWalter
whoheldOckham
in highesteem,
himagainst
Chatton's
Chatton,
defending
criticisms.
He thussidedwithOckham
whenhe found
itimpossible
to
systematic
except
doso,because
ofsomeinternal
orunpalatable
Because
Wodeham
inconsistency
consequence.
understood
Ockham
soperfectly
wellandwassucha vigorous
thinker
theinstances
himself,
where
he disagreed
withhissenior
should
be takenveryseriously.
2 Theworks
I shallbedrawing
from
arehisOrdinatio
as 'Ord.'),
byOckham
(abbreviated
thesecondbookofhisReportatio
as 'Rep")andhisQuodlibeta
(abbreviated
septem
(abbreviatedas <Quod.i).
The references
areto thecritical
edition
ofOckham's
works
theological
'
'
St.Bonaventure,
Institute,
published
N.Y.,intheseriesOpera
bytheFranciscan
Theologica
as 'OTh'),duetoG. Gi,S. Brown,
G. Etzkorn
andF. Kelley
fortheOrdinatio
(abbreviated
to G. Gi and R. WoodfortheReportatio
II (1981)and toJ. Weyforthe
(1967-79),
I shallbe drawing
fromis hisLectura
Quodlibeta
septem
(1980).The workbyWodeham
secunda
inlibrum
Sententiarum
as 'LS'),editedbyR. Woodassisted
primum
(abbreviated
by
G. Gi,St.Bonaventure,
N.Y.,1990(in3 volumes).
3 Intuitive
thoseobtained
thesenses,
areactsofimmedicognitions,
including
through
ateacquaintance
witha thing.
An intuitive
canbe calleda perception,
therecognition
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2004
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl

Vivarium
42,2

13:47:09 PM

226

ELIZABETH
KARGER

we can also have intuitivecognitionsof some of our own

introspection,
these
intuitivecognitionsdo not involvethe sensesand are
and
thoughts
not, therefore,
perceptions.Ockham, however,believed us to have two
souls, a sensitiveand an intellectualsoul, whereasWodeham believed us
to have just one soul, an intellectualsoul. Accordingly,
Ockham held that
in
intuitive
are
formed
cognitions
directly the intellectual
introspective
soul or mind,whereasperceptionsare formedin the sensorysoul, as sensoryintuitivecognitions.Because, on his view,beliefsare formedonlyin
the mind, not in the sensorysoul, it follows,he furtherbelieved, that
perceptionsneed be replicatedas intellectiveintuitivecognitionsin the
mind beforetheycan play a role in beliefformation.4
Wodeham, on the
otherhand, held the simplertheorythat the perceptionswe, as human
beings,are capable of having,existimmediatelyin our intellectualsoul,
wheretheycan themselvesplay a directrole in beliefformation.5
Because
in doctrineplays no role in the issue to be discussedhere,
thisdifference
I shall disregardit and treatWodeham's theoryas if it were common to
both authors.On this theory,thereare just two sortsof intuitivecogniintuitivecognitionsand perceptions.Only those
tions,namelyintrospective
intuitivecognitionswhich are perceptionswill, however,be considered
here.
Many of our perceptionsare misleading,as both authorsrecognized.
In sensoryillusion,we perceive a thingto have a propertyit does not
have, as forexample I perceivethe ignitedend of a stickin rapid circular
motionto forma circleof fire.6Our perceptionof the thingis misleading
witha thing
can
actsofimmediate
fore,
sensory
onlyin thesenseinwhich
acquaintance
Whathasbeenrecently
called'predicational
is regarded
be calledperceptions.
perception'
a perception
inthe
mental
includes
as beinga morecomplex
act,which
bybothauthors
soformer
sensebutdoesnotreduceto it (seefootnote
6). On predicational
perception,
andthe
TheQuest
seeBarry
), Oxford,
called,
Stroud,
(Subjectivism
ofColour
Metaphysics
forReality
2000,154-5.
4 Ockham,
actuspartis
sensitivae
estcausa
Ord.prol.q. 1,OTh I, 22,4-6:". . . nullus
alicuius
actusiudicativi
immediata
necpartialis
nec totalis,
ipsiusintellectus."
prxima,
etsensitiva
essent
intellectiva
LS, prol.q. 1,vol.I, 25,3-18: . . si inhomine
Wodeham,
iudicaret
hancalbedinem
tuncad hocquodintellectus
formae
realiter
esse,non
distinctae,
hocOckham,
... Et propter
sibivisiosensitiva
albedinis.
sufficeret
qui ponitin homine
intuitivam."
eiusdem
duasanimas,
consequenter
ponitrespectu
duplicem
5 Wodeham,
. . . recipitur
immediLS d. 2, q. 4, vol.II, 101,42-5:". . . visiohominis
atein animaintellectiva,
quianullaaliaanimaestin homine."
6 Filling
d. 27,q. 3, OTh
ofthissensory
illusion
inthegapsinOckham's
account
(Ord.
writes
Wodeham
IV, 246,12-9),
(LSprol.q. 4, vol.I, 105,60-8):"quiaoculus
prosequitur
exvisione
eadem
intellectus
statim
circulariter
attente
extremitatem
istam
motam,
ignitam
visionem
moti. . . componit
continuata
propositionem,
ponendo
ipsiusigniscirculariter
<corr.
ex:circuli>
... et essecirculum
propraedicato,
qua propositione
ignisprosubiecto

13:47:09 PM

ANDWODEHAM
OCKHAM
ON DIVINEDECEPTION

227

because it tendsto cause us to believe that the thinghas the propertyit

appears to have, but does not have. It is only misleadingand not downrightdeceptivebecause we can and oftendo realize thatthe thingis not
as it appears to be, thus preventingthe false belieffrombeing formed.7
However misleadingour perceptionof a thing,it can neverthelesslead
to one beliefwhich normallyis bound to be true,namelythat the thing
perceivedexists.On this both authorsagreed. The reason theygave is
the perceptionwe have of a thingis normallycaused
straightforward:
can be
and maintainedin existenceby the thingitselfwhich,therefore,
perceivedonly if present.8
Take the most misleadingperceptionyou can thinkof, even thatperceptionallowsone to knowthatthe thingperceivedexists.In thisrespect,
perceptionsare infallible.Or so it seems, and so it would be if it were
not the case that thereexists,or can exist,an omnipotentGod, capable
of bringingabout whateverinvolvesno contradiction.
abouttheExistence
2. Wodeham's
ofExternalThings
Skepticism
Accordingto a dogma admittedby both Ockham and Wodeham (together
with all their contemporaries),God can bring about alone any effect
hocquodcomponitur
ex
formata,
propter
apparet
ignisilleessecirculus,
quaepropositio,
estevidens
estpropositio
licet
intuitiva
multum
evidens,
cognitione
quaemultum
cognitio,
falsa."
Froma textsuchas thisone,we mayinfer
to bothauthors,
we perthat,according
- whether
- , notjust
ceivea thing
to havea property
thething
hastheproperty
or not
an intuitive
ofit),butbyforming
thething
(orotherwise
byperceiving
having
cognition
a mental
ofthething
as subject-term
andwitha concept
withourperception
proposition
Ifitthenseemsto us evident,
in virtue
ofthe
theproperty
as predicate-term.
expressing
we arehaving
ofthething,
thatitis in factas theproposition
we can
states,
perception
thething
be described
as perceiving
to havetheproperty.
Onlythenis ourperception
(seefootnote
3).
"predicational"
7 Referring
to another
caseofsensory
Wodeham
writes
illusion,
(LS d. 2, vol.II, 28,
baculum
essefractum
cuiuspars
homo,crederet
10-2):"Nisienimaliundecertificaretur
estinaqua.Hoc enimsibiapparet,
velitnolit".
On thefactthatOckham
tooallowed
for
- iftheyareimperfect
thepossibility
thatintuitive
oftheir
cognitions
object
apprehensions
as perceptions
oftenare- shouldcauseerroneous
see E. Karger,Ockham'
s
judgments,
Misunderstood
andAbstractive
, in: P. Spade(ed.),TheCambridge
Theory
ofIntuitive
Cognition
toOckham
, Cambridge,
1999,204-26.
Companion
8 Ockham,
OTh V, 259,14-8:". . . cognitio
intuitiva
naturaliter
non
Rep.II q. 12-13,
causatur
necconservatur
nisiobiectum
in certadistantia
sitdebitomodoapproximatum,
ideononpotest
iudicare
illudquodcognoscitur
naturaliter
intuitive
nisiobiecexsistens,
tumsitpraesens".
LS prol.q. 3, vol.I, 66,3-4and74,84-5:". . . nonpotest
Wodeham,
visionaturaliter
causari
sineexsistentia
etpraesentia
reivisibilis.";
". . . notitia
non
intuitiva
naturaliter
conservan
sinepraesentia
obiecti
sui.. . ."
potest

13:47:09 PM

228

ELIZABETH
KARGER

broughtabout by a secondarycause. Moreover,when an effect,naturallybroughtabout by a secondarycause, is naturallymaintainedin existence by that same cause, God can act insteadof that cause to maintain
the effectin existence.God can also at any momentdestroyany of the
thingsexistingin creation.Given thesethingsGod can do, it followsthat
God can act insteadof a thingto cause in a subjecta perceptionof that
thing.He can do thiseven if the thingitself,thoughit could exist,does
not now exist and perhaps never has. For any naturallycaused perception,he can also act insteadof its object to maintainit in existencewhile
the object.9Even ifwe do not ourselvessubscribeto thisdogma,
destroying
perhapsbecause we do not believe thatGod exists,surelywe mustadmit
that God can exist and that such a being, if he exists,has that power.
Suppose, then,that God does existand that,forsome givenperception,
say the one I am now having of a tree, he is maintainingmy percepcaused
tionin existencethoughitsobject- the tree- , whichhas originally
I
to
would
then
be
has
now
ceased
exist.
having a permy perception,
of
a
tree
which
no
of
a
non-existent
longerexists.
object,namely
ception
Now the possibilitythat God should act in thisway has, as Wodeham
recognized,skepticalconsequences.Rightnow I am lookingat an object,
which happens to be a tree. In virtueof the perceptionI am havingof
indeed so comthe tree, it seems to me evidentthat the tree exists,10
I
that
it
exists,if it were not
pellinglyso that could not help believing
for one caveatwhat if God were preservingin existencemy perception
of the tree, havingjust now destroyedthe tree? As soon as I thinkof
howeverremoteit may be, I can no longerbe absolutely
thispossibility,
certainthatthe treeexists.I must,then,acknowledgethatI do not know
that the tree now exists,given that I cannot rule out that this extraordinarypossibilityis in factrealized. Or rather,I do not know thatthe
tree existsin virtueof perceivingit. But there is no more reliable way
of knowingthat an externalthingexiststhan by perceivingit. I must,

9 Wodeham
inanima,
LS prol,q. 2, vol.I, 37,3-5:". . . nullaestnotitia
simplex
quin
obiectoeiusnonexsistente".
conservare
illampossetDeus causarevelpriuscausatam
OTh V, 259,21-260,1: "... taliscognitio
Ockham,
(intuitiva)
nunquam
Rep.II, q. 12-13,
Ideoistacognitio
intuetexsistente.
nisiobiecto
naturaliter,
est,necconservatur
praesente
Etposito
obiecti.
itivanaturalis
postcorruptionem
quodmaneat
corrumpitur
perabsentiam
ad causaad conservationem
licetnonquantum
tuneestsupernaturalis
obiecti,
quantum
tionem."
10Providing,
of
ofcourse,
thatI form
a mental
myperception
containing
proposition,
See footnote
6.
thatthething
exists.
as a term,
to theeffect
thething

13:47:09 PM

ON DIVINEDECEPTION
ANDWODEHAM
OCKHAM

229

concede thatI cannot know whetherthe tree I am perceiving,

therefore,
and more generallyany externalthing,presentlyexists.11
What we have here is a standard skepticalargument,in which the
of divinedeceptionjust describedprovidesthe skepticalhypothpossibility
esis. Surprisingly
perhaps,Wodeham regardedthisargumentas valid. He
- more
thatwe cannotknowof any externalthing
pregranted,therefore,
that
it
exists.12
mind
our
own
other
than
of
cisely, any thing
Stance
s Antiskeptical
3. Ockham'
Ockham, on the otherhand, avoided thisconsequence.He did not deny
that God could preservethe perceptionwe are having of a thingwhile
destroyingthe thing.But he denied that if this were the case it would
continueto seem to us evident,in virtueof the perceptionwe are having of the thing,that the thingexists.He made the astonishingclaim13
that,if this supernaturalpossibilitywere realized, it would seem to us
evident,in virtueof the perceptionwe are having of the thing,that the
thingdoes notexist.14Indeed, thiswould seem to us so compellinglyevident that we could not help believingthe thingnot to exist. In other
words,the perceptionwe are havingof the thingwould cause us to form

11LS prol.q. 6, vol.I, 169,24-31:"Concedoilludquodinfertur

de iudiciocorreenimtaleiudiex: extra>.Nullum
remesse<corr.
veritati
significanti
contingenti,
spondent!
omnem
dubitationem
excludente
evidens
evidentia
ciumestsimpliciter
Quia
possibilem.
etiudicium
in mente
omnem
notitiam
causaret
cumhocquodDeusvelnatura
possibile,
nonsicessetin re sicutpertalemnotitiam
Dei absoluta
staret
apprequodde potentia
natucreabilis
estitadiminutae
Et concedo
hensam
quodomnisintellectus
significaretur.
de reextra
sisicassentiat
veritatem
circaquamcumque
raequoddecipi
contingenten!
potest
essevelnonesse."
categorice
12Against
weare
inexistence
theintuitive
theviewthatGodcouldmaintain
cognition
thatifit
Wodeham
citestheobjection
no longer
whilethething
ofa thing
exists,
having
wouldfollow
wereso,skepticism
(LS prol.q. 2, vol.I, 48, 18-9): "... tunccontradictio
et itaperirei
ab eo distincti,
mede exsistentia
essetquodDeuscertificarei
cuiuscumque
is tobitethebulto theobjection,
Hisresponse
omnis
certitudo
however,
philosophical'
all we canknowis that
ofa thing,
an intuitive
letandconcede
that,byhaving
cogition
LS prol.q. 6,vol.I, 170,58-9:"Virtute
us; Wodeham,
thething
exists,
ifGodisnotdeceiving
essenisi
iudicari
albedinem
ex ea, potest
evidenter
formata
tarnen
intuitivae,
propositione
nos."
Deusdecipiat
13Juande Celaya(Valentinus),
...
Aristotelis
cumquestionibus
inlibros
postenorm
Expositio
revisa
etaucta
, prol.q. 2, Paris1521,fol.bblrb:"G. Okam. . . concedit
quodin
nuperrime
illanoticia
noticia
intuitiva
iliocasu(viz.ipsaalbedine
destructa,
ipsiusa Deo conservata)
'hecalbedononest',quod
scilicet:
utputaistud
iudicium
contradictorium
intuitiva
causabit
"
vide
tursatismirabile
(italics
mine).
14In other
notto exist(seefootnote
thething
wewouldperceive
words,
6).

13:47:09 PM

230

ELIZABETH
KARGER

He accordinglyheld that
the correctbeliefthatthe thingdoes not exist.15
- or intuitive
- is such that
by natureit causes one
perception
cognition
to judge that its object existsif it does and that it does not exist if it
does not.16This was, accordingto him,the characteristic
propertyof intuitive cognitionin general. By an intuitivecognition,then, even supermaintainedin existence,we can never
naturallycaused, or supernaturally
be mistakenabout the existenceor non-existenceof its object. In this
respect,intuitivecognition and perceptionin particular is infallible.17
It followsthat, on Ockham's theoryof intuitivecognitionin general
and of perceptionin particular,wheneverwe perceivean existingthing
or otherwisehave an intuitivecognitionof it, we know that the thing
exists.We know thisin an absolutelycertainway, excludingall possible
reasonfordoubt.The skepticism
regardingthe existenceof externalthings,
embraced by Wodeham, was thus avoided by Ockham.18

15Providing
a mental
to theeffect
thatthething
does
we form
proposition
perceived
notexist.Rep.II q. 12-13,OTh V, 260,4-22:"...si Deus causetin me cognitionem
inme,possum
etconservet
illamcognitionem
de aliquoobiecto
nonexsistente
intuitivam
illamremintuitive
et
iudicare
remnonesse,quiavidendo
illacognitione
egomediante
virtute
intuitivae
assenhoccomplexo
'hoc
obiectum
nones, statim
intellectus
formato
cognitionis
itaquodillacognitio
intuitiva
estcausapartialis
tiihuiccomplexo
etdissentit
suoopposito,
estde intuitione
naturali.
Et sicperconsequens
intelilliusassensus,
sicutpriusdictum
nihil.
ad conservationem
estpurum
lectus
assentii
Quantum
superquodilludquodintueor
est:siprimo
de aliquoobiecto
causetur
etnoncausationem
naturalem
exemplum
cognitio
Deusconservet
intuitivam
etpostipsoobiecto
destructo
intuitiva
naturaliter,
cognitionem
ad causationem
etsupernaturalis
tuncestcognitio
naturalis
causatam,
quanquantum
prius
esset
Tuncestidemdicendum
hieperomniasicutillacognitio
tumad conservationem.
iudicare
remessequandoest. . ., etnon
causata.Quiaperillampossum
supernaturaliter
essequandononest,positoquodobiectum
(italics
mine).
corrumpatur"
16Ord.Prol.q. 1,OTh I, 31,10-6: . . notitia
reiesttalisnotitia
virtute
cuius
intuitiva
eamesseet
intellectus
iudicat
sciriutrum
ressitvelnon,itaquodsi ressit,statim
potest
illiusnotitiae.
earnesse,nisiforte
evidenter
impediatur
propter
imperfectionem
cognoscit
divinam
conservata
de renon
talisnotitia
Et eodemmodosi essetperfecta
perpotentiam
evidenter
illamremnonesse."
illiusnotitiae
virtute
exsistente,
incomplexae
cognosceret
17Rep.II q. 12-13,
7: "... dicoquodcognitio
intuitiva
estiliaqua
OTh V, 286,16-287,
iudicoremessequandoestet nonessequandononest,modosupradicto,et
exsistente
intuitiva
sivesupernaturaliter.
hocsivecausetur
naturaliter
qualilterQuia habitanotitia
'haecresest'vel'nonest',etvirtute
formare
hoccomplexum
statim
cogcumque,
possum
si nonsit,sicutsupradictum
intuitivae
assentire
si ressitveldissentire
nitionis
complexo
in errore."
nullomodoponitintellectum
est.Et sic(cognitio
intuitiva)
18As recognized
...
himself
(LSprol.q. 6, vol.I, 169,42-4):"Ockham
byWodeham
scitur
evialbedinis
Necmirum,
habetaliuddicere.
quiaipseponitquodperintuitivam
denter
ipsamessequandoestetnonessequandononest.Etideohabetcircataliaponere
infallibile."
iudicium

13:47:09 PM

ANDWODEHAM
OCKHAM
ON DIVINEDECEPTION

231

4. A Possibility
withno Skeptical
ofDivineDeception
Import
Nor did Ockham deny that God can deceive us about the existenceof
an externalthing,makingit seem to us that a thing,which in factdoes
not exist,existsor, alternatively,
makingit seem to us thata thing,which
in factexists,does not exist.Let us see how, on his doctrine,God might
deceive us in eitherof these ways.
It must be noted firstthat, according to Ockham, whatevercausal
power a created thinghas, God can preventthispower fromexercising
itself.He can do thisverysimply,he believed.For he held the thendominant view that nothingin creationcan naturallybring about an effect
unless God cooperates with its causal power.19We do not realize that
God is in thisway involvedin all naturalcausal operationsbecause, in
the normal course of nature,his cooperationwith the causal power of
agents never fails.Nevertheless,he could always withdrawhis cooperation.20He could, in particular,not cooperate with the causal power a
perceptionhas, therebypreventingthe perceptionfromcausingthejudgment that the thingperceived exists,if it exists,or, alternatively
from
the
that
if
the
does
not
it
does
not
exist.21
exist,
causing
judgment
thing
But God could intervenein yet anotherway. Having preventedthe
perceptionI am having of a thingfromcausing the correctjudgment
that the thingexists,if it does, or that it does not exist,if it does not,
he can direcdycause in me the falsebeliefthat the thingdoes not exist,
when it does,22or that it exists,when it does not. Consider the latter
possibility.I shall suppose I am perceivinga possible but non-existent
tree (somethingonly God can bring about). God can now preventthe
perceptionI am having fromcausing the judgment that the tree does
not exist and cause directlyin me instead the false beliefthat the tree
exists.23
Were he to have done this,it would no longerseem to me evi19Ord.d. 45,q. un.,OTh IV, 668,18-20: . . nullacausasecunda
in aliquem
potest
effectum
nisiconcurrente
immediate
causaprimasimpliciter,
scilicet
Deo."
20Rep.II q. 3-4,OTh V, 62, 16-7:". . . suspensio
actionis
nonvidetur
ignisincamino
aliudquamDeumnoncoagere
immediate
ad producendum
calorem."
21Eventhough
- or
a mental
to theeffect
thatthething
exists
proposition
perceived
- is beingformed
doesnotexist
andthereby
Prol.q. 1,OTh I, 70,3{Ord.
apprehended
fieri
ilianoti
tiaintuitiva
sineiudicioconsequente
. . . sicutnon
8): "... dicoquodpotest
estimpossibile
terminos
alicuius
quodaliquiscognoscat
propositionis
perse notaeettamen
etiam
quodnonsciatillampropositionem,
posilo
quodapprehenda
(italics
mine).
22Ord.Prol.q. 1, OTh I, 70, 16-8:". . .fortenonestinconveniens
quodresintuitive
videatur
et tamen
illecredat
remnonesse,quamvis
naturaliter
nonposquodintellectus
sithocfieri."
23Quod.
causareactumcreditivum
5, q. 5, OTh IX, 498,72-3:"TamenDeuspotest
perquemcredoremessepraesentem
quaeestabsens."

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ELIZABETH
KARGER

dent, in virtueof the perceptionI am having of the tree,that the tree

does not exist. It would seem to me instead that the tree exists.24But
would it seem to me evident,in virtueof the perceptionI am havingof
the tree,that it exists?I thinknot. For, if it did, I would be compelled
to judge that the tree exists,not by God, but by the perceptionI am
having of the tree. Or rather,consideringthat God could preventmy
perceptionfromcausing thatjudgmentand cause it direcdyhimself,my
perceptionwould need to have at least the powerof causing thatjudgment. But this is ruled out by Ockham's doctrine,accordingto which
perceptionor intuitivecognitionhas the power of causing only a true
judgmentof existenceor of non-existencewith respectto its object.25
It followsthat,on Ockham's doctrine,when I am perceivinga thing,
as I am now perceivinga tree,and it seems to me evident,in virtueof
the perceptionI am having of it, that the thingexists,causing me to
judge that it exists,I can rule out the possibilitythat God should be
deceivingme in the way just described.For, if he were deceivingme in
thisway, thoughI would be perceivingthe tree,just as I am now, and
thoughI would be judging the tree to exist,just as I am now,26yet it
would not seem to me evident,in virtueof the perceptionI am having
as it now seems.The possibility
of the tree,thatthe treeexists,27
of divine
devoid
of
Ockham
concedes
is, therefore,
skepticalimport.
deception
Failure
5. Ockham's
It appears that Ockham has, by a tour de force,satisfiedtwo primafacie
incompatiblerequirements:he has allowed for the possibilitythat God
24Quod.
res
5, q. 5, OTh IX, 498,74-5: . . etpertalemactumfidei
potest
apparere
essepraesens
quandoestabsens."
25As Ockham
in thelastsentence
ofthetextquotedin footnote
writes
15,in virtue
I haveofa thing,
I canjudge('possum
thatthething
oftheintuitive
iudicare')
cognition
theintuitive
exists
words,
cog(ifitdoes)orthatitdoesnotexist(ifitdoesnot).In other
thatjudgment.
hasthepowerofcausing
nition
ofthething
26Quod.
facere
assentarnen
5, q. 5, OTh IX, 499,100-3:"Concedo
quodDeuspotest
'haecalbedoest'
cumilioassensu
evidenti
huiuscontingentis
sumeiusdem
respectu
speciei
quandoalbedononest...."
27I wouldfindmyself
hewhobelieves
ina psychological
thatinwhich
statenotunlike
he holds
finds
himself.
However
on faiththatGod is oneandyetthreepersons
firmly
ifhedid
he realizes
thatitis so.Rather,
thisbelief,
itdoesnotseemtohimevident
that,
in virtue
ofhisunderstanding
ofthe
itwouldseemto himevident,
notholdthisbelief,
in thecaseat hand,I wouldfindmyself
thatit is notso. Similarly,
involved,
concepts
Rather
thatit exists.
thatthetreeexists,
butitwouldnotseemto meevident
believing
in virtue
itwouldseemto meevident,
I wouldrealizethat,ifI didnotholdthisbelief,
I am having
ofthetree,thatitdoesnotexist.
oftheperception

13:47:09 PM

ON DIVINEDECEPTION
ANDWODEHAM
OCKHAM

233

mightdeceive us about the existenceof a thingperceivedwhile ensuring

that,by perceivinga thing,we know whetherit existsor not. But has
the answeris negative.The fact
Ockham reallysucceeded?Unfortunately,
It contains
is that Ockham's theoryof intuitivecognitionis inconsistent.
the thesisthat an intuitivecognitioncan only cause a truejudgmentof
existenceor of non-existencewith respectto its object, yet it also contains principlesfromwhich the oppositefollows.
Ockham's theory of intuitivecognition was firstdeveloped in the
28
He was led to revisehis origReportatioand laterrevisedin the Ordinatio.
inal theoryin order to answer an objection. The objection ran as follows. No naturalcause- i.e. no createdcause otherthan freewill- acting
withinthe same subject.Therefore,
alone can bringabout oppositeeffects
it is impossiblethat a givenperception,or intuitivecognition,should be
the sole cause withina subjectof thejudgmentthat the thingperceived
existswhen it existsand of the judgment that the thingdoes not exist
when, by God's power, it has ceased to exist althoughit is stillbeing
his originaltheory.He now
Ockham respondedby modifying
perceived.29
intuitive
or
if
a
held that
cognition were initiallycaused by
perception
its object and later maintainedin existenceby God when its object has
ceased to exist,it would, togetherwith the thingperceived,cause the
judgmentthatthe thingexistsas long as it existsand would cause alone
the judgmentthat the thingdoes not exist,as soon as it has ceased to
the verysame cause which acts to bringabout
exist.It is not, therefore,
this revisedtheory
in
the
same
effects
subject.30Unfortunately,
opposite
28Rep.II, q. 12-13,OTh V, 256-61.
29Ord.prol.q. 1,OTh I, 56,9-21:"Septimum
dubium
est,quianonvidetur
quodper
resnonesse.Quiaquaero:
evidenter
derenonexsistente
notitiam
intuitivam
cognosci
possit
remnonessequandononest?Aut
iudicat
illudiudicium
a quo causatur
quo intellectus
nota.Nonprimm,
intuitiva
auta notitia
a solapotentia
rei,auta reintuitive
intellectiva,
in eodem
causa
cum
sit
non
sit.
sive
res
sit
sive
invariata
illa
manet
naturalis,
Igitur
quia
sedquandoresesttunc
etiamindiversis
effectus
temporibus,
oppositos
passononhabebit
Peridem
actusoppositi.
iudicat
remesse;ergosiveressitsivenon,noneritcausatotalis
illiusiudici.Necpotest
sitcausatotalis
intuitiva
diciquodnotitia
patetquodnonpotest
effectus
essecausa
nullius
dicitertium,
non-ens;
potest
igitur
quiaillaresestsimpliciter
efficiens."
30Ord.prol.q. 1,OTh I, 70,21-71,9: "Adseptimum
dicoquodpernotitiam
dubium
resnonessequandononestvelsi nonsit.Et
evidenter
intuitivam
reipotest
cognosci
causari
a notidiciquodpotest
illudiudicium,
a quo causabitur
potest
quandoquaeritur
si ressit,
rei.Et quandodicitur
tiaintuitiva
oppositum
quodillahabetcausareeffectum
causet
diciquodnonestinconveniens
quodaliquacausacumalia causapartiali
potest
causetoppositum
effectum
et tamenquodiliasolacausasinealiacausapartiali
aliquem
iudicium
reiet ipsarescausant
intuitiva
effectum.
Et ideonotitia
quodresest,quando
iudicium.
sineillarecausabit
intuitiva
autemipsaresnonesttuncipsanotitia
oppositum

13:47:09 PM

234

ELIZABETH
KARGER

of intuitivecognition,which we must considerOckham's definitivetheory, provides new possibilitiesof divine deception, of which Ockham
apparendywas unaware, but which later authors,includingWodeham,
recognized.I have counted threesuch possibilities.
The first,spottedby Wodeham, is this.Suppose we are naturallyperceivinga thing.That thing,then,exists.God could, however,now intervene by preventingthe thingfromcausing,togetherwiththe perception
we are havingof it, thejudgmentthat the thingexists.He would do so,
of course, by not cooperatingwith the power the thinghas of being a
partial cause of that judgment. This would leave our perceptionwith
the power it has, when its object does not exist,to cause us to judge the
thingnot to exist.Were God to cooperatewiththispower,we would be
caused (even naturallycaused) by our perceptionof the thingto judge
the thingnot to exist,thoughit does.31
A second symmetrical
possibilityof divine deceptionis this. Suppose
God has maintainedin existencethe perceptionwe are havingof a thing,
whiledestroying
the thing.God can thenact insteadof the thingto cause
with the perceptionthe judgmentthat the thingexists.Were he to act
in thisway, we would be caused, in part by the perceptionwe are having of the thing,to judge that it exists,thoughit does not.32
A thirdpossibilityof divine deception,also recognizedby Wodeham,
depends on anotherfeatureof Ockham's theoryof intuitivecognition.In
the Reportatio
, Ockham had claimed that if an object is too distantfrom
the subject to cause in him an intuitivecognitionof itself,God can act
instead of the object, causing the subject to have an intuitivecognition
of an existing,but distantobject. In this case, Ockham furtherclaimed,
the intuitivecognitionwould cause the correctjudgmentthat the thing
exists.33On Ockham's revised theory,however, an intuitivecognition
Etideoconcedo
iudiciorum,
quodnonesteademcausaillorum
quiauniuscausaestnotitiasinere,alterius
causaestnotitia
cumretamquam
cumcausapartiali."
31LS prol.q. 3,vol.I, 40,44-50:". . . nullum
activum
creatum,
quantumcumque
praein talipasso,nisiDeo (quipotest
effectum
liberetunc
senspassodisposito,
agitaliquem
incamino,
Haecpatetex experimento
de tribus
noncoagere)
coagente.
Scripturae
pueris
Si igitur
etiamapudeum(viz.Ockham).
sibinoncoagat,
scilicet
etestprincipium
obiecto,
influentia
notitiae
intuitivae.
Etipsaquandoagitperse sineobiecto,
coagattamen
generali
ex dictis
causatiudicium
quodresnonexsistit."
32Gilbert
noticiarum
Crab,Tractatus
, Lyon1509,fol.d5v:". . . negoquod(albedo)sit
illudiudicausaeffectiva
illiusiudicii
(viz.'albedoest')quiadeusse solopotest
simpliciter
obiecti
vicem
veldicoquodestcausaeffectiva
deustamen
ciumproducere,
naturalis,
potest
intuitiva
causatidemiudicium
si conservetur
sineobiecto
sicut
. . . notitia
igitur
supplere
existente
obiecto."
33Rep.II q. 12-13,
inmecognitionem
intuitivam
OTh V, 258,20-3:"siDeuscausaret

13:47:09 PM

OCKHAM
ANDWODEHAM
ON DIVINEDECEPTION

235

causes a judgmentof existenceonly by acting togetherwith the object

itself,both being partial causes of thejudgment.But if the object is too
distantfromthe subject to cause in him an intuitivecognition,by the
same token,it is too distantfromhim to contributein causing in him a
judgment.Again, thisleaves only the intuitivecognitionwith the power
it has, when its object does not exist,of causing a judgment and that
judgmentcan onlybe thatthe object does not exist.This is, then,another
supernaturallypossible scenario where the subject would be naturally
caused, by the perceptionhe is havingof a thing,to judge thatthe thing
does not exist,thoughit does.34
Ockham had claimed that a meritof his theoryof intuitivecognition
was that,on this theory,by contrastwith that of Auriol,35no intuitive
caused, could cause one
cognitionof a thing,naturallyor supernaturally
to judge the thingto exist,when it does not.36Unfortunately,
he was
mistakenabout his own theory.As we have just seen, his theory(in its
revisedform)does allow forthe possibilitythat an intuitivecognitionof
a thingshould cause one to judge that the thingexists,thoughit does
not. Moreover,his theoryalso allows forthe possibilitythat an intuitive
cognitionof a thingshould cause one to judge the thingnot to exist,
thoughit does. Ockham was mistaken,therefore,in believingthat, on
his theoryof intuitivecognition,by perceivingor otherwisehaving an
intuitivecognitionof a thing,we would infallibly
knowwhetherthe thing
existsor not. Nor did he succeed, then,in avoidingskepticismabout the
existenceof externalthings.

de aliquoobiecto
exsistente
habitacognitione
eiusintuitiva
iudiRomae,statim
possum
carequodilludquodintueor
et videoest,itabenesicutsi iliacognitio
haberetur
naturaliter."
34LS prol.q. 2, vol.I, 39,33-40,41: "... obiectum
illudpossetpercausasnaturales
tantum
ab istopassivo
absolutum
effectum,
maxime,
elongari
quodnullum
possetin eo
causare.
Nullum
enimactivum
creatum
distantiam
finitam.
Et
potest
agereultraomnem
hocestsibiprincipium
sicut
etmihi
, quiatuncoporteret
infinite,
quodintenderetur
perargumentum
commune
de proportione
facta.Igitur
talielongatione
obiectum
nullum
effectum
in iliapotentia.
concausaret
Solaigitur
visio
absolutum,
qualeestiudicium
quodcumque,
tuncageret.
Estenimcausanaturalis,
habens
Etquandosola
passum
praesens
dispositum.
nonexsistit"
agit,causaiiudicium
quodobiectum
(italics
mine).
35Auriol,
withwhomWodeham
assumed
thatan intuitive
agreedin thisrespect,
cognition
ofa thing
causesonetojudgethatthething
whether
itdoesornot.Referring
exists,
tothe"appearing"
ofa thing
as hadwhenonehasofthething
an intuitive
he
cogntion,
writes:
"unaapparitione
res. . . existenter
inrerum
siveressitsivenonsit"
natura,
apparent
St. Bonaventure,
N.Y.
Sententiarum,
(,Scriptum
super
primum
prol.sect.2, ed. M. Buytaert,
1956,vol.I, 205, 111,77-9,italics
mine).
36See thetextquotedin footnote
17.

13:47:09 PM

236

ELIZABETH
KARGER

I conclude that Ockham's attemptat avoidingskepticismabout the existhatGod deceive

tenceof externalthings,whileallowingforthe possibility
was
was
a
failure.
Wodeham
us about theirexistence,
fullyaware of the
fact.He held an accordinglymodifiedtheoryof intuitivecognition,a theorywhichentailsthe skepticalconcessionthatwe do not knowthatthings
otherthan our own mind exist.37
Paris
CNRS

37Wodeham
writes
(LS prol.q. 6, vol.I, 169,42-170,46): ". . .ipseponitquodper
evidenter
scitur
intuitivam
albedinis
ipsamessequandoestet nonessequandononest.
Posset
haberi.
Sednonego,quipono
iudicium
infallibile.
Etideohabetcircataliaponere
ad uniforme
iudicium.
..."
inclint
quod,sivealbedositsivenonsit,visioeiussemper

13:47:09 PM

'
On theSemantics
of 'HumanBeing and
'
''Animalin Early 16th Century
Erfurt
PEKKA KRKKINEN

1. Introduction
The end of the late medievalperiod is an era of the subtle elaboration
of the resultsof philosophicaldiscussionsconducted over hundredsof
innovationsare not to be
years.Hence it may seem thatgroundbreaking
from
a
when
the
last
scholastics
were eagerlytryingto
time,
expected
the
treasures
of
medieval
for
the
preserve
learning
younger,more humanist orientedgenerations.
Such was the case at the late medievalUniversityof Erfurt.Given the
generalimportanceof William Ockham,John Buridan and theirfollowers forthisnotable German centerof via moderna
that
, it is not surprising
in the late 15th and early 16th centuriesJohannesCarnificisde Lutrea,
and BartholomaeusArnoldide Usingenwere discussing
JodocusTrutfetter
raised
problems
by the philosophicalpsychologyof these authorities.In
the followingI shall sketchone developmentin which some problems
were elaboratedin the writingsof the Erfurtianscholars.
2. Buridanon PartsofAnimalsas Animals
In the firstredactionof his Questions on Aristotle'sDe anima
, Buridan
discussedthe questionof whetherthe animal soul is in everypart of the
body. To answerthe questionhe faced the objectionthatthe affirmative
answerwould implythatall quantitativepartsof an animal,such as their
feetand heads, are to be called animals. So he concluded that the full
definitionof animal must include the notion of totalityand that the
definitionof animal as 'sensitiveanimated substance'withoutthe additional word 'total' is insufficient.1

1JohnBuridan,
intres
libros
De Anima
De prima
lectura
Aristotelis,
Questiones
(= QDA^,II,
oftheeditedtextofthe
6, 76-99,ed. B. Patar,Louvain1991,281-2.The authenticity
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,2

13:48:42 PM

238

PEKKAKRKKINEN

In the thirdredactionof Questions

,2 Buridan elaborateshis answer to
the problem,which he now considersin the form:"whetherany of the
parts of an animal is one animal." The formis similarfor plants and
humans. The formulationshows more clearlythe obvious consequence
that if that were true,we would be forcedto admit that thereis a pluralityof horsesin one horse or many humans in one human being. In
this phase he admits that the problem of partial animals is particularly
In the firstredactionhe had responded to the dubiumrather
difficult.
briefly,simplynotingthat it could be solved by the correctdefinitionof
'animal'. Now he devotesa considerableamount of space to it and the
formof responseis more complicated.3
Since the answerwill be different
regardinghumans,whose souls are
leaves
the
answer
for that part to the questions
not divisible,Buridan
regardingthe thirdbook of De anima.The answerregardingnon-human
senses of the
animals is presentedin two parts,in termsof two different
term 'animal'. The firstfollowsa homogeneityprinciple,according to
which the animal sensitivesoul is composed of quantitativeparts having
the same nature.4In this sense the term 'animal' is a properlysubstantial term,which means here that it is not a connotativeone. Since the
animal soul is homogenouslyextendedthroughoutthe whole body, every
part of an animal is composed of matterand sensitiveform.Therefore,
if 'animal' stands simplyfor such a composition,then everypart of a
homogenouswhole receivesthe same substantialpredicatesas the whole,
as it is common to say in the case of air: everypart of air is air.5
Late-Medieval
SeeJ.M. M. H. Thijssen,
Natural
redaction
hasbeenrecently
first
questioned.
et Philosophie
de Thologie
in Scholarship
in: Recherches
SomeRecent
Trends
Philosophy:
werea earlier
verhereas ifitactually
67 (2000),190.Thetextis considered
Mdievales,
inwordthedifferences
wouldplausibly
Thisinterpretation
redaction.
sionofthird
explain
in later
ofthisparticular
Fortheunderstanding
problem
question.
ingofthisparticular
since
redaction
is ofminor
ofthefirst
tradition
theauthenticity
Buridanian
importance,
totheform
tothelaterauthors
Buridan's
viewsseemstohavebeentransmitted
according
redaction.
to thethird
corresponding
2JohnBuridan,
ediDe tertia
lectura
libros
De Anima
intres
Aristotelis,
Questiones
(= QDA3),
AnEdition
ontheSoulandSensation.
Buridan
tionsin: P. G. Sobol,John
ofBookII ofHis
18 on
anIntroduction
anda Translation
BookontheSoulxmth
onAristotle's
ofQuestion
Commentary
Buridan's
1984andJ. A. Zupko,
Sensible
of
, Diss.IndianaUniversity
Philosophy
John
Species
'
De Anima
andTranslation
Mind:AnEdition
(Third
ofAristotle's
ofBookIII ofHis eQuestions
1989.
andCritical
andInterpretative
with
, Diss.Cornell
University
Essays
Redaction),
Commentary
available.
is no modern
edition
sincethere
I passherethesecondredaction,
3 Buridan,
QDAVII, 7, ed. Sobol(aboven. 2),86; 92-100.
4J. Zupko,
Master
Arts
Portrait
Buridan.
, NotreDame2003,
ofa Fourteenth-Century
John
171-5.
5 Buridan,
ad istamdubitaII, 7, ed. Sobol(aboven. 2), 97: "Ergoquantum
QDA3,

13:48:42 PM

ON THE SEMANTICS
OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'

239

In the othersense of the term,'animal' is not predicatedof its parts.

This is the connotativeuse of the term,and as Buridan notes, in this
sense the terms'animal' or 'horse' are not properlysubstantialterms(non
sint nomina vere substantialia).They signifyan animated sensitivesubstance and connote a totality,
which is explicatedas a stateof affairs,in
which this substanceis a total substanceand not a part of a substance.
This requirementis not fulfilled
by the partsof an animal, and therefore
are
not
animal
in
this
sense.
This second meaning correspondsto
they
the definitionof animal which Buridan alreadyposed in the firstredaction of the questions,namely,that animal is 'a whole animatedsensitive
substance'.6
Zupko argues that Buridan applies here a specificontologyof modes
when he solves the basic problem of change in the truth-valueof the
proposition'B is now an animal', where B means the part of an animal
which remainsaftersome otherpart, like foot,is cut off.Accordingto
the second meaning,'animal' is not predicatedof B beforethe cutting
because of the absence of the connotation,
namely,that B would not be a
part of anothersubstance.However, afterthe cuttingof a foot,'animal'
will be trulypredicatedof B, because as a restit is identicalto the total
substanceof an animal.7
tionem
tertiam
estprimaconclusio
animalis
sit
probata
quodquelibet
parsquantitativa
ex corpore
et anima,etparsanimalis
estanimai,
et quelibet
composita
parsequiequus,
et itapesestequus,si istitermini
'animai'et 'equus'suntveritermini
substantiales
non
et quodomnespartes
animeequisuntad invicem
eiusdem
rationis
et eiusconnotativi,
demspeciei[Soboi:speciem]
animalis."
Buridan
alsotheobjection,
thatanimals
rejects
in regard
oftheir
were,unlike
substances,
plantsandinanimate
essentially
heterogenous
bodies.
to him,substance
oftheanimals
is constituted
ofonesubstantial
form
According
andprime
andthedissimilarity
ofthepartsis dueonlyto accidental
matter,
dispositions
addedto thesubstance.
Buridan,
QDA, II, 7, ed. Sobol(aboven. 2),94.
6 Buridan,
conclusionem
II, 7, ed. Sobol(aboven. 2), 97-8:"Secundam
pono
QDA3,
et ceteranonsintnomina
veresubstan'animal',
quodsi hecnomina
'equus','asinus',
sedconnotativa,
scilicet
connotativa
tuncnonquelibet
tialia,
totalitatem,
parsquantitativa
animalis
velequiestanimaivelequus,necpesequiestequus.Istaconclusio
declaratur
faciliter.
enimper'enstotale'quodestenset nonestparsalterius
etper
Intellego
entis,
'substantiam
totalem'
et nonestparsalterius
substantie.
Si ergoiste
quodestsubstantia
terminus
'animal'significai
substantiam
animatam
sensitivm
et connotat
quodistasit
totalis
etnonparsalterius
de exemplo
substantie,
tunc,
prius
posito
quoda etb suntpartes
manifestum
estquoda beneestanimaiquandodivisum
estab ipsob. Sed non
animalis,
estanimaiquandoestunitum
sedparssubstantie.
sibi,quia nonesttotalis
substantia,
Deficiente
enimconnotatione,
deficit
predicatio."
7 Buridan,
estquodsi pes
II, 7, ed. Soboi(aboven. 2), 98: "Sic manifestum
QDA3,
a et residuum
estquodb nonestequus.Sed,resecato
b,manifestum
equivocetur
pede,
statim
b estequus."Lookup Zupko2003 (aboven. 4), 173. Zupkorefers
hereto
C. Normore,
Buridan's
in:J.Bogen&J. E. McGuire
Are:Studies
Ontology
(eds.),HowThings
inPredication
andtheHistory
andPhilosophy
, Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster
1985,198-9.
ofScience

13:48:42 PM

240

PEKKAKRKKINEN

here is a certain mode or a quality which

The changed connotatum
B
defineshow is related to the rest of the substance,that is, the negation of a spatial continuitywith other integralparts of a substance;a
change in that relationalquality alone changes the truth-valueof the
proposition.What seems importanthere is that this relationalqualityor
mode is "another thing" extrinsicto the thingthe term stands for. So
the spatial continuitymay be destroyed(by cutting)withoutdestruction
of the substanceB and the restof the substance.8
It should be noted that even in the final redactionof the questions
Buridan gives preferenceto the definitionof 'animal' which impliesthe
second, connotativemeaning of the term.He argues that this meaning
is oftenimplied in Aristotle'stexts and in ordinaryspeech even when
considconsideringthingslike plants and stones,which are theoretically
ered in accordance with the homogeneityprinciple.Aristotlesays that
plantscontainonly potentiallymany souls, but thispotencyis actualized
onlyaftera physicaldivision.Similarily,it is commonlyagreed thatthere
is a certainfinitenumber of stones in a stack, althoughthere are an
infinitenumberof partial stonesin each individualstone.9
of speechis even clearerwhenBuridan
The reference
to the conventions
discussesthe similarproblemregardingthe human being. He applies the
same distinctionbetween substantialand connotativemeanings of the
term,but notes that only the whole substanceof the human being is
called 'human being' (homo) in public and ordinaryspeech.10
and.Connotative
3. Substantial
Meaningsof 'Animarin theLaterBuridanian
Tradition
It is plausibleto say thatBuridan'ssemanticsolutionto the problemwas
receivedwell, at least by some of his followers,since it became customary to affirmthat parts of the animal are actuallyto be called animals,
8 Buridan,
estaliudquamante
QDA^II, 7, ed. Sobol(aboven. 2),98: "Nectarnen
nonsolum
velpartialle
Esseenimtotale
se habetad ipsum
erat,sedaliter
significat
pedem.
se haberead ipsumpedem."See Zupko2003,(above
essealiquidsedetiamaliqualiter
references.
n. 4), 174forfurther
9 Buridan,
QDA, II, 7, ed. Sobol(aboven. 2),99.
10Buridan, , III, 4, ed. Zupko(aboven. 2), 36:194-37:200:
"Adquartam
instanQDA3
homo
vel
dicitur
communem
locutionem
nihil
famosam
et
secundum
tiam,dicetur
quod
Necaliqua
substantiae.
scilicet
sicquodnonsitparsalterius
animalnisisubstantia
totalis,
sivealiter
hocilliquid,
siveperformam
dicitur
substantia
substantialem,
(etmaxime
proprie
See also
Et hoc estalibimagisconsiderandum."
totalis.
in organici),
nisisitsubstantia
Zupko2003,(aboven. 4), 177.

13:48:42 PM

OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'
ON THE SEMANTICS

241

on theMetaphysics
,
thoughin a special sense of the term.In his Questions
Book 7, q. 7, Marsiliusof Inghen seems to assume that the categoryof
substancecontainsonly such termsthat do not connote anythingextrinsic to the entitiestheystandfor,or even anotheraspect of theiressences,
These termsare genas do termsbelongingto the categoryof relation.11
erally called essentialterms.12If termslike 'human being' (homo) and
'animal' were to belong to the categoryof substance,theyshould then
not connote being a whole, which would make them respectiveterms.
But then,consideredas substances,'human being' and 'animal', besides
to singularsubstanceslike men and animals,also referto their
referring
quantitativeparts, such as legs, bones, hands, etc. Afteracceptingthis,
Marsiliuscan refutethe argumentthat therecan be no common essential terms,and thereforealso no essentialtermsfor singulars.13
In question 10 of the Questions
on theSecondBookof Sentences
this particularcase also shows Marsilius,as it did Buridan,how far the absolute
meaningof the term'human being' is fromthe ordinaryuse of the lannumguage, and he may have been aware thatspeakingabout an infinite
ber of partial men was already described by Augustine as foolish.14
Therefore,to use these termsin an ordinarysense, theymustbe understood to connote totality,and in this sense the parts of animals are not
animals.15
11Marsilius
ofInghen,
inMethaphysicam,
VII, q. 17,ed. E. P. Bos,in:E. P.
Questiones
andMarsilius
andR. L. Friedman
Medieval
Bos,Thuo
, in:S. Ebbesen
ofViborg
ofInghen
(eds.),
inLanguage
andCognition.
Acts
TheCopenhagen
School
ofthe
Analyses
symposium
ofMedieval
Philosophy
con10-13,1996,Copenhagen
1999,533: "Et patetconsequentia
January
quia:termini
notativi
extrinseci
nonsuntin predicamento
substantie."
12Ibid.,534:"Secundo
notandum
essentialis
dicitur
quodterminus
qui proaliquare
illiessentie
nichil
extrinsece
necetiamistamessentiam
supponit
importando,
pluries
super
se reflectendo,
terminos
relativos
quoddicitur
propter
aliquosutestidemetc."
13Ibid.,532-3:"Etarguitur
esseterminus
communis
quodnon. . . Quinto:nonpotest
necsingularis
. . . Confirmatur
communes
essent
essenessentialis,
igitur
quia:si termini
maxime
istitermini
'homo'etc.,utpatetin Predicamentis.
essent
Sedisti
tiales,
'animai',
nonsuntessentiales,
totalitatem
etc.quia:nonomnis
anisubstantia
quiaconnotant
igitur
mataesthomo,quiamanustuaessetanimal.Item,nonomnissubstantia
animata
sensitivaestanimai,
sedhocnondicitur
esseex alionisi
quiaaliascapudequiessetanimal,
connotant
. . . Ad quintam
totalitatem.";
ibid.,539:"Adrationes
quiaistitermini
negatur
antecedens
. . . Ad confirmationem:
concedi
turmaior,
et negatur
minor.
Ad probationem
istius
conceditur
sithomosaltem
quodquelibet
parshominis
integrlis
proutly 'homo'
absolute
sinetotalitatis
connotatione."
significat
14De Civitate
D, 7, 23.
15Marsilius
ofInghen,
libros
Quaestiones
Sententiarum,
II, q. 10,Strasbourg
super
quattuor
dicendum
isteterminus
bosestterminus
abso1501,f.251vb:"Adquintum
est,quodprout
totallutus,
usu,ubiconnotai
quodsicquaelibet
parsbovisestbos,secusestincommuni
necestde praedicamento
substantiae
itatem,
proprie."

13:48:42 PM

242

PEKKAKRKKINEN

In the same question,therefore,he makes a distinctionbetween the

names of heterogenousand those of homogenoussubstances,the former
being such that they signifythingswhose parts do not have the same
nature as the whole (cuius partes non sunt eiusdem rationiscum toto)
and the latterbeing termssignifying
thingswhose materialpartshave the
same nature as the whole, such as water and air. On the basis of preceding arguments,'horse' cannot be consideredas a homogenoussubstance,but ratheras a heterogenous.16
Understandingtermslike 'human being' and 'animal' as connotative
termsleads to further
consequencesforthe doctrineof categories.Buridan
had alreadyreferred
to the factthatin the connotativemeaning,the term
'animal' is not a substantialterm in the proper sense. Also, Marsilius
divides the termsinto different
categoriesaccordingto theirmanner of
In Questions
on theSentences
he articulatesthe divisionof catsignification.
egoriesso that the categoryof substancecontainsonly absoluteterms.If
these termsare understoodin theirordinarysense, namely,as connotative terms,theydo not (properly)belong to the categoryof substance.17
As in the citedpassage of Questions
on theMetaphysics
, termslike 'human
or
'animal'
are
considered
Marsilius
as termsfor subbeing'
usually
by
stances or as absolute termspar excellence.
The question of partial men
mightgive him some reservationsregardingthisusage. This seems to be
the case in his Tractateon appellations
, where he distinguishesbetween
absoluteand connotativetermsin the beginningof his discussion.There
he simplylists'human being' and 'animal' among the absoluteterms,but
adds that"forpresentpurposesI shallnot discusstheseterms
immediately
which I will call absolute for the time being, whethertheyare or not."
(Transi. E. P. Bos).18
16Ibid.,f. 251ra:"Correlarium.
Isteterminus
equus,proutestnomenheterogeneum,
scilicet
remcuiuspartesnonsunteiusdem
rationis
cumtoto,nonest
proutsignificat
sedconnotativus
totalitatis.
Patetperconclusionem.
Si essetpure
substantiae,
praedicamenti
et ergononesset
absolutus,
secunda,
quaelibet
parsequiessetequus,ut dicitconclusio
sedhomogeneum,
etergononessetheterogeneum.
Similiter
dicide
heterogeneum,
potest
aliishuiusmodi."
Thisdistinction
hassomerelevance
alsoin dealing
withthequestion
in
whichwaythepartsofthewholeareincluded
in thedefinition
ofa whole.SeeJohn
InMetaphysicam
Aristotelis
1588.
Buridan,
, VII, q. 10-11,Parisiis
17Marsilius,
dicendum
Quaestiones
Sententiarum,
II, 10,f. 251vb:"Adquintum
est,
super
isteterminus
bosestterminus
absolutus,
quodprout
quodsicquaelibet
parsbovisestbos,
secusestin communi
usuubiconnotat
necestde praedicamento
substantiae
totalitatem,
ibid.,f.251ra
(seeprevious
proprie.";
footnote).
18Marsilius
ofInghen,
Marsilius
, ed.E. P. Bos,in:E. P. Bos(ed.andtransi.),
Appeliationes
Treatises
onthe
Historical
ofInghen:
Properties
ofTerms,
1983,
(Synthese
Library
22),Dordrecht

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ON THE SEMANTICS
OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'

243

In his commentary
on De anima
made the same
, Lawrenceof Lindores19
differentiation
as Marsiliusdid in his Sentences
commentary.Lindoreseven
contributedan added question to the theme: whethereverypart of an
animal is animal.20In thisquestion,he did not give precedenceto either
answers
meaning of the term 'animal', but simplygave two different
accordingto the different
meaningsof the term.21
4. Christological
Discussion
on theDistinction
between
HumanNatureand Person
In the discussionsof late via moderna
, there was yet another contextin
whichthe signification
of the term'human being' was dealt with,namely
in Christology.As William Ockham puts it, the basic problem is that
thereseems to be no difference
betweenthe significates
of 'human being'
and 'humanity'in the profanesense of the terms,but in the incarnate
Christthereis a real distictionbetweenthe divineperson,whichis called
'human being' and human nature,by whichthatpersonis called human.
This makes the abstractsubstantialterms'humanity'resembleabsolute
concreteterm'white'stands
qualitieslike 'whiteness',whose corresponding
fora reallydistinctentity,i.e. the subjectof whiteness.In Ockham's language, 'human being' becomes, in this special case, a concretetermof
the "firstkind", and such termsare generallyexamples of connotative

128-9:"Quosterminos
esseabsolutos.
Utrum
sintvelnon,hocnonest
pronunc
"suppono
praesentis
speculations.
19Lawrence
ofLindores
de Londorio,
d. 1437),thefirst
Rector
oftheuni(Laurentius
ofSt.Andrews,
wrote
commentaries
onAristode's
andDe anima
were
, which
versity
Physics
usedin theuniversities
ofthefifteenth
On hislifeandworks
see Th.
widely
century.
Das Problem
desUnendlichen
imausgehenden
14.Jahrhundert:
neStudie
mitTextedition
Dewender,
desLorenz
von
Studien
zurPhilosophie
lindores
zumPhysikkommentar
, (Bochumer
36),Amsterdam
2002.
20Lawrence
ofLindores,
inAristotelis
libros
deanima
, ms.Copenhagen,
Quaestiones
Kongelige
Thott5804,ff.262vb-265va.
bibliotk,
21Ibid.,f. 263va"b:
unomodo
"Quartonotandum,
quodly animalcapitur
dupliciter,
estterminus
absolutus
etdiffinitur
sic:animai
estsubstantia
sensitiva.
Secundo
capitur,
prout
connotat
totalitatem
etterminus.
Diffinitur
connotative,
rei,proqua supponit
capitur
prout
sic:animalestsubstantia
animata
sensitiva
totalis.
Et haecde primaarticulo.
Quantum
ad secundam
articulum
sithaecprimaconclusio:
concenCapiendoly animalabsolute
dendum
animalis
sitanimal
. . . Secundaconclusio:
est,quodquaelibet
parsquantitativa
nullaparsquantitativa
I amgrateanimalis
estanimal."
Capiendo
lyanimalconnotative
fulto professor
Lawrence
in a letter
whoconfirmed
Moonan,
that,basedon hisfamilwiththetextual
theCopenhagen
tradition,
iarity
manuscript
maynotdiffer
verymuch
from
themanuscripts
in Erfurt
which
wereavailable
at thattime.

13:48:42 PM

244

PEKKAKRKKINEN

terms,despitethe factthat 'human being' appears firstin his listof mere

absolute terms.22
It seems,however,thatin christological
discussionsit is not onlywhen
to
Christ
that
the
term
'human
applied
being' becomes a connotative
but
also
when
to
other
human
term,
applied
beings. This followsfrom
the differentiation
betweenthe meaningsof the terms'human being' and
about the incar'humanity',by whichOckham deals withthe propositions
nate Christ.So accordingto Ockham, 'humanity'signifies
human nature
in an absolutemanner,but 'human being' mustbe understoodas a connotativeterm.It signifies(primarily)human nature,but has a different
connotatum
when applied to Christand other human beings. In the case
of Christ,'human being' connotesthe divineperson,but in the case of
other human beings,it merelyconnotesa negationof any dependence
on such an externalperson.23
Here it mustbe notedthatit would be a mistaketo considerOckham's
distinctionbetween 'human being' and 'humanity'as simplyequivalent
with Buridan's use of the term 'human being' in the absolute and connotativesense, since thereare considerabledifferences.
Ockham's target
is in the problemsraised by propositionsabout human naturebeforeor
afterthe Incarnationof the Son of God. In questioneleven of the fifth
he explicidydenies that therewere obstaclesto treating'human
quodlibet
theintention
ofAristode",
being'and 'humanity'as synonymous,
"following
i.e. withoutregardingthe case of the incarnateChrist. Since the synis hereunderstood
as theidentity
of objectand mode of signification
onymity
between the terms,it would followthat the difference
between 'human
being' and 'humanity'as connotativeand absolutetermsis not based on
22William
inlibrum
tertium
Sententiarum
Ockham,
III, q. 1, ed.F.E.
Quaestiones
(Reportatio),
St.Bonaventure
fora dis1982(OperaTheologica
Kelley& G. I. Etzkorn,
VI) 29:1-19;
tinction
between
absolute
andconnotative
terms
seeSumma
, I, c.10,ed.Ph.Boehner,
iogicae
G. Gi & S. Brown,
St.Bonaventure
1974,(OperaPhilosophica
1),35:1-38:94.
23William
, III, q. 1,ed. Kelley& Etzkorn
Ockham,
(aboven. 22),41:12-22:
Reportatio
"Etcausaistius
variationis
estquia'homo'nontantum
naturam
humanam
sed
significai
connotat
ethocloquendo
dehomine
Ideoquando
negationem
dependentiae,
non-assumpto.
solumpronaturanondependente.
autemde
supponit
supponit
personaliter,
Loquendo
homine
tuncillehomosignificai
naturam
humanam
etconnotat
ad
assumpto,
suppositum
Et ideoquandoillehomosupponit
quoddependet.
personaliter,
supponit
prosupposito
ad quodnatura
Humanitas
autemabsolute
naturam
non
humanam,
dependet.
significat
necnon-dependentiae,
necaliquodsuppositum
ad
connotando
negationem
dependentiae,
In theresolution
veldependere
connotat."
of
quoddependet
poetest,
quia nihilpenitus
an important
feature
fortheterm'human
theobjections
is thatthepersonal
supposition
alsodiffers
human
theterm
being'inpropositions
accordingly.
Regarding
ordinary
beings,
forhuman
hasa personal
butinthecaseofChrist
itis forthedivine
nature,
supposition
nature.
See Ockham,
, III, q. 1,ed. Kelley(aboven. 22),39:18-40:5.
Reportatio

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ON THE SEMANTICS
OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'

245

anythingwhich is apparentfromthe profaneuse of the terms.In particularOckham objects to the view that 'human being' would also signify,besides human nature,a supplementaryindividuatingdifference.24
Yet defacto
, Ockham considersthe term 'human being' as connotative
on a theologicalbasis, and so it remainsunclear,why shortlyafterthe
discussionof the matterin his Summalogicae
, he does not hesitateto list
it among the termshe categorizesas simplyabsolute.25
Ockham'sviewwas developedin the latercommentaries
of the Sentences.
Pierred'Ailly,forexample,argued thatwhile accordingto Aristotlethese
termsare synonymous,
that is, theystand for exactlythe same entities,
this is not to be accepted unconditionally
because of certaintheological
truths.26
his
view
on
Ockham's
account
of the difference
between
Basing
definitions
of 'human being' and 'humanity',he statesthat'human being'
names an individual(suppositum),whereas 'humanity'names a nature.27
d'Ailly also discusseshere the nominal definitionof the term 'human
being'. For Ockham, as for d'Ailly,the differencebetween Christ and
otherhuman beingslies in the part of the definition
whichdesignatesthe
connotatum
of the term.28
Because of the differences
in the connotatum,
, d'Ailly
24William
Ockham,
Quodlibeta
, V, q. 10,ed.JosephC. Wey,St. Bonaventure
septem
see also
1980,(OperaTheologica
ibid.,q. 11,ed. Wey,523:4-528:132;
IX), 519:17-28;
Summa
, I, c. 7, ed. Boehner
logicae
(aboven. 22),23:1-29:191.
25Ockham
Summa
logicae
I, c. 10,ed. Boehner
(aboven. 22),35:1-36:37.
26Pierre
libros
sententiarum
1490(cited
Quaestiones
, III, q. un.,C, Strasbourg
d'Ailly,
super
inG. White,
Luther
asNominalist
huiusvidendum
, Helsinki
1994,263):"Sedad intellectum
estquodimportatur
in propositio
terminm
'homo'.Proquo sciendum
peristum
quod,
licet(secundum
nullaresimportetur
'homo'quineodemmodo
Aristotelem)
perhocnomen
'humanitas'
eteconverso
importetur
perhocnomine
(exeo,quia secundum
ipsumnihil
esthieinferius,
nisimateria,
velcompositum,
velaccidens
horum
etnulforma,
alicuius,
lumistorum
sicutpatetinductive;
plusimportatur
perunumquamperreliquum,
supnonsignificai
solumanimam
necnaturam
positotamenquod'humanitas'
intellectivam,
secundum
istanomina
nonsunt
tamen,
fidem,
specificam,
quodpronuncsupponitur);
synorebussupponere."
nima,sedpossunt
prodistinctis
27Ibid.,III, q. un.,C: "Namhocnomen'homo'estnomen
et supponit
suppositi,
pro
filiodei;sedhocnomen'humanitas'
estnomennaturae,
et nonsupponit
profiliodei.
Hoc autemfaciliter
ex descriptionibus
istorum
terminorum.
potest
apparere
quidnominis
Namhocnomen
nihilsignificai
'humanitas'
nisinaturam
excorpore
etanima
compositam
nonconnotando
ab aliquosupposito
a
intellectiva,
quodistanaturasustentatur
(scilicet
Et ideosemper
et
Verbo)velquodnonsustentatur.
proistanaturasupponit
praecise,
numquam
profiliodei,cumipsenonpossitesseistanatura.Sed hoc nomen'homo'
illamnaturam,
connotando
eamesseperse existentem;
significai
vel,ab alio supposito
sustentatam
sivesuppositam."
Cf.Ockham,
Summa
, I, 7, ed.Boehner,
logicae
(aboven. 22),
Graham
White
25:68-81;
V, 10,ed.Wey,(aboven. 24),519:30-520:60.
Quodlibeta
(inWhite
1994(aboven. 26),262)seemstohavefailed
tonotice
theconnection
toOckham's
treatin Summa
ments
andQuodlibeta.
logicae
28Pierre
diffinitione
Quaestiones
, III, q. un.,C: "Undeisteterminus
d'Ailly,
'homo',
quid

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PEKKAKRKKINEN

concludesthat 'human being5is not predicatedunivocallyof Christand

othermen.29
Gabriel Biel wishesto avoid thislast conclusionmade by Pierred'Ailly,
and proposesthat 'human being' should be understoodas signifying
"an
individual,which subsistsin a human nature" (suppositumsubsistensin
natura humana), whetheror not this individualis identicalwithits particularhuman natureor not. Such a descriptionof the termwould suffice
in both the case of the incarnateChristand of otherhuman beings.To
allow an equivocationin this matterseemed for Biel perhaps theologicallysuspect,whileit could be understoodas endangeringthe real humana human naturewhichis simply
ityof Christ.Further,'humanity'signifies
a compositeof matterand a rationalsoul.30Biel explicateshis solution
by applyinghere the metaphysicaldefinitionof 'human being', namely,
that human being is a rationalanimal (animal rationale)which would,
both the cases of Christand otherhuman beings
accordingto him,satisfy
because its partssignify
whichsubsistin human nature.31
onlyindividuals,
Biel seemsto be aware of the problemsthatarise,when concreteterms
such as 'human being' are conceived as connotative.So he respondsto
an objectionwhichstatesthatunderstanding
concretetermsforsubstances
sicdiffiniri:
hocestnatura,
ex corpore
etanimaintellectiva,
ab
nominis,
potest
composita
talemnaturam
aliosupposito
nonsustentata;
velestaliquodsuppositum
suscompositam
istadescriptio
tentans.
De quolibet
enimhomine,
verificatur.
Prima
(proaltera
parte)
pars
homine
alioa Christo,
enimverificatur
de quolibet
et secunda
parsde soloChristo."
29Ibid.:"Ex praedictis
dei noneodemmodo,necomnino
sequitur
primoquodfilius
eandem
dicitur
'homo'sicutetaliihomines.
sivesecundum
univoce,
rationem,
Patet,
quia
'homo'quiaestnatura
et quilibet
aliushomo,dicitur
ex corpore
et
Socrates,
composita
animaintellectiva
a nullosustentata.
Sed filius
deinondicitur
'homo'hancratione
(scilicumhocsitimpossibile,
sedquiaestsuppositum
sustentans
talem
cet,quiasittalisnatura),
eiusdependentiam."
et terminus
naturam,
30Gabriel
circa
libros
Sententiarum
Biel,Collectorium
, III,d. 7,q. un.,ed.W.Werbeck
quattuor
& U. Hoffmann,
169:"Prosolutione
autemnotandum
1973-92,
Tbingen
quod'homo'
substantiae
huiusabstracti
nontantum
estconcretum
'humanitas',
voce,sed
praedicamenti
Nam'homo'significai
in natura
sive
etiamsignificatione.
subsistens
humana,
suppositum
humanae
sivenon.Nametusquenuncopiniones
contrariae
invesitidemnaturae
ipsum
niuntur
de hoc,an naturaet suppositum
humanum
sintdis(etiamin Petroet ceteris)
humano.
'Humanitas'
tincta.
Ettarnen
nonestdubitatum,
quin'homo'supponit
prosupposito
a qua suppositum
denominatur
verosignificat
naturam
humanam,
homo,quae realiter
nihilaliudestquamcompositum
ex corpore
seumateria
et animarationali,
utvultbeain Explanatione
fideiad Damasum
sitsuptusHieronymus
papam,sivetalecompositum
sivenon."
positum
31Biel,Collectorium
& Hoffmann,
, III, 7, q. un.,ed. Werbeck
(aboven. 30),170,37rationale'.
Illa enimconvertitur
cum
hominis
esthaec:'Animal
171,48: "Sed definitio
et solumtali. . . Haec
tamVerboincarnato
definito,
quia convenit
quamomnicreato,
estverahominis
autem:'animalrationale'
definitio,
quia tam'rationale'
quam'animad'
in naturasensitiva
rationali.
verosupsubsistente
Compositum
supponunt
prosupposito
ponitetiampronatura,
quaenonestsuppositum."

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ON THE SEMANTICS
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247

as connotativewould destroythe essentialdifferencebetween the category of substance and accidental categories based on the distinction
between absolute and connotativeterms.32The underlyingassumption
between
echoesat leastBuridan'sand Ockham'sideas about the distinction
the categoryof substanceand othercategories.33
Biel's answer is twofold.The firstis to affirmthat concretetermsin
the categoryof substanceare connotative,and thatthiscategorycontains
absolute termsonly when regardingthe abstract,not the corresponding
concreteterms.On the otherhand, thereare also absolutetermsamong
This soluthosebelongingto othercategories,like the term'whiteness'.34
tionwould surelymake Ockham's listof simplyabsolutetermsseem quite
since it beginswith concreteterms.The second answeris
extraordinary,
to reconsiderthe distinctionbetween absolute and connotativeterms.
Accordingthissolutionthe mode of signification,
by which somethingis
to make a term consignifiedas an individual,would not be sufficient
is common
notative.This seemsplausible,since thismode of signification
to all concretetermswhich are predicatedof firstsubstances.Only such
termswhich signifyanotherdispositionalquality than being an individual would then be called connotative.35
32Biel,Collectorium
& Hoffmann,
, III, 7, q. un.M, ed. Werbeck
(aboven. 30),170,1"Etsi replicatur:
et 'substantia'
essent
termini
acciden171,11:
'Homo','animal',
'corpus'
taliter
connotativi.
substantiae.
Sed
falsum,
Consequens
quia sunttermini
praedicamenti
substantiae
etiamtollereabsolutum,
(secundum
omnes)
praedicamentum
ponitur
alioquin
turdistinctio
interpraedicamentum
substantiae
et praedicamenta
accidentium;
quodest
- Probatur
totamlogicam
Tumquia terminus
pervertere
Peripateticorum.
consequential
de quocumque
termino
vereaffirmatur,
de iliosupponente
absoluto
absolutus,
numquam
sed'homo','animal'
de natura
humana
vereaffirmantur
negari
potest;
seipsasubsistente,
- Tumquia,si sunt
etde ea verenegantur
fuerit
nonabsolti.
postquam
assumpta;
igitur
vereconcreti,
concernunt
scilicet
materiale
et
etperconsequens
duo,
formale,
significatum
estcumalio significativum,
id estterminus,
connotativi,
quia connotativum
qui cum
unosubstrative
aliudformaliter."
significato
significat
33JohnBuridan,
Summulae
inpraedicamenta
, 3, 2, 1, ed. E. P. Bos,Nijmegen
1994,21,
inlibrum
Aristotelis
11-15;William
Ockham,
, c. 7, ed. G. Gi,St.
Expositio
praedicamentorum
Bonaventure
1978(OperaPhilosophica
II), 159,44-58.
34Biel,Collectorium
& Hoffmann
, III, 7, q. un.,M, ed.Werbeck
(aboven. 30),170-171,
inventate
substantiae
habent
25-26:"Respondetur
13-20;
quodconcreta
duplex
significatum,
scilicet
et formale.
substrativum
Substrative
et formaliter
naturam
significant
suppositum
a qua denominatur
Si ergoomnis
tersubstantialem,
suppositum
aliquaspeciesubstantiali.
minus
habens
huiusmodi
estconnotativa,
fateor
concreta
substantialia
duplex
significatum
esseconnotativa.
dicoquodpraedicamentum
substantiae
estterminorum
Consequenter
absolutorum
ad abstracta,
nonquantum
ad concreta.
Nullum
enimconcretum
quantum
dictum
estpureetsimpliciter
absolutum
... etmultapraedicamentorum
accidenproprie
tiumsuntabsoluta,
ut'albedo','caliditas'
etc."
35Biel,Collectorium
& Hoffmann
, III, 7, q. un.,M, ed.Werbeck
(aboven. 30),171,2734: "Velpossetdiciquodpenesmodumsignificandi
essesuppositale
nondistinguuntur

13:48:42 PM

248

PEKKAKRKKINEN

Afterpresentingthese two solutions,Biel adds a remarkwhich reveals

thatthe Christianrevelationin factquestionsthe distinction
of categories
made by Aristodeand his followers.He maintainsthat what happens
here is not the corruptionof the art of logic, but instead,bringingit
closer to the truth.Furthermore,this truthis somethingthat pagan
Peripatheticphilosopherscould not yet comprehend,and theyerredhere
as in many other cases in naturalphilosophy,since theydid not know
the divine omnipotencywhich surpassesthe nature.36
5. Man andAnimalas Terms
in Usingen
and Trutfetter
for Substances
Buridan, Ockham, Marsilius,Pierre d'Ailly and Lawrence of Lindores
were respectedauthoritiesfor Erfurtiannominalists
Johannesde Lutrea,
BartholomaeusArnoldide Usingenand JodocusTrutfetter.37
The different
of
the
terms
'human
and
'animal'
described
above are,
meanings
being'
in
also
reflected
their
The
of
their
therefore,
writings.
starting
point
analysis was similarto that of the fathersof via moderna
. For example they
understoodthe semanticcharacterof the categoryof substancein the
same manneras Buridan and Ockham and later expressedby Biel as a
commonnotion:"[Substance] is called the absolutecategory,because the
termsit containsare absolute". They also presented'human being' and
'animal' as standardexamples of the termsor entitiesbelongingto that
category.38
termini
connotativi
etabsolti,
communis
estomnibus
concretis
quiahaecsignificatio
praedde primasubstantia;
sed distinguuntur
icabilibus
aliamhabipenesmodossignificandi
tudinem
a suppositali,
ita quodterminus
nonsignificans
aliamhabitudinem
essentialem
a suppositali
velaccidentalem
dicitur
absolutus.
Ettalessunttermini
substantiales
concreti.
verodicuntur,
hancsuppositalem
Connotativi
circumstantiam
aliamaliquam
qui praeter
habitudinem
cumsuosignificato
substrativo.
accidentium
important
Qualiasuntconcreta
et differentiae
essentiales."
36Biel,Collectorium
& Hoffmann,
, III, d. 7, q. un.,M, ed.Werbeck
(aboven. 30),171,
35-42.
37Johannes
Carnificis
de Lutrea
oftheology
from
and
Erfurt,
(d. 1479)wasa licencite
laterarchdeacon
ofMainz;Jodocus
Trutfetter
themostrespected
(d. 1519)wasprobably
in Erfurt
of histimeand Bartholomaeus
Arnoldi
fromUsingen
(d. 1532)
philosopher
at theArtsFaculty.
On theirlifeand writings
was Trutfetter's
see
colleague
younger
Unwersitas
Studii
E. Kleineidam,
II, Leipzig1992,153-157;
290-292;298-301;
Erjfordensis
lifeandworks,
seealsoJ. Pilvousek,
312.On Trutfetter's
, in:D. vonder
Trutfetter
Jodocus
Denker
undderErfurter
Universitt
Pfordten
, Gttingen
2002,96-117.
(ed.),Groe
Erfurts
38Bartholomaeus
Arnoldi
de Usingen,
Summa
totius
, Basel1507,f.e2v:
compendiaria
logice
in speciali
"Hic agitur
de unoquoque
et primode predicaseorsum,
predicamentorum
Cuiusratioest,quiasubstantia
estprioraccidente
etvocatur
mento
substantie.
predicain eo positisuntabsolti."
mentum
ex eo quiatermini
absolutum,

13:48:42 PM

BEING'AND'ANIMAL'
OF 'HUMAN
ON THE SEMANTICS

249

like Marsiliusin his

As a consequenceof this,Usingen and Trutfetter,
on theMetaphysics
, includednot only individualmen and animals
Questions
in the scope of this category,but also theirquantitativeparts, such as
of substance:
hands,feetand heads. These were includedin the definition
"substanceis a being,which subsistsnaturallyin itself(per se)" (Usingen)
or an
or "being, which is able to subsistnaturallyin itself"(Trutfetter)
essentialpart of such a being. In addition to matterand its form,the
among the
quantitativeparts were counted by Usingen and Trutfetter
essentialparts of a substance,and were thus includedin the categoryof
substancethroughthe latterpart of the definition.So, men and animals,
but also theirquantitativeparts,belonged to the categoryof substance.
From thisone could assume that,as termsforsubstances,whichare necessarilyabsoluteterms,the terms'human being' and 'animal' would then
also stand for these parts. Note that Trutfetterexplicitlyincludes the
human nature of the incarnate Christ in his definitionof substance,
althoughit does not actuallyexistperse, and is not an essentialpart (that
is, form,matteror quantitativepart) of such being. That is implied by
the expression' is able to subsist'in Trutfetter's
definition,
meaning that
if such an entitywere not actuallyinheringin anothersubject,it would
naturallyexistin itself.This does not apply to qualities,which can exist
separatelyfromthe substancesonly by a miracle,but it applies to the
human nature of Christ,which is in this respectsimilarto the human
natureof otherhuman beings.39

39Ibid.,f. e2v:"Substantia
. . . proprie,
ut
... in primaimpositione
dupliciter
capitur
iuxtaduplicem
derivationem
. . . secundo
contra
etsiccapitur
accidens,
dupliciter
distinguitur
huiuspredicamenti.
Et describitur
dicitur
a subsistendo,
et sicestgenusgeneralissimm
in mateveleiusparsessentialis.
Et sicdividitur
sic:estresperse subsistens
[n]aturaliter
... velparseiusessentialis,
ubitangiformam
et totum
riam,
(2. De anima)
compositum
essentiales
turprimo
materia
etforma
coniuncta
materie,
quiatalessuntpartes
compositi
rei.Secundotangunt
ibipartesquantificative
ut hominis,
asinivelalterius
substantialis,
totius
utsuntmanus,
toti,
substantie,
pes,caput,que nonsubsistunt
perse,sedinnitunt
Summule
totius
Erfurt
et suntetiampartes
utclaret."
essentiales,
Trutfetter,
Jodocus
logice,
neccontracte
veroetlogicus
resincommuni
1501,ff.M3r"v:
consyderantes,
"Metaphisicus
ad materiam
et motum,
re,velpartem
quamqueremsua naturanatamperse subsiste
illiusessentialem
substantiam
eta perse stando
substantia
deduciopinantur.
Hoc
vocant,
modoomnis
estmateria,
velforma
veltotum
utscripsubstantia
substantialis,
compositum,
1 et 2 De anima,et 7 Methaphysice
est
sitAristoteles
libris.
sicdefiniunt:
Quaremulti
resnaturaliter
velparsilliusessentialis.
Ubiperpartem
potens
perse subsistere,
priorem
in
forme
et humanitas
includitur
totum
deusputaac intelligentie,
compositum,
separate,
etsuenature
dimissa
Christo,
quenuncestindivino
supposito,
persesubsisteret.
Repelluntur
in sacramento
eademparteaccidentia
et preter
ordinem
altaris,
solum,
que miraculose
naturalibus
observandum
Perpartem
consuetum,
indidit,
persesubsistunt.
quemdeusrebus

13:48:42 PM

250

PEKKAKRKKINEN

When he deals with the distinctionbetween concrete and abstract

notes that 'human being', when depictingthe person of
terms,Trutfetter
human natureor humanity,but the
the incarnateChrist,does not signify
and
he
of
Christ,
paraphrases Pierre d'Ailly extensivelyin this
person
point. Following d'Ailly, he defines 'human being' in this passage to
excludeparts
includeonlyindividualhuman beings,and thusto implicitly
of men fromits scope. His aim is to reconstructa unitarymeaning of
on
'human being', consideringalso the case of Christ,and not reflecting
in
the
the problem of includingquantitativeparts of the human being
scope of the definition.40
On theQuestion
and Trutfetter
6. Lutrea
, Usingen
ofPartialAnimalsin an
Animal
The particularcase in which the semanticsof 'human being' and 'anitextsdeals with
mal' is dealt within Lutrea's,Usingen's and Trutfetter's
the questionformulatedby Lindores:whetherthe partsof human beings
and animals are also to be called human beings and animals. Lutrea,
does not treatit separately,
althoughfamiliarwithLindores'commentary,
but discussesit, like Buridan,in the contextof the question concerning
whethersoul is in everypart of the body. In a corollaryto his principal
answerhe notes simplythat everypart of human being is human being,
and the same applies to animals.41
However, in a response to one of the objections, he differentiates
betweentwo meaningsof the term 'human being'. In the firstmeaning
'human being' is the name of a nature,whereas in the second meaning
it is the name of a suppositum.Lutrea thus applies to this question of
naturalphilosophythe same distinctionas Pierre d'Aillyin the christological context.Similarity,he goes on to label the second meaning as
connotative,where the termconnotesto totalityor, as he says,"negation

substantiales."
etforme
substantiarum
includitur
veroposteriorem
materia,
partes
quantitative,
40Ibid.,f.H6V:"Quaredefinitione
ex
Estnatura
sicdefiniunt.
composita
quidnominis
ntuvelestsuppositum
nonsustentata,
ab aliosupposito
et animaintellectiva,
corpore
iliaproaltera
De quoqueenimmortalium
rmillamsustentans.
verificatur,
partium
descriptio
de solo
et posterior
homine
alio a Christo,
de quolibet
parspriorverificatur
quoniam
Christo."
41Johannes
librorum
de anima
de Lutrea,Exercitium
Carnificis
1482,f. 27r:
, Erfurt
esthomo[et]quelibet
"Correllarium.
pars
parshominis
primo,
quodquelibet
Sequitur
estanimal."
animalis

13:48:42 PM

OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'
ON THE SEMANTICS

251

Like Marsilius,he says thatin

of being-in-another"
(abnegado innitentie).
the connotativesense the term'human being' does not belong to the categoryof substance,and explicitlyassignsit to the categoryof relation.42
Like Lindores,Usingen treatsthe issue in a separate question in his
de animal He answersthe question of whethera part of an
Exercitium
animal is animal affirmatively:
accordingto him everypart of an animal
is an animal. Hence he understandsthe meaning of the terms'human
on theMetaphysics
,
being' and 'animal' as Marsilius does in his Questions
namely,as termswithinthe categoryof substance.Usingen does not see
any immediateproblemin thisway of speaking,althoughterminologically
one reservationcan be observed.He says, like Lindores,that the question is to be affirmedonly when the term 'animal' is understoodto be
the name of a natureand not the name of an individual(suppositum).44
Althoughhis point is rathersimilarto that in Lindores' commentary
As we shall see later,
and Lutrea's Exercitium
, thereare some differences.
he does not want to presenthere two senses of the term 'animal', the
one being absoluteand the otherconnotative.Rather he is speakinghere
of two concepts,which are properlycalled 'animal' and 'animalitas',and
between them by the two species of objects they refer
he distinguishes
to. Firstly,the term 'animal' can be the name of a nature,and in this
meaningit is a substituteforthe proper designation'animalitas'.This is
the general meaningwhen 'animal' refersto any being that is made of
matterand sensitiveform,whetherit is part of an individualor not.
Secondly,the term'animal' can referonlyto individualanimals,and this
is the proper meaning of the term. Thus, to understandthe concrete
term'animal' as the name of a natureis to understandit in an improper
sense, because concretetermsare properlynames of individuals,while
abstracttermslike 'animalitas' are properlynames of natures.Usingen
decides, however, to use the term 'animal' in a sense that does not

42Ibid.,f. 27v:"Respondetur,
duobusmodis:uno modout est
quodhomocapitur
ex materia
et forma,
et iliomodoquelibet
nomennature,
et sicdicitcompositum
pars
homines.
Aliomodo
hominis
esthomo,et concedendum
est,quodunushomositinfiniti
innitentie.
Ilio modo
estnomensupposi
totalitatem
seu abnegationem
ti,et sicconnotat
est
nullialteriinherentem,
et sic nullaparshominis
remperse subsistentem
significat
toticomposito,
etsicestde
sedunaqueque
innititur
homo,quianullaparsactusubsistit,
et connotat
cuiusliet supponit
relationis,
abnegationem
prore composita,
predicamento
betinnitentie."
43Bartholomaeus
Arnoldi
de Usingen,
Exercitium
deanima
1507.
, Erfurt
44Ibid.,f.Fr:"Quibuspremissis
ad questionem
aniaffirmative
respondetur
capiendo
malutestnomen
nature."

13:48:42 PM

252

PEKKAKRKKINEN

correspondto its grammaticalformas a concreteterm,but ratherto its

use as a termfor a substance.45
As proofforhis responseUsingen assertsthat an animal is essentially
homogenousregardingitsquantitative
parts.Being essentially
homogenous
means that any part of an animal can have the same denominationas
the whole,so thatif a whole is called animal,also itspartsare called animals.46The counter-argument
that thisanswercontradictsthe usual way
of speakingis answeredas follows.47
The common conclusionthat parts
of animalsare not animalsis based on the factthatanimalshave different
parts that are formedin different
ways, whereas,for example, elements
like water do not have such parts. From this it followsthat an animal
as a mixed substanceis accidentallyheterogenousin respectof its quantitativeparts,but that it is not essentiallyheterogenous;pure elements,
on the otherhand, are both essentiallyand accidentallyheterogenous.48
if 'animal' is
Againstthisone could respondwitha counter-argument:
the name of a substance,which must be an absolute term,it cannot be
the name of an individual,which would need a connotationof negation
of any kindof being-in-another.49
In his response,Usingenseemsto explicate that the distinctionbetweenthe name of a natureand the name of

45Ibid.,f.E6V:"Secundo
notandum
estiliumterminm
animalcapidupliciter.
Primo
estnomen
omnis
rescomposita
exmateria
etforma
sensitiva.
Dicitur
nature,
prout
qualiter
animalnoncurando
an sittotalis
nullialteri
innitens
velpartialis
alteri
innitens.
Secundo
utestnomen
solumiliaresdicitur
ex mateanimal,
suppositi,
qualiter
que estcomposita
riaet forma
et subsistit
alteritamquam
sensitiva,
perse sicquodnoninnititur
pars.Et
animalinproprie
sedsecundo
modoaccipitur
primomodocapitur
proanimalitate,
prodicitur
nomina
uthumanitas,
aninaturarum,
deitas,
prie,quiaabstracta
proprie
loquendo
et concreta
nomina
uthomo,animai,
deusethuiusmodi."
malitas,
suppositorum,
46Ibid.,f.Fr:"Itemanimalestessentialiter
secundum
homogenium
partes
quantitatiesteiusdem
denominationis
cumtoto;sed totum
vas,ergoquelibet
parsquantitativa
nomine
nomine
animalis."
animalis,
significatur
ergoetiamparsnominabitur
47Ibid.f. Fv: "Arguitur:
animainonestessentialiter
homogenium,
ergo.Antecedens
distinctio
intermixtum
et elementm,
probatur,
quiasicperiret
que est,quodelementa
sinthomogenia
etmixta
utetiam
concedunt
dicentes
eterogenia,
vulgares
quemlibet
partem
animalis
esseanimili."
aqueesseaquam,sednonquamlibet
partem
48Ibid.,f. Fv: "Respondetur
animaiesseessentialiter
sedaccidentaliter
homogenium,
diversimode
etcomplexionatas,
eterogenium,
quiahabetdiversas
partes
figuratas
quodvulautemesthomogenium
tamessentialiter
et iudicat.
Elementm
gusattendit
quamacciet elementm."
inter
mixtum
dentaliter,
quaremanetdistinctio
49Ibid.f.Fv:"Item,
animaiethomononsuntnomina
suppositorum,
ergo.Antecedens
absolti
de predicamento
substantie.
autemest
probatur,
quia sunttermini
Suppositum
cuiuslibet
innitentie."
HereUsingen
terminus
connotativus,
abnegationem
quia connotai
usesthesameformulation
as Lutrea.

13:48:42 PM

ON THE SEMANTICS
OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'

253

an individualis not to be understoodas having semanticcontent,but

accordingto the classificationof the thingssignified.Usingen responds
that 'animal' as the name of a naturealso signifieswhole animals; however, they are not named as individuals,but in the same way as their
confusethe manner of signification
and
parts. One must not, therefore,
the object signified.This would be the case when one would say (as
Lutrea did) that as the name of a nature the term 'human being' is
absolute,but thatas the name of an individualit is connotative.Usingen
argues that the term 'human being' as the name of an individualdoes
not connoteits being an individual,like the term'individual'itselfdoes.
From thisit is evidentthatUsingenwantsto keep the term'animal' conas an absoluteterm,but distinguishes
sistently
onlytwo meanings,accordto
of
ing two distinctclasses significata.50
Usingen refershere to the factthat the basic grammaticalfunctionof
a concretetermis to designatean individualbeing and thereforeit does
not need to have any connotationsof its objects being not parts of any
other.Because this is the basic meaning,it signifiesonly the individual,
in which case it standsfor the correwhen not understoodimproperly,
In
of sayingthatGod assumedhuman
abstract
term.
the
context
sponding
in
'human
is
understood
this impropermeaning.Properly
being,
being'
speakingthatGod assumedhumanbeingmeansthatGod assumedhumanity,viz. the human nature.51
Usingen'spositioncan thus be understoodto mean that accordingto
him it can be affirmed
thatpartsof an animal are properlyspeakinganimalitates
, and animals only in an impropermeaning.In addition,he says
thatifwe also affirmthatmen consistof an infinitenumberof men, this

50Ibid.,f.P: "Adsecundum
homoetsimiles
suntterdicitur,
animal,
quodillitermini
miniabsolti,
sivesintnomina
naturarum
sivesuppositi.
Necsequitur:
suppositum
significant,
suntconnotativi,
sedmodussignificandi
terminm
facitvel
igitur
quianonsignificatum,
absolutum
velconnotativum,
utpatetin logica.Undeilleterminus
homo,utestnomen
sednonsignificai
suppositi,
suppositum
significat,
suppositum,
quiaremnulliinnitentem
sednonsignificat
illamconnotando
remotionem
sedilleterminus
innitentie,
significai,
supconnotai
huiusmodi
remotionem
innitentie.
positum
Quareincauteloquividentur,
qui
dicunt
iliumterminm
estnomen
esseabsolutum,
est
homo,
nature,
et,quoniam
quoniam
nomen
esseconnotativum."
suppositi,
51Ibid.,f.P: "Quiailleterminus
homoproprie
cumconcaptusestnomen
suppositi,
cretive
etnonestnomen
nisicapiatur
locosuiabstracti
humannature,
significet
improprie
deumassumpsisse
conceditur
id esthumanitatem
seuhumanam
itas,qualiter
hominem,
nturm."

13:48:42 PM

254

PEKKAKRKKINEN

would mean thatmen consistonly of an infinitenumberof partialmen,

not of an infinitenumberof whole men.52
53
Trutfetter's
approach to the question in his Summain totam
physicen
differssignificantly
from that of Usingen's. Althoughhis textbookwas
seven
, he seems to follow
published
years later than Usingen'sExercitium
more closelyLutrea's solutionto the problem than that of his younger
does not use the distinction
betweenabstract
colleagueUsingen.Trutfetter
and concreteterms,but distinguishes
betweentheuses of theterms'human
being' and 'animal' as absolute and as connotativeterms.Furthermore,
it seems thatTrutfetter's
descriptionof thesetermsresemblesthe descriptionof what Marsiliuscalls names of heterogenoussubstances,whoseparts
are designatedon a different
basis fromthat used forthe whole.54He is
that
it is onlyas absolutetermsthattheseterms
quite conscious,however,
in the propersense.As absoluteterms,
to
the
of
substance
belong
category
'human being' and 'animal' are equivalentto such definitionsas 'substantia animata sensitiva'(animal) and 'animal rationale' or 'substantia
compositaex corporeet anima rationali'(man).As absoluteterms,'human
natures.55
When
being' and 'animal' are names fornaturesor theysignify
the termsare consideredas connotativeterms,theyconnote totalityor
negationof being-in-another;
theydo not belong to the categoryof subbut
to
the
of
stance,
category relation.In thismeaningtheysignifyindividuals. Trutfetter
thus comes to the same conclusionas Usingen: that
the differentiation
of meaningschooses a different
class of objects,but

52Ibid.,f.P: "Adsecundum
dicitur
concedendo
unumhominem
esseinfinitos
homines
sednontotales."
parciales
53Jodocus
Summa
intotam
hocestphilosophiam
naturalem
Trutfetter,
physicen:
conformiter
siqingimnasio
uidem
vere
: queestTheologia
Isennachcensis
elucrabata
sophie
perD. Judocum
Erphordensis
etedita
1514.Forthefollowing,
seealsoPekkaKrkkinen,
andIndividual
in
Nature
, Erfurt
Summa
intotam
imMittelalter?,
ed.J.A.Aertsen
, in:WasistPhilosophie
Jodocus
Trutfetter's
physicen
& A. Speer,Berlin1998,824-8.
54Trutfetter,
Summa
An
ex dictis
taleoriridubium.
, b.8, tr.1,f.Zv:"Soletpreterea
animalis
sitanimad.
Procuiusdecisione
advertendum
hosterquelibet
parsquantitativa
minos
ac similes
de genere
substantia
substantias
ex
homo,animal
importantes
compositas
diversarum
rationum
bifariam
partibus
usurpali."
55Ibid.,f.Zv:"Unomodoabsolute
utsuntinpredicamento
substantie.
Utanimal
idem
valeatquodhoccomplexum:
'substantia
animata
id est'animal
rationale'
sensitiva',
homo,
sive'substantia
ex corpore
et animarationali',
et suo modode aliis.Et sic
composita
dicuntur
communiter
nominanaturarum
sivenaturam
nomine
significantia.
Accipiendo
in anima,non
nature
esserealeet nondumtaxat
obiectivum
quamqueremhabentem
curando
an sittotalis
velpartialis,
velaccidentalis,
velalteri
substantial,
perse subsistens
innitens."

13:48:42 PM

ON THE SEMANTICS
OF 'HUMAN
BEING'AND'ANIMAL'

255

Trutfetter
does this only aftercharacterizingthe meaningssemantically
in a way that Usingen avoids.56
In his response,Trutfetter
gives,like Lindores,two answers:if 'human
being' and 'animal' are understoodabsolutely,the answeris affirmative;
if connotatively,
the answeris negative.57
In addition,because of inconhe
denies
what
venience, explicidy
Usingen had affirmed:that one can
say that human beings or animals consistof an infinitenumberof partial human beings or animals.58Both of them agreed that proper names
designateex impositione
only individuals,so one would not say that part
of Peteris Peter.59Usingennotesin his responsethatthe factthatproper
nouns signifyindividualsdoes not make them connotativeterms.They
signifyindividuals(supposita),but not as individuals(per modum suppositi),that is, connotatively.60
56Ibid.,f.Zv:"Aliomodoconnotative,
utconnotat
innitotalitatem
siveabnegationem
substantie
sedvenusad aliquidsiverelationis.
tentiae,
quomodoetiamnonsuntingenere
Etanimal
valetquantum
hoccomplexum:
'substantia
totalis
nulliinnitens
excorcomposita
nulliinnitens
totalis
ex corHomo,id est'substantia
poreet animasensitiva'.
composita
Et sicdicuntur
nomina
sivesignificantia
poreetanimarationali'.
suppositorum
supposita.
Atquo mododefiniri
debeatnomenhomo,utverificetur
de Christo
sivefilioin divinis,
in dialecticis
circadiffinitionem
denominativorum
necopusesthicrepetere."
ostendimus,
57Ibid.,f.Z2V:"Quibus
hicprenotatis
ad propositum
dubium,
respondetur
quodusurpatis
histerminis
etc.absolute,
utsintnomina
concedendum
estquamlibet
animai,
homo,
nature,
animalis
esseanimai,
etitahominis
etsicdealiis,
secus
autem
hominem,
partem
quantitativam
terminis
utsintnomina
utfacile
consideranti."
connotative,
sumptis
suppositorum,
patescet
58Ibid.,f. Z2V:"Necproinconvenienti
habendum
estunumhominem
totalem
esse
immoinfinitos
homines
et itade asino,equoetc.et proinde
habentem
plures
partiales,
unumequumtotalem
habereinfinitos
et sicde aliis."
partales,
59Ibid.,f.Z2V:"Nectamenconcedendum
PetriessePetrm,
et
est,quamlibet
partem
sicde aliis,quiapropria
nomina
suntex institutione
dumtaxat
nomina
et
suppositorum
et nonnaturarum
autpartium.
Ita quoquequ[u]messevirum,
essemulierem,
totorum,
essevidens,
essececumetc.dicant
etpassiones
ex usuloquenproprietates
suppositorum
verificabuntur
de partibus
et nominibus
naturarum
tium,
nequaquam
precise."
Usingen,
Exercitium
dicitur
Sortis
nonesseSortem,
cuiusratio
, f.P: "Adtertium
quamlibet
partem
suntsolumnomina
communia
autem
esse
est,quianomina
propria
suppositorum,
possunt
nomina
nature
etsuppositi
exbeneplacito
utentis.
Nemoenimimponit
hocnomen
Johannes
Petrus
velPaulusdigito
velbrachio
sedtotihomini
. . . Ad quartum
dicitur
risihominis,
bileesseproprium
ut homoestnomensuppositi
et non
totalis,
quartomodohominis
nature."
60Ibid.,f.P: "Adtertium
dicitur
nomina
hominum
utSortes
Petrus
etc.esse
propria
nomina
etesseterminos
siveconceptus
determinatus
sit
absolutos,
suppositorum
singularis
nobispossibilis
siveimpossibilis,
etquamvis
nontamen
illa
supposita
significent,
significant
id estconnotative,
sed individua
absolute,
permodumsuppositi,
quia significai
vaga
in logica."Forthe
connotative,
substantie,
significant
quiaillanonsuntproprie
utpatet
distinction
between
determinatus
andvagus
inearlier
Erfurtian
conceptus
singularis
metaphysics,
seeBos 1999,(aboven. 11),527.

13:48:42 PM

256

PEKKAKRKKINEN

7. Conclusion
Usingen's and Trutfetter's
responsesto the question of partial human
animals
show
and
that
theywere quite consciousof the different
beings
that
the
problems
questionposes forthe semanticsof thoseterms.Usingen
triesto avoid as much as possiblethe riskthat thesetermswould not be
suitable candidates as termsin the categoryof substance,and consequentlydenies theiruse as connotativeterms.Perhaps this is also why
he is willingto accept the ideas about an infinite
numberof partialhuman
uses the distinctionbetween
beings,which Trutfetter
rejects.Trutfetter
the absolute and connotativesenses of these termswithoutreservation,
whereas the distinctionbetween concreteand abstracttermswas essential forUsingen.
Unlike Buridan and Marsilius(thelatterin his Questions
on theSentences
),
did not findit problematicthat parts of
Lutrea, Usingen and Trutfetter
humansor animalscould be called humansor animals.Lutreaeven shows
the oppositeattitude,in affirming
thatpart of an animal
unconditionally
is simplyanimal. Also, like Lawrence of Lindores theygenerallytreated
the questionon a more formallevel.
Universityof Helsinki
Department
ofSystematic
Theology

13:48:42 PM

Reviews
intheMiddle
ModalSyllogistics
Henrik
Brill,Leiden,2000,261 pp. ISBN
Ages.
Lagerlund,
desMittelalters,
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
90 04 116265 (Studien
70)
thetwentieth
modallogicdeveloped
's criticism,
extraordinarily
during
DespiteQuine
in thehistory
ofmodal
wassoonaccompanied
Thisdevelopment
byan interest
century.
viewson modalandtheobvious
notions,
place,Aristode's
placetolookwas,in thefirst
untilthelast
ofmodallogicremained
practically
unexplored
history
ity.Butthemedieval
contribution
to this
workis an important
decadesofthecentury.
systematic
Lagerlund's
andreconstructs
itshistorical
on modalsyllogistic,
field.He concentrates
developrising
selected
areshown
tothelatemiddle
from
thefirst
commentators
ment
ages.Theauthors
andsomeofthemarestudied
for
ofthishistory,
toplaya keyrolein thedevelopment
examinaa historical
butalsoa critical
notonlyoffers
thefirst
time.Lagerlund
survey,
thedevelopment
ofmodalsyllogistic
The keyto understand
tionoftheviewspresented.
from
towards
Aristode's
is thegradual
theory:
strong
fidelity
original
changeofattitude
ofthewholesysto thereconstruction
to saveAristotle's
andad hocattempts
paradigm,
newfundamentals.
temfrom
and
an oudineofAristode's
assertorie
one ("Introduction",
pp. 1-18)offers
Chapter
tointerpret
themodal
theproblems
facedbyanyattempt
modalsyllogistic,
andpresents
ifonechoosesan interpretation
thatsavesall (andonly)
usedbyAristode:
propositions
of
rulesarenotvalid.Thedevelopment
validmoods,
thentheconversion
theAristotelian
as thehistory
ofeither
theattempts
thetheory
themiddle
agesis thuspresented
during
or
hismainresults,
a consistent
ofAristode
without
ofgiving
abandoning
interpretation
in theAristotelian
to avoidinconsistency.
thechanges
introduced
system
thesystems
ofRobert
two("Thefirst
commentators",
pp. 19-57)examines
Chapter
ofRogerBacon
andAlbert
theGreat,andtheviewson modalpropositions
Kilwardby
moreattention:
it is thefirst
The workofKilwardby
receives
andLambert
ofAuxerre.
as a coherent
which
theAristotelian
toreconstruct
system,
syllogistic
sophisticated
attempt
influence
andexerted
considerable
becamethestandard
up to theendof
interpretation
in
ofthePrior
Thecoreofthisinterpretation
is a reading
thethirteenth
Analytics
century.
ofthePosterior
thelightofthetheory
ofscience
Analytics
(justthesameideaas theone
in 1964).Thus,theapparent
to therulesestabcounter-examples
proposed
byRescher
and
ofessences
lishedbyAristode
aredissolved
theory
byan appealto theAristotelian
The
between
substantial
andaccidental
terms.
essential
andtothedistinction
predication,
ofthesestrategies,
conto theauthor,
is thead hoccharacter
merely
problem,
according
ofthecombinations
allowedin orderto obtaina validsyllogism.
ofa restriction
sisting
and
between
thethirteenth-century
views
Thechapter
endswithan interesting
comparison
somemodern
Patterson,
(vanRijen,Nortmann,
Thom),thatreconstruct
interpretations
an essentialist
modalsyllogistic
as arising
from
Aristode's
ontology.
in the
another
three("Richard
ofCampsall",
keyfigure
pp. 58-90)presents
Chapter
maincontribution
is thesystematic
useofthe
ofmodalsyllogistic.
development
Campsall's
anddivided
modalpropositions,
thatreplaces
theimplicit
distinction
between
composite
in thethirteenth
thatAristode
intended
themodalsyllogiscommon
century,
assumption,
modalpropositions.
alsoobserves
thatCampsall's
to
ticfordivided
attempts
Lagerlund
frominconsistency
theclassofpropositions
saveAristode
restricting
(again"artificially"
invalidsyllogisms)
in a separation
allowed
result
ofmodallogicfrom
natural
philosophy:
arrives
at a notion
ofcontingency
as allowing
forsimultaneous
alternatives
(thus
Campsall
tosomeextent,
thebasicAristotelian
ofthenecessity
ofthepresent).
abandoning,
principle
Thisfactsituates
to modallogic(theonedevelCampsall
verynearofa newapproach
andmodal
remains
Nevertheless,
possibility
ontologically
dependent
opedbyDunsScotus).
an extensional
receives
syllogistic
interpretation.
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,2

13:48:51 PM

258

REVIEWS

a completely
newattitude,
ofOckham",
four("William
pp. 91-129)presents
Chapter
onindependent
torebuild
modalsyllogistic
Aristotle
andtrying
toabandon
grounds.
willing
ofpossibility,
not
is an intensional
Ockham's
one,basedon a newnotion
interpretation
forwhichexistence
is not
on existential
(a thingis possible
presuppositions
dependent
hestates
thetruth
ofmodalsyllogistic:
Ockham
starts
thesystmatisation
first,
repugnant).
heconstructs
themodal
anddivided
modalpropositions;
forcomposite
conditions
second,
as a partofhistheory
ofconsequences;
modalpropositions
forcomposite
third,
syllogistic
modal
to construct
themodalsyllogistic
fordivided
ofampliation
he appliesthenotion
thesystmatisation
is notcomplete:
Nevertheless,
only
necessity
propositions
propositions.
in theconversion
rules
ofa reduction
withtheconsequence
admita restrictive
reading,
in Ockham's
andhencein thevalidmoodsadmitted
system.
is achieved
towhich
is devoted
Thefullsystmatisation
ofmodalsyllogistic
byBuridan,
after
a brief
note
ofmodalsyllogistics",
five("Thesystmatisation
pp. 130-164),
chapter
Drukken
ofDacia,showing
theevoGiraldus
OdonisandNicholas
on Radulphus
Brito,
influenced
from
theloyalty
to Kilwardby
to a newtrend
lution
oftheParisian
tradition,
madebyBuridan
tothesystmatisation
ofmodalsylThemaincontribution
byOckham.
basedon a uniform
readmodalpropositions,
ofdivided
is hissimplified
analysis
logistic
He thencanoffer
thesubject
term
modalpropositions
(with
ampliated).
ingofalldivided
inhisfamous
which
becomes
the
ofopposition
a careful
oftherelations
octagon,
analysis
middle
canalsotreatthe
fortheentire
thatwillsurvive
basisofa system
ages.Buridan
ifa syllogism
should
be
ofconsequences:
as a specialcaseofhistheory
wholesyllogistic
middle
so that
to
the
form
of
the
it
is
a formal
term,
important
preserve
consequence,
deomni
anddenullo
therulesofclassinclusion
) canapply.In thelastpagesofthe
{dictum
intomodallogic",
innovations
toa "deeper
Buridan's
connects
insight
chapter,
Lagerlund
worldsemantics.
havecompared
to a kindofpossible
whichHughesandKnuuttila
is uncerhasa critical
tone.Lagerlund
six("ThePseudo-Scotus",
pp. 165-183)
Chapter
in thedevelopment
ofmodalsyllogistic:
as
tainabouttheroleplayedbyPseudo-Scotus
but
ofhisQuaestiones
is opento doubt,
in thischapter,
notonlytheoriginality
is argued
should
be reconsidered.
as a goodlogician
alsoPseudo-Scotus'
reputation
thetheories
ofAlbert
of
examines
seven("Buridan's
students",
pp. 184-201)
Chapter
their
of
which
follow
his
master
and
Marsilius
and,
very
closely
through
Inghen,
Saxony
to makeBuridan's
in thelatter
halfofthefourteenth
contributed
influence
syscentury,
view".
the"received
ofmodalsyllogistic
tmatisation
focuses
in thelatemiddle
The eighth
ages",pp. 202-227)
("Modalsyllogistics
chapter
as represenchooses
fourauthors
on thesecondhalfofthefifteenth
century.
Lagerlund
theErfurt
theolotheParisNominalist
ofthiscomplex
tative
GeorgeofBrussels,
period:
and finally
theThomist
thePolishlogician
Trutfetter,
Johnof Glogow,
gianJodocus
wrote
commentaries
de Monte.Threeofthem(George,
Lambertus
JohnandLambertus)
unlike
thana systematic
interest.
rather
witha historical
on thePrior
Lambertus,
Analytics
interandstillintends
togivea coherent
's tradition
follows
Kilwardby
GeorgeandJohn,
on theother
toAristotle's
hand,dealswithmodalsyllogistic
Trutfetter,
system.
pretation
traces
ofindependent
Buridan's
ina systematic
thought).
(notwithout
system
way,adopting
the
thatsummarises
The lastchapter
is a briefand clearConclusion
(pp. 228-232)
ofthe
thecontributions
in themiddle
ofmodalsyllogistics
ages,highlighting
development
thelistof
A useful
in thishistory.
setofAppendices
follow,
containing
keyparticipants
validmoodsaccepted
(V), PseudoI), Ockham(II-IV),Buridan
(Appendix
byAristotle
ofcenandAlbert
Scotus
(VIII),as wellas an outline
(VII),andTrutfetter
(VI),Marsilius
Buridanian
thatincludes
theimpressive
in modalsyllogistic
tralconcepts
octagonof
an ampleandupdated
as expected,
Bibliography
(IX).Thebookalsoincludes,
opposition
suchas thetablesofvalidmoodsthatallowa quickcomandan Index.Somedetails,
the
sometechnical
thefigures
thatillustrate
between
different
divisions,
systems,
parison
eachauthor
studnotesthatintroduce
listofabbreviations
used,andthebrief
biographical
concern
aboutthereader.
andshowLagerlund's
ied,areveryhelpful

13:48:51 PM

REVIEWS

259

to thehistory
ofmedieval
In sum,thisbookis a significant
contribution
logicin genin particular,
to the
modalsyllogistics
basedon a careful
attention
eral,andofmedieval
inprinted
someofwhich
arenotavailable
oftheoriginal
sources
texts,
(relevant
fragments
in thefootnotes).
Thecomplexity
ofmodaltheories
andthenumber
of
areoffered
form,
ofideasand
makethebookrather
different
works
studied
dense,buttheauthor's
clarity
forthisdifficulty.
is against
theopportune
Myonlyobjection
recapitulations
compensate
I understand
intoEnglish:
thatmedieval
thedecision
totranslate
Latinexamples
logicwas
in Latin,andtranslamanifested
as a deviceforanalysing
thelogicalstructures
intended
nuances
anddistinctions
"necessarium
tionsruntheriskofhiding
(suchas theonebetween
" and"
haveplayed
a roleintheoriginal
Latin.Thisminor
estesse
est")thatmight
necessarily
from
achievement:
he has
(and,I know,
arguable)
pointshouldnotdetract
Lagerlund's
ofmedieval
modalsyllogistic,
account
oftherichhistory
thefirst
systematic
completed
research.
thatwillcertainly
be thestarting
pointoffurther
a possible
lineofreflection,
thatI
To conclude,
letmesuggest
byposinga question
oftheattempts
findstimulating.
Is thehistory
ofmedieval
modalsyllogistic
justa history
a coherent
ofmodalsylloto solvea technical
(theoneofconstructing
"system
problem
intheverynotion
ofa "modalsyllogistic"?
oris itrather
theprocess
ofa change
gistic"),
A "modalsyllogistic"
either
as an extension
ofthesystem
ofassercouldbe understood
thisseems
toriesyllogistic
(toinclude
syllogisms
involving
modally
qualified
propositions:
or as theresult
ofa modalapproach
to theassertorie
to be Lagerlund's
interpretation)
themodality
oftheconclusion,
forsomegiven
(inorderto determine
syllogistic
system
modalities
ofthepremises:
thisis Rescher's
Fromthisperspective,
interpretation).
maybe
"adhocstrategies"
be re-evaluated:
to
should
theycanbe readnotas seeking
Kilwardby's
ofa system
ofmodalsyllogistic,
butas trying
to understand
what
savetheconsistency
in a modalapproach
or "contingent"
Aristode
intended
to syllogistic.
by"necessary"
Pamplona

PalomaPrez-Ilzarbe

StenEbbesen
L. Friedman
inLanguage
andCognition
. Acts
& Russell
(eds),Medieval
Analyses
TheCopenhagen
School
ofthesymposium
, January
10-13,1996,
ofMedieval
Philosophy
ofSciences
andLetters
andTheInstitute
byTheRoyalDanishAcademy
organized
forGreekandLatin,University
ofCopenhagen.
C.A. Reitzels
Forlag,
Copenhagen
1999Historisk-filosofiske
Meddelelszet
77),563pp. ISBN87 78761484
Itisa longtimeagothatalmost
andtheologians
oftheHochscholastik
onlythephilosophers
weregivenserious
attention
ofMedieval
whereas
other
thinkers
bythehistorians
thought,
wereall toooften
dealtwithin thecontext
ofothers,
whowereconsidered
thereally
ones.From,
the1930'sonwards,
other
thinkers
cameto
important
say,roughly
speaking,
drawthehistorians's
whether
or notin theperspective
of theirfamous
colattention,
of (presumably)
minorrepreleagues.Fromaboutthe1950's,manya thorough
study
sentatives
oftheperiod
hasrevealed
thatthey,
toodeserve
sincere
attention
bythemselves.
Someofthem,
thoseactiveafter
theperiodoftheHochscholastik
, areworthy
particularly
ofstudy
becauseof theirsignificance
forthedevelopment
in
ofphilosophical
thought
general.
Thepresent
volume
to thepresent-day
testifies
stateofthestudy
of
clearly
flourishing
thissector
oftheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddleAges.The twenty-five
aregivena
articles
fourfold
classifi-cation.
Part1 dealswithmodistic
aboutlogicandgrammar,
includtheory
ofsophismata
andconsequentiae.
Part2 focuses
on thetwelfth
ingthelogical
genres
century,
andinparticular
ontheinterplay
between
Part3 dealswiththedevellogicandtheology.
ofthetheories
ofcognition,
witha specialattention
opment
givento theloreofthesocalledintentiones.
The finalpartcontains
discussions
aboutthe14thcentury
philosopher
Eachcontribution
is preceded
JohnBuridan.
bya useful
summary.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2004
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl

Vivarium
42,2

13:48:51 PM

REVIEWS

259

to thehistory
ofmedieval
In sum,thisbookis a significant
contribution
logicin genin particular,
to the
modalsyllogistics
basedon a careful
attention
eral,andofmedieval
inprinted
someofwhich
arenotavailable
oftheoriginal
sources
texts,
(relevant
fragments
in thefootnotes).
Thecomplexity
ofmodaltheories
andthenumber
of
areoffered
form,
ofideasand
makethebookrather
different
works
studied
dense,buttheauthor's
clarity
forthisdifficulty.
is against
theopportune
Myonlyobjection
recapitulations
compensate
I understand
intoEnglish:
thatmedieval
thedecision
totranslate
Latinexamples
logicwas
in Latin,andtranslamanifested
as a deviceforanalysing
thelogicalstructures
intended
nuances
anddistinctions
"necessarium
tionsruntheriskofhiding
(suchas theonebetween
" and"
haveplayed
a roleintheoriginal
Latin.Thisminor
estesse
est")thatmight
necessarily
from
achievement:
he has
(and,I know,
arguable)
pointshouldnotdetract
Lagerlund's
ofmedieval
modalsyllogistic,
account
oftherichhistory
thefirst
systematic
completed
research.
thatwillcertainly
be thestarting
pointoffurther
a possible
lineofreflection,
thatI
To conclude,
letmesuggest
byposinga question
oftheattempts
findstimulating.
Is thehistory
ofmedieval
modalsyllogistic
justa history
a coherent
ofmodalsylloto solvea technical
(theoneofconstructing
"system
problem
intheverynotion
ofa "modalsyllogistic"?
oris itrather
theprocess
ofa change
gistic"),
A "modalsyllogistic"
either
as an extension
ofthesystem
ofassercouldbe understood
thisseems
toriesyllogistic
(toinclude
syllogisms
involving
modally
qualified
propositions:
or as theresult
ofa modalapproach
to theassertorie
to be Lagerlund's
interpretation)
themodality
oftheconclusion,
forsomegiven
(inorderto determine
syllogistic
system
modalities
ofthepremises:
thisis Rescher's
Fromthisperspective,
interpretation).
maybe
"adhocstrategies"
be re-evaluated:
to
should
theycanbe readnotas seeking
Kilwardby's
ofa system
ofmodalsyllogistic,
butas trying
to understand
what
savetheconsistency
in a modalapproach
or "contingent"
Aristode
intended
to syllogistic.
by"necessary"
Pamplona

PalomaPrez-Ilzarbe

StenEbbesen
L. Friedman
inLanguage
andCognition
. Acts
& Russell
(eds),Medieval
Analyses
TheCopenhagen
School
ofthesymposium
, January
10-13,1996,
ofMedieval
Philosophy
ofSciences
andLetters
andTheInstitute
byTheRoyalDanishAcademy
organized
forGreekandLatin,University
ofCopenhagen.
C.A. Reitzels
Forlag,
Copenhagen
1999Historisk-filosofiske
Meddelelszet
77),563pp. ISBN87 78761484
Itisa longtimeagothatalmost
andtheologians
oftheHochscholastik
onlythephilosophers
weregivenserious
attention
ofMedieval
whereas
other
thinkers
bythehistorians
thought,
wereall toooften
dealtwithin thecontext
ofothers,
whowereconsidered
thereally
ones.From,
the1930'sonwards,
other
thinkers
cameto
important
say,roughly
speaking,
drawthehistorians's
whether
or notin theperspective
of theirfamous
colattention,
of (presumably)
minorrepreleagues.Fromaboutthe1950's,manya thorough
study
sentatives
oftheperiod
hasrevealed
thatthey,
toodeserve
sincere
attention
bythemselves.
Someofthem,
thoseactiveafter
theperiodoftheHochscholastik
, areworthy
particularly
ofstudy
becauseof theirsignificance
forthedevelopment
in
ofphilosophical
thought
general.
Thepresent
volume
to thepresent-day
testifies
stateofthestudy
of
clearly
flourishing
thissector
oftheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddleAges.The twenty-five
aregivena
articles
fourfold
classifi-cation.
Part1 dealswithmodistic
aboutlogicandgrammar,
includtheory
ofsophismata
andconsequentiae.
Part2 focuses
on thetwelfth
ingthelogical
genres
century,
andinparticular
ontheinterplay
between
Part3 dealswiththedevellogicandtheology.
ofthetheories
ofcognition,
witha specialattention
opment
givento theloreofthesocalledintentiones.
The finalpartcontains
discussions
aboutthe14thcentury
philosopher
Eachcontribution
is preceded
JohnBuridan.
bya useful
summary.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2004
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl

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The first
Part(17-161)
hassixcontributions.
In a painstaking
C.H. Kneepkens
study
clarifies
doctrinal
aroundthesemantic
ofsignificati
and
developments
concepts
generalis
inthefirst
halfofthe13thcentury.
IrneRosier-Catach
takesup topresignificatio
specialis
senta 'modular'
ofthedifferent
13thcent,doctrinal
basic
analysis
positions
concerning
issuesin thedomains
oflogicandgrammar,
andarrives
at interesting
newconclusions
aboutthecoherence
between
theepistemological,
thesemiological,
thephilosophical,
the
andthe'intentionalis
modules.
Costantino
Marmoilluminates
a distinctive
grammatical,
markofthemodistic
to logicwhichconsists
in itsfocusing
on significatio
as the
approach
essence
oflinguistic
Robert
Andrews
discusses
thereception
ofmodism
signs.
conclusively
in England,
in theperspective
of thepositions
at issueheldby Simonof Faversham,
Andrew
ofCornwal,
andtheyoung
In a thorough,
DunsScotus.
all-round
paperH.A.G.
Braakhuis
draws
ourattention
toa sophisma
difficult
(i.e.a semantically
sentence)
concerning
themetaphysical
thesis
oftheconvertibility
ofBeingandOne.PaoloFait,finally,
shows
howfragments
ofAristotle's
modalsyllogistic
influenced
the14th
cent,
ofconsequences.
theory
The secondPart(165-313)
consists
ofsevencontributions.
a useful
ofthe
First,
survey
various
on thedivision
ofphilosophy
from
the9thto themid12thcenturies
opinions
by
Iwakuma
Yukio.The nextpaperbyKarinMargareta
offers
a short
discussion
Fredborg
oftheinfluential
12thcent,grammatical
text"Promisimus",
ofwhichshe
(stillunedited)
is preparing
a partial[whypartial?,
de.] edition.
LuisaValente
a veryinforpresents
mative
in 12thcent,theology,
andin a paper
paperabouttheuseoftheloreoffallaciae
on philosophy
andtheology
in 12thcent,trinitarian
SimoKnuuttila
makesa
discussions,
attention
to thenon-philosophical
determinants
of
convincing
pleaforpaying
cognitive
showshowaround1180 twoscholars
made
philosophical
arguments.
LaugeOlafNielsen
an interesting
touphold
PeterLombard's
abouttheIncarnation
attempt
(censured)
theory
current
andlogicaltools.Riccardo
byemploying
conceptual
grammatical
Quinto's
paper
contains
a comparatistic
a theological
viz.thedoctrine
ofthefear
issue,
study
concerning
ofGodas found
inStephen
andHughofSt.-Cher.
In a sociological
contribution,
Langton
LarsBojeMortensen
draws
ourattention
totheinteresting
factthatinthelate12thcent,
in northernandeasternmost
wasa
philosophical
learning
Latinity,
philosophical
learning
ofnobility
andan intellectual
meansofenhancing
an already
established
social
privilege
rather
thana necessary
forentering
offices.
dominance,
qualification
highecclesiastical
Partthree
is devoted
to theutmost
influential
semantic
annex
(317-470)
epistemological
theme
of'intentions',
which
andphiloplayeda keyrolein many14thcent,theological
discussions.
a finestudy
wrote
of'seeing
andsaying'
inSt.Augustine's
sophical
MarySirridge
De Trinitate
XV. Katherine
H. Tachau,theauthor
ofa standard
workon thebackground
andtheimpact
ofthe13-14thcent,discussions
on intentionality,
throws
further
lighton
thevariety
ofmeanings
theterms
'intentio'
and'esseintentionale'
('intentional
being'rather
than'intentional
hadin theMiddleAges.Alainde Liberapresents
us witha
existence')
momentous
ofthemutual
between
theMedieval
viewsofparonymy
study
relationships
andthoseofintentionality,
on account
ofthefamous
oftheuniverparticularly
problem
so tospeak,
ofthisproblem
from
sal,as wellas ofthecounterpart,
area,inwhich,
Roger
Bacononwards,
thenotion
ofconnotation
is goingtocompete
withthatofparonymy.
In
thesamefield
of13-14thcent,theory
ofcognition
is thecontribution
byEleonore
Stump,
whothoroughly
examines
theroleplayedbytheintensional
ofsensible
reception
species
in ThomasAquinas's
account
ofsensorial
Sheconvincingly
thatsensorcognition.
argues
ialcognition
differs
from
inthatperception
a recognition
includes
oftheobject
perception
ofsensation,
andso requires
a first
actoftheintellect
is
bywhichtheobject's
quiddity
Another
theme
is addressed
apprehended.
aspectoftheintentionality
byClaudePanaccio.
He goesintotheinteresting
difference
between
'innerspeech'(sermo
pseudo-Kilwardby's
- theformer
inmente)
andOckham's
oratio
mentalis
notion
on themental
bearing
represen- , andhe provides
tation
oflinguistic
rather
thanthatofobjects
a historical
expressions,
forthetheory
ofthesermo
inmente
itsplaceandsignificance
in the
, byshowing
setting
doctrines
aboutmental
In a thoroughgoing,
arrayofmedieval
language.
comprehensive

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261

L. Friedman
Russell
theinsandoutsof'substantial
nomination'
paper,
investigates
(rather
than'essential
a labelthatcouldconcealthatprimarily
semantic
predication',
conceptualization
andapprehension,
rather
thansyntactical
areatstake)
inPeter
Auriol's
predication
viewofintentionality.
Theauthor's
thisproblem
areaagainst
thebackground
both
putting
ofhowPeterthinks
thatextra-mental
relateto theuniversal
ourminds
objects
concepts
form
ofthem,
andofhisviewoffirst
intentions
moregenerally
seemsquitetothepoint.
a painstaking
as wellas a doctrinal
ofa quasi-anonyThrough
philological
investigation
mousquestion
ofa magister
G. on theproperlocus
ofintentions,
Roberto
Lambertini
unfolds
an interesting
ofBolognese
modistic
aboutintentionality,
inwhich
picture
teaching
Hervaeus
Natalis's
notion
ofobjective
andtheprocedure
ofintellectual
beingis rejected,
is uniquely
an interaction
considered
of extramental
entities
and accidental
cognition
modifications
whichhavetheintellect
as their
substrate.
Alessandro
Conticoncludes
this
Partwithhisenlightening
intheLateMiddleAges,moreprepaperonsecondintentions
thesecondhalfofthe14thandthebeginning
ofthe15thcent.,
whathe
cisely,
including
callsthe'Oxford
Robert
William
realists',
Johannes
Alyngton,
Sharpe,
Pengybull,
Roger
andtheItalianPaulofVeniceOESA (whospentat leastthree
JohnTarteys,
Whelpdale,
attheAugustinin
studium
inOxford).
Before
ontothefinal
Partofthisvulume
years
going
I wouldliketo makethegeneral
notto render
essein thelabelsesseobiectivum
suggestion
andesseintentionale
but'being',
becausein thiscontext
theverbsignifies
a kind
'existence',
ofbeing[modus
essendi
thanexistence,
denotes
a
), rather
justlikeessesubiectivum
primarily
viz.beingdependent
thatat the
wayofbeing,
upona subject-substrate
(viz.themind);
sametimethissubstrate
affords
existence
tothiskindofbeing,
like,say,a pieceofwood
doestowhiteness
or blackness,
is ofsecondary
concern.
Part4 (473-549)
concludes
thisvolumewithfourstudies
onJohnBuridan
and the
Buridanian
tradition.
therelationships
between
GuylaKlimawrotea paperto explore
Buridan's
ofmodes.He takeson tounderscore
hisviewthatboth
logicandtheontology
nominalists
andrealist
thinkers
ofthelateperiodwereableto achievea similar
degree
ofontological
reduction
intheir
andso itwasnotso much
respective
logicalframeworks,
theirontologies
as theirdifferent
thatsetthemapart.Christoph
Fliieler's
logicaltactics
on Buridan's
in ordertofindnew
veryinformative
paperfocuses
commentaries,
reported
evidence
theprocess
from
orallecture
to written
E.P. Bos deals
regarding
commentary.
withtheDanishphilosopher
ThuoofViborg
of
(d. 1472),whoin thewakeofMarsilius
thenature
ofsingularity
andourknowledge
ofsingulars.
Inghen
(d. 1396),investigated
Hispapercontains
notonlya clearexposition
ofthematter
butalsopresents
uswiththe
basictexts(ofThuoandMarsilius)
in twoAppendices
. (Thismakesthereviewer
wonder
didnotaddan edition
of Vat.Lat.6768,ff.201ra-202ra
ofthefocal
whyDr. Lambertini
"Utrum
intentiones
sintsubiective
inintellectu
velin rebus").
Thevolume
winds
question
Green-Pedersen
on Nicholas
Drukken
de
up witha smallcontribution
byNielsJorgen
Dacia'sintellectual
activities
in Parisaround1340,particularly
hiscommentary
on Prior
contains
valuable
information
aboutthecontemporaneous
doctrinal
debate
, which
Analytics
several
concerning
logicaltopics.
The Opening
Address
on The Copenhagen
SchoolofMedieval
Philosophy
bySten
Ebbesen
takestheplaceofprideat theheadofthisimportant
volume.
(7-13)rightly
Maastricht

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andKabbalah
intheThirteenth
J.Hames,TheArtofConversion:
Brill,
Harvey
Christianity
Century.
Leiden-Boston-Kln
2000(The Medieval
Mediterranean:
Economies
and
Peoples,
vol.26),332pp. ISBN90 04 117156.
Cultures,
400-1453,
Theworks
ofRamonLlullhavereceived
extensive
attention
in recent
notonly
years,
their
andinterpretation
butalsoregarding
their
sources
andcontexts.
regarding
meaning
ThebookbyHarvey
Hamesexamines
oneofthesecontexts,
atfirst
minor
glancea rather
thepossible
influence
ofKabbalah.
The issuehasbeentouched
one,namely
uponbya
fewscholars
andwasfirst
raised
inthefifteenth
PicodellaMirandola
century
byGiovanni
thatLlull'scombinatory
artresembles
Abulafia's
who,in oneofhisConclusiones
, suggested
ecstatic
Kabbalah.
The systems,
aretoodistinct
to argueforanykindofsubhowever,
stantial
influence
andanyresearch
on a text-immanent
ofLlullandhis
focusing
reading
sources
willbe boundto conclude
thatKabbalahplaysno significant
rolein his
possible
works
andthathisArtis a creative
butsingular
inmedieval
intellectual
anomaly
history.
Hameschallenges
theseconclusions
thatLlullcanonlybe properly
understood
byarguing
in thecontext
oftheCrownofAragon
ofphilosophical
bywhichhe meanstheclimate
andtheological
thatheatedtheminds
ofscholars
in thewestern
Mediterranean,
polemic
moreinparticular
theProvence
andCatalonia.
Hames'sexposition
ofthisintellectual
climateis extremely
foranyone
in thirteenth-century
interested
intellectual
hisenlightening
thevarious
intellectual
andbeliefs
as separate
torysincehe doesnotpresent
positions
buthasa keeneyefortheir
in terms
ofa dynamic
of
entities,
interrelationships
process
action
andreaction.
Llullthenbecomes
thedynamUnderstanding
primarily
understanding
icsofthereligious
andphilosophical
controversies
ofhisage.
Thesingle
mostimportant
intellectual
eventto settheminds
ofthethirteenth
century
ablazewas theAristotle
whichinitiated
a strong
rationalist
in the
tradition
reception
monotheistic
faiths
oftheMediterranean
withAverroism
a naturalistic
(orrather
reading
ofAverroes)
as itsfountainhead,
butwitha moremoderate
rationalist
as the
theology
mainstream
in whichAquinasandMaimonides
wereexemplary
in Christendom
figures
andJudaism
Christian
andJewish
tothisrationalism,
reactions
andespecially
respectively.
to theextreme
ofAristotelianism,
forms
werestrikingly
similar.
On theonehand,there
wereprohibitions.
The condemnations
ofAristotelian
doctrines
at ParisandOxford
and
thepolemic
Averroist
are somehow
heresies
in theMaimonidean
reflected
conagainst
andthe1305ban ofphilosophy
inJewish
On theotherhand,there
troversy
quarters.
weretheological
reorientations
andinnovations
andevennewmovements.
In theChristian
in Neoplatonic
there
wasa renewed
interest
modesofthought
and
world,
(Bonaventure)
newspiritual
someofwhichevenvoicedsocialprotest
trends,
Franciscans,
(Spiritual
In theJewish
there
wasthesudden
riseofKabbalah,
the
world,
Joachimites,
Catharism).
exoteric
ofwhich
doctrines
werepopularised
forthefirst
timeon a grandscale.
TherapidspreadofKabbalahin thethirteenth
served
a number
ofpurposes.
century
As an alternative
to Maimonidean
it reacted
to thedangers
ofphilosophical
rationalism,
theallegorical
ofScripture,
It
and,in itswake,apostasy.
speculation,
especially
exegesis
alsosought
to givenewvitality
andcontent
toJewish
life.Olderscholarship
(Scholem)
tended
tolookuponKabbalah
as exclusively
butHamesconvincingly
that
esoteric,
argues
thepeculiarly
innovative
character
ofthirteenth-century
Kabbalahwasthatformerly
esotericdoctrines
wereintroduced
intomainstream
Abraham
Abulafia
madean
Judaism.
to whichHamesoccasionally
distinction
refers:
exoteric
Kabbalahis thedocimportant
trineofthetensefirot,
esoteric
Kabbalahis thedoctrine
ofthe22 letters
outofwhich
thedivine
sealsandnamesarecomposed.
Asan exoteric
Kabbalah
the
theosophy,
taught
immanent
of God through
thesefirot
and stressed
thatperforming
thecompresence
mandments
hasa theurgical
on theGodhead.
effect
The popularity
andimportance
of
thesedoctrines
is attested
to byan authority
likeNachmanides
whowasmorethanwillthedoctrines
ofKabbalistic
on thenature
ofdivinity,
butwho
ingtoexpound
theosophy
wasquitereticent
thetheurgical
ofKabbalahbywhichhe meantthe
regarding
aspects
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

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263

likeSolomon
ibn
andothers,
ForNachmanides
ofletters.
andcombination
manipulation
and proximity
of God,the
theimmanence
Kabbalahcouldteachthebelievers
Adret,
andthusservetheneedsofthecommunity.
ofperforming
thecommandments,
efficacy
Kabbalahopenedthewayto an individual
whooptedforthealternative,
ForAbulafia,
hisArtwastheconversion
IfLlull,whosemainaimindesigning
andecstatic
experience.
itwould
ofKabbalah
hadknowledge
ofJewsandMuslims,
contacts,
through
interreligious
havebeenKabbalahoftheexoteric
type.
basedoncorIn thefirst
ofhisbook,Hamesgivesan engaging
reconstruction,
chapter
ofKabbalahin reaction
to
oftheemergence
rabbisandscholars,
between
respondences
Around1200,Maimonides
in thecontext
oftheMaimonidean
rationalism
controversy.
himas a
whohadacknowledged
theProvence)
ofmanyrabbis
(from
gainedthesupport
rabbisfrom
ofthestilldistrustful
Withtheexception
oforthodoxy.
rationalist
defender
wouldseemto haveabated,butin the1230sthis
ofFrance,
thecontroversy
thenorth
roseto challenge
whena newthought
(Kabbalistic
theosophy)
system
radically
changed
andtreatises
ofmanyimporcitesfrom
letters
Hamescarefully
Maimonidean
rationalism.
Kabbalahcameintobeing.IsaactheBlind
ofthetimetoshowhowexoteric
tantfigures
of
aboutthepopularisation
wroteto Nachmanides
master)
complaining
(a Kabbalistic
EzraandAzrielwhomadepublic
in partbrought
aboutbyhisownstudents
Kabbalah,
tokeepsecret.
wouldhavepreferred
material
thathe himself
thetraditional
theosophical
worMeirbenSimonofNarbonne
oftheKabbalah,
Anopponent
ofthenon-rationalism
of
andHiscreation.
AsherbenDavid,a nephew
oftheCreator
riedaboutitsconfusion
and
willonlyleadtomisunderstanding
affirmed
thatsuchpopularisation
IsaactheBlind,
tokeeptheKabbalistic
whowouldalsohavepreferred
IsaacibnLatif,
misrepresentation.
thespiritual
wellas a given
factsinceitserved
their
doctrines
concealed,
spread
accepted
a combination
ofKabbalahandphilosophy.
proposed
beingofthepeople;he therefore
thissuddenspreadof
Hamesdemonstrates
theexcitement
Withmanyotherexamples
also
nexttoa Kabbalist,
communities.
secret
doctrines
causedintheJewish
Nachmanides,
causedthecontroversy
todiedownanddecreed
an important
Halachicauthority,
finally
likeSolomon
Kaballah.Bythetimethata scholar
ofexoteric,
thelegitimacy
theosophic
couldserveas a basisforthestudyofphilosophy,
ibnAdretarguedthatthesefirot
Ibn Adretremained
wasgenerally
as an authority.
Maimonides
Nevertheless,
accepted
of
forallegorical
aboutradicalphilosophy's
interpretation
preference
quiteapprehensive
leadersof
to a ban imposed
and hencehe lenthissupport
by thereligious
Scripture
ofphilosophy
booksbythosebelowthe
in 1305on thepossession
andstudy
Barcelona
ofBziers)
A defender
ofphilosophy
atthetime(YedaiahbenAbraham
ageoftwenty-five.
attract
overKabbalahandphilosophy
hisfearthattheongoing
might
dispute
expressed
Hamessuggests,
showtheextent
andimportance
ofChristians.
Suchfears,
theattention
ofthedispute,
towhichLlullmaywellhavehadaccess.
theJewswhichon thebasisof
towards
The secondchapter
dealswithLlull'sattitude
Hamesgives
in hiswritings
hasgenerally
beenlookeduponas negative.
several
passages
a pragmaassessment
andconcludes
thatLlullwasessentially
an extensive
andbalanced
More
and opinions
to theaudiences
forwhichhe wrote.
hisjudgements
tistadjusting
he didnotshrink
backfrom
wasconversion,
sincehismainpurpose
engagimportantly,
ofChristianity
andrealized
theneedto provethetruths
belief
system
ingin theother's
In certain
he stresses
that
rather
thanbyauthority.
Jewsshould
study
passages,
byreason
insucha waythatthey
schooled
canunderLatinandtheLiberal
Artstobe intellectually
circles.
thatLlullmovedin anti-philosophical
standhisArt.Fromthisitis evident
Jewish
themendicant
in thesynagogues
theJewsto respond
He preached
(which
encouraging
- wouldnotallow).
- whoalsohadpreaching
forthesynagogues
licenses
Though
preachers
Llull'sactualcontacts
with
Hamesmakesit clearthathe had
unrecorded,
Jewsremain
easyaccessto Kabbalistic
theosophy.
In thethird
to pinpoint
Hamesmakesan extensive
as wellas braveattempt
chapter,
in themeticulousness
bothexciting
Kabbalistic
tracesin Llull'sworks.
Thisis an effort

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in theabsence
andingenuity
ofthequestandsomewhat
ofclearandcondiscouraging
similarities.
references
to Kabbalahseemto be absent;
between
vincing
Explicit
parallels
LullianandKabbalistic
areoften
toovagueor incomplete
towarrant
an undeconcepts
niableinfluence.
Hamesis wellawareoftheseinsufficiencies,
butargues
thatLlulPsfragofknowledge
from
Kabbalistic
sources
is a consequence
ofhisart,
mentary
Jewish
display
andthatbytaking
forgranted,
thisfragmentary
nature
it should
stillbe possible
to find
ofhisfamiliarity
with
andmoreinparticular
evidence
Kabbalistic
sources
Jewish
(though
ofcourse,
Llullhimself,
is bynomeansa Kabbalist).
Hamesprobes
hissources
withgreat
acumenand fromthemanyparallels
thathe extracts,
a fewexamples
to
maysuffice
andthelimitations
demonstrate
boththepotential
ofthiscomparative
work.
in thethird
Hames'sargument
on theshared
fascination
of
essentially
chapter
hinges
Llullandthethirteenth-century
Kabbalists
overtheactive
inner
lifeofGod.Philosophical
discussions
aboutGodtendtofocuson whatGodis not.Thisvianegativa
is countered
by
witha viapositiva
thatenablesknowledge
LlullandtheKabbalists
ofGod through
the
ofreason.
Thisshared
canbe mademoreconcrete
forsimuplifting
purpose
bylooking
in theLullianandKabbalistic
Likethesefirot
in Kabbalah,
ilarities
Llull'sdignisystems.
ofGod through
whichknowledge
tatisaretherevealed
ofGodis possible;
powers
they
in creation
arepresent
andcanguidetheartist
to a moreabstract
levelofbeing.The
sefirot
area ladderofascentanddescent
between
theEn sof(theInfinite),
of
mediating
immanent
whichtheyaretherevealed
Likewise
thedignities,
which
face,andcreation.
a ladder.Bothhavea distinct
areimprinted
on creation
likea sealon wax,form
sumin thesefirot,
inthedignities.
mit:Keter
Gloria
Hamescallsthis'morethana coincidence',
butthefactremains
thatthisis where
thesimilarities
thetensefirot
and
end,forbetween
theninedignities
thereareno further
surcorrespondences.
Interesting
correspondences
Hamesmentions
a Kabbalistic
facewhenHamesdealswithLlull'sfigures.
commentary
on theliturgy
Paris,BnFhbr.848,discussed
(an anonymous
byIdei)with
manuscript,
which
circles
andalphabets,
theLullian
Art.Llull'suseofcolour
quaintly
parallels
rotating
andaid meditation
is matched
disto enhance
byAzrielofGirona's
spiritual
experience
ofthesefirot,
a topicaddressed
cussion
ofthecolours
as well,suchas
byotherscholars
whoalsomademodels
ofrotating
benShalom
circles.
Llullmay
Ashkenazi,
Joseph
Again,
models
andmethods,
buthe stillproduced
hisownsystem.
havebeeninspired
byJewish
A mostintriguing
withtheLullian
istheanonymous
source
forcomparison
Sepher
corpus
an introduction
toJewish
ha-Tashar
ethics
witha biastowards
(BookoftheRighteous),
Hameslistsmanysimilarities,
buta fewsamples
Kabbalistic
maybe hightheosophy.
In order
toGod,theSepher
ha-Tashar
theworld
tocomecloser
lighted.
encourages
denying
anddesiring
death.Thisis notat all a Jewish
creed,butitis Llull's.Thereis a passage
in thebookwherethelifeofmonks
anditinerant
as exemplary.
mendicants
is extolled
in a Jewish
andwouldsuggest
theinfluence
ofsomeinterThisis highly
unusual
source,
onein whichLlullhimself
The bookexpounds
participated.
dialogue,
perhaps
religious
decincia
theroots
to Llull'sarbre
ofwhich
theimageofa treethatis completely
parallel
andthestemandbranches
theworld
ofcreation
thatcanprothedivine
world,
represent
ofLlull'sknowledge
ofJewish
ofthedivine
world.
Further
videknowledge
learning
proof
wherewe findthecharacter
ofa Jewwhoseexposiis takenfromTheBookoftheGentile
thethirteenth-century
conandopinions
areclearly
takenfrom
tionsofJewish
doctrines
ideason theresurrection
thatwillhaveappealedto Llull
text.We findhimunfolding
arethenotions
ofglory
forthegood
Christian
overtones:
there
becauseoftheir
primarily
forthebad,followed
in thelifeto come,a limited
bydivine
pardon,
periodofsuffering
to Nachmanides
fortheworst
ofsinners.
Yettheseideasareattributable
anddamnation
Hamesis convinced
that
andhisschoolandon thebasisofmanyinteresting
parallels
strike
oneas being
on this.Although
someofHames'sparallels
Llull's
Jewwasmodelled
a listofartion page157between
theassumed
far-fetched
(forinstance,
correspondence
ha-Tashar
andTheBook
iswholly
unconfaith
from
theSepher
clesoftheJewish
oftheGentile
is amply
andcompellingly
demonstrated.
with
Llull'sfamiliarity
Jewish
learning
vincing),

13:49:04 PM

REVIEWS

265

The fourth
is concerned
withtheconcrete
ofHull'sknowledge
of
chapter
application
in hismissionary
activities.
from
Llull,whoin 1299 received
Jewish
learning
JamesII a
licence
to preachin thesynagogues,
theJewish
elitesofthetruth
of
hopedto convince
thetrinitarian
doctrine
should
leadto a massconversion
oftheJews.The
which,
ideally,
Kabbalists
ofthetimewouldarguethatGod can onlybe approached
andunderstood
thesefirot
andLlullwouldarguethesamefortheTrinity,
butthisconfronted
through
himwiththeimportant
ofhowthedignities
relateto theTrinity.
Hamesshows
question
howLlull's
ideasonthismatter
from
theLibre
decontemplado
totheLibre
dedemostrachanged
cions.
hewoulddistribute
thedignities
thethree
oftheTrinity,
but
Initially
among
persons
he arrived
at whatwouldbe themostimportant
doctrine
ofhissystem,
finally
namely
thateachdignity
hasaninherent
trinitarian
formalised
inhisfamous
triad:
structure,
agent,
and act.Jewswerehesitant
aboutpredicating
of God (in Kabbalistic
patient
anything
terms:
theEn sof)forfearofrupturing
theunity
oftheGodhead(which
in a waywas
Llullbelieved,
havegreat
inexplainTherefore,
compromised
bythesefirot).
they
difficulty
between
theCreator
andHiscreation,
forifonedaresnotpredicate
ingtherelation
anyofGod,onecannotsaythatGodis creative.
Thislinguistic
hasa strong
thing
analysis
dimension
forLlullwhobelieves
thatwhensubject
andpredicate
are equal
ontological
and invertible,
theeternal
and internal
ofthe
theycan be usedto describe
dynamics
Godhead.
thetriad(agent-act-patient)
onecansaythatGodis a unifier
Thus,following
theunified/unity,
which
meansthatGod'sunity
on a trinity.
unifying
depends
Similarly,
thistriune
structure
ofactiveinnerrelations
is alsopresent
in thedivine
which
dignities
in turnarereflected
in creation.
Creation
is therefore
an outerextension
ofan activity
in God.Hence,Godcancreatewithout
Hames'sexpoalready
eternally
present
change.
sition
ofLlull'sdoctrine
is bothknowledgeable
andilluminating.
He presents
thisdoctrine
as a clearchallenge
to Kabbalistic
as itpainstakingly
counters
theshortcomtheosophy,
doctrine
ofcreation
withan elegant
trinitarian
Hamesargues
ingsofthesefirotic
system.
thatitmight
haveappealed
to a contemporary
Kabbalist.
The fifth
andfinalchapter
dealswiththeJewish
to thechallenge
ofLlull's
response
Sincethere
arenoexplicit
refutations
ofLlull,andbecause
system.
Jewish-Christian
polemic
on thewholefocuses
on rabbinic
sources
andnoton Kabbalah,
Hamesclosely
examines
theresponsa
literature
in search
ofconcealed
references.
Solomon
ibnAdret,
thedisciple
ofNachmanides,
wroteresponsa
in replyto RamonMarti(whoin hisPugio
partly
fidei
TalmudandMidrash
toproveChristian
butalsoononeoccasion
inreply
quoted
dogma),
to Llull.Opposing
thetrinitarian
Solomon
madeuse ofKabbalistic
doctrine,
teachings
he wouldnotdo in hisother
andwasclearly
Lullianthemes
(which
responsa)
addressing
whenstating
thatJewish
references
to a 'trinitarian'
structure
ofdivinecreativity
in fact
referred
tothesefirot
andnottoa trinity
in thedignities.
theapparendy
real
Addressing
threat
ofLullian
thecircle
around
Solomon
ibnAdret
becamequitevehement
theosophy,
in itsdefence
oftheunity
oftheGodhead.
Hamesdrawsattention
to Solomon's
disciple
whowasmovedtogivean extensive
Kabbalistic
ofDeut.
BahyabenAsher
interpretation
textforChristian
whotried
6,4('theLordourGodtheLordis One',a seminal
exegetes
to demonstrate
therewas a trinitarian
in theTorah),and to theanonymous
doctrine
Ma'arekhet
ha-Elohut
in whichthedoctrine
ofthedignities
andcorrelatives
is opposed
by
theidentification
of theGodheadwiththesefirot.
Thereappearsto havebeena real
influence
ofLlullonJewish
forAbulafia
at onepointcomplained
thatfirst
the
discourse,
Christians
turned
Godintothree,
andnowtheKabbalists
turnGodintoten.It is clear
thatLlullmadea limited
butdistinct
on theJewish
ofhisdayandin
impact
community
hisconclusion,
Hamesextends
thisinfluence
intothefifteenth
A groupof
briefly
century.
useda Hebrew
translation
oftheArsbrevis
as a ladJewsin Senegallia
(ontheAdriatic)
derofascent
toattain
an uniomystica.
In theChristian
intercamp,Picotooka renewed
estin Llull'sknowledge
oftheKabbalah,
in a way,makesLlulla precursor
of
which,
Christian
Kabbalah.
Thegreatmerit
ofTheArtofConversion
is twofold.
In thefirst
place,itmakesa strong

13:49:04 PM

266

REVIEWS

casefortheinteraction
between
Llull'sthought
andcontemporary
Kabbalah,
theosophic
eventhough
references
in thesourcetexts
arefrequently
In thesecondplace,it
oblique.
demonstration
oftheimpact
ofphilosophy
andrational
onthe
givesa compelling
thought
ofan age.Thethirteenth
intellectual
andreligious
climate
is marked
notonlyby
century
theriseofAristotelian
butalsobytherenovation
andtherational
science,
improvement
ofmystical
andtheosophical
theinteractions
between
theArtand
systems.
Byexamining
a significandy
HameshasgivenLlull'ssystem
newreferential
context.
Kabbalah,
Groningen

JanR. Veenstra

13:49:04 PM

BooksRecved
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Abelardo,
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La notique
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selon
deJandun.
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Cahiersde l'Institut
du Moyen-ge
grecet latin,74 (2003),208 pp. ISSN 0591-0358.
CONTENTS:Chr.Troelsgaard,
A ListofSticheron
Standard
Call-Numbers
ofthe
Abridged
Version
oftheSticherarion;
D. Bloch,Alexander
as a Textual
Witness.
The
Aphrodisias
ontheDe Sensu;Chr.Schabel& R. Friedman,
Trinitarian
and
Commentary
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II; St.Ebbesen,
Issues
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& P. Streveler,
ThePupils
Philosophical
ofthe
Magister
: Abstractions
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Digbeianae,
Regiae& Venetae;St. Ebbesen,
Burley
inhisCompanion
toa Tractatus
Fallaciarum
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onthe
Elenchi;
Equivocation
Addenda
& corrigenda
to CIMAGL56 & 68
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Eisen,TheBookofJobinMedieval
Press,
2004,
Jewish
Philosophy.
University
xii& 324pp.ISBN0 19 5171535
Hester
It Could
HaveBeenOtherwise.
andNecessity
inDominican
Gelber,
Goodenough
Contingency
at Oxford
undTextezur
2004(Studien
, 1300-1350.
Brill,Leiden-Boston
Theology
desMittelalters,
Geistesgeschichte
81),ix & 412pp. ISBN90 04 139079
SimoKnuuttila,
inAncient
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andMedieval
Clarendon
Oxford
Press,
2004,
Philosophy.
X& 341pp.ISBN0 19 9266387
Alainde Libera,
L'Unit
del'intellect
deThomas
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duDe unitate
intellectus
cond'Aquin.
traaverroistas
deThomas
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&
d'Aquin.
J.Vrin,Paris2004(Etudes
philosophique
557pp. ISBN2 711616819
Commentaires),
PiviMehtonen,
Obscure
Unclear
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andPractice
tothe
Language,
Quintilian
Theory
from
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Scientiarum
Helsinki
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Fennica,
byR. MacGilleon.
Academiae
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Humaniora
320),228 pp. ISBN
95141 09112
Morelli
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themanuscripts
withan introduction,
notesandindices
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Logica
byJoke
Turnhout
2004(Studia
Artistarum,
Spruyt.
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12),388pp.ISBN2 503517242
Maistresse
Women
Scholars.
EditedbyL. D'Arcens
andJ. Feros
, Modem
ofMyWit.Medieval
Turnhout
theMiddleAges,7), x & 384 pp. ISBN
2004(Making
Ruys.Brepols,
- Introduction;
2 50351165 1 contents:
Preface
thepracticeof medieval
studies:
W. Harding
& Ph.Maddern,
Ex epistolis
duarum
; C.J.Mews,Encountering
magistrarum
Between
andTheNewAge;E.J.Richards,
A PathofLongStudy:
In
Hildegard:
Apocalypse
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
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- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

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HerOwnMaistresse?:
Search
dePizan
Christine
dePizanthe
; L. D'Arcens,
ofChristine
N. Watson,
Desire
Amateur
; empathy,
ethics,andimagination:
Professional
forthePast/
Criticism:
TheBook
Communities,
; D. Watt,Critics,
Afterword
Compassionate
from
of
Learning
andMemoria/
Heloise,
Rhetoric,
Interrogating
Kempe;
J. FerosRuys,Playing
Margery
Alterity:
'The
and modern
Heloise
women
women:
M. Mitchell,
; medieval
Dialogues
Uncanny
andTheBookofMargery
S. Madison
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ofMistress
JoanMartyn'
Journal
Kempe;
TheLifeofAlice
ina Contemporary
Context
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ofSchaerbeek
Redemptive
Suffering:
inthe
Middle
readers:
Feminism
; women
ofSweden
Ages:
Birgitta
J.Jenkins,
Religious
Reading
andMemory.
Comes
Women
;J.Wogan-Browne,
Feminism,
Culture,
Virginity
Always
Reading:
Twice:
andProfession
Virginity
Thories
del'intentionalit
au moyen
Dominile
de RuediImbachet
Perler,
ge.Avant-propos
Michon.
Librairie
Paris2003(Confrence
Pierre
J.Vrin,
Ablard),
Cyrille
philosophique
169pp. ISBN 2 711616525
vonVorreformatoren.
alsKetzer.
Heterodoxe
vonG. Frank
und
Reformer
Bewegungen
Herausgegeben
Cannstatt
F. Niewhner.
2004(MelanchthonFrommann-Holzboog,
Stuttgart-Bad
Schriften
derStadtBretten,
Bd8),384pp.ISBN3 772822355 contents:
G. FrankunddieReformation
Fr.Niewhner,
Diesogenannten
;
Einleitung:
vorreformatorischen
Bewegungen
"
"
". Beobachtungen
Th. Mahlmann,
zur
", ((vorreformatorisch",
Vorreformatoren
Vorreformation
Geschichte
eines
Wirklichkeit
undTopik
dessogenannten
; G. Frank,
Vorreformatorischen.
Sprachgebrauchs
Armut
alsphilosophische
undchristliche
DerPaulikianismus
; K. Flasch,
Idee;P. Dinzelbacher,
Mittelalters
unddieKetzergeschichte;
DieAchsenzeit
desHohen
K.-V.Selge,
vonFiore;
Joachim
Grund
radikale
beiTauler.
Die
dasinseinen
; A. Fssel,
Denken,
geht:
Diesseitigkeit
J.Kreuzer,
andthe
events
P. Segl,DieAuswirkungen
Ortlieber.
; A. Hudson,
times;
ofthr
English
Wycliffites
G. Audisio,
Uneoriginalit
derhussitischen
vaudoise:
lesbarbes,
mdecins
Bewegung
aufEuropa;
-16esicles);
M. Balzs,Mittelalterliche
del'meetducorps
Hresie
in dergeschicht(15e
der
S. Lalla,Antitrinitarismus
imMittelalter,
W.Schmidt-Biggemann,
Antitrinitarier,
sphihsophie
testium
veritatis"
ab kontrovers-theologische
A. de Lange,
Flacius
Polemik,
"Catalogas
Illyricus'
derWaldenser
indenCottischen
vorundnachderReformation;
Die Ursprungsgeschichte
Alpen
undHugenoten
J. Feuchter,
Albigenser
IrneRosier-Catach,
La parole
sacr.
ditions
du seuil,Paris2004,
ritual,
efficace.
Signe,
780pp.ISBN 2 02 0628058
De ornatu
Wilhelmo
Iordani
, ediditKees
Ruusbroec,
nuptiarum,
Johannes
spiritualium
interprete
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Continuatio
2004(Corpus
Christianorum,
Mediaevalis,
Schepers.
Brepols,
207),408pp.ISBN 2 503 050794
A Journal
ontheInheritance
andMedieval
Sacris
Erudiri.
, 42 (2003),439pp.
ofEarly
Christianity
ISBN 2 503 514316 contents:
G.W.Lorein,TheAntichrist
intheFathers
andtheir
EinchristoTh. Grtner,
Basis;G.D. Dunn,A survey
ofTertulliano
Exegetical
soteriologe;
II
derlateinischen
Paradoxon
inderGattungstradition
(Sed.carm.
Bibeldichtung
pasch.
logisches
LatinintheMissaleGothicum
(Vat.Reg.lat.317).A recon54-62);E. Rose,Liturgical
Mohrmann'
s approach;
Himnos
dela Antigua
litursideration
ofChristine
J. castroSnchez,
Edicin
traduccin
B.Janssens,
DoestheCombination
crtica,
ofMaximus3
yfuentes;
giahispnica.
ad Iohannem
ad ThomamandAmbigua
himself?;
go backtotheConfessor
Ambigua
Isaiahas the
Constantine's
"exaltation
Otto
revendication
E. Mgier,
of
prophet
of
of
Freising's
" inthecontext
Latin
ofChristian
exegesis;
A.J.Forte,
Bengt
Lfstedts
oftheChurch
Fragmente
andAddenda;
C. Wollin,
DasEpitaphium
Bernardi
einesMattus-Kommentars:
Reflections
B.M.303;St.Vanderputten,
etreinvention
inderHandschrft
Soluestris
Angers
Compilation
etl'histoire
deMarchiennes,
leChronicon
Marchianense
lafindudouzime
sicle.
Andr
dessources);
Index
codicum
etcritique
d'une
bndictine
(edition
primitive
abbaye
andJackZupko.
Edited
K. Strange
Stoicism.
Traditions
andTransformations.
Cambridge
bySteven
Press,Cambridge
2004,xi & 295 pp. ISBN 0 521 827094 contents:
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'
onEpictetus
S.K. Strange
& J. Zupko,Introduction;
A.A.Long,TheSocratic
Imprnt
T. EngbergTheStoics
ontheVoluntariness
S.K. Strange,
ofthePassions;
Philosophy;
Moral
Paul:A Philosophical
B. Inwoord,
Stoicism
inthe
Pedersen,
Judgment
Apostle
Reading,

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inSeneca
Stoic
First
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in Christianity
Where
Were
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; R. Sorabji,
; S. Ebbesen,
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Abelardo
Stoicism
andIts Consequences
;
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vis--vis
; D. Rutherford,
J. Lagre,Constancy
Life:
Seneca
andMoralPerfection:
andtheStoics
onthe
; F. DeBrabander,
Psychotherapy
Spinoza
Duties
Duties
Aid:Cicero's
; M. Nussbaum,
ofHappiness
Prospect
ofJustice,
ofMaterial
Problematic
Stoic
Emotion
; L.C. Becker,
Legacy
CeciliaTrifogli,
Liber
Tertius
Aristotelis.
delle
Commenti
ca.
Physicorum
Repertorio
questioni.
Inglesi
SISMEL. Edizionidel Galluzzo,Firenze2004 (UnioneAccademica
1250-1270.
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MediiAevi.Subsidia13),VIII & 393pp. ISBN
CorpusPhilosophorum
88 8450039 7
PaulVignaux,
au Moyen
et
Philosophie
Age,prcdd'uneIntroduction
autobiographique
suivideHistoire
delapense
mdivale
etproblmes
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dits,
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prsents
d'hisparRuediImbach.Librairie
Philosophique
J. Vrin,Paris2004(Bibliothque
toirede la philosophie),
335pp.ISBN 2 711616800

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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
vivarium
is devoted
inparticular
totheprofane
sideofmediaeval
philosophy
andtheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddle
AgesandRenaissance
- H.A.G.Braakhuis,
- C.H. Kneepkens,
editors
L.M.de Rijk,(Leiden)
(Nijmegen)
- W.J.Courtenay,
- E.P. Bos,(Leiden).
D. Perler,
(Groningen)
(Madison)
- M.G.M.vanderPoel,(Nijmegen).
(Basel)
oftheEditorial
Board:
Prof.
C.H.Kneepkens.
Secretary
Allcommunications,
those
ofa business
should
be addressed
nature,
except
toC.H.Kneepkens,
Faculteit
derLetteren,
Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen,
Vakgroep
P.O.Box716,9700AS Groningen,
TheNetherlands.
Mediaevistiek,
- J.E.Murdoch,
advisory
TullioGregory,
Zimmermann,
(Rome)Albert
(Cologne)
committee (Cambridge,
MA).
publishers Brill,
TheNetherlands.
Leiden,
published Twiceyearly,
ca. 320pagesyearly.

Copyright
2004byKoninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
TheNetherlands
Brill
theimprints
Brill
Academic
NVincorporates
Publishers,
Koninklijke
Mrtius
Publishers
andVSP.
Nijhoff
Allrights
reserved.
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stored
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ortransmitted
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orpersonal
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CONTENTS
WilliamJ. Courtenay
WilliamJ. Courtenay
J.M.M.H. Thijssen
Jack Zupko
Stephano Caroti
Jean Celeyrette
Dirk-JanDekker
Simon Oliver
Mischa von Perger
Claude Panaggio &
Ernesto Perini-Santos
Elizabeth Karger
Pekka Krkkinen

Reviews

OF VOLUME

XLII (2004)

Introduction
1
The Universityof Paris at the Time of
3
Jean Buridan an Nicole Oresme
The Buridan School Reassessed. John
Buridan and Albertof Saxony
18
On Buridan's Alleged Alexandrianism:
Heterodoxy and Natural Philosophy in
Paris
43
Fourteenth-Century
Some Remarks on Buridan's Discussion
on Intensionand Remission
58
La problmatique du point chez Jean
Buridan
86
Buridan's
Treatise
De
diverJohn
dependentiis
sitatibus
et convenientiis
: An Edition
109
Robert Grossestesteon Light,Truth and
151
Experimentm
WalterBurley(?),Fragmentm
dedictione
exclusiva totiintegrali
addita
: Eine Edition
181
Guillaumed'Ockhamet la supposio
materialis202
Ockham and Wodeham on Divine De225
ception as a SkepticalHypothesis
On the Semanticsof 'Human Being' and
'Animal' in Early 16th CenturyErfurt
237
HenrikLagerlund,Modal Syllogistics
in the
Middle Ages (rev.by PalomaPrez-Ilzarbe)257
Sten Ebbesen & RussellL. Friedman(eds.),
Medieval Analyses in Language and
Cognition. Acts of the Symposium The
SchoolofPhilosophy,
Copenhagen
January1013, 1996, organizedby The Royal Danish
Academyof Sciences and Lettersand The
Institutefor Greek and Latin, University
of Copenhagen (rev.byL.M. de Rijk) .... 259

13:49:22 PM

iv

CONTENTS
Harvey J. Hames, The Art of Conversion:
Christianityand Kabbalah in the Thirteenth
262
Century(rev.byJan R. Veenstra
)

Books Received

267

13:49:22 PM

induplicate
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Contributions
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Manuscripts
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andin goodliterary
The manuscripts
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andcomplete,
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Authors
receive
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Thepublisher
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madetoproofs
other
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correction
ofcompositor's
or conversion
errors.
Vivarium
isindexed/
abstracted
in:ArtsandHumanities
Citation
Index;ATLARDB;Current
Dietrich's
IndexPhilosophicus;
FRANCISdatabase;
Internationale
Contents;
Bibliographie
derRezensionen
Wissenschaftlicher
Literatur/
International
ofBookReviews
of
Bibliography
Internationale
derZeitschriftenliteratur
ausAllenGebieten
Literature;
Scholarly
Bibliographie
desWissens/International
ofPeriodicals
from
all FieldsofKnowledge;
Iter
Bibliography
totheMiddle
Gateway
AgesandRenaissance;
Linguistic
Bibliography/
LinguisBibliographie
ofBooksandArticles
on theModern
tique;M L A International
Bibliography
Languages
andLiteratures;
MiddleEast:Abstracts
and Index;Old Testament
Periodicals
Abstracts;
Contents
IndexOne:Periodicals
Index;The Philosopher's
Index;Religion
(RIO);Religion
IndexTwo:MultiAuthor
Works.

Copyright
2004byKoninklijke
Brill
TheNetherlands
NV,Leiden,
Brill
theimprints
Brill
Academic
NVincorporates
Publishers,
Koninklijke
Mrtius
Publishers
andVSP.
Nijhoff
Allrights
reserved
. Nopart
bereproduced,
stored
in
translated,
ofthis
publication
may
a retrieval
ortransmitted
inany
orbyanymeans,
electronic,
form
system,
orotherwise,
without
written
mechanical,
photocopying,
recording
prior
permission
ofthe
publisher.
tophotocopy
items
orpersonal
useisgranted
Authorization
forinternal
that
theappropriate
to
byBrill
provided
feesarepaiddirectly
Clearance
Suite
222Rosewood
Center,
Drive,
910,
Copyright
MA01923,USA.Feesaresubject
tochange.
Danvers,
PRINTED
INTHENETHERLANDS

13:49:22 PM

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