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VIVARIUM

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AN INTERNATIONAL
JOURNALFOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUALLIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
vivarium
is devotedin particular
to theprofane
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and theintellectual
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Renaissance.
- H.A.G. Braakhuis,
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Kneepkens,
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(Groningen)
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oftheEditorial
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MA).
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18:38:48 PM

CONTENTS
Jennifer Ottman &
Rega Wood
Elizabeth Karger
Paul Vincent Spade

OF VOLUME

XXXVII

(1999)

Walter of Burley:His Life and Work ....

Walter Burley'sRealism
Walter Burley on The Kinds of Simple
Supposition
Risto Saarinen
WalterBurleyon akrasia:Second Thoughts
Rega Wood
Willing Wickedly: Ockham and Burley
Compared
Gerhard Krieger
Studied on Walter Burley 1989-1997 ....
In memoriam
Prof.Dr. JosephIJsewijn
SimonTugwell, op
PetrusHispanus:Commentson Some Proposed Identifications
Anne Davenport
Peter Olivi in the Shadow of Montsgur
Richard Cross
Ockham on Part and Whole
Andrew E. Larsen
The Oxford "School of Heretics": the
Unexamined Case of FriarJohn
A
Spruyt
Joke
Fifteenth-Century
Spanish Treatise on
Consequences
A Forced March Towards Beatitude:
Kent Emery,Jr.
ChristianTrottmann's
Histoire
of theBeatific
Vision
Reviews
to Medieval
C.FJ. Martin,An Introduction
Philosophy{rev.byJokeSpruyt)
David Pingree,PreceptumCanonis Ptolomei (rev.byJohnNorth
)
Idit Dobbs-Weinstein,
Maimonidesand St.
Thomas on the Limits of Reason (rev.by
AllanBck)
Jan A. Aertsen,Medieval Philosophyand
the Transcendentais:
The Case of Thomas
Aquinas (rev.byAllanBck)
Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and
MechthildDreyer(eds.),JohnDuns Scotus;
Metaphysicsand Ethics (rev.byAllanBck)
Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz (eds.),
L'Enseignementdes disciplines la Facult
des arts(Pariset Oxford,XIIIe-XVe sicles)
(rev.byFransvanLier)

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1
24
41
60
72
94
101
103
114
143
168
178

258
282
285

286

288

290

293

iv

CONTENTS

Books Received

296

The De Rijk-Files

299

18:38:48 PM

Walterof Burky
: His Life and Works
JENNIFEROTTMAN & REGA WOOD

Walterof Burleywas bornin 1274-1275,probablyat thevillageof BurleyYorkshire.1His educationwas long and complete;he was
in-Wharfedale,
an Oxford Master of Arts by 130 1 and a Parisian Master of Theology
by 1324. His experienceof the world was wide: when studyingat Paris,
he held a quodlibetaldisputationat Toulouse. He enteredthe serviceof
Edward III in 1327 as an ambassador to the papal court at Avignon,
acquiring the title of king's clerk by the time of a second mission to
Avignonin 1330. In about 1333, he joined the circleof Richard de Bury,
named in that year to the see of Durham, whose patronagehe enjoyed
forabout tenyears.Burleyfoundhimselfimprisonedfora forestry
offense
in 1336. On his release, he traveledover-season the king'sbusinessin
1338-1339,held a quodlibetaldisputationin Bologna in 1341, and presentedone of his books to ClementVI at Avignonin 1343. He died at
the age of about 70 in 1344 or shordythereafter.
Like so many good
can
be
divided
three
his
life
into
nine
parts:
yearsat Oxford(1301things,
at
Paris
and
sixteen
seventeen
1310),
years
(1310-1326),
years as a clerical courtierin Britainand at Avignon(1327-1344).
Not the least of the problemsconfronting
studentsof WalterBurleyis
thathe wrotea greatdeal; thereare about fifty
authenticworks,a number of whichexistin more than one redaction.The workwhichwe know
of the works enumerated
best, the Physicscommentaiy
, the twenty-fourth
A.
the
situation.
illustrates
byJames Weisheipl,
WeisheipllistedfivedifferH.
ent worksby Burleyon the Physics
Charles
Lohr eliminatedone as
,
and
we
a
discarded second because it was writtenin a maninauthentic,
uscriptdated before 1250.2 Of the three remaining,the firstcould be
1 Forbiographical
A Biographical
seeA.B.Emden,
information,
oftheUniversity
Register
of
toA.D.1500, 3 vols.,Oxford
s.v."Burley,
Walter
1957-59,
de,"vol.1,312-4;and
Oxford
C. Martin,
Walter
Presented
toDanielCallus
Studies
, in: Oxford
, Oxford
1964,194-230
Burley
Historical
n.s.XVI).
Studies,
(Oxford
2 RegaWood,Walter
44 (1984),275's Physics
Commentaries
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Burley
A. Weisheipl,
in:Mediaeval
31 (1969),174-224,
327;James
Mertonense,
Studies,
Repertorium
at no. 24, 197-98;CharlesH. Lohr,Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries:
Authors
G-I,in:
BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke

Vivarium
37,1

18:38:54 PM

OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER

plausiblyattributedto Burley'sOxford period and was certainlywritten


before 1316, the second was probablywrittenat Paris before1322; most
of the last was writtenat Paris between 1324 and 1327 and completed
at the suggestionof Richard de Bury between 1334 and 1337.3
Burleywas not an authorwho ordinarilywrotefromscratch;likemany
othershe usuallystartedwitha base text.He even reuseddedicatoryletters.4In cases where the base textis not his own, such as the Ethicsand
thispracPolitics
commentarieswherethe base is St. Thomas' exposition,5
to evaluate Burley'simportanceand independence.
tice makes it difficult
We do not mean to suggestthat Burley was unoriginal,but ratherto
warn that in this,as in other cases, the medievalpracticeof paraphrasing and quoting withoutacknowledgementcan mislead the unwary.In
the case of the Physicscommentary,one importantbase of the Pans
is the Oxford
Exposition
Questions
Similarly,
Exposition.
partsofboth the Oxford
As with
are incorporatedin theDe BuryCommentary.
and the ParisQuestions
in
the
first
when
he
each
and
authors
teachers,
project,
began
many
is
There
less
difference
in
the
base.
radical
made
books, Burley
changes
betweenthe base and the new workat the end. So, forexample,Ockham
is an importantsource and a centralopponent in books I to V of the
final commentary,but this is less the case in the later books.6On the
is cut
one hand, that's not surprisingsince Ockham's Physicscommentary
shortnear the beginningof book VII. But perhaps it is surprisingthat
Burley did not look elsewhere;in fact VII and VIII, the books Burley
speciallypreparedforRichard de Bury,accordingto Weisheipllook most
like a revisionof the earliestOxford
Exposition.1
LatinAristotle
at no. 17-20,179-81;and idem,Medieval
24 (1968),149-245,
Traditio,
14 (1972),116-26,
de philosophie
Addenda
etcorrigenda,
Commentaries:
mdivale,
, in:Bulletin
at 121.
3 See alsoon thefinalcommentary
Ockham
Anneliese
zu Wilhelm
Maier,Handschriftliches
Gesammelte
Mittelalter:
undWalter
zurGeistesgeschichte
Maier,
Aufstze
, in:Anneliese
Ausgehendes
Burley
ofbookVII inVatican,
thatthebeginning
whostates
at 226-27,
/,Rome1964,209-35,
thefirst
from
from
theusualform,
Vat.lat.2150is different
periodof
dating
perhaps
composition.
4 Martin
., aboven. 1),225.
op.cit
5 On the(Ethics
in
onAkrasia:
Second
Walter
seeRistoSaarinen,
, elsewhere
Burley
Thoughts
onSome
andJohn
seeLowrie
thisvolume;
on thePolitics
Burley
Aspects
Wyclif
J.Daly,Walter
Premire
vaticanes
Tisseront
; Histoire
, vol.4, Archives
ecclsiastique:
, in:Mlanges
Eugne
ofKingship
Some
and
e
testi
at
179-84
Vatican
idem,
163-84,
1964,
CCXXXIV);
,
(Studi
City
partie
andM.R.Powicke
onthe
Politics
onWalter
Notes
, in:T.A.Sandquist
(eds.),
Commentary
Burley's
at 279-81.
Toronto
toBertie
Presented
inMedieval
1969,270-81,
Wilkinson,
History
Essays
6 Wood{op.cit.,
aboven. 2), 296.
7
at
30 (1968),163-213,
in:Mediaeval
andSome
Ockham
Studies,
Mertonians,
Weisheipl,
182-3.

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY
I HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

So thereis some questionabout the significance


of the worksprepared
forRichard de Bury and otherpatronsnear the end of Burley'slife.It
is possible,for example, that a work ostensiblycompletedin 1337 was
in factwrittenfor the most part in 1305. To add to our uncertainties,
we do not know what base (if any) Burleyused when he began lecturing on the Physics.
about dating,thereare problemswith the text;
Apart fromdifficulties
thereis no modern edition of Burley'sPhysics.Only the final commentaryis printedat all, and collationof the survivingmanuscriptssuggests
thatthe publisherwas not extraordinarily
fortunatein his choice of manon
the
uscripts.Working
question of motion in a vacuum, we found
and othermistakenreadings.8As is so oftenthe
plentyof homeoteleutons
case in discussingmedieval authors,workingon Burley requires either
some skatingon thinice (as we are doing here) or an inordinateinvestment of time.
The aim of thispaper, however,is the less ambitiousone of attempting to make sense of as many as possible of the remainingworksattributed to Burleyin chronologicalterms.We will tryto distinguishwhat
remainsfromthe Oxford, Paris, and court years. Works about whose
datingwe could findnothingwe have simplyomittedfromthisaccount;
thoughwe cannotresisthintingat evidenceof what appears to be another
lost work,the Tractatus
de novem
accidentium
to which Burleyrefers
generibus
on more than one occasion.9Despite the limitationswe put on thisstudy,
it is an endeavor in which we surelyneed help in the formof corrections and additions,which we will gratefully
receive. In addition to the
listscompiledby Weisheipland Lohr alreadycited,thoselookingon their
own should also consultthe bibliographywhich appears in this volume
and the one publishedin the SIEPM Bulletin30 (1988), which includes
a reference
to Mary Shriver'sSt. Bonaventuremaster'sthesis.10
That 1958
thesisincludesyet anotherlist of manuscripts,a listwhich includesquite
a numberof manuscriptsnot listedby Weisheipl.
8 See Wood,Walter onMotion
ina Vacuum
45 (1989-90),
, in:Traditio,
Burley
191-217,
at 207-17.
9 Forexample,
Walter
In Physicam
Aristotelis
etquaestiones
, Venice1501
Burley,
expositio
Hildesheim-New
York1972],f.8vb:"Aliasrationes
multas
feciad hanc
[facsimile
reprint,
intractatu
de novem
accidentium:
sedistacausabrevitatis
sufficiant
cognitionem
generibus
ad praesens."
10
1969(iup.
cit
Lohr1968(<
., aboven. 2), 185-208;
., aboven. 2), 171-87;
Weisheipl
op.cit
Lohr1972(op.t
onWalter
1968-1988
., aboven. 2), 121;Wood,Studies
, in:Bulletin
Burley
de philosophie
30 (1988),233-50;andMaryEllenShriver,
TheTractatus
deunimdivale,
versalibus
St.Bonaventure
, M.A.thesis,
Burley
ofWalter
1958,7-27.
University,

18:38:54 PM

OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER

1. Oxford
At Oxford Burleywas a fellowof Merton College. Merton fellowsordinarilycompletedtheirpreliminarystudiesat othercolleges.Since Burley
came from the North, and Balliol College was intended for northern
scholars,who were requiredto move on when theywere readyforinception, C. Martin suggeststhat Burley may have studied firstat Balliol
College.11Burley's regencyin Arts at Merton College was long, from
1300 to 1310 accordingto Weisheipl.12
Burley'searliestsurvivingworks are logical; they include both independenttreatisesand commentaries.If it were not forthe titlefoundin
13 and a
a single manuscriptof a commentaryIn Perihermenias
colophon
foundin one manuscriptof his Obligationes
,14MertonCollege recordswould
15
suggestthat Burleywas not yet a Master of Artsin 1305. Fortunately,
not only do we have a dated work from 1301 whose tide statesthat its
authorwas a Master of Arts,but it is both printedand edited. Stephen
F. BrowneditedBurley's1302 Oxford
in 1974.16
onthePerihermenias
Questions
It is a workin whichBurleyarguesagainstthe viewsof Avicenna,Albert
the Great, Henry of Ghent, St. Thomas, and Giles of Rome. Burley
prefersthe positionof Godfreyof Fontainesto these authors.17
With regard to the Perihermenias
, the situationis similar to that of
the Physics
, except that there are four survivingworks: an elementary
summaryas well as questions,followedby two others,the MiddleCommentaryprobablywrittenat Paris and the Final Commentary
completedwhen
a
was
member
of
the
of
in
circle Richardde Bury 1337.18Though
Burley
11Martin
., aboven. 1),202.
(iop.cit
12
basedon hisabsencefrom
theMerton
bursars'
rollofEasterto August
Although
himto haveleftOxford
considers
1305and
1307,Martin
bythatpoint,i.e.,between
Easter1307:ibid.,202.Weisheipl
1968(op.dt
., aboven. 7), 175,n. 56,quotesLondon,
Lambeth
tractatus
depuritate
artis
70,f.109vb:
"Explicit
logice
Burley
Anglici,
mag.Walteri
naturalis
et subtilis
optimi
logici,famosi
philosophi,
theologi,
utpote
qui in universitte
Oxon.quammultis
annirexit
in artibus
in theologica
facltate."
et tandem
Parisius
13"Questiones
de Burley
Peryarmenias
quinqudatea mag.Waltero
superlibrum
a.d. 1301":Weisheipl
1969(<
aboven.2),
., aboven. 2),no.4a, 188;Lohr1968(op.dt.,
op.dt
no. 7, 177.
14"Explicit
tractatus
de obligacionibus
de Burleye
anno
datusa mag.Waltero
optimus
domini
Millesimo
aboven. 2),no.20a,196.
trecentesimo
secundo":
1969(op.dt.,
Weisheipl
15He is listedas a fellow
butnotgiventhetitleofmagister:
1968(op.dt.,
Weisheipl
aboven. 7), 175.
16Stephen
F. Brown,
in:FrancisWalter
inlibrum
Perihermeneias,
Burley's
Quaestiones
canStudies,
at 202-95.
34 (1974),200-95,
17Brown1974(op.dt.,
aboven. 16),200.
18
1969(op.dt.,
aboven. 2), no. 4a,b,c,188;no. 7, 189;Lohr1968(op.dt.,
Weisheipl

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFEANDWORKS

it containspassages takenverbatimfromthe MiddleCommentary


, the Final
is
a
which
of
artem
veterem
also
retracts
views
stated
,
,
Commentary
part Super
in the MiddleCommentary
,19so it is an importantindependentwork.
Even aftereliminating
one commentary
as theworkofWilliamMilverly,20
the
found
six
versions
of
Weisheipl
commentaryon the Libersexprincipioif
in
rum
we
include
the
the
De BurySuperartemveterem
version
.21This is
,
a rare case, where we have two post Parisian versions.22
The early versions relyheavilyon AlbertusMagnus and were writtenbeforeBurley's
contactwith Ockham.23At least one probablycomes fromthe Oxford
"
vetus?m
period; its colophon refersto it as the expositio
lists
de obliMercifully,
Weisheipl
only three versionsof the Tractatus
.25No one has commentedon the third,preservedonlyin Erfurt
gationibus
and attributedto Burley in the catalogue of 1412.26 But debate rages
about the othertwo: one writtenin 1302 and the otherbeforethattime.
The authenticity
of the 1302 Obligationes
is generallyaccepted; more questionable is the authenticityof the much shortertreatise (three times
Martin Grabmann rejected the attributionto Burley of the
shorter).27
shorttreatise;28
Weisheiplaccepted it.29There are foursurvivingmanutwo
at
Paris
and one at Erfurtand Venice. One Parisian manuscripts,
scriptattributesthe work to a "Master W." in a colophon. The other
aboven. 2),no. 1-2,173-74;
no.4, 174-76;
no.7, 177.Themiddle
hasalso
commentary
beeneditedbyBrown,Walter
Middle
onAristotle's
in:
Burley's
Perihermeneias,
Commentary
Franciscan
33 (1973),42-134,at 45-134.
Studies,
19Brown1973(<
., aboven. 18),43.
op.cit
20Weisheipl
1968{op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 178,n. 71.
21Weisheipl
1969(<
no.7, 189.SeealsoQuaestiones
.,aboven. 2),no.3a,b,c,d,e,
186-7;
op.dt
dearte
vetere:
De universalibus,
depredicamentis
etdesexprincipiis
, ibid.,no.6, 188-89.Lohr1968
., aboven. 2),no. 3-4,174-6.
(<op.cit
22Weisheipl
1969{op.cit.
aboven. 2),no. 3e, 187:"Etistamopinionem
tenuiParisius
etearndeclaravi
in primo
tractatu
de formis
accidentalibus."
23
1968{op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 178.
24Weisheipl
1969{op.cit..
aboven. 2),no.3c, 187.
Weisheipl
25
1969{op.dt.,
aboven. 2),no.20a,b,c,196.
Weisheipl
26Wilhelm
deramplonianischen
Verzdchnis
Schum,Beschrdbendes
zu
Handschiften-Sammlung
Deutschlands
undderSchwdz,
, no.O. 76,Berlin
1887,733;Mittelalterliche
Erfurt
Bibliothekskataloge
vol.2, Bistum
Munich1928,Loricano. 11,17.
Mainz:Erfurt
, ed. PaulLehmann,
27Bothareedited
in Romuald
AnIntroduction
totheLogical
Treatise
"DeobligationGreen,
ibus":With
Critical
Texts
, 2 vols.,Ph.D.diss.,
ofWilliam
ofSherwood
(?) andWalter
Burley
Universit
de Louvain,
at 2:34-96andtheearlier
trea1963,the1302treatise
catholique
toWilliam
ofSherwood,
at 2:1-33.
tise,ascribed
28Martin
DieIntroductions
inlogicam
desWilhelm
vonShyreswood
Grabmann,
(f nach1267):
literarhistorische
undTextausgabe
derBayerischen
, Munich
1937,21-3(Sitzungsberichte
Einleitung
Akademie
derWissenschaften,
1937,X).
Philosophisch-historische
Abteilung,
1968{op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 179.
Weisheipl

18:38:54 PM

& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER

Parisianmanuscriptand the Erfurtmanuscriptfromwhich it was copied


the workto Walter Burley.The Venetian
include a colophon attributing
a
both
title
includes
attributingthe work to Burley and a
manuscript
colophon attributingit to William Sherwood; that colophon has been
crossed out.30Romuald Green, who edited both treatisesin his Louvain
dissertation,rejected the attributionto Burley on account of inconsistencies between the views stated in the shorter and the longer version. He laid greatestweighton the factthat the longer 1302 Obligationes
rejecteda view statedin the earliertreatise,introducingit withthe words
"
."31
quidamdicunt
By contrast,Paul VincentSpade and Eleonore Stump believe thatthe
differencein opinion is the sort of change in views an author might
make.32Contraryto Weisheipl,Spade and Stump as well as Green agree
that the shorttreatiseis the early one; theyalso agree that the author
of the longer treatiseknew the shortertreatise.It is our view that the
presumptionis in favor of the evidence of the colophons and for the
of the shortearlytreatise.But if thatis so, we have a work
authenticity
writtenbefore1302: thatwould be as earlyor earlierthan what was precomviouslydescribed as Burley's earliestwork, the 1301 Pmhermenias
mentary.On the other hand, perhaps the titleof earliestwork should
itselfbe reassignedto the Quaestiones
superIII De animarecentlyeditedby
Walter Burley,the titleof a
Edward A. Synan and ascribed to dominus
editedby N.J.
or to some versionof the De consequentiis
bachelor of arts,33
Green-Pedersen,who identifiesthe copy of that treatisefoundwith the
as a revisedredaction.34
1302 Obligationes
and the De conL.M.
de Rijk, both the 1302 Obligationes
to
According
which
made
of
a
of
six
treatises
form
up a course
sequentiis
part
group
30Green1963(op.cit.,
aboven. 27),1:186-7.
31Green1963(op.cit
., aboven. 27),1:189-94.
32PaulVincent
Attributed
andtheObligationes
Walter
Burley
Stump,
SpadeandEleonore
andPhilosophy
ofLogic,4 (1983),9-26.
toWilliam
, in:History
ofSherwood
33Weisheipl
aboven. 2),
1969(op.cit
., aboven. 2), no. 32b,200-1;Lohr1968(op.cit.,
ontheDe anima
andWalter
andthetextinAdamBurley
no.29, 182-83;
Questions
Burley,
A. Synan,
Leidened. Edward
Walter
andDominus
Adam
Burky
Burley,
ofAristotle
byMagister
desMittelalters
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
NewYork-Cologne
1997,76-156(Studien
Gonville
headoftheunique
intherunning
Cambridge,
manuscript,
LVI).Thetitle
appears
andWalter
A. Synan,
Introduction
173r:seeEdward
& Caius668*,f.158v, inAdamBurley
at x-xii.
vii-lxiii,
Burley,
34Weisheipl
Walter
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),no. 19a,195;N.J.Green-Pedersen,
Burley's
at 108-10,
40 (1980),102-66,
AnEdition,
in:Franciscan
"Deconsequentiis":
Studies,
dating
textat 113-63.

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY:HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

of logic as it was taughtat that time,35a connectionwhich has encouraged most modern authorsto date all six together.If we suppose that
theymake up a singlelogic course offeredin 1302, thenperhapsit makes
sense that only the last of the treatises,the Obligationes
, is actuallydated
the
edited
scribe.
The
first
is
the
,
Suppositions
by Stephen Brown and
by
on account of its presencein two manuscriptscondated in 1302, firstly
tainingotherworksfromthat period and secondlybecause Burleycalls
Here a caveat is in order:not all of the works
it "a workof his youth."36
of Burley's youthbelong to the Oxford period. Burleyappears to have
called workswrittenin 1326 as well as workswrittenin 1302 "worksof
and De exclusivis
are the secEdited by De Rijk, De exceptivis
his youth."37
ond and thirdtreatisesin the group.38The fourthis De consequentiis
, and
De insolubilibus
is
also
dated
De
the fifth,
1302
,
by
Rijk.39
as an early treatmentof an imporBrown describedthe Suppositiones
its treatment
of relativesuppositionwas copied
tanttopicin theDe puritate'
.40Somethingsimilarcould
and accepted by Ockham in his Summalogicae
the
five
be
said
about
other
treatises.
For purposes of simplicprobably
will
this
of
six
we
call
treatises
Burley's Logicof 1302.
ity
group
Possiblyalso belongingto the Oxford period is the Posterior
analytics
, of which there may be as many as three redactions:expocommentary
is based on Albertus
sition, summaryand questions.41The Exposition
42 The
and
Grosse
teste.
, perhaps to be dated before
Quaestiones
Magnus
with
De
animae
1307 together
the
,43have been edited in a 1981
potentiis
35L.M.de Rijk,Walter
Bur
De exclusivis:
AnEdition
23 (1985),
, in:Vivarium,
ley'sTract
23-54,at 23.
36Weisheipl
1969(<
Walter
Treatise
De
., aboven. 2),no. 12,191;Brown,
op.cit
Burleigh's
andItsInfluence
on William
32 (1972),
, in: Franciscan
Studies,
ofOckham
suppositionibus
textat 31-64,dating
at 16.
15-64,
37Weisheipl
1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 182.
38Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),no. 16-17,195;De Rijk,Walter
De excepBurley's
tivis:
AnEdition
24 (1986),22-49,at 23-49;De Rijk1985(op.cit.,
above
, in: Vivarium,
n. 35),28-54.
39Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),no.21, 196;textin M.L. Roure,La problmatique
despropositions
insolubles
au XIIIesicle
etau dbut
duXIVe,suivie
de Vdition
destraits
de
W.Burleigh
W.Shyreswood,
etTh.Bradwardine,
in:Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
et littraire
at 262-84;De Rijk,Some
du moyen
ontheMediaeval
Tract
Notes
ge,45 (1970),205-326,
Deinsolubilibus
Edition
the
the
EndoftheTwelfth
4
, with
, in:Vivarium,
ofa Tract
Dating
from
Century
at 87.
(1966),83-115,
40Brown1972(op.cit.,
aboven. 36),16,25-26,27.
41Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2), no. 9a,b,c,190;Lohr1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),
no.9-10,177-78.
42Weisheipl
1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 178.
43ForthedateseeSynan
1997(op.cit.,
aboven.33),Introduction
, x-xi;andidem,
Introduction,

18:38:54 PM

OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER

the summaryis describedby Weisheiplas of doubtToronto dissertation;44


and by Robert Andrewsas a mere list of conclusions.46
ful authenticity45
The last of the logical workswhich may have been writtenat Oxford
is the Elenchicommentary
, which survivesonly in English manuscripts.47
are
at
least
and an Exposition
or Treatise
there
two
versions:Questions
,
Again
. The Questions
also knownas Modusarguendi
surviveonly in an early 14th
centurymanuscript,and no one has writtenon it recently.By contrast
both Sten Ebbesen and Clemens Kopp have writtenon the De modo
,48Kopp has ascribeda thirdversionto Burleywhichhe calls the
arguendi
Fallaciaebreves
, along withone of fourversionsor adaptationsof the thirOxoniaeeditedin parallelin his
textbookFallaciaead modum
teenth-century
" foundin the
and a commentaryto the Logica"Cumsitnostra
dissertation,
Oxoniaetreatisesare
same manuscript.49
All fourof the Fallaciaead modum
in: Richard
Vol.1, Questiones
librum
of Campsall,
TheWorks
ofRichard
ofCampsall.
super
A. Synan,
MS Gonville
andCaius668*,ed. Edward
Toronto
Priorm
Analeticorunv
1968,111969
and TextsXVII). FortheDe potentiis
animae
see Weisheipl
34, at 18-19(Studies
The"Depotentiis
aboven. 2), no. 33, 201-2;and thetextin M. JeanKitchel,
(<
op.cit.,
" Walter in:Mediaeval
at 88-113.
to
33 (1971),85-113,
animae
Studies,
According
of
Burley,
S. Harrison
exists
a medieval
Hebrew
translation
ofthiswork:
S. Harrison
Thomson
there
at202.
7 (1933),
Grosseteste
TheDe animaofRobert
201-21,
, in:NewScholasticism,
Thomson,
44Publication
librum
Posteriorum
ofWalter
, ed. MaryCatherine
Quaestiones
Burley,
super
Institute
ofMediaeval
withthePontifical
is underdiscussion
Toronto,
Studies,
Sommers,
Canada.
45
1968{op.cit.,
aboven. 7), 178.
46Weisheipl
Personal
communication.
47Weisheipl
aboven. 2),no. lla,b, 191;cf.ibid.,no.22 (Desophismatibus
1969(op.cit.,
theauthenticity
ofthisworkhasbeenquestioned
cum
suasophisteria
byJan
), 196,although
L.M. de Rijk
onExclusives
C.H. Kneepkens,
Walter
, in:H.A.G.Braakhuis,
Pinborg,
Burley
and
totheTime
From
theEndoftheTwelfth
andSemantics:
ofOckham
(eds.),English
Logic
Century
23Leiden
andSemantics,
onMediaeval
Acts
-Nijmegen,
ofthe4thEuropean
Logic
Symposium
Burleigh:
27 April
1979, Nijmegen
1981,305-29,at 307 (Artistarium,
I). Lohr1968
Supplementa
aboven. 2),no. 13-14,178-79.
(op.cit.,
48StenEbbesen,
in:P. Osmund
A Theory
about
theOrigins
OXYNAT:
Lewry
ofBritish
Logic,
andSemantics
onMedieval
Sixth
Acts
,
Logic
(ed.),TheRiseofBritish
ofthe
European
Symposium
Logic:
19-24June1983,Toronto1985,1-17,at 3 (Papersin Mediaeval
BalliolCollege
, Oxfordy
Studies
VII).
49Clemens
"-EinFehlschlutraktat
ausdem13.
ad modum
Oxoniae
Kopp,Die "Fallaciae
text
toBurley
at xxviii-xxxi,
zu Kln,1985,ascription
, Ph.D.diss.,Universitt
Jahrhundert
- einWerk
in:Aristotelisches
Walter
breves
at4-153;idem,
DieFallaciae
Oxoniae)
(admodum
Burleys?,
York
Berlin-New
imarabisch-lateinischen
Mittelalter:
Erbe
Kommentare,
bersetzungen,
Interpretationen,
mediaevalia
1986,119-24
XVIII);andtextinidem,Einkurzer
Fehlschlutraktat:
(Miscellanea
MSS 12 F XIX3104rbMuseum
London
breves
DieFallaciae
, Royal
, British
Oxoniae):
(admodum
withGudrun
Vuillemin-Diem
in:Albert
zurmittelalterZimmermann,
105vb,
(eds.),Studien
at263-73(Miscellanea
York1982,262-77,
Berlin-New
lichen
undihren
Quellen,
Geistesgeschichte
A Contribution
totheHistory
modernorum:
mediaevalia
ofEarly
XV). See alsoDe Rijk,Logica
en
teksten
vol.2, pt. 1, 445-6(Wijsgerige
Terminist
2 vols,in 3, Assen1962-67,
Logjic,
studies
VI, XVI).

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

verysimilarto each other,withlots of verbatimborrowing.So the presumptionis that Kopp is right.But to say the least it complicatesthe
situation.For it mightequally be that what Kopp has foundis the base
textor textsBurleyused in lecturingon the Elenchi.
we tentativelyattributethe earliestof
As stated in the introduction,
commentaries
to
the Oxford period. Apart from such
Burley'sPhysics
in
modern
authors, the attentivewill note that
derring-do dating by
worksto the Oxfordperiod. There
thereis littleevidenceforattributing
on thePeriheris a titlein one of threemanuscriptsof the Oxford
Questions
meniasand a colophon in one of two manuscriptsof the 1302 Obligations
.
That is a circumstancewhich might prompt the prudent to wonder
whetherthese early Oxford productionseven have the same author as
the famousworkspublishedin 1330s. Here the workof Brown,who has
publishedsome of the earliestof these works,offersreassurance.Brown
, and the
, the ParisExposition
pointsto close parallelsin the firstQuestions
Final Commentary
.50For the firstbook of the
of Burley'sIn Perihermenias
.51So
1302 Logic
, Brownlistsparallelpassages in the De puntateartislogicae
one advantageof Burley'sreuse of earlierredactionsis greatercertainty
thatwe are dealing withworksby a single author.
2. Paris
Burley'sclericalcareer began in 1309, when he was admittedas rector
of Welbury,Yorkshire,a positionhe owed to SirJohn de Lisle, a friend
of the Archbishopof York, William of Greenfield.An acolyte,Burley
took this position in order to finance his study of theologyat Paris;
throughouthis pastoralcareer he employedsubstitutes.
Along with the income fromhis firstrectory,Burleyreceivedpermission to studyand to take holy ordersabroad. At Paris, Burleystrengthened his tieswithBishop Greenfieldby actingas a companionto Greenfield'snephew,Baldwin of St Albans, who received a Yorkshirerectory
at the same time as Burley.Papal reservationof a beneficein the giftof
the bishop of Lincoln was conferredon Burleyat the petitionof William
That
Testa, cardinal of S. Ciriaco, in 1317, notwithstanding
Welbury.52
received
the
a
new
of
before
the
is, Burley
last,
promise
rectory
leaving
but he did not occupy two rectoriessimultaneously.53
Burley'sLincoln
5)0Brown1973 cit.,aboven. 18),43; Brown1974 cit.,aboven.
(op.
(op.
16),201.
51Brown1972(<
., aboven. 36),26-7,n. 43.
op.cit
52See Emden(op.cit.,
aboven. 1),312.
53See Martin
aboven. 1),214,n. 3.
(op.cit.,

18:38:54 PM

10

OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER

rectorywas Pytchley,Northamptonshire,to which he was admittedin


1320; by 1321, Burleywas a priest.
Althoughmany of his printedworksseem to have been finallycompleted during his years as a courtier,intellectuallythe most exciting
period in Burley'slifemusthave been at Paris shortlyafterhe completed
his lectures on the Sentences
, when he firstencountered and reacted
William
of
Ockham's
against
logic and naturalphilosophy.Burleyand
Ockham studied theologyat the same time, Burley at Paris, Ockham
at Oxford. Both Burley and Ockham began theirstudiesaround 1310
and completedtheirSentences
lecturesaround 1320. Aftercompletingtheir
theologydegrees,both returnedto a considerationof logic and natural
philosophy.
The most serious loss with regard to Burley'sworks are his lectures
on theology.His Parisian Sentences
has not survived.(Edith
commentary
was prepared, but not preDudley Sylla doubts whetheran Ordinatio
sumably the existenceof a Reportatio
).54 However, since in his Tractatus
primusBurleyadvertsto the materialcovered in the fourthbook of that
work,we may assume thatsome of the same materialwhichwas treated
primus. By conoriginallyin the fourthbook is repeatedin the Tractatus
trastto the Tractatus
, the fragmentary
primus
theologicalquestiondiscovered by S. HarrisonThomson tellsus nothingabout Burley'stheological
views- the denial that Christiansalvationis possible by natural means
being a view universallyheld.56
At Paris, Burley was associated with Thomas Wilton,whom Burley
calls his sodus and reverendmaster in the Tractatus
primus.01
Weisheipl
believed that Wilton was Burley'schiefopponentin the Tractatus
primus
as well as his reverendmaster,but Sylla considersthat an open question.58Like Burley,Wilton had been at Merton College, where he was
a fellowfrom 1288 to 1301. Wilton became a Parisian masterof theology in 1314 and Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral in London in 1320,
54EdithDudleySylla,Walter
theRelations
Evidence
Tractatus
of
Burley's
primus:
Concerning
44 (1984),257-74,
at 261.
Works
andWritten
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Disputations
55Weisheipl
1969(op.t.,
aboven. 2),no.44,204.
56Thomson,
etHumanAnUnnoticed
, in:Medievalia
ofWalter
Burley
Questiotheologica
see
to Thomson's
stica,6 (1950),84-88,textat 87-88.Fora correction
interpretation,
Martin
aboven. 1),209,n. 2.
(op.t.,
57Martin
aboven. 1),207-8.
[op.t.,
58Weisheipl
aboven. 54),258.
1968(op.cit
., aboven. 7), 185-6;Sylla1984{op.cit.,
whileSyllaconsiders
assumes
thatBurley's
is thesamethroughout,
opponent
Weisheipl
thisuncertain.

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

11

but receivedpermissionto remainabroad until 1322. Since Burleymentionshis master'spromotionto Chancellorin thework,the Tractatus
primus
has to be dated after1320. Since BurleyprobablyinceptedbeforeWilton
actuallyleftforLondon, around November 1, 1322, when Wilton'spermissionto be absentfromSt. Paul's expired,it seems reasonableto suppose that Burleyinceptedin 1322 or not long after.59
The Tractatus
primus
grewout of the discussionwhichfollowedBurley's
, just as Ockham's
inaugurallectureon the fourthbook of the Sentences
De sacramento
altarisaddressesquestionsraised in his fourthbook. Indeed,
it seems to us that Burley'sTractatus
primuswas writtenafterhis lectures
on the Sentences
and before he became a master,and should be dated
withthe dates suggestedforthe assobetween1320 and 1322, correlating
sit maximaopposition
ciated Quaestioutrumcontradicho
the firsthalf of the
and
Tractatus
secundus
between
and
One problem
1320
1323.60
1320s,
,
withthatsuggestionis thatit is generallyassumedthatthe Tractatus
primus
was writtenafterBurleybecame a masterof theology,because when it
was writtenhe had already held a quodlibet at Toulouse: De primoet
ultimo
instanti
.61However,the objectionholdsonlyifwe believethatMasters
of Artscould not hold quodlibetaldisputations;surelyat Toulouse, there
would be no obstacleto Burley'sholdingsuch a quodlibeton a question
in logic and physicsbeforebecominga Parisianmasterof theology(Sylla
also appears to hold thisview).62
59Assuming,
ofcourse,
thatbyreferring
to Wilton
as his"reverend
master"
Burley
meant
toindicate
thathe incepted
underhim,an assumption
whichdoesmakeitrather
difficult
to explain
hissimultaneous
useofthetide"socius."
60On thequaestio
seeDe Rijk,Burley's
So-Called
Tractatus
with
anEdition
primus,
ofthe
"
Additional
contradicho
sitmaxima
in:Vivarium,
34 (1996),161-91,
QuaestioUtrum
opposition
at 164,withtextat 176-91,
andMaier,Handschriftliches
Ockham
undWalter
zu Wilhelm
Burle)/.
Mittelalter:
Gesammelte
des14.
zurGeistesgeschichte
, in: Maier,Ausgehendes
Nachtrag
Aufstze
ofthetextbasedona different
/,Rome1964,469-79at 474;andtheversion
Jahrhunderts
msfrom
thefourusedbyDe Rijkin Ryszard
Burleii
Utrum
conPalacz,Gualterii
quaestio:
tradicho
sitmaxima
318f. 141va-l
in:Mediaevalia
(Ms.Vat.Ottob.
oppositio
45vb),
philosophicapolonorum,
11(1963),128-39.
On thetractatus
Traktat
De
, seeMaier,Zu Walter
Burleys
intensione
et remissione
in:Franciscan
25 (1965),293-321,
at 293-4.
formarum,
Studies,
61Weisheipl
1969(<op.t
andCharlotte
., aboven. 2),no.47,205;textinHerman
Shapiro
De primoet ultimoinstanti
desWalter
frGeschichte
der
, in: Archiv
Shapiro,
Burley
47 (1965),157-73,
at 159-73.
Philosophie,
62Sylla1984(< ., aboven. 54),261,
itis Maierwhomakes
thepointexplicop.cit
although
Maier1964(op.t.,
aboven. 60),475-76.Martin
assumes
thatonlya doctor
canhold
itly:
a quodlibet,
butmakestherather
morecomplicated
thatBurley
couldhave
argument
a first
written
version
ofthetreatise
before
Wilton's
in 1322,onlyto revise
it
departure
between
hisinception,
1324and 1327,after
whichin Martin's
viewmaybe as lateas
1324:Martin1964(op.cit.,
aboven. 1),208-9.

18:38:54 PM

12

& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER

beforeBurleybecame
was written
More evidencethatthe Tractatus
primus
a masterof theology,that is before 1324,63 comes fromits citationby
comWilliamof Ockham. Ockham borrowedfromit, as well as critically
on thePhysics.6*
mentingon it, in his circa-1324 Questions
there
are
no
insultingpersonal commentsin Ockham's
Interestingly,
includes
on
the
circa-1319Scriptum
on the Sentences
Ockham's
Questions Physics.
that
he
would
Ockham
and
the firstinsulttradedby
Burley.Ockham says
not have treateda certainfrivolousobjection (cavillatio
) had it not been
that "some people who considerthat theyknow logic give great weight
to such childishconsiderations(puerilid
) on account of which theyposit
from
this
But apart
comment,there are no more
many absurdities."65
nastyremarksabout Burleyin Ockham's writings.Some views Ockham
seeks to refute;others he adopts withoutattributionin the circa-1323
.66More importandy,beforeBurley's1324 Physics
Summalogicae
commentary,
thereis no sign thathe was aware of Ockham as an enemy.This peaceful intervalsuggeststhat when we findworksby Burleyin which there
is no sign of hostilityto Ockham, theymay be as late as 1324, though
it is more usual to suggest1320.67
One such work is the firstredactionof Burley'sfamouslogical treaThe second redaction,by contrast,is
tise, the De puntateartislogicae.
63See below.
64Svila1984(iop.cit
., aboven. 54),258.
65William
II-III,
ordinato:
Distinctiones
Sententiarum
ofOckham,
inlibrum
primum
Scriptum
withGedeonGal,St. Bonaventure
ed. Stephen
1970,146(OTh II): "IstacavilBrown,
talia
se scirelogicam,
nisiquiaaliqui,reputantes
lationonessethicponenda
pondrant
terminorum."
circasuppositionem
multaabsurda
propter
quaeponunt
puerilia,
66William
GedeonGal,andStephen
ofOckham,
Summa
Boehner,
, ed.Philotheus
logicae
De supposiSt. Bonaventure
1974,233-6(OPh I), wherehe useseither
Brown,
Burley's
tractaartis
tractatus
tionibus
orhisDepuntate
ibid.,233,n. 1. IftheDepuntate
longior;
logicae
itwould
to Ockham's
in response
tobe written
tuslongior
is supposed
Summa,
presumably
to himat thetimeofwriting.
be theformer
whichOckham
wouldhaveavailable
67Weisheipl
1968(<op.cit
., aboven. 7), 179,183-84.
68Weisheipl
arein Walter
aboven. 2), no. 13a,b,191-2.Bothversions
1969{op.cit.,
ed.
With
a Revised
Edition
Depuritate
artis
tractatus
breuior,
oftheTractatus
longior:
logicae
Burley,
Institute
Pub1955(Franciscan
St. Bonaventure-Louvain-Paderborn
Philotheus
Boehner,
at 1-197.Weisheipl's
at 199-260and thelonger
TextSeriesIX), theshorter
lications,
1980
Green-Pedersen
version:
fromtheshorter
no. 19b,De consequentiis
, is an excerpt
ofthe
translation
theGerman
version
aboven. 34),110.See alsoforthelonger
[op.cit.,
der
VonderReinheit
derKunst
terminorum
treatise
first
) in: WalterBurley,
{Deproprietatibus
anded. PeterKunze,Hamburg
derTermini
VondenEigenschaften
Traktat:
Erster
, trans,
Logik:
ofthefirst
translation
Bibliothek
1988(Philosophische
partofthe
CDI), andtheEnglish
OnConin: IvanBoh,Burleigh:
secondtreatise
conditionalibus)
{Depropositionibus
hypotheticis
bothwith
23 (1963),4-67,at 14-67,
ditional
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
Propositions
Hypothetical
Latinon facing
Boehner's
pages.

18:38:54 PM

WALTEROF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

13

dated by Boehner between 1324 and 1329, "or more probablybetween


1325-1328";69it is an attemptto refuteOckham's circa-1323 Summalogicae. Since the Swede, John Nicholas, made excerptsfrom the second
redactionin 1329,70it has to have been writtenbeforethatdate. Probably
the work can in fact be dated before 1327, when Burley leftParis for
Avignon.But since the datingof Ockham's Summahas now been pushed
back a bit, we do not have a shorterinterval,just a slightlyearlierone,
1324-1327.
Burleyhad become a masterof theologyby 1324, as we know from
71From
a rubricat the beginningof his Physicscommentary.
Burley's point
is
of view, there nothingpeaceful about the relationshipwith Ockham
from 1324 onward, and disagreementis frequentlysignaled by insult.
in 1324,
When Burleycompletedthe firstbook of his Physicscommentary
he scornfully
refersto Ockham as one who claimed to know more logic
thanany othermortal.72
Completedby 1326 when Ockham's not advancing to mastermightbe expected to rankle,book IV refersto Ockham
In book VI, the last book completedbefore
as a beginnerin philosophy.73
69Boehner
1955(op.citaboven. 68),Introduction
Depuntate
, in:Walter
, vi-xiv,
Burley,
at vii-viii.
70"Hancextractionem
de logicaBurleordinavit
frater
de cuslector
Nicholai,
Johannes
todiaLincopensi
Parisius
annoDomini
Daciae,quandostuduit
MCCCXXIX,
provinciae
de cuiuslogicaecommendatione
in huncmodum.
Postpraecedentem
praemisit
prologm
summam
a fratre
editam
Burlealiumtractatum
de logica
Ockham)
(Willielmo
compilavit
inquopaucacontinentur
utiliarealiter
nihilvelsumpta
de priori
summa
in
velde Boethio
librode categoricis
ethypotheticis
O. 67,f. 125v,
Erfurt,
syllogismis":
Amplon.
quotedin
Boehner
1955{op.cit.,
aboven. 68),vii.
71"Scriptum
Galtende Burley
doctoris
sacraetheologiae
magisti
superlibrum
phisicorum
Aristotelis
editum
Annodomini
MCCCXXiiii":
Basel,Universittsbibliothek,
parisius
F. II. 30,quotedinWeisheipl
1968(<op.cit
ofthedate
., aboven. 7), 181.The application
is madebyEmden(op.cit.,
to Burley's
ofthedegreein theology
aboven. 1),
acquisition
aboven. 1),208,n. 5. Maierreadsthedatein therubric
312,andMartin1964(op.cit.,
as referring
andsuggests
thathadBurley
beena master
onlytothedateofcomposition,
VI in thededication
Clement
to thePolitics
as a forby 1324,he wouldhavedescribed
mercolleague
andnotsomeone
from
whomhe learned,
thathe morelikely
concluding
thedegreeonlyjustbefore
received
Paris,in 1326or" 1327:Maier1964(op.cit.,
leaving
as "sacrae
aboven. 60),478-9.He is described
in EdwardIll's commispaginae
professor
sionof1327:Martin
1964(op.cit.,
aboven. 1),213-4.Maier'sreading
seemsforced,
since
hadevery
incentive
thepope,regardless
to flatter
ofwhoincepted
first.
Burley
72Walter
InPhysicam
rationes
nonessent
nisi
hieponendae
, f.8 : "Istaetamen
Burley,
sescirelogicam
asserentes
omnes
ad illamrationem
mortales,
quiaquidam
super
respondent
dicentes
tibibovem'permitto
tibiunamremsingulrem
extra
'permitto
quodsicdicendo
istum
sednonpermitto
bovemvelistum,
tibibovem'ille
animam,
quiain illa'permitto
terminus
etideononsupponit
bosstatconfuse
tamen
disiunctive
probovibus
singularibus,
sedsupponit
etc."
disiunctim,
ergo
73Walter
f. 98vb:"Ad hancigitur
In Physicam,
Burley,
quaestionem
quidamde novo

18:38:54 PM

14

& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER

he leftParis, Burleyonce more calls attentionto the fact that Ockham


is still an inceptoror beginner;his exposition,says Burley,includes a
"suggestionany idiot could make."74
Burley'shostilitydid not diminishwith time,so that worksfromthe
courtperiod,as well as workswrittenin Burley'slast years at Paris,contain referencesto Ockham, as "a beginnerin philosophy"and even as
a heretic.75
The final versionof Superartemveterem
includes rebuttalsof
Ockham's views on quantityfoundin Quodlibet
4, De sacramento
altaris,and
From
a
that
this
means
ExpositioPhysicorum.n
chronologicalstandpoint
of
the
insults
Ockham
that
directed
indicates
the
though
presence
against
work mustbe after1320 and probablyafter1324, it is no sign that the
workwas not writtennear the end of Burley'slife.
For a great many works,we reallyknow with certaintyonly whether
they were writtenbefore or after Burley began his controversywith
Ockham.Weisheiplconsidersit likelythatBurley'sfirstreactionto Ockham
is found in the Tractatus
deforrais
,77which deals in its second part with
dicunt
undede
continentis,
incipientes
philosophai!
corporis
quodlocusnonestultimum
virtute
sermonis
debetdiciquodlocusestcorpuscontinens
et circundans
aliudcorpus
itaquodquaelibet
versus
locatum
tancontinentis
undique
quaeestultima
parscorporis
locatieteconverso
versus
locum
gitaliquam
partem
quaelibet
parslocatiquaeestultima
tanrit
loci."
aliquampartem
74Walter
"Ex hisigitur
In Physicam
duoquae suntcontra
, f. 183ra:
Burley,
apparent
in istisgenindivisibile
quosdam
incipientes
probari
qui dicunt
quodnihilestsimpliciter
erabilibus
etcorruptibilibus
nisianimaintellectiva
etaccidentia
non
eius,etquodtempus
sitaliquaeresalia a rebuspermanentibus."
"Sedcircasolutionem
Ibid.,f. 196va:
praesentis
rationis
estdudum
idiotapotest
sicsolvere
dicendo
quodvelocissimum
quiaquilibet
tandem
tardissimum:
sednonattiget
dumtardissimum
attiget
ipsum
praecedit."
75Introducilo^
in:William
ofOckham,
//,St. Bonaventure
1978,24*.
Opera
philosophica
Walter
veterem
Frankfurt
artem
, Venice1497(facsimile
1967),f.e v
Burley,
Super
reprint,
adinva: "Propter
istadicunt
quidamincipientes
philosophai!
quodresnonreferuntur
vicemdistinguendo
rescontrasignarerum
sivevoces,quia sola nominaet taliasigna
rerum
referuntur
adinvicem."
Ibid.,f.e vi ra:"Adprinciplem
quaestionem
proboquod
haecopinioponens
solamvocemvelsignum
esthaeretica,
quiafides
perse esserelativum
in divinis
uttrespersonae
sunttresrelationes
realesseutriarelativa,
divinae,
tenet*quod
undein divinis
Si ergosolavoxvelsignum
sicutin creaturis
suntrelativa.
pateretfilius
velrelatio
nonessent
trespersonae
essetrelativum
et nonres,sequitur
quodin divinis
reldivinam
essent
sedsolumtresvocesveltriasignaqui significant
essentiam
relativae,
in divinis,
esthaereticum."
necprocessio
ativa,etsicnonessetgeneratio
quod
76WalterBurley,
Frankfurt
artem
veterem
, Venice1497(facsimile
1967),
Super
reprint,
f.e ii vb;William
ofOckham,
C. Wey,St.Bonaventure
1980,
Quodlibeta
, ed.Joseph
septem
to refute
Duhem'scomments
on Burley's
395,n. 1 (OTh IX). See alsoPierre
attempts
in theCategories
oftheSuper
artem
veterem
andin book
Ockham
on indivisibles
Commentary
I ofthePhysics
Pierre
Medieval
Theories
Place,
Time,
Duhem,
ofInfinity,
Commentary:
Cosmology:
andthePlurality
Void,
, ed. andtrans.
ofWorlds
RogerAriew,
ChicagoandLondon1985,
24-5.
77Weisheipl
1968(op.cit
1969(op.cit
., aboven. 2), no. 42, 204;fordating,
Weisheipl

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

15

the same topics considered in Ockham's De sacramento


altaris
chiefly,
quantityand the compositionof the continua.78It was probablywritten
at roughlythe same time as Burley'sother early attackson Ockham's
79
views,about 1324-1326.
Of courseOckham was not the onlycontemporary
attackedby Burley,
and we cannot assume that everymentionof a "modern" author refers
to Ockham. There is a recitationand refutation
of the viewsof Franciscus
de Marchia in the Physics
, accordingto AnnelieseMaier;80Super
commentary
artem
veterem
includesa refutation
of PeterAureol'sviews on esseobiectivum
,
as well as Ockham's on quantity.81
Maier even suggestsa dialogue with
Buridan on the subject of motion in a vacuum;82looking at the same
subject,however,Wood foundOckham as usual influencing
Burleynegmore
she
found
a
influence
from
atively;
unexpectedly,
strongpositive
Scotus.83Clearer is the influencein the other direction:Markowskihas
describedBuridan'spolemic againstBurley'stheoryof universais.84
3. At Court
Burley'sentryinto lifeat court was as part of the politicalgroup which
deposed Edward II of England.85His firstdiplomaticassignmentwas to
aboven. 7), 183-4;textin: Frederick
Treatise
De formis,
J. DownScott,Walter
Burley's
Munich
Akademie
derWissenschaften,
derKom1970,7-71(Bayerische
Verffentlichungen
mission
frdieHerausgabe
Texteaus dermittelalterlichen
Geisteswelt
ungedruckter
IV).
78Scott1970(iop.cit.
, aboven. 77),2-4.
79Weisheipl
datesit 1320-23,
on thegrounds
thatit antedates
thefinalPhysics
combutit is unclear
whichbooksofthePhysics
he has in mind:Weisheipl
1968
mentary,
aboven. 7), 184.
(op.cit.,
80Maier,
derscholastischen
DasProblem
derintensiven
^weiGrundprobleme
Grsse;
Naturphilosophie:
DieImpetustheorie
e letteratura
, 2nded.,Rome1951,232-4(Storia
XXXVII).
81Walter
artem
veterem
Frankfurt
, Venice1497(facsimile
Burley,
Super
reprint,
1967),
f.b i ra.
82Maier,
AnderGrenze
von
Scholastik
und
DieStruktur
dermateriellen
Substanz;
Naturwissenschaft:
Das Problem
derGravitation;
Die Mathematik
derFormlatituden
, 2nded.,Rome1952,244-5
zurNaturphilosophie
III, Storiae letteratura
(Studien
XLI).
83Wood1989-90
aboven. 8). See alsoAgustn
UaJurez's
for
(op.cit.,
arguments
as an auditor
ofScotusin Oxford,
basedon a reference
in book7 ofthePhysics
Burley
UaJurez,
Lafilosofia
delsiglo
XIV:Contexto
cultural
deWalter
commentary:
,
Agustn
Burley
Madrid1978,18-22(Biblioteca
"La ciudadde Dios,"LibrosXXVI).
M. Markowski,
Buridans
Polemik
Universalienlehre
desWalter
Johannes
, in:
gegen
Burleigh
Mediaevalia
26 (1982),7-17.
philosophica
polonorum,
85On the
seeinaddition
toEmdenandMartin,
N. Denholmevents,
following
Young,
Richard
deBury
onMediaeval
(1287-1345
), in: N. Denholm,
Young,Collected
Papers
Subjects
Oxford
intheReign
III, Cambridge
1946,1-25;ScottL. Waugh,
England
1991,
ofEdward
10-14(Cambridge
Medieval
andW.M.Ormrod,
TheReign
III: Crown
Textbooks);
ofEdward
andPolitical
inEngland
1327-1377
, NewHaven-London
Society
1990,3-7.

18:38:54 PM

16

& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER

seek the canonizationof Thomas, Earl of Lancaster,Edward II's late and


unlamentedcousin, the leader of the baronial oppositionwhose refusal
to supportthe King resultedin the loss of Scotland at Bannockburnin
1314. Afterseven years of complicityin Scottishraids,Thomas of Lancasterlost the batde of Boroughbridgeand was condemnedto a traitor's
death in 1322.
Five years later the tides had turned,under the leadershipof Queen
Isabelle. Isabelle travelledto France in 1325 whereshe arrangedthe marriage of the futureEdward III to Philippa of Hainault, and whereyoung
Edwardjoined her to do homageforGascony.In September1326,Isabelle
returnedto England and took London with the assistanceof the count
of Hainault and of her loverRoger Mortimer,who had escaped to France
fromthe Tower where he was imprisonedafterBoroughbridge.Edward
II's ministers,
the two Hugh Despensers,fatherand son, were hanged in
November; Edward himselfwas forced to abdicate in January 1327.
Edward III was crowned on February 1 at the age of fourteen.On
February28 a letterwent out in his name askingthe Pope to canonize
Thomas of Lancaster,whose brotherHenry was chiefof Edward Ill's
regencycouncil.
Burley'sassociateswere deeply involvedin these events.The bishop
to whom Burleyowed permissionto studyabroad while holdinga rectoryin the diocese of Lincoln, Henry Burghersh,was a close associate
of Queen Isabelle. Richard de Bury,Burley'smost importantintellectual
patron,may have visitedIsabelle at Paris whilein the serviceof the future
Edward III in 1325-1326, at which time Burleymay also have met his
futuresponsors.One of Burley'stwo associateson the missionto Avignon
seekingThomas of Lancaster'scanonizationin Februaryof 1327 was the
knightWilliam Trussel, who presided at the tribunalwhich sentenced
Hugh Despenser to death in Novemberof 1326 and who acted as procurator of the realm in the formalretractionof homage fromEdward II
in Januaryof 1327. When Edward III marriedPhilippa in Januaryof
1328, Burley himselfwas appointed her almoner. So Burleybegan his
politicallife as part of the successfulnorthernbaronial partyof rebels,
which ought to increase the interestof his Politicscommentary.
During Burley'sfirstmissionat Avignonin 1327, William of Ockham
was also in residencethere.Unlike Burley,who was an enemyof Edward
II, Ockham mighthave benefitedfromsome of Edward II's acts, even
if indirectly.
In 1322, Edward at firstdeniedJohn Lutterellpermissionto
travelto Avignon,probablybecause Edward did not want an enemyof

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

17

OxfordUniversityto gain the Pope's ear.86When Lutterellwas granted


permissionto travel to Avignon,where he presentedhis criticismsof
Ockham's theology,it was fortwo years.Afterthatperiod,in May 1325,
about a year afterOckham arrivedto defendhimself,Edward II ordered
Lutterellhome again. John XXII refused,claiming that Lutterellwas
needed to combat "certain pestiferousdoctrines,"presumablythose of
Ockham whose Sentences
Lutterellwas examining.In 1330, at
commentary
the time of his second mission,this time as a king'sclerk,when Burley
again attemptedto have Thomas of Lancaster canonized, his statusas
one of Ockham's mostprominentenemiescan only have been an advantage at the papal curia.
Once he traveledto Avignon,Burley'sclericalcareertook off.In addition to holding a rectory,Burley augmentedhis income by holding a
positionas a canon or prebendary;these positions,too, he held as an
absentee.In May 1327 he became canon of Chichesterand prebendary
ofWalthamby papal provision.These positionshe exchangedin September of 1332, becoming canon of Wells and prebendaryof Shalford.A
formercanon of Wells, now its Dean, was Burley'sgreatpatronRichard
de Bury.As keeper of the privyseal, De Bury was one of the organizers of the coupd'etatof 1330 which cost Mortimerhis head and made
Edward III kingin factas well as in name. Afterthat success,the Pope
providedDe Bury to the see of Durham in October 1333; in December
the King and Queen of Scotland attended De Bury's consecrationas
Bishop. In 1334-1335,he was Chancellorof England. De Burygathered
around himselfa court of intellectuals,a distinguishedgroup which included Thomas Fitzralphand Richard de Kilvington,as well as Robert
Holcott, Thomas Bradwardine,and Burley. Between 1334 and 1343,
,87the last versionof his
Burleydedicatedto De Buryhis Ethicscommentary
his
artem
veterem
and
.89
,
,88
commentary
Physics
Super
finallyhis Politics
commentary
86On Lutterell,
seeEmden1957-59
andFrancis
E. Kelley,
., aboven. 1),2:1181-2,
(<
op.cit
Ockham:
andAfter
Ockham
, Before
, in:AnneHudsonandMichaelWilks(eds.),From
Avignon
toWyclif,
Oxford
in Church
Subsidia
1987,1-18,at 1-9(Studies
History,
V).
87Weisheipl
aboven. 2), no. 48, 205-6;Lohr1968(op.cit.,
1969{op.cit.,
aboven. 2),
no.36, 185-6.
88Weisheipl
1969(op.cit.,
aboven. 2), no. 7, 189:"Completa
esthecexpositio
quinta
diemensis
annodomini
millesimo
CCC tricsimo
et annoetatisexpoAugusti
septimo
nentssexagsima
secundo."
Lohr1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),no.4, 174-6.
89Weisheipl
1969(op.t.,
aboven. 2), no. 49b,206-7;Lohr1968(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),
no.37, 186-87.
On thevarious
seeMartin1964(op.cit.,
dedications
aboven. 1),219-22,
225-7.Thededicatory
letters
tothePolitics
areinMaier, Walter
Politik-Kommentar,
Burleys

18:38:54 PM

18

OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER

vetApparentlycompletedafterthe finalversionof Burley'sSuperartem


a
is
treaDe
one
last
It
erem
universalities
also
be
of
works.90
,
may
Burley's
tise which mightrepay furtherstudy.It was edited less than fortyyears
so some of the
ago by an able latinistat St. BonaventureUniversity,91
errorsin the printededitionshave been corrected.More to the point,
thismay be the last logical workwrittenby Burley.Since so much work
has been done on Burley'searliestperiod,and the De puntateof the midto see
dle yearsis much studied,perhapsit would be a good opportunity
how much and what kindof change occurredin fortyyears.At least that
comis what we thoughtwhen we read this sentencein the Categories
in
"All
De
Ars
:
material
will
be
clearer
the
vetus
this
from
mentary
Bury
the treatiseon universais,God willing:De ista tamen materia plenius
apparebitin tractatude universalibusDeo concedente."92
was
But because we knew that Weisheiplbelieved thatDe universalibus
not a late work, but an early example of a treatisedirected against
We knew
Ockham's fictumtheoryor esseobiectivum,
,93we checkedfurther.
that the argumentagainstesseobiectivum
foundin the IsagogeCommentary
fromthe De BurySuperartem
veterem
was directednot againstOckham but
it
all
of AureoPs characteristic
examples
against Peter Aureol; repliesto
So we comparedthe two discussionsand foundthat
of sensoryillusions.94
revealedthatthe entireDe unitheywere the same. Furtherinvestigation
the
text
as
the
versalibus
same
presents
prologue to the Isagogecommen-

des14.Jahrhunderts
in:Maier,Ausgehendes
Mittelalter:
Gesammelte
zurGeistesgeschichte
/,
Aufstze
in:
onthePolitics
Walter
Rome1964,93-9;andThomson,
ofAristotle,
Commentary
Burley's

mdivale
littraire
etdoctrinale
dela scolastique
Etudes
d'histoire
Pelzer:
offertes
Auguste
Mlanges
anniversaire
l'occasion
desonsoixante-dixime
Pelzer
, Louvain1947,557-78
Monseigneur
Auguste
etde philologie,
3dser.XXVI);and
d'histoire
de Louvain,
Recueilde travaux
(Universit
on
areexcerpted
in L.J.Daly,TheConclusions
theconclusions
Burley's
Commentary
ofWalter
I toIV' in: Manuscripta,
Books
12 (1968),79-92,at 84-89;and idem,The
thePolitics,
13
V andVI, in:Manuscripta,
onthePolitics,
Books
Conclusions
Burley's
Commentary
ofWalter
at 145-8.
142-9,
(1969),
90
1969(<
., aboven. 2),no.23, 197.
op.cit
91Weisheipl
Shriver
aboven. 10),28-71.
1958(op.cit..
92WalterBurley,
Frankfurt
artem
veterem
, Venice1497(facsimile
1967),
reprint,
Super
f.d ii vb.
93Weisheipl
absenceofanydetailed
1968(op.cit
., aboven. 7), 180:"Thenoticeable
found
's arguments
thatitwaswritten
before
ofOckham
refutation
Burley
might
suggest
butsuchan absencecouldjustas
to study
ordinatio
an opportunity
Ockham's
carefully,
a detailed
refutation
written."
already
easily
presuppose
94For
Wodeham
andOckham
onsensory
seeWood,Adam
thepositions
ofAureol
illusions,
"
38
3, in: Traditio,
an Edition
onSensory
with
Illusions
, Quaestio
secunda,"
of Lectura
Prologus
at 220-6.
(1982),213-52,

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

19

taryfound in the De BuryLogic?0What does that mean? It is hard to


know, a puzzle yet to be unraveled. Either it means that the sentence
was copied into the De BuryLogicfroman earlier version,or it means
thatthe printedversionincludedbits and pieces not part of the original
De BuryLogic.96
So far all we have been able to establishis that the earliestversionof the Categories
fromwhich the statementcomes
commentary
de universalibus
includesno referenceto the Tractatus
. A manuscriptof the
De BuryLogicrefersto a chapterratherthan a treatiseon universais.97
Membersof Richard de Bury's circlebenefitedfromtheirshared societyand fromhis wonderfullibrary;De Burywas the foremostbook collector of his age. Burley appears to have been particularlyclose to a
canon lawyerwho belonged to the circle,Richard Bentworth.In 1336,
he exchangedbeneficeswithBentworth,
movinghis canonryand prebend
fromWells to Durham. AfterBentworthbecame bishop of London in
May of 1338 and Chancellor of England in July,Burleybegan, at his
Bentworthdied 8 Dec.
request,to workagain on the PoliticsCommentary.
the
was
before
work
1339,
complete,leaving Burleywithouta powerful
and
free
to
dedicate
one
more workto De Bury,to whom Burley
friend,
musthave been verygrateful gratefulamong otherthingsfora pardon.
Grantedtwo oaks in Sherwoodforest,not farfromhis rectoryin Pytchely,
by Queen Philippa, Burleywas arrestedand imprisonedwith his men
when he cut themdown;98a pardon forhis forestry
offenses
was obtained
at De Bury'srequestin December of 1336.
95Walter
artem
Venice1497(facsimile
Frankfurt
veterem,
Burley,
Super
reprint,
1967),
f.a iii vb-bi rb.UaJurezidentifies
theDe universalibus
section
ofWeisheipPs
Quaestiones
dearte
vetere
artem
veterem
(no.6) withthepassagein theprinted
, andapparently
Super
alsowiththeseparate
De universalibus
., aboven. 83),
(no. 23): UaJurez1978(op.cit
56-7.He also notesthattheQuaestio
deprimo
etultimo
instanti
is included
in
disputata
book8 ofthePhysics
f.252va-254va
ofthe1482ed.:ibid.,77.In the1501ed. used
, citing
in thispaperthequestion
is found
on f.257ra-259va.
96Lohr's
oftworedactions
oftheSexprincipiis
andofthePerhermenias
underthe
listing
oftheSuper
artem
veterem
wouldseemworthy
offurther
inthisregard,
heading
investigation
as wouldKonstantyn
Michalski's
statement
thattheprinted
version
ofthecommentary
on
thePosterior
is an abridged
version
ofthatinthemss:Lohr1968(op.dt,
above
Analytics
n. 2), no.4, 174-76;andKonstantyn
La physique
nouvelle
etlesdiffrents
courants
Michalski,
au XIVesicle
international
de l'Academie
dessciences
, in:Bulletin
philosophiques
polonaise
etdeslettres:
Classede philologie,
Classed'histoire
et de philosophie,
(1927),93-164,at
96. See alsoScott's
comments
on theincoherence
ofthetextoftheDeformisi
Scott1970
aboven. 77),4-5.
(op.cit.,
97Vatican,
Vat.lat.3048,f.34r.
98A
in therecords
blamed
oftheaffair
on "certain
ofhisrivals,"
unforcomplication
nototherwise
identifiable:
Martin1964(op.cit.,
aboven. 1),224.
tunately

18:38:54 PM

20

& REGAWOOD
OTTMAN
JENNIFER

Burley'sotherexperienceof women may not have been entirelyfavorable either.At least one passage fromhis Ethicsis conspicuouslysexist.
The text on which Burleyis commentingis harmlessenough. Aristotle
remarksthat women are not called incontinentor overcomeby passion
because of the position they assume in (missionarystyle)intercourse."
Followinga ratherpoor translation,Aquinas takes thispassage to mean
thatsince women are led ratherthanleading,theydo not countas incontinent.Supplyingan explanation,Aquinas tells us that this is because
lacking reason, women are led by their affectionsratherthan governing their affectionswith reason. Consequently,we rarelyfind strong,
wise women.100
Burleygoes further.He agrees that such women are rare and adds a
prurientnote: For the most part, he says,women are led by theirconcupiscentdesires.If theyare not to be led by theirconcupiscentdesires,
then since they lack reason, they must be led by the reason of men.
Consequently,Burley concludes that, strictlyspeaking,women do not
- that iftheir
counteitheras continentor incontinent
is,
appetiteis unconof
universal
the
concomitant
women
lack
trolled,
practical right
grasp
reasonwhichcharacterizesthe merelyweak; iftheirappetiteis controlled,
it is by a man's reason, not by theirown.101
and his Politics
Burley'slastworkswere a 1341 disputationat Bologna102
1
to
in
November
of
343
which
he
dedicated
,
Pope ClementVI,
commentary
99Aristotle,
The
in:Aristotle,
W.D. Ross,rev.J.O. Urmson,
Ethics
Mcomachean
, trans.
Series
ed.Jonathan
TheRevised
Works
Barnes,
Translation,
Bollingen
Oxford
Complete
ofAristotle:
at lib.7, cap.5, no. 1148b,1815.
1984,2:1729-1867,
LXXI,Princeton
100
2 vols.,
C.I. Litzinger,
ontheMcomachean
Ethics
ThomasAquinas,
, trans.
Commentary
ofLiving
Catholic
1964,lib.7, lect.5, no. 1376,642 (Library
Thought).
Chicago
101
libros
Aristotelis
decern
Ethicorum
Walter
, Venice1500,f. 112 :
Burley,
Expositio
super
mulieres
maioris
dicens
"Deindeponit
supquod
quemadmodum
exemplarem
probationem
se per
in eis:undenonducunt
rationis
defectum
incontinentes
propter
ple nondicuntur
viri:vela concupiscentiis
rationem
sedmagisducuntur
suis,ita
perrationem
propriam:
non
debilem
nec illiqui habentrationem
concupiscentias
quae nonestnatarepellere
esthocprimoquod
autcontinentes
debentdiciincontinentes
Intelligendum
simpliciter.
nonpotunt
fortes
habent
tamcontinentes
quaerepelli
concupiscentias
quamincontinentes
conet quiatalisrationonestin hisqui delectabiliter
nisiperrationem
fortem,
operant
cumratioin eissitquasitotanonestnataessein talibus:
ideocontinentia
tranaturam,
etinquibusnon
velconsuetudine:
autexegritudine
exmalitia
literoppressa
complexionis
habeant
cumcontraria
ineisdem
nonestnataesseincontinentia:
estnataessecontinentia
mulieres
nondicuntur
circaidem.2 estintelligendum
fieri
quodin idiomate
graecorum
a concupiscentiis
et nona ratione
ducuntur
propria,
incontinentes,
quia ut in pluribus
naturae."
autfortes
mulieres
underaroinveniuntur
sapientes
propter
imperfectionem
102
derSptscholastik
Studien
im14.Jahrhundert:
DieVorlufer
Galileis
zurNaturphilosophie
,
Maier,
e letteratura,
Rome1949,257-8(Storia
XXII).

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY:HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

21

whom he remembersfromthe time theywere both studentsof theology


at Paris (Peter Roger inceptedin 1323).103Burleymay have particularly
rememberedthe two panegyricson St. Thomas Aquinas (canonized in
of Thomas'
1321) deliveredby the futurepope, on the fiftieth
anniversary
death, March 7, 1324, and again in 1326. Perhaps their"sonorouseloquence" directedBurley'sattentionto Thomas' work.In any case, like the
Ethicscommentary
, the Politicscommentary
depends on Aquinas, and at least
in mundane terms,Burley must have consideredthe Politicsa success.
In January 1344 he was confidentenough of his standingto ask papal
favorsfor his clerk,two servants,and a nephew,Nicholas de Borbache
of Coventry.
4. Last Yearsand Conclusion
in the winterof 1336 led to Burley'sdisPossiblyhis briefimprisonment
enchantmentwith Pytchely;in any case aftertwenty-oneyears there,
Burley moved to more southernrectories:firstto Suffolkin 1341; to
Surreyin 1342; to Wiltshirein May 1344; and finallyto Kent, where
he was admittedinJune of thesame year.Oddly enough,Burleybenefited
fromno papal provisionsin 1344, the year in whichClementVI declared
thatall ecclesiasticalofficeswere subjectto such provisions.However,he
also continuedto shifthis other benefices,perhaps indicatingcontinued
residencein Avignon:he receivedpapal provisionto a canonryin York,
withexpectationof a prebend,in 1342, and thento a canonryat Salisbury
and prebend of Netheravonin 1343.
WhetherBurleyactuallyresided in Kent, his last rectory,is not certain. It has been presumedthatBurleydied at the age of 70 shortlyafter
he ceased gettingnew benefices.But thismay be mistaken.It is possible
that Burleylived many contentedyears in retirementat his rectoryin
the south of England, Great Chart in Kent.
witnesshas been the
Similarly,the absence of a fourteenth-century
basis forconcludingthatfar and away the most popular workassociated
with Walter Burley,De vitiset moribus
, is not authentic.104
philosophorum
103Chartularium
universitatis
vol.2,ed.Henricus
with
Aemilius
Parisiensis,
Denifle,
Chatelain,
Paris1891,271-72;Martin1964(op.cit
., aboven. 1),211.
104
aboven. 2),no.50,207.Foran updated
1969{op.cit.,
listofmanuscripts,
Weisheipl
over270,seeJanPrelog,
DePictagora
DieBiographie
desPythagoras
in
numbering
phybsopho:
demWalter
Liber
devitaetmoribus
16
, in: Medioevo,
Burley
zugeschriebenen
philosophorum
undDrucke
vonWalter
Liber
devitaetmoribus
idem,DieHandschriften
(1990),191-251;
Burleys
9 (1983),1-18;andidem,ZurBewertung
derTextzeugen
, in:Codicesmanuscripti,
philosophorum

18:38:54 PM

22

OTTMAN
& REGAWOOD
JENNIFER

Mario Grignaschihas concluded that it is ratherthe workof an anonymous Italianauthor.105


Certainly,it was writtenbefore1326,whenexcerpts
were made fromit, and it is now generallyaccepted that the modern
who have takenfromBurleyhis mostpopularworkare correct.
philologists
Still, as in the case of his supposed death in 1344, the evidence for
thisconclusionis not yetwhollycompelling.And thereis some slighteviin Burley'sturnof mind. Having examdence in favorof the attribution
and its relationto its base in Thomas's
ined Burley'sEthicscommentary
we
can
assure
exposition,
you that Burley omits not one detail which
could formthe basis of a good story.While Aristotle'stextitselfprovides
the exampleof the laggardwho dragshis clothesthroughthe mud because
it's too much workto liftthem,106
along with(by way of a garbledtransVenus's
and the animal exemplars
of
the
lation)
sandalstrap,107
symbolism
of the variousvices,in which the filthof pigs is contrastedwiththe comit is on his
parativecleanlinessof sheep, are taken over fromThomas,108
" in:Mittellateinisches
vonWalter
"Liber
devitaetmoribus
20
philosophorum
Jahrbuch,
Burleys
and
for
the
text
see
O.H.
TheDe vitaetmoribus
John
(1985),164-83;
Stigall,
philosophoIntroduction
ofColorado,
AnEdition
with
rumofWalter
1956,
, Ph.D.diss.,University
Burley:
bersetdevitaetmoribus
Miteiner
Liber
1-266;andWalter
altspanischen
Burley,
philosophorum:
desLitterarischen
1886(Bibliothek
derEskurialbibliothek
, ed.Hermann
Knust,
zung
Tbingen
- Stigall's
basedon
in Stuttgart
offer
different
texts
Vereins
CLXXVII).The twoeditions
- butneither
is a
on earlyprinted
editions
sixmanuscripts
chosenfortheirage,Knust's
butnone
in thefullsense.Theredo existfourteenth-century
critical
edition
manuscripts,
ina contemporary
DePictagora
toBurley
hand:Prelog,
ofthem
include
theascription
phy, 194.
losopho
105MarioGrignaschi,
Lo Pseudo
Walter
e il Liber
devitaetmoribus
,
Burley
philosophorum
sullaquestione
dello
Ps.
etaddenda
in: Medioevo,
16 (1990),131-90;andidem,Corrigenda
16 (1990),325-54.
Burleo
, in:Medioevo,
106
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Walter
, Venice1500,f. 115ra:
super
Burley,
Expsitio
utpigri
tristitias
"Suntetiammultiqui magisfugiunt
delectationes,
quampersequuntur
veltristilaborem
in terraet in luto,utvitent
suasfluere
deorsum
vestes
quipermittunt
a terra,
allevando
vestes
sursum
tiamlaboris
qui tamennonpersequunquaeperveniret
Cf.Aristode,
lib.7,cap.7,no.1150b,1817;
tursuperabundanter
delectationes
corporales."
lib.7, lect.7, no. 1414,656.
ThomasAquinas,
107
delectabile
WalterBurley,
, f. 113va:"Sed nonestsic de concupiscentia:
Expositio
delecad perhibendum:
et nisiratiositdiligens
enimestperse natum
movere
appetitum
de
Undequidamloquentes
fuerit
trahit
ad se appetitum.
cumapprehensum
tabilestatm
enimquodVenusfuit
earndolosaecyprigenae:
dicitur
Venere
Cypri:
regina
comparaverunt
et eiuscorrigiam
undedicitur
quasiCyprireginavelquasiin Cyprogenita:
cyprigena
dicunt
essevariam
ligat:et dicitur
concupiscentiam
quaementes
perquamintellexerunt
tactui:
in delectabile
in aliquidquodapparet
essebonumscilicet
essevariaquiaintendit
Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7,cap.6, no. 1149b,1816;Thomas
estmalum."
quodtamen
simpliciter
lib.7, lect.6, no. 1394,648.
Aquinas,
108
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Walter
, Venice1500,f. 113super
Burley,
Expositio
solumdicimus
esse
scilicet
humanas
et naturales
114ra:
"Et circaprimas
concupiscentias
necinternetpropter
hocnecbestias
dicimus
etintemperantiam,
temperatas
temperantiam

18:38:54 PM

WALTER
OF BURLEY!HIS LIFE ANDWORKS

23

own account thatBurleyexpands and generalizesAristotle'streatmentof


the regal weaknessof delicatelynuturedprinces.109
Quite originalis his
proofthatpeople are willingto undertakegreatrisksforthe sake of excessive enjoyment
namely,the manydangersencounteredby solitarywalkers on long winternightsin frigidweather for the sake of voluptuous
ClearlyBurleywas an engagingas well as a usefulauthor.
enjoyment.110
New Haven
Yale University

sedsolum
secundum
hocestmetaphorice
etsecundum
similiperatas
proprie,
metaphoram
tudinem
unumgenusad aliudgenusanimalium.
Differt
enimunumgenus
comparando
animalium
ab alioincontumelia
id estinhocquodunumestmagiscontumeliosum
quam
aliud:autin hocquodunumestmagisinmundam
vitamhabenssicutporcus
quamovis:
etsinamoria
scilicet
stultitia
utinhocquodunumanimal
eststultitius
alio,utasinus
equo:
etomnivorax
in hocquodunumestvoraxutlupuset aliudnon,undepercomscilicet
horum
animalium
intalibus,
animalium
dicunparationem
quaesuperfluunt
aliquagenera
turtemperata
etintemperata
utporcus
ovisdicitur
etovisrespectu
respectu
intemperatus
Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7, cap.6, no. 1149b,1816;ThomasAquinas,
porcidicitur
temperata."
lib.7, lect.6, no. 1399-1400,
649-50.
109
Walter
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Burley,
, Venice1500,f. 115vb:
Expositio
super
"Sedsi hocaccidat
eisexnatura
scilicet
exnatura
generis
progenitorum
quodnonpossint
sustinere
tristitias
neclabores
necresistere
delectationibus:
acciditeisex natura
progenitorum
sicutaccidit
et filiis
scilicet
delicate
suntnutriti:
non
regibus
regum
quia multum
debent
dicimolles
velincontinentes
seddebent
dicimolles
mollitiae
simpliciter:
regisvel
molles
Talisenimmollities
in regibus
invenitur
delicate
nutriri
genere.
Scytharum
propter
sustinere
tristitias
neclabores."
Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7, cap. 7, no. 1150b,
quodnonpossunt
lib.7, lect.7, no. 1416,657.
1817;ThomasAquinas,
110
Walter
decern
libros
Ethicorum
Aristotelis
Burley,
, Venice1500,f. 115ra:
Expositio
super
"2 estnotandum
delectationes
quodmultisuperabundanter
quaerunt
qui tamennon
tristitias
Multienimmultas
tribulationes
labores
etpericula
sustifugiunt
superabundanter.
nentpropter
delectationes
utpatetde multis
incontinentibus,
consequendas:
qui propter
delectationes
etcalores
etmulta
ambucorporales
patiuntur
consequendas
frigora
pericula
lantes
solitarii
intempore
ad consequendum
delectationes
pernoctes
hyemales
frigidissimo
et voluptates,
et talesmagisnegociantur
circadelectationes
corporales
quamcircatristitias."Cf.Aristotle,
lib.7, cap. 7, no. 1150a,1817;ThomasAquinas,
lib.7, lect.7, no.
655.
1406-7,

18:38:54 PM

WalterBurley3
s Realism}
ELIZABETH KARGER

In 1962, H. Shapiro publishedan editionof a shorttracton universais,


attributedto WalterBurley,callingthe tractDe materia
etforma
} A couple
an
he
had
article
on
Burley'srealism,based on
years earlier,
published
that tract.3There he argued that,althoughthereis plentifultextualevidence that Burleyhad subscribedto the so-called "exaggeratedrealism"
whichhad become associatedwithhis name, thereis some textualevidence
that he had also subscribedto an extremelymoderateformof realism,
one whichwould have placed him squarelywithinthe conceptualist
camp.
the
textual
evidence
to
Burley's
According Shapiro,
concepsupporting
etforma.
tualismis providedby one solitarytract:De materia
etformaprovidesno such evidence,however.For
The tractDe materia
thoughthe tractdoes contain a theoryof universais,it is a fullyrealist
Shapiro simplymisuntheory,not a conceptualistone. Unfortunately,
derstoodthe text.
etforma("M&F" forshort)and the
The theorycontainedin De materia
incomtheoryof universaisassociatedwithBurley'sname are, nonetheless,
patible theories.Burleycould have subscribedto both only by having,at
some point in his career, performedwhat Shapiro has called a "sharp
turnabout".But when mightBurleyhave takensuch a turn?Where universaisare discussed,his laterworkscontainthe theoryof universaiscomto as "exaggeratedrealism".4
monlyassociatedwithhis name and referred
So we mustlook earlier.In a workof his mid-career,however,his Expositio
1 I wishto thank
andfornumerous
Professor
inspiration
RegaWoodbothforgeneral
thefinaldraft
which
andsuggestions
wereofa greathelpwhenI waswriting
comments
ofthispaper.
"
2 Thisedition
Realism
in:H. Shapiro,
Moreonthe"Exaggeration
is contained
,
ofBurley's
in:Manuscripta,
6-2(1962),94-8.
3 H. Shapiro,
A Noteon Walter
Realism
21
Studies,
, in: Franciscan
Exaggerated
Burley's
205-14.
(1960),
4 Thoseworksare:Burley's
and on Aristotle's
on Porphyry's
Commentaries
Isagoge
etAristotelis
de
artem
veterem
in hisExpositio
contained
, hisTractatus
super
Porphyrii
Categories,
inPhysicam
Aristotelis.
andhisExpositio
etquaestiones
universalibus
Vivarium
37,1

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

18:39:01 PM

BURLEY'S
REALISM
WALTER

25

in librosde anima
,5 the theorydeveloped in later worksis alreadypresent.
Could he have taken that turn early on in his career? That too seems
in librum
Periherruled out, forin one of his earliestworks,his Quaestiones
mendas
,6 the same theoryis already found. Moreover, in none of these
works,have I been able to discovera passage where Burleyso much as
mentionsthe theoryof universaiscontainedin M&F.
In view of these facts,I am inclinedto seriouslydoubt that Burleyis
the authorof thattract.7Nor can I agree withShapiro thata practically
incontrovertible
proofof Burley'sauthorshipis providedby the factthat
the sole printedversionof the tract,8as well as the codex whichcontains
the two knownmanuscriptversionsof it,9both ascribethe tractto him.10
This is not a point I wish to press, however.For whetherBurleyis
the authorof thistractor not, the factis that the theoryof extra-mental
universaiswhich it containsis one of the major medieval alternativesto
the theorycommonlyassociatedwithBurley'sname and foundin so many
of his works.As such, these two theoriesare well wortha comparative

5 A. Maierhasargued
"Averroist"
des14.Jahrhunderts:
Walter
(in:A. Maier,Einunbeachteter
e Rinascimento
B. Nardi),
Florence
, in:Medioevo
1955,477-99,
Burley
(Festschrift
reprinted
in:A. Maier,Ausgehendes
at 119-20)
Mittelalter
thatthisworkwas
I, Rome1964,101-121,
written
after
deanima
andtherefore
ThomasofWylton's
intellectiva
after1312and
Quaestio
Z. Kuksewicz
Theproblem
in:A. Maier&
Averroism,
(in:Z. Kuksewicz,
ofWalter
Burley's
A. Paravicini
diAnneliese
sulXIVsecolo
inmemoria
Maier
, Roma1981,
(eds.),Studi
Bagliani
in 1316.SinceConti(in:A. Conti,Ontology
341-77at 377)thatitwasprobably
written
inWalter
LastCommentary
onthe
Arsvetus,
in:Franciscan
50 (1990),121-76,
Studies,
Burley's
at 138)provides
no argument
in support
ofhisclaimthatbookI, thebookwhichcontainstheviewson universais
I discuss
between
1301and
here,was"probably
composed
it.
1307",I havedisregarded
6 Written
in 1301,seeS.F. Brown,
Walter
inlibrum
in:
Quaestiones
Pehermenasi
Burley's
34 (1974),200-95,
at 200.
Franciscan
Studies,
7 H.-U.Whler,
Das "realistische"
Walter
imgeschichtlichen
Kontexty
Burleys
Individualittskonzept
in:J.A. Aertsen
& A. Speer(eds.),
Individuum
undIndividualitt
imMitteralter
York
, Berlin-New
at 318 (Miscellanea
its
1996,313-326,
Mediaevalia,
24),citesM&F without
questioning
Nordoesheseemtohaverealized
toBurley.
howprofoundly
different
thetheascription
in thistractis from
contained
thetheory
contained
in otherworks
oryofuniversais
by
Burley.
8 In theprinted
edition
ofOxford
is entided:
"Tractatus
demate1518,thetract
perbrevis
riaetforma
Burlei
doctoris
Magisti
pianissimi
9 ThecodexisAssisi
2146.It is described
Vaticani
Latini,
byMaierin:A. Maier,Codices
codices
2118-2193
Vaticana1961,59-66.It contains
twoversions
ofourtract,
, Bibliotheca
which
is ascribed
to
in a notewritten
dated1397.
bytheowner,
10NorwouldthisBurley
be theonlyinstance
a worknotbyBurley
where
hasbeenascribed
tohim,evenat a relatively
methatall ofRichard
earlydate.RegaWoodhasinformed
Rufus'
works
havebeenascribed
to Burley
sinceabout1400,although
the
philosophical
themselves
datefrom
before
1250.
manuscripts

18:39:01 PM

26

ELIZABETH
KARGER

study,a studywhich,it is hoped, will contributeto our knowledgeof the


various formstaken by medieval realism.
In orderto leave open the issue whetheror not Burleyis the authorof
M&F, I shall referto the theoryof extra-mentaluniversaiscommonly
associated with his name as to "Burley'scharacteristictheoryof extraThat theory,whichmay have originatedwithBurley,
mentaluniversais".11
is foundin theworkscitedabove. In thispaper, I shall compareit withthe
in the1230s.12
one containedin M&F, a theorywhichwas alreadycirculating
The firstpart of the presentpaper is devoted to the theoryof extramentaluniversaisstatedin M&F and the second part to Burley'scharacbetweenthe two theories,
teristic
theoryof thoseuniversais.The differences
as well as theirfew common features,are spelled out in the conclusion.
PartI: The theory
universais
statedin De materiaet forma13
ofextra-mental
Though the subject is mentionedin its firstlines, M&F does not deal
chieflywithmatterand formas the two "principles"of individuals.Rather
it is about extra-mental
universais,its purposebeing to explainwhat they
are and what theirmode of being is. One of the two manuscriptversions of the tractprovidestwo titlesfor it: De duobusprincipiis
primisand
De modoessendiuniversalim
.14As A. Maier realized,the second titleis the
more appropriateone.15
deals are
The extra-mentaluniversaiswith which the tract chiefly16
in
univerof
As
such
those
universais
the
substance.
category
exclusively
sais are common to individualsubstances.Accordingly,the text opens
with a metaphysicalaccount of individualsubstances.
The account presentedis simplified:only the essentialcomponentsof
an individual substance are mentioned,excluding accidents. On that
11I shallnotcallit"exaggerated
Thereis
thisis a misnomer.
realism"
becauseI think
in so manyofhis
in therealist
towhichBurley
subscribed
theory
"exaggerated"
nothing
be called"exaggerated
A theory
ofuniversais
an infinite
works.
hierarchy
might
positing
to no suchtheory.
subscribed
realism",
but,ofcourse,
Burley
12The theory,
of
works
insomeofthephilosophical
ora closevariant
ofit,is present
to thispaper.It is
before1238.See theappendix
Richard
RufusofCornwall,
written
to
as background
assumed
ofSherwood,
later,
theory
writing
slighdy
byWilliam
probably
theses.
29.
someofhissemantical
See,below,footnote
13Allreferences
in Shapiro1962
contained
to thistractwillbe to Shapiro's
edition,
., aboven. 2).
(iop.t
14The tractis calledDe materia
8.
See footnote
in theprinted
edition.
etforma
15See Maier1961(iop.t
., aboven. 9).
16Mentaluniversais
in thistract.
arealsomentioned

18:39:01 PM

WALTER
REALISM
BURLEY'S

27

where
account,individualsubstancesare composed of matterand form,17
form
is
not
an
The
a
substantial
accidental
one.
submeant,
by "form",
stantialformis said to providethe individualas a whole withan essence18
In otherwords,it providesthe individualas a whole with
or quiddity.19
a natureof a certainkind.A human being,forexample,is regarded,on
thisaccount,as essentiallycomposed of matterand of a substantialform
in virtueof which he or she is a human being.
Assumingthis to be a correctaccount of individualsubstances,the
authorproceedsto identify
extra-mental
universaiswithsubstantialforms.
is not, however,a straightforward
This identification
one. It requiresthat
a distinctionfirstbe drawn between actual and habitual being. It will
- identified
then turn out, as we shall see, that extra-mentaluniversais
withsubstantial
forms existas universaisonlyinsofaras theyhave habitual
being,whereas,insofaras theyhave actual being, theyexistas singulars.
Obviously,this is a doctrinewhich cannot be understoodunless the
distinctionbetweenactual and habitual being is clear. The actual being
of a thingis its presentexistence.But what is its habitual being?
Roger Bacon, surelyone of the fiercestopponentsof the notion,at
least tells us what its contentis. Habitual being, he reports,is characterizedas a being common to thingspast, presentand future.20
But the
which
is
common
to
and
future
onlybeing
precisely
past, present
things
is past, presentor futurebeing. Habitualbeing,therefore
or
, is past,present
future
being.
If this is what actual and habitual being are, relationshipsbetween
them will followfromtruthsof tense logic. Thus, it is a truthof tense
logic that whateverhas presentbeing has past, presentor futurebeing,
thoughnot conversely.Consequently,anythingwhich has actual being
has habitualbeing as well,thoughsome thingshave habitualbeing which
do not have actual being. Propertiesof actual and of habitualbeing will
also followfromtruthsof tense logic. Thus, it is anothertruthof tense
logic thatwhateverhas past, presentor futureexistencewill alwayshave

17"Notandum tantum
suntduoprincipia
substancie
secundum
materem,scilicet
quod
riaetforma."
(96).
18"Forma
autemesttotaessencia
. . ." (96).
compositi.
19"Secundum
autemquodforma
estin materia
... estperfeccio
tociuscompositi,
et
hocessedicitur
secundum
'quidditas'."
(97).
20Compendium
Studii
Leiden-New
York-Kobenhavn-Kln
, ed. T.S. Maloney,
TheologLae
unumesse... etdicunt
illudessehabitale.
Ethocdicunt
essecom1988,92:". . . fingunt
munepraesenti,
et futuro
..."
praeterito,

18:39:01 PM

28

ELIZABETH
KARGER

it. Accordingly,
we findthe authormakingthe claim that,insofaras ithas
habitualexistence,a thingis, as he puts it, "incorruptible".21
By contrast,
if a thinghas presentexistencenow, it does not followthatit will always
have it in the future.Accordingly,
we findthe authormakingthe further
claim that,insofaras it has actual existence,a thingis "corruptible".22
Such is the distinctionbetween actual and habitual being which the
authoruses to articulatea theoryof extra-mental
universais.On thattheory, an extra-mentaluniversal,identifiedwith a substantialform,has
Its actual being,however,supposingit does actuhabitualbeing of itself.23
it
to
fact that thereis an actual individualin which
owes
the
ally exist,
it existsas one of the individual'stwo essentialcomponentparts,matter
being the other.24But each of the componentparts of an actual individual is singular.25
It followsthat a given universal,insofaras it actually
exists
a
as
exists,
singular.Moreover,in all but exceptionalcases, a universal,if it existsin one individual,existsin many others.In each individual, it existsas a distinctsingular.It followsthat a universal,insofar
as it actuallyexists,normallyexistsnot just as one, but as many singulars. Insofaras it habituallyexists,however,whetheror not it also actually exists,a universalexists,not as a singularnor as many singulars,but
as a universal.
Let us take as an example the universalin which being human consists.That universalactuallyexistsinsofaras it existsin actuallyexisting
human beings. In each individual,it existsas a singular.Since it exists
in manyhuman beings,it followsthat,insofaras it actuallyexists,it exists
as manysingulars,and not as a universal.Insofaras it has habitualbeing,
however,a being which it has of itself,it existsas a universal.
we could say that a universal(or
Using the author'sown terminology,
substantialform),insofaras it actually exists,is "actually multiplied".
Insofaras it habituallyexists,by contrast,it is not actuallymultiplied,
thoughit is "multipliable".26
21Talking
essehabiofforms
or universais,
theauthor
tarnen
says(97):"Secundum
sunt.
..."
tale,incorruptibilia
22Talking
oruniversal,
theauthor
says(98):"subtaliesse[esseactale]
againofa form
estcorruptibile
..."
23". . . licetuniversale
..." (98).
insepreter
hocquodestinsingulari
essehabitale
habeat
24"... [universale]
in singularibus,
cumforma
sine
secundum
actumsolumreperitur
materia
subsistere
nonpotuit."
actualiter
(98).
25". . . principia
sinindividuarum
etnonuniversalia,
rerum
sunt,
quiaforma
singularia
. . ." (97).
et materia
singularis
gularis
26". . . priusenimsecundum
naturam
estforma
quamactu
permateriam
multiplicabilis
. . ." (97).
multiplicetur

18:39:01 PM

WALTER
BURLEY'S
REALISM

29

To leave mattersat this,however,mightgive the impressionthat a


universalhas, as such, no relationto individuals.For it has been said
thata universalexistsas a universalonly insofaras it has habitualbeing
and not insofaras it existsin actual individuals.Yet a universalas such
is essentiallyrelatedto individuals.For nothingis a universalunlessit is
commonto individuals.As the authorsays,a universal,by itsverynotion,
is "one in many"- i.e. one in many individuals.27
The author is thus
faced with the challenge of showingthat a universal,insofaras it has
habitualbeingand existsas a universal,thoughit does not,as such,actually exist in actual individuals,neverthelessdoes in some way exist in
individuals.
The authormeetsthischallengeby drawingonce again on the distinction betweenactual and habitualbeing. He now admitsthat a universal
can existin two ways in an individual:eitheractually,or habitually.28
To
say that a universalactuallyexistsin an individualis to say that it now
existsin it. To say that a universalhabituallyexistsin an individualis
to say that it has, does or will existin it.
It followsby tenselogic that everyuniversalwhich actuallyexistsin a
givenindividualalso habituallyexistsin it. For example,the universalin
which being human consists,which actuallyexistsin Henry,also habitually existsin him. On the verbal level, this means that we can assert
both that Henry is human and that he is, was or will be human.29
Now, insofaras a universalactuallyexistsin an individual,it existsin
it as a singular.Insofaras it habituallyexistsin an individual,however,
it existsin it as a universal.
But in which individualsdoes a universalhabituallyexist?Surelynot
just in individualswhich actuallyexist. Rather, it habituallyexistsin all
27"Etsi
adhucquodhecestdefinido
universalis,
aliquisobiciat
quodsitunuminmultiset nonpreter
multa
..." (98).
Notethatthisformof realism,
whereuniversais
are alwayscommon
to individuals,
excludes
order
universais.
Thesameholdsforallforms
ofmedieval
realism
I know.
higher
"Undesecundum
hocesse[essehabitale]
universale
habitualiter
estinmultis
. . ." (98).
29Alternatively,
onecouldconsider
thattheaffirmative
intwo
copula"is"canbe taken
either
toexpress
theactualexistence
ortoexpress
thehabitual
existence
ofa unisenses,
in an individual
versal
orin individuals,
andthatthesentence
is human"
is true
"Henry
inbothsenses.
Thisis theviewtaken
ofSherwood
inhisSyncategoremata
, where,
byWilliam
thecopula"est",hewrites
discussing
(TheSyncategoremata
, ed.J.R.
ofWilliam
ofSherwood
in:Mediaeval
3 (1941),71):"Sciendum
autemquodhocverbum
'est'
O'Donnell,
Studies,
dicitenimquandoque
esseactale
actualiter
quandoque
accipitur
aequivoce;
quoddebetur
essehabitale
ei quodinse estnatura
existenti;
quandoque
quoddebetur
aliquaetnatum
esthabitualiter
essein aliquosingulari.
..."

18:39:01 PM

30

ELIZABETH
KARGER

the individuals,past, presentand future,to which,on its habitualmode


of being,it is commonor which,on thatmode of being,it "includes",as
the authorsays.30Thus, the universalin which being human consistshabituallyexistsnot onlyin Henry,who is now alive,but in Caesar, who is
now dead, as well as in the Antichrist,
not yet born. It habituallyexists
in all of them,just as, on the verbal level, it is true to say of each that
he was, is or will be human.31
The impressionthatuniversaisare, as such, unrelatedto individualsis
thus corrected.It is recognizedthat a universalis, as such, related to
individuals,indeed to the past, presentand futureones in whichit habitually exists.
To summarize:on the theorycontainedin M&F, everyextra-mental
thingwhich actuallyexistsis singular.32
Consequently,extra-mentalunias singulars.33
insofar
as
exist
versais,
Only insofaras
theyactuallyexist,
It is a farcryfrom
theyhave habitualbeing do theyexistas universais.34
this doctrineto the conceptualistdoctrinethat everyextra-mentalthing
is singularand that,therefore,
universaiscan only be mental.
PartII: Burley3
s characteristic
universais
ofextra-mental
theory
I now turnto the theoryof extra-mental
universaisfoundin indisputably
authenticworksby Burley,a theoryI shall be calling "Burley'scharacteristictheoryof extra-mentaluniversais".35
30"et
subhocesse[essehabitale]
nonincludit
determi[universale]
aliquaindividua
et futura
indifferenter
..." (98).
nata,sedomniapresencia,
preterita
31ThetextbyWilliam
as follows:
"Primo
ofSherwood
29 continues
quotedinfootnote
modo
secundo
existente;
modo,haecestfalsa'omnishomoestanimal',nullohomine
vera..."
32". . . secundum
. . ." (97).
nihilestextraanimam
nisisingulare
actumexistendi
33". . . secundum
in materia
. . ." (97).
actumexistendi,
forma
solumreperitur
34". . secundum
universale
estextraanimam."
tamenhabitm,
(97).
35In thissection,
I shallbe referring
to thefollowing
works
usingabbrevibyBurley,
in:Brown1974(op.
aboven.6),
atedtides:Quaestiones
inlibrum
ed.Brown,
cit.,
Perihermeneias,
are
inlibros
deanima
abbreviated
as "QPH";Expositio
, I, q. 3, Vat.lat.2151(quotations
madeitavailaA. Contiwhokindly
from
a provisional
edition
ofthisquestion
byProfessor
in:F.J.Scott,Walter
bleto me),abbreviated
as "De anima"I, q. 3; Defornis
, ed. Scott,
Treatise
De Formis,
Mnchen1970(Bayerische
Akademie
derWissenschaften.
Burley's
TexteausdermitfrdieHerausgabe
derKommission
ungedruckter
Verffentlichungen
on
as "DFpp";Commentary
telalterlichen
Geisteswelt,
4) parsprior,
pp. 7-48,abbreviated
inExpositio
onAristode's
andCommentary
, bothcontained
super
Isagoge
Categories
Porphyry's
"
abbreviated
as "Isagoge
artem
Minerva
veterem
et
Venice1497[reprint
1967],
Porphyrii
" Aristotelis,
in:
M.E.
andas "Categories
Tractatus
de
universalibus
ed.
M.E.
Shriver,
Shriver,
,
respectively;

18:39:01 PM

WALTER
REALISM
BURLEY'S

31

On this theory,as on the precedingone, thereare extra-mentaluniversais,the most conspicuousof which are universaisin the categoryof
substance.As such,thoseuniversaisare commonto individualsubstances.
Accordingly,as on the precedingtheory,an account of those universais
requiresa metaphysicalaccount of individualsubstances.
Burley'streatiseDe formiscontainssuch an account. On that account,
an individualsubstanceis essentiallycomposed of two singularparts: its
matterand its substantialform.This substantialformis said to "perfect"
the entirematterof the individual.In everyindividualsubstance,there
necessarilyexistsexactlyone such form.For it is that substantialform
whichgivesthe individualitsidentity,
both specificand numerical,making
it an individualof a certainsort.36It is, for example, by her intellective
soul- which is the substantialformwhich perfectsher entirematter
that Susan is an individualhuman being.37By contrast,Susan's corpse,
because it has no substantialformperfecting
its entirematter,is not an
individualof any sort,it is a mere aggregate.38
Though an individualsubstancealways has just one substantialform
itsentirematter,it generallyhas otherformswhichalso perfect
perfecting
its matter.Some are substantialformseach of whichperfectsonly a part
of the individual'smatter,called "partial" forms.For example, different
parts of Susan's matterare perfectedby substantialformsin virtueof
whichone partis bony matter,anotheris flesh,anotheris nerves.39
Other
formsare accidentalforms.They perfectthe matterof the individualinsofaras thatmatteris alreadyperfectedby a substantialform,providing
TheTractatus
deuniversalibus
St.Bonaventure
, typescript,
dissertation,
ofWalter
Burky
University
as "Deuniversalibus";
etquaestiones
inPhysicam
Aristotelis
1958,abbreviated
/,Venice
Expositio
"
1501[reprint
Olms19721,
abbreviated
.
as Physic
36DFpp(op.
cit
substantialis
datessesimpliciter
., aboven. 35),10:". . . forma
composito
cuiusestforma
. . . Verbigratia:
forma
substantialis
hominis
dathomini
essesimpliciter
et
substantialis
quodsithomo.Undenihilesthomo,nisiex hocquodforma
sua,scilicet
animaintellectiva,
suammateriam
..."
perficit
37
estunaforma
substantialis
., aboven. 35),35: ". . . in homine
DFpp(op.dt
perficiens
totam
materiam
animaintellectiva
..."
hominis,
scilicet,
38DFpp(op.dt.,
aboven. 35),37: . . dicendum
mortuum
non
quodcorpusanimalis
estunumperaliquam
unamformam
substantialem
necinducitur
novaforma
substantialis
inmateria
. . . Dicoergoquodcorpus
animalis
mortuum
non
quandoanimalcorrumpitur
estunumnisiunitateaggregationis
..."
39DFpp (op.cit
animamintellectivam
suntpluresforme
., aboven. 35), 35: "Preter
substantiales
diversas
materie,
partiales
perficientes
partes
que forme
distinguuntur
specie,
cuiussuntforma
forma
nervi
etsicde aliis.Etitaestin quolibet
alio
carnis,
ossis,forma
..."
etheromogenio

18:39:01 PM

32

ELIZABETH
KARGER

the individualwith size, shape, color, etc.40Neitherits partialformsnor


its accidental formsare essentialto the individualas a whole: only the
substantialformwhich perfectsits entirematteris.
All those forms,substantial,partial and accidental,are thingswhich
are thoroughlysingular.41There is no conceivable mode of being on
which any of them could be general. The intellectivesoul of Susan, for
example, can no more be a general thingthan Susan herself.
The formswhich perfectits matterare not, however,the only forms
which existin an individualsubstance.In any individualsubstance,there
necessarilyexist in addition other formsand, in particular,other substantialforms.These are formswhich"declare quiddity",as Burleysays.42
They are essentialto the individualas a whole, fromwhich theycannot
be separated.43These formsare not, however,singularforms,as are the
formswhich perfectmatter;instead,theyare general.As such, theyare
shared (or shareable)by otherindividuals.They can be called specificor
soul, whichis her
generic"natures".Thus, in additionto her intellective
has
formor nature
substantial
Susan
one
substantial
form,
general
proper
in which being human consists,anotherin which being an animal consists,a thirdin whichbeing a substanceconsists,a fourthin whichbeing
All these general substantialformsor naturesexistin
rationalconsists.44
her actually,as does her proper substantialform,though theyactually
40DFpp(<
., aboven. 35), 10-1:"...est sciendum
perficiens
op.cit
quodquedamforma
immemateriam
etquedamestaccidentalis
. . . forma
substantial
estsubstantialis
perficit
...
materiam
sedforma
accidentalis
immediate
diatemateriam
compositam
perficit
primam
et quantitatem
et qualitatem;
substantialem
materia
formam
primasimultempore
recipit
velquantitatem."
tarnen
natura
formam
substantialem
recipit
quamqualitatem
prius
41Itsmatter,
areall
itsmatter,
forms
form
andtheaccidental
thesubstantial
perfecting
is different
to theindividual.
eachofthesethings
Consequently,
singular
things
proper
above
AsBurley
writes
oneindividual
tothenextin thesamespecies.
from
(DFpp(op.dt.,
veroindividuorum
subeademspecieesttampermateriam
n. 35),9-10):"Distinctio
quam
materialiter
Verbigratia:
Sortes
per
distinguitur
performam
quametiamperaccidentia.
suametaccidenindividuali
etformaliter
materiam
suama Platone
distinctione
performam
sua."
taliter
peraccidentia
42DFpp
substantiaforme
., aboven. 35),45:"Omniaistaquedietasuntde unitate
(op.cit
declarantibus
materiam
et nonde formis
lis,dietasuntde formis
quiddiperficientibus
ineodem,
utspecies,
essesimul
tatem,
possunt
quedeclarant
quidditatem
quiatalesforme
above
. . .". AlsoCategories
et differentie
(op.cit.,
genusgeneralissimm
genussubalternum,
et forma
forma
estduplex,
declarans
scilicet
n. 4), f.dS1*:". . . forma
perfiquidditatem
..."
ciensmateriam
43Categories
... estessendeclarans
., aboven. 4),f.d3 : ". . . forma
quidditatem
(<op.cit
eius."
tialiter
concomitans
essentiam
44DFpp(iop.cit
., aboven. 35),45: ". . . talesforme
possunt
que declarant
quidditatem
etdifferentie."
essesimulin eodem,utspecies,
genusgeneralissimm
genussubalternum,

18:39:01 PM

REALISM
WALTER
BURLEY'S

33

existin otherindividualsas well.They, and otherslikethem,whichdo not


existin Susan but existin individualsof otherkinds,are the extra-mental
universaisin the categoryof substancewhich the theoryrecognizes.45
On thistheory,then,it would seem thatan individualsubstanceincludes
as its essentialcomponentparts not only singularmatterand a singular
substantialform,but also general naturesor universais.This is indeed
the view taken by Burley in his Expositioin librosde anima
, a work he
He took the oppositeview, however,not only
wrotein his mid-career.46
in librum
Periherrneneias
in his laterworks,47
but also in his earlyQuaestiones
,48
a
that
a
can
be
of
an
considering
only singularthing
componentpart
individualand that,consequently,the universaiswhich existin it are not
among its componentparts.This is not an attractiveview, however,for,
as Burleyhimselfrealized,it entailsthat,if the universaiswhich existin
45It is invirtue
a certain
ofhaving
substantial
form
thatan individual
hascerproper
tainsharedsubstantial
forms.
whichis her
Thus,it is byherpropersubstantial
form,
intellective
thatsheis an anisoul,thatSusanis a human
being,thatsheis an animal,
matedbody,thatsheis rational
and thatshehas,consequendy,
thesharedsubstantial
inwhich
forms
thosequiddities
consist.
As Burley
writes
., aboven. 35),38):
(DFpp(op.dt
"... homo. . . peranimam
intellectivam
esthomoet animalet corpusanimatum".
The
oftheindividual
overthegeneral,
manifested
here,is oneofthemostremarkpriority
ofuniversais
ablefeatures
oftherealist
characteristic
ofBurley.
Thirteenth
theory
century
a priority
realists
hadcommonly
assumed
ofthegeneral
overtheindividual,
thuscreatofindividuation,
forwhichBurley,
on thistheory
ofuniversais,
inga needfora theory
hasno needwhatsoever.
46De anima
estparssubstantiae
, I, q. 3: ". . . dicendum
determinatae,
quoduniversale
neccomponitur
Sortes
sufficienter
exhacmateria
etexhacforma:
immoexhacmateria,
et
ex hacforma
in quidde eo."Thewholepassageis quoted
etex universalibus
praedicatis
ofthiswork,
seefootnote
5.
., aboven. 5), 138-9.On thedating
byConti1990(<op.dt
47Physica
universale
sitresextra
., aboven. 35),f. 9rb:". . . dicoquodquamvis
(iop.dt
tarnen
nonestparsindividui,
suntcausaeparticulares,
animam,
quiaeffectus
particularis
et sicdicoquod. . . species
nonestparsindividui
sufficienter
constituquiaindividuum
..."
iturex causisparticularibus
makessimilar
claimsin Isagoge
aboven. 35),f. a5va,in De universalibus
Burley
(op.dt.,
aboven. 35),51 andin Categories
aboven. 35),f.d3ra.
(op.dt.,
(op.dt.,
48Eachoftheuniversais
which
existinitcanbe calleda "quidditative
part"("pars
quidButthatjustmeansthatbetween
oftheindividual.
theuniversal
andtheindividitativa")
"
"
"
dualthere
is a relation
ofa persesuperius
to its inferius
in virtue
ofwhich
", a relation
it is equally
to saythattheuniversali
is a "universal
whole"("totum
universale
legitimate
")
ofwhichtheindividual
is a "subjective
has,obvi"). Thatrelation
part"("pars
subjectiva
todo withtherelation
between
a wholeandeachofitscomponent
ously,
nothing
parts.
canconcede
in itthatitis a quidofeachoftheuniversais
Burley
Accordingly,
existing
ditative
anddenythatitis oneifitscomponent
Thisis exactly
partoftheindividual
parts.
whathe doesin QPH, q. 1,1.821,ed. Brown1974(op.dt.,
aboven. 6), 213,whereit
reads:"... dicendum
ettotum
univerquodressignificata
per'homo'estparsquidditativa
saleSortis.
Et. . . nonestconcedendum
ex natura
ettoto
quodSortes
componatur
speciei
residuo
a natura
ex se ipsoet alio."
specieinisiconcederetur
quodSortescomponatur

18:39:01 PM

34

ELIZABETH
KARGER

an individuaiare imaginedsubstractedfromit, the remainderis stillthe


whole individual.49
Whetheror not the universaiswhich existin it are regardedas component parts of the individual,they are as essentialto it as its singular
substantialformis.50On this theory,then,instead of therebeing in an
individualjust one substantialformessentialto it, a formwhich,on one
mode of being,is singularand, on another,general,as was the case on
the precedingtheory,there are several substantialformsin an individual, each essentialto it, onlyone of whichis singular,whereasthe others
are general.All have the same mode of being, namelyactual being.
The featurewhich is most distinctiveof this theoryof extra-mental
universais,however,settingit apart fromthe precedingone, is thata universalactuallyexistsin an individual,not as a singular,but as a universal.
Since, in all but exceptionalcases, a universalwhich existsin one actual
individualexistsin othersas well, it followsthat it existswhollyin each
individualas a universal.It retains,therefore,
its unityand is in no way
in
In each individualin
actual
individuals.
multipliedby existing many
whichit exists,it existsas one and the same actuallyexistinguniversal.51
At firstsight,such a theorymightbe thoughtto be unsustainable.For
distinctactual individualshave distinctlocations.It followsthat,if a universal existsas one and the same universalin different
actual individuals at the same time,it existsas one and the same universalin different
places at the same time.But is it not impossiblethata thingshould exist
as one and the same in different
places at the same time?52
49QPH, q. 1, 1.121,ed. Brown1974(op.cit.,
aboven. 6), 203:"Tuncarguo:omne
ex hoccorpore
et hacanimaestSortes;
a natura
residuum
compositum
specieiestcomet hacanima;igitur
etper
ex hoccorpore
residuum
a natura
estSortes,
positum
speciei
in residuo
a natura
totanaturaSortis"
and,a few
consequens
specieihabetur
complete
., aboven. 6), 213:"dicoquod.. .
pageslaterQPH, q. 1, 1.821,ed. Brown1974(op.t
in ilioresiduo
estcompleta
natura
Sortis."
50Ifhisintellective
Norwouldhe,or
soulweredestroyed,
Tomwouldnolonger
exist.
in whichbeinghumanconsists
were
existifthespecific
nature
anyotherhumanbeing,
destroyed.
51Isagoge
1958(op.t
, ed.Shriver
., above
., aboven. 35),f.a4rbandDe universalibus
(op.t
n. 35),36: "Aliaestopinioquaeponituniversale
in suissinguhabereessesubjectivum
laribus
etquoduniversale
se totum
estin quolibet
suosingulari."
secundum
This"opinion"
is theoneBurley
defends.
52Isagoge
cit
1958(op.
aboven. 35),f. a4vband De universalibus
.,
, ed. Shriver
[op.t.,
istam
n. 35),43: "Contra
suntrationes
Primo
secundum
istamopinionem
opiapparentes.
nionem
sitin caeloetin inferno,
quiahomoqui estspecies
sequitur
quodidemomnino
etinilioquod
estin quolibet
suoindividuo
quodestin inferno
ergoestin ilioindividuo
estin caelo."

18:39:01 PM

WALTER
BURLEY'S
REALISM

35

Burleybelieved that this is not impossibleat all, at least not for all
"things".For individuals,it is indeed, he granted,impossiblethat they
should exist as one and the same in different
places at the same time.
But universaisare not individuals,and the propertyof not possiblyexisting as one and the same in different
places at the same time,whichholds
of individuals,does not hold of universais.
Why not? Because universaishave a type of identitywhich individuals do not have. There is, of course, a type of identitycommon to all
things,whethertheyare individualsor universais.Burleycalls this type
of identity"numericalidentityin the common or wide sense". But, more
basic than this general type of identity,are two other typesof identity,
one characteristic
of individuals,the otherof universais.Burleycalls the
former"numericalidentityin the strictsense" and the latter"specificor
The propertyof havingnumericalidentityin the wide
genericidentity."53
sense is thusderivative:it is common to whateverhas numericalidentity
in the strictsense and to whateverhas specificor genericidentity.54
Because theyhave different
typesof identity,individualsand universais supportoppositepropertiesof a veryfundamentalnature.In particular, individualshave the propertyof not possiblyexistingas one and
the same thingin different
whereasuniversais
places at the same time,55
53It is essential
torealizethattheexpression
orgeneric
is nottaken
"specific
identity"
hereinitsusualsense(thesenseinwhich,
in Topica
usesit),where
itdenotes
1,7,Aristotle
a certain
sortofsimilarity
therelation,
whichindividuals
ofthesame
relation,
namely,
or ofthesamegenusbearto eachother.
Instead
itis takenin a sensein which
species
a genuine
it denotes
therelation,
whicha universal
bearsto
relation,
identity
namely,
itself.
Theviewthatindividuals
havenumerical
whereas
univer(inthestrict
identity
sense),
saishavespecific
orgeneric
is expressed
overandoveragainbyBurley,
bothin
identity
Thus,in QPH, q. 1, 1.82,ed. Brown1974(<
earlyandin laterwritings.
., above
op.cit
n. 6),213:"... hocnomen'homo'significai
remextraanimam
sedillaresnonestuna
numero
sedunasecundum
necestomnisresextraanimam
unaresnumero.";
speciem,
inDe anima
. . . habeatessepraeter
itaquod
, I, q. 3: "Quodautemuniversale
animam,
estaliquanatura
extra
inIsagoge
animam,
numero,
.,
quaenonestunanatura
{op.cit
patet.";
aboven. 35),f.a5rb
andinDe universalibus,
ed.Shriver
1958{op.cit.,
aboven. 35),47: "Sed
unumnumero
stricte
secundum
contra
unumspecieetunum
accipiendo
quoddistinguitur
sicunumnumero
contra
commune
etsicidemetunum
genere,
distinguitur
quodcumque
idemestquodindividuum
numero
... et ideonullum
universale
estunumnumero
..."
andinPhysica
aboven. 35),f.9rb:"Sicdicoquoduniversale
nonestunumnumero
{op.cit.,
sedestunumspecievelunumgenere".
54Isagoge
aboven. 35),f.a5raandDe universalibus
1958{op.cit.,
above
, ed.Shriver
{op.cit.,
n. 35),46: "... idemnumero
scilicet
communiter
et stricte.
Idem
accipitur
dupliciter,
numero
communiter
est. . . superius
ad idemnumero
stricte
et ad
acceptum
assumptum
unumspecieet ad unumgenere
et etiamestcommune
cuilibet
enti..."
55Isagoge
aboven. 35),a5rbandDe universalibus
1958{op.cit.,
above
, ed. Shriver
{op.cit.,

18:39:01 PM

36

KARGER
ELIZABETH

have the oppositeproperty.It is not, of course, as numericallyone and


the same thingin the strictsense that a universalcan exist in several
places at the same time,but as numericallyone and the same thingin
the wide or common sense.56
By establishingthat a universalcan exist as one and the same thing
in different
places at the same time, therebyprovingthat the contrary
was
assumption
wrong,Burleydisposed of a major objectionagainstthe
theoryof extra-mentaluniversaiswhich he favors.It now appears that,
farfrombeing "unsustainable,"the theorythata universalactuallyexists
as one and the same universalin everyindividualin which it existsis
quite attractive.
of Burleyis thus
The theoryof extra-mentaluniversaischaracteristic
based on a theoryof identity.Because universaisare assigneda typeof
fromthat of individuals,a universalcan be recognized
identitydifferent
as actually existingas one and the same universalin each of many
individuals.It followsthat,on thistheoryby contrastwiththe preceding
one, no mode of being otherthan actual being is requiredto ensurethat
universaishave extra-mentalbeing as universais.In particular,the theory need not posit habitual being for that purpose.
It does not followthat the theorymust deny habitualbeing,however.
I know of no indisputablyauthentictextby Burleyin whichhe so much
as mentionshabitual being. Yet there is a text,containedin his early
in librum
Perihermeneias
, where he subscribesto a semanticaltheQuaestiones
sis whichprobablycommitshim to denyingthatuniversaishave habitual
being.
The semanticalthesisin question is the thesisthat a generalsubstantive termcannot be univocallyor, as Burleyalso says, uniformly
predicated of past, presentand futureindividuals.The term "human being"
forexample cannotbe uniformly
predicatedof Caesar, who is now dead,
who is not yet born.57
of Henry who is now alive, and of the Antichrist
unum
contra
stricte
secundum
unumnumero
n. 35),47:"Sedaccipiendo
quoddistinguitur
..."
sitin caeloetin terra
estquodidemnumero
et unumspecie. . . impossibile
genere
56Isagoge
above
1958
Shriver
De
uniuersalibus
ed.
n.
f.
and
a5ra
above
.,
,
.,
(
op.t
35),
(iop.t
... sicnonestinconidemnumero
communiter
n. 35),46: "Dicoergoquodaccipiendo
..."
sitsimulin caeloetin inferno
veniens
quodunusvelidemnumero
57Burley
above
thesis
thefollowing
(QPH,q. 4 4.51,ed. Brown1974(op.t.,
rejects
deillisindifferenter
indifferenter
abstrahitur
n.6),274):"... a quibusaliquid
dicitur;
igitur
Instead
hesubscribes
esthomo'sicetista'Caesaresthomo'."
sicuthaecestvera'Gualterus
com1974(<
tothisthesis
., aboven.6),290):". . . terminus
op.cit
(QPH,q. 5 5.31,ed.Brown
de
univoce
in
rem
se
non
munis
suppositis
praesentibus,
per
genere
praedicatur
significans

18:39:01 PM

WALTER
BURLEY'S
REALISM

37

It followsthatthe corresponding
universal
by the generalterm
signified
existin those individuals.Nor does it, therefore,
habitcannot uniformly
ually exist in each. When writingthis work, then, Burley would have
surelyopposed the notion that a universalhabituallyexistsin past, present and futureindividuals.It is likelythat he would also have opposed
the notionthat universaishave habitual being.
Conclusion
universaisare verydifferent
fromeach
These two theoriesof extra-mental
other.They are, indeed, incompatibletheories.
On the theorystatedin M&F, a universalactuallyexistsin actual indi- i.e. as
viduals only as "multiplied"
many singulars,not as a universal.
It is only insofaras it habituallyexistsin past, presentand futureindividuals thatit existsas a universal.On Burley's characteristic
theory,by
universalactuallyexistsin actual individualsas
contrast,an extra-mental
a universal,or as one mightsay, it existsin them as "unmultiplied."58
Moreover,on thistheory,universaisare not recognizedas habituallyexisting in past, presentand futureindividuals.
these theorieshave some featuresin common: theyboth
Nevertheless,
avoid what may well have been regardedby medievaisas two major pitfalls for a theoryof extra-mentaluniversais.The firstpitfallcould be
called "inconsistent
whichacknowlrealism,"meaninga theoryof universais
edges extra-mentaluniversaiswhile denyingthem any mode of being
other than one wherebythey exist as singulars.59
Both theoriesclearly
avoid thatpitfall,the theorystatedin M&F by admittingthatextra-mental
et futuris,
sed analogice,
'homo'essetunivocus
ad
praeteritis
quoniamsi isteterminus
etCaesarem,
essentia
hominis
salvaretur
inJoanne
etetiaminCaesare.Sedhoc
Joannem
estfalsum,
nonhabetCaesaraliquamessentiam
..
quia. . . Caesarecorrupto
58Apparently
the"opinion"
subscribed
to byBurley
in so manyofhis
characterizing
in Ordinatio
Ockham
writes
andG. Gi,St.Bonaventure
works,
I, d. 2, q. 4, ed.St.Brown
istamopinionem
1970,101,6-11
(OTh II): "Etitasecundum
quotsuntuniversalia
praedicabilia
in quidet perse primomodode aliquosingulari
totsuntin
perse in genere
eo resrealiter
distinctae
realiter
ab aliaetab iliosingulari,
quaelibet
distinguitur
quarum
etomnes
illaeresin se nullomodomultiplicatae,
quantumcumque
singularia
multiplicenindividuo
eiusdem
tur,suntin quolibet
speciei."
59In Ordinatio
I, d. 2, q. 5, ed. Brownand Gi (<
., aboven. 58), 153,Ockham
op.cit
refers
toa theory
towhich:
"... universale
etunivocum
according
[est]veraresextraanimamrealiter
in eo tarnen
distincta
ab individuo,
realiter
realiter
et
exsistens,
multiplicata
variata"
is inconsistent,
forit entails
(153,3-5).As he is quickto pointout,thistheory
thatevery
universal
is a singular
nota universal.
"... igitur
omnis
and,therefore,
thing
talisresestveresingularis
etperconsequens
nonestuniversalis."
(153,20-1).

18:39:01 PM

38

ELIZABETH
KARGER

universaishabituallyexistas universais,and Burley'scharacteristic


theory
by admittingthat extra-mentaluniversaisactuallyexistas universais.
The otherpitfallis theformof realismabout universaiswhichmedievais
seem to have been unanimousin condemning,namelythe doctrinewhich
Aristotlehad alreadydenounced,ascribingit to Plato. On thatdoctrine,
extra-mentaluniversaisactually exist as universaisseparatelyfromany
actual individual.Now this is incompatibleboth with the theorystated
in M&F and with Burley'scharacteristictheory.On the formertheory,
universaishave beingas universaisseparatelyfromany actual
extra-mental
it is habitualbeing,not actual being.60On the latterthebut
individual,
extra-mental
universaishave actual being as universais,but only by
ory,
existingin actual individuals.61
These two theoriesare clearlyamongstthe mostimportantformstaken
by scholasticrealism.One of these theories namelyBurley'scharacter- stillhas
istictheory
partisanstoday;62the othertheory,as faras I know,
does not.
to Walter
etforma
An Appendixon parallelpassagesin De materia
, attributed
in
works
Richard
Rufus
of
Cornwall.
and
Burley,
philosophical
by
etformaand in works
There are parallel passages in the tractDe materia
written
before
Richard
Rufus
of
Cornwall
1238, when the authorwas
by

60The author
ofM&F is gladto pointthisout.He writes
.,
(ed.Shapiro1962(iop.cit
secundum
rem
aboven. 2),97-8):"Etsi aliquisobiciat
quodhecopinioponituniversale
sicutposuit
etitaponitydeasseparatas
et extrasingularia,
essealiquidpreter
intellectum
habere
extrasingularia
universales
Plato;dicendum
separatas
quodPlatoposuitformas
Sed licetuniveraliorum.
et essehocaliquidet enciaactu,sicutentitas
actumexistendi,
actum
tamen
secundum
in se preter
salehabeatessehabitale
hocquodestin singulari,
subsistere
nonpotuit."
sinemateria
actualiter
in singularibus,
cumforma
solumreperitur
61In Isagoge
ed. Shriver
aboven. 35),f.a4 andf.a5va)andinDe universalibus,
{op.cit.,
contrasts
hisownopinion,
1958,36 and52,Burley
namely:
"opinioquaeponituniverse totum
secundum
in suissingularibus
et quoduniversale
salehabereessesubjectivum
"aliaestadhucopinioquae
whichhe rejects:
suosingulari"
withanother
estin quolibet
ethaec
essea singularibus;
suntextraanimam
secundum
separata
ponitquoduniversalia
sibiimponit."
secundum
fuitopinioPlatonis
quodAristoteles
62Hereis howDavidLewis(OnthePlurality
1986,ch.I, 64)charac, Oxford
ofWorlds
"To each
attractive:
whichhe considers
universais"
a "sparse
ofimmanent
terizes
theory
is
theproperty
. . . Wherever
a universal
natural
therecorresponds
property,
perfectly
. . . One andthesameuniversal
universal
thereis thecorresponding
recurs;
instantiated,
a shared
common
inbothparticles,
itiswholly
itis multiply
located;
partwhereby
present
incoma universal
is 'having
thetwoparticles
something
overlap.
Beingalikebysharing
to sucha theory,
literal
sense."Thoughlessfavorable
mon'in an absolutely
Armstrong

18:39:01 PM

REALISM
WALTER
BURLEY'S

39

a master of Arts in Paris. They suggestthat those works by Richard


mighthave servedas a director indirectsource of the theorycontained
in that tract.The textof two pairs of such passages is given here.63
33and as
1. Onformsas "actually
multiplied
"multipliable33
la. De matera
etforma(96-7)
Hec formaque solum in materiareperiturduplex habet esse. . . . aliquod
in se preteresse quod sibi derelinquitur
esse habetpriusnaturaliter
inquantum est actus materieet perfecciocompositi.Prout ergo est aliquid in se
duplex esse habet; unum inquantumest una essencia in se alia ab essencia materie,sine omni comparacionead materiam. . . aliud habet in comper materiam;prius
paracione ad materiaminquantumest multiplicabilis
enim secundum naturam est forma multiplicabilisper materiamquam
actu multiplicetur,
et hoc esse vocatur "esse habitale," quod debetur
natureinquantumnatura est multiplicabilis
per multa. Secundum autem
in
forma
alia
... et utrumqueistorum
est
duo
habet
esse
materia,
quod
duorumesse vocatur"esse actale" sive "actus essendi,"et secundumhoc
esse est formasubstanciain actu et principiumindividui;et sic patet quod
principiarerumindividuarumsingulariasunt, et non universalia,quia
formasingulariset materiasingularis. . .
lb. RichardRufus
Sententia
cumquaestionibus
Aristotelis
, ed. R. Wood, liber II,
superPhysicam
tr. II, pars 5, ErfurtQuarto 312, fol. 4vb:
Forma enim duplex habet esse: unum esse scilicetsecundum quod est
et aliud esse secundumquod actu multiplicataest. Si primo
multiplicabilis,
modo consideretur
forma,ei debeturcommunitas;de se enim est forma
Si
secundo
modo considereturforma,sic est principium
multiplicabilis.
et causa eius quod est hoc-aliquid. . . formae individuataeet multiplicatae [sunt]per materiam.

thatit "comesclose"to whathe takesto be "thetruth


ofthematter"
recognizes
(D.M.
andScientific
Universais
Realism
, 2 vols.,Cambridge
1978,vol.1,68).
Armstrong,
63When
texts
I shallbe quoting
from
a provisional
edition
Rufus,
byRichard
quoting
in.Professor
Wood,whois the
byProfessor
theyarecontained
RegaWoodoftheworks
editor
ofRufus'works,
me withtranhas,withboundless
general
generosity,
provided
ofthoseworks
as wellas ofa number
ofothers
author.
scriptions
bythisfascinating

18:39:01 PM

40

ELIZABETH
KARGER

as incorruptible
and as corruptible
2. On universais
etforma(97-8)
2a. De materia
. . . Unde Philosophus... et Commentator. . ., cum dicit quod [nullum]
universalehabet esse extra animam, intelliguntde esse quod est actus
existendi,et [non] de esse habitale.. . . secundum. . . esse habitale,
sunt; . . . secundumautem quod est actualiter
[universalia]incorruptibilia
...
multiplicatum,
[universale]... est corruptibile
2b. RichardRiifiis
Sententia
, ed. R. Wood, Erfurt,Quarto 290, fol.
superlibroPosteriorum
32va:
. . . dicendumquod universaledupliciterpotestconsiderali:aut secundum
esse quod habet in individuis;aut secundum esse quod debeturei non
inquantumest in individuis,sed quod debeturei in sua essentia... Et
proptereaper corruptionemindividuorumnon corrumpiturquoad esse
quod habet in sua essentia,sed tantumquoad esse quod actualiterhabet
in individuiscorrumpitur
ad eorum corruptionem.
Paris
CNRS

18:39:01 PM

1
WalterBurleyon The Kindsof SimpleSupposition
PAUL VINCENT SPADE

1. Background
By the early-fourteenth
centuryat the latest, the mediaeval theoryof
in most authorsinto two main branches,
divided
could
be
supposition
whichin recentliteraturehave come to be called the theoryof "suppositionproper"and the theoryof "modes of personalsupposition,"respecWhile the relationbetweenthese two branchesremainsobscure,
tively.2
we can say to a firstapproximation
thatthetheoryof supposition
properwas
a theoryof "reference,"
to
answer
the
what
designed
question
entityor entities a termrefersto or "supposits"forin a given occurrencein a given
whereasthe theoryof modes of personalsupposition,
whatever
proposition,
its ultimatepurpose,was the part of the theorythatincludedthe muchdiscussedaccountsof "descentto singulars"and "ascent fromsingulars."3
Walter Burley and his somewhatyoungercontemporary,
William of
Ockham,forthemostpartagreedabout themodesofpersonalsupposition,4
1 I am
to RegaWoodandElizabeth
comments
andsuggesgrateful
Kargerfortheir
tionson an earlier
ofthispaper.
draft
2 See PaulVincent
Kretzmann
et al. (ed.),
, in: Norman
Spade,TheSemantics
ofTerms
TheCambridge
Medieval
Thister, NewYork1982,Gh.9 (188-96).
History
ofLiter
Philosophy
wasfirst
usedbyT.K. Scottin the"Introduction"
to histranslation
ofJohn
minology
See T.K. Scott(trans.),
Buridan's
Buridan:
, andis notmediaeval.
John
Sophismata
Sophisms
onMeaning
andTruth
, NewYork1966,29-42.
3 Foran account
ofthissecondpartofthetheory,
anda discussion
ofsomeofthe
difficulties
TheMedieval
it,seePaulVincent
oftheCategorical'
surrounding
Spade,TheLogic
andAscent
Kretzmann
andInference
inMedieval
, in:Norman
ofDescent
Theory
(ed.),Meaning
inMemory
Studies
Dordrecht
Fora critique
ofmy
1988,187-224.
ofJanPinborg,
Philosophy:
ofthetheory
there
notofmyaccount
ofitsmechanics),
seeGareth
interpretation
(although
B. Matthews,
TwoTheories
, in: Topoi,16 (1997),35-40.See alsoTerence
ofSupposition
as Quantification
versus
as Global
Parsons,
, in:Topoi,
Supposition
Supposition
Quantificational
Effect
16(1997),41-63,especially
61,n. 2.
p.
4 Thatis, although
theirdefinitions
ofthemodesofpersonal
those
differ,
supposition
- at leastin
definitions
thevarious
modestoparticular
cases
appearto agreein assigning
thecontexts
thetheory
seemstohavebeenprimarily
tohandle.
Buridan's
designed
(John
definitions
behavethesameway.)On thisoddfactanditssignificance,
see Spade1988
cit.
, aboven. 3).
(op.
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

Vivarium
37,1

18:39:29 PM

42

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

but they disagreedfundamentally


about suppositionproper,particularly
about the kindsof suppositionknownas "personal"and "simple."5Even
there,however,theyagreed on the main paradigmcases. In "Everyman
is mortal",for example, theyboth held that "man" is in personal suppositionand suppositsforindividualhuman beings;in "Man is a species",
theyboth held that "man" is in simplesuppositionand suppositsforthe
universalman.6Their disagreementwas over what is going on in these
and othercases, both metaphysically
and semantically.
Ockham
was
a
nominalist.
For him, talk about uniMetaphysically,
- whichhad been an
versais
of
importantpart logicaldiscourseever since
Aristode'sCategories
and Porphyry's
Isagogecame to be includedin the logical corpus- onlymakessense as talkabout universalconcepts
in themind.7
Of course,like everything
else in Ockham's ontology,conceptsare metacan be regardedas uniphysicallyindividual.Some of them,nevertheless,
versal "by representation,"
so to speak; theyare general
concepts(mental
of many individualsat once. Burley,by contrast,was a
representations)
metaphysicalrealistof some kind or other.8For him, talk about species
and genera is talk about the world
.
Semantically,the main basis forthe disagreementbetweenBurleyand
Ockham was over signification,
and hence over the properway to define
and
personal
simple supposition.For Ockham, a termin personal supit
position always supposits for what it signifies(that is, for everything
which is always one or more individuals(thereare nothingbut
signifies),
individualsin Ockham's ontology),whereasin simplesuppositionit supfora mentalconcept.For Burley,on the otherhand,
positsnon-personally
a termin personal suppositiondoes not always suppositforwhat it signifies,and indeed only rarelydoes so;9 it is typicallyonly in simplesup5 Fora general
overview
ofthetheory
of"supposition
seeSpade1982(op.dt
.,
proper,"
aboven. 2), 192-3.Fora discussion
ofsomeaspects
ofthisdisagreement
between
Burley
andOckham,
see PaulVincent
oftheBwrley-Ockham
Spade,Some
Epistemological
Implications
seePaul
35 (1975),212-22.Forcorrections
tobothpapers,
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
Dispute
ontheSimple
Terms
Vincent
, in:Topoi,16(1997),
ofSingular
Spade,Walter
Burley
Supposition
7-13.
6 ForOckham,
that
ofcourse,
universal
istheconcept
"man."
Seethefollowing
paragraph.
7 And,derivatively,
tosuchconsubordinated
aboutuniversal
orwritten
words
spoken
in conventional
cepts
languages.
8 Theexactform
still
realism
tookisa matter
under
Forsomerecent
discussion.
Burley's
inWalter
LastCommentary
ofthequestion,
D. Conti,
treatments
seeAlessandro
Ontology
Burley's
Mental
ontheArsVetus,
in:Franciscan
andElizabeth
50 (1990),121-76;
Studies,
Karger,
34 (1996),192-230.
Sentences
toBurley
andtotheEarlyOckham,
in:Vivarium,
according
9 In fact,
forexamdiscrete
thisoccurs
calls"simple
terms,"
onlyincasesofwhatBurley

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

43

positionthat a termsuppositsfor what it signifies,and what it signifies


may turnout to be a metaphysicaluniversalor to contain such a universal as a part.10
fromOckham's in waysthatgo beyondthese
But Burley'stheorydiffers
basics. Perhaps because so much of the modernsecondaryliteraturehas
focusedprimarilyon Ockham's theory,these differences
have not been
to the extenttheydeserve.Burley,forexample,dividedand
investigated
subdividedsimplesuppositionintovariouskinds,and furthermore
changed
his mind about at least some aspects of thisstructureover the course of
his intellectualcareer. This part of Burley'stheoryhas receivedpractically no attentionat all in the modern secondaryliterature.11
In the presentpaper, therefore,
I shall explorein at least a preliminary
of
the
account
divisions
and subdivisions
of simplesupposition,
way Burley's
that
account
over
and
how
time,
investigate
changed
inquireintothemotivationbehindthispartof his doctrine.The main textsI shallbe concerned
12
withare Burley'searlytreatiseDe suppositionibus
(dated 1302) and his later
13
De puntateartislogicaetractatus
(before 1327). I shall occasionally
longior
mentionBurley'slate Expositio
artem
veterem
super
(1337), althoughthe theoryof simplesuppositionin thatworkremainsto be studiedmore fully.14
and Compared
2. Absolute
SimpleSupposition
In hisDe suppositionibus
firstinto"absolute"
, Burleydividessimplesupposition
The basis forthisdivisionis the two traditional
and "compared."15
features
names.
Fora discussion
ofthisaspect
ofBurley's
seeSpade1997(<
.,
pieproper
theory,
op.cit
aboven. 5).
10Thelastclauseis included
toaccommodate
suchcasesas "White
Socrates
is a being
See Spade1997(op.cit.,
aboven. 5) fora discussion
ofthisproposition.
accident".
by11
A brief
andpartial
maybe foundin AllanBck,WhoIs theWorthiest
exception
of
Them
Read(ed.),Sophisms
inMedieval
andGrammar:
ActsoftheNinth
All?,in:Stephen
Logic
andSemantics.
HeldatStAndrews
. June
1990, Dordrecht
Logic
European
Symposium
forMedieval
at 284-5.
1993,277-87,
12Edited
inStephen
F. Brown,
Walter
Treatise
De suppositionibus
andItsInfluence
Burleigh's
onWilliam
Ockham
32 (1972),15-64.On thedate,seeibid.,16.
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
of
13Editedin Walter
De puntate
artislogicae
tractatus
a
With
Burley
(= Burleigh),
longior,
Edition
Revised
brevior
St.Bonaventure,
NY 1955.In
, ed.Philotheus
Boehner,
oftheTractatus
theintroduction
to hisedition
datesthiswork1325-1328.
ButRega
(p. viii),Boehner
Walter
andWorks
a slighdy
earlier
date.
Wood,inanunpublished
, suggests
Burley:
Life
paper
14Walter
Burlei
artem
veterem
etAristotelis
, Venice:Otinus[deLuna]
Burley,
super
Porphirii
11 May 1497(Copyin theLillyLibrary
at IndianaUniversity).
On thedate,
Papiensis,
A. Weisheipl,
seetheexplicit
in:Mediaeval
Mertonense,
Studies,
quotedinJames
Repertorium
31 (1969),174-224,
at p. 189.
15Desuppositionibus
formalis
estquandoterminus
, 35-6,( 2.3):"Suppositio
supponit
pro

18:39:29 PM

44

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

of a universal,namelythat,althoughit is one thing,it is both "in many"


and "said of many."16Absolutesimplesuppositioncorrespondsto the former featureand compared simplesuppositionto the latter.For example,
in "Man is the mostworthycreatureamong creatures"17
the term"man"
suovelprosupposito,
etdividitur
formalis
estsimplex
significato
suppositio
quiaquaedam
etquaedampersonalis.
Et dividitur
terminus
suppositio
simplex,
quiaaliquando
supponit
absoluto
et aliquando
Et sicsupad supposita.
prosignificato
prosignificato
comparato
estduplex:
etquaedam
absopositio
simplex
quaedamestabsoluta
comparata:
suppositio
lutaut hic'Homoestdignissima
et suppositio
creaturarum
ut hic
creatura,'
comparata
'Homoestspecies.'
universale
habetduascondiciones:
unaeiuscondicio
estesse
Quoniam
in multis,
et aliadicide multis.
Secundum
habetessein multis
debetur
quoduniversale
sibisuppositio
et secundum
de multis
debetur
sibisuppositio
simabsoluta,
quoddicitur
Undesecundum
aliamsupposi
tionem
esthaecvera:'Homoestspecies,'
plexetcomparata.
et secundum
aliamesthaecvera:'Homoestdignissima
creaturarum
creatura,'
alioquin
foret
haecvera:'Dignissima
creaturarum
creatura
estspecies.'"
is formal
("Supposition
whena term
foritssignificate
orfora suppositum.
Formal
isdivided,
supposits
supposition
becauseone kindis simpleand another
kindpersonal.
is divided,
Simplesupposition
becausesometimes
a termsupposits
foritsabsolute
and sometimes
forits
significate,
with[its]supposita.
Andso simple
is oftwokinds.
significate
[as]compared
supposition
Onekindis absolute,
andtheother
kindis compared.
Absolute
as here:'Man
supposition,
is themostworthy
creature
andcompared
as here:'Man
amongcreatures',
supposition,
is a species'.
Fora universal
hastwoconditions.
One condition
ofitis 'beingin many',
and theotheris 'beingsaidofmany'.According
as a universal
has 'beingin many',
absolute
toit.Andaccording
as itis 'saidofmany',
andcombelongs
supposition
simple
toit.Thus,according
totheonesupposition
'Manis a species'
paredsupposition
belongs
is true,
andaccording
to theother
'Manis themostworthy
creature
is
amongcreatures'
true.Otherwise
'Themostworthy
creature
is a species'
wouldbe true.")
amongcreatures
Translations
from
De suppositionibus
in thispaperarepartsofa larger
I have
translation
ofthetext,
ofa portion
available
on theWorldWideWebat "http://pvspade.
prepared
thelinksto the"Download"
com/Logic."
(Follow
paee.)
16Thischaracterization
of a universal
is a slogancommonly
attributed
to Aristotle.
itreflects
hisviews,
Aristotle
doesnotsayallofitinanyoneplace.
Nevertheless,
although
See Metaphysics
xii.131038bll(for"inmany")
7 17b39-40
andDe interpretatione
(for"said
ofmany").
17Thelocution
"themost
creature
creatures"
creaturarum
creatura
worthy
(dignissima
)
among
is apparently
"themostworthy
creature
ofall."Ockham
justan elaborate
wayofsaying
discusses
a trivial
thesameproposition
inversion
ofwordorder)
inWilliam
ofOckham,
(with
Summa
G. Gi andSt.Brown,
NY 1974,1.66,
ed. Ph.Boehner,
St.Bonaventure,
logicae,
lines3-9,26-50(OPH,I). Indeed,
theproposition
ofat leastonekindof
wasa paradigm
wellbackintothetwelfth
in
See theentries
under"creatura"
century.
simple
supposition
theindextoL.M. De Rijk,Logica
Modernorum:
A Contribution
totheHistory
Terminist
ofEarly
at vol.2.2,863.The odd expression
"creature
, 2 vols.,Assen1962-1967,
Logic
among
Arabic
creatures"
soundsto mesuspiciously
likea literal
ofa fairly
translation
common
itself
is taken
construction.
Thisin turnsuggests
thatperhaps
theproposition
syntactical
from
an Islamic
ofthe
source.
Ockham
's editors
itis theincipit
(ibid.,
p. 199n. 1)suggest
De pomo
Death").ButtheLatinversion
pseudo-Aristotelian
(= "TheApple,orAristotle's
ofthatworkinstead
"Cumhomocreaturarum
similitudo
sit. . .," which
begins
dignissima
thecharacteristic
in question
and (2) is theincipit
of
construction
(1) doesnotcontain
ownLatinprologue,
Manfred
ofSicily's
notoftheoriginal
Arabic
work.
See theeditions

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

45

has absolute simple suppositionand suppositsfor the universalspecies


maninsofaras it is "in many" individualhuman beings. By contrast,in
"Man is a species"the term"man" has comparedsimplesuppositionand
suppositsforthe universalspecies maninsofaras it is "said of many."
Burleydoes not say enough in thispassage to make the basis forthis
distinctioncompletelyclear, and the examples do not on the face of it
offermuch help. Some motivationfor the second example may perhaps
be derivedfromPorphyry'sdictum,"Species is what is predicated
, with
in
several
to
what
the
number."18
is,
But,
thing of
things
differing
respect
is
to
see
the
first
could
not
as
well
it
hard
why
initially,
example
just
have been counted as compared
simple suppositioninstead.
To be sure, it is possible to supplyways to motivatethe distinction,
but theyare not ways Burleyhimselfgives in thispassage. For example,
it mightbe construedas the distinctionbetween a universalessence or
nature as something"absolute" inheringin singulars(correspondingto
absolute simple supposition)and that same essence or nature as that
wherebyeach singularis related("compared") to all othersof the same
kind,and indeed to the essence or nature itself(correspondingto comThis suggestiondoes take account of the fact
pared simplesupposition).19
thatwhen one hears "Man is a species", it is naturalto ask "A species
?" The answer is that it is a species of singulars,of individual
of what
thus
men,
relatingor "comparing"the universalto the severalindividuals that partakeof it, in a way that isn't obviouslydone with "Man is
the most worthycreatureamong creatures".
in Marianus
Plezia(ed.),Aristotelis
liber
De pomo:Versio
latina
vetusta
quiferebatur
interprete
duce
societatis
Polonorum
47.1(1954),191-217;
, in:Eos:Commentarti
Manfredo
philologiae
andBrunoNardiandPaoloMazzatini,
Il canto
diManfredi
e il Liber
depomo
sivedemorte
Aristotelis
anddiscussion
inMaryF. Rousseau,
, Torino1964.Seealsothetranslation
(trans.),
TheApple
orAristotle's
Death
DeMorte
sive
, Milwaukee
1968;andtheinfor(DePomo
Aristotelis)
in Charles
mation
B. Schmitt
andDilwyn
A Guide
Latinus:
toLatin
Knox,Pseudo-Aristoteles
Works
Attributed
toAristotle
1500, London1985,51. See thefurther
discussion
Before
Falsely
of theArabicsourceof thisworkinJrgKraemer,
Das arabische
despseudoOriginal
"Liber
aristotelischen
depomo"in: Studi
orientalistici
inonore
di Giorgio
LevidellaVida
, 2 vols.,
Rome1956,at vol.1,484-506.
I wouldwelcome
further
information
on thebackground
tothemediaeval
ofthisproposition.
discussions
18Porphyry,
FiveTexts
ontheMediaeval
Problem
, PaulVincent
Isagoge
Spade(trans.),
of
Universais
, Indianapolis
1994,p. 4, para.(19).The Greekis eiaxitraxrckeivov
KaiiacpEpvTcov
I takeit thatfor,forpurposes
x(papip.^evicpt axiKaxriYopo)|j.evov.
ofmerely
theexample,
of' (Kairiyopo-u^evov)
here
motivating
"predicated
maybe regarded
"
as an approximate
of"saidof"(A-eyojievov).
See L.M. de Rijk,"Categorization
equivalent
as a KeyNotion
inAncient
andMedieval
in:
Semantics
26 (1988),1-18.
, Vivarium,
19Thisreading
wassuggested
to mebyRegaWood.

18:39:29 PM

46

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

But howeverone is to understandthe distinctionas drawn in De sup, in his later De puntateartislogicaetractatus


positionibus
Burleyattriblongior
utes that account to the "older logicians,"20
and thengoes on to present
a new and alternative
On thisalternative
basisforthedistinction.21
account,
20De puntate
in thisform
1955(op.cit
., aboven. 13),11.2-21(references
, ed. Boehner
are to pageand linenumbers
in theBoehner
"Visoquandoterminus
habet
edition):
videndum
dividitur.
Et diviest,quomodosuppositio
suppositionem
simplicem,
simplex
ditur
secundum
insuppositionem
absoltam
etinsupsuppositio
simplex
antiquos
logicos
absolutaest,quandoterminus
positionem
simplex
simplicem
comparatam.
Suppositio
communis
ut estin suppositis.
absolute
supponit
Suppositio
simplex
prosuo significato,
communis
secundum
est,quandoterminus
comparata
prosuosignificato,
quod
supponit
de suppositis.
Universale
enimseuterminus
communis
habetduasconditiones
praedicatur
secundum
et dicitur
de multis.
Secundum
quoduniverPhilosophum,
quiaestin multis
salehabetesseinmultis,
debetur
sibisuppositio
etsecundum
absoluta,
simplex
quoddiciturde multis,
debetur
Undesecundum
sibicomparata
siverespectiva.
suppositio
simplex
unamsuppositionem
verificatur
ista:'Homoestspecies',
aliamsuppositionem
etsecundum
verificatur
ista:'Homoestdignissima
creatura
creaturarum'.
Secundum
enimquodilleterminus'homo'habetsuppositionem
ista:'Homoestdigabsoltam
verificatur
simplicem
nissima
creatura
sedsecundum
creaturarum';
quodhomohabetsuppositionem
simplicem
OnthePurify
verificatur
ista:'Homoestspecies'."
ofthe
(SeeWalter
Burley,
comparatam,
ArtofLogic:
andthe
Treatises
PaulVincent
TheShorter
, trans.
Longer
Spade,NewHaven(forthhassimple
wemust
see
coming),
45: "Nowthatwehaveseenwhena term
supposition,
howsimple
is divided.
to theoldlogicians,
is
supposition
simple
supposition
According
divided
intoabsolute
and compared
is
simplesupposition.
supposition
Simplesupposition
absolute
whena common
termsupposits
as it is inits
foritssignificate
insofar
absolutely
is compared
whena common
term
foritssignificate
supposita.
Simple
supposition
supposits
insofar
as itispredicated
Fora universal
or a common
termhastwoconofitssupposita.
to thePhilosopher,
becauseitis inmanyandis saidofmany.
Absolute
ditions,
according
andcompared
to theuniversal
insofar
as ithasbeing
inmany,
simple
belongs
supposition
or respective
to itinsofar
as itis saidofmany.
Thus,'Manis
belongs
simple
supposition
a species'
is madetrueaccording
totheonesupposition,
and'Manis theworthiest
creatureamongcreatures'
For'Manis the
is madetrueaccording
to theothersupposition.
as theterm'man'hasabsolute
worthiest
creature
is madetrueinsofar
amongcreatures'
as 'man'hascompared
But'Manis a species'is madetrueinsofar
simple
supposition.
simple
supposition.")
It is notclearwhothese"olderlogicians"
are.BothRegaWoodandElizabeth
Karger
Thematter
havesuggested
to methatRichard
Rufus
ofCornwall
maybe oneofthem.
itis alsopossible
is merely
deserves
further
Ofcourse,
thatBurley
referring
investigation.
willbe to theTractatus
to Depuntate
hereto hisownformer
view.(Allreferences
longior,
inmyforthcoming
first
toBoehner's
andthentotheparagraph
number
edition,
translation.)
21Depuntate
tamen
aboven. 13),11.21-8:
"Posset
1955(o/>.a/.,
dici,quod
, ed.Boehner
absolute
non
absoluta
est,quandoterminus
supponit
prosuosignificato
suppositio
simplex
in comparatione
ad essein,necquantum
ad dicide.Sedsupad supposita
necquantum
in
communis
est,quandoterminus
prosuosignificato
supponit
positio
simplex
comparata
Primo
inferioribus
suishabentibus
ad supposita
velproaliquibus
supposita.
comparatione
modoesthaec
creatura
secundo
modoesthaecvera:'Homoestdignissima
creaturarum',
vera:'Homoestspecies.'"
onecould
., aboven. 20) 45:"Nevertheless,
(trans.
Spade(<op.cit
foritssignificate
isabsolute
whena term
alsosaythatsimple
absolutely,
supposition
supposits
oras faras bang
notin comparison
toitssupposita,
either
as faras bnginis concerned

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

47

the distinctionbetween absolute and compared22simple suppositionhas


nothingto do with "being in" or "being said of." Instead, he now says,
a termin absolute simple suppositionsuppositsfor its significatenotin
eitherwith respectto "being in" or with
comparisonto its supposita,23
said
of."
to
respect "being
Again the example is "Man is the most worthycreatureamong creatures".On the other hand, a common termin
in comparisonto
comparedsimplesuppositionsuppositsforits significate
its supposita,or for some of its inferiorsthat have supposita.(We shall
in section3 of thispaper, below.)
examinethe two partsof thisdefinition
in
"Man
is a species".24
As
De suppositionibus
, the example is
butsimple
saidofis concerned,
is compared
whena common
term
for
supposition
supposits
in comparison
toitssupposita,
itssignificate
orforsomeofitsinferiors
having
supposita.
In thefirst
creature
is true;in thesecond
way,'Manis theworthiest
amongcreatures'
is true.")
way,'Manis a species'
NotethatBurley
theviewofthe"olderlogicians."
givesno reasonforrejecting
22AtDepuntate
1955(op.cit
healso
, ed.Boehner
., aboven. 13),11.14(seen. 20 above),
callsthis"respective"
simple
supposition.
23Thenoun"suppositum"
hasbotha logicalanda metaphysical
sense.In
commonly
thelogical
itmeans
whatever
a term
for.(Thatreading
wouldbe obviously
sense,
supposits
awkward
an entity
sense,a "suppositum"
is,roughly
here.)In themetaphysical
speaking
inwhich
other
entities
butthatdoesnotitself
in anything
inhere
inhere
else.See thediscussion
inmy"Introduction"
toJohn
De universalibus
: (Twctatus
deUniversalibus
), trans.
Wyclif:
Oxford
at pp.xxviii-xxix.
there
is notappli1985,vii-1,
Anthony
Kenny,
(Thediscussion
cableonlyto Wyclif.)
fortheological
reasons
notall individuals
aresupposita,
Although
allsupposita
nevertheless
areindividuals.
Untilrecendy
I thought
thatincontexts
suchas
thepresent
wasusingtheterm
inthemetaphysical,
notthelogone,Burley
"suppositum"
icalsense.(See,forexample,
aboven. 5), n. 10.)ButI nowwishto
Spade1997(op.cit.,
thatBurley
is usingthetermin yeta third
sensein thesecontexts.
In thisthird
suggest
thesupposita
ofa term
the"lowest"
ofwhich
theterm
sense,
are,roughly
speaking,
things
canbe predicated
on thePorphyrean
tree.Thus,ifweallowthenotion
ofthe"inferiors"
ofa term(a notion
in thisthird
senseareits
Burley
uses),thenitssupposita
frequently
In thisthird
andPlatoaresupposita
oftheterm"man"andthe
sense,Socrates
"infima."
manis a suppositum
oftheterm"species".
Butonlytheformer
twoaresupposita
species
in themetaphysical
sense.
onemight
aboutwhichsenseof"suppositum"
is usingin a
Although
disagree
Burley
somesenseliketheonejustdescribed
is neededto accommodate
cergivencase,clearly
tainthings
inDe suppositionibus
is forBurley
says.Forexample,
(2.3),he says"Supposition
malwhena termsupposits
foritssignificate
or fora suppositum."
(See n. 15 above.
De puritate
1955(op.cit.,
aboven. 13),3.1-3,trans.Spade(op.cit.,
, ed. Boehner
Compare
aboven. 20) 11.)The former
is simple
andthelatter
supposition
personal.
Obviously
in theseconddisjunct
herecannot
be takenin thelogicalsense,becausea
"suppositum"
termalways
foritssuppositum
in thatsense,so thatallsupposition
wouldthen
supposits
haveto be personal.
Butif"suppositum"
hereis takenin themetaphysical
sense,then
terms
like"species",
"accident"
and "universal"
couldneverbe in personal
supposition.
somethird
senseis needed.
Plainly,
24In hisPrologue
to thecommentary
on Porphyry's
in hisExpositio
artem
Isagoge
super
veterem
remarks
thata (common)
nature
is a thing
offirst
intention
insofar
as itis
, Burley

18:39:29 PM

48

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

Despite the use of the same examples,Burley'snew account in fact


representsa subtlechange of doctrine.Recall firstof all thatin both De
and De puntate
, Burleyexplicitlyallows some discreteterms
suppositionibus
for them.25In
to be such that simple and personal suppositioncoincide
considered
ofsecondintention
insofar
as it is considwhereas
it is a thing
"absolutely,"
"Etconceptus
reiestduplex,
eredinrelation
totheindividuals
itiscommon
to(fol.a2rb"va):
Verbigratia:
scilicet
et secundus.
Possum
enimde homine
habereunumconcepprimus
tumquoconcipio
humanam
naturam
scilicet
velconcipiendo
absolute,
intellegendo
ipsum
essesubstantiam
animatam
sensibilem
solum
rationalem.
Et sichabeounumconceptum
in
Et possum
humanam
de homine
haberequo concipio
naturam
primm.
conceptum
Et sic
ordinead iliaquaeparticipant
eandemnaturam,
scilicet
ad Sortem
et Platonem.
habeoaliumconceptum,
scilicet
secundarius
concepconceptum
comparatum
qui dicitur
contus.Et isteabstrahitur
a conceptu
dicitur
primaintendo;
primo.
Conceptus
primus
immediate
dicitur
Undeprimaintendo
estconceptus
secundaintendo.
ceptussecundus
a rebus.Sed secunda
a conceptu
vela
estconceptus
abstractus
abstractus
intendo
primo
Nomina
suntprimae
intentioenimrerum
existentium
extraanimam
conceptibus
primis.
'albedo''nigredo'.
Sedconceptus
abstraed
ab istissignificante
nis,ut'homo''animal'
per
secundae
ut 'genus''species'
et hujusmodi.
nomina
intentionis,
'subjectum'
'praedicatum'
estsecundarius
Undebreviter
estprimus
intendo
rei,secunda
primaintendo
conceptus
rei.Nomenprimae
intentionis
estnomen
remutcaditsubprimario
conceptus
significans
remutcaditsub
intellectus.
Nomensecundae
intentionis
estnomensignificans
conceptu
et
Et ex hispateteandemremesseprimae
intentionis
secundario
(fol.2^/2)
conceptu.
subprimario
intellecsecundae
intentionis,
conceptu
quia eademrespotestapprehendi
tuset secundario,
cumtarnen
intentio
nonsunteaedem."
("Thereare
primaet secunda
of
twokindsofconcept
first
I canhavea concept
ofa thing,
andsecond.Forexample,
- thatis,byunderstanding
I conceive
orconceivmanwhereby
humannature
absolutely
conanimate
substance.
In thatcaseI haveonlya first
sensible,
inghimto be rational,
I conceive
as ordered
to
ofmanwhereby
nature
human
cept.I canalsohavea concept
- namely
andPlato.In thatcase
thethings
thatparticipate
thatsamenature
to Socrates
Thisis
I haveanother
a compared
thatis calleda 'secondary
concept'.
concept
concept,
a first
The first
thesecond
is calleda 'first
abstracted
from
intention';
concept
concept.
is a concept
is calleda 'secondintention'.
Thusa first
intention
immediately
concept
from
a first
conis a concept
abstracted
from
buta secondintention
abstracted
things,
'whitethesoul,like'man','animal',
Fornamesofexisting
outside
things
ceptorconcepts.
from
thesearesignified
areoffirst
Butconcepts
abstracted
intention.
ness','blackness',
by
andthelike.Thus,
like'genus',
namesofsecondintention,
'species',
'subject',
'predicate',
a secondintention
is a secondary
in brief,
a first
intention
is a first
ofa thing;
concept
as it
a thing
insofar
A nameoffirst
intention
is a namethatsignifies
ofa thing.
concept
is a name
a nameofsecond
intention
oftheunderstanding;
fallsundera primary
concept
Fromthese[observaas it fallsundera secondary
thatsignifies
a thing
insofar
concept.
because
andofsecondintention,
is offirst
intention
itis plainthatthesamething
tions],
ofthe
and a secondary
undera primary
thesamething
can be apprehended
concept
- although
are
andthesecondintention
nevertheless
thefirst
[themselves]
understanding
notthesame."
doesnot
andcompared
absolute
thedistinction
between
supposition
simple
Although
see
ofthisfact,
veterem
in theExpositio
artem
seemto be present
(onthesignificance
super
inDepulitale
thatthedistinction
as drawn
section
5 below),
thispassagesuggests
implies
I amgratecontexts.
willoccuronlyinw/z^-intention
thatcompared
simple
supposition
fulto Elizabeth
forcalling
thispassageto myattention.
Karger
25Forthedetails,
seeSpade1997(op.cit
., aboven. 5).

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

49

such cases, the termhas simple suppositionfor an individual,not for a


in De suppositionibus
universal.When therefore,
, Burleydividessimplesuppositioninto absolute and compared suppositionon the basis of the two
traditionalfeaturesof a universal,the divisioncannot be exhaustiveof
, some simplesupsimplesupposition.That is to say, in De suppositionibus
is
is
and
some
is
neither.
some
Certain disposition absolute,
compared
cretetermsin simplesuppositionsuppositfortheirsignificates
(individuals),
but cannotbe said to do so eitherinsofaras the significates
are "in many"
or insofaras they are "said of many" (since individualsare neitherin
many nor said of many) and so such termshave neitherabsolute nor
comparedsimplesupposition.
In De puntate
, however,the divisionbetween absolute and compared
simplesuppositionis not drawnon the basis of the featuresof universais.
Notice in fact that there the stipulation"common term" occurs in the
descriptionof comparedsimplesupposition,but not in the descriptionof
it is in absolutesimplesupposition
absolutesimplesupposition.
Furthermore,
that a termis theresaid to suppositforits significate
withoutregardto
it
or
not
and
without
have,
any supposita may
may
regardto "being in
the distinction
, therefore,
many" or "being said of many." In De puntate
betweenthe absoluteand comparedkindsis exhaustiveof simplesupposition.That is, everycase of simplesuppositionis eithersimpleor compared.
The simplesuppositionof all singulartermswill be absolute;some occurrencesof common termswill be in compared simplesupposition.But, as
the example "Man is the mostworthycreatureamong creatures"shows,
common terms(here "man") can have absolute simple suppositiontoo.
a new and
Thus, althoughBurleyis silentabout his reason foroffering
alternativeformulation
of the distinction
betweenabsoluteand compared
simplesupposition,it is not hard to supplyone forhim: it is to "close the
and to makethedistinction
an exhaustiveone.
gap" in hisearlierformulation,
3. General
and SpecialCompared
SimpleSupposition
In both De suppositionibus
and De puritate
certaincases
, Burleydistinguishes
of compared simple supposition26
into "general" and "special."27In De
26In neither
textis thedivision
ofcompared
meant
tobe exhaustive
simple
supposition.
27De suppositionibus
, ed. Brown1972[op.
cit.,aboven. 12), 2.32:"Sciendum
quodterminus
habens
subse species
etindividua
haberesuppositionem
generalis
potest
simplicem
habere
velspecialem.
comparatam
duplicem,
quiapotest
suppositionem
generlem
Quando
habetgenerlem,
tuncsupponit
itaquodnonproaliquosuppoabsolute,
prosignificato
sto.Etsecundum
hancsuppositionem
esthaecvera:'Substantia
estgenus
generalissimm.'

18:39:29 PM

50

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

is said to apply onlyto a "general"termthat


, thisdistinction
suppositionibus
has species and individualsfallingunder it. Since the termhas to have
speciesunder it, the expression"general term" here implies not just a
"commonor universal"termbut a "genus term"in particular.In De puriitaquod
tuncsupponit
Sedquandohabetsuppositionem
prospeciebus
simplicem
specialem
Undehaecest
estsubstantia
secunda.'
etsicesthaecvera:'Substantia
nonproindividuis,
secundum
secunda'
estsubstantia
vera:'Prima[onthis
word
' seen.37 below
quod
] substantia
knowthata general
habetsuppositionem
subiectum
("Youshould
simplicem
specialem."
ofsimple
under
itcanhavetwokinds
term
andindividuals
compared
supspecies
having
Whenithasgeneral
orspecial
Foritcanhavegeneral
[supposition],
supposition.
position.
Andaccordso as notforanysuppositum.
for[its]significate
thenitsupposits
absolutely
is a mostgeneral
'Substance
genus'is true.Butwhenithasspeingto thissupposition,
Andin that
so as notforindividuals.
forspecies
cialsimple
thenitsupposits
supposition,
is true
is secondsubstance'
is true.Thus'Substance
is secondsubstance'
case'Substance
has
as
the
supposition.")
according
subject specialsimple
comDepuritate,
ed.Boehner
1955(<
., aboven. 13),11.29-12.23:
simplex
"Suppositio
op.dt
Et
haec
distinctio
et
in
dividitur
specialiter
specialem.
generlem
suppositionem
parata
ingeneribus
scilicet
habente
subse species
etindividua,
habetlocumin termino
generali
habetsuppositionem
generlem,
simplicem
generalis
Quandotalisterminus
generalissimis.
etisto
itaquodnonproaliquoeiusinferiori;
tuncsupponit
absolute,
prosuosignificato
Sed quandohabetsuppositionem
estgenusgeneralissimm'.
modoestvera:'Substantia
Et isto
ita quodnonproindividuis.
tuncsupponit
prospeciebus,
simplicem
specialem,
est
'Substantia
estsecundasubstantia',
verae:'Substantia
modosunttalespropositiones
Si
'substantia'
definitur'.
enim
'Substantia
de
substantiae',
accipereproprie
species genere
etadacquato,
sicesthaecfalsa:'Substantia
turprosuosignificato
definitur',
proprie
primo
omnibus
substantiis
siveremcommunem
remextrasingulrem
sivesubstantia
significet
necconcepdefinitur
in anima,quianecressingularis
sivesignificet
proprie
conceptum
sivegenusgeneromnibus
substantiis
necrescommunis
tusin anima,cumsitaccidens,
daturpergenuset
et omnisdefinitio
cumnonhabeatgenuset differentiam,
alissimm,
necsubcumnecindividuum
differentiam.
definitur',
Ideo,si haecsitvera:'Substantia
contends
in communi
stantia
definiatur,
prospeciebus
supponat
oportet
quodsubstantia
suntresextra
etgenera
Et illudoportet
diceretamponentes
subsubstantia.
quodspecies
in
vel
intentiones
sunt
et
etiam
animam
conceptus
genera
species
ponentes
quod
quam
sive
sitres,sivesitcommunis
substantiae
de genere
anima.Si enimgenusgeneralissimm
Et ideo,si istaaliquomodositvera:
manifestum
est,quod nondefinitur.
singularis,
estspecies
veletiamista:'Substantia
'Substantia
substantiae',
quodiste
definitur',
oportet
sitillud,nec
necsupponat
'substantia'
terminus
quodcumque
progeneregeneralissimo,
siveillae
et ideooportet
etiamproindividuis;
substantiae,
prospeciebus
quodsupponat
in anima."(trans.
sintresextrasiveconceptus
., aboven. 20) 46Spade(op.dt
species
Thisdisintogeneral
andspecial
is divided
48: "Compared
supposition.
simple
supposition
under
andindividuals
termhaving
tinction
species
appliesin a specialcaseofa generad
hasgeneral
term
Whensucha general
in thecaseofthemostgeneral
it,namely,
genera.
andnotforanyofitsinferiforitssignificate
itsupposits
absolutely,
simple
supposition,
simis a mostgeneral
ors.In thissense,'Substance
genus'is true.Butwhenithasspecial
sense
In thislatter
forthespeciesand notforindividuals.
it supposits
ple supposition,
is a
'Substance
is secondsubstance',
are true:'Substance
likethefollowing
propositions
were
if
'substance'
For
defined'.
'Substance
is
of
the
substance',
properly
genus
species
wouldbe
is properly
defined'
then'Substance
andadequate
takenforitsfirst
significate,
toallsubcommon
ora thing
external
a singular
whether
'substance'
false,
thing,
signifies

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

51

is stipulatedverbatim
tate
, but then Burleyadds the
, the same restriction
in
the
of
the
most general genera"words
case
"namely,
unexpected
thatis, the Aristoteliancategories.
Two thingsare surprising
about thisaddition.First,termshavingspecies
and individualsunder them are certainlynotconfinedto category-terms;
at all will count.And second,althoughall Burley'sexamany genus-term
"substance",the problem
ples in both textsdo involvethe category-term
is designedto address seems to be one that will arise for
thisdistinction
whatever,not just the most general ones.
any genus-term
in the commentaryon the Categories
foundin his Expositio
Furthermore,
the doctrineof De suppositionibus
, Burleyreaffirms
, that
superartemveterem
the distinction
betweengeneraland special simplesuppositionapplies to
all and only generaltermsthat have both species and individualsfalling
under them.28This suggeststhat the added words in De puntateare simply in error,and thatBurleydoes not intendany real change in or furtherrestriction
of the distinction
betweengeneraland special supposition.
the
is
Perhaps
simplestexplanation thatthe "mostgeneral"(= generalissimis
)
in the added phrase "namely,in the case of the most generalgenera" is
an erroneousglossor a corruptionof the textand shouldsimplybe omitted. In that case, the addition,now reduced to "namely,in the case of
of the point
genera",would be nothingmore than an acknowledgment
in
De
that
made
connection
with
the
restriction
of
,
already
suppositionibus
orwhether
itsignifies
a concept
in thesoul.Fora singular
is notproperly
stances,
thing
is a concept
defined.
Neither
in thesoul,sinceit is an accident.
Noris thething
com- thatis,themostgeneral
- sinceit doesnothavea genus
monto all substances
genus
anddifference,
andevery
definition
isgiven
anddifference.
if'Substance
Therefore,
bygenus
is defined'
is true,thensinceneither
an individual
norsubstance
in general
is defined,
'substance'
mustsupposit
forthespecies
contained
undersubstance.
Thosewhomaintain
thatspecies
andgenera
arethings
outside
thesoulhaveto saythis,as wellas thosetoo
whomaintain
thatspecies
andgeneraareconcepts
in thesoul.Forifthe
or intentions
mostgeneral
is a realthing,
thenclearly
it is notdefined,
genusin thegenussubstance
itis common
whether
or singular.
Andtherefore,
if'Substance
is defined'
is truein any
is a species
ofsubstance',
theterm'substance'
mustsupposit
sense,andalso'Substance
neither
forthemostgeneral
thatmaybe, norforindividuals
either.
genus,whatever
itmustsupposit
forthespecies
ofsubstance,
whether
thosespecies
areexterTherefore,
nalthings
in thesoul.")
or concepts
28Burlei
artem
veterem
"Etsciendum
de suppositione
sim, fol.d2va:
super
quodhaecdivisio
etspeciali
habetlocum[correction
hand
inthemargin
plicigenerali
bya mediaeval
oftheIndiana
subse species
et individua,
from
uocem]in terminis
University
copy
generalibus
qui habent
etnonin aliisterminis."
between
andspecial
("Youhaveknowthatthisdivision
general
concerns
terms
thathavespecies
andindividuals
underthem,
simple
supposition
general
andnotto other
terms.")
I amgrateful
to Elizabeth
forcalling
thispassageto myattention.
Karger

18:39:29 PM

52

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

the distinction
to "general"termsimpliesnotjust "commonor universal"
but
terms,
"genus terms"in particular.
Apart perhaps fromthat one dubious point,the divisionof compared
simplesuppositioninto generaland special is exactlythe same in the two
treatises.A genus-termterm has general compared simple supposition
when "it suppositsfor its significateabsolutely29
so as not for any supIt
has
positum."30
special comparedsimplesuppositionwhen "it supposits
forthe species so as not forindividuals."31
Note thatwhile at thispoint in the textsthe wordingis virtuallyidenticalin the two treatises,
theirgeneralnotionsof simplesuppositionappear
to be different.
When simple suppositionis firstintroducedin De suppositionibus
,32it seems to be intendedas always suppositionfor the term's
At the beginningof the passage, the preliminary
notionof "forsignificate.
mal" supposition
is introducedas supposition
eitherfortheterm'ssignificate
or for the term's suppositum.Formal suppositionis then immediately
divided into simple suppositionand personal supposition.The textdoes
not say explicitlythat the latterdivisionexactlymatchesthe former,so
thatsimplesuppositionwill alwaysbe suppositionforthe term'ssignificate
,
but that is the most naturalway to read it. This impressionis strengthened when the passage goes on at once to divide simplesuppositioninto
absolute and compared,both of which are said to be versionsof suppoThe case is perhaps not air-tight,
sition for the term'ssignificate.
to be
in
we
in
have seen
section2 above that De suppositionibus
the
sure, since
divisionof simplesuppositioninto absoluteand comparedis itselfnot an
exhaustiveone. But the exceptionalcases involveddiscretetermsforwhich
simple and personal suppositioncoincide, and there simple supposition
continuesto be suppositionfor the term'ssignificate
(in this instance,an
individual).
In De puntate
, however,Burleyhas a more complicatednotionof sim"Suppositionis simplewhen a common termsupposits
ple supposition33:
29"Absolutely"
hereis notbeingusedtechnically.
Thatis,general
compared
simple
isa typeofcompared
nota typeofabsolute
supposition.
supposition
simple
simple
supposition,
30De
1972(op.
cit.,
, ed.Boehner
, 2.32,ed.Brown
above,n. 12).InDepuntate
suppositionibus
1955(op.cit.,
aboven. 13),11.33-34,
trans.
cit.,aboven. 20) 46,"notforany
Spade(op.
seen. 27 above.
Forbothtexts,
is replaced
by"notforanyofitsinferiors".
suppositum"
31De suppositionibus
, ed.Boehner
cit.,aboven. 12);Depuntate
, 2.32,ed. Brown1972(op.
1955(iop.cit
trans.
., aboven. 20) 46. See n. 27
., aboven. 13),11.36-12.1,
Spade(op.cit
above.
32De suppositionibus
aboven. 12).See n. 15 above.
, 2.3,ed. Brown1972{op.cit.,
33Depuritate
above
1955(op.cit.,
, ed. Boehner
above,n. 13),7.1-5,trans.
Spade(op.cit.,

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

53

orforeverything
contained
underitsfirstsignificate
forits firstsignificate
, or else
when a singularconcretetermor a singularcompound termsuppositfor
The wordsjust italicizedappear to be an attempt
its whole significate."34
to accommodatespecial compared simple supposition,as we shall see.
in the general notion of simple supposition
This apparent difference
to
a
: a termin special comleads
problemforDe suppositionibus
perhaps
not
but ratherfor
suppositforits significate
pared simplesuppositiondoes
a speciescontainedunder thatsignificate.
Thus it violateswhat seems to
be the view in De suppositionibus
that simple suppositionis always suppoThe problemis conjectural,since Burley
sitionforthe term'ssignificate.
of simplesuppositionin De suppositionibus.
givesno explicitgeneraldefinition
But ifit is real,thenonce again we see a way in whichDe puntate
attempts
to "clean up" the theoryof simple suppositionin De suppositionibus.
At any event,the point of the distinctionbetweengeneraland special
compared simple suppositionis the following.Consider the proposition
"Substance is properlydefined".35
(Since Latin has no indefinitearticle,
"A substanceis properlydefined"would look exactlythe same.) If the
term"substance"in thatpropositionsuppositsforindividualmen,the propositionis falsesinceindividualscannotbe properlydefined.On the other
hand, if "substance"suppositsforwhat it signifies
namely,for the cat- the
is
false
once
since
proposition
egory
again,
properdefinitions
proceed
in termsof genus and difference,
whereas a category,being a most general genus,belongsto no highergenusin termsof whichit can be defined.
But if "substance" suppositsfor specific
substancessuch as man, ox and
- in short,forintermediateentitieson the
dog
Porphyreantree,between
individualsat one end and the categoryat the other- thenthe proposition
is true.For mancan be properlydefinedas rational
animal.
Similarconsiderationsapply to "substance"in propositionslike "Substanceis second
substance"and "Substanceis a species of the genus substance".37
In such
n. 20) 28: "[S]uppositio
communis
est,quandoterminus
simplex
supponit
prosuosignivelproomnibus
ficato
subsuosignificato
contends
velquandoterminus
sinprimo
primo
velterminus
concretus
suosignificato
totali
..."
gularis
singularis
compositus
supponit
pro
34Forthepartaboutsingular
see Spade1997(<
terms,
., aboven. 5). The notion
op.cit
ofa "first
is derived
fromtheAristotelian
"first
ofan attribute
or
significate"
subject"
in Posterior
universal"
1.473b25-74a3.
Analytics
attribute,
"commensurately
35Depuritate,
ed.Boehner
1955{op.cit.,
aboven. 13),12.3-23,
trans.
above
Spade(op.cit.,
n. 20) 47. See n. 27 above.Thisexample
is notusedin De suppositionibus.
36Although
doesnotmakethepoint,
thespecific
substances
do nothaveto be
Burley
willdo. Thus,animal
Subalternate
canbe properly
defined
as sensible
infima
species.
genera
organism.
37Depuntate
1955(op.cit.,
aboven. 13),12.2-3,
trans.
above
, ed.Boehner
Spade(op.cit.,

18:39:29 PM

54

SPADE
PAULVINCENT

cases, Burleysays, "substance"has special compared simple supposition.


By contrast,in a propositionlike "Substanceis a mostgeneralgenus",
the term"substance"can only suppositfor the category,if the proposition is true. In such cases, Burleysays, the termhas generalcompared
simple supposition.
We saw in section 2 above that in De puntateBurleydescribescompared simplesuppositionas occurringwhen [a) a commontermsupposits

n. 20) 47. See n. 27 above.In De suppositionibus


, 2.32,ed. Brown1972(<op.cit
., above
substance"
as a variant.
n. 12),37,n. 37,thesentence
"Substance
is secondary
appears
is secondsubstance".
in theedition
Asitstands
theexample
reads"First
substance
there,
is to be
I
thatthevariant
The correct
is
reading
althoughconjecture
reading uncertain,
aresecondsubstances.
substances
In either
case,no individual
substances)
("first"
preferred.
itappearsthattheproposition
canbe readas truewhenthesubject
On either
reading,
thepoint
in general
termis takeneither
or in specialsimple
Nevertheless,
supposition.
ofsupposition.
withthosetwokinds
stands
thattheproposition
things
saysquitedifferent
thecomIn favor
discussion
from
ofmytextual
thefollowing
above,consider
conjecture
is Aristode's
in Expositio
artem
veterem
on theCategories
, fol.d2va(thecontext
mentary
super
secunda
sitsubstantia
"Seddubium
estutrum
substantia
discussion
ofsecondsubstance):
'Nullasubstantia
estsubstantia
velnon.Etvidetur
secunda;
ergo
quodnon,quiasequitur:
estsubstantia.
nullasubstantia
secunda
simplicem.
patetperconversionem
Consequentia
etsicde aliis;ergo,
Antecedens
homoestsubstantia
secunda,
sequitur
probatur,
quianullus
Patetconsequentia
estsubstantia
secunda'.
Philosophi
perauctoritatem
quodnullasubstanta
a qualibet
ubidicitquodilludquodnegatur
circafinem,
2 Topicorum
specieuniversaliter
enim:
'Nullushomo
a
sicut
universaliter
patet.
Sequitur
sumpta
genere
sumpto,
negatur
animalcurasinuscurrit,
et sicde singulis
nullus
animalis;
currit,
speciebus
ergonullum
estgenusgeneralissimm,
ri.Et eodemmodopotest
quia
quodnullasubstantia
probari
subnecaliquisbos,et sicde singulis
nullushomoestgenusgeneralissimm,
speciebus
Dicendum
estgenusgeneralissimm.
stantiae;
quodhaecestvera
ergo,nullasubstantia
estsubstantia
secunda'
et tamenhaecestvera'Substantia
'Nullasubstantia
estsubstantia
sicuthaecestvera
habetsuppositionem
secunda'secundum
simplicem,
quodsubjectum
secundum
'Nullushomoestspecies'
et haecsimiliter
'Homoestspecies'
quodsubjectum
in secundasuppositionem
in primahabetsuppositionem
("But
personalem."
simplicem,
is a substance
ornot.Anditseems
second
substance
there
is a doubtwhether
not,because
is a subno secondsubstance
is a secondsubstance;
it follows:
'No substance
therefore,
because
is proved,
The antecedent
conversion.
The inference
is plain,bysimple
stance'.
ofsubstance];
andso on fortheother[species
no manis a secondsubstance,
therefore,
The inference
is plainon theauthoris a secondsubstance.
itfollows
thatno substance
hesaysthatwhatis deniedofevery
n,neartheend,where
Topics
ityofthePhilosopher,
Thisis plain.Foritfolis deniedofthegenustakenuniversally.
takenuniversally
species
noaniofanimal;
andso on foreachspecies
no assruns,
lows:'No manruns,
therefore,
is a mostgeneral
thatno substance
malruns'.In thesamewayitcanbe proved
genus.
is anyox,andso on foreachspecies
andneither
Forno manis a mostgeneral
genus,
is a mostgeneral
no substance
ofsubstance;
therefore,
genus.It mustbe said[inreply]
substance'
is a second
andyet'Substance
is true,
substance'
is a second
that'No substance
is true
hassimple
as thesubject
is trueaccording
justas 'Manis a species'
supposition,
has
in thefirst
as thesubject
and'No manis a species'
likewise,
[proposition]
according
supposition.")
[and]in thesecondonepersonal
simple
supposition

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

55

for its significatein comparisonto its supposita,or (b) for some of its
inferiorsthat have supposita.Alternative(a) describesgeneral compared
while(b) describesspecialcomparedsimplesupposition.
simplesupposition,
Thus, in "Substance is a most general genus", "substance" has general
(the catcomparedsimplesuppositionsince it suppositsforits significate
a
"most
and
is
called
its
egory),
general genus" only in comsignificate
parison to what comes under it, and ultimatelyto its supposita.Again,
in "Substanceis properlydefined","substance"has special comparedsim(its
ple suppositionsince it suppositsfor species in the categorysubstance
and those species have supposita(individualsubstances).38
"inferiors")
4. TheMotivation
for TheseDistinctions
What is the purpose of all these divisions?Burleydoes not tell us what
is motivatinghim, but his purpose appears to be to block certaintypes
of fallaciousinferences.
Let us firstconsiderthe distinctionbetween absolute and compared
immedisimplesupposition.Consider the following.In De suppositionibus^
ately afterintroducingthe examples "Man is the most worthycreature
among creatures"and "Man is a species" in explainingthat distinction,
Burleyremarks,"Otherwise'The most worthycreatureamong creatures
is a species' would be true."39Althoughhe does not fillin the reasoning,presumablythe point is thatthe last propositionis nottrue,since an
individualhas all the perfectionof its species plus an additionalperfection besides (the individualdifference?),
so that an individualis more
than
its
"worthy"
species.40
In order to preventthe false conclusion,therefore,
we need to block
the inference"Man is the most worthycreatureamong creatures;man
is a species; therefore,the most worthycreatureamong creaturesis a
species." Burley'sanalysisdoes this by makingthe syllogismrest on an
ambiguityin the middle term. The firstpremise is true according to
38I do notunderstand
theoccurrence
of"some"in thephrase"someofitsinferiors
in clause(b). (See n. 21 above.)In noneof Burley's
thathavesupposita"
examples
is properly
"Substance
"Substance
is
substance"
and
"Substance
a
is
defined",
secondary
- is thereanyapparent
in thegenussubstance"
reasonwhy"substance"
should
species
foronlysome"ofitsinferiors
thathavesupposita"
supposit
(thatis,forsomesecondary
andnotforall ofthem.I suspect
no specialweight
shouldbe givento the
substances)
wordhere.
39De suppositionibus
2.3,ed. Brown1972(op.cit
., aboven. 12);seen. 15 above.
40But
therejected
in thepassagequotedin n. 41 below.
inference
compare

18:39:29 PM

56

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

absolute simplesupposition,but the second premiseis true accordingto


need not follow
compared simplesupposition.The conclusion,therefore,
afterall.
Curiously,Burleyseems to rejectthissolutionin De puntate.There he
apparentlyjust grantsthe conclusion"The most worthycreatureamong
creaturesis a species". This time he does explicitlyconsiderthe objection that the individualSocrates is more worthythan the species manin
general,and countersit by sayingin effectthatsince Socratesexistsonly
and
whateverperfectionhe has he has only contingently,
contingently,
he is thereforeless worthythan the species, which has its perfection
necessarily.41
But the overallpointdoes not reston the example.If the previoussyl, we stillhave to deal with syllologismis sound accordingto De puntate
is
a
like:
"Substance
most
general genus; substance is properly
gisms
defined;therefore,a most general genus is properlydefined."And the
conclusion of thatsyllogism,as we have seen, is most definitelyfalse.
: it
Burleycan block it just as he did the earlierone in De suppositionibus
kindsof
restson an ambiguityin the middle term,which has different
simple suppositionin the two premises.
41Depuntate
above
trans.
1955(op.t.,
aboven. 13),14.1-10,
cit.,
, ed.Boehner
Spade{op.
n. 20) 56: "Et quandodicitur,
creatura
quodSortesestdignior
quamhomoin comSortesincludat
muni,soletdiciquodilludonestverum,
perfectionem
quia quamvis
Sortes
includit
tarnen
nonnecessario
hominis,
earn,sedcontingenter,
quiaSortecorrupto
totam
nonvalet:'Sortes
includit
nonesthomo.Et itapatet,
perquodistaconsequentia
fectionem
et etiamaliquamperfectionem
hominis,
superadditam,
ergoSortesestperfectiornatura
sedoportet
includeret
addere,
humana',
perfectionem
quodSortesnecessario
humanae
humanae
velquodincluderet
sui;
tamquam
partem
speciei
perfectionem
speciei
creature
thatSocrates
is a worthier
illorum
estverum."
et neutrum
("Whenit is stated
includes
itis usually
saidthatthisis nottrue.Foralthough
Socrates
thanmaningeneral,
because
itnecessarily
butrather
theperfection
ofman,yethedoesnotinclude
contingendy,
'Socrates
is nota man.So itis plainthattheinference
whenSocrates
is dead,Socrates
ofman,and alsosomesuperadded
thewholeperfection
includes
therefore,
perfection;
is notvalid.Rather,
onehasto add that
Socrates
is moreperfect
thanhumannature'
or thathe would
include
theperfection
ofthehumanspecies,
wouldnecessarily
Socrates
oftheseis
Andneither
ofthehuman
as a partofhimself.
include
theperfection
species
himself
outHe doesnotcommit
's pointhereis oddlymuted.
NotethatBurley
true.")
is a species",
butonly
creature
to thetruth
of"Themostworthy
amongcreatures
right
avoided.
howa certain
itstruth
is "usually"
describes
(I do notknow
against
argument
whohe hasin mindhere.)
ofthepropoto avoidthetruth
Notealsothatthedeviceadopted
byDe suppositionibus
to methat
in thispassage.Elizabeth
mentioned
sition
is nowhere
Kargerhassuggested
but
herewithwhatwassaidin De suppositionibus
concerned
is perhaps
notreally
Burley
in Summa
ofOckham
an objection
raisedbyWilliam
rather
withcountering
1.66,
bgicae)
havesimple
cannot
creature
that"man"in "Manis themostworthy
amongcreatures"
supposition.

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

57

There is more to the story,however.Notice an importantdifference


betweenour two examples. In the second (the syllogismconcluding"A
most general genus is properlydefined"),the ambiguityin the middle
termis that it has general compared simple suppositionin one premise
and special compared simplesuppositionin the other.And in those two
kinds of simple suppositionthe term suppositsfor different
, for the
things
in
one
case
for
that
in
the
other.
and
speciesunder
category
category the
But in the firstexample (concluding"The most worthycreatureamong
creaturesis a species"),thisis not so. There the middletermhas absolute
simplesuppositionin the one premiseand compared simplesupposition
in the other.But in absolute and compared simple supposition,a given
- its
termsuppositsfor thesamething
It merelysuppositsfor
significate.42
in
thatthingin different
one
the
case and "in compariways,absolutely
son to its supposita"in the other.
But if thatis so, then it appears that Burleyin De suppositionibus
really
has no way of blockingthe conclusionafterall. If the same universalman
is both the most worthycreatureamong creaturesand also a species,
then,inevitably,the most worthycreatureamong creaturesis a species.
The factthatthe middletermhas different
kindsof simplesuppositionin
the premisesdoes not preventthisresult,any more than the factthatin
"Everyman is an animal" the subjecthas confusedand distributive
personal supposition,whereasin "Some man is a Greek" it has determinate
personalsupposition,43
preventsthe conclusion"Some animal is a Greek".
It is no wonder,then, that in De puntateBurley avoids his earliersolution in De suppositionibus.
Once more we see that Burley'stheoryof simin
De
ple supposition
puntateneatlysidestepsproblemswiththe theoryin
the earlierDe suppositionibus
.
But if thatearliersolutionis abandoned, it appears thatthe distinction
betweenabsolute and compared simple suppositionin De puntateis left
withno real theoreticalrole to play. It seems to be keptmerelyas matter
of classification
forclassification's
sake. One can, to be sure,say as Burley
does in De puntatethatthereis a difference
betweena term'ssuppositing
forits significate
withand withouta comparisonto its supposita.But that
distinction
does not allow one to solve any sophisms,to preventany falor
as
far as I can see to avoid any otherproblemswhatever.The
lacies,
42Thatis notquitecorrect.
In specialcompared
a termdoesnot
simple
supposition
foritssignificate
butfora species
contained
under
itssignificate.
Butspecial
comsupposit
in theexample.
is notinvolved
pared
simple
supposition
43 Forthemodesofpersonal
seeSpade1988(op.cit.,
aboven. 3).
supposition,

18:39:29 PM

58

PAULVINCENT
SPADE

theoryof simple suppositionwould have been just as adequate without


it. It is perhaps significant,
therefore,that in the commentaryon the
in
his
late
, Burleydiscussesthe disCategories
Expositio
superartemveterem
tinctionbetweengeneraland special simplesuppositionbut entirelyomits
the distinctionbetweenabsolute and compared simplesupposition.44
On the otherhand, the situationwith the distinctionbetweengeneral
and special compared simple suppositionis more complicated.There is,
afterall, a difference
betweentalkingabout a categoryand talkingabout
in the
the species under that category;one is talkingabout different
things
two cases. We musttherefore
findsome kindof suppositionforeach case,
or else therewill be instancesin which termshave none of the recognized formsof suppositionand the theorywill be incomplete.Ockham
does thisby definingsimplesuppositionin such a way thathis definition
applies univocallyto both these cases; he does not botherto draw any
furtherdistinctions.45
,46builds
Burley,by contrast,at least in De puntate
these two cases into his definitionof simple suppositionat the outsetas
and then separatesthem again in a
separate clauses of a disjunction,47
later distinction.
5. Conclusion
In severalrespects,therefore,
Burley'stheoryof the kindsof simplesupin
De
to
on the theoryin De
puntateappears be an improvement
position
The descriptionof special compared simplesuppositionin
suppositionibus.
De suppositionibus
seems to conflictwiththe impliedview therethatin sima
ple supposition term always supposits for its significate.Burleymeets
44Expositio
I amgrateful
toElizabeth
forcalling
artem
veterem,
, fol.d2va.
my
Karger
super
attention
to thisfact.
45Ockham,
lines26-7,ed.Boehner,
GiandBrown
1974:"Suppositio
Summa
, 1.64,
logicae
sednontenetur
estquandoterminus
animae,
significative."
simplex
supponit
prointentione
whena term
foran intention
ofthesoulbutis nottaken
is simple
("Supposition
supposits
a
thisdefinition
meansthatforOckham
See alsoibid.,1.68.In effect,
significatively.")
andis notin personal
whenit supposits
fora concept
termhassimple
supsupposition
towhich
itis subordifortheconcept
Notethathe doesnotsayitmustsupposit
position.
ForOckham,
to Burley's
foritssignificate.")
nated.
(Thatwouldcorrespond
"suppositing
so that
thatfallunderthemareconcepts,
ofcourse,
thecategories
as wellas thespecies
andspeinonefellswoopallthecasescovered
hisdefinition
includes
byBurley's
general
cialcompared
simple
supposition.
46Recallthat
- andproblematic.
See secin De suppositionibus
is different
hisprocedure
tion3 above.
47Depuntate,
ed. Boehner
1955[op.
cit.,above
cit.,aboven. 13),7.1-5,trans.
Spade[op.
n. 20) 28. See n. 33 above.

18:39:29 PM

THE KINDSOF SIMPLESUPPOSITION

59

this problemby adoptinga nuanced and much more carefullydefined


notionof simplesuppositionin De puntate
, a notion that explicitlyallows
thatin some cases a termin simple suppositiondoes notsuppositforits
but ratherforthe non-individual"inferiors"
of thatsignificate.
significate,
the
division
of
into
absolute
and comparedis
Again,
simplesupposition
in such a way thatit failsto be exhaustive;some
drawnin De suppositionibus
instancesofsimplesupposition
are neithertheone nor theother.This apparresultis fixedin De puntate
, which carefullyredefines
entlyunintentional
absoluteand compared simple suppositionin a way that avoids it.
Yet again, the divisionof simple suppositioninto absolute and compared, and of some cases of simple compared suppositioninto general
and special, seems to have been originallymotivatedby a concern to
block certainkindsof fallaciousinferences.But while the latterdivision
can successfully
be used to thisend by diagnosingthe inferencesas relyon
an
ing
ambiguoustermthat suppositsforquite different
thingsin its
various occurrencesin the inference,the formerdivision seems much
harderto use forthispurpose. Significandy,
De puritate
does not
therefore,
use it in thisway, and indeed abandons one attemptin De suppositionibus
to do so. As a result,however,the divisionof simple suppositioninto
absolute and compared is leftwithoutany real motivationin De puntate
and has in factdisappearedby the timeof his late Expositio
in artem
veterem.
These developmentssuggestthat Burley'stheoryof the kinds of simple suppositionis a topiche thoughtabout carefully,
revisingand improving the theoryin subde but noticeableways. Perhaps it will repay us to
thinkabout it carefullytoo.
Bloomington
IndianaUniversity

18:39:29 PM

WalterBurkyon akrasia: SecondThoughts


RISTO SAARINEN

1. BurleyandAquinas
: Gomes'Results
1 has been
WalterBurley'sExpositio
Aristotelis
superlibrosEthicorum
neglected
most
scholars
of
medieval
moral
In
to
the
extenaddition
by
philosophy.
can
find
some
sive unpublisheddissertation
one
analyses
by GJ. Gomes,2
of Burley'streatment
ofNicomachean
Ethics[EIN) in my own studyof weakness of will3and in a veryhelpfularticleby Rega Wood.4All thesestudies
findBurley'scontributionto medieval ethicshighlysignificant,
but they
evaluate his evidentdebt to Aquinas to some extentdifferently.
I will
thereforebegin (1.) by clarifyingonce more the relationshipbetween
Burleyand Aquinas withthe help of Gomes' study.In keepingwiththis
clarification,I will then (2.) reconsidermy earlier findingsconcerning
Walter Burley'sview of Aristotle'sabasia (;incontinentia
, weaknessof will)
and (3.) addressthe problemswhichWood and Jeffrey
Hause5 have seen
in my interpretation
of Burley.Afterthat (4.) I will have a closer look
at Burley'spreferred"fourthsolution"of abasia. In the last part of this
article(5.) I will summarizemy readingof Burleyas the "insufficient
reaabasia.
soning" explanationof
Throughouthis expositionof Aristotle'sethics,Burleyborrowsheavily
fromthe Sententia
libriEthicorum
of Aquinas. AlthoughAquinas is hardly
ever mentionedby name, thisdebt is so evidentthat nobody can fail to
see it: oftenBurleyis simplyparaphrasingthe textof Aquinas. In additionto the exposition,however,Burley'scommentary
containssome quesAs
tions and above all a great number of dubia
, notandaand intelligenda.
form:opposingviewGomes pointsout, the longerdubiahave a fullquestio
1 In the
I willusetheVenice1521edition.
following
2 G.J.Gomes,
onAristotle's
in Walter
Foundations
Nicomachean
ofEthics
Burleigh's
Commentary
Ethics
1973.
, Diss.Columbia
University
3 R. Saarinen,
From
toBuridan
Weakness
, Leiden
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought:
Augustine
1994,131-45.
4 In the
issueofVivarium.
present
5J. Hause,
ReviewofSaarinen
1994,in:Speculum
1996,759-60.
Vivarium
37,1

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

18:39:35 PM

61

SECONDTHOUGHTS

pointsand theirreasonsare set out, a resolutionis given,and the opposing views are answered.Thus Burley'scommentaryemploysa method
whichadds a lot of new materialand new perspectivesto Thomas' literal
exposition.Gomes calls this methodologicalfeaturethe "double orientation" of Burley'scommentary.6
AfterextensivelycomparingBurleywith
Gomes
comes
to
the
conclusion
that it is the dubia
and
, notanda
Aquinas,
that mark the widest departurefromAquinas' commentary.7
intelligenda
Gomes stressesthatthisdeparturepertainsnot only to the structureand
of Burley'scommentary
but also to itscontent.Burleydeparts
methodology
fromAquinas on some crucial pointsof doctrine.8
The two commentatorsare, however,in agreementon a number of
importantissues.Both affirmthat naturallaw is the norm forthe moral
of action and, consequently,they accept ethical naturalism,
justification
rationalismand cognitivism.Here Ockham according to Gomes clearly
parts companywith Burley,Aquinas and also with Buridan. Moreover,
thesethreeauthorsgenerallyagree on the conceptsof the supremegood
and the ultimateend and on theiridentification
with happiness.Gomes
further
notesan agreementbetweenBurleyand Aquinas on the doctrine
of justice and on the place of desire,will, the voluntaryand choice in
moral action.9
In addition to a number of differences
in detail, Gomes observesa
doctrinal
difference
between
major
Aquinas and Burleyin theirview of
the speculativeintellect.Whereas forAquinas the practicalreason in the
habit of synderesis
containsthe firstprinciplesof action,Burleyholds that
the speculativeintellectknows and establishesthe universalpreceptsof
the naturallaw. In a ScotisticmannerBurleydenies any real distinction
betweenthe speculativeand the practicalintellect:theyare formallydistinctbut denotatively
the same on the level of naturalreason. Burleythus
the
emphasizes
unityof the intellectand consequentlyrestoresthe function of the speculativeintellectin ethical theory.Accordingto Gomes,
Burley'sview anticipatesthe later conceptionthat the two intellectsare
not different
facultiesbut different
functionsof the same mind.10

6 Gomes1973(op.citaboven. 2),98-9.
7 Gomes1973
aboven. 2), 103.
8 Gomes1973(op.cit.,
., aboven. 2), 119-20.
(op.cit
9 Gomes1973(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),503-4,517,508.
10Gomes1973(op.cit.,
aboven. 2),512-4.

18:39:35 PM

62

RISTOSAARINEN

2. Burley's"Model2
, his results
AlthoughGomes does not deal withBurley'saccountof akrasia
are instructivefor the understandingof Burley'sexpositionof EN VII.
occurs
Here BurleynormallyfollowsAquinas, but whenevera notandum
Thomas
from
taken
are
the reader mustbe careful.Some of the notanda
or at least reflecthis views,but othersdepartfromAquinas and are critconof the text.Moreover,some of the notanda
ical of his understanding
medieval
all
earlier
from
to
tain viewswhich seem depart
interpretations
of Aristotle'sakrasia.
Burley'scontributionto medieval discussionon akrasiacan be briefly
Medieval interpreters
formulatedas follows11:
approach Aristotle'sakrasia
how
one can act againstone's
the
describedin EN VII i.e.,
problem
own betterjudgment withthe help of threedifferent
conceptualmodels.
Accordingto the firstmodel, the akraticpersonignoressomethingin his
the good action does not materialize.Most often
reasoningand therefore
thismodel is outlinedin termsof "particularignorance"explanationwhich
holds that the akraticperson does not grasp properlythe minorpremise
of the practical syllogism.The particularignoranceexplanationcan be
classifiedas model la., whereas a slightlydifferent
explanationlb. holds
minor
and
thatthe akraticpersonknowsboth major
premisebut failsto
combinethemproperly:akrasiawould thusratherresemblea logicalerror
than ignorance.
Accordingto what I call "model 2" the ignorancein question does
not pertainto the premisesof practical syllogismbut to its conclusion.
This explanationhas receivedsome supportin modernscholarshipwhich
somehow
has paid special attentionto Aristotle'swords that the akrates
when
before
choice
Moreover,
the
acting akratically.12
right
possesses
"
action
akratic
in
is
(EN
Aristotlesays that the "last protasis ignored
1147b9), a supporterof model 2 may claim that the last protasisis not
In
the minorpremisebut the propositionalconclusionof the syllogism.13
the
conclusion
is
choice
the
since
that
claims
model
2
reached,
right
sum,
11Cf.Saarinen
1994(op.t
., aboven. 3).
12EN 111Ibi3-15;1151a5-7;
Aristotle's
D. Charles,
See further
1152al5-17.
hilosophy
andWeakness
Aristotle
,
oftheWill
Reason,
London1984andN.O. Dahl,Practical
ofAction,
1984.
Minneapolis
13Charles1984(op.t.,
somehereclaimsthatAristotle
Charles
aboven. 12),117-21.
ofthepractical
whofailsto reachthegoodconclusion
onetypeofakrates
discusses
times
butfailsto
thegoodconclusion
another
typewhoreaches
(model1),sometimes
syllogism
withit(model2).
actin accordance

18:39:35 PM

SECONDTHOUGHTS

63

mustalso to some extentbe presentbut in a mannerwhichis insufficient


to produce the correspondingaction.
"Model 3" comprisesall voluntaristexplanationswhich claim thatthe
will as a self-determining
principleis not necessitatedby what reason dictates. Wickednessis thereforenot simplya formof ignorance,but we
can will wickednessknowinglyand deliberately.
Late medieval views of akrasiafor the most part oscillate between
models 1 and 3. Interestingly
enough, I find Walter Burley to be the
commentator
who
only
clearlyidentifiesmodel 2 as a plausible option.
This findingis based on the followingevidence:
-a) Afterthe expositionof EN 1147b9-18 in a ratherThomisticmanwhich claims that
ner, Burleyadds a notandum
theproposition
withregard
towhich
theakratic
is deceived
andofwhich
he
person
is ignorant,
is nottheminor
ofthepractical
buttheconclusion
premise
syllogism,
ofthepractical
Letus consider
forinstance
thefollowing
syllogism.
practical
syllosweetoughtto be tasted,
thisis sweet,
therefore
thisshouldnotbe
gism:nothing
tasted.
is notdeceived
inregard
totheminor
since
Now,theakratic
person
premise,
heknows
wellenough
thatthisis sweet.
Butheis deceived
withregard
to theconclusion
whichhe doesnotactually
knowbecauseofvehement
concupiscence.14
I have foundno parallelsto thisclaimin medievalcommentaries.
Normally
"
thecommentators
hold thatAristode's"ultima
(EN 1147b9)which
propositio
is to some extent ignored refersto the minor premise and thus they
explain the passage in termsof the particularignoranceexplanation,
-b) In what he calls the "fourthsolution"BurleydepartsfromAquinas
in thathe does not explain akrasiain termsof ignorancebut in termsof
the person'sknowledgebeing "bound" and "released":
. . . theknowledge
which
he [theabates
on theuniversal
levelis so bound
] possesses
whenvehement
takesover,theformal
knowlthat,
byconcupiscence
concupiscence
cannot
themovement
ofconcupiscence.
. . . One can
edgeoftheuniversal
prevent
actanddoesactagainst
theboundknowledge
andtheopinion
oftheparticular;
for
theincontinent
actsin thisway.15
14InEth.VII C.3. 2 (f.
"Scienda
sunthaecduo:Primum,
circa
121va):
p.
quodpropositio
incontinens
et cuiusignorantiam
quamdecipitur
habet,nonestminor
syllogismi
practici,
sedestconclusio
insyllogismo
Verbigratia,
sitistesyllogismus
nullum
practico.
practicus:
dulcegustare
hocestdulce,ergohocnonestgustandum.
Circaminorem
huius
oportet,
nondecipitur
incontinens,
syllogismi
quiabenenovitquodhocestdulce.Sed circaconclusionem
et earnignort
actupropter
vehementem."
decipitur
concupiscentiam
15In Eth.
VII C.3.p.2 (f.121ra'
estligataper
): ". . . scientia
quamhabetin universali
itaquodratiouniversalis,
nonpotest
concupiscentiam
vehementi,
insurgente
concupiscentia
motum
. . . Contra
scientiam
inuniversali
etopinionem
prohibere
concupiscentiae.
ligatam
incontinens."
particularem
potest
quisagereet agit,scilicet

18:39:35 PM

64

RISTOSAARINEN

Unlike Thomas, Burleyconsidersthat this bondage in the reasoningof


the akraies pertainsto the major premisewhereas the minoris perfecdy
accessible.We will returnbelow to the precise contentof this claim.
c) Burleytakes very seriouslyAristotle'sclaim that the abates has the
capacityfor a good choice. He explains thisby holdingthat the akratic
person is preventedfrom"executing"this choice in a mannerwhich is
similarto the sicknessin which the paralysedlimbsdo not obey reason's
commands.16
Burley'sviews in b) and c) clearly cannot be reduced into claiming
thatconcupiscenceonly affectsthe body but he does emphasizethe bodin abatesmore stronglythan otherexpositors.Moreover,Burley
ilyeffects
d) developsa logic of the will in which the logical consequensneed not
be willed althoughthe logical antecedentis willed. A person can thus
willtheconclusion.17
knowand willthepremisesbut he does not necessarily
and are not found
These views occur forthe most part in the notanda
in Aquinas' text. In many cases Burley's note includes a criticismof
Thomas' view. All this evidence is in keepingwith model 2; in many
ways one can even claim thatBurley'sview matcheswell withsome modern interpreters
of Aristotlewho argue in favorof thismodel.18One can
note thatthe evidenceis also in keepingwiththe importantobserfurther
vation of Gomes that Burleystressesthe unityof intellectand restores
The syllogistic
structhe functionof speculativeintellectin ethicaltheory.19
him
than
most otherexpositors.
ture of action theoryinterests
more
theTextualProblems
3. Reconsidering
Afterstatingthat the last propositionwhich is ignoredis the conclusion,
which says that the akratic person who
Burley adds another notandum
knowsboth premises
withregard
to it.Thisoccurs
andbe deceived
can be ignorant
oftheconclusion
in orderto reachtheconcluwhenhe doesnotactually
together
putthepremises
at theconclusion,
sion.Butwhenhedoesactually
aiming
together,
putthepremises
toknowthepremises
andignore
theconclusion.20
itis notpossible
16Cf.Saarinen
1994(iop.cit
., aboven. 3), 140-6.
17Cf.Saarinen
aboven. 3), 142-3.
1994(op.cit.,
18I.e. Charles1984{op.cit.,
aboven. 12);Dahl 1984(<
., aboven. 12).
op.t
19Gomes1973{op.t.,
aboven. 2),512-4.
20InEth.VII C.3.p.2 (f.121va):
uniscientiam
"Secundo
estintelligendum
quodhabens
inactudeminori
etopinionem
maioris
insyllogismo
versalem
propoparticularem
practico,
actu
nonapplicat
conclusionem
etdecipicircaearn,
sitione,
quandoscilicet
ignorare
potest
conclusionis
inducendae."
ad invicem
respectu
premissas

18:39:35 PM

65

SECONDTHOUGHTS

In thisconnectionBurleyalso quotesAristotle's
(71a21),
Analytica
posteriora
thus clearlyindicatingthat the akratic person commitsa logical error
which resemblesour model lb.
doesn't seem to fitwell into its context.For if thislogThis notandum
ical error explains the ignorance of the conclusion,why does Burley
develop the ratherelaborateidea of bound and releasedknowledge?And
why would he claim in the previousnote that the ignoranceof which
Aristotlespeakspertainsto the conclusion?For Aristotlein EN 1147a 10b 15 concentrateson cases in which the akraticperson claims to know
the "last protasis".If ignorancehere only means a logical error,no such
quasi-knowledgeof the conclusion would emerge in the akrateswhich
would need explanationin the firstplace.
In my book I resolve these discrepanciesby defendingmodel 2 as
as being
Burley'spreferredview and interpretthis problematicnotandum
compatiblewithit. One reviewerhas already remarkedthat thisdoesn't
work,since lb and 2 are simplyincompatible.21
Rega Wood suggeststhat
in
is
fact
alternative
three
models
of explainingakrasia.In
Burley
offering
additionto the above-mentioned
models2. and lb., Wood quotespassages
in whichBurleyadheresto the Thomistic"particularignorance"explanation la.22 These passages are in factparaphrasesof Aquinas' exposition.
How should we deal with all these findingswhich seem to raise serious doubts concerningthe inner coherenceof Burley'scommentary?As
to Burley'smethodology,I stillthinkthat Gomes' view of "double orientation"is useful:whereasBurley'sexpositionof the textfollowsAquinas,
the notanda
veryclearlymark out anotherkind of opinion which oftenis
not in keepingwith Thomas. I agree with Wood that all three models
of explainingakrasiacan be foundin Burley'scommentary.Perhaps one
should not reduce them to any one view but say simplythat akrasiais
explainedin threedifferent
ways. The view la is presentin Aquinas and
is clearlytakenfromthere;the view lb is suggestedby Averroeswho at
thispointspeaksof syllogistic
failuresin the reasoningof the akrates
P Perrefersto thatspecificAristotelian
haps view lb in Burley'ssecond notandum
case in whichthe lastprotasis
is not known,whereashis model 2 pertains
to cases in which it is knownimperfectly.24
21Hause1996(<op.cit
., aboven. 5), 760.
22Wood(inthisissue).
23Averroes,
In Eth.VII c.3 (f.98va"vb),
in:Aristotelis
omnia
cum
Averrois
commentants,
Opera
Venice1562,vol.Ill [reprint
Frankfurt
1962].
24Cf.EN 1147b9-12,
Latintext:"ultima
. . . velnonhabetin passione
ens
propositio
[= lb] velsichabetutnoneratin haberescire[= 2]".

18:39:35 PM

66

RISTOSAARINEN

I can agree withRega Wood in that the


With these reconsiderations,
- and what we have been
view which Burleycalls "the fourthsolution"
outliningin termsof "model 2." is an explanationof akrasiawhichmarks
a departurefromThomas' view. But the fourthsolutionwhich Burley
here, quoting the Greek commentary,calls the solutionwhich Aristotle
nevertheless
co-existswiththe othertwo more traditionalmodpreferred,
els of explanation.
One may here note thatnot onlyBurleybut also othermedievalcommentatorsofferseveralcompetingexplanationsof akrasia.GeraldusOdonis
in a somewhatinconsistentmanner offersboth models la and 3 as his
P In a veryusefularticleBonnie Kent claims that
explanationsof akrasia
fromhis theThomas Aquinas' philosophicalexplanationof abasia differs
these
two
views
it.26
of
probablycan be
Although
ological explanation
the
reconciledwitheach otherwithinthe so-calledtwo-stepexplanation,27
remains.Thus it is not
textualfactobservedby Bonnie Kent nevertheless
unusual to say that different
approaches can also be found in Burley's
explanations.
Solution"
in the"Fourth
4. PracticalSyllogism
In order to understandBurley'sfourthsolutionwe have to outlinehis
view of Aristotle'spracticalsyllogismsomewhatmore closely."Model 2"
which we have put forwardas Burley'sown contributionto the explanation of akrasiapresupposesthat a distinctioncan be made betweena)
the propositionalexpressionof the conclusionand b) the conclusionas
between a) the internalgood choice and b) the
action, or, respectively,
externalrealizationof the conclusion.Since Aristotleseems to hold that
the conclusionof the practicalsyllogismis the action itself[EN 1147a25deny the possibilityof makingsuch distinctions.
30), many commentators
But othersdo thinkthat theycan neverthelessbe applied.28
25See Saarinen
1994(op.dt
., aboven. 3), 146-60.
26B. Kent,Transitory
of
oftheHistory
onIncontinence
Vice:Thomas
, in:Journal
Aquinas
27 (1989),199-223.
Philosophy,
27As outlined
holdsthat
in Saarinen
aboven. 3), 125-9,thisexplanation
1994(op.dt.,
delibwithout
abandoned
becomes
theright
as a result
ofconcupiscence
majorpremise
a falsemajor
under
aredeliberated
facts
thattheparticular
After
eration
premise
(first
step).
is tosomeextent,
be pursued",
secondstep).Thusthesinofakrates
should
(e.g."pleasure
aboven. 5),760)finds
Hause(1996[op.dt.,
Whereas
deliberate.
butnotaltogether,
Jeffrey
to it and
thisexplanation
RegaWood(inthisissue)adheres
onlyan "educated
guess",
ofAquinas.
criticism
showsin which
waythesecondstepis at thefocusofBurley's
28Charles1984(op.dt.,
above
aboven. 12),113, 146,156;Saarinen1994(op.dt.,
n. 3), 13.

18:39:35 PM

67

SECONDTHOUGHTS

In the fourthsolutionBurleyis explainingin what sense the conclusion of the practicalsyllogismfollowsfromits premises.There, as I will
show next, he applies a distinctionbetween the propositionaland the
fromthe premisesand thusfollowstheintercausal consequencesresulting
29 Gomes offersadditional
of
model
2.
supportto this
pretativepatterns
that
while
since
he
shows
interpretation,
Burley,
commentingon EN III,
considersthe conclusionof the practical syllogismto be not an action
but a normativeor prescriptivestatementindicatingwhat is to be done
in a particularsituation.The choice followsthis statementas a conclusion drawn fromit.30
In the fourthsolutionBurleyholds that,unlikein theoreticalsyllogism,
in practicalsyllogismthe action does notfollow
in thewaytheconclusion
from
butin thewaytheposterior
follows
from
premises,
theprior,
likethedownpour
from
theraincloud.
In thiswaydoestheactionfollow,
iftheagenthaving
is notprohibited
fromacting.
theseopinions
Forexample:
if
someone
hastheactualopinion
thateverything
sweetoughtto be tasted,
andhe
alsohastheactualopinion
thatthisis sweet,
thenit is necessary
thattheperson
himfrom
theseopinions
tastesthisifnothing
Thus,from
having
prevents
tasting.
thepremises:
sweetoughttobe tasted"
and"thisis sweet",
itnecessar"everything
that"thisoughtto be tasted".
Buttheactiondoesnotnecessarily
follow
ilyfollows
from
theactualopinion
theuniversal
sweet
tobetasted"
concerning
"everything
ought
andfrom
theactualopinion
thesingular
"thisis sweet".
Foritis possiconcerning
blethata person
whohastheseopinions
canbe prevented
from
Butifhe
acting.
is notprevented,
he necessarily
actsandtastes
thething
which
he actually
considers
sweet.31

29Cf.alsoSaarinen
1994(op.t
., aboven. 3), 133-4.
30Gomes1973(op.dt.,
aboven. 2),330.He quotesBurley,
In Eth.Ill c.3 p.3 (f.51ra):
"Electioestquasiconclusio
ad sententiam
factam
de operabili
que sequitur
que proUt si arguitur
sic:legibus
estobediendum.
Sed hoprieestconclusio
sillogismi
practici.
norrepatrem
in lege.Igiturpateresthonorandus.
et matrem
estpreceptum
Et ad
hancsententiam
electioeiusquodesthonorre
que estde honorando
patrem
sequitur
patrem."
31In Eth.VII c.3. (f.
in speculativis
ex propositione
universali
"[Sicutigitur
p.2 121ra):
et propositione
... ita in practicis
necessario
et factivis
ex
conclusio,
singulari
sequitur
in actuet opinione
universali
in actunecessario
opinione
singulari
sequitur
opus.]Non
sicutconclusio
ex premissis,
sedtarnen
sicutposterius
ad prius,
utplusequitur
sequitur
via sequitur
ad nubem.
Sic igitur
ab operando.
sequitur
opus,nisiopinans
prohibeatur
Verbigratia:
si aliquisactuopinetur
etetiamactuopiquodomnedulceestgustandum,
neturquodhoc estdulce,necesseestquodsic opinansgustet
hoc nisiimpediatur
a
Undeex istispremissis,
omnedulceestgustandum,
hocestdulce,de necesgustando.
sitate
in actude istauniversali,
Sed ex opinione
omne
ergohocestgustandum.
sequitur:
dulceestgustandum,
etex opinione
inactude illasingulari,
hocestdulce,nonde necessitatesequitur
in actupotest
ab operando,
opus.Habensenimistasopiniones
impediri
sedsi nonimpediatur
de necessitate
etgustabit
hocquodinactuopinatur
esse
operabitur
dulce."

18:39:35 PM

68

RISTOSAARINEN

We distinguishhere two levels: at the propositionallevel the premises


strictly
implythe conclusion,whereasat the level of actual opinionsthese
opinionspromptaction withanothertypeof necessitywhichis subjected
The impedimentor preventionintroduced
to externalcausal impediments.
here enables Burley to claim that the action cannot be identifiedwith
the conclusionof the practicalsyllogism,since theyoperate at different
levelsof necessity.The actionfollowsnot like a conclusionfrompremises,
but ratherlike a physicaleffectof some precedingcause. One can thus
hold the conclusionof practicalsyllogismbut not act accordingto it e.g.
in cases in whichthe appetitivepower,concupiscence,succeedsin causally
"binding" the knowledgein such a way that the conclusion does not
materializeas action.
but also shows in a
Rega Wood not only shares this interpretation
in
of
this
how
feature
Burley'sanalysis deliberationrelates
helpfulway
him fromAquinas. She further
him to Ockham and distinguishes
emphasizes the weakness of the link between understandingand executionin
Gomes thinksthat the above-quoted
Burley'sview of human intellect.32
text supportsBurley'sview that the conclusionof practicalsyllogismis
not an action but a normativestatement.Gomes furtherconsidersthat
thiskind of "gap betweenjudgmentand choice" linksBurleywithScotus
and voluntarism.33
The links with Scotus and Ockham do not mean, however,voluntarismin the sense of deliberatewrong-doing.On the contrary,Burley
attemptsto explain akrasiawithoutpostulatingevil deliberation.His criticismof Aquinas' view in thiscontextshowsthat.WhereasAquinas holds
thatconcupiscenceoffersits own major premisewhichthe abatesto some
extentdeliberatelyfollows,Burley claims that concupiscenceaffectsthe
At the same
structures.34
particularsand thusdoes not introducesyllogistic
32Wood(inthisissue).
33Gomes1973(<
., aboven. 2), 330-1;339-40.
op.cit
34In Eth.VII C.3.
esthiesecundum
aliquosquodquedam
p.2 (f. 121): "Sciendum
uniet quedamipsiusconcupiscentiae.
universalis
estipsiusrationis
Propositio
propositio
universalis
extrahoram.
dulceestgustandum
rationis
estista:nullum
versalis
Propositio
etinconetperconsequens
esttalis:omnedulceestgustabile,
delectabile,
concupiscentiae
sic:omnedulce
submaioriconcupiscentiae
sumitminorem
tinens
syllogizando
practice
hocdulce
conclusio
hocestdulce,et sequitur
quiagustabit
operationis,
oportet
gustare,
in
cumsitpassioexistens
videtur
Mihitarnen
si nonsitprohibitus.
quodconcupiscentia,
in
inclinatur
sedsolum
inquaminclinetur,
universalem
nonhabetaliquam
partesensitiva,
etsubunasumit
universales
habetduaspropositiones
incontinens
particularia.
Ipsetarnen
in illamuniversalem,
noninclint
in practice
Sed concupiscentia
minorem
syllogizando.

18:39:35 PM

SECONDTHOUGHTS

69

timeBurleyalso explainsakrasiawithoutpostulatingany ignoranceof the


(model la) and the volpremises.Thus he avoids both the intellectualistic
untaristic(model 3) view of akrasia.
But what does the perverseappetite preciselyeffectin the mind in
order that akraticactions can take place? One must note here that the
bad effectis not called ignoranceor forgetfulness,
but it resemblesa causal
obstaclewhich preventsthe action. Ignorance of the premisesneed not
- soluta i.e.
be postulatedas such but only in the formof scientialigata
,
bound and released,or "inaccessible"and "accessible" knowledge.The
impedimentwhich the scientialigatacauses relatesto the major premise:
as a resultof this inaccessibility
the person's deliberationdoes not proceed as it should,althoughthe minorpremisesare as such fullyknown.
Consequently,the rightconclusionremainsin some sense ignored and
the akraticpersonvoluntarily,
followsan option
thoughnot deliberately,
some
minor
and
desiredby concupiscence.
presentedby
premise
Interestingly
enough, Burleydoes not even mentionignorancein his
discussionconcerningthe fourthsolution.Ignorance is firstintroduced
afterthatin the expositionof EN 1147b6-8 whichis takenfromthe Greek
And then Burleyclaims,as we have seen, that the "ignocommentary.35
ranceof theparticulars"relatesto the conclusionof thepracticalsyllogism,
not to the minorpremise.Ignorance is thus not the causeof akrasia
, but
ratherits effect.
one
cannot
claim
that
a
"clearPerhaps
Burley adopts
, since the conclusionof the syllogismis not actual
eyed" view of akrasia
at themomentof akraticaction.But it is certainlysafeto say thatwhereas
forAquinas akrasiabasicallyresultsfromthe ignoranceof the particulars,
Burleyin his fourthand fifthsolutionaims at showingthat,even when
the major and minorpremisesare known,akrasiacan neverthelessarise
as a resultof insufficient
reasoning.
"
5. Burley
's (Insufficient
ReasoningExplanation
Accordingto Burley's "fourthsolution" akratic action is not deliberate
nor does it presupposeignorance of the premises.Concupiscence here
causes akrasiaby hinderingthe syllogisticdeliberationprocess so that its
conclusiondoes not materializeas action. This can happen as a resultof
sedinparticularia
contenta
subiliauniversali."
1994(iop.citaboven. 3), 125-9
Saarinen
and 136-7.
35See Saarinen
1994{op.cit.,
aboven. 3), 137.

18:39:35 PM

70

RISTOSAARINEN

the bondage of the major premise(fourthsolution)or, even in a case in


which no such bondage is operative,as a failureto put the premises

together("fifthsolution").
Let us call this view the "insufficient
reasoning"explanationof akrasia. This explanationonce more bringsmodels lb and 2 (or the fifth
and
fourthsolution)into close connection,although one cannot simplybe
reduced to the other.What is distinctive
in Burley'sview of akrasiais his
tendencyto explain it as a problemof syllogistic
reasoning,thusemphathat
the
Aristotle's
view
cause
of
akrasia
can
be explained froma
sizing
"natural" syllogisticviewpoint(EN 1147a24-25). The "particularignorance" explanationis a commonplacein all medievalliteratureon akrasia.
In addition to this,Thomas Aquinas and especiallythe Franciscansare
in what sense akrasiais not onlyvoluntarybut also
interestedin clarifying
deliberate.Still another importantexplanatorystrategyis employedby
and
Albertthe Great and John Buridan who emphasize the uncertainty
facie
of
in
mind.36
character
the
ethical
the
akratic
prima
Though
premises
withany
dependenton many sources,Burley'sview cannot be identified
of these othermajor strategies.37
Why does Burleyemphasize so much the insufficient
reasoningas a
major cause of akrasiaiFurtherresearchis necessaryin order to give a
reallygood answer,but perhaps threefactorshere play a role.
1. Since Burleyin the firstplace clearlydistinguishes
betweenjudgment and choice (Gomes) and considersthe linkbetweenunderstanding
and executionto be a weak one (Wood), he has no need to postulate
:
additionalignoranceor deliberatebad choice in order to explain akrasia
insufficient
this
reasoningalready explains
phenomenon.
2. If Gomes is rightin claimingthat the speculativeintellectplays a
strongrole in Burley'sethics,its capacity for reasoningis decisive for
action theory.Whereas concupiscence cannot overcome true scientific
knowledge,it may temporarilysucceed in bindingthis capacity of reaactions.
soningso that it cannot bringabout self-controlled
rea3. In additionto historicaland conceptualissues,the insufficient
we
know
well
kind
has
a
of
soningexplanation
psychologicalplausibility:
enough many general truthsconcerningcertain harmfulactivities,e.g.
pollution.We can also
eatingsweets,cigarettesmokingor environmental
36Forthese,
see Saarinen
1994(op.dt.,
aboven. 3).
37In BookIII Burley
which
someremarks
doesmake,
however,
uncertainty
concerning
to
f. 47vavb.
I intend
Cf.In Eth.Ill c.2. p.2, especially
resemble
Buridan's
discussions.
return
to theseon another
occasion.

18:39:35 PM

SECONDTHOUGHTS

71

easily identifythe respectiveparticularactions as belongingunder the


we do
generaltruth.But in the everydaydecision-making
processeseither
not care to put theseparticularsunder the well-knowngeneralrule orwe
considerourselvesas exceptions,thus "binding"the forceof generalrule
withoutforgetting
it. In the lattercase we not only know the factsbut
also in some sense both reach and ignore the conclusion.
Strasbourg
Institute
Research
forEcumenical

18:39:35 PM

WillingWickedly:
Ockhamand BurleyCompared
REGA WOOD

Contraryto St. Thomas Aquinas and the restof the scholastictradition


as wickedof Aristotelian
ethics,Williamof Ockham arguedthatwickedness
was
ness could be willed. Specifically,he argued that Thomas
wrong
to thinkthat we can explain willed wickednessby positingignoranceof
the particularpropositionswhich formthe minor premisesin practical
syllogisms.
AgainstBl. John Duns Scotus, Ockham argued thatwillingwickedness
is just as bad as doingsomethingwicked.In supportof his claim,Ockham
betweenconditionaland executiveacts of will. What lends
distinguished
to
plausibility the view thatexternalacts are worsethan internalvolitions
is our suspicionthat willingwickednesswithoutexternalaction is somehow blamelessbecause ineffectual.
Accordingto Ockham, that's a conconditionalvolitionsfrom
fusionthatresultsfromour failureto distinguish
executiveacts of will.Conditionalvolitionsdo not resultin externalaction
because actual externalactions were never intended;executive,formally
imperativeacts of will inevitablyresultin action unless impeded by an
- such as, the failureof the
extraneousexternalcircumstance
firing
entirely
mechanismof the weapon of a murderer.
Walter of Burley,like his predecessorsin the classical and scholastic
traditionsdenied that wickednessas wickednesscould be willed. But he
agreed with Ockham that sometimesignorance of particularscannot
explainwilledwickedness.When we departfromdietswhichdictatethat
'all sweetsshould be eliminatedfromthe diet' and eat chocolatetruffles,
we are not ignorantof theirsweetness.Moreover,like Ockham's, Burley's
account of practicalreason involvesexecutiveacts.
So as is oftenthe case, the views of these contemporariesare related
in an interesting
fashion,which bringsus to a perennialproblem:which
of them wrote on ethics first?Burleywas born about 1275;1 Ockham,
1J.
31 (1969),175.
in:Mediaeval
Studies,
Mertonense,
Weisheipl,
Repertorium
Vivarium
37,1

BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke

18:39:42 PM

WILLING
WICKEDLY

73

more than ten yearslater in about 1287.2But Ockham's teachingcareer


was muchshorterthanBurley's;beginningabout 1318, it effectively
ended
about 1328, when like Burleyhe enteredthe politicalarena. By contrast
Burley'sphilosophicalworksdate from 130 1 untilalmost the end of his
lifein 1344. Specificallythe workwithwhichwe shall be mostconcerned
here, Burley'sEthicscommentaryis dated about 1333-1334,3 more than
ten years afterOckham's De connexione
so we will be considering
virtutum'
a well-knownolder master'sresponseto a youngerman's work. Burley
did not take kindlyto Ockham. Even when he borrowed Aristotelian
expositionfromOckham,Burleypointedlycalled him a beginnerin logic.4
Though Ockham was not named in the Ethics,presumablyBurleywas
tacitlyreplyingto him. And since Burleywas pardy convinced,though
stillverycritical,it ought to be an interesting
reply;and it is.
In this article,Ockham and Burleywill be compared and contrasted
on threetopics:
1) how to explain cases where we do what we know is wrong
2) how to distinguishweaknessof will fromvice, or in medieval terms
incontinencefromintemperance,and
3) how to describe the link between knowledgeand volitionin moral
acts.
In conclusion,I will considerwhat effectmedieval speculationson vice
may have had on the concept of intellect.
Much of this articlewill concern the difference
betweenincontinence
and intemperance,or between moral weakness and moral vice. It is a
topic where examplesare useful.For purposesof clarity,instead of simsexes in the examples,I have adopted a conventionwhich
ply alternating
presentsweak women and wicked men. Unfortunately,
experiencesuggests that there are also plentyof weak men and wicked women. The
conventionI adopted does not reflectmy beliefsabout the distribution
of moral flawsamong the sexes; ratherit is a sign of sloth. There are
more examples of weakness,and only male scholasticauthors,so this
conventionmakes ambiguityin pronoun referenceeasier to avoid.
2 R. Wood,Ockham
ontheVirtues
Indiana1997,1.
, WestLafayette,
3J.
1969(op.cit
., above,n. 1), 187.
Weisheipl
s. totum
I t.c.4-5
Aristot.
Burley,
tr.l,f.8 ; I t.c.15tr.2c.l, f.13 ; III t.c.
Exfiositio
Phys.
11tr.lc.l, f.64rb;
IV t.c.42tr.lc.5,f.98vb;
VI t.c.24tr.lc.4,f. 183ra;
VI t.c.79tr.3c.l,
f.196va
Praedic.
34rb.
Cf.G. Gi,
Veteran,
(ed.Venice1501).InArtem
3, Venice1541,f.33vb,
Guillelmi
deOckham
, II, 24*.
Opera
Philosophica

18:39:42 PM

74

REGAWOOD

?
1. Must Wickedness
be basedon Ignorance
1. 1 Ockham
Ockham's positionon willingwickednessis well-known;it was, forexample, ably discussedby MarilynM. Adams at the 1994 EasternDivision
a briefsummarybased on Ockham's
APA Meetingin Boston.5Nonetheless,
De connexione
virtutum
will be useful.
In that work, Ockham defends,among other things,the thesisthat
prudencewithoutmoral virtueis possible.That is, we can knowperfecdy
well what it is we should do and yet fail to do it. We know the conclusion of the practicalsyllogism,and yet we do not choose to obey its
dictate. Unlike his predecessors,who claim that we choose wickedness
only because we somehow fail to understandour duty,Ockham claims
that sometimeswe cannot fail to understand.He holds that the intellect
is necessitatedor determined;by contrast,the will is free and undetermined. And since both Christiantheologians6and pagan philosophers7
agree thatwe are praised or blamed onlyforwhat is voluntary,Ockham
concludes that the will is the primarymoral faculty.8
he defends
Ockham's is a veryChristianthesis,and not surprisingly,
it in part by adducingthe authorityof all the theologianswho agree that
thereis malicioussin.9But malice does not differfromignorance,if the
maliciouslike theignorantdo not knowthe minorpremiseof thepractical
moral syllogism:'everything
worthyshould be done, thisis worthy,thereforethisshould be done'. The case based on malice is confirmedby an
argumentbased on incontinenceor weaknessof will,10a case in which
malefactorsdisplayawarenessof what it is theyshould or should not do.
In the processof arguingforhis conclusionOckham rejectsthe various
theorieswhich had explained that what is reallyinvolvedin wickedness
is a formof ignorance.The firstsuch thesisis the view that the minor
5 A revised
onWill,
as Ockham
is forthcoming
Nature
version
, andMorality
, in:P. Spade
toOham.
TheCambridge
Companion
(ed.),
6 Cf.August.,
De verareligione
, c.14,n. 27 (PL 34, 133):'Nuncverousqueadeopecsi nonsitvoluntarium.';
ut nullomodositpeccatum,
estmalum,
catumvoluntarium
De concepta
Anselmus,
, c.4,ed. Schmitt
(Rome1950),vol.II, p. 145:'Quidquid
virginali
estvoluntatis.
totum
faciunt,
imputandum
igitur
7 Cf.Aristot.,
BracarenMartmus
1; 3.5.1114a22-30;
Ethics
Mcomachean
, III.1. 1109b30-3
Louvain-Paris
Aristotelis
in:LesAuctoritates
demoribus)
citedas Seneca,
, ed.J.Hamesse,
sis,Liber
est.'
1974,p. 280(1): 'Omnispeccatiactiovoluntaria
8 Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed.J.C.Wey,364(OTh VIII).
9 Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,365(OThVili).
10Ockham,
virtutum
De connexione
, a. 3, ed. Wey,367(OThVili).

18:39:42 PM

WILLING
WICKEDLY

75

which I shall call the particularignoranceexplapremiseis unknown,11


nation (PIE). In the formpresentedby Ockham, PIE suggeststhat since
the rectitudeand certitudeof scientificknowledgemake it incompatible
withmoral error,it must be that the wicked are ignorantof the minor
proposition.Ockham repliesfirstthat thereis as much rectitudein the
major premiseas in the minor. So if we can know the major, and yet
act wickedly,we can know the minor and act wickedly.
Ockham nextrejectsa variantof PIE, whichdistinguishes
the ignorant
fromthe malicious in termsof the intensityof theirknowledgeof the
universal.Those who do wickedthingsmaliciouslyhave a well-developed
of the universalprinciplesof moral science,12as opposed
understanding
to the ignorantwho understandsuch universaisonly dimly. To this
Ockham repliesthatthe degree of knowledgeis not relevant;both know,
or could know,the universal,since even the ignorantknow that 'everythingworthyshouldbe done'. Yet on his opponents'account,neitherthe
malicious nor the ignorant know the particular. There is no difference betweenwhat is knownby the ignorantas opposed to the malicious
unless one admits that the malicious know the particularin Ockham's
view.13
The last of these suggestionsis in some ways the most interesting
thatthe behaviorof the incontinent
is governedby two major premises:14
should
be
done'
and 'everything
'nothingunworthy
enjoyable should be
done'. And since she knowsonly 'thisis enjoyable'and not 'thisis unworHere Ockham repliesthatwe cannot knowtwo
thy',she acts unworthily.
such universalmaxims,since theyare incompatible.Assentto one militatesagainstassentto the other.If this argumentis rejected,he appeals
to experience.Supposingsuch simultaneousassent is reallypossible,it is
stilltrue that people sometimesact unworthilyeven thoughthey know
the conclusionas well as the major and the minorpremisesof the practical syllogisms
which dictatethe avoidance of the unworthy.
The freedomof the will is the basis of the last of Ockham's proofs
thatwe can will wickednessknowingly.In the sensitiveappetite,perception is sometimesimmediatelyfollowedby the inclinationto grasp or to
11Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,365 (OThVIII).
12Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,365-6(OThVili).
13Another
is thatthosewhoactwickedly
havemerely
rejected
suggestion
speculative
notpractical
ofmoralpropositions
virtutum
knowledge,
knowledge,
{Deconnexione
, ed.Wey,
366(OThVIII).
14Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,367 (OThVIII).

18:39:42 PM

76

REGAWOOD

avoid an object. But if the will is free,this cannot be its relationto the
dictatesof the intellect,accordingto Ockham.15
The classic replyto this argumentis that the will can avertthe intellect fromconsideringany object. It is free because it determineswhat
subjects the intellectconsiders,not because it can act contraryto the
intellect'sdictate.16
Ockham countersby askingabout the act of willwhich
determinedwhat subject the intellectconsiders:was it dictatedby our
understandingor not? If so, then the will is not free.If not, then since
the will is not followingan intellectualdictate,the will,not the intellect,
is the primarymoral faculty
contraryto the proponentsof the original
reply.Ockham concludes this series of argumentsby explainingthat in
any series of acts of will and intellect,there is an originalact of will
which depends not on a demonstratedconclusionbut on a bare act of
intellectwhich manifeststhe object to the will.17So, basically,Ockham
holds that the firstact is an intellectualact, but denies that it is an act
of reasoning;ratherit is a bare manifestation,
a merelyapprehensiveact.
In confirmation
of his views, Ockham adds that sensitiveappetiteis
and yet we do not
just as capable as the will of avertingthe intellect,18
his claim that
call the sensitiveact freeon that account. He strengthens
the intellect,unlike the will, is necessitatedand not free,by reminding
us that evidence compels the intellect.19
1.2 Burleyon WillingWickedness
a chapter
A discussionof Burley'sviewson Weakness
oftheWillconstitutes
in a recentbook by Risto Saarinen.20It is a valuable studyof an important
15Ockham,
De connexione
uirtutum
, a. 3, ed.Wey,367-70(OThVIII).
16Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,368(OThVili).
17Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,368-9(OThVili).
18Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,369-70(OThVili).
19Ockham,
a. 3, ed. Wey,370(OThVili).
De connexione
virtutum)
thatthewill
ofthewillsuggests
Another
toOckham's
account
ofthefreedom
objection
to
Ockham's
to understanding.
is freein respect
to external
notin respect
actions,
reply
actions
andexternal
thisobjection
is basedontheclaimthattherelation
between
volition
butinevitably,
from
executive
volitions
notfreely
is notfree.
External
actsfollow
provided
ofthisclaimis basedon authority.
FromSt.Gregory
Hisproof
there
is no impediment.
inEvang
seeXLHomiliarum
is volition
there
is action,
there
hetakestheclaimthatwhere
.,
itwilldo' is a textdrawn
II h. 30 (PL 76, 1220C). 'Whatan animaldesires
decisively,
to
Ockham
is heretacitly
from
Aristotle's
(9.4.1048a8).
Presumably,
appealing
Metaphysics
authorities.
intheworks
andphilosophical
oftheological
ourexperience
as agents,
as reflected
20R. Saarinen,
toBuridan
From
Weakness
, Leiden
Augustine
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought:
rolein thedevelopment
whosebookplayedan important
1994.Mythanks
to Saarinen

18:39:42 PM

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77

studied.Some
topicin medievalphilosophy,whichhas been insufficiently
hints of the difficulty
in studyingBurley on Aristotle'sEthicsare provided- one of whichis the extentto whichBurleyborrowsfromhis predecessors,mostof all St. Thomas Aquinas, fromwhom a greatdeal of the
literalexpositionof the text is taken,as Saarinen indicates.21
Moreover
thereis the problemwith unnamed sources. There are a couple places
which seem to indicatecontactwith Ockham as we shall see; similarly,
it is chronologically
quite possiblethatthereis a debt to GeraldusOdonis
whose pre-1329 Commentary
antedatesBurley's(1333-1334) by about five
it
is
indeed
views about
years;
quite likelythat some of the interesting
what goes wrongin incontinencedescribedbelow come fromGerald.22
So much is taken fromAquinas, that it is not always easy to discern
Burley'sown views. Sometimesthe quotation is so extensivethat it is
'almostimpossibleto see [Burley's]own contribution.'23
Facingthisdifficulty,
and seeing that Burleyadvocates alternativesto PIE, Saarinen assumed
thatBurleyhad rejectedPIE, Aquinas' principalsolutionto the problem
of abasia. But thisstrategyis too sweeping.We cannot simplydisassociate fromBurleythe views he owes to Aquinas.
SaarinencontrastsAquinas withBurleyin termsof two modelsof abasia. Thomas, he says, accounts for weakness in termsof ignorance of
moralscience;Burley,in termsof disregardforpracticalknowledge.According to Thomas, an incontinentperson does not know the minorpremise
in thepracticalsyllogism;
accordingto Saarinen,Burleyclaimsthatincontinentpeople are 'clear-eyed'.Saarinen completeshis expositionof Burley
by suggestingthat concupiscenceacts only on the body; thatwould certainlyexplain why incontinentpeople can retain theirknowledgewhile
actingbadly.24
I believe both that Burley'sdisagreementwith Thomas is less basic
and on a different
point, having to do not with the absence of knowlbut
the
absence
of deliberationamong the incontinent.I will show
edge,
firstthat Burleyand Aquinas do not disagree in the manner suggested
by Saarinen. Over and over again, Burleysays thatmoral science in the

ofmyownviews.
Saarinen
hascontinued
hisresearch,
as thereader
willseeinhisWalter
onabasia:Second
in thisissueofVivarium.
Burley
, whichappears
Thoughts
21R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit.,
above,n. 20),131-3.
22Gf.R.A.Gauthier
& J.Y.Jolif,
Nicomaque:
Introduction
etcommen, traduction
L'thique
2nded.,Louvain-Paris
taire,
1970,136.
23R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit
., above,n. 20),132.
24R. Saarinen
1994(<op.cit
., above,n. 20),135-41.

18:39:42 PM

78

REGAWOOD

exirein actuy
incontinent
is not actual (nonpotest
actu,etc.),25but what
ignort
is not actual is not 'clear-eyed' knowledge.As to the suggestionthat
knowledgeis intactbecause concupiscenceaffectsonly the body not the
of a textwhich Saarinen
intellect,it is the resultof a misinterpretation
himselfcorrectlytranslates:'concupiscencenot only moves the soul, but
even . . . the body'.26
Saarinen's expositionis also based on a correctreadingof a brieftext
frombook VII ch. 3 of theEthicswhichrendersthewholepuzzling.Burley
says in one sentencethatincontinencedoes not resultfromignoranceof
the particular,minor premisein the practicalsyllogism,thus seemingly
rejectingPIE,27the particularignoranceexplanationof incontinence.But
of incontinence
elsewhereBurley repeatedlyapproves the identification
with ignoranceof the particular.For the purposes of establishingthat
Burleydoes not reallywant to hold thatincontinencecannotinvolveignorance of the particular,let me quote a couple of laterpassages in which
he summarizeswhat has been establishedin the thirdchapter:There is
a sentenceat chapter8 which reads: We should note that the incontinent [person]trulyevaluatesthe universalbut not theparticular(.Notandum
... sed habet
... in universali
. . . habetveramexistimationem
estquodincontinens
A littlelaterin the same chapter,
de eis inparticular).m
falsamexistimationem
we read: 'An incontinent[person] acts against a dictate of reason on
account of passion, but passion passes rapidly,and when it ceases, she
contradictamen
evaluates the particularcorrectly(propter
passionem
operetur
inparexistimationem
habetrectam
cessante
tarnen
rationis,
passionequaecitotransit
is not
reason
that
'the
incontinenti
At
P
ticular)'
chapter 10, Burleysays
in
When
reason
the
universal.
she
has
passion [first]arises
right
corrupt;
she [also] has rightreason in the particular;she has it actually[again],
when passion ceases.'30
So Burley's apparent rejectionof PIE is puzzling.To get to the bottom of the puzzle, let me explain the structureof book VII, chapter3
of the Ethicsas Burleyexpounds it. Chapter three concernsa problem
set by Aristotle:what happens when someone does somethingwickedand
25Expositio
ArteSimonis
Aristotelis
libros
Ethicorum
Burlei
decern
Gualteri
, 7.1.3,Venetiis:
super
de Asula,1500[Hain,4144],f.l09vb
de Luere,impensis
AndreeTorresani
E-F, 110*
Nationale
UCLA'scopyoftheBibliothque
from
P. Xeroxcopy;reproduced
original.
26R. Saarinen
1994{op.cit.,
above,n. 20),134-5.
27R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit
., above,n. 20),138.
28Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.8,f.116vaB.
29Expositio
D.
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.8,f.116vb
30Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.1.10,f.ll8vaF.

18:39:42 PM

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WILLING

79

knowsit? Are her acts unconsidered?Is she usingher knowledgeor not?


In medievalterms:is she speculatingas she acts (agerespeculante
)? Burley
believes that Aristotlepresentsfour solutionsto this problem, and he
quotes Eustratiusas sayingthat Aristodeaccepted the fourthmore fully
than the rest.Saarinen seems to have seen these fouras mutuallyexclusivesolutions.Since Burleyhad copied mostof thefirstthreefromAquinas,
includingthe second, which is PIE, he may have consideredit safe to
ignorethe firstthree,which is not the case.
In fact as Burleystatesat the outset,the firstthreesolutionspresent
in termsof which the problem of incontinenceis
the basic distinctions
to be solved.The firstsolutionis the most basic, the distinctionbetween
The second solves the probhabitualknowledgeand actual knowledge.31
lem by distinguishing
between the different
propositionsin the practical
In
and
PIE.32
syllogism
by suggesting
response to the hardest case, in
which the incontinentperson says thingswhich indicate that she knows
thatwhat she is doing,Aristodedistinguishes
betweenknowledgewhich
can and cannot be acted on. The habitual knowledgeof healthypeople
who are awake is at theirdisposal in a way in which it is not accessible
to sleepers,drunks,or the insane. For Burley,followingAquinas, inaccessible knowledge is described as boun, ' ligatus
'. Burley contrasts
bound knowledgewith released knowledge,or habitussolutus
;33he distinbetween
accessible
and
inaccessible
Bound
knowlguishes
knowledge.
cannot
be
to
bear
on
moral
or
actually brought
edge
problems; rather,
premisesknownin this way are not actuallyavailable for the construction of syllogisms.
In the fourthsolution,34
in a someBurleyapplies the threedistinctions
what different
the
first
is
to
the
second
way;
always operative.Coming
he considerswhat otherpartsof the practicalsyllogismbesides
distinction,
the particularmightnot be known.The thirddistinction
providesBurley
withhis basic pictureof sinsof passion:concupiscencewars againstknowledge and succeedsin bindingit,so thatit cannotdictateaction;35it affects
both the body and the soul. Buildingon those distinctions,
Burleythen
constructswhat he describes as Aristotle'spreferred,fourthsolution.
According to the fourthsolution, concupiscence binds knowledge,as
31Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Etil.Arisi.
7.1.3,f.109rbC.
32Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
A.
7.1.3,f.109ra*rb
33Expositio
G.Burls. X lib.Eth.Arist.
E.
7.1.3,f.109va
34
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
7.1.3,f.110raJ-K.
35Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
110raG.
7.1.3,f.109vaExpositio

18:39:42 PM

80

REGAWOOD

and as the second distinctionsuggests,


describedin the thirddistinction,
what
is bound is the universalnot the
one
is
but
only
premise bound,
particularpremise.
Burleyconsidersthe posFinallyin what is in effecta fifthsolution,36
knows
both the major and the
that
an
incontinent
person actually
sibility
minorpremise,but does not know the conclusion.He notes that if the
major and minor are actuallyknown in combination,the conclusionis
unavoidable. But he suggeststhat theymay not be combined (applicatio
ad invicem).
actupraemissas
Now what I thinkis going on here is Burleyexploringdifferent
ways
into the intellect.In additionto the
in which to introduceindeterminacy
PIE model,in the fourthsolution,Burleydescribesa second model where
in the fifthsolution,a thirdmodel,
the major premiseis inaccessible;37
but
uncombined
premisesaccounts for an incontinent
featuringknown,
Not onlyBurley'scontinuedaccepperson'signoranceof the conclusion.38
tance of PIE, but his use of language like 'someone can' suggeststhat
thisis the case.
What do we make of Burley'sassertion,in the course of describing
the thirdmodel, that the minor is not unknown?He may be referring
to the simplepremise'thisis sweet',ratherthan to the qualifiedpremise
'thisis a sweetI should not eat'. Earlierhe has noted that 'thisis sweet'
is only accidentallyopposed to 'all sweetsare to be eliminatedfromthe
diet'.39Only in the presenceof an passion forsweetsis knowledgeof the
simple minor likelyto lead to actions incompatiblewith the course of
action suggestedby the major.
Suppose that the three models presentedin solutionstwo, four and
fiveare alternative,but not mutuallyexclusive,solutions.What purpose
mightbe served by introducingthem? Perhaps Burley recognizedthat
incontinencemighthave more than one explanation.Sometimeswe do
not recognizean action as unworthy(PIE, model 1), but also sometimes
we do not stop to thinkor combine the relevantpremises(model 3). As
Aristotlepointed out, it even sometimeshappens, thatwe say thingswe
do not understand.In Burley'stermswe may say thatwe have to maintain
a reasonable weight,but not reallyunderstandthe riskthat a fattydiet

36Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib. Eth.Arisi.
7.1.3,f.110*O.
37Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.Burlei
7.1.3,f.llO"J-K.
38Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
7.1.3,f.110rbO.
39Expositio
G.
s. X lib.Eth.Amt.7.1.3,f.llOra
G.Burlei

18:39:42 PM

WILLING
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81

presents;model two describesa case in whichwe won't reallyunderstand


untilour firstheart attack.40
I see this is as an interestingvariation on Thomas, whom Burley
endorsesas 'the commonexpositor'.41
Moreover,at least one modernstudent of Aristotle,David Charles,42suggeststhat Aristodepresentsa similar account. Describingwhat I have called Burley'smodel two, he says
that 'thereis one type of abates who actuallyreaches the good conclusion (in an off-colour
way) but does not act on it.' 'If,' as Charles says,
'this account of the chapter's structureis correct,'then where Burley
modifiesAquinas' account by providing alternate models of incontinence, it is in the directionof greaterfidelityto Aristode.43
Where Burleydoes disagreewith Thomas is on the subject of deliberation.44
Here again a glance at Saarinen is instructive.
Saarinen (quite
I
sees
Thomas
a
as
of
the
view
that inconcorrectly believe)
proponent
is
not
tinence,though voluntary,
deliberatelychosen.45By contrastto
Bonnie Kent,46who emphasizesthe Augustininaspects of Thomas' theologicalworkswhichsuggestthatincontinenceis deliberatelyundertaken,
Saarinen holds that Thomas followsAristotleon the key point- namely,
thatincontinenceresultsfromignorance.Concupiscenceavertsthe intellect, so that the practicalsyllogismrequiredfor continenceis not completed.Saarinen accountsforthe passages in the theologicalworkswhich
indicate that incontinenceis deliberateby what he calls the 'two step
The firststep is some sort of failureof
explanation'of incontinence.47
actual knowledgeregardingthe syllogismwhich would prohibitthe act.
The second stepis the completionof a misleadingsyllogism,
whichbegins
is
sweet
delectable'
and
licenses
incontinence.
Incontinence
is
'everything
deliberatein the sense that it resultsfroma permissivepractical syllogism; it is not deliberatein the sense that the failureto complete the
40Modelstwoand threebothdescribe
casesin whichtheignorance
involved
is not
oftheparticular,
butignorance
oftheconclusion
ignorance
(ICE).
41
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
G.
7.1.4,f.ll4vb
Expositio
42Aristotle's
Action
, Ithaca,NY 1984,128;cf.156;168.
of
Philosophy
43Cf.alsoNorman
Aristotle
Dahl,Practical
Reason,
, andWeakness
oftheWill,
Minneapolis
to conclusions
in an 'off-colour
known
1984,200. Bycontrast
way'or 'notfully
posrealknowledge
is 'integrated'
to Charles
andDahl.
sessed',
according
44Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
K. TheviewBurley
is opposing
is
7.1.3,f.110ra
inAquinas'
stated
Summa
theol.
I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4; cf.alsoDe maloq. 3 a. 9 ad 7.
45R. Saarinen
1994(<
., above,n. 20),126.
op.cit
46Transitory
Vice:
Thomas
onIncontinence
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
, in:Journal
Aquinas
27 (1989),199-223.
47R. Saarinen
1994(op.cit.
, above,n. 20),127-9.

18:39:42 PM

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82

prohibitivesyllogismis the resultof ignorance,and not somethingchosen.


As we saw above, Ockham challengessuch accounts of incontinence.
He denies that the intellectcan simultaneouslyassent to two universal
premiseswithcontraryimplications.Here Burleyagrees withOckham in
rejectingThomas' account of incontinenceas the resultof a permissive
grounds.Burleyholds that concupiscence
syllogism,thoughon different
inclinesdirectlyto particulars,ratherthan achievingits effectsby means
of a practicalsyllogism.He does not believe that it is proper to depict
concupiscenceas providingan alternatemajor premise such as, 'everythingsweet should eaten'. 'Since concupisicenceis a passion of the sensitivesoul,' Burleysays: 'it seems to me thatit does not inclineby means
He appears to be
of some universal,but only [directly]to particulars.'48
dictatedonly
an
which
acts
of
incontinence
account
permits
suggesting
in particular,not as the resultof syllogisticdeliberation,an account in
which concupiscence resultsin unconsideredacts. Thus where Burley
departsfromThomas, it is to underminethe view that incontinenceis
deliberatein one sense. It takes him not fartherfrom,but closer to the
Aristotelianaccount of abasia as voluntarybut not deliberate.
and Intemperance
2. Incontinence
2.1

Ockham

For Aristotleincontinenceis not a vice, because it is the resultof passion,


not a deliberatechoice (NE 7.8. 1151a5-7; 7.9. 1152a4-7); by contrast,
and moregenerallyvice 'expressesdecision'(NE 7.8. 1151a7).
intemperance
the medievalvirtue/viceliteraturetakesanotherline.
Cicero,49
Following
It distinguishes
continenceas sexual virtuefromtemperanceas virtuein
eatingand drinking e.g. Phillipthe Chancellor,SummadeBono.50Accordof Aristotle'sethicsdescribeincontinenceas
ingly,medieval interpreters
a vice. Ockham, forexample,quite correctlyobservesthat,accordingto
Aristode,the temperate,unlikethe continent,are not troubledby inordinatepassion (NE 3.1 1. 1119a 11-20).51But Ockham does not,and probably could not, say that intemperanceis a vice but incontinenceis not.
48Exositio
K.
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi7.1.3,f.llOra
G.Burlei
49Cicero,Oratio
ed.
De bono
inCatilinam
3.2.223,
, 2. 25. Cited,forexample,
byAlbert,
inWestph.
H. Khleet al.,Mnster
1951,135(OO 28).
50Philippi
Bernae1985,900.
ed. N. Wicki,
Summa
debono,
Cancellarii
Parisiensis,
51Ockham,
& F. Kelley,
273(OThVIII).
etvitia,
edd.G. Etzkorn
Circa
virtutes

18:39:42 PM

WILLING
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83

OrdinarilyOckham uses the two termsin the usual medievalfashion,so


that 'temperance'means restraintin eating and drinking,52
as contrasted
with restraintin sexual matters,or 'continence'. Ockham realizes that
Aristoderelatedboth temperanceand continenceto bodilypleasuresgenerally.He describesAristoteliantemperanceas a superiordegree of continence
superior,eitherbecause inclinationsfor depraved pleasuresare
absent,or because the person involvedhas taken steps to avoid temptation.53This presentsno major interpretive
is
problems; the difficulty
ratherwithincontinence,which Ockham, like othermedievais,sees as a
vice distinguished
fromintemperanceonly by its subject matter.
What thismeans forthelargerquestionis thatto some degreeOckham
lacks an account of wicked acts which are the resultof weaknessrather
than vice. Accordingto Ockham, there are three causes of vice: ignoin accountingforchosen
rance,malice,or passion.54He has no difficulty
wickednessor malice. But concerningpassion, Ockham appears poorly
positioned.How would he account forwickednessproduced by passion,
but withoutmalice- vices of weaknessratherthan deliberation?How can
he distinguish
passion frommalice?
He mightclaim to deal with the distinctionin one of two ways. He
can account forweaknessof will as a formof conditionalwilling
being
movedby passionnot to willtheworthyunconditionally.
To takea dietary
example,I mightwish to abstainfromsweetsonlyif thatneed not result
in any loss of pleasure. To take a charitableexample, I mightwish to
give a milliondollars to UNICEF if I had it. My not having a million
dollars,Ockham contends,is a partial object of that volition.Willingto
act fromwilling
give a milliondollars you have is an entirelydifferent
to give away whatyou do not have, accordingto Ockham. So thismodel
of weaknessof will suggestssimplythat my desire for pleasure exceeds
What has gone wrongis that the desire for
my desire to live virtuously.
virtueratherthan the desire forpleasure is conditional,not absolute.
Ockham mightalso accountforweaknessof willin termsof the degrees
of virtuehe posits. Virtue in the firstdegree is definedas follows:. . .
someonewillsthe performanceofjust worksin conformity
withrightreaas
it
dictates
that
such
acts
should
be
son,
performed,accordingto the
52Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3 & a. 4, ed. Wey,361& 393(OThVIII).
53Ockham,
Circa
virtutes
etvitia
, 273-5(OTh VIII).
54Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,354(OThVIII).Thisis a traditional
cf.Bonaventura^
II d. 43 a. 3 q. 2, Opera
account,
infirmitas,
malitia,'
Sent.,
'ignorantia,
omnia
II:994s.

18:39:42 PM

84

REGAWOOD

proper circumstancesrespectingpreciselythis work, on account of the


worthinessof thiswork itself,as an end.55Second degree virtueadds to
thisdefinition
the determination
to persevere.Supposingvice were defined
in parallel fashion,the incontinentmightbe said to be guiltyof onlyfirst
degree vice, since theydo not intendto persist.Their act is contraryto
but theydo
rightreason and hence vicious,and theirgoal is unworthy,
not plan to continue.
What is suggestedhere as a solutionOckham mighthave advancednamely,thatincontinenceis vice in a minordegree is not farfromSt.
Thomas Aquinas' view. Aquinas followingAristotle{NE 7.8. 1151a5-6)
holds thatincontinenceis vice (or ratherdepravity
) onlyin a qualified,not
an unqualifiedsense of the term,because it is not continuous.56
But where
have
a
because
and
to
fundamental
they
Burleyappear
Aquinas
problem,
deny thatwe can knowinglychoose wickedness,Ockham does not; there
wickedchoices.
is no reasonhe need denythatpassionmotivatesknowingly
Rather what Ockham may have difficulty
accountingfor are cases of
self-deception,or vices which result from partial ignorance. He cites
Aristotlein behalfof the claim thatwhen we know the major and minor
premises of a practical syllogism,we cannot fail to know the conclusion.57By contrast,as we saw above, Burley'saccount of weaknessof will
consistsof a descriptionof various models of incompleteknowledgeor
self-deception.
2.2 Burky
If the commonestcases of incontinenceresultfromignoranceof particulars,accordingto Burley,the problemwithintemperanceis thatknowledge of the universalis corrupted.Both are voluntary,but intemperance,
unlikeincontinence,is deliberate.Like Ockham, Burleycorrectlyunderstands Aristotle'sdistinctionat least in part, indicatingthat neitherthe
temperatenor the intemperateis much troubledby passion or rather
He even recitesa passages fromEustratiusin which
inordinateappetite.58
the statementis made that incontinenceis not a vice.59But like other
medieval theologians,he cannot deny that incontinenceis a vice.
55Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 2, ed. Wey,335(OTh VIII).
56Aquinas,
Sententia
libri
Ethicorum
, 7.8,Rome1969,OO 47,415.
57Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,367(OThVIII).
58Exbositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.
G.Burlei
, 7, f.lllrb,115*.
59Expositio
K.
s. X lib.Eth.Amt.,
G.Burlei
7.1.1,f.l05vb

18:39:42 PM

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85

a vice- onlypartly,
Ultimately,
Burleyclaimsthatincontinenceis partly
because although appetite is corrupt,reason is not.60The incontinent
properlyunderstandthe universalpropositionwhich indicateswhat our
properends should be, at least most of the time. Their problemis that
theirreason is overwhelmedby theirpassion.
Concerningintemperance,Burley like a number of other medieval
thatAristodewas not using
commentators
had no difficulty
understanding
the termas the medievaisdid, to referonly to vices of eatingand drinking. Aristotelianintemperance,according to Burley,is habitual lack of
rightreason concerningall bodily pleasures,making them the ends of
life.61
For Burley,as forOckham, temperanceis a superiordegreeof continence:rightreason concerningbodily pleasures undisturbedby strong
inclinations.
would not doBurleydoes do thingsa modernAristotlecommentator
such as, claimingthat continenceis a mean,62and holding that contifromothervirtuesmainlyin that it is not a firmhabit,but
nence differs
Like Ockham and othermedievais,64
rathera habitualdisposition.63
Burley
includesbestialityamong the vices [ratherthan excludingit as the result
of nature]. Burleymakes Aristotlea worse sexistthan he reallyis, suggestingthat in the Aristotelianscheme of thingswomen do not count
eitheras continentor incontinent.65
But his grasp of the basic Aristotelian
will
of
weakness
of
concept
appears unexceptionable:knowingwhat is
led
but
right,
by appetiteto act wickedly.The contrastingstate of
being
intemperancepromptednot by strongappetite but deliberatelychosen
falseprinciplescorrespondsto Aristotle'sstatementthat the intemperate
person thinkshe is right[NE 7.9. 1152a6-7).
Let us returnnow to Ockham's more Christianscheme for dividing
vice accordingto its causes: ignorance,passion,and malice. Incontinence
is the Aristoteliandescriptionwhich most closelyresemblesvices of passion,66while intemperanceresemblesmalice in some respects.Moreover,
Ockham arguesthatorthodoxAristotelians
cannotdistinguish
passion and
malice fromeach otherand fromvice. Aquinas distinguishes
malice from
passion,or ratherintemperancefromincontinence.Intemperanceresults
60Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.,
7.1.4,f.lllraB.
61Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.7.8,f.116ra
A-B.
62Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist
., 7.1.9,f.117ra*vb.
63Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist
E.
., 7.8,f.116vb
64Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,343(OThVIII).
65Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.,
A.
7.1.5,f.112rb
66Expositio
G.Burlas. X lib.Eth.Arist.,
7.8,f.116raB.

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REGAWOOD

fromdeliberatelychosen vicious acts; its ultimateoriginis the failureto


graspthefirstprinciplesof moralphilosophy the major premisesof practical syllogisms.If intemperanceis produced by ignoranceof the major
premise,incontinenceresultsfromignorance of the minor premisesin
such syllogisms.Ockham rejects this account, holding that no one can
fail to know such major premises as 'everythingunworthyshould be
avoided'. Thus if thereis ignorance,it must be ignoranceof the minor
in the case of the maliciousas well as the incontinent.
On thistopic,Burleydoes not seem to have takenOckham's criticism
veryseriously.He simplyadopts Thomas' account. Like Aquinas, Burley
betweenincontinencewhichis a temporarydisturbanceand
distinguishes
intemperancewhich is habitual.
NeitherOckham nor Burleytreatsvices which resultfromignorance
separately.As we saw above, Ockham attacksthe Thomisticpositionfor
betweenvice which resultfromignoranceand those
failingto distinguish
whichresultfrommalice or passion (incontinence).
Again thisis an attack
which Burley did not take seriously.Perhaps, there are perfectlygood
reasonsforthis.Ockham agrees withBurleythatthereare some circumstancesin which ignoranceis exculpatory.Ockham's distinctionbetween
culpable and non-culpableignorance regardingvice is straight-forward.
Inculpable ignoranceis insurmountable;culpable ignorancearises when
we can and should know what we do not know.67Burley'saccount is
similar;ignoranceexcuses only when we ourselves(or our credulity)is
not responsiblefor our ignorance.68
Non-culpableignorancecan be disregarded,since it does not count as
vicious at all. Culpable ignorancewould be treatedas the resulteither
of passion or of malice. Indeed Burleytreatsincontinenceas a formof
67Ockham,
virtutum
De connexione
, a. 3, ed. Wey,354(OThVIII).
68Exposio
dicenhicfactam
G: 'Adrationem
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.
G.Burlei
, 7.1.2,f.l08ra
malumsciensilludessemalumestpeiorilio
dumquandodicitur
quodillequi operatur
dicoquodistamaiornonestuniversaliter
illudessemalum,
malum
quioperatur
ignorans
- scilicet
nonsit
veranisicumduabuscondicionibus
(1) quodipseoperans
superaddendis
enimvelerrorcuiushomoest
seufalsaecredulitatis.
causasuaeignorantiae
Ignorantia
estcausasuaeignoranutpatetex III huius;sedintemperatus
causanonexcusat
ipsum,
enimetvitiasuntin
virtutes
etvirtutum;
namnossumus
causaevitiorum
tiaeeterroris;
unius
ab ignorantia
Aliacondicio
utpatetexIII huius.
nostra
(2)estquodcetera
potestate
habetconNamincontinens
in proposito.
sintpariaquodnonaccidit
alterius
et scientia
concuautnonhabethuiusmodi
et intemperatus
vehementes
delectationum,
cupiscentias
malusestqui fortiter
et minus
et remissas;
authabeteas debiles
concupiscens
piscentias,
simile
vel debiliter
malumquamqui nonconcupiscens
operatur
concupiscens
operatur
malum.'

18:39:42 PM

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87

ignoranceresultingfrompassion,while intemperancemightbe regarded


as maliciouslyinduced ignorance.69
Thus Burleymightclaim thata separate treatmentof the vices of ignorancewould be superfluous.
3. How is WhatWe Do Relatedto WhatWe Knowand Will?
3.1

Ockham

If the suggestionmade at the end of the last section is correct,most


medievalethicalphilosophersare chieflyconcernedto account forvices
produced by passion and malice. In terms of the issues which divide
Ockham and Burley,as followersof Scotus and Aquinas, respectively,
the
focusis on volitionaland intellectualvices. Ockham and Scotus treatall
vice as volitionaland the will as the true rational agent; by contrast,
Burley and Aquinas describe both intemperanceand incontinence,or
vices of passion and malice, in termsof defectiveknowledge.A considerationof the issues thatdivide the partisansof the primacyof will from
thoseof the primacyof intellectwould take us far afield.What will concern me here,instead,is an issue on which Ockham and Burleydepart
fromtheirrespectiveschools: the executionof virtuousand vicious acts.
Having rejected the intellectas an importantmoral facultyon the
groundthatit is not a free,but a naturalfacultycompelledby evidence,
Scotus was willingto hold thatthe actual executionof volitionhad a distinctmoralsignificance.
His was a model of fittingness
whichlikensvirtue
to dancing;what has moral value is notjust what you will,but what you
actuallydo in particularcircumstances.Actuallyto do somethingis better than merelyto will it.70Ockham disagreesand deploys a varietyof
argumentsin the dispute.One claims that extrinsicactionscan have no
independentmoral significancebecause the same physicalact is virtuous
whenperformedforone reason,and viciouswhen performedforanother.
Such acts are only accidentally,not intrinsically
good. A second suggests
thatwe may be misledby the fact that people who are actuallyvicious
sometimeshave theirbehaviorreinforced
by the resultsof thatbehavior
as when eatingone pistachioproduces a cravingthat resultsin our consumingthe entirecontentsof the container.AnotherindicatesthatScotus'
view has confusedwhat is more severelypunishedon earth in order to
69Asquotedin the
note.
previous
70M. McCordAdams,
Is to WillIt as BadAs To Do It?,in: Franciscan
41
Studies,
(1981),5-60.

18:39:42 PM

88

REGAWOOD

maintainpublic orderwithwhat is more vicious.Finally,we may be confusingvolitionwhich does not resultin action withweak volition.71
In fact,it is logicallypossible for equally intense,and hence equally
consereprehensible,acts of willingwickednessto have vastlydifferent
the
order
and
both
two
commanders,
Roger,
Henry
quences. Suppose
order
executionof an innocentsoldierin identicalcircumstances.
Henry's
is immediatelycarriedout, while Roger's is accidentallydelayed,and the
soldierescapes. Henry may be temptedby the success of thismethodof
eliminatingannoyance to issue similar commands,so his vice may be
certainly,if the sovereign,King Stephen,wants to encourstrengthened;
he will have to punish Henry more severelythan Roger.
age enlistment,
But fromthe point of view of an omniscentGod, at the time the order
is issued there is nothingin the situationwhich would justifyexcusing
Roger but not Henry, according to Ockham. Both commandershave
eliciteda formallyimperative,executiveact of will,72and hence both are
equally blameworthy.
When the widow of Henry'svictimobjects thatthe actionsof the two
commandersare not comparable,she's rightif she means that Stephen
should punish Henry more severely,but wrong if she thinksthat God
will not punishRogerjust as harshlyas Henrywas punished.The widow
is wrong,accordingto Ockham, providedboth Henry and Roger unconditionallywilled the execution that is, provided their acts of volition
were both formallyimperative.Neitherhad any more reason to believe
that the soldierwould survivethan I have that my hand will not grasp,
or my stomachdigest,the sweet I decide to eat. It is certainlypossible
that the volitionwill be impeded,but not because of anythingof which
I am aware or in control.And since moralitypertainsto what is volunlikea suddenparalytary,as Augustineand Aristodeagree,circumstances
sis of my hand are not relevantto evaluatingme as a moral agent.
Ockham distinguishesbetween conditional and formallyimperative
executiveacts of will to take account of the sortof considerationswhich
Scotus and his defender,Ockham's enemy Walter Chatton, offeredin
of the view thatdoing good is betterthan willingit. Ockham
justification
willmurderis worse than conditionally
admitsthat actuallycommitting
act
is
that
where
the
is,
only equivalentlyimperative.He
ing murder
denies that there is a differencein the moral significanceof formally
imperative,executiveacts of willingmurder,which depend on whether
71Ockham,
375-9(OThVI).
3 q.ll, edd.F.E. Kelley& G.I. Etzkorn,
Sent.,
72Ockham,
a. 3, ed. Wey,372(OThVIII).
De connexione
virtutum,

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89

WICKEDLY
WILLING

theyare or are not unaccompaniedby the correspondingexternalacts.


This does not mean thatOckham was unawareof themoralsignificance
betweenrelevantimpediments
of impedimentsto action. He distinguishes
of whichwe are aware in makingmoral choices and those which,however much theyaffectthe outcome,do not affectthose choices. Impedimentswhich restrictaction are partial objects of a conditionalvolition.
If we are aware of impediments,formallyimperativeacts of will are
impossible.Moreover,conditionallywillingmurderis less culpable than
willingits actual executation.
Formallyimperativevolitionis possibleonlywherethereare, or appear
to be, no impediments.In some sense Ockham has built the executive
functioninto his descriptionof imperativevolition. His descriptionis
intendedto eliminateas irrelevantsituationsin which if the outcome
in any respectfromthe willed exterioract, that difference
is accidiffers
from
factors
we
neither
know
nor
control.
dental resulting
3.2 Burle)>
Now Burleyalso describesexecutiveacts, and he does so in describing
Ethics(6.9. 1143a7) that the conprudence.73It is fromthe Nicomachean
of
arises.74
and
Thomas followinghim,explain
executive
acts
Albert,
cept
for Thomas
Aristotelianprudence in termsof a three-folddistinction;75
the thirdmemberis praecipere
or command.76Albertand Thomas use this
distinctionto explain the difference
between mere comprehension,syneand
Thomas
tells
us
that
sis,
thoughin the speculativesciences,
prudence.
and
thereare only two steps:inquiry
judgment;in the practicalsciences
inquiryand considerationmust be followedby action or command.
Ockham is implicitlycitingthe same passage when he tells us that
understanding
only involvestwo steps,afterwhich the conclusionnecesThat conclusion was drawn by Thomas at Ethics
, 7.3.
sarilyfollows.77
73Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arist.
C.
, 7.1.10,f.ll8rb
74The earliest
medieval
usewithwhichI am familiar
comesfrom
Albert
theGreat,
whousestheconcept
in explaining
thedifference
andjudgment
between
prudence
{Super
Eth
. 6.15,ed.W. Kbel,Mnster
in Westph.
1987,485-7(OO 14).
75Thisdistinction
from
a morecomplicated
comesultimately
in Damascene's
passage
'
Defideorthodoxa
consiliatio
and elec
whichmentions
o'
tio,cf.the Versio
inquisitio,
Burgundi
Louvain-Paderborn
maintains
Thomas'
identiC.36,ed.E.M.Buytaert,
1955,137.Gauthier
fiesjudgment
andcommand,
butdistinguishes
between
command
as an intellectual
dictateandas an actofwill.
76
Sententia
libri
Ethicorum
, 6.9,Rome1969,OO 47, 366.
77Aquinas,
De connexione
a. 3, ed. Wey,367(OTh VIII).
Ockham,
virtutum,

18:39:42 PM

90

REGAWOOD

1147a24, but Ockham cites instead the openingpassages of the Posterior


(1.1. 71a20).78PresumablyOckham's choice of referencesis dicAnalytics
tated at least in part by the wish to avoid passages in which Aristode
says that prudence is not prudence unless it is acted upon.
Ockham uses thisdictumabout two step speculativereasoningto prove
that therecan be prudencewithoutvirtuousaction. Once we know the
major and minorpremisesof a practicalsyllogism,the conclusionis evident at once. And since Ockham identifies
prudenceas knowledgeof the
conclusion of the practical syllogism,in his view, once the dictate is
thereis prudence.But not everyonewho knowsthe premises
formulated,
a
of practicalsyllogismacts virtuously.
Therefore,therecan be prudence
in the absence of virtue.79
Burleyhas thisargumentin mind when he explainsincontinence,cit.80But Burley
Analytics
ing the passage used by Ockham fromthe Posterior
argues instead that as long as concupiscencepreventsus fromapplying
the minorto the major,prudencecan be absent.His aim is to safeguard
the claim that thereis no prudence withoutvirtue.
Burleyhas anotherdefense,withmuch more farreachingimplications,
Analytics
againstOckham's Posterior
argument.It is based on the EthicsVII
passage. Again it is an explanationfor how the premisesof a practical
syllogismcan be knownwithoutproducingprudence.Burleystartswith
Aquinas' account of the distinctionbetween the relationof premisesto
conclusionin the practicalas versusthe demonstrative
syllogism.Instead
leads to action.Whereas
of a propositional
conclusion,a practicalsyllogism
leads
of
a
demonstrative
the
syllogismsimultaneously
premises
positing
a
of
the
to
the
pracnecessarily
concludingproposition,positing premises
tical syllogismdoes not necessarilylead to action. The agent can be imso thatshe cannotexecutetheact dictated
peded by externalcircumstances
reason.
Burley says that action followsjudgment not as a
by practical
conclusionfollowsfrompremiseswith logical necessity,but as rain folbetween
lows fromclouds.81To me it seems that this is the difference
completeand partial causes, fromwhich we could conclude that understandingdoes not by itselfdetermineexecution.
78In expounding
Thomassays(Led.2) thatin
thePosterior
thispassagefrom
Analytics
immedifollows
theconclusion
oncethemajorandminorareknown,
somesyllogisms,
oncethepremises
follows
thattheconclusion
states
Ockham
immediately
unqualifiedly
ately.
hecouldhavecitedGilesofRome.
ofthispassage
forwhich
an interpretation
areknown,
79Ockham,
De connexione
virtutum
, a. 3, ed. Wey,367(OThVIII).
80Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib. Eth.Arisi
, 7.1.3,f.110rbP.
81Expositio
110raG.
. Amt.,
s. X lib.Eth
G.Burlei
7.1.3,f.109vb-

18:39:42 PM

91

WILLING
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forthe
When expoundingbook VI c.9, Burleyuses Aquinas' terminology
threeacts of prudence: inquiry,judgement and command. But at book
vel
VII,82he describesthe thirdpart of prudence as 'executive'{executiva
So what has happened is that Burleyhas contrasted
executionis).
praeceptiva
impedablepracticalreasoningwithspeculativereasoningthatis inevitably
successfulonce the premisesare combined.He has pointedto the weakness of the link betweenintellectualjudgmentand practicalexecution.
If Ockham's pictureof the soul linkswill and execution,Burley'sexpositionof Aristodeunlinksintellectand execution.They are complementaryphilosophicalstrategies,both of which call our attentionto possible
problemsin the link betweenunderstandingand action. Burleyemphasizes that the intellectcannot be a total cause in the practical sphere;
Ockham stressesthe connectionof moral practice and will. Burley,like
Ockham, maintainsthat understandingdoes not determineaction. And
thoughhe does not maintainthatvolitiondeterminesexecution,Ockham
seeks to show that interruptions
of that linkage,unlikethe link between
and
are
volition,
understanding
morallyirrelevant.
It is odd to findBurleyliningup with an advocate of the primacyof
the will. Certainly,Ockham and the Franciscans,withtheircaricatureof
Thomism,would be surprised.And doubtlessthere are Thomists
perBut Thomas
haps Giles of Rome is an example who would be horrified.
himselfmightnot be. Gauthierhas argued persuasivelythatforThomas,
prudenceis a habit of will as well as intellect.83
Specifically,he suggests
a role forwillin the executionof the commandwhichis logicallythough
not temporallydistinctfromthe judgmentof the intellect.For Aquinas,
as forBurley,an adequate account of incontinencerequiresthatwe posit
or the lack of it, to linkjudgment
somethingotherthan understanding,
and action, somethingwhich functionsproperlyin some cases and not
in others.
4. Conclusion
Since Burley'sworkis considerablyless well-knownthan Ockham's, I will
conclude by consideringBurley'scontributionto medieval ethics.Burley
aimed at completeness
ratherthan originality
in his EthicsCommentary.
Most
of Grosseteste's
notesare included,as are substantial
excerptsfromEustratius'
82Expositio
G.Burlei
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.,
7.1.10,f.118rbC.
83R.A.Gauthier,
ina review
ofPsychologie
etmorale
in:Bulletin
Thomiste,
byO. Lottin,
8 (1947-1953),
65-9.

18:39:42 PM

92

REGAWOOD

commentary.What Burleysoughtto provide,and what his readerswere


lookingfor,was a competentsummaryof common opinion, revisedin
accordance with modernviews. Burley's commentaryis verywell structured;it would be worthhaving if only for the outlineat its beginning:
he listsof all the questionsand doubts raised by each book of the Ethics
,
The
conclusions
and
the
conclusions.
common
with
propositions
together
in the textand the marginare numberedto correspondto the listat the
beginning.
Burleymodernizedthe treatmentby adding shortnotes to the expowill be found,introduced
sition;that is where any originalcontributions
'
or 'dubiumes. Often these
', 6intelligendum'
by words such as notandum
reflect
sectionsin which he treatsproblemsraised by his contemporaries
of
discussion
for
a
sustained
interests.
There
is,
example,
Burley'slogical
the questionin what sense the statement'the incontinentman abandons
withreferenceto the
proposition,84
any and everychoice' is a self-evident
are
scatteredand brief,
.
discussions
These
firstbook of the Posterior
Analytics
so it is hard to evaluate theirimportance.In one regard,at least, we
in the historyof philosophy.
may see Burley'streatmentas significant
Sarah Broadie holds thatviewingknowledgeas a stateratherthan an
activityis a consequence of the 'modern dialogue with scepticism.'85
Because the exercise of knowledgedoes not add to its justificationor
secure it fromskepticalattack,our concept of knowledgeno longerincludes its exercise,she thinks.Viewingknowledgenarrowlyas a state,if
theyvalue its exercise,she argues thatmodernshave to decide whichof
our non-rationalfacultiesits exercise should be attributedto- 'will or
sensibility.'
What we have seen in the medieval dialogue with Aristotlesuggests
anotherhistory,in which stresson the will is not a productof preoccupation with skepticalconcerns; nor is the will separated fromour rationalnature.Indeed, both Ockham and Scotus claim thatthe will is the
primaryrationalfaculty.The problemis not placing value on the exercise of our rationalfaculty,it is ratherhow to explain the interplayof
intellectand will in thatexercise.Certainlyit was not an attemptto reply
to skepticalarguments(withwhichOckham, forexample,was notoriously
unconcerned),whichled medievaisto focuson the will. Rather,it was an
attemptto account for disordersin the exerciseof our rationalfaculty
84Expositio
s. X lib.Eth.Arisi.
G.Burlei
, 7.1.9,f.117rbC-D.
85S. Broadie,
York1991,/91.
with
Aristotle
Ethics
, Oxford-New

18:39:42 PM

93

WILLING
WICKEDLY

which led to the descriptionof the intellectas a state,distinctfromits


exercise.In thisdevelopment,Burleyplays an importantrole,influencing
in themannersuggestedby Scotusand OckhamorthodoxAristotelianism
and execution
theweaknessof the linkbetweenunderstanding
by stressing
in the intellect.
and by expandingon Aquinas' account of indeterminacy
New Haven
Yale University

18:39:42 PM

Studieson WalterBurley1989-1997
GERHARD KRIEGER

This bibliographyis a continuationof the bibliographyfrom1988 which


and
mdivale
was published by Rega Wood in the Bulletinde philosophie
which listed the studieson Walter Burleyfor the period from 1968 to
1988. The categorisationof this bibliographyfollowsthat of the bibli"
(50) has been
philosophorum
ographyfrom 1988; only "De vitiset moribus
works"
due to the
and
"Doubtful
under
the
of
spurious
category
placed
a
better
this
about
it.
For
orientation
recentdiscussion
precategorisation
cedes the bibliography.
Like the bibliographyfrom 1988 the followingbibliographyis based
by the membersof the BurleySocietyand variousdata
upon information
Abstracts
Index
bases like the Religion
Index,the Dissertation
, the Philosopher's
mdivale
. A special word
and the relevantissues of Bulletinde philosophie
of thanks goes to Dr Olga Weyers, 's-Gravenhage (Netherland),who
whichshe has compiledforher own
has suppliedus witha bibliography,
dissertation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERALSTUDIES
SurvivingAuthenticWorks
, Prdicamentorum
1) Expositio
superlib. Porphyri
Pmdicamentorum
lib.
2) Expositio
super
et Prdicamentorum
s. librum
5) Qustiones
Porphyrii
librisexprincipiorum
3) Expositio
(2L)
4) Expositio
superlib. Perihermenias
vetere
de
arte
6) Quast,
(de univ. praed.et sex prin.)
a.d. 1337 (4L)
7) Expositio
superartemveterem,
libriPriorm
8L) Expositio
Analyticorum
9) Expositio
superlibrosduosPosteriorum
Vivarium
37,1

BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke

18:40:32 PM

STUDIESON WALTER
BURLEYI989-I997
10) Expositio
superlibrosTopicorum
( 11L)
Summa
lib.
Elenchorum
:
Tract,
de
modoarguendi
11)
(13L)
12) Suppositiones
13) De puntateartislogica
14) Notabiliade logicis
15) De probationibus
16) De exclusivis
17) De exceptivis
18) De syncategorematibus
19) De consequentiis
20) De obligationibus
21) De insolubilibus
cumsua sophisteria
22) De sophismatibus
Tractatus
de
universalibus
realibus
23)
librorum
24) Expositio
Physicorum
(Lohr 17-19)
de duratione
25) Qustio
naturalibus
26) De principiis
de
Calo
et Mundo(2 IL)
27) Expositio
De
ationeet corruptione
28) Expositio
super Gener
(24L)
s. Metheorum
librosIV brevissime
29) Expositio
(26L)
deplanetiset eorumvirtute
30) Tractatus
Problemata
Aristotelis
31)
Tractatus
de
anima
33)
potentiis
de sensuet sensato(30L)
34) Expositio
de memoria
et reminiscentia
35) Expositio
(3 IL)
de
somno
et
36) Expositio
vigilia(34L)
de longitudine
et brevitate
vita(34L)
37) Expositio
de motuanimalium
38) Expositio
(33L)
De substantia
orbis
39) Expositio
superAverrois
Tractatus
de
42)
formis
44) Tractatus
primus: De comparatione
specierum
: utrum
contradicho
sit maximaoppositio
45) Qustio
disputata
secundus
: De intentione
et remissione
46) Tractatus
formarum
: De primoet ultimoinstanti
47) Quodlibet
librorum
Ethicorum
48) Expositio
(36L)
49) Expositio
superlibrosPoliticorum
(37L)
Lost works
16L) Expositio
superlibrosDe causis
orum
27L) Qustiones
superlibrosMeteor

18:40:32 PM

95

96

GERHARD
KRIEGER

38L) In librosconomicorum
in lib. Sententiarum
43) Commentum
Doubtfuland Spurious Works
8) Commenta
superII Priorm
Analyticorum
(39L)
12L) Questiones
superlibrosTopicorum
2OL) NotulasuperlibrosPhysicorum
23L) NotulesuperDe calo et mundo
naturales
24) Questiones
et corruptione
25L) NotulasuperDe generatione
Meteorm
28L) Notulasuperlibrum
librorum
De anima(29L)
32) Expositio
et
Aristot.
40) Expositio quast.s. Metaphysicam
(15L)
et sententia
summrie
41) Divisiones
superMetaph.
40L) Shortertreatiseon the Ethics
4 IL) Dicta de libroPhysicorum
(Jacobus de Alexandria)
Auctoritates
or
42L)
Philosophia, FloresParvi
50) De vitiset moribus
philosophorum
GENERALSTUDIES
Berger, Harald, "ExtensionaleversusIntensionaleSemantikam Beispiel
der SprachphilosophieOckhams und Burleierhs",
in: ActaAnalytica
,4
171-186
(1989),
Boh, Ivan, "WalterBurley( b.ca. 1275; d. 1344 or later)", in:JorgeJ.E.
Gracia (ed.), Individuation
in Scholasticism.
Albany 1994, 347-372
Michael
"The
Real
Fitzgerald,
J.,
DifficultyWith Burley's Realistic
in:
Vivarium
Semantics",
, 28 (1990), 17-25
und
Krieger, Gerhard,Art. "Burleigh,Walter", in: Lexikon
fiir Theologie
Kirche.3. Aufl.,Bd. 2, 1994, 813
Bd. 8,
Laarmann, M., Art. "Walter Burley",in: Lexikondes Mittelalters.
1994-1995
1997,
im 14. Jahrhundert.
Berlin 1992
Perler, D., Der proportionale
Wahrheitsbegriff
Read, Stephen,"I promisea pennythatI do not promise':the Realist/
NominalistDebate over IntentionalPropositionsin Fourteenth-Century
BritishLogic and its ContemporaryRelevance",in: P. Osmund Lewry
(ed.), The Rise ofBritishLogic.Acts of the Sixth European Symposium
on Medieval Logic and Semantics,Balliol College, Oxford,19-24June,
1983. Toronto 1985, 335-359 (Papers in Medieval Studies,7)
withAureol:Peter
s Rolein theLateMedieval
Aureol3
Schabel, C.D., The Quarrel

18:40:32 PM

STUDIESON WALTER
BURLEYI989-I997

97

and FutureContingents,
1315-1475. Ph. D.
DebateoverDivineForeknowledge
of
172-173
Dissertation,University Iowa, 1994,
Synan,EdwardA., "Albertand theTwo Burleys:Citationsand Allusions",
Catholic
70 (1996), 157-177
in: American
Quaterly,
Philosophical
SURVIVINGAUTHENTICWORKS
em,a.d. 1337 (4L)
7) Expositio
superartemveter
E
Ashworth, J., "Equivocationand Analogyin FourteenthCenturyLogic:
Ockham, Burleyand Buridan",in: BurkardMojsisch and Olaf Pluta
MediiAevi:Studien
derPhilosophie
zur Geschichte
(edd.), HistoriaPhilosophiae
desMittelalters
2 vols., Amsterdam1991, Vol. I, 23-43
Conti, AlessandroD., "Ontology in Walter Burley'sLast Commentary
on the Ars Vtus
Studies
", in: Franciscan
, 50:28 (1992), 121-176
De Libera, A., La querelle
des universaux.
De Platon la fin du MoyenAge.
Paris 1996, 400-402
Karger, Elizabeth, "Mental Sentences according to Burley and to the
, 34 (1996), 192-230
Early Ockham", in: Vivarium
Die Relationstheorie
desJohannes
Schnberger, Rolf, Relationals Vergleich.
Buridanim Kontext
seinesDenkensund der Scholastik.
Leiden-New YorkKln 1994, 183-189 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichtedes
Bd. 43)
Mittelalters,
10) Expositio
( 11L)
superlibrosTopicorum
"'Ex
D'Ors, Angel,
impossibiliquodlibet sequitur'(Walter Burley)",in:
Archives
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
et Littraire
du MoyenAge, 57 (1990), 121-154
12) Suppositiones
Muos Garcia, A., "Es la determinadauna suposicindistributiva?",
in:
17
331-337
Medioevo, (1991),
Spade, Paul Vincent,"WalterBurleyon the SimpleSuppositionof Singular
Terms", in: Topol, 16 (1997), 7-13
Id., "WalterBurley,From the Beginningof his Treatise on the Kinds of
, 16 (1997), 95-102
Supposition(De suppositionibus)",in: Topoi
13) De puntateartislogicae
derKunstderLogik:ErsterTraktat
Burley, Walter, VonderReinheit
, Vonden
der
Termini
lat.-dt.
Ed.
Peter
Kunze. Hamburg 1988 (Philo,
Eigenschaften
sophischeBibliothek,Bd. 401)
Terminorum.
SinnundReferenz
in mitDufour, C.A., Die LehrederProprietates
telalterlicher
Mnchen-Hamden-Wien
360-361
1989,
Logik.

18:40:32 PM

98

GERHARD
KRIEGER

Nuchelmans,Gabriel, "WalterBurleighon the ConclusionthatYou Are


an Ass", in: Vivarium
, 32 (1994), 90-101
con"Historische
Richter, Vladimir,
generalibus
Bemerkungenzu De regulis
and theSciencesin
in Ockham und Burley", in: Knowledge
sequentiarum
MedievalPhilosophy
, 2. Proceedingsof the EighthInternationalCongress
of Medieval Philosophy,Helsinki,24-29 August 1987. Helsinki 1990,
626-630 (Publicationsof LutherAgricola Society,B 19)
Studies
Spade, Paul Vincent,"A BurleanDilemma",Franciscan
, 44:22 (1984),
193-196
Id., "How to Startand Stop: WalterBurleyon the Instantof Transition",
cf. 12) Suppositions
and the Problemof Universais",
Wagner, Michael F., "Supposition-theory
in: Franciscan
Studies
, 41:19 (1981), 385-414
Walter Burleys
Whler, H.U. "Das "realistische"Individualittskonzept
im geschichtlichen
Kontext",in:J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer (ed.), IndiundIndividualitt
im Mittelalter.
Berlin-NewYork 1996, 313-326
viduum
Bd.
24)
(Miscellanea Mediaevalia,
19) De consequentiis
Green-Pedersen,NielsJorgen,"Two EarlyAnonymousTracts on Consedu MoyenAge Grecet Latin, 35 (1980),
quences", in: Cahiersde l'Institut
1-28
Karger, E., "Propositionset syllogismesc l'oblique5 dans la logique
et Littraire
du MoyenAge, 60
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
d'Ockham", in: Archives
n.l
(1993), 147,
20) De obligationibus
of Burley'sDe obligationibus
",
D'Ors, Angel, "On Stump's Interpretation
in MedievalPhilosophy
in: Knowledge
and theSciences
, 2. Proceedingsof the
EighthInternationalCongressof Medieval Philosophy,Helsinki,24-29
August 1987. Helsinki 1990, 468-478 (Publicationsof Luther-Agricola
Society,B 19)
De Rijk, L.M., "Specific Tools Concerning Logical Education", in:
au moyen
du travailintellectuel
et instruments
Olga Weijers (ed.), Mthodes
intellectuel
le
vocabulaire
78
sur
Turnhout
1990, 71-75,
(tudes
age.
du moyen age, 3)
were Counterfactuals
Spade, Paul Vincent,"If Obligations
[WalterBurley]",
171-188
in: Philosophical
20
,
(1992),
Topics
21) De insolubilibus
Panaccio, Claude, "Solving the Insolubles: Hints from Ockham and

18:40:32 PM

STUDIESON WALTER
BURLEY1989 -1997

99

in MedievalLogicand Grammar.
DorBurley",in: St. Read (ed.), Sophisms
drecht 1993, 398-410
de universalibus
realibus
23) Tractatus
Texte
zum Universalienstreit.
II, Berlin 1994, 115-148
Whler, H.-U.,
librorum
Physicorum
(Lohr 17-19)
24) Expositio
Jung-Palczewska,E., "Le problmed'Averroismede WalterBurleydans
son Commentairesur la 'Physique'",in: StudiaMediewistyczne
, 24 (1986),
100-109
, 45
Wood, Rega, "Walter Burleyon Motion in a Vacuum", in: Traditio
(1989-1990), 191-217
Primus
44) Tractatus
De Rijk, L.M., "Burley's So-Called Tractatus
Primus
, with an Edition of
sitmaxima
in: Vivarium
theAdditionalQuaestio Utrum
contradictio
,
oppostilo",
34 (1996), 161-191
Calculators
and theMathematics
Sylla, E.D., The Oxford
ofMotion1320-1350.
andMeasurement
New York-London 1991, 71-95
Physics
hyLatitudes.
: De intentione
secundus
et remissione
46) Tractatus
formarum
Calculators
and theMathematics
Sylla, E.D., The Oxford
ofMotion1320-1350.
and
Measurement
Latitudes.
New
York-London
1991, 95-111
by
Physics
De primoet ultimoinstanti
47) Quodlibet:
Paul
Spade,
Vincent,"How to Startand Stop: WalterBurleyon theInstant
of Transition",in: JournalofPhilosophical
Research
, 19 (1994), 193-221
49) Expositio
superlibrosPoliticorum
(37L)
undInterpretation
derAristotelischen
Politicaim
Fleler, Christoph,Rezeption
Zweiter Band. Amsterdam 1992, 13-22 (Bochumer
sptenMittelalter.
Studien zur Philosophie19)
Genet, Jean Philippe, "The Disseminationof ManuscriptsRelating to
EnglishPoliticalThoughtin the FourteenthCentury",in: MichaelJones
and Malcolm Vale (ed.), Englandand herNeighbours
, 1066-1453. Essays
in honour
Pierre
London
217-237
1989,
of
Chaplais.
Haas, Max, "Musik und Affektim 14. Jahrhundert:Zum Politik-KommentarWalterBurleys",in: Schweizer
Annales
Jahrbuch
furMusikuuissenschqft:
suissesde musicologie
, 1 (1981), 9-22
Nederman,CaryJ., Kings,Peers and Parliament:Virtueand Corulership
in Walter Burley's Commentaries
in VIII LibrosPoliticorum
Aristotelis
", in:
391-407
24
Albion, (1992),

18:40:32 PM

100

GERHARD
KRIEGER

DOUBTFULAND SPURIOUSWORKS
librorum
De anima(29 L)
32) Expositio
on theDe animaofAristotle.
Burley, Adam and Burley, Walter, Questions
Ed. Edward E. Synan.Leiden-NewYork-Kln1997 (Studienund Texte
zur Geistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters,
55)
50) De vitiset moribus
philosophorum
Cherchi, Paolo, "Su una fonte del Piovano Arlotto e il Liberde vita
di Walter Burleigh",in: ForumItalicum
, 26 (1992), 5-13
philosophorum
Donnini, Mauro, "Tre fogli di Gaultiero Burleo nel codice 'Asis. Lat.
italianodifilologia
578'", in: Giornale
, 33 (1981), 135-139
Grignaschi, Mario, "Lo pseudo Walter Burleye il Liberde vitaet moribus
in: Medioevo
, 16 (1990), 131-190
philosophorum
Id., "'Corrigenda et addenda' sulla questione dello pseudo Burleo", in:
Medioevo
, 16 (1990), 325-354
4
"Il
Id.,
catalogo delle opere di Ippocrate e Galeno nel De vitaet moribus
, in: Medioevo
, 16 (1990), 355-395
philosophorum'"
de los viejos
os": El
Kirk, Kathleen-Louise,"La Viday las costunbres
filosof
EscorialCodexh. III.l. an EditionoftheFifteenth-Century
SpanishManuscript
3s De vitaet moribus
and
' withan Introduction
of WalterBurley
philosophorum
Ph. D. Dissertation,Universityof Kentucky,1994
Glossary.
Prelog, J., "De Pictagoraphylosopho.Die Bibliographiedes Pythagoras
in dem WalterBurleyzugeschriebenenLiberde vitaetmoribus
philosophorurri'in: Medioevo
, 16 (1990), 191-251
ViDMANOV,
Amezka, "La formationde la seconde rdactiondes 'Vite
, 16
philosophorum'et sa relation l'uvre originale",in: Medioevo
253-272
(1990),
FakulttTrier
Theologische

18:40:32 PM

In memoriam
Prof.Dr. JosephIJsewijn
Prof.Dr. IJsewijn,
memberof the EditorialBoard of Vivariumsince 1974,
passed away on November 27, 1998, afteran illness of which the first
signsappeared already in 1997.
Born in Zwijndrecht(Belgium) on December 30, 1932, he studied
Classical Philologyand Ancient History at the Catholic Universityof
Louvain, where he was appointedfullprofessorin Latin Language and
Literaturein 1967.
Until 1973 the scope of Vivarium had been limitedto the Middle
Ages. Afteran evaluationheld on the occasion of the tenthanniversary
of ourjournal in 1973 the EditorialBoard judged it importantto broaden
the scope to the Renaissanceand to increasethe numberof Board members to include scholarsspecializingin thisfield.When asked to join the
Board, ProfessorIJsewijn,much to our pleasure,accepted withouthesitation,and thus became not only the firstRenaissance scholar in our
midst,but also the firstBoard memberfromabroad. His internationally
recognized expertisein the field of Renaissance Latin and Neo-Latin
enabledtheBoard to takeresponsibility
forthe new domain.As a member
of the Board ProfessorIJsewijncontributedsubstantially
to the scholarly
of
Vivarium
for
almost
five
quality
twenty
years, always impressinghis
his
with
and
sound
colleagues
penetratinginsight
judgement.
ProfessorIJsewijn'sscholarlymeritswill be discussed more comprehensivelyelsewhere,interalia in his journal Humanistica Lovaniensia,
whichwas supervisedby him fora long time in an admirableway. May
it sufficehere to mentionhis Companion
to Neo-LatinStudies
, which ever
since its appearance in 1977 has been an unfailingbest-seller(it saw a
second and revisededition);it is the referencebook par excellence
forNeoLatin studiesall over the world.
An honorarydoctoratebestowedon him by the University
of Valencia
and a numberof fellowshipsawarded him by severallearned academies
and societiesconstitutefurtherproofof his academic excellence.
The membersof theEditorialBoard ofVivariummournJosephIJsewijn's
passingand will miss his presence.

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

Vivarium
37,2

18:32:51 PM

1
on SomeProposedIdentifications
PetrusHispanas: Comments
SIMON TUGWELL,OP

In his article,Petrus
Summularum
(Vivarium,35 (1997),
HispanusO.P.,Auctor
D'Ors
the
the
author
of the Summulae
revives
claim
that
21-71), Angel
and
he
makes
several
Logicaleswas a Dominican,
suggestionsabout his
identity.However,withregardto two of his candidates,Pedro Ferrando
and PetrusHispanus conversus,we are on much firmergroundthan he
seems to realise,and it is doubtfulwhetherwhat we know about them
is compatiblewith the hintswhich Dr D'Ors has uncoveredabout the
authorof the Summulae.
With regardto two others,thereis no evidence
that theywere eitherSpanish or Dominican.
1. PedroFerrando
On Pedro Ferrando,we have a more or less contemporarystatement
fromsomeone who knew him well. The obituarycontainedin the Vitas
is one of severalcontributedby the formerDominican provincial
fratrum
of Spain, Giles of Portugal,and it is already there in the edition prepared by Gerald de Frachet in 1258, which survivesin Toulouse, Bibl.
mun., cod. 487. Giles was himselfpresentwhen Pedro died in Zamora,
as his narrativemakes clear:
Petrus
Cumfrater
nutritus
et doctus
Ferrandi,
qui a pueroin ordinesanctissime
beatiDominici
nostri
doctor
inmultis
fuerat,
locis,tanquietuitam
patris
descripsit,
demapudZamoram
frater
uiditipsumsupramontem
infirmaretur,
quidamdeuotus
altissimum
etfaciem
stantem
eiusresplendentem
utsol,eta dextris
eta sinistris
duos
iuuenes
stantes
nimis.
Cumautem
diefrater
michi
uisionem
hanc
splendidos
sequenti
dixisset
fratrem
Petrum
inproximo
intellexi
moriturum.
Etcumuenisquamuiderat,
semad eumet sederem
in lectoin quo ipseiacebat,
. . . narrauit
. . . michiquod
uiderat
sibiassistere
beatamuirginem
et sanctum
Iohannem
euangelistam
singulas
in caputilliusponentes.
coronas
Hancinquituisionem
uestre
dilectioni
committo.
michiquidsignificet.
Rogoautemut dicatis
Ego igitur,
qui uitamet conscientiam
eiuspienecognoueram,
tuedebetur,
alterapredicationi
dixi,Una illarum
uirginitati
et quia uirgoet doctores eas beateuirginis
et Christi
atquedoctrine,
discipuli
meutfratres
adiutorio
Tuncrogauit
omnesanteeumuocarem.
acquisisti.
Quibus
1 In thisarticle,
I use thefollowing
AFP = Archivm
abbreviations:
Fratrum
PraeMOPH = Monumenta
Ordinis
Praedicatorum
Histrica.
dicatorum;
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

Vivarium
37,2

18:33:02 PM

104

SIMONTUGWELL
. . . Finitis
hiis
nonestordoquemdominus
tantum
astantibus
ait,Fratres
diligat
uerbis
in domino.
coramcunctis
fratribus
obdormiuit

The vulgatetextof the Vitas


was preparedby Humbertof Romans,
fiatrum
in
and he modifiesGiles's textslightlyto make it clear that Pedro doctor
as
multislocisHyspaniemultisamis extiterat.
was
well
Humbert
as
placed
anyone to know whetherPedro had ever been a lectoroutsidehis own
can probablybe accepted as reliable.2
province,so his clarification
From the earlyfourteenth
centurywe have Bernard Gui's account of
thepeople who have writtenabout St Dominic,includingPedro Ferrando:
Secundoscripsit
frater
Petrus
natione
de Galexia.
Ferrandi,
Hyspanus
Gui had clearlynot seen a textof his legenda, but on its author,as on
several other points,he had evidentlyreceived informationfromsome
Spanish confrre.His statementabout PetrusFerrandiis alreadypresent
in the firstedition of his compilationof Dominicana, presentedto the
Master of the Order in 1304.3
Gui tellsus thatPedro's lifeof Dominic was approvedby some general
by the legendain the Regensburglectionary
chapter,and thisis confirmed
(Oxford,Keble College, 49), whichbears the headings,forthe two feasts
of St Dominic (if. 78 and 129"):
a
FraterPetrusHyspanus,
beatiDominici
approbatam
qui composuit
legendam
In translatione
beatiDominici.
capitulo
generali.
In festo
s. Dominici,
frater
Petrus
cumapprobatione
generalis.4
capituli
Hyspanus
of Pedro Ferrandoas the
The actual textfullyvalidatesthe identification
authorof the legenda editedby F. van Ortroy.5The Regensburglegenda,
identified
apart froma fewextraposthumousmiracleswhichare explicitly
'
beati
Dominici
as having come to light'postcompositionem
(f. 80r),is
legende
van
an
of
that
edited
Ortroy.
by
simply abridgement
As is generallyrecognised,the Regensburgmanuscriptcontains the
firsteditionof Humbert of Romans's lectionary,preparedwhile he was
2 The textwaseditedbyB.M.Reichert,
in MOPH,
in a lessthanscholarly
fashion,
theevolution
andshallexplain
26 manuscripts,
I, Louvain1896,263-4.I haveexamined
in particular,
in a book,TheShaping
ofthetext,and therleofHumbert
oftheVitas
ofthe
Historicae
toolongin theDissertationes
Fratrum
before
, whichI hopeto publish
Dominican
Historical
Institute.
3 I haveedited
Guidonis
deSancto
Domini
Bernardi
thetextinScripta
co,in:MOPH,XXVII,
withcomments,
ibid.36-35.
Rome1995,105-6,
4 The textwaseditedbythelateHilarius
imersten
BarthOP in DieDominikuslegende
Lektionar
Humberts
vonRomans
(1246), in:AFP,54 (1984),83-112.
5 F. Van Ortroy,
de
deS. Dominique
Pierre
Ferrand
O.P.etlespremiers
,fondateur
biographes
in:Analecta
30 (1911),27-87.
Vordre
desFrres
Bollandiana,
Prcheurs,

18:33:02 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS

105

of the general chapterof 1246


provincialof France, on the instructions
It
thus
antedates
the
(MOPH, III, 36).
publicationof the thirdlegenda,
There
is
no
warrant
eitherto disputeHumbert's
of
Orvieto.
by Constantine
statementabout the authorshipof the legenda and its approvalby a general chapteror to deny that thisis the second legenda listedby Bernard
Gui (it is clearlydependenton, and thereforeposteriorto, the Libellusof
Jordan of Saxony).6
Finally,it is only thissame legenda which containsthe textwhich the
generalchapterof 1242 orderedto be deleted:7
Ferr.
MOPH,III 24
et volumus
de Semetipsum
Monemus
licetex matris
uteroin
etiam,
quodabradatur
beatiDominici
ubisemetipsum
asse- carnis
diuinagratiaconseruatum,
legenda
integritte
divinagracia asseruit
illam
nondum
euadere
rii,licetin carnisintegritte
imperfectionem
nondum
illamimperfectionem
iuuencularum
conservatum,
potuisse
quinmagisafficeretur
evadere
iuven-colloquiis
uetularum.
posse,quinmagisafficeretur
quamaffatibus
cularum
vetularum.
colloquiis
quamaffatibus
There is thusabsolutelyno room fordoubt that the legenda which Van
Otroy claimed for Pedro Ferrando was officiallyin use in the order
betweenJordan'sLibellusand the new legenda composed by Constantine
of Orvieto,and thatis theone whichHumbertascribedto PetrusHispanus.
It would be perverseto deny that it is also the life of St Dominic with
whichGiles of Portugalcreditsthe PetrusFerrandiwhose deathin Zamora
he witnessedand reportedno laterthan 1258, or thatthisPetrusFerrandi
is the one who was, judging by the information
which reached Bernard
Gui no later than 1304, rememberedas being "fromGalicia".
Contraryto the assertionsof H.C. Scheeben8and Barth,9thereare no
groundsforbelievingthatPedro Ferrandowas commissionedto produce
his legenda. Such a belief is, if anything,excluded by the prologue
(Gttingen,Univ. Bibl. 109, f. 2):
6 Dr D'Ors'ssuggestion
thattheLibellus
mayhavebeenghostwritten
(D'Ors 1997
as theauthor
identifies
andindeed
above,p. XX),50)isuntenable,
himself,
(op.cit.,
clearly
a fairamount
oftheworkis autobiographical.
Whatis more,as I havetriedto show
ontheLifeofStDominic
, in:AFP,68 (1998),5-116,esp.5-33),the
OP, Notes
(S. Tugwell
bulkoftheLibellus
waswritten
in 1218/1219-1221,
muchofitevenbefore
Jordan
joined
theOrder;it wasonlysuperficially
in 1233,whenJordan
revised
forpublication
was
Master
oftheOrder.
Theoffending
words
wereremoved
from
so theyarenot
circulation,
quiteeffectively
found
in anyofthemanuscripts
usedbyVan Ortroy,
or byH.M. Laurent
in hiseditioninMOPH,XVI;butI havediscovered
theminonemanuscript:
Bibl.Nac.,
Lisbon,
Alcob.CXXXIII/24.
8 H.Chr.Scheeben,
Petrus
Ferrandi
at 334-5.
, in:AFP,2 (1932),329-47,
JBarth1984(op.cit above,n. 4), 98.

18:33:02 PM

106

SIMONTUGWELL
Huiusordinis
institutor
etpaterinclitus
extitit
beatus
cuiusuitam
Dominicus,
primus
etordinis
uirtutibus
obitum
quoqueetexpartemiracula
pienam
deoquegratissimam,
exordium
rudiquidem
mundi
et occasutemporis
orientis
ipsiusin occiduis
partibus
lesuChristi.
estopitulante
sedueracistiloperstringere
gratia
opereprecium

Etiquetterequiredthe author of a saint'slifeto presentsome excuse for


his presumption;the best possible excuse was the ordersof one's superiors, so, if Ferrandohad been commissioned,he would undoubtedlyhave
said so. Failingthatexcuse,the authorhas to fallback, as Ferrandodoes,
on apologising for his incompetence and saying that the attempt is
neverthelessworthmaking.
The main source of Ferrando'slegenda is, naturally,
,
Jordan'sLibellus
whichJordan did not, both about Dominic's
but he had information,
yearsin the Midi and about his visitto Spain. In the Midi, Dominic was
Spanish mission,whose members,once the order
part of a predominantly
was established,mainlyreturnedto Spain; so it was preciselywithSpanish
material that Ferrando was able to enrich the story.Apart fromthis,
he has a much fulleraccount of Reginald of Orlans, derivedexpressly,
fromwhat Reginald himselfsaid, probably on his deathbed, and from
fromParis
what Dominic said about him afterhis death,i.e. information
and fromthe general chapterof 1220, which could easilyhave reached
Ferrando in Spain, though I should not wish to exclude the possibility
that he had himselfstudiedin Paris soon afterReginald's death.10The
only other historicalmaterialadded by Ferrando is the list of miracles
involvedin the canonizationof Dominic in 1234.11This musthave come

10Jordan's
is basedexclusively
on whathe heardDominic
sayin Parisin 1219,
story
forthedating
arrival
there.
Thisis an important
before
partoftheevidence
Reginald's
oftheLibellus.
Cf.Tugwell
cit.,above,n. 6), 24-6.
(op.
11Ferrando
he died,Dominicformally
writer
to claimthat,before
is also thefirst
and
andvoluntary
thethree
ofcharity,
virtues
tohisfriars
humility
poverty,
'bequeathed'
intotheorder.It is
whointroduced
thathe pronounced
a curseon anyone
possessions
OP
and R. Creytens
or thecurseis historical,
thetestament
mostunlikely
thateither
device(R. Creytens
as a literary
thattheyshould
be regarded
O.P.,LeTestament
argued
etmoderne
dominicaine
ancienne
deS. Dominique
dansla littrature
, in:AFP,43 (1973),29-72,
wasinspired
ofthetestament
thatat leastthestory
bythe8th
esp.52-71).It is possible
filiis
uite
firmamentm
St
for
feast
of
Dominic:
matins
the
pau"Migrans
pater
antiphon
theoffice
himself
TheclaimthatFerrando
testamentm".
humilis
condit
composed
pertatis
andit is rendered
is notsupported
bythefactthat
improbable
byanyearlyevidence,
fratri
thethird
Laudsantiphon
reuelatur,
perquampatertran("Scalaceloprominens
found
ofGuala's vision
alludes
totheversion
sienssursum
onlyintheoriginal
ferebatur")
the
whentheLibellus
was revised
ofJordan's
version
Libellus'
chapter,
bysomegeneral
accountwhichis
and it is thetwo-ladder
by twoladders,
singleladderwas replaced
reproduced
byFerrando.

18:33:02 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS

107

fromthe papal curia, and we may conjecturethat it was broughtback


to Spain by Raymund of Penyafortwho, even beforehe receivedpermissionto leave the papal curia, was in the peninsula on the pope's
businessin 1236-1237.12
A legendaofficially
theordermustobviously
approvedforuse throughout
have been in Latin; but Getino thoughthe had found evidence of an
earlierversionof Ferrando'slegenda in Spanish, in a compilationon St
Dominic containedin a manuscriptbelongingto the Dominican nuns of
Santo Domingo el Real, Madrid.13This is the 'earlier Castilian version'
to whichDr D'Ors alludes.14However, Getino's theorywas refutedlong
ago by Manning.15
Manningwas unable to obtainphotographsof the Madrid manuscript,
so he had to relyon Getino for his knowledgeof its contents;16
he was
also dependenton ratherinadequateeditionsof theLatin legendas.Though
his analysisof the Madrid compilationis substantially
correct,some points
need furtherclarification.
It is far fromclear exactlywhat sort of text we are dealing with in
the Madrid codex; the materialis disorganised,and on occasion we are
offeredtwo different
translationsof the same Latin original.The first
ingredientis the officiallegenda that of Humbert,17as we shall see
going up to Humb. 51, thus includingsome itemswhich are firstfound
in Const, or in Humb. We then backtrackto a much earlierpart of the
12Gf.thedocuments
editedinJosRuisSerra,SanRaimundo
dePenyafort
. Dipbmatario,
Barcelona
1954,38-51.
13LuisG. AlonsoGetino,
delRosario
castellanas
, Vergara1925,XIIOrigen
y Leyendas
ibid.99-225,
Getino
omits
somesections
and
XV; muchofthetextis published,
though
tosomeextent
thosewhichhe includes.
re-arranges
14D'Ors 1997(op.cit..above,p. XXX),51.
15Warren
F. Manning,
AnOldSpanish
Dominic:
Sources
andDate
, in: U.T.
lifeofSaint
Holmes
Medieval
Studies
inHonor
Denis
Matthias
Ford
JrandA.J.Denomy
,
(edd.),
ofJeremiah
Mass.1948,139-58.
Cambridge
16Havinghad theirgenerosity
abusedearlier
in thecentury,
thenunsbecamevery
oftheir
andwouldnotallowit to be takenoutofthemonastery
possessive
manuscript
tobe professionally
WhenI wenttherenearly
microfilmed.
twenty
yearsago,I unfortua badtimeforthenuns,so wasonlyabletospenda veryshort
timewith
nately
picked
themanuscript;
buttheprioress
allowedme to sendin a photographer.
In the
kindly
he turned
outto havecurious
notions
ofhowtophotograph
a manuoutcome,
though,
andevenafter
twoattempts
I remained
without
ofa fewpages;
script,
anyreproduction
thosethatI particularly
secured
I letthematter
rest.
wanted,
having
17References
toJordan's
Libellus
andtothelegendas
ofFerrando
Constantine
(Lib.)
(Ferr.),
andHumbert
aregivenaccording
totheparagraph
numbers
intheedi(Const.)
(Humb.)
tions
contained
inMOPH,XVI,butI usemyownprovisional
edition
ofthetexts,
based
on a widerrangeofmanuscripts
andtestimonia.

18:33:02 PM

108

WELL
SIMONTUG

story,with a ratheruntidyselectionof pieces fromthe life of Dominic


in the Legenda
Aurea
, combinedwithtwo storiesforwhichno Latin source
is known; owing to the loss of a couple of folios,the second of these
is incomplete,and thereis no way of knowingwhat followedit.18After
the missingfoliosthereis a new beginning,with a completetranslation
of the miraculasanciiDominiciof Cecilia, the canonization process of
St Dominic, and the ways of prayer of St Dominic. As I have shown
elsewhere,the translationwas made on the basis of the Latin textadded
by Bernard Gui to the final edition of his compilationof Dominicana,
19
presentedto the Master of the Order in 1314. This is followedby a
translationof the posthumousmiraclesinvolvedin Dominic's canonization, togetherwith a paragraph de moribus
ultimatelyderived fromlib.
102-105. The firstmiracleis omitted,sinceJames of Varagine's version
of it has alreadybeen included;the second is presentedin two different
one at the beginningwhereit belongs(f.88r),the otherintertranslations,
polated afterGetino's chapter LXXXVIII (f. 89r). Then, aftera blank
page, a new seriesof miraclesbegins(whichGetinoprintsbeforethe canonization miracles),correspondingto Humb. 52-9 (thus completingthe
translationof Humbert's legenda up to his version of the de sanciiuiri
Afterthis,the Spanish codex turnsto St Peter Martyr.
moribus).
Getino claimed that "del texto
a Ferrand
, pertenecen
castellano,
quepublicamos
los treinta
tantos
los
en
ltimos
los
son
,
y
captulos
primeros
y
milagres
paraleque
textocastellano
los nuestro
latinodel escritor
". We shall
y elya conocido
gallego
turnto the miraclesin a moment;but Manning was quite rightto say
that the firstpart of the compilation correspondsto the legenda of
Humbert,not that of Ferrando.
Since Ferr. was Humbert'sfavouredsource,it is not surprising
thata
thereare differences,
greatdeal of theirtwo textsis identical;nevertheless,
and the Spanish text invariablyfollowsHumb., not Ferr. For example,
Humberttakesover what Ferrandosays about the youngDominic's habit
of sleepingon the ground,but he adds a phrase at the beginningand
omitsthe referenceto Prov.22:6 at the end:
18Getino's
XLIII-XLVcorrespond
to Leg.Aur.68-100,127-32in thenew
chapters
XLVIIcritical
edition
Florence
1998.XLVI hasno known
source,
byG.P.Maggioni,
LIX correspond
is another
toLeg.Aur.235-43,
After
there
338-84.
248-305,
313-27,
this,
translation
of Leg.Aur.69-100,whichGetinoomits.LX-LXIcorrespond
to Leg.Aur.
which
121-6.Thenthere
is thebeginning
ofanother
talewithno known
Getino
source,
oftheMadrid
alsoomits.
Thereisan 18th-century
intheDominican
transcript
manuscript
in Rome(AGOP,X, 982),butunfortunately
archives
theoriginal
hadalready
lostthe
in thecopy("aquifaltandos
missing
pages,as is remarked
ojas").
S. Tugwell,
Edition
A Textual
andCritical
TheNineWays
,
ofSt.Dominic:
ofPrayer
Study
in:Mediaeval
47 (1985),1-124,at 7-8;I editedtheSpanish
textofthewaysof
Studies,

18:33:02 PM

109

PETRUSHISPANUS

Humb.3
Ferr.5
a Diuinaigitur
Gumenimessetadhucpuerulus
nondum
gratiaiamin eo mirabiliter
cumessetadhucpuerulus
nondum
nutreis
segregatus,
diligentia
deprehensusoperante,
iam a nutreis
estsepelectum
dimitiere,
diligentia
deprehensus
segregatus,
quasicarnis
iam
eteligebat
delicias
dimittere,
abhorreret,
quasicarnis
super estsepelectulum
potius
et eligebat
terram
accumbere
abhorreret,
potiussuper
quamin lectocorporali delicias
accumbere
iacere.Et terram
quamin lectocorporali
quodammodoquieteresolutus
iacere.
resolutus
Extunc
ex tuncduxitin consuetudinem
declinata quodammodo
quiete
declinata
stratus
mollicie
frequentissime
superterram autemduxitin consuetudinem
mollicie
iamilludquodnondum stratus
dormire.
Videbatur
frequentissime
superterram
intellexisse
Adolescensdormire.
legerat
prouerbium,
iuxtauiamsuametiamcumsenuerit
non
recedet
ab ea.
The Spanish textclearlyfollowsHumb. (f. 2r)E porla gratiade diosque obrauaen el, enperoque eratanpequenno
que avn
en la tierra
delama,dexauamunchas
vezesel lechoet echauasse
nonle partiesien
de la carnee deseauamasyaseren tierra
assicomosi aborreiesse
ya losplaseres
se fallaua
ende.Et de si ouo en costunbre
de yaser
que en el lechoet masfolgado
en tierra
etdormir
y a menudo.
Shortlyafterthis,where Ferrando introducesthe section on Dominic's
studiesin Palenciawitha curt"posthe' the SpanishtextfollowsHumbert's
"
more ample "puerilibus
autemannisinnocenter
excursis
(Ferr. 7, Humb. 5):
"
la
hedat
de
sin
danno
"Despuesquepasso
pequennes
(f. 2r).
There are thus no groundsfor claimingthat the opening section of
the Spanish compilationderivesfromFerrando,withsupplementary
items
inserted
fromlaterlegendas.The wholesectionis translated
fromHumbert.20
In the case of the canonizationmiracles,however,Manning is wrong
to say that theyare translatedfromHumb. The decision of the editors
of MOPH, XVI not to repeatposthumousmiraclesfromone legenda to

ibid.92-103.Gf.alsoMOPH,XXVII,125-7.Sincenomanuscript
ofGui'sLatin
prayer,
texthassurvived,
thispartoftheMadridcodexis particularly
important.
20Dr D'Ors'ssuggestion
aboutghostwriting
to Humb.thanto
appliesmoreplausibly
- (itis ascribed
wasalways
butthelegenda
as Humbert's
ownwork
to
Jordan;
regarded
himbyDietrich
ofApolda(edited
inActaSanctorum
, Aug./,Antwerp
1733,
byG. Cuperus
Gui (MOPH,XXVII, 106-7,already
in thetext
563)and,independently,
byBernard
- and,granted
before
GuibecameawareofDietrich)
hislongstanding
inthe
involvement
revision
ofthelectionary
as a writer,
andhisfluency
thereis no realreasonto dispute
theascription.
Whatis more,as I hopetoshowin TheShaping
there
Fratrum,
oftheVitas
is goodevidence
thathepersonally
indeedrewrote,
muchoftheVitas
In
revised,
fratrum.
else,noneofitsinnovations
anycase,evenifHumb.wasactually
compiled
bysomeone
withSpain,so it wouldbe entirely
to suppose
that
anyconnection
suggests
gratuitous
PedroFerrando
hadanything
todo withit.In TheShaping
I shallalso
Fratrum
oftheVitas
showthattheascription
ofthecronica
ordinis
to Ferrando
is impossible,
as wellas being
attested.
verypoorly

18:33:02 PM

110

SIMONTUGWELL

another preventedhim from realisingthat the different


legendas have
which
different
so
that
it
is
to
texts,
significantly
perfectly
possible identify
of themis the source of any translation.In the case of the Madrid codex,
the source is undoubtedlyFerr. However, Ferr. existsin two editions,21
and it is probable that the second was produced at the generalchapter
which approved the legenda foruse in the order; on occasion,the revisers misunderstoodeitherthe point or the Latin of Ferrando's original
text,which suggeststhathe himselfhad nothingto do withthe revision.
And it is the revisededitionwhich underliesthe Spanish versionin the
Madrid codex. Two examples will sufficeto show that we are dealing,
not witha Castilian originalproduced by Ferrandobeforethe Latin legenda, but with a translationof the officialLatin textof Ferr.
One of themiracleswas workedforsomeonecalled Marsiliusde Suauitis
(Ferr. 55).22Constantinecould make nothingof the name, so he substituted Marsiliusde sua uita desperans
, and this was followedby Humbert.
The Spanish translator,whose originalclearlycontainedthe name, can
thus only have been followingFerr.,and his renderingof it is delightful:
Marsiliode VillaBesos'
Another miracle was worked for the two sons of a certain Albert
(Ferr. 60):
a natiuitate
Duo namque
Alberti
deTusignato
filii
muti
puericuiusdam
permanserant,
etatisquidemaltersupraquintum
altersupratercium
dimidium
dimidium,
agens
annum.
In the Lisbon manuscriptof Ferr. and in some manuscriptsof Const.,
Alberti
is corruptedinto abbatis,and thisis foundalso in the Spanish version. And the revisersof Ferr. failedto understandthe way in whichthe
i.e.
annumagenssupraquintum/
tercium",
boys' ages are indicated("dimidium
inserted
et
so
half way throughthe year afterthe fifth/third
and
year)
this too is reproducedin the Spanish:
each time beforedimidium'
desunasimiento
mudos
Dos moosdevnabbaddevnlogarquele dezianTusigrato
erande hedadvnode incoannose medio,otrosobretresannose medio.
The canonizationmiraclesare rounded offwitha generalcomment,followed by a section de sancii uiri moribus(chapter CIX in Getino). As
21Cf.Barth1984(op.cit.,above,n. 4), 97-100.
22The nameis guaranteed
in Cuperus's
edition
bytheoriginal
deposition,
preserved
ofthelostOsmamanuscript
oftheLibellas
Sanctorum
(Acta
Aug.I 559),butthetextinthe
at this
ofthefirst
edition
ofFerr.(Gttingen
109)is defective
onlysurviving
manuscript
point.

18:33:02 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS

111

Manning pointedout, thiscorrespondsto Lib. 102-5; but it did not necessarilycome directlyfromthe Libellus.None of it was included in the
originalversionof Ferrando'slegenda, but it was added by the revisers.
of the revisededitionof Ferr.,Lib. 102 is added, rather
In all manuscripts
the
of the whole legenda, afterFerrando's own formal
at
end
ineptly,
'
. That thisis the sourceof the Spanish
conclusion,completewithits Amer
textis suggestedby the factthatthe latterevidentlyfeltthe embarrassment
of the double conclusionto the legenda, and added a second 'Amen
Madrid
Ferr.
se demostraron
...
Multaquidem
etalia. . . innotuere
miracula,Muchasotrasmaravillas
a notification
Hec masestascosassonescripias
designata.
que nonsuntstiliofficio
... e a alabanae gloautembreuiter
adnotata
suntad sanctita- de la su sanctidad
ria
.
de
.
. biuee regna
tiseiusastructionem
... ad laudem
parasienaquel
que
quoque
et gloriam
eiusqui. . . uiuitet rgnt
per pre en todoslos sieglos.Amen.De los
delasenfermedades
muchas
cosas
infinita
sculaseculorum.
Amen.De cura- cuydados
manifiestas
inno- nosfueron
tionibus
etiam
infirmitatum
queacercadeloprepluranobis
mandata
non sentenonen escripto
tuerunt,
puestas
mageraque
queadpresens
scripto
sonsennales
de la su sanctidad
e nobleza.
eiusinsignia.
suntsanctitatis
Amen.
In almost all manuscriptsof the revisedFerr., the section de sanctiuiri
moribus
is insertedjust beforethe account of Dominic's death (it replaces
the first-edition
texteditedin MOPH, XVI as Ferr. 45), withoutJordan's
which are inappropriatein the new context.However,
words,
opening
thesewords are retainedin the Madrid codex:
Madrid
Lib.103
todaslasotras
cosasquepadresancto
estmagni- Entre
Ceterum,
quod ipsisfulgentius
fue
mas
e mas
tanta
honestate
morum
Domingo
resplandeiente
miraculis,
ficentiusque
de miraculos
fuequetantores...
magnifico
pollebat
estebienaventurado
varnen
plandeia
honestidad
...
Here too, though,the Spanish does not necessarilyderivedirectlyfrom
the Libellus
. . . miraculis
is also found at this point in the
, since ceterum
Lisbon manuscriptof the revisedFerr.,withwhichwe have alreadyfound
the Madrid translationagreeingin error.
On balance, it seems likelythat the whole of Getino's LXXXIII-CIX
derivesfromsome manuscriptof Ferr.; but it is the revisedtextof Ferr.
which underlies the Spanish version, not some pre-existingCastilian
legenda.We may safelyconclude thatPedro Ferrandohad nothingwhatsoeverto do withthe Spanish compilation,exceptthatthe revised,official
editionof his legenda was one of its sources.

18:33:02 PM

112

SIMONTUGWELL

Thus the 'Dominican traditions'which Dr D'Ors feelsfreeto reject23


seem to be historically
The PetrusFerrandiknownto us from
watertight.
earlysourcesis theauthorof thesecond approvedLatin lifeof St Dominic,
who was probablyGalician, and who died in Zamora no laterthan 1258.
2. PetrusHyspanusconuersus
Another candidate proposed by Dr D'Ors is thefraterPetrusHispanus
conuersus
mentionedin T.M. Mamachi, ed., AnnalesOrdinis
Praedkatorum
I,
Rome 1756, 466, as one of the firstfriarssent to Bologna. This suggestion relieson the possibilityof takingconversus
as meaning'convert'(from
or
rather
than
Judaism Islam)
'laybrother'.
Our earliestinformation
about thisfriarcomes fromJordanof Saxony,
who liststhe people whom Dominic sent to Bologna at the beginningof
1218 {Lib. 55): 'fiaterIohannesde Nauarraet quidamfiaterBertrandus
, postuero
Christianus
cum
conuerso".
The
modum
conuersus
is
not
named,
fiater
fiatre
and if conuersus
is to be takenas 'convert'ratherthan 'laybrother',
Jordan
has singularlyfailedto make his meaning clear.
The identification
of the conuersus
as 'fraterPetrusHyspanus' comes in
a fragmentof the lost chronicleby Galvano della Fiamma quoted in
.24The only reason fortakingthe identification
ampliores
Taegio's chronicae
is
that
Galvano
seriously
mightwell have been drawingon the tradition
of his own prioryin Milan, on the assumptionthat the Peter in ques' who had been St
tion is the same as the fiaterPetrusHyspanusconuersus
Dominic's socius at some time and was subsequentlyone of the firstfriars in Milan. Galvano clearlyintendsus to understandconuersus
as mean"
ing laybrother:afterlistingthe priestsin the community,he adds, Tres
ibiJuerunt
etiamconversi
, videcet
fiaterPetrusHyspanus,
quifiieratbeatiDominici
de
Benexio
Modoe
Gulielmus
et
de
sotius,
fiater
fiaterDelphinus
Far frombeing a convertwho became a Dominican teacherof logic
and died in Spain, this Pedro was clearlya laybrotherwho, probably
23D'Ors 1997{op.cit.
, above,p. XXX),52.
24The textis edited
La cronaca
dell'ordine
domenicano
di Galvano
byG. Odetto,
maggiore
Fiamma.
Frammenti
in:AFP,10(1940),297-373,
at 344,from
oneofthetwosurvivediti,
Bibl.
(Rome,AGOP,XIV 51,f. 122r);theothermanuscript
ingmanuscripts
(Bologna,
Univ.,1594)hasthesamereading.
25Thisisquoted
inTaegio's
from
various
herespecifically
Galvano's
documents,
excerpts
chronicle
(Rome,AGOP,XIV 53, f. 122r);it is editedbyOdetto1940(op.at.,above,
n. 24),321.Anidentical
statement
is quotedin Taegio'schronicae
(Odetto1940,
ampliores
inNotes
discussed
thematter
ontheLifeofStDominic
/,in:AFP,65
345).I havebriefly
(1995),5-169,at 57.

18:33:02 PM

PETRUSHISPANUS

113

havingaccompaniedSt Dominie to Rome, was sentfromthereto Bologna


and then to Milan, where,so far as we know,he remained.
3
Petri
3. Two 'maistri
Two more Peterscited by Dr D'Ors are equally unhelpful.First,there
is the 'magisterPetrus' who witnesseda deed in which the abbess of
S. Maria in Tempulo leased some propertybelongingto the monastery
(MOPH, XXV, 135). There is nothingto indicatethat he was Spanish,
or that magister
here denotes an academic title.Nor is thereany reason
to believe that he was a Dominican; indeed, it is highlyunlikely.Quite
apart fromthe fact that he does not sign as 'frater'the deed indicates
that,on 25 Nov. 1220, the nuns of S. Maria in Tempulo had abandoned
theirintentionto move to the pope's intendednew monasteryin S. Sisto,
forwhich,since late 1219, St Dominic had been responsible.26
In the circumstances,theyare unlikelyto have invitedany Dominican to witness
what theywere doing. Only when Dominic returnedto Rome at the beginningof 1221 did theyreturnto the path whichled to theirbecoming
Dominican nuns.27
Secondly, there is the 'magisterPetrus' cited in the Vitasjratrumas
being miraculouslyrelieved of tooth-acheat the tomb of the recendy
deceased formerDominican provincialiof Provence,William de Sissac.28
He is describedby Gerald de Frachet as 'rector
scolarum
Burdegaiensium'
which is not a Dominican title;and thereis nothingwhatsoeverin the
textto suggestthat he was a Dominican.
I wish Dr D'Ors everysuccess in his search for a Dominican author
of theSummulae
; but thesefourPeterscan be eliminatedfromhis enquiry.
Rome
Istituto
Storico
Domenicano
26Thiswas
outbyV.J.Koudelka
etlafondation
OP, Le Monastenum
pointed
Tempuli
dominicaine
deSanSisto
toCecilia'sstory
, in:AFP,31 (1961),5-81,at 56. It givescredence
Dominic's
absence
from
topressure
from
their
families
that,
Rome,thenunsyielded
during
andfriends
andwentbackon their
tojoinS. Sisto(Miracula
14,ed.A. Walzin:
promise
DieMiracula
beati
Dominici
derSchwester
in:AFP,37 (1967),5-45,at 42).
Ccilia,
27Cf.Tugwell,
ontheLifeofStDominic
Notes
//,in:AFP,66 (1996),5-200,at 117-8.
28William
is saidtohavediedon 23 May1238,butitis notclearonwhoseauthority.
therestofthedatecomes
from
Bernard
Gui'shistory
oftheprovincials
ofProvence,
Though
and Gui reports
it onlyon hearsay,
he doesnotseemto be responsible
fortheyear,
so faras I know,
is notan original
It is added,
which,
partofthetextinanymanuscript.
ina laterhand,in Bordeaux,
Bibl.mun.,780,butthisdoesnotseemtobe oneofGui's
owncorrections.
The Vitas
textis editedin MOPH I, 298-9,thatof Gui in
fratrum
E. Martne
& U. Durand,Veterum
. . . amplissima
collectio
, VI, paris1724,419-20.
scriptorum

18:33:02 PM

1
PeterOlivi in theShadowofMontsgur
ANNE DAVENPORT
carnosno emdelmonnilmones de nos

Franciscanscienceas a mission
One of the difficulties
withinterpreting
to "defendCatholicEurope,"2 is thata numberof creativefriarsremained
far more focused on radically transforming
Catholic Europe than on
defendingit. No sooner had the FranciscanOrder obtaineda prestigious
Paris chair throughAlexanderof Hales than zealous friarspublishedan
introductionto Joachim da Fiore's Eternal Gospel, heraldingthe imminent demise of ecclesiasticalinstitutions
and the advent of a new spiritual age.3 Franciscan"spirituals"who felttheyhad special insightinto the
s teachingplaced it on a par withpapal authority
and foundthempoverello'
selvesin chronicconflictwithexistingChurch practicesand withRome.4
The line betweenobedience and defianceremainedparticularly
problematicin the South of what is now France. Franciscanfriarslike Hugh
of Digne at the conventof Hyres and Raimondo Barravi at the con-

1 I thankR. JamesLongforinviting
of thispaperat the
me to reada summary
in LeedsonJuly13, 1998;DavidBurrand Robert
International
MedievalCongress
andformaking
available
to me;Leon
Pasnauforfruitful
discussions
keyOlivimaterial
forhismeticulous
review.
Golubformultiform
help;andJohnMurdoch
I alsothank
ofHonolulu
Mr.andMrs.J. RussellCadesandtheCadesFoundation
Hawaiifortheir
generous
support.
2 RogerFrench
TheInvention
Friars'
Science:
Natural
andAndrew
Before
ofthe
Cunningham,
as "the
arecharacterized
Franciscans
, Aldershot
1996,2; seealsop. 204,where
Philosophy
consciences
oftheir
Church
oftheRoman
ageintheservice
spiritual
3 A summary
inMorton
ofthe"Eternal
Bloomfield,
Joachim
Gospel"scandalis found
XIII (1957),249-311.See alsoJohnMoorman,
: A Critical
in: Traditio,
Survey,
ofFiora
theFranciscan
Order
1968.
, Oxford
History
4 A of
vitae
Ubertino
da Casale.SeehisArbor
isPeterOlivi'sdisciple
crucifixae
goodexample
withan introduction
, Venice1485(reprinted
byC.T. Davis,Turin1961);seealso
Jesu
andthe
M.D. Lambert,
: TheDoctrine
Absolute
Franciscan
ofChrist
ofthe
Poverty
Apostles
Poverty
ofFranciscan
intheFranciscan
Order
1210-1323
, London1961;fora theological
analysis
vonAssisi
desHl. Franziskus
seeK. Esser,
DieArmutsauffassung
,
Mysterium
paupertatis:
poverty,
undWeisheit,
XIV (1951),177-89.
in:Wissenschaft
Vivarium
37,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

115

vent of Bziers pursued an ascetic ideal of personal holiness rooted in


the same esoterictheologyof the Holy Spiritas the late Cathar parfaits
.5
the
sister
founder
of
Franciscan
of
Douceline,
Hugh's saindy
bguinage
Marseille, had to physicallystop people from reveringher in the old
Cathar manner.6Rather than the splendorof Gothic light,these barefoot servantsof God loved extremefrugality
and the
[altissima
paupertas)
wilderness[ermitage).
drew
their
from
the
They
inspiration
example of
Francison Mount Verna,7but also fromthe legend of the Hindu Prince
Gautama-Buddharetoldby local troubadours,8and fromthe legend of
Mary Magdalene, whose thirty-year
penance in the wilderness of la
Sainte-Baume
betweenToulon and Aix exemplified
the soul's returnto God
throughliberationfromcarnal snares.9
Perhaps the most famous Franciscan spiritualto make his way from
Bziers to Paris and to contributeto scholasticphilosophyis PeterJohn
Olivi.10Born in Srignan in 1248,11four years afterthe holocaust of
5 Fortheesoteric
ofpersonal
asceticism
andGathars,
see
meaning
amongBogomils
Henri-Charles
contre
lesBogomiles
deCosmas
le Prtre,
Puech,Le Trait
, Paris1945,260-79.
See alsothemanystudies
AcThouzellier.
byRenNelli,DodatRochandChristine
toSalimbene's
Chronica
hisJoachite
, Bari1966,339,Hughwasholding
cording
study-groups
in 1248,theyearofOlivi'sbirth.
at Hyres
In his1285Apology,
Olividescribes
Hugh
as a "mostfamous
andmostholyman".
See la viedeSainte
desbguines
deMarseilles
in Provenal
in
Doucelines
fondatrice
(written
theearlyXlVthcentury)
in a bilingual
edition
published
Provenal-French
byJ.-H.
Marseille
1879.
Albans,
7 As Bonaventure
in Itinerarium
inDeumi
mentis
thewilderness
the
explains
symbolizes
viator's
exile.Thesoulinthislifetime
is likea "poormaninthedesert",
forspirstarved
itualfood,farfrom
histruecelestial
home.Forthegnostic
character
ofthisattitude,
see
LesGnostiques
Huntin,
, Paris1963,24-5.
Serge
8 See Le Roman
deBarlaam
etJosaphat
, trad.R. Lavaudet R. Nelli,in: Les
spirituel
Troubadours
"ArnospodembendirdeJozaphas
, Paris/Bruges
1960;especially
pp.1210-17:
ha suffert
e batalhas
de malignes
e motzd'autres
treque motastemptacions
esperitz,
balhse sofrachas
carperla sequezade l'ermitage
que aviade las erbasque manjava;
nony trobava
gayre."
9 MaryMagdalene's
rootsas Helen-Epinoia
arediscussed
gnostic
complex
byDodat
Rochin Le Catharisme,
Narbonne
as
1957,42-3.PeterOliviinvokes
MaryMagdalene
loveliberates
thesoulfromsinbetter
thangoodworks;
see
proofthatcontemplative
I ofhisQuaestiones
De perfectione
in: Studi
Quaestio
, ed. EmmenandSimoncioli,
evangelica
61 (1964),438-9.
Francescani,
10A nowclassicintroduction
to Olivi'strialsand tribulations
is DavidBurr'sThe
Persecution
in:Transactions
oftheAmerican
NewSeries,
Olivi,
ofPeter
Philosophical
Society,
66/5(1976).Foran earlystudy
ofOlivi'sphilosophical
seeEfrem
Le
doctrines,
Bettoni,
dottrine
diPierdi Giovanni
Olivi
, Milano1959.
filosofiche
11We knowthisdateandplacewith
becauseOlivi'sfollowers
revered
him
precision
as a saint.See theBooklet
onthePassing
Peter
Menand
ofBrother
JohnOlivi,Which
Beguin
Women
Revere
andRepeatedly
ReadorHearReadintheir
sancti
cited
(Transitus
Meetings
Patris),
Bernard
Guiin Practica
heretice
bytheDominican
, givenin
inquisitor
inquisitionis
pravitatis

18:33:10 PM

116

ANNEDAVENPORT

Montsgur,Olivi enteredthe Franciscan conventof Bziers circa 1260


and was sentforhis higherstudiesto Paris,wherehe heard Bonaventure's
on theSevenGiftsof theHoly Spiritin 1268.12Back in Narbonne
Collations
and Montpellier,Olivi soon drew firefor his Joachite faithin a new
spiritualage, his advocacy of extremepoverty,his reservationsabout the
sacramentof marriage,his disdainforburial fees,his dualisticview ofthe
soul, and his theoryof the Trinity,judged to be dangerouslytri-theistic.13
AlthoughOlivi himselfvigorouslydefendedthe orthodoxyof his theses
and convincinglypointed to a diffamation
campaign against him, there
in
which
Olivi's
orthodoxtheses differ
sense
be
an
still
may
important
fromthe more mainstreamorthodox theses being elaborated in Paris
and Oxfordby his contemporaries.For one thing,Olivi interpretedthe
Franciscanmovementitselfas the apocalypticresultof the infamous1209
Bziers massacre.14The special prism of Occitanhistoryshaped his idea
of what is most novel and distinctiveabout Franciscanspirituality.
Among Olivi's many censored articlesis the doctrinethat the substance of the human soul increasesthroughgrace. As Giles of Rome will
recognize,thisarticleis tied philosophicallyto Olivi's more generalclaim
thatsubstancesare inherently
capable of increaseand decrease:substantiae
,15By examininga numberof textsjointly,we will
magiset minussuscipiunt
and Evansin Heresies
, New
Ages
oftheHighMiddle
byWakefield
Englishtranslation
York/London
1969,438-9.
12Citedfrom
forOlivi'sParisdates
sources
Burr1976{op.at.,above,n. 10),6. Burr's
contra
toR.,f.51 (63)v;Deperfezione
areLetter
, q. 16,f.71*; Quoniam
paupertatem)
evangelica
f.56r;Apocalypsim
, f.69ra.
13See Littera
contra
doc'Littera
inGeroldus
sigillorum3
septem
Fussenegger,
septem
sigillorum,
47 (1954),45-53;
Franciscanum
Ioannis
Oliviedita
trinam
Petri
historicum,
, in: Archivm
desuis
Parisienses
Ioannis
Oliviad aliquadicta
Petri
also,Responsio
perquosdam
maistros
frats
and374-407;
Franciscanum
28 (1935),115-55
historicum,
, in:Archivm
excerpta
quaestionibus
ofOlivionthesoul,seeRobert
Fora recent
29 (1936),98-141and365-95.
Pasnau,
study
6 (1997),109-32.
andTheology,
Olivi's
Metaphysics
ofSoul
, in:Medieval
Philosophy
14Thisis reported
by Burr1976[op.cit.,above,n. 10),33, basedon Olivi'scomwasordered
ontheday
themassacre
ontheApocalypse.
coincidentally,
Perhaps
mentary
as reported
ofthefeastofMaryMagdalene,
byRoch1957{op.cit.,above,n. 9), II,
La chanson
dela croisade
seealsoE. Martin-Chabot,
, 3 vol.,Paris1931-61.
109-11;
albigeoise
15Jansenin Fr.Petrus
Librum
inSecundum
Iohannis
OliviO.F.M
Sententiarum,
, Quaestiones
admits
that
substance
lists
the
doctrine
595,
III,
amongOlivi's
1926,
degrees
Quaracchi
thatareproper
thanunder"theses
rather
modern
theses
thatcontradict
Aristotelianism,
NotethatPierre
with"others."
toOlivi,"
sinceOliviexplicitly
saysthatthisideaoriginates
's publication
before
duMonde
Duhemin Systme
Jansen
, vol.VI, Paris1917,426,writing
c. 1340"professe
D'Andrs
Antonio
Franciscan
thattheScotist
ofOlivi,reports
writing
tellequela blancheur
unequalit
forpeurpandue.
Uneforme
unedoctrine
accidentelle,
car un corpspeuttreplusou moinsblanc;mais,de
de divers
estsusceptible
degrs,
il n'enestpasde mmed'uneforme
desPripatticiens,
l'avisde la plupart
substantielle;

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

117

see that Olivi's idiosyncraticanalysisof substanceand related theoryof


withCatharism.16
What thissuggestsis that
grace bear a startling
affinity
whether
or
and
Olivi,
consciously not,
perhaps in strategicreaction to
new Aristotelianelements,soughtto formalizea relativelymore gnostic
versionof Christiantheologyby expressingits axioms withinthe philosophicalidiom of scholasticculture.
To place Olivi in his proper Occitancontext,we firstturn brieflyto
his vernacularProvenal treatises,17
in particularto a preghiera
(prayer)
"
composedto converthis compatriotsaway fromthe vanityof aquestmon
."l8 Through metaphor,allusion and double-entendre
, Olivi draws
messongier
- on troubadour
on
culture
resentment
abundantly regional
poetry,
against
the Inquisition,shared griefover the French devastationof Languedoc,19
and on a diffuserepertoireof Cathar expressionsthat had seeped into
local religiouslife.20From troubadourculture,Olivi assimilatesthe ethos
offin' amoraccordingto which a lover mustbear privationas a method
of spiritualpurification:
God's servant,Olivi says,mustchoose to hunger
un lement,
en effet,
n'estpas plusou moinsfeu;il l'esttout faitou pas du tout:sa
forme
Antonio
d'Andrs
estd'aviscontraire.
substantielle,
donc,n'admet
pas de degrs.
Il veutqu'uneforme
substantielle
toutcomme
uneforme
treplusou
accidentelle,
puisse,
moinsintense
et prsenter
desdegrs."
DuhemthenshowsthatJohntheCanon(from
viewfrom
Antonio
d'Andrs.
Catalonia)
adoptsthisunusual
16Olivischolars
haveabundantly
defended
Olivi'sorthodoxy
whiletacitly
that
assuming
Catharism
is a "counter-religion
to Christianity"
hasputittome).
opposed
(as onecritic
Ifinstead
weaccept,
as weshould,
thatCatharism
is a genuinely
Christian
then
teaching,
areasofintersection
between
Olivi'stheses
andCatharviewsdoesnotnecesexploring
Olivi'slegitimacy
as a Catholic
sarily
challenge
theologian.
See DiegoZorzi,Testi
inediti
inlingua
delcentro
, in Miscellanea
francescani
provenzale
di studimedievali,
ser.I, Milan1956,269-72;alsoTrattato
dipenitenza
, edited
provenzale
by
C. De Lollis,
in:Studidi Filologia
V (1890),293-8.Fora senseofhowOlivi's
romanza,
vernacular
treatises
wererevered
andusedbyhisbeguini
intheir
followers
communal
"poor
seetheaccount
GuiinPractica
Bernard
houses",
givenbytheDominican
inquisitor
inquisitionis
heretice
in 1323-1324,
finished
inEnglish
translation
and
pravitatis
given
byWakefield
Evans(op.dt., above,n. 11),411-39.
10 lhis
world. Seepreghiera.
, edited
deceitlul/lying
byZorzi[op.at., above,n. 17),270
inRaoulManselli,
e beghini
inProvenza
(Latinversion
, Roma1959,274-8.To the
Spirituali
- ledieuestrahn
- is responsible
theevilprinciple
forthelies,deceitandillusions
Cathars,
ofthisworld.
See e.g.thefollowing
Le roman
deBarlaam
etJosaphat
,
passagefrom
spirituel
ed. RenNelli,1076:"E canta la begnintat
de nostre
senhor
JhesuCristque-mvoie
desliurar
delpoderdel dyable,
el mifesmesprezar
la vanetat
et adonx
d'aquestmont,
montnoneramayscantnientetvanetatz."
yeu miconsiriey
que
aquest
19Fortheregional
and political
sources
of Olivi'sapocalyptic
see Annie
mentality,
Hrsie
etSocit
13-14(1989),7-61.
Cazenave,
, in:Heresis,
20Jean
in:La religion
descathares
Toulouse1976,272-4,documents
forexamDuvernoy,
",adombre
"
useoftheCatharterms
and"endura
plethecontinued
byOccitanCatholics
after1245.See alsothetroubadour
c. 1245:"A rainhas
poetPeireCardenal,
writing
- ofcupidity,
fallen
overthisregion
prideandevil.[. . .] God'sfriend
("l'amiede Du"),

18:33:10 PM

118

ANNEDAVENPORT

and thirstand yearn at all timesfor God as thoughfor an inaccessible


love: sia tottemps
fameiante sedeiante desiranla mia anima.21Cathar-like
elementsare intermingled
throughout,not only in the ubiquitousappeal
to los fiuelsespiritais
(spiritualeyes) and los amiesde dieu(God's friends),22
in the idea that evil manifestsitselfin man as a
but more distinctively
in the idea that God has no harm
sort of moral amnesia or oblidament;
del
to oppose to harm; and in the idea that Christianwisdom {entendensa
Be) growsfromrecognizingthe pleasuresof thisworldas falseand bitter:
0 Senhor
sian a mi
IhesuCrist}
fay que lasfalsas saborsd'aquestmonmessongier
amarase sas amorsdolors.23
One of the more subtle Cathar elementsto surfacein Olivi's prayer
by God:
appears when the convertedsoul asks to be strenghtened
Confirm
this,God,thatyouworkin me,andincrease.24
Reminiscentof St. Paul and of St. Augustine,thisappeal to be "increased"
mightseem innocuous enough, but, as Ren Nelli and Dodat Roch
de bons
both point out, the idea that the legitimateGod (Dieu dreyturier
works
in
their
his
creatures
speritz)
spiritual
spiritual
by "augmenting"
substance against nothingnessis distincdyCathar.25Indeed the XHIthcenturyCathar theorist
Jean de Lugio explainsin the "Book of the Two
that
Principles"
wherever
he is,realizes
thatmenerr,having
losttheir
senseofGod("losende Du an
dutroubadour
See R. Lavaud,Posies
Peire
Cardenal
, Toulouse1957,530;
perdut").
compltes
CXVII
andLucieVarga,Peire
in:Revuedel'histoire
desreligions,
Cardinale
tait-il
hrtique?,
205-31.
(1938),
21"Maymysoulat all times
Troubadour
andin a stateofdesire."
be hungry,
thirsty
"service"
andPauline"service"
arethussuperimposed.
NotethatCathartheorists
argue
thatif"goodChristians"
thatGodneedstheir
arecalledto"serve"
God,thisproves
help
deduobus
theevildieuestranh.
See e.g.Jeande Lugio
's Liber
to fight
, c. 13,ed.
prindpiis
Chr.Touzellier,
Paris1973,194-9.
22See
, ed. Zorzi1956(op.cit
., above,n. 17),271:"Senhor,
que
e.g.Olivi'spreghiera
ofthislabel,seeDuvernoy
tanthonras
losservidors
e-lstieusamies";fortheimportance
1976(op.cit.,above,n. 20),298.
23"LordJesusChrist,
to me,and
makethefalsesweetness
ofthisworldtastebitter
turnitslovesintopain."On thisgnostic
seeRoch1957(op.cit.,above,n. 9)
principle,
dansla cration,
etlessouffrances
maisil estintgr
II, 15:"Le rledu malestpositif,
servent
notrelibration
et notreavancement
versla perfection
spirituelle."
24"Confirma
es in meet adauge."Thisis theLatintext,
hoc,Deus,quodoperatus
e Beghini
inProvenza
, Appendix
1, 278. The
published
by RaoulManselliin Spirituali
because
textedited
at line33 oftheLatintext,
Provenal
maybe
byZorziendsabruptly
theending
thelastpageanda halfofOlivi
waslost,maybebecauseit wascensored:
rather
thansheperds
states
that"those
whopreside
aremercenaries
(quihodie
prayer
today
mento teach
mercennarii
andcallsfornewevangelical
uidentur
presunt
magis
quam
pastores)
Christ's
truedoctrine.
" See ReneNelli,LesCathares
, Pans 1972,132-3:Le Dieudu bien... estcapable,

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOWOF MONTSGUR

119

to theessences
of thosewhohad becomeeviland
God himself
addssomething
themto goodworks.26
disposes
Whetheror not this is what Olivi means in this prayer,his Franciscan
superiorsrejecteda kindredidea expressedin one of Olivi's formalscholastic texts.In 1283, an assemblyof Franciscantheologianscensored Olivi
forteachingthat grace "augmentsthe soul's essence." Specifically,Olivi
was chargedwithwronglyassertingthat
is an increase
ofgrace,andglory
increased
increase
thesoulis substantially
through
is increased.27
ofthesoulin thesensethatthesoul'sessence
In a responsepresentedin Avignonin 1283, Olivi denied that he ever
taughtthis.28He also denied the charge in a letteraddressedto friends:

dansle Bien,d'ajouter
unsurcroit
d'tre ceuxquele Mal a demi
tant
tout-puissant
la puissance
de l'trea, rptons-le,
autant
'anantis'.
d'accrotre
[. . .] Le dieusuprme
etincorruptibles
etde lesrendre
immuables
comme
lui";
qu'ilveutl'trede sescratures,
de l'action
divine
Roch1957{op.cit
., above,n. 9),II, 15:"La description
pourla crades mauvais
tiondesbons,pourla transformation
plus
qu'ilchangeen bonsenajoutant
mme
d'tre
nousmontre
restitue
toutes
leuressence
choses
(myemphasis),
que le Christ
en lui."
26Liber
deduobus
c. 23,ed.Thouzellier
above,n. 21),240:"Peripsum
{op.cit.,
principiis,
illorum
deumaliquidadditur
erant,
(verum)
ipsosinbonis
superessentias
quimalieffecti
on p. 248:"creare
The sameexpression
is repeated
et facere
ordinando."
est
operibus
andon p. 252.Noticethat"addere"
is constructed
with
aliquidadderesuperessentias";
is notthatsomething
therefore
rather
thanwith"ad":themeaning
is
"super"
foreign
butthattheessence
tosomething
different
thanitself,
is increased,
combined
with/added
i.e."Godaddssome"overandabovewhatamount
ofessence
is already
there.
Thusto
whathemeans,
Isaiah45,6-7:"NonestaliusdomiJeande Lugio(254)invokes
explain
withPaul,Ephes.
nusformans
enimaliquando
lucemnisiego"(254)together
5, 8: "Eratis
nuncautemlux."Onceagain,RenNelli(1972,80-1;op.cit.,above,n. 25)
tenebre,
dansle Bien,et- c'estici la conception
la pluspro"Dieuesttout-puissant
interprets:
comme
ilveutl'tre
de certaines
de sescratures
fonde
deJeande Lugio ilpeutaccrotre
de la libration."
si ellessontsurle chemin
27See Littera
1954{op.cit.,above,n. 13),53:
, art.22,ed. Fussenegger
septem
sigillorum
"Itemdicerequodin augmento
animasubstantialiter
et quodgloria
gratie
augmentetur
estaugmentum
animeessentialiter,
erroneum
est."
28"Semper
credidi
animasubstantialiter
nonaugmentetur,
quodin augmento
gratiae
animaeessentiale."
See "Responsio
etquodglorianonestaugmentum
Petrus
quamfecit
Ioannisad Litteram
sibiin Avinione",
editedbyDamasus
magistrorum,
praesentatam
Ioannis
Olm
SuiIpsius
, O.F.M.TriaScripta
, in: Archivm
Apologetica
Labergein Fr.Petri
in
Franciscanum
28 (1935),130.Olivilumpstogether
articles
16-22as listed
historicum,
theLetter
Seals
: "De aliisarticulis,
sextus
duodevidecimus,
decimus,
oftheSeven
septimus
etvigesimus
secundus
articuli
nonmetangunt,
primus
gesimus,
undevigesimus,
vigesimus
communes
Etsemper
credidi
contrarium
docui,sequens
opiniones.
quodgraquiasemper
et quodideaein Deo realiter
tiaponatin animaaliquidabsolutum,
nondifferunt,
et
animasubstantialiter
nonaugmentetur,
etquodglorianonest
quodinaugmento
gratiae
In thelonger
animae
essentiale."
toParismasters
in 1285,
augmentum
response
presented
thisparticular
Olivineglects
charge
altogether.

18:33:10 PM

120

ANNEDAVENPORT
I neither
saidthisnorwroteit; rather,
I believetheopposite,
sinceindeedgrace
indicates
an accidental
habitinthesoul,as I havetried
toprove
withallmystrength
in myquestions
on grace.29

But in 1311, on the eve of the Council of Vienne and at the requestof
Pope Clement V, Giles of Rome will once again examine this doctrine
as one of Olivi's errors,and give a fairlydetailed critiqueand answer.30
Did Olivi teach this doctrine?
In his own defenseto BrotherR.,31Olivi argues,as we just saw, that
the condemnedarticleis actuallyincompatiblewithhis true teachingon
grace. Since he has always maintainedthatgrace indicatesan accidental
habit in the soul, he cannot also maintainthat it indicatesa substantial
increase. Furthermore,
since the censored articleimpliesthat sinfulacts
would decrease the verysubstanceof the soul, it contradictsOlivi's teaching that no creature'sact is capable of corruptingthe substanceof the
rationalsoul. Olivi is therefore"not so insane as to say or thinkthis."32
With regardto glory,however,Olivi concedes that in a questionexamining whetherthe will is an active power33he "recitedthe positionof
some who say thatthe verysubstanceof our mind will be raised to subwhen the habit of gloryis given."34But this position,
limity(sublimatur)
29See Letter
toR. published
withtheQuodlibeta
1509)underthetide
(Venice:Soardum
aliorum
articulorum
immocontrarium
, f.52v:"Hecnondixi;necscripsi:
credo,
Impugnaciones
dicathabitm
animeaccidentalem,
sicutin questionibus
meisde gratia
cumenimgratia
I warmly
viribus
nixussumprobare."
thank
thisletter
availtotis
DavidBurrformaking
ableto mein microfilm.
30Aegidii
Romani
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
in: Archivm
, editedbyLeo Amoros,
Impugnatio
at p. 448.
Franciscanum
24 (1934),399-451,
historicum,
31DavidBurr(1976,37; op.cit.,above,n. 10) citestwocandidates
forBrother
R,
R. de Camliaco
in the1509Veniceedition,
andRaymondo
as stated
Gaufredi,
namely
fromspeculation.
refrains
as perhapssuggested
by a manuscript
copy.Burrhimself
sincehe
fitsnicely
withOlivi'sgreeting
of"truly
beloved
brother"
Gaufredi
Raymondo
- whichcausedhimeventually
to be
to theSpirituals
wasa fellow
Occitan
sympathetic
- oneofOlivi's
ofJohnofMurrho
as Minister
General
VIII,infavor
byBoniface
replaced
in 1283andeventual
Olivi'sdisciples.
censors
leaderofthepersecution
against
32See Letter
toR.}in: Quodlibeta
, ed. Venice1509(op.cit.,above,n. 29),f.52v:"Cum
cornoncredam
animerationalis
actum
creature
etiamperaliquem
aliquidde substantia
nonsumitainsanus
fieret
illiusarticuli
peractumpeccati,
rumpi
posse:quodsecundum
velsentirem."
uthocdicerem
33See Quaestio
librum
Sententiarum
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
seuvoluntas
libera
an liberum
arbitrium
"Quaeritur
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 394-517:
sitpotentia
activavelpassiva."
34Letter
toR., in: Quodlibeta
, ed.Venice1509(op.at., above,n. 29),f.51: In responan voluntas
sitpotentia
factiin questione:
sionemtamencuiusdam
activa;
argumenti
simul
cum
recitavi
dicentium,
glorie,
quodquandodaturhabitus
positionem
quorumdam
mentis
nostre."
substantialiter
substantia
hocsublimatur

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOWOF MONTSGUR

121

Olivi proteststo BrotherR., is neitherhereticalnor false: rather,it is a


"probable" theory and he could, if he cared to, supportit with many
good arguments.35
The controversialtheoryin question is "recited"by Olivi as a possiLVII of his Quaestiones
ble solutionto a delicateproblem.In Question
super
thesis
Sententiarum
Olivi
defends
the
that the will is by its
secundum
librum
,
veryessenceactive in the precisephilosophicalsense thatthe will is the
cause of its acts. The objectionis made
immediateand exclusiveefficient
that acts of grace and of glorypossess more perfectionthan the mere
willingof them: thereforethe will cannot strictlyof itselfproduce these
acts.36Olivi concedes thatthisis a formidableobjection.37
He agrees that
we mustavoid sayingthat acts of grace and glorystemfromthe human
will naturallywithoutdivinehelp, but we mustalso avoid presentingthe
will as a passive mediumforGod's grace, strippingit of its freedomand
Afterreviewingand discardingseveralstandardsolutions,Olivi
dignity.38
venturesa theoryproposed by mysterious"others." These anonymous
theoristsargue that,just as the will, generallyspeaking,must focus on
some object in order to actuallybe willing{ad hocquodvelit
), for the will
will {ad hocquodliberevelit),it must,in addition to this,focus on
to freely
a "high" and "lordly"object to which it submits:altuset dominativus
super
se ipsam
.39The reason is not that thisexalted focusis per se the efficient
35Letter
toR., in:Quodlibeta
, ed.Venice1509(op.cit.,
above,n. 29),f.51v:"Etquamvis
nonvideoquodsitfalsum
hocibinonasseram,
authereticum:
immosatisprobabile
videturmihi.Etpossem
ad hocplures
rationes
assere:
verisimilitudines
sednonestmihicure."
36See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
Sententiarum
librum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
nullus
totam
effectus
trahens
suamessentiam
a sua
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 396:"Item,
causaet hocimmediate
esseperfectior
huiusmodi
causa;. . . sed [. . .] beatitudo
potest
et principaliter
nostra
formaliter
estin actibus,
meliores
sunt
[. . .] actusetiamgratiae
. . . fieri
nostris
... [...]; ergoimpossibile
estactusvoluntatis
ab ipsis."
potentiis
LVIIIof Quaestiones
See Quaestio
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 422: "Quodautemde actibus
gloriaeet gratiae
adiungitur,
nimium
estdifficile."
38See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1924
Sententiarum,
super
theproblem
as follows:
above,n. 15),II, 422,also424,whereOlivisummarizes
(op.cit.,
enimdebetcaverine autunusmodusveritatem
libertatis
tollatautalius
"Summopere
etutili
tatem
necessitatem
etnobilitatem
evacuet."
To situate
Olivi'sphilosophy
of
gratiae
willin context,
: Anselm
andChoosing
andOckham
seeCalvinNormore,
onChoice,
in:
Picking
36 (1998),23-39.
Vivarium,
39See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1924
Sententiarum,
super
difficultati
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 423:"Quidamveroaliinitentes
praedictae
respondicerequodsicutad hocquodvoluntas
derevisisuntaliquando
velit
aliquaactualiter
etaspectus
debitus
ad hocautemquodlibere
conversio
requiritur
supersuumobiectum,
velitrequiritur
ultrahocaspectus
altuset dominativus
superse ipsam."

18:33:10 PM

122

ANNEDAVENPORT

cause of the will's acts,but thatthe active strength


of the will (virtus
activa
is
not
to
unless
est
ipsiusvoluntatis)
powerful operate (non potensoperan)
attached to such a focus.40Thus these anonymoustheoristsargue that
the will is incapable of acts of grace unlessits strengthand activepower
- the
"unite with,absorb, and quasi-incorporatethe divineobject"41
way
iron, for example, must absorb and quasi-incorporatethe heat of a fire
in orderforits substantialcore to liquefy.42
They do not howeverintend
to say that thistransformation
is substantial:the will is changed onlyper
accidens
-justas the heat of a fireis not changedperse when it is absorbed
by iron, and just as the substanceof wax is not changed by takingon
the imprintsof various seals.43

40See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1924
Sententiarum,
super
sintperse
hocquodhuiusmodi
., above,n. 15),II, 423: "Nonpropter
aspectus
(op.cit
causaeffectiva
actuum
activaipsiusvoluntatis
nonestpotens
eius,sedquiavirtus
opeoftheimpairment
ralinisisubtalietcumtaliaspectu."
withOlivi'sdiscussion
Compare
offreewillin sleepand in infancy
LIX,ed.Jansen,
II, 518-68:"Aninfantes,
(Quaestio
etfuriosi
exercere
andwithQuaestio
III ofQuaestiones
dormientes
operaliberi
arbitrii")
possint
DeDeocognoscendo,
Sententiarum.
ed.B.Jansen,
in:Quaestiones
secundum
librum
, III,Appendix
,
super
at p. 545,whereOliviproves
God'sexistence
to
1926,453-554,
byappealing
Quaracchi
thedramatic
on Godandofthose
contrast
between
theactsofpersons
whoarefocused
whoarenot.
41See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
in actusgratiae
nisi
nonpotest
above,n. 15),II, 423:"Sic,utdicebant,
voluntas,
(op.cit.,
eiusvirtus
etpotestas
imbibita
etunitaetquasiincorporata
obiecto
activasitspiritualiter
divino
et obiectum
divinum
ei."
42See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
calesi daremus
incorporalibus
above,n. 15),II, 423:"Sicut,
quodignishaberet
(op.cit.,
facere
autliquefacere
centralem
substantiam
uniusmassaeaureaevelferreae,
nonposset
inipsometallo,
etnisi
hocfacere,
nisivirtus
caloris
imbiberetur
etprofundaretur
quidem
in medioipsiusignisseufornacis
Notethata verysimmetallum
igneaeprofundaretur."
is found
inOlivi'svernacular
ilarmetaphor
, ed.Zorzi1956(op.cit.,
above,n. 17),
preghiera
la duricia
e la tebesessa
delmieucore la ingratitut,
271:"Tantgrane tantabominabla
ni amolesir";
the
d'amorne focno se potescalsar
ni fondre
que pertantgranfornas
"Tantaettamabhominabilis
Latintext,
ed.Manselli
1959(op.cit
., above,n. 18),277,gives:
non
amoris
estduricia
et tepiditas
et ingratitudo
cordismeiquodprotalifornace
ignita
calefieri
alsowiththesingle
necmollilinecscindi."
poemof
potest
Compare
surviving
thecatharisant
troubadour
Guilhm
de Durfort,
oneofthelordsofFangeux:
"Quomaurs
en fueco cumaciersen farga."
43See Quaestio
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
LVIIIof Quaestiones
, ed.Jansen1924
super
vel
autemperhocquodipsaforma
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 423: "Nonintendebant
activavoluntatis
sedsolumperaccidens,
sicutneccalorignisper
virtus
perse moveretur,
suaemateriae
se movetur,
[. . .] Nonetiamintenquandoad congregationem
congregatur.
ceraesubsubstantial
debant
essetsubstantial,
sicutnecforma
quodistatransmutatio
diversas
tamipsaquamsua
stantialiter
transmutatur,
sigillorum
quandosecundum
imagines
materia
variefiguratur."

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

123

The will, say these quidamalii, absorbs and "quasi-incorporates"the


But
divine object throughvirtuoushabits, especiallythroughcharity.44
not substantiality,
since these habits transformthe will only per accidens,
cause of the will's acts of
these habits are not, technically,the efficient
cause of these acts is the active power of the
grace: rather,the efficient
will itself,which has become disposed (disposita)
and adjusted (coaptata)
to
act under and throughsuch virtuoushabits.45In short,the accidental
habitsacquired throughgrace allow the will itselfto become newlypotens
in operan.This anonymoussolutionthus saves the essentiallyactive character of the will withoutdenyingthat God's grace is indispensablefor
the will to act over and above its cripplednaturalstate.46The will itself
originatesacts of grace because its active power has been strengthened
and made relativelymore deiformthan before.When, however,it comes
to glory,thesetheoristssay thatmore is requiredover and above peraccidensvirtuoushabits:gloryrequiressublimatio
of the soul's verysubstance,
increase (<augmentatio
) of the intellectand will, indeed of the whole form
of the mind- so that it exceeds our natural and meritoriousstates.
The underlyingidea, clearly,is that since gloryis the consummation
of grace, the process of quasi-incorporation
of God becomes both complete and irreversiblein glory i.e. substantial.The soul and God are
permanendymerged.The fireand the iron, the wax and the seal, are
indivisiblyone: tantaestenimilia sublimatio
quod. . . nonpotestdarisinequodammodohabendi
etfinali.In restrospect,
Deumgloriose
it seems that theper
accidens/
substantialiter
distinctionon which Olivi relies for exonerationin
the case of grace, hides a secundum
distinctionthatpresents
quid/
simplidter
the
limit
a
as
of
coherent
transformation:
glory
throughgrace, the will's

44See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestixmes
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
fitperhabitus
virtuum
et specialiter
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 423:"Quae incorporatio
caritatis."
perhabitm
45See Quaestio
LVIIIof Quaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1924
super
nonsuntperse causa
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 424:"Dicebant
ergoquodipsihabitus
effectiva
huiusmodi
sedpotius
activavoluntatis
utsubtalibus
habitibus
actuum,
ipsavirtus
etpertaleshabitus
ad agendum
et coaptata."
disposita
46Olivirejects
in particular
thesolution
thatpresents
thewillas a passive
"medium"
illuminated
LVIIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.
bygrace.See Quaestio
super
1924(op.cit.,above,n. 15),II, 422:"Si auteme contra
dicatur
Jansen
quodinproductioneistorum
voluntas
liberanonplusfacitnisiquantum
substantia
(i.e.actusgratiae)
lunaeautaerisfacit
inilluminatone
inea suscepto
a sole:tunchuiusquaeexita lumine
modiactusnullomodoerunt
libertatis
omnino
se habebit
liberi,
quiavirtus
peraccidens
ad productionem
sicutet forma
substantialis
se habet
ipsorum,
ipsiusaerisperaccidens
ad producendum
actumilluminationis."

18:33:10 PM

124

ANNEDAVENPORT

active power (its very essence) is strengthenedbecause the will, being


related to God as its focus,begins to possess the divine object in a relative sense. In glory,the will is permanentlyand absolutelystrengthened
since God is now "possessed in a final and gloriousway."
(sublimatur)
Without"converting"to a "high" and "lordly"focus,the willis notpotens
in operari
over and beyond natural,worldlyacts.47When "converted"to
Christ,i.e. when related to Christ'sgrace,48the will absorbs and quasiincorporatesdivine form,which allows it to become sufficiently
potensin
to
effect
acts
in
in
of
the
consists
absolute,or
operari
grace. Glory, turn,
substantialculminationof thisprocess- symbolizedby the idea that two
distincttermsrelatedperaccidens
In
become substantially
indistinguishable.
short,grace allowsthe soul to have relatively"more" of its essentialpower
- and
and freedom
.49Much as
gloryconsummatesthisincreasesimplidter
Olivi denies it, it seems that his superiorsgrasped the gistof the theory,
and Olivi's favorableopinion of it, fairlyaccurately.50
47
withOlivi'sdiscussion
oftheimpairment
offreewillinsleepandininfancy
Compare
UX ofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
1924(op.cit.,
above,
, ed.Jansen
(Quaestio
super
n. 15),518-68)and withQuaestio
III of Quaestiones
De Deocognos
ed.Jansen1926
cendo,
is proved,
as itwere,pragmatically,
basedon
(op.dt.,above,n. 40),545.God'sexistence
thedifference
in byappealing
to thedramatic
in theactions
ofthosewhofocus
contrast
their
willon Godandthosewhodo not.
48NotethatOliviwasalso
withwrongly
that"gracepositsnothing
charged
teaching
in thesoulbutinstead
absolute
a relationship
to Christ's
grace,in thesenseofa certain
to partake
in Christ's
thewaythata monkhasa right
to thegoodsofhis
merits,
right
See Littera
1954(op.at.,above,n. 13),52:
, ed. Fussenegger
monastery".
sigillorum
septem
et tenemus
nihilponitin animaabsolutum
"Dicimus,
credimus,
quoddicerequodgratia
sed relationem
ad gratiam
Christi
seu ius quoddamin meritis
sicudmonachus
Christi,
habetiusin bonismonasterii
nonperaliquidabsolutum,
esterroneum."
Notethatin defending
in Quaestio
II ofhis
theprimacy
ofthewillovertheintellect
dePeifectione
andSimoncioli
1964(op.cit.,above,n. 9),
Quaestiones
, ed. Emmen
Evangelica
enimin
formof thesoul:"Videmus
120,Oliviarguesthatthewillis the"principal"
omnibus
tantoest
universaliter
seudifferentia,
adveniens,
quodforma
quantoestposterius
et actualior,
et tantointerceteras
in tantum
formas
perfectior,
quodomnes
principalior;
aliaesuntquodammodo
instrumentales.
est
secundum
suamrationem
[. . .] Sed voluntas
ordine
intellectu:
et actualior,
ad
in tantum
posterior
ergoet perfectior
quodse habebit
sitquodliberOlivialsowrites,
ipsamsicutinstrumentum."
p. 121:"Cumetiamcertum
taspotissime
sitin volntate
nostra
et actueius,etquodnihilestitanobilevelaltumin
nobissicutin quo sumus
liberiet omnium
actuum
est
nostrorum
domini,
patentissimum
involntate
estsumma
nobilitas
etultima
nostra
quodinvolntate
potissimum
perfectio
erit."We mustalsokeepin mindthatin infancy
to Olivi,thewill's
andsleep,according
fromcarnalthings.
Thisis presumably
essential
freedom
is impaired
bycontamination
on a lowerplane,to thewillnotbeingpotens
withregard
to actsof
inoperari
analogous,
itis related
toChrist
as itsfocus.
Thereis thusa deepconceptual
graceunless
continuity
in thewill'sprogressive
to ordinary
exercise
ofitsownfreedom
from
acts,to
slumber,
- andfinally
actsofgrace
toglory.
50I thank
DavidBurrforcalling
to a similar
"coherent
transformation"
myattention

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOWOF MONTSGUR

125

But since Olivi "recites"this theorywithoutassertingit, is he really


implicated?To answerthisquestion,we must followa clue providedby
Giles of Rome, and turnto Olivi's earlier Question
XXII, which examines
in a generalphilosophicalway whether"substanceadmitsa more and a
less": an substantia
suscipiat
magiset minus.Olivi here is much less careful
about what he says. We will see that,taken together,Questions
LVIII and
XXII revealthe truecharacterof Olivi's position,and, more importantly,
shed lighton the reasons forcensure.
Does substanceadmit a more and a less? Olivi attacksthe questionin
standardscholasticmannerby firstoffering
, beginning
eightreasonsquodnon
withAristotle'sstatementin Metaphysics
VIII thatspecies are like numbers
and therefore
The listendswithAristotle's
changetheirnatureifincreased.51
in
the
assertion
that
it
a
is
characteristicpropertyof
explicit
Categories
substancenot to admita more or a less.52Aristotle'sauthoritythusweighs
heavilyon the side of denyingthat substanceadmits degrees.
Olivi, however,defendsa positiveanswer. He startsby distinguishing
betweenwhatsubstancesare logice
as linguistic
featuresof rationaldiscourse
and what substancesare extramentally
in themselves,secundum
rem.With
to
rational
Olivi
endorses
Aristotle's
discourse,
regard
position:since the
functionof rational definitionsis to unambiguouslyclassifyphenomena
fordiscursivepurposes,substancestakenin thisrationalsense as labels for
extramental
thingscannotadmitof a more or a less. The special flavorof
Olivi's proto-nominalist
analysisis worth noting: Olivi emphasizes that
our rationaldescriptions
serveto (falsely)idealize thingsthatin themselves
inOlivi'sdiscussion
scheme
ofintellectus
inthethird
inhisApocalypse
spiritualis
age,found
Olivicommentary
(cf.W. Lewis,Peter
John
Prophet
oftheYear2000, Inaugural-Dissertation
zurErlangung
derDoktorwrde
demFachbereich
I "Evangelische
an der
Theologie"
Eberhard-Karls-Universitt
zu Tbingen,
a remarkable
claim
1972,979)."After
making
aboutthewayinwhich
wewillbe tunedintotruth
without
needofbooks,
Oliviassures
us thatthisprediction
'is beingfulfilled
andwillbe fulfilled
secundum
quidin thechurch
butsimpliciter
in thechurch
militant,
triumphant'."
51See Met.VIII, 1043b32-1044a14.Olivisummarizes
Aristotle's
as follows:
argument
"Definitiones
substantiarum
a suisinferioribus,
nonenimpossent
aequaliter
participantur
inunohaberet
autem
inaequaliter
participan,
quindefinido
plusquaminalio;secundum
VIII Metaphyskae
rerum
suntsicutnumeri
in quibus
Aristotelem,
, specieset definitiones
additio
veldiminutio
variat
si ergoinaequaliter
nonessent
eiusspeciem;
participarentur,
demspeciei,
seddiversae."
52Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
Sententiarum)
super
dicitin Praedicamentis
above,n. 15),I, 390: "Item,Aristoteles
quodhoc estproprium
nonrecipere
scilicet
See Cat.,3b33-4a7.
Olivi'sobjections
substantiae,
magiset minus."
2, 4 and6 arebasedon thispassage,
e.g.2: "Item,unushomonondicitur
magishomo
quamalter."

18:33:10 PM

126

ANNEDAVENPORT

in no way
are impermanent,messyand vague. Our rationaldefinitions
ideal
natures
exist
that
such
"punctual"
extramentally.53
imply
rem
, Olivi tells
Turningnow to what is true about substancessecundum
us that
withwhomI findmorereason
toagree,
others,
however,
saythata moreanda less
mustbe granted
in substances
secundum
evenifthisis nottruesecundum
viam
rem,
.54
logicalem
VIII that "substances
Aristotlehimself,Olivi insists,assertsin Metaphysics
taken abstractlydo not vary according to more and less, whereas substances receivedin matterdo."55What Aristotlemeans, Olivi creatively
argues,56is that universaisconsideredas rationalnames do not vary by
degree,whereasreal extramentalsubstancesdo. Since Olivi endorseshylemorphismforall creatures,fromhis point of view, all createdsubstances
are composed of formand matter.57
God alone is absolutelyimmaterial.
rem.b%
The divineessence alone is therefore
absolutely"punctual"secundum
and
Aristodedifferendy, argue that
As forthose,Olivi says,who interpret
53Thisis also a keyfeature
in Olivi'srejection
illumination:
matheofAugustinin
he says,aremerely
notdivine
Ideas.See
matical
rulesandgenerad
abstractions,
concepts,
deDeocognoscendo
, ed.Jansen(op.dt.,above,n. 40),III, 455-99.On Olivi's
Quaestiones
seeE. Bettoni
1959(op.cit.,
above,n. 10),514-5:"MiparecheOccam
proto-nominalism,
Oliviana
delproblema
conaltreparolela soluzione
Quando
degliuniversali.
riproponga
le cose"aptaenataesuntsicintelligi"
sonooggettivi,
chei concetti
l'Oliviafferma
perch
attitudine
dellecose
di indicare
le ragioni
chefondano
raffermata
e nonsenteil bisogno
la posizione
di predicati
di qualchedecennio
a diventare
universali,
soggetto
anticipa
occamistica."
54Quaestio
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit
XXIIofQuaestiones
.,
Sententiarum,
super
iudicodicunt
above,n. 15),I, 391:"Aliiautemquibusin parteistamagisassentiendum
viamlogestdaremagiset minus
secundum
rem,etsinonsecundum
quodin substantiis
icalem."
55Quaestio
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.dt.,
XXIIofQuaestiones
Sententiarumi
super
autemest
remaliter
se habet,
above,n. 15),I, 392:"Quiaautemsecundum
metaphysici
nonhabet
considerare:
naturas
realiter
ideo,VIII Metaphysicae
, dicitquodsicutnumerus
sedsi quidem,
sicnecsubstantia
quaecum
quaeestsecundum
speciem,
magisetminus,
illahabet."
materia,
As we will
wouldagreewithOlivis interpretation.
Fewor no Aristotelian
exegetes
endorsed.
is notlikely
to be widely
thathisinterpretation
knows
seelater,Olivihimself
57LikeThomas,
thatAvicebron
Duhem1917(op.at.,above,n. 15),V, 361argues
(Ibn
alsothatScotus
isatthesource
ofFranciscan
formally
"Augustinizes"
hylemorphism,
Gabirol)
andthe
ForAvicebron's
ofspiritual
matter.
Avicebron's
gnosticism
placeinJewish
theory
ha-Kabalahu-Provans:
seeG.G.Scholem,
at Olivi'stime,
KabbalahactiveinMontpellier
hug
1963.
RabiTitshak
ha-Rabi
Avraham
benDavidu-veno
Jerusalem
SagiNahor,
58See Quaestio
librum
Sententiarum
secundum
XXII of Quaestiones
, ed.Jansen1922
super
remaliterse habet,
metaphysici
(op.dt., above,n. 15),I, 392-3:"Quiaautemsecundum
dicitquodsicutnumerus
considerare:
autemestnaturas
realiter
ideo,VIII Metaphysicae
sedsi quidem,
sicnecsubstantia
nonhabetmagiset minus,
speciem,
quaeestsecundum

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

127

formsper se do not vary by more or less, but that materialconditions


vary,theirpositionis "ridiculous"since it impliesthat a reallyexisting
the distinctiveindividualthat it is.59
thingis accidentally
In supportof the anonymous"others"who teach thatsubstancesperse
admitdegreessecundum
rem
, Olivi invokesmultiplearguments.He invokes
the experience of two things of the same kind manifestingdifferent
in theirformalproperties.60
He invokesmixtures,in which the
intensities
formsof the elementsare less intensethantheyare in isolation.61
substantial
On a more theoreticallevel, Olivi argues that, the nobler the matter,
the nobler the formit is disposed to receive.62This implies that form
iliahabet.Persubstantiam
enimsecundum
videtur
quaecummateria,
speciem
intelligere
substantiarum
universaliter
estpotius
species
acceptas,
quimodus
accipiendi
logicalis
quam
veroquaeestcummateria
videtur
realis;
formam,
persubstantiam
accipere
proutestparin materia
ticulariter
Formaenimquaeomnino
estabstracta
a materia,
sicutest
signata.
solusDeus,nonpotest
undeetsiuniversalia
seuspeciesrerum
recipere
magiset minus;
universales
essent
a materia,
sicutPlatovoluit
autsicutiuxtamodum
separata
intelligendi
nonpossent
et minus."
dicit,
logicus
recipere
magis
59Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
above,n. 15),I, 393:"Quodautem
quidamexponunt
quodsubstantia
quaeestcummateriahabetmagiset minus,
id est,quodsecundum
materiales
et nonsecundispositiones
dumformam
estdarein substantia
ridiculosus
sensus
quaedatspeciem
magiset minus:
secunvidetur,
quiahocnonestaliuddicere
quamquodsubstantia
recipit
magisetminus
dumsua accidentia
et nonsecundum
materialia
enimeiusmateriales
se; dispositiones
secundum
haberemagiset minus,
si nonsuntei substantiales,
quasdicitur
oportet
quod
sintaccidentales."
Olivi'svehement
ofmatter
as theprinciple
ofindividuation,
rejection
a keyarticle
ofThomas'synthesis,
shouldalertus to thepossible
anti-Cathar
forceof
A discussion
Thomas'position.
ofOlivi'sphilosophical
viewson individuation
in
is found
Bettoni
1959(op.cit.,above,n. 10),214-35.
60Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
Sententiarum,
super
enimquodin propriis
substantiarum
conseabove,n. 15),I, 393:"Constat
passionibus
earum
sivegenerales
sivespecificas,
estdaremagisetminus;
undeuna
formas,
quentibus
in eademproprietate,
substantia
excedit
alteram
et hoc tamin substantiis
corporalibus
Sed maioritas
seuexcessus
huiusmodi
nonpotest
quamin intellectualibus.
proprietatum
causalinisiab eo a quo causatur
cumilleexcessus
sitquaedampars
ipsaproprietas,
essentialis
A possible
sourceis Avicebron,
FonsVitae,
ed.J. Schlanger,
ipsius
proprietatis."
Paris1970,III, c. 15,p. 110:speaking
of simplesubstances,
Avicebron
says"quanto
fuerint
subtiliores
etfortiores
et meliores,
tantomagisaptaead agendum
etconferendum
se et sua."Compare
alsowiththemuchlaterAntonio
Andrs:
"caliditas
intenditur
et
causanaturalis
et secundum
remittitur;
ergoet ignis"(since"omnis
agitquantum
potest
ultimum
andJohntheCanon:"Calidum
intenditur
etremittitur;
potentiae")
ergoetignis"
CitedbyDuhem1917(op.cit.,above,n. 15),VI, 427-8.
(forthesamereason).
61Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
Sententiarum,
super
n. 15),I, 394:"Item,
formae
substantiales
elementorum
inveniuntur
inmixtis
minus
above,
intensae
A brief
a mixto
discussion
ofOlivi'sthequamsintinipsiselementis
separatis."
inAnneliese
isfound
AnderGrenze
vonScholastik
und
Maier,
oryofmixtures
Naturwissenschaft,
Roma1952,40-1.
62Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super

18:33:10 PM

128

ANNEDAVENPORT

mustalso admitof a more and less,since capacitati


actumaterne
correspondei
alitasformae
: variationin the capacityof matterto receiveformimpliesa
correspondinglatitude of degrees in formal act.63In particular,Olivi
explains,successiveformsgraduallyimprovematter,makingit betterand
betterdisposedto receivea higherand higherform.But sincewe observe
thatmattervariesin its degree of amelioration,thisimpliesthatthe prior
formswere receivedin varyingdegree.64
A second theoreticalargumentis based on analysingthe notion of
form.To claim thatformsare perse indivisible,Olivi says,is to attribute
to creaturesabsolute propertiesthat belong exclusivelyto God.65Indeed
a formthat cannot be increased or decreased cannot consistof a pluralityof parts,since otherwiseit would be possibleto augmentor reduce
it by adding or takingaway some part.66But thenthe act of such a form
would eitherbe so absolute that it would be impossibleto imagineit as
less (thisis clearlyGod's case)- which is absurd,especiallyin the case of
angels;or we would have to supposein thisform"an intelligible
magnitude
so that in this magnitude,
compatiblewith everymanner of simplicity,"
forexample,"any intelligible
But
part would be identicalto any other."67
enimmateriae
etad recipiendum
melius
nobilior
above,n. 15),I, 399:"Nobiliori
dispositae
debetdariforma."
63Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
Sententiarum,
super
nonsitin
dicerequodrespectu
formae
substantial
above,n. 15),I, 400:"Oportet
igitur
ea capacitas
virtusedpotiushabenslatitudinem
et gradus
cuiusdam
ambitus
punctalis,
in
in ea recepta
substantial
hochabeat;
alis;et sicperconsequens
oportet
quodforma
omniautemforma
in qua estdaregradum
et gradm
darimagiset minus
per
potest
erithocdare."
seusubtractionem;
substantiali
graduum
appositionem
ergoinomniforma
64Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
librum
secundum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
ad recipienestmagisdisposita
above,n. 15),I, 400-1:"Unamateria
priores
performas
dumsequentes,
totidem
priores:
quodhocsitprincipaliter
quamsitaliahabens
ergovidetur
formarum
substantialium."
melioritatem
propter
priorm
65As Bettoni
Oliviantoposderives
1959(op.cit.,above,n. 15)points
out,thiscentral
from
ofOlivi'sangelology
atpp. 152-3.
Bonaventure:
seeinparticular
Bettoni's
discussion
66Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.i.,
super
Omnisenimforma
actusformalis.
above,n. 15),I, 401:"Tertio
patethocexparteipsius
nullam
habetin se pluritatem
partium
quae nullomodopotest
magiset minus
recipere
nechabere
uniuspartis
estparsetpars,persubtractionem
potest
potest,
quiaubicunque
dariminus
etpereiusdem
darimagisvelmaius."
restitutionem
potest
67Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
librum
secundum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
informis
carenomnimodam
above,n. 15),I, 401:"Hocautemmodosumendo
partium
et essentiam
seuitamodicam
actualitatem
tiam,oportet
quod
quodhabeant
punctalem
nonpossit
informis
dariautexcogitari
etmaxime
minor,
angeliquodestvaldeabsurdum,
cumomnimoda
cis;autestdarein ea quandam
simplicitate,
magnitudinem
intelligibilem
illius
itaquodin ea nondiffrt
ettotaliter
etitaquodquaelibet
totum
parsintellectualis
sitidemomnino
et id ipsumcumaliaparteeiusintelligibili."
magnitudinis

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

129

this sort of simplicityand magnitudebelong only to God.68 Indeed a


Moreovera substanceendowed
magnitudeof thiskindwould be infinite.69
with such a magnitudewould have to be supremelyabsolute and selfcontained(absolutissimum
et in se ipso manens)and have infinitepower ad
extra.10
But all of thisbelongs only to God:
form
I believe
thatitaccords
better
withFaithtosaythatevery
substantial
therefore
a plurality
ofparts,
hasin itself
towhichitis possible
to imagine
in it a
according
moreanda less.71
Only God is absolute everyothersubstanceis vulnerableto decline and
also susceptibleto being improved.Olivi's nexttheologicalargumentpursues this"inductive"characterof createdsubstancesfurther.Olivi argues
that God's power would be restrictedif he could not make the formof
one individualbe "betterand more actual" than the formof some other
individualof the same species.72Olivi thus explicitlyargues that Gos
omnipotenceallowshim to increase(<augere
) the verysubstanceof one individual relativeto anotherindividualof the same formaldescription.That
thisis Olivi's claim is clear froman earlierargumentin which he points
out thatwe commonlyexperienceindividualsof the same species to vary
in nobility.For example, we recognize that some precious gems are
68Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.dt.,
super
et talismagnitudo
soliusDei videtur
esse
above,n. 15),I, 401: "Talisautemsimplicitas
propria."
b Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
Sententiarum,
super
idemsimplicissimum
above,n. 15),I, 401: "Qua ratione
potesthaberetantam
magnieademratione
habere
etinfinitam."
Olivirecognizes
thata magnitude
of
tudinem,
poterit
suchabsolute
nolonger
toEuclide's
conforms
andhastherefore
axiom,
simplicity
part/whole
no "reason"
tobe finite.
70Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
omnisvirtus
veloperario
manans
ab huiusmodi
forma
above,n. 15),I, 402:"Praeterea,
esttotaet totaliter
a qualibet
id est,ipsa
parteintelligibili
magnitudinis
ipsiusformae,
forma
se totam
secundum
et secundum
suamtotalitatem
et secundum
quodlibet
intelligibilesuaeessentiae
totamvirtutem
et operationem
a se fluentem
et quamlibet
product
earum:
isteautem
modusagendiestsoliusDei proprius,
etsicutdeducenti
faciliter
partem
omnetaleagenspotest
in infinita
etestagensabsolutissimum
etin agendo
patere
potest,
illimitatum:
et sicutdeducenti
faciliter
(isteautemmodusagendiestsoliusDei proprius,
omnetaleagenspotest
in infinita
et estagensabsolutissimum
etin agendo
patere
potest,
illimitatum)."
71Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.dt.,
super
fidem
dicerequodomnis
above,n. 15),I, 402:"Credoigitur
quodsaniusestsecundum
forma
substantialis
habeatin se pluralitatem
secundum
partium
quampossitin ea cogitanmagisetminus."
72Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
et divinarum
idearum.
above,n. 15),I, 405:"Sextopatethocex partedivinae
potentiae
DicereenimquodDeusnonpossit
formam
entiscreati
augereet diminuere
cuiuscunque

18:33:10 PM

130

ANNEDAVENPORT

superiorto others,or thata spiritedyoungstallionparticipatesmore fully


in the formof its species than a crastratedworkhorse.73
Moreover,Olivi
argues next,intellectualsubstanceshave
havemore
moreofthetruth
ofbeing{plushabent
deventate
entis
), and theirforms
and theirmatter
moreperse existence,
formal
act,and theirindividual
supposits
substances.74
moreofessential
thancorporeal
essentiali)
purity
[plusdepuniate
- "truthof
Olivi now arguesthatVeritas
entis
being" belongsto substances
in varyingdegree. In particular,substancesreceivedin spiritualmatter
have "more" of it thansubstancesreceivedin perishablematter.Moreover,
since spiritualmatterhas "more" essentialpuritythan perishablematter,
thisin turnimpliesthat perishablematteris a degraded,impuresortof
matter,withrelativelylittlecapacityto receivea high degreeof form.In
fact,Olivi's analysisimpliesthatthe visible,tangiblephenomenaof aquest
monmessongier
have very litde ontological"truth"at all.75Olivi's philoof perishablephenomena resemblesnothingmore than
doctrine
sophical
it does Josaphas spiritualdoctrine:yeu mi consiriey
que aquestmontnonera
.76
mayscantnientet vanetatz
This bringsus finallyto Olivi's censoreddoctrine.Man's variousmetaphysicalstates created,fallen,redeemed prove, Olivi argues,thatsubstances admit of a more and less:
Forwho,indeed,
woulddenythatourglorious
bodywillhavemoreoftheactof
itsspecies
thanourmortal
body?77
formam
meliorem
et actualiorem
uniusindividui
autdicerequodipsenonpossitfacere
multum
securum."
sitin alioeiusdem
nonvidetur
speciei
quam
73Quaestio
libmm
Sententiarum
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
nobilius
enimin eademspecieunumindividuum
above,n. 15),I, 404:"Videmus
partiet eiusproprietates
specieitam
ciparespeciem
quamaliud.Undeinterlapideseiusdem
metet idemestin auroet ceteris
magnaestdifferentia;
quamnonpretiosos
pretiosos
a roncinis
in animalibus:
allis.Idemetiampatetevidenter
equienimmagniet generosi
differre
et idemestin canibus."
in participatione
suaespecieimultum
videntur;
74Quaestio
secundum
libmm
Sententiarum
XXIIofQuaestiones
, ed.Jansen1922(op.t.,
super
entiset
de ventate
enimintellectuals
above,n. 15),I, 404-5:"Substantiae
plushabent
et
et supposita
earumplusde perse existentia
formali
formae
earumplusde actualitate
materiae
earumplusde puntate
essentiali
quamsubstantiae
corporales."
75To
deperfectione
ofthis,compare
withQuaestiones
thecharacter
,
evangelica
appreciate
forhe
oftheworld,
be deceived
. . . cannot
VIII: "Theloverofpoverty
bytheelements
in
Elements
as nothing."
CitedbyDavidBurrin: TheApocalyptic
counts
all temporal
things
40 (1971),26.
in:Church
Olivi's
Aristotle,
History,
of
Critique
76"I thenconsidered
in:Le
andvanity.",
thisworldtobe litdemorethannothingness
from
withthecitation
Roman
, ed.Nelli1960(op.dt.,above,n. 8), 1076.Compare
spirituel
footnote.
citedin theprevious
Olivi'streatise
on evangelical
poverty
77Quaestio
librum
Sententiarum
secundum
XXIIofQuaestiones
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
et
nostrorum
status
corporum
above,n. 15),I, 405: "Septimo
patethoc ex diversitate

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOWOF MONTSGUR

131

rem.Regardless
Rememberthatwe are consideringwhat is true secundum
in
human
substance
of what is truedefinitionwise,
realityadmitsa wide
spectrumof orderedvalues. Depending on whetherwe are considering
Adam in paradise, or fallen man corruptedby evil, or spiritualman
redeemedin glory,human substancevaries dramaticallyby "more and
less." Olivi's analysisimplies,in particular,that the human formthat is
receivedin perishablematteris a minimaldegree of humanity,quasi-nihil
comparedto the human formthatis foundin heaven clothedin celestial
Indeed as Olivi explainedearlier,materialcapacityand degree of
light.78
materiae
formalact go together:capacitati
actualitas
formae.Since
correspondet
the capacityof carnal matterto receivethe human formis disproportionatelyless than the capacityof spiritualmatter,it followsthat the degree
of humanitythat is receivedin carnal matter(and providesthe basis of
Aristotle'santhropology)
is a sort of infinitesimal
residue of what "man"
reallyis.79
There is of coursea veryimportantexception.Who, Olivi arguesnext,
would deny that the human body in its state of innocence has more
capacitythan our own perishablebodies, or
thatChrist's
soulhas a better
and higher
etaltiorem
nature(meliorem
than
naturam)
other
souls?80
" dressedhimself
Thus accordingto Olivi, when "IhesuCristveramienostre
in our nature,81
he did not take on our degree
of humanity,anymorethan
he took on our own corruptflesh.82
To articulateall of thisphilosophifor
cally,Olivi uses a numberof equivalentexpressionsinterchangeably:
animarum.
nonhabeatplus
nostrum,
Quisenimdicetquodcorpus
quandoestgloriosum,
de actualitate
suaespeciei
mortale?"
quam
corpus
78On thegnostic
rootofthisconcept,
seeHenry
Terre
dersurrection
cleste
etcorps
Corbin,
,
Paris1960.
79Forthe
ofthisas DunsScotus'pointofdeparture,
andinparticular
for
importance
in thePrologue
Scotus'critique
ofAristotle's
ofhisSentences
epistemology
commentary,
seePaulVignaux,
LireDunsScot
in:Laphilosophie
aumoyen-ge
, Albeuve
aujourd'hui,
reprinted
1987,243-65.
80Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.dt.,
super
nonhabeatmeliorem
etalteabove,n. 15),I, 406:"QuisetiamdicetquodanimaChristi
riorem
naturam
aliaeanimae?"
quam
81See Olivi'spreghiera
IhesuCrist
, ed.Zorzi1956(op.cit
., above,n. 17),271:"Senhor
e veramienostre,
nostra
natura
hasvestida."
pueys
que
82Quaestio
XXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
nonplus
above,n. 15),I, 405: "Quisenimdicet... quodcorpusin statuinnocentiae
In boththeJewish
haberet
nostra
Zoharand in Catharism,
quamcorpora
corrupta?"
Christ
is "robbed
inhisethereal
beneath
theappearance
ofordinary
For
flesh.
garment"
thegnostic
character
ofthisproblmatique
, see Huntin1963(op.cit.,above,n. 7), 53-5,

18:33:10 PM

132

ANNEDAVENPORT

a being to "have more of the act of its species" is forit to "have more
form,"or, equivalently,"more parts of form,"which give thisindividual
a "better"nature,or a "higher"nature. If thereforeChrist'ssoul has a
meliorem
naturam
than othersouls,thismeans that Christ'ssoul
et alteriorem
has "more form"than ours. But if Christ'ssoul has "more" substance
than ours, this in turn implies that Christ's soul is formallyincreased
relative to our own- just as the glorious degree of humanitythat is
receivedin celestialmatteris formallyincreasedrelativeto the low degree
of humanitythat is received in our own muddy vesturesof decay. At
one level, Olivi's analysisis standardChristianfare.But at anotherlevel,
die veryattemptto expresstheseChristianmysteries
philosophically
brings
out the deep congruitybetween Olivi's doctrineand the more mythically-statedCathar doctrine,as capturedfor example by Dodat Roch
in the followingsummary:
human
totheCathars,
soulslefttheir
bodiesinthespiritual
According
pure,ethereal
intothese"tunics
realmwhentheyentered
ofskin,"
which
are,in St.Paul'swords,
in a pure,
thebodiesofsin.In contrast,
and incarnated
himself
Jesusdescended
humanbody:hencethedesignation
of"celestial"
or "spiritual"
ethereal
body.This
it
wasmadedensebythephysical
elements
thatfedit,andtowhich
bodyhowever
ofa terrestrial
human
thisbody
organism.
Consequently,
gavetheshapeandreality
initafter
becamemortal.
himself
However,
gradually
purified
byChrist
manifesting
itwasresurrected
theBaptism
oftheHolySpirit
as a glorious
(byJohntheBaptist),
thecrucifixion.83
bodyafter
If we now combinethismythicalaccountof Christ'sbodilymetamorphoses
with the Cathar teaching that God, to rescue his flock from nihilitas
,
increases theirspiritualsubstance,what we obtain is nothingless than
the esoteric blueprintof Olivi's philosophical doctrine: the purer the
materialvessel,the "more" human formit receives,the higherthe degree
of human substancein act. Olivi's axiom that capadtatimateriae
corresponneeded to express
deiactualitas
formae
providesthe philosophicalframework
in scholasticlanguage the Cathar doctrinethatthe verysubstanceof the
c. 1270:'Jesuswasnotmade
whoalsocitesa Cathar,
Bzerza,
Raymonde
interrogated
. . . NeverdidGodputon ourmortal
flesh."
ofourflesh
83Roch1957[op.rit.,
onthedepoabove,n.9),II, 82.Rochbasesthissummary
partly
inthebeginning
oftheXlVthcentury,
Fournier
sitions
received
bytheinquisitor
Jacques
ofBlibaste.
theteachings
NotethatOlivi,as reported
byDavidBurrin Eucharistie
stating
of the
inLateThirteenth-Century
Franciscan
Presence
andConversion
, in:Transactions
Thought
thedocetic
himself
from
74/3(1984),
distances
American
55,explicidy
Society,
Philosophical
admits
of"a moreanda
ofgnostic
traditions
wellknow,
Butas students
heresy.
gnostism
herebyDodatRochis,liketheviewimplied
less."The Catharviewsummarized
by
view.
as opposed
to a frankly
a verymitigated
andsubtle,
Olivi'sanalysis,
"docetic,"

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOWOF MONTSGUR

133

human soul is increasedby God in those who embark on the path of


As losamixde dieugraduallywean themselvesfromaquestmon
purification.
de bonssperits
, they
messongier
throughfastsand serviceto the Dieu dreyturier
graduallybecome capable of receivinga "betterand highernature"than
othersouls,i.e. theyreceive"more and more of the act of theirspecies"in the recoveryof theirChrist-nature.
But is thisnot also the
culminating
esotericteachingof St. Francis, in whom "Christ was manifested"on
Mount Verna?
Olivi thusassumesas his startingpoint a distinctive
entendesa
delBe that
viewshuman substancemythically
and dynamically,ratherthan naturalWho, Olivi naivelyasks,would denythatChrist's
isticallyand statically.84
soul has "more"of man's truesubstancethanour own?Gradualpurification
fromcarnal corruptionallows the soul to recover"more and more" of
its transcendentnaturethroughgrace, untilit reaches the statusof alter
In the processof analysingsubstancein his Question
Christus.
XXII, Olivi
translatesthisesotericteachinginto formalphilosophicallanguage, then
invokesit as proofthat substancesgenerallyare susceptibleof "a more
and a less."85
The answerto our questionis thereforethat yes: thereis a veryreal
remsense, in which Olivi held (1) that increase
sense,namelya secundum
in grace substantially
increasesthe soul, and (2) that gloryincreasesthe
soul essentialiter.
But Olivi's focus lay wholly on articulatingthe formal
of
Christie
implications
metamorphosisfor natural philosophy not on
defendingChristiemetamorphosisper se. Olivi's goal was to convince
his brethren
thatdenyingtheincreaseor decreaseof substancesphilosophiwould
force
themto deny that Christ'ssoul is formallyof a higher
cally
naturethan ours,or thatgloryconsistsin the fulland irreversible
recovery of our celestialform.And what sort of Christianwould deny this?
, persecuteGod's servants,
(Only those carnal men who rejectususpauper
seek burial fees,build cathedralsand slavishlyfollowAristode,the "god
of thisworld.")
84To appreciate
howdifferent
theGathar
viewis from
Aristotle's
eternal
steady-state
universe
seethefollowing
anthropology,
summary
byRoch1957[op.cit.,above,n. 9),
de connatre
cesphasesde l'volution
du monde,
de la Terreet
II, 25: "Il estessentiel
de l'humanit
si l'onveutcomprendre
comment
le Christ,
descendu
de sphre
en sphre
etmanifest
dansle corpsphysique
de Phomme-Jsus,
estremont
dansle mondethil pntre
la Terrede sa lumire
et nousdonnela vie,pourquoi
il est
rique,comment
de noscorpset de la terreelle-mme,
l, agissant
par amourpourla transmutation
il nedescendra
etpourquoi
il attend
pourquoi
plusversnousencorpsphysique
quenous
nouslevions
versLuilibrement."
lireTeilhard.)
(On croirait
I thank
forpointing
outthatOlivi'sprocedure
is hardly
a goodone
JohnMurdoch

18:33:10 PM

134

ANNEDAVENPORT

Thus by examiningthe wider philosophicalcontextof Olivi's multifaceteddiscussion,we come to appreciatewhy his Franciscansuperiors
reacted so negativelyto the anonymouspositionhe innocently"recites"
in Question
LVII. Hypersensitive
to the thinline thatdividesCatholic docdel Be,
trinefroma more gnosticand even franklyheterodoxentendensa
increase
of
of
the
substantial
their
Occitan
confrere's
theyjudged
analysis
the human soul to be overall more hereticalthan Catholic- -justas they
sensedhot Cathar cindersbeneathOlivi's view of marriage,baptism,burial fees and the rationalsoul.86
The theologianswho censoredOlivi's articlewereperhapsfamiliarwith
in which the Cathar doctrineabout the soul's
Jean de Lugio's treatise,87
essentialincreaseis explicitly
expressed,or perhapswithDurand of Huesca's
writtenin Languedoc c. 1222.88This last treatise
LiberContraManicheos,
specificallyalerts Catholic theologiansto the metaphysicalproblmatique
raised by Olivi. In Chapter XIII, Durand respondsto the Cathar claim
- and were therefore
thatthe perishablephenomenaof thisworldare nihil
not createdby God. Althoughbasicallyunschooled,Durand trieshis best,
thatsubstance
by means of the Latin word semel,to argue philosophically
or affair.Thus he
does not admit of a more and a less, but is an either/
says that
orincorporeal,
is madewithout
No substance
smallorlarge,
God,norcan
corporeal
cannot
be
Whatindeedis once(semel)
it properly
be called"nothing."
something,
be attributed
tothattowhich
cannot
given,
Non-being
beingis once(semel)
nothing.
call
itsbeing.Do not,Cathar,
itmight
andrenew
eventhough
changeappearance
whatcanbe touched.89
nothing
Olivi's
illustrates:
whatthiscase-study
Butthisis,in a sense,precisely
philosophically.
remains
ofphilosophy
andamiede Dieu- hisassimilation
is to be a friar
deepidentity
extrahn.
somewhat
86It is interesting
thatNelli1972(op.at.,above,n. 25),113,
to note,in thisregard,
in Languedoc
in thelastquarCatharism
a
of
"diffuse"
sort
patriotic
spreading
reports

versla findu XIIIesicle,et surtout


"On voitse rpandre
teroftheXlllthcentury:
orient
surtout
versla
Toulouse
danslesmilieux
unesortede catharisme
diffus,
cultivs,
morelle,
catholiques
quedesanticlricaux."
quigagne sa causeaussibiendesrformistes
87Note
werealsotransdeduobus
thatkeyideasfrom
Jeande Lugio'sLiber
prinpiis
tract
circulated
"themostwidely
whowrote
Rainerius
mitted
Sacconi,
bytheDominican
and Evans1969(op.cit.,above,
Wakefield
on theCatharsof thethirteenth
century".
survive.
ofthetract
thatmorethanfifty
n. 11),329and746,n. 1, report
manuscripts
88Published
Thouzellier
underthetitleUneSomme
witha commentary
byChristine
deDurand
deHuesca
Manicheos
leLiber
Contra
Anti-Cathare:
, Louvain1964.
89LibercontraManicheos,
1964(op.cit.,above,n. 88),221: Nulla
ed. Thouzellier
factaestsineDeo necprovelincorporea,
corporea
parvanecmagna,
ergosubstantia
nonnichilessepotest.
Cui semel
essenichil.
Quod enimsemelestaliquid,
priepotest
etnovatessesuum.Quodquevalet
nonesselicebit,
sedmutt
faciem
essedatur
nunquam
nichil."
nondicas,kathare,
tangi,

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

135

Durand correctly
mutability,
change
appreciatesthatthe Catharsinterpret
and corruptionas hallmarksof the evil principle,as evidence of the relative nihilitas
of visiblephenomena.90Durand's argumentis thateven perishable and corruptibleentitiesare not "nothing,"since a thingeitheris
a substanceor is not. Whateverhas being- whatever,in particular,can
be touched- is not "more or less" something,but is something,and canbe properlydescribedas "nothing."In short,what Durand
not therefore
denies,is thatsubstanceadmitsdegrees.Durand moreoverseemsto understand that denyinga "more or less" to substancestrikesat the heart of
Cathar teaching,since the Cathar claim is preciselythatperishablephe- the resultof a cosmic
nomena are a mixtureof being and non-being
and
, fragmented
fall,afterGod's celestialcreationwas invaded by nihilitas
time
and
death.
corruptedby alteration,
Durand's Cathar opponentswould thuspresumablyhave answeredhim
that perishablephenomena inquantum
taleshave so littlesubstance,and
are so bereftof ontologicaltruth,so degradedcomparedto God's original
in
creation,thattheymay as well be nihil.And since God is all-powerful
is
but
no
evil
to
what
has
to
all
that
he
can
evil,
good
making
oppose
do to rescue his fallencreaturesis to increasetheirspiritualsubstanceso
that theyhave "enough" spiritualsubstanceto sufferevil withoutdoing
evilin return,and thusbe restoredto eternallife.The notionthatspiritual
melhorament
requiresGod to increase the soul's essence is fundamentalto
Catharism,since only throughan additionof spiritualsubstanceis man's
soul "made new" and awakened fromamnesia and liftedfromthe darkness of evil. The soul's degree of substantialdignityis inverselyrelated
to its admixtureof nihilitas
: the "greater"or "higher"the soul, the freer
it is fromnegationand despair,and the betterdisposed to effectacts of
grace.As Jean de Lugio explains,moral freedom,forthe Cathars,consists
in the power notto sin, ratherthan in the power to sin.91The person in
90See, for
theanonymous
entitled
Breuis
summula
contra
herrares
example,
compilation
notatos
to a Franciscan
friar
in Wakefield
herecorum
circa1250-60,
and Evans
assigned
1969[op.rit.,
mutable
arenotfrom
above,n. 11),354-5:"Theysay.. . thatthings
God;
thatnothe butthedevilcreated
thesebodies.TheysaythatthegoodGoddidnotand
doesnotmakeanything
ofa perishable
nature.
TheysaythatthegoodGod doesnot
givelifeto andkillbodies;he onlygiveslife,He doesnotkill.The evilone,however,
kills."
91Whichis no "power"
at all buta falseillusion
a mimicry,
a snare.See
ofpower,
Liber
deduobus
ed.Thouzellier
1973(op.rit
., above,n. 26),181-203;
JeandeLugio,
principiis,
alsotheprayer
recited
underBlibaste's
citedbyRoch1957
bysimple
croyants
guidance,
deJacques
., above,n. 9), II, 96-7from
Fourniers
(op.rit
JeanDuvernoy,
d'Inquisition
Registre
dePamiers
Toulouse1965,II, 461-2:"e pertalquarli diapble
eramot
uque
(1318-1325),
faisque lesprometa
male be."

18:33:10 PM

136

ANNEDAVENPORT

whom "Christmanifestshimself"is freeto act withtrue charity:to love


his enemiesand pray forthosewho persecutehim.92Good Christianson
theirway to perfectionthus ask theirheavenlyfatherto increase their
souls daily with charity,which is theirand God's very substance.93
Or,
:
as Olivi succincdyrendersthisidea in his preghiera
es in meet adauge.
Confirma
hoc,Deus,quodoperatus
We will now see that Giles of Rome, examiningOlivi's errorsanew in
1311, indirectlyconfirmsthe Cathar characterof Olivi's view on subit along the same linesas Durand.94Moreover,
stantialincreaseby refuting
that existsbetween
Giles quite inadvertendyremindsus of the affinity
Olivi's censored doctrineand a certainAugustinianism.
Aftercitingthe censored articleas it appears in the Letter
of theSeven
Seals,Giles writes:
tothePhilosopher
We canonlymarvel
at thosewhospeakthisway.Foraccording
in beingoncewhatit is (essentia
in theMetaphysics
, theessenceofa thingconsists
thatthe
ofsix,saying
andhe givestheexample
cuiuslibet
reiconsistit
inessesemel)]95
we
butsixtaken
once.Fromthis,
orsubstance
ofsixis notthree
essence
plusthree,
and
in beingindivisibly
of a thingconsists
haveit thattheessenceor substance
etpunctuali).96
(inesseindivisibli
punctually
Giles correctlyconnects Olivi's censored article to Olivi's wider philosophical claim that substancesgenerallyadmit degrees a philosophical
92Rainerius
c. 1250,reports
thattheCathars
Sacconi,
rejected
punishcapital
writing
ment(seeWakefield
andEvans1969(op.cit.
, above,n. 11),330;as doestheanonymous
and
errores
notatos
hereticorum
Brevis
summula
contra
tobe Franciscan)
(seeWakefield
(presumed
de
I ofhisQuaestiones
Evans1969(op.cit.,above,n. 11),361).Notealsothatin Quaestio
andSimoncioli
1964(op.cit.,
above,n.9),419,Oliviadopts
, ed.Emmen
Perfectione
Evangelica
ofauto-deterinhiscaseas a progressive
viewed
a similar
aboutfreedom,
recovery
position
et vivacitate
"Si etiamcumsumma
mination.
ofthewill,Oliviwrites:
agiltate
Speaking
liber."
nonessetperfecte
omniain Deumnonordinaret,
93SeeA Gloss
andEvans1969(op.cit.,
Lord's
translated
onthe
above,
byWakefield
prayer
of"Giveus todayourdaily
618-9fortheCatharinterpretation
n. 11),607-30,
especially
bread."
94See Amoros
1934(op.cit.,above,n. 30).
95
whichreads"consistit
to emendAmoros'
text,
JohnMurdoch's
suggestion
Adopting
thispassage
butin reality
in semel."Amoros
givesMet.BookVII, text20 as reference,
cum
Averrois
Commentariis
butinAristotelis
inMet.BookV, c. 14,1020b6-8;
is found
,
Opera
I
vol.VIII, 169-72,
Veniceedition],
ofthe1562-1574
am Main1964[reprint
Franfurt
havenotfound
thisstatement.
96See Aegidii
P. I. Olivi
o Doctrinae
Romani
, ed,Amoros1934(op.cit.,above,
Impugnati
de sicloquentibus.
n. 30),448:"Dicendum
Nam,secundum
Philosophum,
quodmiramur
de
in (esse)semel;et ponitexemplum
reiconsistit
in Metaphyska
cuiuslibet
sua,essentia
velsubstantia
sex,dicensquodessentia
ipsiussexnonesttreset tres,sedsemelsex.Ex
inesseindireiconsistit
velsubstantia
cuiuslibet
haberi
quodessentia
potest
quibusverbis
etpunctuali."
visibli

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

137

claim that he, Giles, thoroughlyrejectson Aristoteliangrounds:dicimus


. Like Aristotleand Durand,
substantiae
susdpere
magisetminus
ergononcompetere
Giles insiststhatbeinga substanceis an either/oraffair.And likeThomas,
Giles upholds the positionthat formsper se do not vary by more and
less: onlymaterialconditionsvary.Even in the special case of qualitative
forms,where degrees can be admittedwith regard to existence(<quantum
ad esse),no degreemustbe admittedin the essence (<quantum
ad essentiam).97
A fortiori,
degreeswill not be admittedin the case of substantialforms
with regardeitherto essence or to existence.To say thereforethat the
substanceof the human soul increasesthroughgrace is a philosophical
absurdity:
whenit is saidthatthesoulincreases
theincrease
Therefore
of
essentially
through
sincetherational
soul,ofwhichwe speak,is a certain
graceor in glory:
specific
whichmanbelongs
to hisspecies,
to saythatthissoulincreases
substance
through
or thatitsnatural
or substantial
is notintelligible.98
essentially
beingincreases,
To bolsterthisconclusion,Giles invokesthe same passage fromMetaphysics
VIII thatOlivi citesagainsthimself:99
speciesare likenumbers,theychange
theirnatureif increased:
We can indeedadducethePhilosopher's
statement
thatforms
are likenumbers.
be increased
Therefore
cannot
without
itsnumeric
justas a number
varying
species,
so theessence
ofanygivenform
cannotbe increased
without
itsform.
changing
in itsessencethrough
Therefore
ifthesoulis augmented
ofgraceor in
increase
itwillno longer
be ofthesamespeciesas itself,
whichis a ridiculous
glory,
thing
tosay.100
97See Aegidii
Romani
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
, ed,Amoros1934(op.cit
., above,
Impugnatio
n. 30),448:"Potest
enimcontingere
accidentales
quodforme
suspiciant
magiset minus
ad essentiam,
ad esse,nonautemquantum
utid quodestcalorvelessentia
caloquantum
rishabetintensius
esseinmateria
sicca,queestmagisdisposita,
hmida,
quaminmateria
itadisposita
ad calorem.
que nonestmateria
Propter
quodcalorigneus
qui estin materiasicca,que estmateria
ita
hmida,
magisdisposita
quammateria
que nonestmateria
ad calorem,
estintensior
hmida.
Non
disposita
quamcaloraereusqui estin materia
dabimus
accidentalibus
ad intensionem
velremissionem,
vel
ergoetiaminformis
quantum
veldiminutionem,
ad huiusmodi
sedin
forme,
quantum
augmentum
gradusin essentia
esse."Gilesaddsthatin thosecaseswhere"essence"
indicates
notone,butmanyforms,
it is possible
to speakofincrease
anddecrease:
essettalisessentia
"nisiforte
quodnon
diceret
unamformam,
sedpluresformas;
namnonsolumunumanimalestsaniusalio,
sedetiamunasanitas
animalis
estmaiorsanitate
alia."
98See Aegidii
Romani
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
, ed,Amoros1934(op.cit.,above,
Impugnatio
n. 30),448: "Cumergodicitur
quodin augmento
gratieet in augmento
glorieanima
cumanimarationalis,
essentialiter
de qua loquimur,
sitquedamsubstantia
augmentatur,
inspecie,
inessentia
velquod
specifica
perquamhomoreponitur
quodipsaaugmentetur
in suoessenaturali
sivesubstantiali
nonestintelligibile."
augmentetur
99Met.VIII, 1043b321044a14:seefootnote
51,above.
100See
Romani
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
, ed,Amoros1934(op.cit.,above,
Aegidii
Impugnatio

18:33:10 PM

138

ANNEDAVENPORT

As we saw, Olivi argues that Aristotlein thispassage speaks about subratherthan secundum
rem.mBut suppose this
stancessecundum
viamlogicam
is not Aristotle'smeaning? Olivi's response revealsjust how carnal he
thinksdenyingGos power to increase the soul's substancereallyis:
in theCategories
thusspeakslogically
butsupposing
thatthisis
Aristotle
(vialogica);
tobelieve
hismeaning,
Aristotle
isnottheGodofourintellect
whom
weareobliged
- as do thosewhoareoftheseedofAntichrist.102
likesomeinfallible
rule
We note that Olivi's approach to the philosophicalanalysisof substances
exemplifieshis own guidelineswith regard to selectiveappropriationof
rulesforrationaldiscoursemustbe rigorously
pagan philosophy:Aristotle's
observed,but thephilosophicalcontentof his workmustnot be uncritically
adopted, since, as Olivi passionatelyputs it, "the principlesof truthare
supremelyspiritualand abstract,and the carnal man cannot grasp them,
ratherthansensual."103
becausediscernment
or experienceof themis spiritual
The duty of spiritualman is to formallyarticulatethese higherprinciples, thusgivingriseto a more abstractand veridicalscience.Presumably,
is a sample of this
Olivi's doctrinethat substantiae
magiset minussuscipiunt
more abstractand more veridicalscience, since it makes philosophical
- what Olivi calls "diversi
room for man's varyingmetaphysicalfortunes
."
et animaram
tas statusnostrorum
corporum
etiamad hocidemadducere
illudverbum
n. 30),448:"Possumus
Philosophi,
quodforme
in numero
nisivarietur
suntsicutnumeri.
fieri
Sicutergononpotest
species
augmentum
nisivarietur
forme
fieri
inessentia
sicnonpotest
numeri,
species
cuiuscumque
augmentum
sicaugmentum
velglorie,
forme.
Si ergoanimaessentialiter
peraugmentum
grafie
augeretur
dicere."
nonessetin eademspeciecumse ipsa,quodestridiculum
101
SententiaXXIIofQuaestiones
secundum
librum
inQuaestio
Thusinhissolutio
obiectorum
super
which
thefirst
ed.Jansen
1922(op.cit.,
rum}
above,n. 15),I, 409,Olivianswers
objection,
dicendum
incontrarium
1044a14,as follows:
"Adprimum
citesMet.VIII, 1043b32igitur
in
aequaliter
participants,
quiatuncnonattenditur
logicaliter
acceptae
quoddefinitiones
Veritas
earum."
sedsolumabsoluta
eisintensio
velremissio
earundem
differentiarum,
102Quaestio
secundum
librum
Sententiarum
XXIIofQuaestiones
, ed.Jansen1922(op.cit.,
super
et posito
via logicali;
in Praedicamentis
enimAristoteles
above,n. 15),I, 410: "Loquitur
cuicredere
nonestipseDeusintellectus
nostri
regulae
tanquam
quodipsehocsensisset,
Burr1971
Seefurther
illiquisuntde semine
Antichristi."
sicutfaciunt
inerrabili
teneamur,
fromOlivi's
op.at.,above,n. 75), 15-29.In thisstudy,
p. 26, Burrcitesthefollowing
ofthe
theexperience
from
deperfectone
"Aristotle
tookhisprinciples
Quaestiones
evangelica:
elements
ofthisworldandthusconsidered
sensesor from
thesensible
impossible
simply
be
. . . cannot
. . . Buttheloverofpoverty
whatever
to senseexperience
seemed
contrary
to be nothing."
ofthisworld,
forhe counts
all temporal
deceived
things
bytheelements
havesaiditanydifferently.
wouldhardly
Jeande LugioandBlibaste
103See P. Ferdinandus
tractatus
'Deperlegendis
Fr.Petri
Olivi
Delorme,
Philosophorum
Joannis
enimveritatis
in:Antonianum,
16 (1941),32-44,especially
libris'
spirip. 38: "principia
homononpotuit
tualissima
suntet abstractssima,
quiaeorum
percipere,
quae animalis
sedpotius
examinatio
seuexperientia
nonestsensualis,
spiritualis."

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOW


OF MONTSGUR

139

Olivi's commitmentto this doctrine,with or withoutAristotle,is intiwhich


matelyconnectedto one of his best acknowledgedcontributions,
is to restoreself-sufficiency
to human knowledge.104
Since, accordingto
Olivi's analysis,the supreme form of the soul, namely the will, really
acquiresnew powerthroughbeing relatedto Christ'sgrace,it followsthat
spiritualman not only acts autonomouslyin framingscientificdoctrines,
but indeed moreautonomouslythan carnal man, who is relatively"asleep"
comparedto spiritualman. The new epistemologicalautonomyand dignitythat Olivi attributesto man stem directlyfromhis Cathar-likedoctrinethat the human will reallyacquires throughgrace new "parts" of
its essentialpower and freedom.If Olivi rejectsthe need forpassive illumination,it is preciselybecause he substitutesfor this the more Occitan
theorythat the will itselfis actually"increased."105
If Olivi has a vested interestin complyingwith Aristotlein logical
matters,Giles in turnhas a vested interestin complyingwithAugustine
in spiritualmatters.As Ren Nelli points out, the Cathar teachingthat
"the good God" increasesspiritualsubstancesto rescue themfromnothIn Confessions
ingnessfindsa secretecho in certainAugustininpassages.106
Book VII, forexample,Augustinesays that the soul "decreases" through
sin, but "grows" throughgrace, as though receivingspiritualfood that
graduallymakesit more deiform.107
Wresding,unaware,withAugustine's
debt to variousgnostictraditions,Giles concedes that thereis "a way to
give Olivi's censored article a good meaning." Indeed whereas virtues
perfectthe soul's powers,grace and gloryperfectthe soul's veryessence.108
104
See Bettoni
1959(op.cit.,above,n. 10),508:"La novit
chelo caratterprincipale
izzadifronte
antecedente
enmiparere,
nelfatto
chel'Oliviriduce
consisto,
all'agostinismo
notevolmente
la necessit
del concorso
divinonelleoperazioni
naturali
dellecreature
e
tendea restuire
ad esseun'autosufficienza
operativa
completa."
Bettoni
tracesOlivi'sinnovation
to theinfluence
ofAristotle:
"Conci il
wrongly
Maestro
di aversubito
dimostra
l'influenza
dell'aristotelismo."
provenzale
profondamente
On thecontrary!
Oliviblamesno onemorethanAristotle
forthedoctrine
thatthewill
is passively
movedbytheobjectpresented
to it bytheintellect.
See Quaestio
II ofhis
De perfectione
1964[op.t.,above,n. 9),
Quaestiones
, ed. EmmenandSimoncioli
evangelica
114: "objectum
autemperintellectum
movet
voluntatem,
praesentatum
perse et directe
secundum
III De Anima,
in fine."(c. 10,433a9-433b30).
Aristotelem,
106
Nelli1972(iop
. cit.,above,n. 25), 164.See alsoRoch1957[op.cit.,above,n. 9),
on "SaintAugustin
et lesmanichens
de sontemps."
I, 153-82,
BookVII, c. X(16),ed. Cambridge,
Mass.-London
(Loeb):"Inveni
longemeessea
te in regione
audirem
vocemtuamde excelso:"cibussum
dissimilitudinis,
tamquam
cresceet manducabis
me.Nec tu mein te mutabis
sicutcibumcarnistuae,
grandium:
sedtumutaberis
in me."Also:"proiniquitate
erudisti
hominem
et tabescere
fecisti
sicut
araneam
animam
meam."
108
Romani
Doctrinae
P. /. Olivi,
ed.Amors
1934(op.cit.,above,n. 30),
Aegidii
Impugnatio

18:33:10 PM

140

ANNEDAVENPORT

This is the meaning,Giles says,of CorinthiansXV, 10- "ThroughGod's


byJean de
grace I am what I am" a passage also cited,coincidentally,
Lugio to argue thatifwe are able to convertfromevil and become God's
servants,this is only because God "adds" to our souls.109Giles neutralizes the thornyquestion of the soul's "increase" by graftingAugustine
onto Aristotleas follows:
we obtainthrough
IndeedwhatI am,i.e. whatwe are supernaturally,
gracethat
ofgrace.
whichis theconsummation
or through
thesoul'sessence,
perfects
glory,
thatare
toAugustine
in De Trnitate
Andsinceaccording
VI, c. 8, "In thosethings
andsincegraceandglory
notlargebecauseofbulk,to be greater
is tobe better";
ofthesoul,andsincetheveryessence
ofthesoulis made
arein theveryessence
theveryessenceof thesoulcan be saidto be
better
graceand glory,
through
increased
graceandglory.110
through
Giles somewhatevasivelyimpliesthat eitherwhat is increasedis distinct
fromthe essence, or that essence is "increased" only in a metaphorical
sense. Untroubledby the ambiguityof his analysis,Giles concludesthat,
despitethispossibleAugustiningloss,Olivi is not exonerated,since what
of the soul is increased- not thatits
he wronglyclaims is that the nature
lifeis perfected:
wenonetheless
do notsaveit
thatweappeartosavethisarticle,
however,
Granted,
ofthesoul,and
thatgraceandglory
areintheessence
Forindeed,
literally.
granted
ofthesoulis madebetitis possible
to saythattheessence
that,on thisaccount,
is
teror increased
to be better
(forin suchthings
through
graceor through
glory
ornature
ofthesoulcan
thisthattheessence
tobe greater),
itdoesnotfollow
from
in itsessential
in an essential
be saidto be increased
sense,i.e.,to be increased
Thus
in
its
or
natural
but
rather
or
being.
grace-bestowed
being
supernatural,
being,
thatthesoulis essentially
increased
thearticle
thatasserts
through
graceor glory,
is false.111
utinhoc
ad bonum
si volumus
449:"Possumus
reducere,
tamen,
aliquomodoarticulum
essentiam
et gloriaperficiunt
et gloriam
et virtutes,
deturgratiainter
que gratia
gratiam
sedvirtutes
animae,
perficiunt
potentias."
109
ed. Thouzellier
theliberdeduobus
As citedpreviously
prindpiis,
(above,n. 26) from
and252("aliquid
cit.,above,n. 21),240("additur")
addere").
(op.
1,0Aegidii
1934(op.cit.,above,n. 30),
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
Romani
, ed.Amoros
Impugnatio
a gratiaque
habemus
449: "Id enimquodsum,id est,id quodsumussupernaturaliter,
et quiasecundum
vela gloriaque estipsagratia
essentiam
consummata,
anime,
perficit
hocestessemaius
VI De Trnitate,
cap.8: "Inhiisquenonmolemagnasunt,
Augustinum,
etipsaessenCumergogratia
etgloriasintinipsaessentia
anime,
quodestessemelius."
diciauganimepotest
velpergloriam,
tiaanimesitmeliorata
ipsaessentia
pergratiam
velpergloriam."
mentata
per
gratiam
1,1Aegidii
1934(op.cit.,above,n. 30),
Doctrinae
P. I. Olivi
Romani
, ed.Amoros
Impugnado
adhuc
multum
accedere
ad salvandum
videamur
449: "Sed licetsic dicendo
articulum,
nonsalvamus
verba;namlicetgratiaet gloriasintin essentia
propria
ipsumsecundum
vel
meliorata
velaugmentata
animeex hocdicatur
anime,et ipsaessentia
pergratiam
hoc
non
tamen
est
esse
maius
esse
in
talibus
idem
melius,
per
quod
pergloriam,
quia
vel
id est,inesseessentiali
diciaugmentata
velnatura
animepoterit
essentia
essentialiter,

18:33:10 PM

PETEROLIVIIN THE SHADOWOF MONTSGUR

141

Giles' solutionthusconsistsin exploitinga classicessentia/


essedistinction.
he
the
soul's
which
he equates
between
"nature,"
Specifically, distinguishes
withthe indivisible
substance
and
/punctual
positedby Aristotle, the soul's
- and allows
"lifeof grace,"whichhe equates withAugustininperfection
to vary by degree, since it involves,at least metaphorically,a certain
intensivemagnitudesusceptibleof being increasedthroughgrace. As we
solution:"human form"taken indivisiblyis
saw, Olivi offersa different
a mere figureof speech, while human formtaken secundum
remvaries in
to
from
one
individual
the
next
on
far or how
how
degree
depending
close thisindividualis fromthe statusof alterChristus.
Olivi's distinction
between"man" consideredlogiceand human substanceconsideredsecun- a distinctionthat Olivi
dumrem
creativelyadds to Aristotle allows him
to complywith Aristotle'sdiscourse,but also to framewith this a genuinelyphilosophicaltheoryof man's metaphysical"latitude."In particular,
it allowshim to characterizeman's Christ-nature
philosophicallyas a formallyhigher,more excellentnaturethan man's cripplednature.In short,
Olivi formally
translatesintoscholasticlanguage a doctrinehe shareswith
the Cathars and with Augustine,namely the doctrinethat grace gradually feeds and increasesthe soul, makingit more and more deiform
tu mutaberis
in meU2 and that Christ is "a certain great excellence of
human nature- magnaquadamnaturae
humanae
excellentia."U3
In the process of translatinghis esotericbeliefsinto the language of
philosophy,Olivi initiatesa second significant
departure,also connected
withman's dignityas an epistemologie
subject.Olivi's innovativedistinction
betweenwhat is true logiceand what is true secundum
remrendersGiles'
essentia/
in
essedistinction
this
sensitive
case, but, more imporsuperfluous
it
calls
fresh
in
a
attention
to
the
hiatusthatseparates
tantly,
generalway
and things:the factthatwe knowhow to speak about things
word-systems
and unambiguouslydoes not implythatwe know what they
consistently
are secundum
rem.A generationafterOlivi, William of Ockham will systematicallyanalyse this hiatus,with broad repercussionson the conduct
of philosophicalinquiry.
in essenaturali,
sedin essesupernaturali
et gratuito,
ut etiamhocmodofalsus
sitarticulusasserens
velpergloriam
animam
essentialiter
etc."
per
gratiam
augmentan
1,2See Confessions
107.
, BookVII, c. x, citedabovein footnote
113
sentiebam
de domino
, VII,c. xix(25):"Egoveroaliudputabam
Confessions
tantumque
Christo
deexcellentis
viro..." Then:"Totum
inChristo
hominem
meo,quantum
sapientiae
noncorpus
tantum
autcumcorpore
hominis
sinemente
sedipsum
agnoscebam:
animum,
nonpersona
veritatis
hominem,
(he saysthatthisis theManichean
view),sed magna
naturae
humanae
etperfectiore
excellentia
ceteris
quadam
participatione
sapientiae
praeferri
arbitrabar."

18:33:10 PM

142

ANNEDAVENPORT

What we learn fromexaminingthe contextof Olivi's censoredarticle


is thatthe rationalpursuitof a distinctly
Franciscanspirituality
prompted
at
delBe,
philosophicalinitiativesaimed formalizingan esotericentendensa
based, like Catharism,on a complex and highlymetaphysicalversionof
imitatio
,114Whetherin the long run Olivi's philosophicalinitiatives
Christi
served to defendCatholic Europe or instead to bringabout a new and
more complexspiritual"catholicity"remainsto be determined.Soon after
Olivi's death, while the Franciscan MinisterGeneral John of Murrho
marshelledFranciscan doctors to defend Papal hierocracyin Paris, the
"Poor Brethrenof Penitenceof the Third Order of St. Francis"whom he
foughtto suppressin Languedoc spread Olivi's spiritualteachingto the
fourcornersof Europe.115In the XVth century,FranciscanObservance
- and littleto
The
will owe much to Olivi's teaching
John of Murrho's.116
role played by the more authenticallyspiritualaspirationsof Franciscan
scrutinized.
Observancein the genesisof modernsciencemustbe carefully
to Piero della
Observantmilieux
seem to have been pivotalin transmitting
Francesca,Luca Pacioli,JohannesKepler,Marin Mersenne,Descartesand
Blaise Pascal, some versionor otherof the gnosticidea- so close to Plato,
- that we are "in the world,but not of the world":
so alien to Aristotle
car nosno emdel monnil mones de nos.117
Cambridge,Mass.
HarvardUniversity
114See,e.g.Willibrord
aveclemouvement
d'Assise
de Paris,Rapports
desaint
Franois
spirituel
XII (1962),139:"Un trait
nouveau?
duXII*sicle
, in:Etudesfranciscaines,
[. . .] Ce qu'il
sinonde nouveau,
du moinsde plusprcis,
sembleajouter
(i.e.SaintFranois
d'Assise)
sur
mistrsfortement
leurleonspirituelle,
de plusaudacieux,
celaparaittrel'accent
withwhatRenNellisays
assiduedeJsus-Christ."
d'uneimitation
Compare
l'exigence
cathare.
in: Le phnomne
cathare"
dansla mtaphysique
aboutthe"rlede Jsus-Christ
etmorales
, Toulouse1964,43-8.
Perspectives
philosophiques
1,5See Bernard
ed. Clestin
haereticae
Douais,Paris
Gui,Practica
prcivitatis,
inquisitionis
ofJohnofMurrho's
1965(op.t., above,n. 91). On thecontext
1886;andDuvernoy
duBx.JeanDunsScoten1305, in:Archivm
La Matrise
see AndrCallebaut,
strategies,
these
between
Franciscanum
21 (1928),206-39.On therelationship
historicum,
persecuted
ofNa
andLouisaBurnham's
andOlivi'steaching,
see DavidBurr'sarticle
study
beguini
1298-1998
Pierre
deJeanOlivi:
Actes
duColloque
International
ProusBonetaintheforthcoming
heldin Narbonne,
France,11-15Mars1998.
116See Livarius
Constantienses
De Relatione
inter
Obsewantium
Querimonias
(1415)et
liger,
9 (1916),3-41.
Franciscanum
libertini
Casalensis
historicum,
Quoddam
, in:Archivm
Scriptum
1,7"Forwearenotoftheworld
forsimple
is notofus."Froma prayer
andtheworld
in Duvernoy
and preserved
1965(op.cit
believers
communicated
., above,
byBlibaste
outthattheterm
1976(op.at.,above,n. 20) 172,n. 5 points
n. 91),II, 461-2.Duvernoy
"bonshommes
" was
MarinMersenne.
e.g.to Father
eventually
appliedto theMinims,

18:33:10 PM

Ockhamon Part and Whole

RICHARD CROSS

materialsubstancesare comOn the standardAristotelian


understanding,
positesof matterand form.Matter and formare not, on thisview, the
onlypartsintowhicha materialsubstancecan be analysed.Materialsubstances have, for example, integralparts too. (Material substancesare
bodies, and no body lacks integralparts.) But the possessionof integral
partsis, forthe Aristotelian,
fullyexplainedby the compositionof matter
and form.Matterand formare the explanatorily
basic partsof a substance.
For a medievalAristotelian,
the
most
then,
interesting
questionabout the
the
a
between
of
substance
and
the
whole substance
relationship
parts
concernsthe relationshipbetweenthe matterand formof the substance,
on the one hand, and the substanceitself,on the other.Ockham sometimesasks- followingthe lead of his eminentpredecessor,Duns Scotuswhat,if anything,a whole adds to its parts; whether,in otherwords,a
wholeis something
overand above the sum of itsparts.The partsOckham
has in mind,as a good Aristotelian,are matterand form.So the question Ockham asks is whethera compositeof matterand formis more
thanjust the sum of matterand form.1
1 I use thefollowing
editions
and abbreviations
here.Aquinas,
Summa
contra
Gentiles
Marcetal3 vols.(TurinandRome:Marietti,
Summa
(= ScG),ed.Petrus
1961-7);
Theologiae
3 vols.(Turinand Rome:Marietti,
(= 57"),ed. PetrusCaramello,
1952-6);Aristotle,
Commentarla
inlibros
Averroes,
(= Metaph.)
(standard
editions);
magna
Metaphysica
Physicorum
cum
Aristotelis
Averrois
Commentarla
1550);Duns
, 11 vols.(Venice,
(= InPh.),inAristotelis
Opera
inScotus,
Ordinatio
Omnia
12vols.(Lyons,
Scotus,
, ed.LukeWadding,
(= Ord.),
Opera
1639);
William
ofOckham,
Varim
inWilliam
ofOckham,
Quaestiones
(= Qu.Var.),
Opera
Theologica,
ed. Iuvenalis
Laloretal.,10vols.(StBonaventure,
NY: St Bonaventure
Press,
University
in OTh;Scriptum/
inlibros
Sententiarum
(= OTh);Quodlibeta
1967-86)
(= Quod.),
Quaestiones
Septem
in OTh;Summulae
Naturalis
, ed.
(= In Sent.),
(= Sum.Ph.),in Opera
Philosophiae
Philosophica
Iuvenalis
Laloretal.,7 vols.(StBonaventure,
NY: St Bonaventure
Press,1974University
ofWare,In Sententias
AdamWodeham,
Lectura
Secunda
88) (= 0/%);William
(= In Sent.);
NY: St Bonaventure
(= Lect
.),ed. RegaWoodandGedeonGi,3 vols.(StBonaventure,
thatbookstwoto fourofOckham's
Sentence
commenUniversity,
1990).I am assuming
datefrom
thathisSumma
datesfrom
andthatbookone
1317-19,
1319-21,
tary
Philosophiae
of Ockham's
Sentence
datesfrom1321-3.The dateof thecentral
textI
commentary
- question
- is unknown,
examine
Variae
it
six,article
two,ofOckham's
Quaestiones
though
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

Vivarium
37,2

18:33:18 PM

144

RICHARD
GROSS

Aristotelianaccounts of matter are, of course, ambiguous. Many


- and
Aristotelians
perhaps even Aristotlehimself believe that the ultimate correlateof formis primematter:a more or less bare substratein
potencyto any formwhatsoever.All the thinkersI considerhere accept
thatprimemattershould be includedamong the componentsof a material substance.But I describeprimematteras 'more or less' bare because
I look at in detailhere- Duns Scotusand Williamof Ockhamthethinkers
both want to dissociateprime matterfrompure potency.Prime matter,
for these thinkers,has some propertiesall its own, all the time- though
none of these propertiesis in any way incompatiblewithany substantial
form.Prime matterhas to have some such properties,accordingto the
thinkersI examinehere,otherwiseit could not remainconstantover substantialchange,and thuscould not performthe mostcentralrole ascribed
to it in Aristotelianphysics.2
On this sort of view, prime matterhas some propertiesall its own.
Accordingto the thinkersI examinehere,form,too, shouldbe thoughtof
as some sortof individualobject withits own properties.It is, minimally,
an individualizedcollectionof a substance'snecessarystatesor properties,where such a collectionshould be understooditselfto have certain
propertiesof its own. It is in virtuef a form'shavingthe propertiesthat
it has that its substancehas the propertiesthat the substancehas.3
So Ockham's questionhas to do withthe unityof two objects- matter
and form.The questionis whetheror not a compositeof thesetwo objects
is itselfa furtherobject, numericallydistinctfromthe sum of its two
parts.As we shall see, Ockham's replyis negative.And thisreplyimmediatelyraises certainproblems.For thereare at least two views that on
the face of it a medieval Aristotelianwould want to avoid here. One is
of matterand form.
to reduce a materialsubstanceto a mere aggregate
The other is to reduce a material substance to some sort of accidental
unity.Whatever a materialsubstance is or is not, its unitycannot be
I shall
towhich
itrefers.
Sentence
bookfourofOckham's
commentary,
certainly
post-dates
comone
of
the
Sentence
as
book
below
that
it
be
of
should
post-dating
thought
argue
ofas
is usually
notbymuch,sinceOckham
too- though
thought
mentary
presumably
all hisnon-political
by1324.
writings
having
completed
1 ror
see Richard
o! primematter,
bcotuson theactuality
Cross,lherhystcs
oj Duns
cited
Vision
: TheScientific
Context
Scotus
1998,14-23,andthetexts
, Oxford
ofa Theological
Ockham
McCordAdams,William
forOckham,
see Marilyn
, 2 vols.,NotreDame,
there;
citedthere.
Ind.1987,II, 639-46,andthetexts
3 ForScotuson thisquestion,
seeGross1998(op.at
., above,n. 2),34-41,andthetexts
seeAndrGoddu,ThePhysics
forOckham,
citedthere;
, Leiden/Kln
ofOckham
ofWilliam
citedthere.
andthetexts
1984,99-101,

18:33:18 PM

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

145

merelythe unityof an accidentalwhole. But, while avoiding these two


views, Ockham does not want to have to commithimselfto the claim
that a materialsubstanceis somethingover and above its two parts. So
thereis a sense in which Ockham's account of the issue is reductionistic:
a whole materialsubstanceis reducibleto the sum of its parts (matter
and form),even thoughit is neitheran aggregateof these parts nor an
accidentalwhole. As I shall tryto show, Ockham's theoryyieldsa way
of distinguishing
thesevarioussortsof whole (aggregative,
accidental,and
substantial).4
The sort of view that Ockham wants to defend was not originalto
him.But theview had, priorto Ockham's defenceof it,receivedconsiderable criticismfromScotus. Ockham quotes Scotus's arguments,tryingto
defendhis reductionistic
account againstthese attacks.In what follows,I
shall brieflydescribe the Scotistview and its antecedents(sectionone),
and thenlook in detail at Ockham's account,focusingfirston his theory
of substance(sectiontwo),and secondlyon the account of propertiesthat
he believeshis theoryto entail(sectionthree).In the course of this,I will
describehis various attemptsto defeatScotus's objections.5
I
Scotus offersa seriesof argumentsin favourof the view that a material
substanceis an object over and above its parts and the relationbetween
them.The partsavailable on Scotus's account are matter,form,and the
relationbetween them. (Scotus allows that the relationcan count as a
partherebecause he believesthatrelationsare things,analogousto matter
4 Fora discussion
ofvarious
sortsofunity
in Ockham,
see Gottfried
Wilhelm
Martin,
vonOckham,
: Untersuchungen
derOrdnung^
Berlin1949,234-43.
zurOntologie
5 Fora brief
discussion
oftheissueI examine
in detailhere,seeAdams1987(<
.,
op.cit
AdamsnorMartin
above,n. 2),II, 662-7.Neither
(seetheprevious
note)goesintoany
detailaboutOckham's
ofmaterial
distinctive
which
I examine
substance
here;neitheory
theextent
ther
do they
realize
towhich
Ockham's
distinctive
(andvery
unexpected)
theory
ofthesubjects
ofvarious
sortsaccidents
in Adams,
II, 662-3)is driven
(discussed
briefly
inhistheory
ofsubstance.
insection
concerns
thistheory
three
byprior
(I discuss
below.)
- perhaps
The reasonis thatwriters
on Ockhamhavefailed
becauseofformerly
wide- topayanyattention
doubts
aboutitsauthenticity
to thecrucial
textin Ockham
spread
in detail:namely,
wheretheseissuesareall discussed
Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh
, VIII, 207-19).
Fortheauthenticity
ofthisphilosophically
seetheeditorial
introduction
text,
sophisticated
to Qu.Var.(Ockham,
OTh
thistext,
itis impossible
toseetheextent
, VIII, 16*).Without
andprecise
nature
ofOckham's
withScotus;
inparticular,
itis hardto see
disagreement
that(as I showin partthree
ofthispaper)Ockham's
withScotusrelieson his
argument
ofScotus's
central
anti-reductionistic
unequivocal
acceptance
principle.

18:33:18 PM

146

RICHARDGROSS

and form.6As we shall see, Ockham (at least in the textI focuson here)
does not share thisbelief.For him,the onlypossiblepartsof a composite
substanceare matterand form.We need to keep thisin mindto understand
what follows.)Scotus's view is that a materialsubstanceis numerically
distinctfromthe union of its parts.7His most importantarguments
- all
which I discussin a moment
springfroma crucial centralpremiss:
(1) If a substancex has a propertythat does not inhere in (one or
more of) its parts,then x is numericallydistinctfromthe sum of
its parts.
Both Scotus and Ockham accept (1). Scotus believesthat the antecedent
of (1) is demonstrably
true,and he offersthreesortsof propertythat he
believessatisfyit: generation,corruption,and the possessionof threesorts
of necessarybut non-defining
property:proper passions,proper actions,
and properaccidents.8As just pointedout, the partsavailable on Scotus's
6 On this,
seeMarkG. Henninger,
Relations:
Medieval
Theories
1250-1325
, Oxford
1989,
68-78;alsoCross1998(op.cit.,
above,n. 2), 107-12.
7 Eleonore
hasrecently
drawn
attention
toa rather
different
sortofanti-reducStump
tionistic
sortofaccount
in themiddle
thefactthatmaterial
account,
ages:'On Aquinas's
arecomposites
ofmatter
meansthatmaterial
andform
canhaveemergent
objects
objects
ofthesystem
ofthematerial
that'areproperties
butnotproperties
properties',
properties
ofthesystem':
Substance
Dualism
andMaterialism
without
Non-Cartesian
Reductionism,
parts
Stump,
in: FaithandPhilosophy,
sortofaccount
12 (1995),505-31(p. 510).Thisis a different
viewI am discussing
from
theScotist
here.The sortsofpartsthatScotushasin mind
are matter
on Stump's
therelevant
and form;
accountofAquinas,
partsare material
- thephysical,
andbiological
ofan object.I shallignore
this
chemical,
components
parts
inwhatfollows,
different
sortofanti-reductionism
there
is no doubtthatStump's
though
ofemergent
account
is farcloserto modern
accounts
thanthemoredistincproperties
I consider
is no doubtthat
medieval
ofanti-reductionism
here.Whilethere
tively
variety
offered
anda significant
theanalysis
ofthemind-body
byStumpis challenging,
problem
contribution
to modern
debatein theissue,I strongly
doubtthatitbearsmuchobvious
holdsthat'understandresemblance
to Aquinas's
account.
to Stump,
According
Aquinas
to thewholematerial
thatis a humanbeing'(p. 512).
composite
ingis to be attributed
Whilethisis true,
overa crucial
thecaseofintellectual
difference
between
Stump
glosses
is
on theonehandandnon-intellectual
activities
on theother.
activities
Understanding
attributed
toa
tobe attributed
to a humancomposite
on thegrounds
thatitis properly
- thesoul
- thatis itself
see
form
ofthebodyofthecomposite:
thesubstantial
substance
ScG
2.
69,n. 1464(II, 204b);ST 1.75.2(I/i,352a).(NoteherethatforAquinas
Aquinas,
in
A humanbeingincludes,
thebodyis notidentical
withthewholehumancomposite.
in matter':
ST 1.76.1ad 4 (I/i,359b).)
addition
to body,a partthatis 'notimmersed
attributed
nottothesoulbuttothebodyconsidered
activities
areproperly
Non-intellectual
see ST 1. 77. 5 (I/i,373b).
as a composite
ofmatter
andform:
8 I suspect
ofa subcausalpowers
thatby'proper
actions'
Scotusmeansthenecessary
holds
invirtue
ofthesepowers),
sincehe elsewhere
stance
thantheactions
elicited
(rather
canpossess
all ofitsactivecausalpowers
andyetlackanyopportunity
thata substance

18:33:18 PM

ON PARTANDWHOLE
OCKHAM

147

account are matter,form,and the relationbetween them. So Scotus's


claim is that none of these propertiescan be possessedby matteralone,
by formalone, by the relationbetweenthem,or by any aggregateof two
or more of these parts. Scotus thereforeconcludes,on the basis of (1),
that a substanceis numericallydistinctfromthe sum of its parts.9
Scotus offerstwo other argumentsin favourof his anti-reductionistic
claim that a substanceis an object over and above the sum of its parts.
The firstis thatanyone denyingthata substanceis an object numerically
distinctfromthe sum of its partshas to accept thata substanceis numericallyidenticalwiththe sum of its parts.But it is true of aggregatesthat
they are numericallyidenticalwith the sum of theirparts. So without
some added criterionforsubstancehood,Scotus's opponentswould have
to reduce all substancesto aggregates.10
The second argumentis that,accordingto Aristode,matterand form
are (in some sense)causes of something
Aristotelian
theyare respectively
materialand formalcauses of a composite.And if the substancethathas
matterand formas parts is numericallyidenticalwith the sum of these
two parts,thenthereis n object forthe matterand the formto cause.11
Scotus's account is directedagainst the views of his teacher William
of Ware, and ultimately(accordingto Scotus) againstAverroes.I doubt
thatthe view Scotus opposes can be foundin Averroes.12
But it certainly
forexercising
them(on this,see myIncarnation,
andtheVision
Indwelling,
ofGod:Henry
of
Ghent
andSome
Franciscans
Scotus
wouldmake
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
forthcoming).
Perhaps
a similar
claimin relation
topassive
in whichcase'proper
shouldbe
liabilities,
passions'
ButI am notsureaboutthis.
interpreted
accordingly.
9 See Scotus,Ord.3. 2. 2, nn.7-8
Qu. Var.6. 2
(VII, 76, 79),quotedin Ockham,
see Cross,DunsScotus's
Anti
(OTh,VIII, 211-12,11.104-14,118-20).For discussion,
Reductionistic
Account
Substance
33 (1995),137-70(146-8,155);
, in: Vivarium,
ofMaterial
alsoCross1998(op.cit.
to Scotus's
hereis
, above,n. 2), 81-2,86. Presupposed
argument
thatproperties
ofthesorthelistsherecannot
toaggregates:
there
mustbe a strong
belong
senseinwhich
their
arenumerically
one.Asweshallsee,thisclaimturns
outto
subjects
be central
inbothScotus's
account
andOckham's.
We should
notethatScotusargues
on
thebasisofa stronger
than(1),namely,
ifa substance
x hasa property
thatis
principle
different
inkindfrom
hadby(oneor moreof)itsparts,
thenx is numerianyproperty
from
thesumofitsparts.
ofthisprinciple,
seeCross
callydistinct
(ForScotus's
acceptance
1995(op.dt
itself
., above,n. 9), 163-6;Cross1998(op.cit.)
above,n. 2),90-1.)Thisprinciple
entails
Ockhamand Scotusfocuses
on (1),andwe do not
(1). Butthedebatebetween
needto consider
Scotus's
here.
stronger
principle
10Scotus,
Ord.3. 2. 2, nn.7-8(VII, 76, 79),quotedin Ockham,
Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh,
in Cross1995(op.dt.,
discussed
VIII, 211,11.96-103),
above,n. 9), 145-6,153-4;Cross
1998(op.cit.,
above,n. 2),81,85-6.
11Scotus,
Ord.3. 2. 2, nn.7-8(VII, 76,79),quotedin Ockham,
Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh
,
discussed
in Cross1995(op.dt.,
VIII,212,11.115-17),
above,n. 9), 147-8,155.
Averroes
at onepointclaimsthata material
substance
is identical
withthesumof

18:33:18 PM

148

RICHARDGROSS

can be found in Ware, writingin the late 1290s, and thusjust a few
years beforethe ScotisttextI am lookingat here. Ware argues that the
sortof account proposed by Scotus entailsan infiniteregress.Suppose a
whole includessomethingover and above its matterand form.This additional thingis presumablyrequired to explain the unityof the matter
and form.But we will need to invoke a furtherobject to explain the
.,3
unityof matter,form,and the firstunityexplainer:and so on ad infinitum
Ware too seems to accept (1). So, given his beliefthat the consequent
of (1) is false,Ware argues (like Ockham afterhim) that the properties
of a materialsubstancemustprimarilybe propertiesof its parts- thatis
to say, they must be propertieseitherof its matter,of its form,of the
relationbetweenthese two, or of any aggregateof two or more of these
parts.Ware arguesthatwhen a substanceis generatedor corrupted,what
is reallygeneratedor corruptedis the relationbetween the substance's
matterand its form:the matterand frombegin,or cease, to be united.14
fromthe view Ware attacks.
Clearly,Scotus's view is ratherdifferent
a
to
in
whole
does
not
According Scotus,
any way include
anythingbeyond
its matter,form,and the relationbetween them. It does not have any
furtherpart otherthan these parts. A whole reallyis an object numerically distinctfromthe sum of all its parts. It is this view that Ockham
criticizes.15
Various beliefsthat both Scotus and Ockham share allow the considerationsdebated here to be applicable in exactlythe same way both to
the generalcase of matterand formand to the specificcase of body and
soul. The reason is that both Scotus and Ockham believe that certain
sortsof bodies- animatebodies, forexample- have a seriesof hierarchically orderedsubstantialforms.An animatebody includesprimematter,
bodily form(givingthe body the basic structureit has), and an animating form(givingthe body thus basicallystructuredthe sortsof function
itsmaterial
at.,above,n. 9), 144,
parts:seeIn Ph.1. 17 (IV, 7a),citedin Gross1995(op.
n. 20; Gross1998(<
claimis thesort
., above,n. 2), 80,n. 7. Butthisreductionistic
op.dt
that
ofviewopposed
notbyScotus,
butbytherather
different
sortofanti-reductionism
finds
in Aquinas.
(as notedabove)Eleonore
Stump
13See Ware,InSent.
inCross1995(iop.t
Cross
., above,n. 9), 149-50;
q. 164,discussed
1998(op.dt.,
above,n. 2),83-4.
14See Ware,In Sent.
m Cross1995(op.
at.,above,n. 9),
qq. 164,172,175,discussed
150-2;Cross1998(op.dt.
, above,n. 2),84-5.
15The Ockhamist
AdamWodeham,
around1330,claimsthatOckhammiswriting
a fewyearsearlier
understands
Scotusto acceptthetheory
byWare:see
takenly
rejected
I am aboutto give
Lect.
Wodeham,
prol.1 (I, 12,11.23-6).ButI hopethattheaccount
makesitclearthatWodeham
is mistaken
aboutthis.

18:33:18 PM

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

149

that it has- presumablyby givingfurtherslightstructuralfeaturessuch


thatthe bodywiththisfinalstructuring
is alive).161 do not want to debate
of this relativelycomplex account of the compositionof
the desirability
animate substances,except to note that both Scotus and the parsimonious Ockham believe thereto be good reasons forwantingto accept it
over the simplerThomist (and Aristotelian)account accordingto which
everybody is a compositeof matterand (necessarily)
just one substantial
form.The accounts of part and whole that I considerhere are equally
applicable both to standard matter-form
compositionand to body-soul
is
a
of
composition(wherebody
composite matterand form,and soul is
a furtherformconstituting,
jointlywith body, a livingsubstance).
II
Ockham unequivocally rejects the claim that a material substance is
numericallydistinctfromthe sum of its parts:
I saythat,
thepartsthatarematter
andform,
thereis no third
disbeyond
entity
tinct
from
these.So a composite
is neither
norform,
butmatter
andform
matter,
united
andconjoined.17
together,
On this view, a compositeof matterand formis numericallyidentical
with the sum of its parts. AfterI describe Ockham's position and his
motivationsfor acceptingit, I will show preciselyhow Ockham distinguishes a substanceon his theoryfroman aggregate.In doing this, I
hope thatthe way in which Ockham understandshis theorywill become
plain.
Ockham's motivationsfor denyingany numericaldistinctionbetween
a whole and the sum of its parts all have to do withdifficulties
Ockham
findswithScotus's theory.There seem to me to be foursubstantiveargumentsagainstScotus,scatteredthroughOckham's writings.First,suppose
that a substanceis numericallydistinctfromthe sum of its parts. Is this
substanceitselfsimpleor composite?If it is simple,thenit is eithermatter
or form,over and above the matterand formthatare partsof the composite. It presumablycannot be matter.Ockham does not suggestwhy
not, but I take it that it would be impossiblefor one object to fail to
16ForScotus
onthis,
seeCross1998(op.cit
., above,n. 2),55-71;forOckham,
including
a general
ofthewholedebate,
account
seeAdams1987(<
., above,n. 2),II, 647-61.
op.t
Notethat,as Adamsmakesclear,Ockham,
unlike
theneedforseparate
Scotus,
accepts
andsensory
soulsin addition
to thebodily
form
andintellective
soul.
vegetative
17Sum.Ph.1. 19 OPh
( , VI, 206,11.30-3).

18:33:18 PM

150

RICHARDGROSS

exhibit unityof its prime matter.Neither,more interestingly,


can this
substancebe form.Ockham offersseveral reasons,one of which is one
offeredby Ware a fewyears earlier:the substancecannotbe form,since
we would then have the appeal to furtherformsto explain the unityof
the parts of the compositesubstance (i.e. matter,form,and the unity,18
explainingform),and so on ad infinitum
the
is
not
substance
If, however,
simple,it mustbe composite:
Ifthisthird
of
is composite,
itis clearthatitcanonlybe composite
however,
entity
matter
andform.
overand abovematter
other
andform,
it is nothing
Therefore,
thana certain
thatis nothing
otherthanitsparts
composite
joinedtogether.19
Accordingto Ockham, then,the proposed compositethatexistsover and
above its matterand formturnsout, on closer inspectionto be identical
with the union of matterand form. But this scarcely does justice to
Scotus's position.Clearly,in Scotus's view, the whole substanceis composite; but it is compositein such a way as to fail to be reducibleto the
union of its matterand form.Scotus does not have to accept Ockham's
conclusionhere at all. (I will returnto Scotus's compositionclaim in section threebelow.)
Ockham's second strategyis perhapsmore hopeful.When dealingwith
Scotus's Aristotelianargumentthat unless a substanceis numericallydistinctfromitsparts,therewill be nothingof whichthesepartsbe (material
and formal)causes,Ockham makes use of an ex nihilonihilfitstrategyof
the sort employedin modern rejectionsof emergence:
I saythatintrinsic
whether
causes[viz.matter
andform]
do notcauseanything,
absolute
orrelational,
inanywaydistinct
from
becauseiftheydid,then
themselves,
wouldbe efficient
tothisthing,
wouldbe extrincausesinrelation
andthusthey
they
siccauses.
to matter
andform
. . . Andforthisreasonthatfantasy
whichascribes
someothercausality
is falseandunintelligible.20
(Intrinsiccauses here are Aristotelianmaterialand formalcauses not the
sortsof thingthat bring
abouteffects.)Ockham's argumentis thatScotus's
of
the
theory
'emergence' of a substanceas an object numericallydistinctfromthe sum of itspartsentailsthatthepartsin some way (efficiently)
cause the object to emergefromthem.And, Ockham reasons,thiscausal
claim must be false,because matterand formdo not have the relevant
causal powers (theyare intrinsic,not extrinsiccauses, and do not have
the sortsof powers that could allow them to be extrinsiccauses). It is
18Sum.Ph.1. 19 OPh
, VI, 205-6,11.16-25).
19Sum.Ph.1. 19 (
VI, 20611.26-9).
(OPh,
20Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh,VIII, 216,11.
214-17,224-6).

18:33:18 PM

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

151

easy to feel some sympathyforthis. On Scotus's view, it seems that the


mere conjunctionof objects of the certaintypescan resultin the productionof a furtherobject. And it would be nice to know which agents
were responsibleforthisproduction,and what sortof causal powersthey
had. On the face of it, we would not expect matterand formto possess
the relevantsortsof causal powers.
Doubtless,Scotus would want to replythat the causal agency underlyingthe productionof the substance,over and above any sum of the
substance'sparts,belongs not to the matterand formof the substance
cause of the substance.But thisproductionis somebut to the originating
how achievedvia the mere union matterand form;so perhaps Ockham
should stillbe concernedabout the causal relationsoperativehere. Any
Scotistaccount seems to involve some sort of (possiblycausally underhow we ultimatelyassess Ockham's
determined)emergence.Nevertheless,
Ockham manages to
argumentwill,I think,depend on how successfully
in
a
of
the
which
an
account
composite substance possesses
way
give
- a
Ockham's
thirdargumentagainst
that
is
central
to
properties topic
Scotus.
Accordingto Ockham for reasons that I will examine in the next
section accidentscan be no more or less complex than theirsubjects.
Accordingto Scotus's (1), we need to posit the existenceof a substance
numericallydistinctfromits matterand formon the groundsthatcertain
in kind fromthe propertiesof
of a substance'spropertiesare different
any of that substance'sparts.Let us label such accidentsC-accidents'
accidents.Ockham argues that at least some of the Ccomposite-entailing
accidentsproposedby Scotus are necessarilyless complex than the putativecompositein whichtheyinhere.For example,manyaccidents,ifthey
have partsat all, have partsthat are of the same typeas the whole accident- patchesof redness,forexample,or certainsortsof mentalstate.And
some- mentalacts,forexample- presumablylack any sortof part at all.
On Ockham's simplicityclaim, none of these accidentscould inhere in
a compositesubstancesuch as Scotus proposes.With referenceto Scotus's
claim that the sortsof thingthat Scotus categorizesas C-accidentscannot inherein any of the partsof a composite,Ockham concludes:'thereI
forewhat [Scotus] believes to be unreasonableis in fact necessary'.21
will returnto this argumentof Ockham's- which seems to me to have
some veryodd consequences- in the next section.
21Qu.Var
. 6. 2 (07,VIII, 217,11.237-8;forthewholeargument
seepp. 216-17,
11.
227-38).

18:33:18 PM

152

RICHARD
GROSS

A fourthargumentagainstScotus does not look as thoughit need presenthimwithtoo manyproblems.On Scotus'sview,a compositeincludes
thoughis not identicalto matter,form,and relation.Relations,however,
are accidents.So, accordingto Ockham, Scotus's view entailsthata substance necessarilyincludesan accident,and thusthata substanceis necessarilya merelyaccidentalunity.As Ockham notes,any seriousAristotelian
would regardthe conclusionas absurd.22Scotus, of course,could simply
deny that all relationsare accidental.In fact,he already has to hand a
- transcendental
set of relationsthatare necessaryfeaturesof theirsubjects
relations,as he calls them. All creatureshave a dependence relationto
God. This relation is necessary,since no creaturecould exist without
God's causal sustenance.Perhaps the relationbetweenmatterand form
could be like this.23
The gist of Ockham's argumentsis that therecannot exist any composite that is numericallydistinctfromits parts. Ockham proposes two
theoriesforhow a compositecould be numericallyidenticalwith
different
the sum of its parts.As we shall see, Ockham believesthereto be overwhelmingobjectionsto the firstof these, and consequentlyaccepts the
second one.
The point of both theoriesis to overcomean obvious (but not simpleminded)objectionto the sort of view proposed by Ockham. How can a
substancebe identicalwith the sum of its parts,if it is the case (as it
seems to be for at least some substances)that the parts can existwithout the whole's existing?(As we shall see in a moment,Ockham holds
thathuman beings,forexample,have partsthatcould be separatedfrom
each other, such that the parts exist but the person no longer does.)
Ockham discussesan analogous objection in the case of an artefact,a
house: how can a whole house be identicalwith its parts,given that (if
we are very careful)we can disassemblea house, and thus destroyit,
withoutdestroyingany of its parts- its bricks,timber,and so on?24
22Qu.Var
ofthe
. 6. 2 (OTTi,
VIII, 209,11.49-57;forOckham's
graspoftherelevance
to Scotus's
view,seep. 207,11.14-20).
argument
23For'transcendental
inScotus,
arecalled)
seeHenninger
1989(op.
relations
at.,
(asthey
matter
andformareessential
thattherelations
between
above,n. 6), 78-85.Claiming
for
and theform)
stillposea problem
features
of theirsubjects
(i.e.thematter
might
But
forbelieving
matter
andform
to be separable.
becausehe hasotherreasons
Scotus,
to matter
or form;
Scotuswouldarguethattherelation
neednotbe essential
perhaps
in Scotus,
to thesubstance.
andits
it needsto be essential
Foraccidental
rather,
unity
seeCross1998(op.citabove,n. 2), 100-7.
distinction
from
substantial
unity,
* Sum.Ph.1. 19 (OPh,VI, 206-7,11.43-8).

18:33:18 PM

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

153

In the case of a house, Ockham argues thatthe whole is identicalwith


its parts 'when theyare unitedin the requiredway and placed together
This looks reasonable enough. The orderingand placement
properly'.25
of the componentsof a house are not themselvespartsof the house; but
theyare certainlythe sortsof thingthat we would need to include in a
descriptionof the house, and are certainlythe sortsof thingthatlook to
be necessaryfor the identityof a house.
What does Ockham say about the case of a composite substance?
Ockham's firsttheoryis thata whole is identicalwithits two parts (matterand form)along witha relationbetweenthem.Ockham proposestwo
different
versionsof thistheory,a philosophicalversionand a theological
one. The distinguishing
featureof the two versionslies in theirdifferent
assessmentsof the ontlogicalstatusof real relations.Both versionsof the
,
theoryare treatedat greatlengthin the distinctionthirtyof the Ordinatio
a textthat has been discussedin detail elsewhere.26
Here I focus on the
Variae,since Ockham
summaryaccount given in question six Quaestiones
in thislattertextrejectsboth versionsof the firsttheory.
On the less theologicalproposal, Ockham argues that the relation
betweenmatterand formis caused by the existenceof matterand form
in the same place. Matter and form,on this account, are causally disposed such that,when placed together,theypossess a relationof union
a relationof 'information' between themselves.27
The idea
specifically,
here is that the real relationbetween matterand formis reducibleto
theirspatial coincidence.A real relation on this theoryis not a thing
reallydistinctfromthe two relata(in this case, matterand form).
Ockham's second proposal is more theological.Christ'ssoul existedat
the same place as his (dead) body afterthe crucifixion,
but nevertheless
did not forma compositewhole with this body. So merelyexistingin
thesame place cannotbe sufficient
formatterand formto cause a relation
of union. Rather,Ockham argues,we should thinkof the union between
matterand formas itself,along withmatterand form,a partialcause of
the compositewhole.28The point here is that the theologicalexample25Sum.Ph.1. 19 (0/%,VI, 206,11.42-3).
26See Adams1987
1989(<
., above,n. 2), I, 250-9,andHenninger
., above,
(<
op.cit
op.cit
n. 6), 127-35forthefirst
version
ofthetheory;
1989
I, 267-76,andHenninger
Adams,
The accounts
above,n. 6), 140-5forthesecond.
(op.cit.,
givenbyAdamsandHenninger
areextremely
sometimes
similar,
oddlyto thepointofverbatim
identity.
27Qu.Var.6. 2 (OT,VIII, 207,
11.5-14, 208-9,11.42-4).
28Qu.Var.6. 2 {077i,208,11.24-42). pp.

18:33:18 PM

154

RICHARDGROSS

Christ'sdead body in the tomb- forcesOckham to posit thata real relation is itselfan object, a partialcause5 of the compositeof which it is a
part.
The thrustof Ockham's firsttheoryis clear enough. On both versions
of thisfirsttheory,Ockham claims that a real relationof union between
matterand formis essentialto the composite.29
But accordingto Ockham
this makes the theoryvulnerable to an objection that Ockham raises
against Scotus. The objection is that a compositesubstancenecessarily
includessomethingaccidental- namely,a relation.And, as we have seen,
the AristotelianOckham sees this as unacceptable.(I have alreadyindicated some reservationsabout this,so I will not repeat them here.)
Ockham therefore
proposesa second, more subtle,theory,one thathe
as
'more
rational'.30
This second theorydenies that the union
regards
between matterand formshould count as a real relationat all. Rather,
the union between matterand formamountsto the denial of a certain
sort of distinctionbetweenthem. On this theory,thereare varioussorts
of beingdistinct
, one of which,as we shall see in a moment,is a real relation. For matterand formto be united is thus for them to fail to have
this real relationof distinctionbetween each other.
Ockham in fact discernstwo sorts of beingdistinct.
On the firstsort,
two objects are distinctif it is impossiblefor them to become parts of
one and the same composite.31
Ockham believesthat thissortof distinction is not a real relationat all, but merelya rationalone.32The second
sortof distinction
obtainsbetweentwo objectsthatnaturallyuniteto form
one composite.Disunited matterand formare distinctin this way: if
united,formwould naturallyinhere in matter:
Whenform
in matter
it causessomething
andonebya unity
inheres
non-distinct
. . . Thisseconddistinction
thatis opposed
tothissortofdistinction.
seemstoimply
oftheinformative
to theinformatile.33
andsignify
a realactualrelation
On the second theoryunion is not a relationbut ratherthe lack of a
where the relevant
relation:it is the lack of a real relationof distinction,
sort of distinctionis that which would obtain between disunitedmatter
and form:
29Qu.Var.6. 2 (07%,VIII, 207,11.14-16, 209,11.45-8).
30Qu.Var.6. 2 (OU, VIII, 209,1.58). p.
31Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh,VIII, 209-10,
11.62-70).
32Forrational
see the
in Ockham,
from
realrelations,
relations
andtheirdistinction
accounts
inAdams1987(<
1989(op.t
andHenninger
., above,
., above,n. 2),I, 259-67,
op.t
n. 6), 136-40.
33Qu.Var.6. 2 (077i,VIII, 210,11.75-7).

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155

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

a realrelation,
but
doesnotsignify
The unionthatis opposedto thisdistinction
is distinguished
thenegation
oftherealrelation
bywhichtheinformable
merely
theinformative.34
from
The union of matterand form,then,is just for them to lack real reladistinction.On thissortof view,a substanceis identionsof matter-form
tical with the sum of its parts,where the sum of parts is just the parts'
A substanceis not identicalwith
lackingany real relationsof distinction.
its disunitedparts,since disunitedparts include furtherentitiesblocking
On this account, a real relationis not a componentpart of a
identity.35
compositesubstance,since compositionentails merelythe lack of real
relationsof distinction
as just outlined.It is forthisreason thatI claimed
above that Ockham would not count relationsamong the possible parts
of a substance.For Ockham, the only ultimatecomponentsof a substance are its matterand form.36
and richness
This account- or all itsmetaphysical
sophistication
might
not look veryexplanatory.But the crucial claim, I think,is that matter
and formhave a naturaltendencyto unite.Matterand formuniteunless
prevented.What preventsmatterand formfromunitingare theirrelations of distinction.But no such explanatoryreal featuresare required
fortheirunion. Union is just the lack of blocks on union; no more, no
less. Of course,on thisaccount,we need a theoryof relationssufficiendy
rich to distinguishreal relationsfrommerelyrationalrelations.But the
medievais,includingOckham all accept accounts thatwill allow forthis.
(Presumably,Ockham is going to need to invoke an additionalnegative
34Qu. Var.6. 2 (077i,VIII, 210,11.80-4;forthewholediscussion,
see p. 210,11.
71-84).
35Anobvious
Aristotelian
to thissortofaccount,
towhichmatter
objection
according
whendisunited
andform
haverealrelations
ofdistinction,
is thatanygivenform
seems
tohaverelations
toinfinitely
ofmatter,
ofmatofdistinction
andanychunk
manychunks
to infinitely
ButOckham
is natudoesnotbelieve
thata form
ter,likewise,
manyforms.
to morethanoneexistent
chunkofmatter,
or a chunkofmatter
to more
rallyunited
number
thana finite
offorms.
toOckham,
therelations
ofdistinction
are
And,according
thathavenatural
inclinations
to union:see Qu. Var.6. 2
onlybetween
objects
required
(07h,VIII, 218,11.265-70).
36Previous
in Ord.1. 30,have
becauseoftheir
focuson thediscussion
commentators,
tospotthiscentred
in Ockham's
failed
modification
account
The discussion,
ofsubstance.
I think,
forwanting
warrant
to datequestion
twoof the
six,article
givesus sufficient
Variae
laterthandistinction
oftheOrdinatio.
In Qu. Var.6. 2, Ockham
Quaestiones
thirty
recounts
andrejects
bothversions
he defends
in Ord.1. 30, and replaces
ofthetheory
themwitha further
he raisesagainst
notsusceptible
to thesortofobjection
his
theory
in theOrdinatio.
theories
Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,
tellus anything
aboutthedatesofthe
other
ofquestion
sixoftheQuaestiones
articles
Variae
is itself
an
, sincethisquestion
merely
editorial
ofmiscellaneous
Ockham's
Sentence
articles,
composite
supplementing
commentary,
in mostofwhichOckham
someofScotus's
views.
directly
targets

18:33:18 PM

156

RICHARDGROSS

theologicalcriterion.God could in principleintervenesuch thatspatially


coincidentmatterand formretainthe distinctionrelationsthattheyhave
when spatiallyseparate. I take it that this means that the real relations
of distinctionfound in Ockham's second theorywill have to be things
over and above the disunitedmatterand form.But Ockham does not
make this explicit.)
So on the face of it Ockham's theorylooks as thoughit is coherent.
To assess it against the Scotist alternative,we need to see how well it
can defeat the various Scotist objections to this sort of reductionistic
account.As I showed in the previoussection,Scotus's argumentsfallinto
view on the
threegroups:first,thosethatargue forthe anti-reductionistic
subbasis of (1); secondly,those that argue fromthe need to distinguish
stancesfromaggregates;and thirdly,
thosethatargue fromtheAristotelian
need to allow matterand formto be in some sense intrinsiccauses of a
thing.I have already looked at the thirdof these. I will spend the rest
of this sectionthinkingabout ways in which Ockham can deal withthe
second of these, and then in the next section thinkabout Ockham's
optionsin relationto the firstScotistobjection.
How, then,can Ockham distinguishsubstances,as describedby him,
frommere aggregates?Scotus, of course, can do this easily enough. An
aggregate,unlike a substance,is not numericallydistinctfrom(the sum
of) its parts.An aggregateis not an object over and above all its parts
and the relationsbetween them. Ockham is certainlyaware that his
account of substancesmeans thatan aggregatecan on occasion be useful
as an analogy for what a substance is. When dealing with the Scotist
worrythat there must be somethingfor formand matterto be causes
of, Ockham at one point suggeststhat matterand formcan be causes
of a whole that is numericallyidenticalwith the union of matterand
form,just as theycan be parts of a whole that is numericallyidentical
with theirunion. Ockham appeals to the notion of a whole people for
supportin thissecond case: people can be parts of a whole thatis identical with the union of all its parts.37
But this is not to say that Ockham is committedto reducinga substanceto an aggregate.Ockham in factbelievesthat,even thougha whole
substance,like an aggregate,is identical(not numericallyidentical,however, as we shall see in a moment)with the sum of its parts,thereare
clear and principledways of distinguishing
substancesfrommere aggre37Sum
. Ph.1. 19 (OPh
, VI, 207,11.64-76).

18:33:18 PM

ON PARTANDWHOLE
OCKHAM

157

gates.In one centralpassage Ockham claimsthatsubstances,unlikeaggregates,are properlyspeakingnumericallyone:


In oneway,[itis taken]strictly
one'. . . canbe takenin twosenses.
'Numerically
one'is saidofthatwhich
is in itself
one(perse
andthen'numerically
andproperly,
a simple
andform,
or a composite
whosepartsarematter
or
unum),
namely
thing,
whosepartsare]numerically
distinct
butnotofdifferent
andin
kinds;
[a composite
in othercases.
or thiswhiteness,
is numerically
thiswaythisfire,
one,andlikewise
one'is takenbroadly
andimproperly
In another
forthatwhich
is
way,'numerically
distinct
ofmanythings
onebytheaggregation
(whether
byspeciesor merely
by
in themselves
In thiswaya heap
thatdo notmakeonething
(perseunum).
number)
thanmany
anda kingdom
ora peopleisnumerofstones
isoneheap(rather
heaps),
human
there
arenotmany
there
aremany
one,sincealthough
beings,
ically
peoples.38
Substances,unlikeaggregates,are properlynumericallyone, and thuson
Ockham's principlesnumericallyidenticalwith the sum of theirparts.
Equally, aggregatesmightbe identicalwith the sum of theirparts,but
we cannot properlyreferto thisidentityas 'numerical'identity,since an
aggregateis not properlynumericallyone. But none of this gives clear
genuine numericalunitiesfromaggregates.
principlesfordistinguishing
What sort of criteriadoes Ockham offer?When explicitlyresponding
to Scotus's argumentthat reductionistslike Ockham will be forced to
reduce substancesto aggregates(on the groundsthatboth substancesand
aggregatesare merelysums of theirparts),Ockham suggeststwo criteria
necessaryforsubstancehood.The partsof a substancebelong to the same
genus,and the partsof a substanceare such that,althoughone is potential and the otheractual,none is by itselfa completememberof a genus.39
On the firstcriterion,whatevermaterialand formalcomponentswe
want to analyse a substanceinto, these componentswill always themselves belong to (be parts of) the same genus: that is to say, theywill
belong to the genus of substance.
The second criterionseems to involve two separate conditions.The
firstis that one of the parts of a substanceis potentialand the other
actual. The second is that neitherof the parts of a substanceis itselfa
actualityclaim is just that
completememberof a genus. The potentiality/
a
is
like
one of the parts something
propertyof the other formis a state
or mode of matter,as I suggestedabove.40To understandthis,we need
38SumPh.
dis, VI, 138-9,11.27-39).I takeit thatthenumerically
(OPh
praeambula
tinct
shouldbe understood
to be thepartsofa
partsofthesamekindofa perseunity
continuum.
39Qu.Var.6. 2 (077*,
11.151-62).
VIII, 213-14,
40On therelevant
and actuality
in Ockham,
sensesofpotentiality
see Adams1987
cit.,above,n. 2),II, 643-5.
(op.

18:33:18 PM

158

RICHARDGROSS

to keep in mind that,althoughboth matterand formare individualswith


theirown properties(or at least, individualsthat admit of certaintrue
non-trivial
thereis a crucial sense in which formis a set of
descriptions),
about
propertiesof matter.This is just a commonmedievalpresupposition
the nature of the form-matter
union.
As Ockham makes clear, this potentiality/actuality
criterionis hardly
a mark of substancehood.The union between substance and accident
satisfiesthis criterionas well.41The idea behind the claim that none of
the partsof a substanceis a completememberof a genus is that matter
and form,by themselves,are not completesubstances.Accidents,by contrast,and the partsof an aggregate,are completemembersof genera.A
of whitenessdoes not includeanything
definition
over and above whiteness;
a definitionof a substancenecessarilyincludesboth matterand form.
Of thesevarious criteria,I thinkwe should prioritizethe potentiality/
actualityone over the others.The parts of a substance prime matter
and form are necessarilysuch thatwe can plausiblyspeak in some sense
of the formorganizingthe matter;and thisis clearlynot the case forthe
parts of an aggregatesuch as a people, or (to use anotherof Ockham's
examples) a house.42But if we prioritizethe potentiality
/actualitycritewe
will
to
from
accidental
need
some
substances
rion,
way
distinguish
unities.In fact,Ockham's discussionmakes it clear that he would want
to regardaccidentalunitesas more akin to aggregatesthan to substances.
41Qu.Var.6. 2 (07 VIII, 213,11.158-9).
42Forthehouseexample,
seeSum.
Ph.1. 19(OPh,VI, 206-7,11.43-9).I do notwant
nowthequestion
ofartefact
andinparticular
whether
there
is anysense
todiscuss
unity,
in whichan artefact
suchas a househas a form.
Whendiscussing
hisclaimthatthe
ofa
ofa thing
in relation
Aristotle
usestheexample
essence
is defined
to itsfunction,
14-19)),though
isjust
H. 2 (1043a
thepointoftheexample
house(seeAristotle,
Metaph.
ofa thing
is defined
in relation
toitsfunction,
notthatartefacts
toshowthattheessence
The discussion
in thetextcitedhereat leastseemsto makeit clearthat
haveessences.
in factbe thought
Ockham
thata househasa form.
It might
wouldnothavethought
thatappealing
tothepresence
ofjustoneform
inmatter
wouldbe a natural
wayofdisandartesubstances
between
andaggregates
substances
(or,forthatmatter,
tinguishing
he believes
thereto be
ButOckham
cannotmakethisappeal,since,likeScotus,
facts).
havemorethanone
reasons
thatat leastsomesubstances
forsupposing
overwhelming
wantto makethepresence
ofjustoneform
substantial
form.
Ockhammight
Perhaps
him
butnotnecessary
fortheexistence
Butwhatis troubling
sufficient
ofa substance.
a principled
a composite
ofmatter
andform
hereisfinding
(whether
wayofdistinguishing
from
oneform
or many)
an aggregate
ofmatter
andform,
giventhattheunionofmatfrom
themereunionof
terandform
in an objectnumerically
distinct
doesnotresult
ofjustonesubto findtheappealto thepresence
matter
andform.
So he is unlikely
andform
a substance
is prestantial
form
Whymatter
sufficiently
compose
explanatory.
needsexplaining.
what,forOckham,
cisely

18:33:18 PM

ON PARTANDWHOLE
OCKHAM

159

So perhaps the most fruitful


approach would be to look more closelyat
his claims about completeness.Presumably,part of what Ockham wants
to say is thatthe identityof the partsof a substancein some sense derives
fromthe substance;whereas the identityof at least one the parts of an
accidentalwhole, and perhaps both (wherean accidentalwhole includes
exactlyone substanceand one accident),is determinedindependentlyof
the identityof the whole, or perhaps itselfdeterminesthe identityof the
whole.
In additionto the threecriteriafordistinguishing
substancesfromagI
in
think
can
otherpossibiliwe
fact
find
severed
gregatesjust mentioned,
in
ties Ockham's various discussions.One can probablybe foundin the
on different
reflections
sortsof distinction
alreadydiscussed.For Ockham,
the parts of a substance are such that one informsor inheres in the
other.43
This presumablyadds nothingin itselfto the potentiality/actuality
criterion.But what Ockham's discussionof it entails is that incomplete
objects related to each other in the relevantway are such that when
united they compose numericallyone thing- albeit one thing that is
identicalwiththe sum of itsparts.And I take it thatOckham
numerically
does not want to make thissortof claim about aggregates.(I will tryto
substantiatemy claim here in the next section. But briefly,Ockham is
quite happy to claim that the (non-trivial)propertiesof the parts of a
substanceare in some sense propertiesof the whole; a claim thathe does
not make about aggregates
presumablybecause an aggregateis not in
any sense numericallyone thing.)
More enlightening,
certainlyin relationto the distinctionbetween a
substanceand an aggregate,is Ockham's spatialcoincidenceclaim,examined brieflyabove. At one point,Ockham actuallydistinguishes
different
sortsof unityin termsof the spatial relationsbetween theirparts:
wholes
there
arerequired
Fordifferent
different
unions
ofparts.Forsometimes
itis
thatthepartsarespatially
sometimes
thatthepartsarenotdiscoincident;
required
tant(suchthatthereis nothing
between
sometimes
therecan be something
them);
between
butthepartsmusthavea right
them,
order,
justas whenmanyhuman
makeonepeople.44
beings
I have alreadylooked in detailat Ockham's discussionof thisspatialcondition.Presumablyhe can plausiblyuse thesecoincidence,continuity/conand discontinuity
claimsto distinguish
betweensubstances,integral
tiguity,
wholes,and aggregates.(Again, Ockham cannot use these spatial claims
43See alsoSum.Ph.1. 19 (OPVI, 207,11.74-6).
44Sum.Ph.1. 19 (OP
, VI, 208,11.93-8).

18:33:18 PM

160

RICHARDGROSS

to distinguishbetween substancesand accidental wholes, because accidents satisfythe spatial coincidencecriteriontoo.)45


Ockham holds, then, that there are some clear grounds for distinaccount
guishingsubstancesfromaggregates,even on his reductionistic
of substance.In the next section,I want to look at Ockham's proposals
forthe inherenceof accidentsin a compositesubstance.By doing this,I
featureof substanceson
hope to be able to expose anotherdistinguishing
Ockham's account.
Ill
As we have seen, Ockham holds that Scotus's anti-reductionistic
theory
of substanceis false.Accordingto Ockham, it is not the case thata substanceis numerically
distinctfromthe sum of itsparts.As Ockham understands this claim, it has some importantconsequences for the way in
which propertiesinhere in substances.Basically, Ockham, like Scotus,
accepts (1). The premiss of Ockham's argumentabout propertiesis
of (1):
roughly the contrapositive
(1*) If it is not the case thata substancex is numericallydistinctfrom
the sum of its parts, then any propertyof x inheresin (one or
more of) x's parts.
In this last section,I want to examine this part of Ockham's theorya
bit more closely,showing,first,that for Ockham at least some of the
propertiesthatScotus would have held to inheredirectlyin a whole composite substance Scotus's C-accidents actuallyinhere directlyonly in
one of the substance'ssimple parts. Secondly,I shall tryto show that,
forOckham, propertiesthatinheredirectlyin one of the partsof a substance inhereindirectlyin the whole. It is thissecond claim that,I shall
substancesfromaggregatesin Ockham's reducargue,reallydistinguishes
tionisticaccount of substance.(I do not mean that this claim allows us
to explainthe difference
between substancesand aggregates;merelythat
45AtSum.Ph.1. 19 OPh
andits
notesthatan accident
( , VI, 208,11.87-90),Ockham
in thesameplace,suchthat'ifnumerically
oneandthesameaccident
substance
exists
would
andthere
itwouldinform
bothofthem,
werein thesameplaceas twosubjects,
andtheaccident,
ofthefirst
be twocomposites,
onewouldbe composed
ofwhich
subject
In herdiscussion
andtheothercomposed
andthesameaccident.'
ofthesecondsubject
theparts
in Ockham,
Adamsfocuses
criterion:
ofsubstantial
on theincompleteness
unity
ofa substance
areincomplete
above,n. 2),667,referring
(seeAdams1987(op.dL,
things
in Qu.Var.6. 2 allows
tothediscussion
toOckham,
2. 10(OTh
, IX, 161).Attention
Quod.
ofOckham's
ofsubstantial
us togivea muchfuller
account
unity.
theory

18:33:18 PM

161

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

difference
betweensubstancesand
it is the mostmetaphysically
significant
I
In
the
course
this
shall
see whetherOckham's
of
discussion,
aggregates.)
(and Scotus's) relianceon (1), or a principlecloselyrelatedto it, can be
defended.If it can, I shall suggestthatScotus's account is to be preferred
to Ockham's. I shall conclude by tryingbrieflyto see which thinker
Ockham or Scotus- was rightto thinkthat his view is the one held by
Aristotle.
Ockham's defenceof (1*) formspart of a wider defenceof the logical
equivalenceof a whole seriesof claims. What the argumentlacks in elebetweentwo different
Ockham distinguishes
gance it gainsin thoroughness.
sortsof Scotus's C-accidents.Some which I shall label iG]-accidents'
are simplein the sense of havingparts the same in kind as theirwhole.
(I brieflydiscussedthis sort of Ockhamistaccident above.) Others C2- are not
accidents
simple in this way. Making use of this distinction,
Ockham understands(1*) as follows:
(1**) If it is not the case thata substancex is numericallydistinctfrom
the sum of its parts,then both (a) any Cj -accidentof x inheres
in exacdy one *'s parts,and (b) any C2-accidentof x inheresin
the sum of (more than one of) x's parts.
Ockham's argumentsrequireclose analysis,via fourrelevanttextswhich
I label '(I)'-'(IV)'. First,it is easy enough to show that,for Ockham, C-accidentsbelong to a whole onlysecondarily,and in virtueof theirinherin one of the partsof a whole. Ockham offersthe following
ing primarily
to
Scotus's
firstargumentagainst reductionism:
reply
(I) I replythat,if we accept 'passion' as it impliesa thingdistinctfrom
its subject and formallyinherentin it, then I say that a composite
does not have any proper operationor proper passion that does not
belong firstto its parts. And the reason for this is that,just as is
proved elsewherein Ockham, a subjectis always exactlyas simpleas
an accidentreceivedin it. For this reason no accident that has parts
of the same sortas itselfcan be receivedfirstly
by a [composite]whole.
Rather, all the operationsand real passions that belong to a composite belong to it throughthe parts to which [theseproperties]first
belong forexample,understanding,
willing,and sensingthroughthe
like throughthe body. For this
and
such
soul; laughing,descending,
reason I say thatwhat [Scotus] believesto be unreasonableis in fact
necessary.46
46Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTVIII, 216-17,11.227-38).
See alsoIn Sent.
4. 9 {OTh,VIII, 16,

18:33:18 PM

162

RICHARD
GROSS

The premisshere is that an accident can be no more or less complex


than the object in which it inheres.We should not misunderstandthis
to entailthateveryC-propertyinheresin a whole onlybecause it inheres
primarilyand properlyin a part of the whole. One of Ockham's examples is laughing,and anotherdescending.These properties,accordingto
Ockham, inhere in the body, a reduciblecomplex whole of matterand
bodilyform.On Ockham's simplicitycriterion,laughterand descentare
C2-accidents.Elsewhere,Ockham gives furtherexamples of properties
- that are
propertiesgenuinelyof the whole construedas a
C2-accidents
sum of its parts:
(II) The per se end term of generationis the compositeof matterand
form.And I concede that one part [alone] is not the completeperse
end termof generation,thoughit could be the end termof formal
and partial generation.47
'Being generated',as describedby Ockham, is a complex stateof affairs,
not a simplepropertyat all. I takeit thatC2-accidentsare all likethis,and
hence such thattheycan belong properlyto a whole reduciblecomplex.48
Taking (I) and (II) together,I thinkwe can reasonably claim that
Ockham is committedto the followingprinciple:
(2) If a propertyis exactlyas simpleas the object in whichit inheres,
then both (a) any Cj -accidentof a substancex inheresin exacdy
one *'s parts,and (b) any C2-accidentof * inheresin the sum of
(more than one of) *'s parts.
And thisprincipleis the basis forOckham's responseto thefirstof Scotus's
anti-reductionistic
argumentsdiscussedin sectionone above. Because any
propertyis exacdy as simple as the object in which it inheres,thereare
11.12-16):
'Thisis confirmed
areintheir
whole
thatsomeaccidents
bythecommon
saying
invirtue
ofmatter
andsomeinvirtue
ofform
(forexample
(forexample
quality).
quantity),
Thiswouldnotholdunless
inmatter
weresomeaccident
received
there
(for
immediately
andsomein thesubstantial
form
quantity),
(for
example
example
quality).'
47Qu.Var.6. 2 (OTh,VIII, 214,11.163-6).
s
on Ockham
too,of course,can havesimilarly
Aggregates
properties
complex
- evento thepointofhaving
ofthe
thatcannot
be properties
theory
complex
properties
theproposition
ofthe
Forexample,
Ockham
sometimeanalysing
parts
spends
4Allthe aggregate.
toshowhow'being(numerically)
is a property
ofthe
aretwelve'
twelve'
Apostles
wholeaggregate
see
oftheApostles
without
ofanyoneoftheApostles:
beinga property
In
11.183-191).
see Ockham,
Fora different
Qu.Var.6. 2 (07,VIII, 214-15,
example,
Sent.1. 24. 2 (OTh,IV, 106,11.19-22).

18:33:18 PM

ON PARTANDWHOLE
OCKHAM

163

no propertieshad by a substancethat are not had eitherby one of the


objectsparts,or by the sum of one or more of the objects parts.
In (I), Ockham claims to have demonstratedthe antecedentof (2) elsewhere. The argumenthe offersruns as follows:
(III) I assume an accident receivedin a composite.I then ask whether
thataccidentis receivedonlyinto one part of the composite,or into
each part,since accordingto you [i.e. Ockham himself]thereis no
thirdform[reallydistinctfromits parts]. If it is receivedonly into
one part, for example matteror form,then we have proved what
we proposed,that an immediatesubject is exactlyas simple as an
accidentreceivedinto it. If it is receivedinto each part, eitherthe
whole accidentis in each part, or part of it is in one, and part in
the other.If the first,then numericallythe same accidentis equally
immediatelyreceived into two numericallydistinctaccidents.This
seems to be false,since thus one subject,with that accident could
by divinepower be destroyed,while the othersubjectwiththe same
accidentcould remain.In thiscase, the same accidentwould remain
which is absurd. If the second [viz. part of the
afterits destruction,
accidentis receivedinto one part of the subject,and the otherpart
of the accidentinto the otherpart of the subject],thenwe have also
provedwhat we proposed,since thatpart whichis receivedinto one
part of the compositehas a subject exacdy as simple as the accident, and the other part likewise.And this is what I call the first
subject.49
There are twopartsto thiscrucialargument.The firstis thatthe reducibilityof a substanceto its parts entailsthat any Cj -accidentof a substance
X is had by exacdy one of *'s parts. I take it that Ockham would be
happy to claim analogouslythat the reducibilityclaim entails that any
C2-accidentis had by the sum of more than one of x's parts.So the first
part of the argumentin this passage is just that (1**) is true. The second part of the argumentis that the consequentof (1**)- namely,both
(a) any Cj -accidentof a substancex inheresin exacdy one *'s parts,and
(b) any C2-accidentof x inheresin the sum of (more than one of) *'s
parts entailsthe antecedentof (2) namely,a propertyis exacdy as simple as the object in which it inheres.Since the conclusionof (1**) and
49In Sent.
4. 9 {OTh,VII, 163,1. 13-p.164,1.9).

18:33:18 PM

164

GROSS
RICHARD

(2) is the same, it followsthat the premissand conclusionof (2) are logically equivalent.
(Ill) is in factno help in Ockham's attemptto attackthefirstof Scotus's
since (III) establishesthe crucialsimplicity
argumentsagainstreductionism,
claim by inferencefroma reductionistic
account of substance.Ockham's
here
turns
out
Scotus
to be circular:the proof of its
argumentagainst
relies
its
on
conclusion.
Nevertheless,theremightbe otherways
premiss
forOckham to establishthe crucialsimplicity
claim. Or perhapshe could
to
it
as
an
obvious
basic
truth.
just appeal
The final piece of Ockham's overall argumentis found in another
passage:
(IV) John [i.e. John Duns Scotus] positsa formof the whole. So he can
consequentlyposit that the immediatesubjectof an accidentis that
thirdformof the composite,and thus accordingto him the immediate subject of an accidentis not exactlyas simpleas the accident
itself.But those who do not posit such a thirdformwould have to
posit thatthe immediatesubjectof any accidentis exactlyas simple
as the accident.50
There are two claims here. First,thatif a substancex is numericallydistinctfromthe sum of its parts,then it is not the case that a propertyis
exacdyas simpleas the objectin whichit inheres.In otherwords,Scotus's
anti-reductionism
entails that the antecedentof (2) is false. Secondly,if
it is not the case that a substanceis numericallydistinctfromthe sum
of its parts,then a propertyis exactlyas simple as the object in which
it inheres. Ockham's reductionismentails the antecedentof (2). Thus
Ockham believesthat his reductionismis logicallyequivalentto his simplicitycriterionforpropertyinherence.
Taking all of Ockham's argumentstogether,he evidentlyregardsthe
followingthreeclaims as logicallyequivalent:
(i) It is not the case that a substanceis numericallydistinctfromthe
sum of its parts.
(ii) A propertyis exactlyas simple as the object in which it inheres.
(iii) Both (a) any Cj -accidentof a substance* inheresin exactlyone
*'s parts,and (b) any C2-accidentof x inheresin the sum of (more
than one of) *'s parts.
50In Sent.
4. 9 (OTh
, VII, 163,11.5-11).

18:33:18 PM

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

165

We learn from(IV) that(i) and (ii) are logicallyequivalent;and we learn


from(I), (II), and (III) that (ii) and (iii) are logicallyequivalent.(We also
learn from(III) that (i) entails(iii),but thisentailmentis itselfimpliedby
the equivalence relationsjust oudined.)
In fact,however,to understandOckham's basic metaphysicalinsight,
we do not need to focuson all of theselogical equivalences.The crucial
claimsare (1**)and (2). As Ockham understands(1**),it is logicallyequivalentto (1), a principleaccepted by Scotus. So Scotus and Ockham share
a crucialmetaphysicalinsight,namelythatif an object is reducibleto its
parts, we should regard these parts as the immediate subjects of the
object'sproperties.So if an object reallyis reducibleto its parts,itspropertiesshould be reducibleto propertiesof its parts. Ockham infers(2)
fromthis,since he believes that the antecedentof (1**) (i.e. (i)) entails
the antecedentof (2) (i.e. (ii)). There is no reason forScotus to deny this
inference,thoughhe, of course,rejectsthe antecedentof (1**), and thus
need not accept the antecedentof (2). (In fact,as Ockham points out,
Scotus will certainlywant to rejectthe consequentof (2), and thus reject
its antecedentas well.) Scotus's implicitrejectionof Ockham's simplicity
claim- as noticedby Ockham- means thatScotus does not have to concede that Cj -accidentsinhere in the parts of a substance,or that C2accidentsinherein the sum of (two or more of) a substance'sparts.For
Scotus,many Cj -accidentsinherein a compositewhole. And on Scotus's
basic claim (1), this entails that a reductionistic
account of substanceis
false.
It seems to me likelythat Scotus and Ockham are rightabout (1) and
(2). Given that (1) and (2) are true,can we say which account Scotus's
or Ockham's is to be preferred?(1) and (2) are both principlesabout
reductionism.
of a substanceto its parts,and
(1) is about the reducibility
about
the
of
the
(2)
reducibility
propertiesof a substanceto the properties of parts of the substance. Given that a composite substance, in
Ockham's account, is identicalwith the sum of its parts (where these
in kind fromeach other- matterand form,forexampartsare different
ple),51such a substanceis simplynot a possible subject of inherencefor
Cj -accidents.Put morebluntly,since on Ockham's accountthe onlyavailable compositesubstancesare reducibleto theirparts,it followsthat the
51By'kind'I do notmean
sinceas wehaveseenOckham
thata whole
genus,
accepts
hasparts(i.e.matter
substance
andform)
ofthesamegenus(i.e.thegenusofsubstance).
Thepointisjustthatno parcelofa substance's
matter
is form,
andno parcelofa substance's
form
is matter.

18:33:18 PM

166

RICHARDCROSS

propertiesof such substancesare reducibleto the propertiesof the parts


of the substance.
So Ockham holds that C, -accidentsinhere in the parts of the composite.Sensing,to use Ockham's example,is primarilyan accidentof the
(sensory)soul. But this whole account of thingsis, on the face of it,
immenselyimplausible.An analysisof substanceoughtto allow thatoperations such as sensinginherein the whole, and notjust in a partsof the
whole. Sensingis properlyan operationof an animatecomposite,not of
the sensorysoul of that composite.So I conclude that we should prefer
Scotus's anti-reductionistic
account to Ockham's more parsimoniousone.
Of course,Ockham's account does not commithim to the claim that
there is no way in which an operation such as sensingbelongs to the
composite.All of the passages cited make it clear that everypropertyof
a substancetrulybelongs to the substance,thoughsome of these prop- the C -accidents
- are
erties
primarilypropertiesof variousparts of the
j
substance. C ^accidents are neverthelessderivativelypropertiesof the
whole, in virtueof theirbeing properlypropertiesof various parts. So
Ockham is quite explicitthat the propertiesthat inhere in a part of a
composite its Cj -accidents in some sense belong to the whole of which
it is a part. These propertiesare propertiesofthe whole, forexample,as
we have seen. This yieldsa furtherway for Ockham to distinguish
substances fromaggregates.For Ockham never makes an analogous claim
about the propertiesof a part of an aggregate.A propertyof a human
being,forexample,is not a propertyof a people. So I take it thatwhat
really distinguishessubstances from aggregatesis that the (non-trivial)
propertiesof a part of a substance its Cj -accidents are in some sense,
and in everycase, propertiesof the whole. The same is not trueof aggresubstancesfrom
gates. So Ockham has a plausible way of distinguishing
of
even
his
reductionistic
account
substance.
aggregates,
given
Equally,none of thisentailsthatan Ockhamistsubstanceis not numericallyone. In fact,Ockham is explicitthat a substanceis perse one, and
as we have seen thiscommitshim to the numericalunityof a substance.
A substanceis in a fullsense 'one thing'.It is more 'one thing'than any
of its partsare, since its partsare in some sense incomplete;but it is less
'one thing'than its parts are in anothersense, since it is not sufficiently
unifiedto be the immediatesubjectof simpleaccidents.As Ockham sees
the debate, the significant
featureof his positionis the claim that a substance is reducibleto its parts.
One final point needs to be made, however.As I noted above, the

18:33:18 PM

OCKHAM
ON PARTANDWHOLE

167

debate betweenScotus and Ockham relieson the claim that matterand


constituents
of a substance.Both thinkersclaim Aristotle
formare individual
of a substanceto
for theirviews on the reducibilityor non-reducibility
its parts.If we ask how Aristotelianthe whole debate is, however,I suspect that we will immediatelyhave to face the possibilitythat Aristotle
does not thinkof matterand formin thisway at all. For Aristotle,part
of the point of a matter-form
analysisis that a substancejust is matter
withform,such thatthe only object is the substance,and the onlypropertiesare the form.Compared withthissortof analysis,the viewsof both
Scotus and Ockham involve an account of substance that makes submorecomplexthanin Aristotle's
account.On Aristotle's
stanceconsiderably
account, the debate between Scotus and Ockham about reductionism
could not even get started.
Oxford
OrielCollege

18:33:18 PM

The Oxford"Schoolof Heretics":theUnexamined


Case of FriarJohn
ANDREWE. LARSEN

In the past two decades or so, considerablestrideshave been made in


the historyof Oxford and the thoughtof Oxfordscholars
understanding
in the fourteenthcentury.The work of historianssuch as WilliamJ.
Courtenay, ChristopherOcker, John D. North, and Girard Etzkorn,
among others,has shed considerablelight on the years between 1325
and 1375, which only a fewdecades ago David Knowles termed"a dark
period in the historyof Oxford thought".1
This scholarshiphas mainlyconcentratedon the contentof the major
thinkersof thisperiod,and somewhatless attentionhas been paid to incidentsof academic discipline,in part because such incidentsare fewerand
less well-understood
than parallel cases at Paris.2This is certainlyregrettable, because these incidentsreveal a good deal about the climate in
whichscholarsoperatedand the limitationswhichwere imposedon academic thought.
Of the knowncases of academic disciplineat Oxfordin the fourteenth
century,the least examinedis the case of FriarJohn,who foundhimself
in conflictwiththe university
over statementsmade duringa determination in 1357. Scholars have generallyignoredthis case, except in passing mention,because therewas evidentlylittleto be said about it, since
the only survivingdocumenton the incidentfailsto fullyidentifyFriar
John. However, my own researchhas suggestedthe friar'sidentity,and
having discoveredthat,a great deal can be establishedabout thisset of
events.Detailed examinationof thiscase revealssome of the politicaltensionswhichpervadedOxfordin the 1350s and suggeststhatscholarsneed
to re-appraisethe relationshipbetween intellectualfreedomand academic disciplinethat existed at Oxford, and quite possiblyat Paris and
as well.
otheruniversities
1 DavidKnowles,
TheCensured
oftheBritish
in:Proceedings
ofUthred
ofBoldon,
Opinions
at 307.
1951,305-42,
Academy,
2 Cf.William
inMedieval
Universities
andInquisition:
Academic
Freedom
,
J. Courtenay,
Inquiry
andHeresy
at the
in: Church
andJ.M.M.H.Thijssen,
Censure
58 (1989),168-81,
History,
1998.
, 1200-1400
, Philadelphia
University
ofParis
Vivarium
37,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke

18:33:25 PM

THE OXFORD"SCHOOLOF HERETICS"

169

In 1358, John of Hotham, the chancellorof Oxford,and the proctors


William Denby and Richard Toulworth,passed sentence on a certain
BrotherJohn, who was a masterof theology.3Accordingto the record
of the incident,duringthe resolutionof a determination,
John maintained
thatthe friarsdeservedthe tithesof churchesmore than the rectorsdid,
that the king had the rightto take away the temporalitiesfromclerics
ofbad living,and thatthe university
was a "gymnasium
haereticorum"
.4During
the ensuinginvestigation,
BrotherJohn appealed the case to unspecified
lords and magnates and caused the universitygreat expense. Whoever
he appealed to was eitherunwillingor unable to intervene,and the chancellor and proctorspassed sentence. As punishmenthe was forced to
make a public recantationat the churchof St. Mary at the startof the
academic year 1358-9,withthe actual statementhavingbeen writtenfor
him. He was fined 100 shillingsand forbiddento ever lecturewithout
the express license of the chancellor,the proctor,and the mastersof
theology.The formof his recantationis included in the notice of the
event.
John's identityis impossibleto determinefromthis documentalone,
and thisis perhapswhyscholarshave avoided examiningthecase in detail.
The record refersto him as "fraterJohannes" and then leaves a blank,
and thensays "doctor"followedby a second blank. Presumablythe scribe
in questiondid not knowJohn's last name or what he was a doctor of
and leftthe blanksemptyto be filledin later.5A marginalnote in a later
hand reads "Jo: Wyclif",and a second hand has written,"non accedo
3
."6
, sed coramimpugnator
, si quis alius, accerimus
Wiclijusenimfraternonerat
The firstnote was clearlypromptedby the fact that BrotherJohn was
's teachdiscussingtheissue of dominion,one of the major issuesin Wyclif
ings,but the second hand has correctlystated the flaw in that identification,sinceWyclifwas nota monkor friar.The recordalso notesthatJohn
made his revocationin the presence and by the agreementof his principal and the other doctors,and the priors of 'the said order', but it
doesn'tactuallysay what orderis referredto. Given his claim about mendicantsdeservingtithesmore than rectors,it is safe to assume thatJohn
3 Munimenta
Acadmica
orDocuments
Illustrative
at Oxford
ofAcademical
, ed.
LifeandStudies
H. Anstey,
cancelarii
etprocuratorum
, London1868,208-11(RS 50).
pt. 1: Libri
ed.Anstey
1868{op.cit.,above,n. 3),209-10.
Munimenta
bincethedocument
laterrefers
toJohn
s saidorderwithout
mentioned
the
having
itis possible
thatoneofthespaces,probably
thelatter,
wasintended
to indentify
order,
order.
John's
ed.Anstey
1868[op.cit.,above,n. 3),208,n. 7.
Munimenta

18:33:25 PM

170

ANDREW
E. LARSEN

was himselfa mendicant,but it is impossibleto say fromthisdocument


alone to which orderJohn belonged.
The only previous scholars to cite this incidentmade no suggestion
as to whoJohn may have been.7However,therewere at least two regent
mastersin 1357 who were named John, and both are possible candidates. In 1358, the university
complainedabout the 'Wax Doctors' menwho
dicants
obtained privilegesfrom authoritiesoutside the university
orderingthattheybe givenexemptionsfromsome of the normalrequirementsand procedures.8One of the two people the university
specifically
complained about was the Franciscan Richard Leomynstre,who was a
protgof the Black Prince. He was permittedto inceptwithouthaving
to reign in theology,and instead the regencyof another master,John
Nutone,was extendedto coverwhat shouldhave been Richard'sregency.
was evidentlya regentmasterin 1356 and 1357.
John Nutone,therefore,
A.B. Emden identifies
him as a Dominicanwithoutoffering
any evidence,
but the only documenthe is mentionedin does not specifyhis order,
and Leomynstrewas a Franciscan,makingit probable that Nutone was
as well. However, had John been a Franciscan,we would expect to find
the guardian present,not a prior, who played a different
role in the
Franciscanorder fromthatin the othermendicantorders,and thusit is
unlikelythatJohn Nutone should be identifiedwith this FriarJohn.
The other regentmaster named John in 1357 was the Augustinin
John Kedington.In 1357, Kedingtonwas removedfromofficeforsome
offense,which he appealed to the Court of Arches withoutthe permission of his prior.We possess testimony
fromthe AustinFriarsof Oxford
about the matter,as well as a record of the expenses incurredby the
Chancellor and Proctors,who had to travelto London to deal withthe
with the knownfacts
case.9 The eventsof Kedington'scase fitperfectly
in FriarJohn's case. Both were mendicantregentmastersin theologyin
both appealed to author1357, both got into troublewiththe university,
in considerities outsidethe university,
and both involvedthe university
able legal expense.AubreyGwynnnoticedKedington'scase, but thought
that Kedington had been removed from officeto make room for the
7 SeeJohnRea Bacher,
1942,
TheProsecution
inMedieval
, Philadelphia
ofHeretics
England
A Friar's
Klenkok
c. 1310-1374
1993,35;
16;Christopher
, Philadelphia
Ocker,
Life,
Johannes
1989(op.cit.,above,n. 2), 169.
Courtenay
8 Munimenta
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3),207-8.
, ed.Anstey
9 Medieval
Oxford
Archives
ed. Rev.H.E. Salter,
1920,vol.1,
oftheUniversity
ofOxford,
171-5,179.

18:33:25 PM

THE OXFORD"SCHOOLOF HERETICS"

171

incomingmasterGeoffreyHardeby and made his appeal to protesthis


removal.10
However,nothingin thosedocumentssayswhyhe was removed,
and it is just as plausible that Kedingtongot himselfin troubleduringa
and was removedfromoffice,which sparkedhis appeal.
determination
Once FriarJohn's identityis establishedas John Kedington,the exact
Sometimein the wineventsof the case become fairlystraight-forward.
ter term of 1357 he presided over a theologydebate which evidently
involvedthe then controversialtopic of dominion,and duringhis resolutionof the issue he declared that the Mendicant Orders had a greater
rightto tithesthan rectorsof churchesdid, presumablyusing as his basis
He also
forthisstatementArchbishopFitzralph'stheorieson dominion.11
said that the king had the rightto deprive ecclesiasticsof theirlivings
"forbad and disorderlyliving",again presumablyusing Fitzralph'sarguments.12
The record also says that he called the Universitya "gymnasium
but it seemshighlyunlikelythathe would make such a statehaereticorwri'
unless he did so as tempersrose in reacment duringa determination,
tion to his statements.
Word of his statementsclearlyspread, and someone at the University
attemptedto intervene.Most likelyit was eithera secular or monastic
student,or a memberof the Universityhierarchy.In a formadproceedto investigatethe
ing forheresy,a friar'sorderhad the firstresponsibility
if
and
the
in
this
did not hapmatter,
university
normallyonly stepped
of
pen.13While thiswas not strictlyspeakinga matter heresy,a similar
procedurewould probablyhave been followedin thisinstance.There is
nothingin eitherof the documentsrelatingto this incidentto suggest
that the Austinstook any action against Kedington, and in the letter
whichformedpart of his appeal, the chancellorJohn of Hotham and his
proctorsfor the previousyear,JohnJoskinand Alexander of Feribrigg,
are repeatedlymentionedas havingtakenactionsagainstFriarJohn.This
underminesGwynn'sassumptionthatit was John'sorderthat
particularly
removedhim. Rather,Hotham and his proctorsremovedKedingtonfrom
10Aubrey
TheEnglish
Austin
Friars
in theTimeofWyclif
Oxford1940,90-1.
Gwynn,
wassuspended
Ockerspeculates
thatKedington
becausehewasoneofthe'WaxDoctors';
Ocker1993(op.cit
., above,n. 7),34.
" See
XXX below,
whereI discuss
whathisprobable
was.
page
argument
12Munimenta
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3),209:"rexa clericis
etvirisecclesi, ed.Anstey
asticis
maleetinordinate
viventibus
absqueinjuria
possessiones
possetauferre".
13William
TheArticles
Condemned
at Oxford
Austin
Friars
in1315,pp. 9-10,
J. Courtenay,
in:HeikoA. Oberman
andFrankA. JamesIII (eds.),ViaAugustini:
intheLater
Augustine
Middle
Renaissance
Medieval
Archives
, andReformatio
n,Leiden1991,5-18,at 9-10.
Ages,

18:33:25 PM

172

ANDREW
E. LARSEN

his office.There is no mentionof a committeeinvestigating


Kedington,
but by the end of the whole matter,a brieflist of condemnedpropositions had been drawn up, as was normal in cases of academic error.
At some point during the reaction to him, FriarJohn appealed his
case. He persuadedRichard de Plessy,the archdeaconof Colchesterand
deacon of St Mary Archesin London to writeto ArchbishopSimon Islip
of Canterbury,assertingthat FriarJohn was a legitimatedoctor of theuntilthe university
officials
removed
ologywho had lecturedpraiseworthily
him withoutcause. Plessy'sletteremphasizesat considerablelengththat
the action had been taken withoutdue process and withoutlegitimate
cause.14Althoughthismay be exaggerationon John or Richard'spart to
theircase, it is entirelyplausible.John had, so far as we can
strengthen
done
see,
nothingto meritactual removal fromhis office,and thereis
no sign that his order had taken any action againsthim. The local and
provincialpriorsof his order subsequendydenied the factsof Richard's
letter,which would presumablymean that Kedington had done somethingworthremovaland thatthe law had been followed,but the charges
listed in the final verdictagainst him contradictthat. It is more likely
that his order opposed his appeal because theyfoundit politicto do so.
in conThis appeal starteda legal strugglethatinvolvedthe University
siderablelegal expense.15This expense is partiallyreflectedin an account
book for the Universityfromthe 1357-8 academic year, which includes
the expenses of the chancellorand proctorswhen theywent to London
to deal with the matter.16
It was likelyduringthisprocessof appeal thatJohncalled the University
a school of heretics.In supportof this reading is the fact thatJohn's
retractiontreatsthisstatementseparatelyfromthe othertwo,as if it had
been added on afterthe list of propositionswas drawn up. The priorof
John's convent,also named John, forbadeKedingtonfrompursuingthe
but by thistimethe Archbishophad apparentlydevelprocessany further,
an
in
interest
the case. Hotham was cited to appear at the court
oped
14Medieval
non
ed.Salter1920(op.cit.,
citatum,
above,n. 9), 173:"nonlegitime
Archives,
in ea partede iurerequisitis
et iurisordine
necconfessum,
causecognicione
convictum,
ab officio
seulegitima
doctoquacumque,
penitus
pretermissis,
absquecausaracionabili
etlegdocendi
sicregendi,
huiusmodi
ratusseumagisterii
cura,statuethonore
exercicio,
endi. .
15Munimenta
indebite
Universitatem
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3),210:"totam
, ed.Anstey
dominis
et aliismultiplicibus
et magnatibus
vexavi,improvide
querelando,
appellando,
expensis
gravando".
16Medieval
Archives
, ed. Salter1920(op.dt.,above,n. 9), 179-82.

18:33:25 PM

THE OXFORD"SCHOOLOF HERETICS"

173

of Arches and he went therein Januaryof 1358, along with his proctors,Richard the Cistercian abbot of Lowth Park,John of Lancaster,
and otherclerics.Hotham broughtwith him a letterfromWilliam,the
Augustininprior provincial,and PriorJohn, which attestedthatJohn
Kedingtonhad made his appeal withoutthe permissionof his order and
which rejectedhis claims.
This letterwas witnessedby FriarWilliamof Alneto,Richard of Lowth
Park,masterJohn Bodi, Richard of Tennemuth,Galfridusof St. Botulph,
John Bourtone,John Bernewik,and other unspecifiedindividuals.Unwe knowlitdeabout any of thesemen. William,Richard,and
fortunately
describedas doctorsof theology,so the others
John Bodi are specifically
weren't.
Bodi
was a Benedictinewho had been insulted
John
apparently
an
unknown
Friar
in
1357 (presumablynot John Kedington).
by
John
The othersare completelyunknownexcept fromthis document.
How much furtherthe matterwent is unknown,but Kedingtonultimatelylost his case. The appeal cannot have dragged out much longer,
sinceJohn was being punishedbyJuly,and withJohn havingbeen forbidden to pursue the matter,the court of Arches probablyrenderedits
finalverdicta few monthslater. The court of Arches turnedthe matter
back to the chancellor.Kedington'spunishmentwas overseenby the proctorsof the University
for 1358-9,WilliamDenby and RichardToulworth.
of
Hotham
John
may also have been present,althoughthe record only
says in "the year of the Lord 1358, in the time of Chancellor John
Hotham, withthe presenceof the proctorsWilliam Denby and Richard
Toulworth".17
The judgmentwas made in the presence of and with the
of
permission John'sprincipal,otherdoctors,presumablyof theology,and
priorsof John's order. It would appear, then, that Denby, Toulworth,
and possiblyHotham determinedthe sentencein consultationwith the
othersmentioned.The referenceto John's principalis puzzling,since the
Augustiniansdo not appear to have employedan officialwith that tide,
but it is probablya referenceto John, the prior of the Oxford convent.
The elementsof John's punishmentneed to be considered,because
they are unusual withinEnglish universities.His punishmentinvolved
being forcedto publiclyread a statementof apology writtenforhim, to
17Munimenta
1868[op.cit.,above,n. 3), 208:"Memorandum,
, ed. Anstey
quodanno
Domini
millesimo
trecentesimo
Hothom
octavo,
Cancellarii,
Johannis
quinquagesimo
tempore
existentibus
Procuratoribus
Willheimo
Toulworth
. . Thefactthatthe
DenbyetRicardo
document
isrecorded
intheBookoftheProctors,
rather
thanintheBookoftheChancellor,
seemstosupport
this.

18:33:25 PM

174

ANDREW
E. LARSEN

pay a fineof 100 shillings,and to be barred fromever lecturingin theology again withoutthe permissionof the chancellor,the proctors,and
all the doctorsof theology.The fineof 100 shillingsis extremelyheavy,
and may have been imposed to help the Universitymake up for the
expenses involvedin the appeal. It is certainlya non-standardpunishment, with no parallel in any other case involvingacademic debate,
although imposing a fine was justifiedby the rules governingunjust
appeals.18John, being a friar,would not have been able to pay such a
fine,and it would have fallento his order to make good the payment.
No othercase at Oxfordor Cambridgeinvolvessuch a punishment.The
recantation,althoughunparalleledin heresycases in England,has a parallel in at least one non-heresycase at Oxford and was a standardpunishmentat continentaluniversities.19
The documentexplicitlynotes that
was
to
read
the
recantation
John
exactlyas it had been writtenforhim,
withoutany changes,additionsor deletions.20
Althoughwe cannotbe certain,it appears thatthispunishmentruinedJohn's career,since he is not
mentionedin any othersurvivingdocument.
It is importantto note thatJohnwas neverexplicitly
accused of heresy,
the
he
because
statements
made
were
the
source of considundoubtedly
erable controversy
at the time and had not been formallycondemnedby
the Church. The overall impression,however,is thatJohn was treated
as ifhe were a heretic,and his retraction
readslikea recantationof heresy.
In it, he is forced to retractthe opinions he expressed about tithes
and the deprivationof ecclesiasticsand to affirmthe contrary,and to
18Unjust
as farbackas c. 1300,when
fortheuniversity
appealshadbeena problem
formaking
theuniversity
hadbeenforced
toincrease
thepenalties
unjust
Unjust
appeals.
networth,
anda scaleoffines
intothree
basedontheir
weredivided
catagories
appellants
were
offenders
withtheappellant's
The wealthiest
wasestablished
thatincreased
wealth.
fines.
in excessofstandard
fined10 shillings.
Evengiveninflation,
finewasvastly
John's
In thelate15thcentury,
to 2s. or 3s.4d.See Munifines
forappealsnormally
amounted
TheUnivered.Anstey
1868(op.cit.,
Rashdall,
menta,
above,n. 3),73-6,as wellas Hastings
andA.B.Emden,
Oxford:
sities
intheMiddle
ed. F.M.Powicke
1936),vol.3,
ofEurope
Ages,
andMedieval
Archives
, ed. Salter1920(op.dt.,above,n. 9),vol.2, 281.It is worth
136-7),
court
thattheCrownpasseda statute
forbidding
noting
appealsfromtheChancellor's
to theArchbishop's
a fewyearsafter
thiscase.
just
19Munimenta
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3), 211-2.An unidentified
, ed. Anstey
preaching
in a sermon
friar
attacked
a University
as theSophists
thesameyearthat
groupknown
to apoloBrother
andthefriar
wasforced
It touched
offa quarrel
Johnwaspunished.
His retraction
wasmuch
theartsstudents.
forhaving
insulted
gizein a secondsermon
ofarts.
thathe didn'tintend
todetract
from
thestudy
to a statement
milder,
amounting
20Munimenta,
ed.Anstey
1868(op.cit.,above,n. 3),209:"quodlegeret
palametpublice
ddo
necdiminuendo,
necaliquaverba{erasure}
revocationem
necaddendo,
infrascriptam,
inpublico
in ecclesia
Oxoniae".
BeataeMariaeVirginis

18:33:25 PM

THE OXFORD"SCHOOLOF HERETICS"

175

promiseneverto hold those opinionsagain, eitherpubliclyor privately.21


John's punishmentwas fairlysevere,about as severe as the university
could make against someone who was not actuallya heretic.To some
extent,this may have been due to the expense he caused the university
and even more so to the offensehe gave by callingit a school of heretics.
But even so, we mustalso take into considerationthe broader contextof
his statements.
John's case must be seen in the contextof the debate over lordship
whicheruptedin 1356 betweenArchbishopFitzralphof Armaghand the
Salvatoris
, firstpriAugustininfriars.22
Fitzralphcirculatedhis De pauperie
vatelyat Oxfordand then publicly,in which he accused the mendicant
ordersof abusing theirvows of povertyand humilityand usurpingthe
pastoral functionof the episcopate. This put them in a state of sin by
which theylost theirlordshipover theirpropertyand privileges.23
Then,
in a series of sermonspreached at London in 1356-7, he attackedthe
mendicantordersopenly.24
The friars,led by the Augustinians,
responded
him
of
erroneous
by accusing
teaching.Fitzralphretaliatedby attacking
the worldlinessand wealth of the friars.By the end of March 1357, the
friarshad enlistedthe aid of King Edward III, and Fitzralphwent to
Avignonto carryon the debate.
21Munimenta
1868(op.cit
domini
astantes
, ed.Anstey
., above,n. 3),210-1:"Reverendi
et singuli,
in determinatione
ultimo
facta,materias
quadam,termino
hyemali
praeterito
tractavi
odiosasquamplurimis
et displicentes,
et praecipue
matris
aliquasdeterminando
nostrae
Universitatis
nimium
de quo dolensetanxius
fuitempore
nonmodico,
offensivas,
verum
in hacpartede mandato
Universitatis
promeopossesatisfacere
cupiens,
ejusdem
venerabilis
dicamin scripto;
nostram
Universitatem
venerImprimis,
quodistammatrem
abilem
scioCatholicam
sanafundatam
etsanaefidei
esse,indoctrina
Item,
protectricem;
doctores
reverendos
essecatholicos
virosdicoet affirmo;
Item,quodpraedictam
ejusdem
matrem
etreverendos
nostram
doctores
etmaistros,
etpraecipue
dominum
Cancellarium
etProcuratores
humilius
ab eisdem
veniam
offendi,
quopossum
pluries
petounavoce;et
Universitatem
indebite
et magnatibus
dominis
vexavi,
quiatotam
improvide
appellando,
etaliismultiplicibus
ideoireat satisfactionem
offero
querelando,
expensis
gravando,
juxta
me reportaverunt
in determinatione
vires;Itemquia pluresvalentes
dixisse,
praedicta
etdeterminasse,
domini
asseruisse,
quodquicumque
temporales
prosuolibito
absqueauctoritate
Ecclesiae
Deo et ecclesiis
donataauferre
ab eisdem
et
possunt
aliquatemporalia
Ecclesiae
fratribus
mendicanrevocare;
Item;quoddecimae
perpetuo
magissuntdebitae
tibus
etcuratis;
Idcirco
de temporalibus
etdecimis
quamrectoribus
praedictas
quaestiones
errneas
etfalsas
essedico,earumque
contradictorias
fateor
esseveras,
etillasquaestiones
et earumquamlibet,
minuscatholicas
ex nuncet in perpetuum
afirmativas,
tamquam
neceasvelearum
de caetero
modosustinebo
tacite
velexpresse."
detestor,
aliquam
aliquo
22Gwynn
1940(op.cit.,above,n. 10),80-9.See alsoOcker1993(op.dt., above,n. 7),
A FourteenthScholar
andPrimate:
Richard
inOxford,
33-8,andKatherine
Walsh,
Century
Fitzralph
andArmagh,
Oxford
1981,349-451.
Avignon,
23Walsh1981 cit.,above,n.
(op.
22),402-3.
24Walsh1981(op.
cit.,above,n. 22),409-21.

18:33:25 PM

176

ANDREW
E. LARSEN

Running throughoutFitzralph'sattackson the mendicantsis his theory of lordship.Drawing on Augustinintheology,he suggestedthatonly


those clergyof sound livinghad a rightto the lordshipof theirtemporalities,somethinghe had assertedas early as 1340.25His assertionthat
the mendicantsought to lose theirprivilegesbecause theyabused them
evolves out of thisprinciple.
This debate was by no means confinedto London. Fitzralphwas in
the vicinityof Oxford in October 1356, where he preached againstthe
in Oxfordat thattime,
Sahatoris
mendicants,and he circulatedDe pauperie
and may even have debated the issues formally.26
By the end of 1357,
GeoffreyHardeby, Kedington'sreplacementas Augustininregentmaster at Oxford, had debated the topic, eitherwith Fitzralphhimselfor
one of his supporters,and was respondingto Fitzralphwith his De vita
, in whichhe assertedthatlordshipwas independentof the merit
evangelica
of the holder.
John's statements,whateverthe exact details,are clearlyanotherelement of the responseto Fitzralph.Unlike Hardeby,who triedto undercut Fitzralph'sargument,
John seems to have triedto turnthemaround.
The exact lines of his argumentare unclear, but the most likelyinterpretationis thathe claimed that the mendicantshad a superiorlife,and
thatthereforetheyhad a superiorclaim to churchpropertythan thatof
the seculars.
Given thatthe mendicantsare likelyto have supported,or at least not
stronglyobjected to John's arguments,the impetusfor his punishment
musthave come fromthe secular or monasticmasters.The secularmastersare the mostlikelyleaders of the action againstJohn. Not onlywould
theyhave had cause to be offendedby his suggestionthatthe mendicant
was superior,his argumentthatmendicantsdeservedthe tithesof
lifestyle
churchesmorethantherectorsdid was a directthreatto them,sincemany
secular mastersexpected to become rectorsafterleaving the University.
It is also worthnotingthatArchbishopIslip, himselfa secular,is known
to have favoredthe secular clergyagainstthe friarson at least one other
occasion, and thismay have played a factorin his decisionto returnthe
case to the University.27
25SeeGwynn
1940(op.cit.,
above,n. 10),59-73,andWalsh1981(op.t., above,n. 22),
to thisissue.Fitzralph
wasdrawing
on Gilesof
377-86,forthetheological
background
Rome.
26Walsh1981(op./.,above,n. 22),411-5.

18:33:25 PM

THE OXFORD"SCHOOLOF HERETICS"

177

wereundera good deal ofpressurewithintheUniversity


The mendicants
at thistime.In 1357, anotherFriarJohn (presumablynot the same one)
was forcedto apologize forhavingdishonoredthe BenedictinemonkJohn
Bodi, while a thirdfriarwas forced to apologize for insultingthe arts
students.In 1358, the mendicantswere forbiddento recruitamong the
students,while in 1360 or 1361 the regentmasterscondemnedthe 'wax
doctors' of the mendicantorders,mendicantswho received degrees by
virtueof connectionswith importantpatronsratherthan by having followed the normalacademic track.28
Given thisatmosphereof hostility
to
the mendicants,it is unsurprising
thatJohn was treatedso harshlyfor
what was hardlya major offense.Indeed, the size of his finemay reflect
a desire on the part of secular or monasticmastersto punish his entire
order.This contextalso helps to explain why his superiorschose to forbid his appeal and wrotea letterundermininghis case. They were under
a good deal of pressureat Oxford,and Kedington'sactionshad evidendy
embarrassedthem.
John Kedington'scase offersus a window into political and intellectual tensionsduringwhat is in manywaysstilla murkyperiodin Oxford's
history.It demonstratesclearlythe lengthsto which Universityauthorities were willingto go to punish someone who had offendedthem,and
it highlights
the fact,too littleacknowledged,that academic condemnationsdid not occur forpurelyreligiousreasons.
Madison, Wisconsin
of Wisconsin
University

21He limited
therights
offriars
to hearconfession
and discharge
functions,
pastoral
forthesecularclergy.
See D. Wilkins,
Concilia
Britanniae
et
owingto a concern
magnae
Hiberniae
, London1737,v. 3, p. 64,andtheDictionary
, vol.10,512:
ofNational
Biography
"Simon
Islip".He alsoestablished
students
at Oxford;
A.B.
Canterbury
Collegeforsecular
A Biographical
theUniversity
vol.2, 1008.
Emden,
, Oxford
1957-9,
Register
of
Oxford
of
28Ocker1993(op.cit.,
1868(op.cit
above,n. 7),34-5.SeeMunimenta
, ed.Anstey
., above,
n. 3),207-8.

18:33:25 PM

A Fifteenth-Century
SpanishTreatiseon Consequences
JOKE SPRUYT

During a visitto Spain in the Autumnof 1971, ProfessorDe Rijk came


SumofLogicin the librariesof Sevilla
across two copies of an introductory
and Zaragoza, whichin the Zaragoza copy was entitled"Logica Morelli".1
This Logica
, which presentsa complete account of the materialusually
discussedin late medieval textbooks,seems to neatlytestifyto the way
in which logic was taughtin fifteenth-century
Spain.
The presentedition is of the section of the Summaentided De consequendis.It is firstof all intendedas a modest contributionto the ongoing researchon the developmentof the theoryof consequencesin the
Middle Ages, which formsone of the most importantparts of medieval
centurymay be regardedas the most
logic. Again, while the fourteenth
as
far
as
the
developmentof the theoryof consequences
importantperiod
the
fifteenth
is concerned,
centurydeservesour attentionto determine,
among other things,to what extentcertain traditions(e.g. nominalism)
managed to thriveduringthe late Middle Ages.2Particularlyin the late
and sixteenthcenturiesthe theoryof consequencesformeda very
fifteenth
importantsubjectwithinSpanish logic.3
treatisewe can recogniseelementsfrom
In the present,fifteenth-century
a number of earliersources. For one thingits contentsappear to fitin
writtenby Ralph Strode. Furwith what we findin the De consequentiis
that
has its originin the works
thermore,it containstechnicallanguage
of Paul of Venice, particularlyas far as the semanticsof the proposition
is concerned.Finally,the author also proves himselfto be quite familiar
with Buridan's type of semantics,which clearlycomes to the forewhen
issues pertainingto word order are dealt with.4
1 Professor
oftheentire
a critical
edition
de RijkandI arepreparing
Logica.
2 ForSpanish
La Logica
seeV. MuozDelgado,
Nominalista
inthisdirection,
developments
and traditions
enla Universidad
deSalamanca
% Madrid1964.Fortheschools
(1510-1530
andEarly
Humanist
LateScholastic
intheLateMiddleAges,seeGabriel
extant
Nuchelmans,
York1980,6-8.
Theories
, Amsterdam/New
oftheProposition
3 Cf.MuozDelgado1964(op.t.,above,n. 2),passim.
4 Forthefamiliarity
hissemantic
onlogic,
with
Buridan's
works
ofourauthor
particularly
Vivarium
37,2

BrillNV,Leiden,1999
Koninklijke

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

179

Before going into details about the treatise,I shall first,by way of
introduction,
presenta surveyof the contentsof the Logica.
Let me startwith a shortdescriptionof the manuscripts.5
1 Aboutthemanuscripts
and theauthor
The two manuscriptswe have at our disposal are writtenin a similar
hand. They seem to be unrelated to each other. At times they have
different
readings,and both have omissionsoccurringin different
places.
This distinctionbetweenthe Sevilla and Zaragoza codexes suggeststhat
the two scribeseach must have had access to some other copy.
1.1 Ms Sevilla
Colombina
, Biblioteca
, 7-3-13
Capitular
Our firstcopy is found in codex 7-3-13 of the Biblioteca Capitular
Colombina in Sevilla. This in quartomanuscript,datingfromthe fifteenth
century,contains 145 folios.The textis writtenin one column of about
30 lines each. In many places the textis extremelydifficult
to read as a
resultof damp stains.On the firstfolio a later hand wrote "Guillelmus
Ferrer"(presumablythe name of the scribe),followedby the title"Logica
M." Our Logicabegins on the second folioand ends on the page that is
numbered132r,but is in fact 142r,because the numbers"102- (in fact
"1012"!) 111" are used twice. In the upper margin of f.2r,the same
hand of f.lr added the old siglum "C'Z. Tab. N 6 113". The scribe
frequendywriteshispanismssuch as "sich", "tunch","diferencia","discribere","neguare","sequella",and so on insteadof "sic","tunc","differentia",
"describere","negare" and "sequela".
The Logicafoundin thismanuscript(ff.2r-132
(DO 42)r)has the following incipit
LOGICAEST racionalis
veria falsodiscretiva.
sciencia
Primo
racionalis
logicadicitur
sciencia.
Et in hocconvenit
cumaliisscienciis
seuartibus
. . . etc.
liberalibus
The colophon runs as follows:
DEO GRACIAS.LaustibisitChriste,
iste,littera
nonestformosa
quialiberexplicit
setestbenestudiosa.
ferer
vocatur
benedicatur
laudeguiPermus
quis(!)scripsit.
virgo
turpostquam
finis
librihabetur
detur
Amen.
propena(!)scriptori
gloriaeterna.
seeJokeSpruyt,
Some
onSemantic
Remarks
inTwoSpanish
Tractatus
de conseviews,
Topics
onMedieval
and
quents,in:Actsofthe12thEuropean
Symposium
LogicandSemantics:
"Logic
Semantics
inSpain1220-1550",
heldinPamplona,
26-30May,1997.
5 I amvery
to Professor
De Rijkforsharing
hisinformation
withme.
grateful
Forthecontinuation
seeoursection
2, below.

18:33:38 PM

180

JOKESPRUYT

On folio 133 (DQ43)r some other contemporary


hand startedcopying
another tract,leaving some room for a rubrica,"A", even thoughthe
text opens with the completeword "ad". The incipit
is that of the wellknown tractby PetrusThomae OFM, sc. De distinctione
,7
predicamentorum
which has been preservedunder different
names in quite a numberof
manuscripts:
Primoenim
Ad evidenciam
distinctionis
sic intendo
predicamentorum
procedere.
secundo
alicaprobabilia.
ad primum
Quantum
ponamalicanecessaria;
conculdam(!)
alicasdistincciones,
secundo
declarabo
alicasproposiciones.
permittam(!)
primo
del CabildoMetropolitano
1.2 Ms ZaraZa>Biblioteca
The othercopy is extantin the Bibliotecadel Cabildo Metropolitanoin
Zaragoza under the siglum 15-57 (formerly
"Reg. 922"). This codex of
134 foliosof one column was also writtenin the fifteenth
century,in a
In the colophon
handwriting
verysimilarto thatof the Sevilla manuscript.
it is dated "Anno Domini MCCCCLXXVI". Unlike the Sevilla scribe,
the scribeof the Zaragoza manuscriptseldom uses hispanisms.The manuscriptin question containstwo other tracts,and our tract on logic is
found in between.The firstfivefoliosare not numbered,and the sixth
one is numbered"1".
The firstitem,which is an anonymousincompletetracton syllogistic
figures,opens as follows:
STUDIOSISSIMEperquisivi
ut<rum>illafigura
inprimo
libro
quamdatAristotiles
essetfaciliter
manifesta
et claraomnibus
desiderantibus
earnscire... etc.
priorm
On the sixthfolio,the same hand begins with a completecopy of our
, renumberingthe foliosfrom 1 onwards (which is quite unusual,
Logica
as a matterof fact):
lr:LOGICAEST RACIOnalis
sciencia
... etc.
The texthas been writtenin one column,witha ratherlarge marginon
the rightside, which is sometimesused for adding a few glosses,particthe botularlyon the firstpages. Sometimesthe marginsat the top a#nd
tom of the page are used for that purpose as well. The workwinds up
on folio 142r.
The firstfolioson which the text of the Logicais foundcontainsseveral glosses.Thus f.lr has the gloss:
7 Printed
forPetrus
atVenice,1517byHieronymus
Romanus
de Nuciarellis;
Thomae,
N.Y.1959.
seeG.G.Bridges,
andDistinction
inPetrus
Thomae
O.F.M.
, St.Bonaventure,
Identity

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

181

Nota.Secundum
Scotum
decorata,
logicaestclavisaureapupureijs
argumentis
per
cuiusauxilium
reservantur.
Velaliter
secundum
Abicennam,
...(?) libraphilosophie
de secundis
intentionibus
adiunctis
... etc.
logicaestque tractat
primis
On f.r the marginalgloss is found:
Notasecundum
Albertm
se extendit
unomodoad omneilludquod
quodsignum
facitaliquidevenire
in cognicionem
alicuius
... etc.
apprehensum
On the next page, afterthe Logica
, a freshstarthas been made with a
still
in
the
same
hand:
grammaticaltract,
<S>ECUNDUMQUOD DICIT philosophus
4 in ilia
primoetichorum(!)
capitulo
incidentaliter
inventores
scienciarum
et preactores(!)
partein qua docetur
quomodo
circaearummateri<a>s
diversimode
se habent,
arciumnonsolumsunt
principia
arcium
dimidium
... etc.
ymoplusquamdimidium
Like the firstone, this tractis incomplete.It breaks offon f.145.
The firstfly-leaf
of the Zaragoza copy calls our treatise"Logica Morelli".
The Sevillacopyonlyhas "Logica M". It is likelyto assumethat"Morellus"
is a nickname,but as yetwe do not know who it belongsto. The author
is obviouslya Spanish master who skillfully
compiled his introductory
workfromtextbooksthat were currentin SouthernEurope in the fourteenthand fifteenth
centuries.
2

The contents
of theLogica8

The treatiseopens with two preliminaryremarksabout the art of logic.


Firstlogic is definedin the usual manneras the "rationalskillof discerning between what is true and what is false". The componentsof this
definitionare then explained. Because of its rational nature, logic is
identifiedas one of the seven liberal arts,which are all seienderacionales
owingto the factthat theyare foundedin a rationalsubject,namelythe
rationalsoul:9
2r:LOGICA EST racionalis
sciencia
veria falsodiscretiva.
Primologicadicitur
racionalis
sciencia.
Etinhacconvenit
cumaliisscienciis
seuartibus
scilicet
liberalibus,
cumgramatica,
et astrologia(),
rethorica,
arismetica,
musica,
geometria,
que omnes
dicuntur
a subiecto
sciencie
inquosunt,
racionales
racionali
inanimaracionali.
scilicet
8 Professor
de Rijkhaspresented
an interesting
account
ofsemantic
issuesfeaturing
in
thesection
on terms
andpropositions,
in:LogicaMorelli.
Some
ontheSemantics
Motes
ofA
in theActsoftheTwelfth
on
, forthcoming
Fifteenth
Century
Spanish
Logic
European
Symposium
Medieval
andSemantics
26-30May1997):"Logic
andSemantics
inSpain(1250Logic
(Pamplona,
1550)".
Allquotations
arefrom
theSevillacopy,butthehispanisms,
in
whicharenotfound
havebeencorrected.
Zaragoza,

18:33:38 PM

JOKESPRUYT

182

Its discretivenatureis explained as the propriumthat makes logic differ


fromthe otherliberal arts:
aliarum
arcium
Ibid.:Secundologicadicitur
veria falsodiscretiva
ad differenciam
seuscienciarum,
veleconverum
a falsodiscernere,
quiaad solamlogicam
pertinet
verso.
Next an alternativedefinition
is presented,in whichlogic is equated with
"dialectic"and called "the art of disputation".Again, its positionamong
the otherliberal arts is described:
VEL ALITERet brevius
estarsdisputationis.
describitur
sic:logicaseudialctica
Primoin descriptione
cumaliisartibus
supradicponitur
ly'ars',etin hocconvenit
tis.Secundoponitur
ad differenciam
aliarum
arcium
ly'disputationis'
predictarum,
dicitur
arsdisputationis.
estactusracionabiliter
quiasolalogicaseudialctica
Disputado
et racionabiliter
opponendi
respondendi.
Our treatiseconsistsof fiveparts:
(1) the logic of terms,includingthe so-calledpropertiesof terms,ampliation and appellation,
(2) the logic of propositions,includingtheirdiverse"probationes",
(3) the theoryof argumentation,
(4) the doctrineof the predicablesand the categories,
(5) the doctrineof the so-called "obligaciones".
This divisionof the Logicais accompanied by a didacticadvice (whichin
fact has quite a modern ring to it) to startthe studyof logic with the
second ratherthan with the firstpart, because it is easier fortyronesto
fathomthe logic of propositionsthan the logic of terms:
scilicet
estdifficilior
2V:[. . .] quiamateria
terminorum,
primapartis,
quammateria
et puerorum
idcirco
terminorum
difficultatem
pro
proposicionum,
propter
ipsorum
huius
consulo
anteprimam
quibussuntprimitus
5] ruditatem
partem
[promotus(7J
saltem
materia
legi,scilicet
proposicionum,
usquead matelogicesecundam
partem
riamprobacionum,
facilior
estin materia
quia puerorum
ingressus
proposicionum
terminorum.
quamin materia
2.1

On thelogicof terms

dicussionof
The firstpart of the Logicaopens (2^3") with an interesting
is defined
the notionsof 'sign', 'signifying'
and 'significative'.
Next terminiis
an
in
the
soul
or
as
(3*)
somethingexpressedin words
incomplexconcept
in a non-complexway,10and thus the
or in writingthat is significative
definitioncomprisesmental,vocal and writtenterms.
10Terminus
anime
hieacceptus
etproprie
describitur
sic:terminus
estsimplex
conceptus
autaliquidvocalevelscriptum
incomplexe
significativum.

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

183

Next follow(4^9*) twelvedivisionsof incomplexterms.First(4r"v)


incomterms,
plex termsare divided into categorematicand syncategorematic
and thosethatare partlycategorematicand pardysyncategorematic,
such
as adverbsof timeand place (e.g. ubique
as
well
as
substantiated
, semper)
, omnia).The remainingdivisionsall concern catequantifiers(e.g. aliquid
gorematicterms.The second division(4V)is into concreteand abstract
- a termof the
terms,the third{ibid)is into absoluteand correlativeterms
lattertypeis definedas a termthatcannot be understoodwithoutunderstandingthe opposite termwith regard to which it is called correlative
and filia, and dominus-servus).
The fourthdivi(such as the pairspater-filius
sion (5r"v)concernsdisparate,convertibleand opposite(i.e. contrary,conrelativelyopposed, and privativelyopposed) terms.The fifth
tradictory,
division(5v-6r)is into superiorand inferiorterms(e.g. animalcompared
to homoand the otherway round, respectively).
The sixthdivision(6r'v)
is into oppositeor real termsand termini
a resficta
, such
fidi (i.e. signifying
as chimaera
and vacuum).
The seventhdivision(6v-7r)concernsthe dictasimpliciter
and the dicta
secundum
quid.The formerare termswithouta restrictive,
ampliativeor
some other addition which preventsit from designatingits principal
such as homo,animal.Their counterpartsare phrases such as
significate,
albussecundum
homocorruptus
dentes,
, in which the principalsignificatesof
homoand albusare qualified.In this contextthe labels terminus
diminuens
,
terminus
distrahens
and terminus
are explained. The eighthdiviampliativus
sion (7r"v)is into finiteand infiniteterms,the ninth(7v-8r)into positive
and privativeterms,the tenth(8r) into termsof firstand second intention or imposition,the eleventh(8rv) into common and discreteor sinconcernsimmediateas
gular terms,and the twelfthand last one (8V-9V)
- the formerare terms
terms
to
mediate
opposed
owingto whicha propositioncannotbe proved,thatis, analysedinto protocolsentences,whereas
the latterare such that a propositioncan be proved. The mediate terms
are dividedinto resoluble,exponible and officiableones.
Next the propertiesof terms are discussed,viz- supposition(9V-20V),
and fivekindsof
includingsix divisionsof supposition(material-personal,
personalsupposition),ampliation(20v-22v)and appellation(22v-23v).The
discussionof these propertiesalso containsa numberof rules.
2.2

On thelogicofpropositions

The second Part discussesthe definition


ofproposicio
and its different
kinds,
and the so-calledprobaciones
The firstchapterdeals withthe
proposicionum.
proposition,which is definedas follows:

18:33:38 PM

184

JOKESPRUYT
veravelfalsa,autequivalens.
24r:PROPOSICIOestoracioindicativa
perfecta

The phrase "aut equivalens" is added for two reasons,the authorsays:


Ibid.:Quintoponitur
duo.Primoquiasi aliqualittera
velsillyEquivalens'
propter
labaveldiccioveloracioimponitur
tantum
sicutaliquaproposiad significandum
seu equivalens
Secundopropter
cio,tunctalispotestdiciproposicio
proposicioni.
condicionalem
velexpletivam,
ex partibus
coniunctis,
compositam
que apudlogicos
benedicitur
velsaltem
licetnonsitoracioindicaproposicio
equivalens
proposicioni,
'si homoessetasinus,
homoessetrudibilis',
ethuiusmodi.
tiva;utcumdicitur
Afterthe distinction
betweencategoricaland hypothetical
has
propositions
been explained*the former'snature and components(subject,predicate,
copula) are discussed(24r-25v).Next ten divisionsof the propositionare
dealt with.First,the divisioninto veraand falsa, includingan interesting
discussionof the significatimi
proposicionis
(25v-27r).The second division(27rconcerns
the
of
the
, necessaria28v)
modality
(possibilis-impossibilis
significate
The thirddivisionis into scita,dubitavelnesta
, and eredita
(28vcontingens).
and compossibiles
velsimulstantes
29v); the fourthinto repugnantes
(29v-30r);
the fifthinto de inesseand modalis
, the modalityof the assertion,that is
The
sixth
deals
with
division
the distinctionafirmativa
and negativa
,
(30r'v).
and in thisconnectionsome rules regardingnegationare presented(30vwhichis
31*). The seventhdivisionconcernspropositionalquantification,
dividied into universalis,
and
,
indefinita
singularis
(31v-33r).The
particularis,
one
concerns
the
distinction
between
different
eighth
typesof categorical
propositionaccordingto its matter,the relationship,thatis, betweenthe
subject-and predicateterm;thus categoricalpropositionscan be of the
in contingenti
materia
or in remota
materia
materia,
type in naturali
(33r"v).The
ninthdivisionconcernsthe relationshipbetween propositionsquantified
in different
and
contradictoire,
subcontrarie,
ways; thisdivisionis into contrarie,
subalterne.
The discussionof this divisionincludes the rules of inference
governingtheirtruthand falsity(SSM-O1).The last divisionconcernsthe
of equivalencebetweencategoricalpropositions
different
(40vrelationships
421). Finally,the threeways of conversionof categoricalpropositionsare
conversio
discussed,viz. conversio
simplex,
per contraper accidensand conversio
posidonem
(42r-44v).
Afterthe account on the categoricalproposition,the second chapter
of the second Part pays attentionto the different
kinds of hypothetical
No
less
than
kinds
of
proposition.
eight
hypothetical
propositionare taken
into consideration,viz copulativa
'tu
es
et
homo, tu es animal5),dis(e.g.
tu
iunctiva
'tu
vel
es
es
homo,
animal'), racionalis
(e.g.
(e.g. 'homo currit,
ergo animal currit'),condicionalis
(e.g. 'si tu es homo, tu es animal'),causalis
(e.g. 'quia tu es homo, tu es animal'), expletiva
(e.g. 'tu es homo, licet tu

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185

es animal'),similitudinaria
(e.g. 'ego curro,sicut tu curris'),localis(e.g. 'ego
sum ubi [ibi S] tu es'), and temporalis
(e.g. 'tu curris,dum tu moveris')
(44v-48v).Four rules are added (48v-49r):
[1] "Secundum quosdam oppositum ypotetice non dicitur proposicio
ypotetica",
[2] "Oppositum copulative equivalei disiunctivefacte ex contradictoriis
parciumilliuscopulative",
[3] "Oppositum disiunctiveequivalet copulative facte ex contradictoriis
parciumilliusdisiunctive",
[4] "Oppositum racionalis significaiopposito modo ad proposicionem
racionalem,et proposiciocondicionalissignificai
oppositomodo ad proposicionem condicionalem,et oppositumcausalis significaioppositomodo ad
proposicionemcausalem, et ita de omnibus aliis speciebus".
The thirdchapter of the second Part (49v-75r)deals with the probacionesproposicionum
, in the wake of the fourteenth-century
Billinghamtradition.11Making use of the twelfthdivision presentedin the firstPart,
in which mediate termsas opposed to immediatetermswere definedas
those owing to which propositionscan be verifiedor falsifiedby reducthreetypes
ing themto simpleprotocolsentences,the authordistinguishes
of mediate propositions,viz resoluble,exponible and officiablepropositions.Next theirdifferent
verifications
are discussedalong much the same
linesas in the treatisesof the Billinghamtradition.This discussionincludes
an extensiveaccount of exclusive(54v-58r),exceptive(58r-60r)and reduplicative (60r-62v)propositions.Next the remainingtypes of exponible
, comparativeand
propositions(containingexponibletermsas idem,differ
superlativeterms,or incipitand desinitetc.)are dealt with (62v-71r).The
of modal propositions(71r-75r).
chapterwinds up with the verification
2.3

On argumentation

, the
Startingoffwith the well known Boethian definitionof argumentum
thirdPart of our Logicadeals with induction,exemplum,12
enthymema,
and syllogism(75r-81v).The syllogistic
modes and figuresare extensively
11See L.M. de
14thCentury
Tracts
ontheProbationes
Terminorum.
Martin
Rijk,Some
of
Alnwick
Richard
andOthers
1982(= Artistarium,
O.F.M.,
, Edward
, Nijmegen
Billingham
Upton
3).
As usual,thewayexemplum
is instanced
is indicative
ofthecouleur
locale
ofourtreatise:"Exemplum
estquo unumsimile
utcumdicitur
similitudinem,
probatur
peralterius
contra
Gallicos
malum
contra
Castellanos
est;ergoAragonenses
'Anglicos
pugnare
pugnare
malum
est".The sameexample
is found
in theZaragozamanuscript.

18:33:38 PM

186

JOKESPRUYT

discussed(75v-81v).Part Three concludeswith a detailed examinationof


consequents
(82r-109v).13
2.4

On universais
and categories

The Part on universaisand categoriesopens withfivepreliminary


remarks
about the structureof the discussion(109M15V):
CIRCA UNIVERSALIA
109v-110r:
Seu predicabilia
et predicamenta
proipsorum
Primo
noticia
suntprimitus
determinanda
adquirenda[m]
quinqu
perordinem.
quid
et quidterminus
sitterminus
univocus
et quidterminus
equivocus
analogus,
quia
omneuniversale
hieacceptum
esseunivocum.
Secundoquidsitpredicacio
oportet
hieacceptum
est
essencialis
et quidpredicacio
accidentalis,
quia omneuniversale
in quidet quid
essencialiter
velaccidentaliter.
Tercioquidsitpredicali
predicabile
inquantum
etquidinquot,
sitpredicali
[predicare
S] inqualeetquidsitpredicali
tervelcognoscimus
etsicde quibusdam
aliispredicacionibus
perquasinvestigamus
minosrespondibiles.
et quiddiffinitum,
Quartoquid [110r]sitdiffinicio
quia per
diffinicionem
quidestesserei.Quintoquidsitdivisio,
investigamus
quiaperdivia superiori
sionem
facimus
descensum
ad eiusinferiora.
The otherremarktellsthe readerin what way the authorintendsto deal
with the universaisand categories.It contains a referenceto the logici
moderni
:
110r:Etconsequenter
De quibus
dicetur
de ipsisuniversalibus
etpredicamentis.
secundumusumseu modumloquendimodernorum
Et
breviter
logicorum
pertransibo.
racioestquia ad habendum
et generlem
introduccionem
perfectissimam
ipsorum
notinonsolumlogicalem
et phisicalem
sed eciammethaphisicalem
presupponunt
eciamvarietatem
et modorum
tamlogicorum
ciam,propter
loquendi
opinionum
quamnaturalium
quammethaphisicorum.
The univocal, equivocal and analogous uses of termsare discussedfirst
(110r-112v);14
subsequentlyessentialand accidentalpredication(112v-113r),
and then predication in quid, in quale, and so on. Next division and
definition(113r-115v)are broughtup.
Afterthese praenotanda
, the proper tract on universaisand categories
opens with the discussionof the fivepredicables,namelygenus,species,
differentia,
(1 15M 18v).
proprium,and accident,includingtheircommunitates
The discussion of the ten Aristoteliancategoriesis remarkablefor its
semanticapproachto thematter:thecategoriesare spokenof as significative
termscoordinatedin different
ways. Thus the ten categoriesare listedas
The opening section
ten "modes of signification"
(maneries
significadonum).
is quoted in full:
13Fora short
see oursection
3 below.
ofthistract,
survey
c
14Thefolios
lllv areerroneously
numbered
thatcomeafter
*103',
'104', 105',
1012(!)',
andso on.Thiserror
hasbeencorrected.

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
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187

118V119r:PREDICAMENTUM
alicuius
genere
largeaccipitur
progeneralissimo
decern
coordinacionis15
[119r]Et istomododicuntur
predicamenta
predicamentalis.
scilicet
decern
substancia,
relacio,
accio,pasquantitas,
qualitas,
genera
generalissima,
et habitus.
Sed predicamentum
sio,ubi,quando[quanta5],situs,
accipitur
proprie
scilicet
et specierum,
difomnium
terminorum,
generum
prototacoordinacione
seuindividua.
factaa generalissimo
ad specialissima
etindividuorum
ferencia<ru>m
decern
decern
cooridinaciones
Et istomodosimiliter
dicuntur
predipredicamenta
scilicet
ex decern
modispredicandi
velsignificandi
camentales
diversimode,
sumpte
substancie,
relacionis,
accionis,
ubi,
quantitatis,
passionis,
qualitatis,
predicamentum
estcoordinacio
termiUndepredicamentum
substancie
quando,situs,et habitus.
estcoordinacio
etpredicamentum
norum
substancie;
<quantitatis
significat<iv>orum
et predicamentum
estcoordinaterminorum
qualitatis>
significativorum
quantitatis;
etpredicamentum
relacionis
estcoordinacioterminorum
significativorum
qualitatis;
estcoordinacio
etpredicamentum
accionis
cioterminorum
relacionis;
significativorum
terminorum
et predicamentum
estcoordinacio
accionis;
significativorum
passionis
termiterminorum
et predicamentum
ubiestcoordinacio
significativorum
passionis;
terminonorumsignificativorum
loci;et predicamentum
quandoestcoordinacio
et predicamentum
rumsignificativorum
situsestcoordinacio
terminorum
temporis;
et predicamentum
estcoordinacio
habitus
terminorum
significativorum
posicionis;
habitus
circacorpus.
significativorum
Ex quibuspatetquodterminus
substancie
dicitur
de predicamento
significativus
utly'homo','animal',
sedterminus
de predicamento
estde
substancie,
quantitatis
et itade omnibus
aliis.Et sic<ut>suntdecern
maneries
predicamento
quantitatis;
sicdicuntur
decern
terminorum,
significacionum
predicamenta.
Secundo
nonpotest
patetquodidemterminus
pereandem
significacionem
[ponunt
sedperdiversas
S' essediversorum
predicamentorum,
significaciones
potest
poniin
diversis
Utly'albus',quiaformaliter
ideo[etS]
predicamentis.
significai
qualitatem,
<sed quiafundamentaliter
subperse in predicamento
ponitur
qualitatis,
significai
inpredicamento
stanciam
substancie.
Similiter
>, ideoponitur
peraccidens
ly'pater'
formaliter
ideoponitur
sed
relacionem,
relacionis,
significai
perse in predicamento
ideo [non5] ponitur
in
substanciam,
quia fundamentaliter
significai
peraccidens
substancie.
ideo[non
Sedquialy'homo'solumsignificai
substanciam,
predicamento
Et huiusmodi.
substancie.
5] ponitur
<perse> in predicamento
Next, the ten categoriesare discussedone by one (119r-131v).Folio 120v
has a pictureof the Arbor
porphyriana.
2.5

On thears obligandi

The fifthand last Part (13 1v-142r) of the LogicaMorelliis about the ars
obligandi.
Obligadois definedas follows:
131v:OBLIGACIOhiesumpta
estadmissio
describitur
sic:obligacio
ad
respondentis
ad aliquid
admissum
sifuerit
tenetur
opponentem
quarespondens
propositum,
responderesecundum
si oppoexigenciam
signi[Scsignificatum
5] obligacionis.
Exemplum:
nensdicatrespondenti
"Ponotibiistam
'tuesRome'",etrespondens
dixerit
"Admitto",
tuncfacta
siveadmissio
estistaobligacio
tenetur
"Concedo
respondere
quarespondens
illamproposicionem
'tues Rome',si fuerit
et hocsecundum
proposita",
exigenciam
15Thespelling
ofthiswordbothin theZaragozaandin theSevillacopies("cohordithetacitassociation
of'ordo'and'cohors'.
nacionis")
betrays

18:33:38 PM

188

JOKESPRUYT
huiussigniobligacionis
tenetur
scilicet
negando
'pono'.Et deponens
respondere,
utinferius
dicetur.
secundum
istius
exigenciam
signiobligacionis
'depono',

which in his
Subsequently,the author refersto an alternativedefinition,
is
opinion,however, inadequate:
estoracio[ordinacio
Vel alitersecundum
131v-132r:
5] comObligacio
quosdam:
et obligto.
"Ponotibiistam
utcumdicitur
positaex signis
Exemplum,
obligacionis
vocatur
'tues Rome'",tunctotaistaoraciovocatur
etly'ponotibiistam'
obligacio,
et 'tu es Rome'vocatur
et huiusmodi.
Sed talis
obligacionis,
obligtm;
signum
videtur
insufficiens,
quia ex talidescripcione
sequitur
quod,si opponens
descripcio
dixerit
"Ponotibiistam'tues Rome'"absqueadmissione
5]
[dimissione
respondenti
essetobligacio;
factaab ipsorespondente,
[132r]
quianondicitur
quodessetfalsum,
sibi
donecrespondens
admiserit
quamopponens
proprie
obligacio
proposicionem
S]; ethuiusmodi.
S] veldeposuit
5] velimposuit
[deponit
[imponit
posuit[opponit
and
, deposicio
Next, the threekindsof obligationare discussed,viz.posicio
a
of
rules
After
the
last
number
rule,
,
imposicio
(132r-142r).
including large
which concernsthe impositionof an impertinent
proposition(e.g. tues
lapis'), the explicitruns as follows:
142r:Et hecsintdictade terciaspecieet ultima
et,perconsequens,
obligacionum
huiuslogice.
de quintapartesiveultima
DEO GRACIAS
There is a colophon in the same hand.16
So much for the contentsof the Logica.Let us now say a few things
about the sectionon consequences.17
3
3.1

on consequences
The section
Shortsurvey
of thecontents

Like the otherparts of the Logica,


, the sectionon consequencesis clearly
meant as an introductionfor students.It is very neatlystructuredand
of the itemsthatare brought
pays much attentionto theoreticalreflection
and
are
Thus
definitions
rules
up.
presentedwithgreat considerationfor
such
as
the
exact
detail,
phrasing.
The contentsof our tract bears considerableresemblanceto Ralph
Most of the rules(especiallythegeneral
Strode'streatiseon consequences.18
16Quotedabove,p. 179.
1 ror
see
otthistract,
teatures
a moredetailed
otsomeparticularly
account
interesting
deconsequentiis)
forthinTwoSpanish
Tractatus
Remarks
onSemantical
Some
JokeSpruyt,
Topics
andSemantics
onMedieval
intheActs
,
(Pamplona
Logic
oftheTwelfth
European
Symposium
coming
inSpain(1250-1550)".
26-30May1997):"Logic
andSemantics
18I haveusedtheedition
AnEdition
andTranslatum
Seaton,
oj the
byWallaceKnight

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

189

and specificones) can be tracedback to Strode's work.But while Strode


postpones the discussionof his rules (the ways in which they can be
'proved' and possible objectionsto them)untilhe has them all summed
up, our authorimmediatelyproceeds to discusstheirtheoreticalfoundation and issues that relate to precise wording.
The openingchapterof this section(which comprisessix small chaptersin all) startsoffwith a descriptionof consequences in general and
of the kinds of consequences that are studied in logic. There are two
ways in which the notion of consequence is described,namelyfromthe
perspectiveof the linguisticexpressioninvolved,and of the mentalactivity underlyingit. The author's account of a valid consequence centres
round the relationshipsbetween 'the firstand adequate significate'( primmetadequatimi
of the antecedentand of the consequent.The
significatum)
with
winds
some
remarksabout causal consequences,of which
chapter
up
it is said thattheycan cause some problemswhen talkingabout the validityof inferences.
In the second and thirdchapterswe find general rules of inference,
accompaniedby a discussionof alternative
waysof phrasingthem.Furthermaterialis
and
more,we come accross the distinctionbetween consequencia
formalis.The thirdchapter is concerned with rules of conseconsequencia
kinds of
formalisalone. The fourthchapter deals with different
quencia
termsthatfeaturein propositions,and the rules thathave to do withthe
betweentheseterms(e.g. the relationshipof an inferius
to its
relationships
and the otherway round, of incipitto desinitand the other way
superius
round,and the relationshipbetween relatives).Explicitattentionis paid
to propositionsthatcontaindivineterms.Chapter fiveis devotedto inferences governingcategoricalpropositions,and the final chapterdiscusses
inferencesgoverninghypotheticalinferences.
It would be beyond the scope of thisintroductionto give a complete
analysisof all the detailspresentedin our treatise.Instead, I believed it
would be interesting
to look somewhatmore closelyinto some of the subjects it deals with and to compare what our author has to say with discussionsof previousauthors.In the followingI shall confinemyselfto,
firstof all, exploringa number of topics that pertain to the notion of
validityof consequences. Furthermore,I shall pay attentionto general
rules of valid consequence. To wind up the introduction,attentionwill
Tractatus
De consequentiis
andFriend
, Fourteenth
byRalphStrode
Century
Logican
ofGeoffrey
ofCalifornia,
Chaucer
as an authorized
facsim, University
Ph.D.,1973,reproduced
Berkeley
ilein 1981byUniversity
Microfilms
AnnArbor,
International,
U.S.A./London,
Michigan,
England.

18:33:38 PM

190

JOKESPRUYT

be given to some of the rules that pertainto relationshipsbetweenthe


different
termsinvolvedin consequences.
3.2

The description
of consequences

The firstchapter of Morelli's section De consequenciis


(hereaftercited as
MDC) presentsa descriptionof all the elementsa consequence consists
of. The consequence is describedin a similarmanner as was done by
Strode as an illaciosiuesequelaconsequentis
ex antecedente.
Based upon the
),20a furtherdistinctionis then made
opinion of others{secundum
quosdam
into valid and invalid consequences,i.e. consequencia
bonaand consequencia
mala {MDC 1,1). Subsequentlyan alternativedescriptionis given, vizconsequence as a National'or 'conditional'propositionwithan explanation of the difference
betweenthe two21{MDC 1,2-3).The descriptionof
in general winds up with the an explanationof the notions
consequencia
antecedens
Our author is somewhatmore elaborate on this
and consequens.
than
for
Buridan,
instance,showinghow these conceptsfunction
subject
in different
ways in a conditionaland in a rationalproposition:
- in raonaliproposicio
antecedens
vocaliter
notamconsequencie
precedens
= in condicionali
notamconsequencie
sequensimmediate
proposicio
=
in
raonali
notam
consequens
proposicio
sequens
consequende
= in condicionali
alia proposicio,
siveprcdt
notam
siuesubsequatur,
consequencie
{MDC 1,3).
In this descriptionthe word vocaliter
is used. In the next paragraph
is definedagain as a proposicio
antecedens
notamconsequencie
,
sequensmentaliter
que denotatur
sequiex antecedente
{MDC 1,4).
The remainderof the firstchapterof our tractis devotedto the description of a valid consequence. These descriptionsare ratherlike the ones
given by Strode. A valid consequence is definedin our treatiseas a
cuius
etadequatimi
antecedente
non
esseabsque
et
primm
consequencia
significatum
primo
potest
suiconsequentis
(MDC1,5),or
adequato
significato
cuius
non
stare
cumsuoantecedente
oppositum
consequentis
(MDC1,6).
potest
19Cf.
De am;.1.1.01,ed. Seaton1S73(op.cit.,above,n. 18),1.
Strode,
20TheRalph
ideaofsomepeoplethatanyhypothetical
orratiooftheconditional
proposition
naltypecanbe calleda consequence,
butthatsomewillonlyapplythislabeltothetrue
inJohnBuridan,
onesis alsofound
De consequentiis,
Louvain-Paris
3, ed.H. Hubien,
1976,
2i16-20
mdiaux,
(philosophes
XVI).
21Buridan
a hypothetical
thedifference
between
justmentions
by
conjoined
proposition
"si"andby"ergo",
butdoesnotgivethemtheseparate
namesofconditionalis
andrationalerespectively;
De cons.
3, ed. Hubien1976(op.cit.,above,n. 20),217*15.

18:33:38 PM

TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
A I5-C. SPANISH

191

For an invalid consequence the definitionruns the other way round


MDC
1,7-8).Strode definesthus:

non
essesicut
bona
dicitur
cuius
adequate
significatur
perantecedens
consequentie
potest
consequentia
anddicitur
nonbonavelnon
suum
nisisitsicut
consequentia
perconsequens
adequate
significatur
antecedens
licet
non
sitsicut
esse
sicsicut
valere
stat
significatur
adequate
persuum
quando
significatur
adequate
persuum
consequens2"1
this was one of the
et adequatum
As to the expressionprimm
significatimi,
of a proposition,as opposed to the secondaryone, whichwere
significates
by logicians in the wake of Paul of Venice.23Our author
distinguished
about
this
notion in a precedingsectionof the Logica
, when dealspoke
of
The
or
total signifiwith
the
ing
signification propositions.
adequate
cate of a propositionis the resultof the combinationof all the partsthat
make up the proposition,whereas the partiglisignificateis the resultof
the combinationof onlypart of thepropositions^elements.As an example
the author uses homoest asinus
esse
, which adequately signifieshominem
esse.Again, the primary(adequate) signifianimal
, and partiallyhominem
cate of a propositionis set apart fromthe secondaryone; the primary
essehominem
and the
(adequate) significateof e.g. Sortesesthomois Sortem
follows
one
is
hominem
esse
animal.
The
latter
is
what
from
the
secondary
propositionwe startedoffwith.24This use of primaryand secondary
meaning is closelylinked up with Paul of Venice's terminologyin the
Logicamagna(II, II).25
Our authorsummariseshis descriptionsof the consequenda
bonawiththe
remarkthat the only thingrequiredfor a valid consequence is that the
consequentfollowsfromthe antecedent,irrespectiveof whethertheyare
both trueor false,whereasfora consequence to be invalidit is sufficient
thatthe consequentdoes not followfromthe antecedens.His last remark
about what it means to concede or to deny a consequence seems to be
a practicadremarkabout how one should handle consequencesin actual
arguments{MDC 1,9).
The finalparagraphsof this introductory
chapter raise the notion of
causal consequences.Our authoris inclinedto followthosewho reckonthem
should be
definition
among the consequences,but in thatcase a different
used: in a valid causal consequence the state of affairssignifiedby its
22De cons.,
1.1.02,ed. Seaton1973[op.t.yabove,n. 18),1.
23Forthegeneral
ofthisidea,seeNuchelmans
1980{op.cit.,above,n. 2),
background
45 ff.
24See De
Rijk(op.cit.,above,n. 8).
25SeeL.M.
deRijk,Semantics
inRichard
andJohannes
Venator
Maier
, in:Alfonso
Billingham
inItaly
inthe14th
and15th
Centuries
(ed.),English
Logic
(= Actsofthe5thEuropean
Symposium
on Medieval
Rome,10-14November
1980),167-83,
LogicandSemantics,
esp.172-5.

18:33:38 PM

JOKESPRUYT

192

antecedentis the true cause of the state of affairssignifiedby its conseest


bonaquandoressignificata
consequencia
per einsantecedens
quent (talisdicitur
veracausa rei significate
an
invalid
consesuum
whereas
for
per
consequens
),
quent this conditionis not met (MDC 1,10).
in genThe last paragraphcompletesthe introduction
about consequencia
consea
that
valid
and
invalid
the
of
eral, adding warning
descriptions
- for in the
earlier
not
causal
do
to
the
ones
quences presented
apply
latterthe notionof something'sbeinga truecause is an additionalrequirementfortherebeing a valid consequence- and thatthe ruleshe is about
to give are to be applied to non-causal consequencesonly (MDC, 1,11).
Thus far we have seen that consequences are divided into valid and
invalidones. Furthermore,
a specifictypeof consequencehas been introducausalis.There is one other divisionof valid conseced, viz. consequencia
quences that comes up later,in the second chapter,namelyinto the conseu bonadeformaand the consequencia
materialis
seu bonade
sequencia
formalis
materia.
This is of course a divisionwell knownfromearliertreatiseson
the author gives reflectboth a traditional
consequences.The definitions
in
one
found
Strode
as
outlook,
well,and the more novel approach found
in Buridan. The definitionof a formallyvalid inferenceruns
seuin
estconsequencia
bonacuiquelibet
ei similis
informa
consequencia
formalis
consequencia
modo
estde
estbona
eiusdem
siformetur,
terminis
, inquibuscumque
, etconsequens
fiat
arguendi,
intellectu
suiantecedentis.
The firstpart of thisdefinition
is quite in line withBuridan's,whichruns
bonaconseestcuiomnis
similis
informa
esset
formalis
consequentia
propositio
quaeformaretur
quential
It expressesthe idea of validity(whichbecame currentafterthe second
half of the fourteenth
century)that a consequence is formallyvalid if it
obtains no matterwhat termsare used. The second part, similarto the
definitionfoundin Strode's treatise,which runs
antecedentis.21
intaliconsequentia
deforma]
estdeformali
intellectu
bona
[sc.consequentia
consequens
is reminiscentof the traditionalidea of inclusionin valid formalconsequences.28
26JohnBuridan,
De cons.
4, ed. Hubien1976{op.cit.,above,n. 20),237'8.
" De cons.
y1.1.UJ,ed. eaton197{op.at., above,n. Iti),I.
Mrorthechange
inthenotions
seerranzachupp,
andformal
ofmaterial
consequence,
Withtheedition
oftheLiber
Problems
consequentiLogical
oftheMedieval
Theory
ofConsequences.
arum
ofLogic,VI).
, Napoli1988,29 (= History

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
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193

The materiallyvalid consequence is definedas a


bonacuinonquelibet
similis
inmodo
siformetur
, estbona
,
conseguendo,
consequncia
arguendi,
inquononincluditur
velcuius
antecedens
estimpossibile
eiusconsequens
autcuius
est
consequens
necessarium
ineiusantecedente.
(MDC1,9)
quodnonincluditur
In the subsequentparagraphs,in which the anonymousliststhe different
kindsof materially
valid consequence,the idea of inclusion(and hence the
between
termsthataccountforthe validityof a consequence)
relationships
is even more prominent.The interestingthingis that the firstkind of
materiallyvalid consequenceis a formof an enthymematic
consequence,
in which an extrapremisswill do to completethe argument.But, oddly
enough, this argumentis also labelled a valid materialone in virtueof
the terms:
enim
dicitur
seubonademateria
materialis
velgracia
conQuedam
terminorum,
quianonquelibet
ei similis
inmodo
estbonade
, siformetur
, estbona.Uttalisconsequencia
sequncia
arguendi
materia
velgracia
Huesanimal;
terminorum
tueshomo'
demnstrate
homine
. (MDC1,10)
ergo
The secondtypeof materially
invalidconsequenceis one whose antecedent
is impossible,such as homoestasinus
; ergobaculusstatin angulo{MDC 1,10).
The example given here is exactlythe same one as Strode's.29The third
; ergoDeus est{MDC
typeis one whose consequentis necessary,e.g. tucurris
1,10).
Unlike Strode, our author does not add the remarkthat all formal
consequencesare materiallyvalid, but not vice versa {De cons.p. 2 (ed.
Seaton), 1.1.03). Nor does he state that all materialconsequencescan be
reduced to formalones either,as Buridan does;30instead he mentions
that there are consequences in which an impossibleantecedentis formally included in the consequent,in which case the consequence is a
formalone, and there are consequences in which an antecedentis formallyincludedin a necessaryconsequent,in which case the consequence
is a formalone as well {MDC 1,12). Moreover, unlike Strode, he separatesthe typesof materiallyvalid consequence fromthe rules that apply
to them.There are only two rules connectedwithmaterialconsequence:
31
eximpossibili
ad quidlibet
sequitur
quidlibetand necessarium
sequitur
{MDC 1,13).
29De cons.,
1.1.04,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),2.
MDe cons.,
ed. Hubien1976(op.cit.,above,n. 20),2314"
.
Theruleeximpossibili
wasa subject
ofgreatdebateuntil
wellintothe
sequitur
quidlibet
thirteenth
For earliertwelfth
sourcesof thisrule,see Y. Iwakuma,
century.
century
eximpossibili
Thesis
Comments
onthe
Sources
theTwelfth
,
Parvipontani's
quidlibet
sequitur:
from
Century
in:KlausJacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie:
Scholastische
undsemanzu denlogischen
Forschungen
tischen
Korrekten
Leiden-New
York-Kln
undTexte
1993,123-51(= Studien
Regeln
Poigerns,

18:33:38 PM

194

JOKESPRUYT

3.3 Rulesofvalidconsequence
In the second chapterthe anonymouslistsfourgeneralrulesof valid consequence. In factwhat is presentedis a more elaborateaccount of validity as it pertainsto consequence. The firstand second rules {MDC II,
1-2) actuallyfollowfromthe definitionof a valid consequencethe author
had given earlieron. In Strode's treatisetheyare not mentionedas separate rules,but merelyas parts of the descriptionof what a consequentia
bona is.32The third rule {MDC 11,3) correspondswith Strode's 24th,33
and the fourthrule {MDC 11,4)with Strode's 21st.34
Having presentedthese general rules of valid consequence,the author
then proceeds to look at a numberof consequenceswhich appear to be
truebut are disqualifiedby the rules.The consequenceshe discussesare
all aimed to show that one should always make a distinctionbetween
a propositionand its significate,
and that consequence concernsthe significateof propositions.In his explanationof what goes wrong,it seems
that what underliesthis type of distinctionis the principlethat validity
is applied to states of affairs,and not to the truthof the propositions
est
themselves.For instance,one cannot inferDeus est;ergohecproposicio
veraDeus est3,because it is possible that no such propositionexists,while
it stillis the case thatGod exists{MDC 11,5),nor is one entitledto infer
3est
'homoestasinus
hecproposicio
vera;ergohomoestasinus,forthe reason that
3 could
at some futuretime the proposition(homo
estasinus
signifythatGod
exists
while
it
that
man
is an ass {MDC
would
still
not
be
the
case
,
obviously
est vera;ergohomoestasinus
11,6).Again, the consequences nullaproposicio
are rejected
and nullaproposicio
estnegativa;
estaffirmativa
proposido
ergoomnis
on the suppositionthattherecould be a timewhen no propositionexists.
estnegaThe consequence omnisproposicio
estaffirmativa;
ergonullaproposido
tiva
, on the otherhand, is valid, because, owing to the existentialimport
of the antecedent,there is no case in which the opposite of the consequent does not contradictthe antecedent{MDC 11,6-7).
In the thirdchapterthe general rulespertainingto valid formalinferences are discussed.Most of the rules the authorpresentscan be found
is
oflaterdevelopments
zurGeistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters,
XXXVIII).A discussion
inJokeSpruyt,
Thirteenth
Positions
ontheRuleEx impossibili
found
quidlisequitur
Century
161-93.
bet,in thesamevolume,
32De cons.,
., above,n. 18),1.
1.1.02,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit
SiDe cons.,
contradictoed.Seaton1973(op.cit.,
above,n. 18),5: 24aregula:
oppositum
riumconseqeuntis
nonpotest
starecumantecendente.
* De cons.,
ex consi arguitur
ed. beatn1973(op.at.,above,n. 18),5: 21a regula:
estbona.
tradictorio
ad contradictorium
antecedents,
consequentia
consequentis

18:33:38 PM

TREATISE
A I5-C. SPANISH
ON CONSEQUENCES

195

in Strode's tract.There are a fewexceptions.Two rules have a different


rule of our author runs
wordingin Strode. The twenty-second
bone
etformalis
estaffirmatiuum,
antecedens
eiusdem
nonest
Si alicuius
consequens
consequencie
(MDC111,22)
negativum.
pure
where Strode has
estpureaffirmatiuum,
antecedens
velaliqua
12aregula
est,si consequens
parsantecedent
igitur
estpure
affirmativum.35
Both authorspresentcounter-examplesto the rules. Strode pays attention to the consequencesDeus nonest; ergoDeus est36which he concedes,
but as a materiallyvalid consequence only.37Anothercounter-example
is borrowedfromAristode,viz-the equivalence of necesse
estesseand posthisequivalencetoo is grantedon the groundsthat the
sibileestnonesse;38
two propositionsare not absolutelyequivalent,but only togetherwithan
affirmative
medium
expressingthat esseand nonesseare contradictory
opposites.39The final counter-exampleStrode presentsconcerns the consequence nonest ita quodnihilest; ergoaliquidest.40Strode concedes that
consequenceas a materiallyvalid one, not formally.41
Like Strode, our author too presentssome possible counter-examples
to the rules.The firstexample is nichilest; ergoaliquidest.Like Strode,he
also accepts it, but as a materialconsequence only,on the groundsthat
its antecedentis impossibleor its consequent necessary,and its consequent is not formallyincludedin its antecedent.Unlike Strode,however,
he refrainsfromdiscussingwhy thereis no questionof formalinclusion.
Strode,on his part, explainsthat one can understandnihilessein understandingnonesseita quodnihilest, because one can infernihilest;ergonon
estita quodaliquidest,necestita quodnihilestin the same manner as one
can infertu nones; ergotu nones homo
, necnonhomo.42
that
from
the
the
solution
Apart
consequence nichilest;ergoaliquidest
is materiallyvalid and not formally,
our authorgives anotherway out of
the problem.The inferenceupon which the validityof the proposed consequence was supposed to rest ran si nichilest;ergosic est quodnichilest.
35De cons.,
ed. Seaton1973(op.cit
., above,n. 18),4.
36De cons.,
1.2.23,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),14.
37De cons.,
1.2.27,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),15.
38De cons.,
1.2.24,ed. Seaton1973(op.dt.,above,n. 18),14.
39De cons.,
1.2.28,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),15-6.
40De cons.,
1.2.26,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),15.
" De cons.,
l.z.oU,ed. beatnly/o(op.cit.,above,n. 18),lb-7.
42De cons.,
1.2.30,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),17.

18:33:38 PM

196

JOKESPRUYT

The operativeword in this consequence is sic (or ita). This word can be
understoodin two ways. Firstit can be interpretedas a state of affairs
(our author speaks of a mode of being') which is asserted.In that case
the consequent,expressingin some mode of being that nothingis, contradictsthe antecedent,which states that nothingis. And if nothingis,
thismeans thatit is not true to say thatin some mode of being it is the
case that nothingis. If, on the otherhand, the word sic (or ita) is taken
as a mode of nothingnessor negation,thenthe consequencenichilest; ergo
sic est quodnichilestdoes hold good, but then it followsthat nothingis
[MDC 111,25-26),which means that the inferencenichilest;ergoaliquidest
is not acceptable.
Anotherrule foundin Morelli's tractthat does not featurein Strode's
treatiseis one that does not pertainto a singleconsequence,but to the
relationshipbetweena numberof consequencesused in an longerargument. This rule states the conditionsfor the validityof an argumenta
{MDC 11,36).
primoad ultimum
Of the general rules mentionedin Strode some are missingin our
author'stract.These are the 3rd and 4th,43and the 21st,22nd, 23rd and
24th44rules.As far as Strode's 23rd45rule is concerned,our authordoes
not approve of it as it stands,on the groundsthat one can know thata
consequence is valid, and know the antecedent,but this does not mean
a te our
that one knows the consequent. Thus to the phrase intellectum
author prefersthe expressionscituma te esse verum
, which is something
other than simplyscituma te. The reason for puttingit this way is his
contentionthat in order foryou to know a proposition,you mustknow
the terms.And thisis not the case if you are dealing withsome Hebrew
proposition,for instance,of which you know that it is true,but you do
not know what the termssignify[MDC 111,16).
So much for the rules of consequence headed under the categoryof
general ones. In the fourthchapter of our treatisethe author turnsto
specificrules.
43De cons.,
erititasicut
ed. Seaton1973(op.rit.,
above,n. 18),4: 3a regula:
aliquando
4a regula:
tuncerititasicutsignificatur
perconsequens.
significatur
perantecedens;
igitur
noneritsicutsignificatur
tuncnonerititasicut
significatur
igitur
aliquando
perconsequens;
perantecedens.
44Decons.,
siarguitur
excontradictorio
n. 18),5: 21aregula:
ed.Seaton1973(op.cit.,
above,
siarguitur
estbona.22aregula:
ad contradictorium
antecedentis,
consequentis
consequentia
...
conclusionis
cumaltera
alterius
exopposito
premissarum,
sequitur
oppositum
premisse.
starecumantecedente.
contradictorium
nonpotest
24a regula:
consequentis
oppositum
45De cons.,
si antecedens
estinteled.Seaton1973{op.cit.,
above,n. 18),5: 23a regula:
estintellectum
a te.
lectum
a te,consequens

18:33:38 PM

TREATISE
A I5-C. SPANISH
ON CONSEQUENCES

197

on specific
rulesofconsequence
3.4 Someremarks
This firstchapterdevotedto specificrulesof consequencedeals withrules
betweenterms.This chapof consequenceconcerningspecial relationships
similar
as
de spealibusreglines
Strode's
ter is organisedalong
capitulum
ulis.46It startsoffwith rules relatingto the inferius-superius
relationship
betweenterms.The firstfourrulesof our treatise{MDC IV,2; IV,7; IV,8;
difference
betweenthe two authors
IV,9) resembleStrode's.One significant
here is that our anonymouspresentstwo rules that are not found in
adds fivenew rules,of which
Strode {MDC IV, 10-11), and furthermore
he says thattheyfollowfromthe firstsix he has given {MDC IV, 16-20).
The fivenew rules listedin this sectionof the fourthchapterdo not
relareallyappear to have any directconnectionwith the inferius-superius
tionship.The firstone seems to linkup witha remarkmade by Burley,47
and also by Buridan concerningthe invalidityof consequencesinvolving
adiacensand "est"tertium
adiacens.Accordingto Buridan, a
"est"secundum
to
adiacens "est"secundum
adiacensis formally
consequencefrom"est"tertium
not valid due to the fact that a propositionof the form eB estA3 could
be an instanceof ampliation,as in homoestmortuus.
Our anonymousstates
mode is permitted,provided
that such a consequence in the affirmative
no termsare involvedthatwould preventthis,in the formof a distracting
(<distrahens
),48ampliativeor equivocatingterm {MDC IV, 16).49To this he
adds anotherrule accountingforthe validityof consequencesin the negativemode from"est"secundum
adiacens
to "est"tertium
adiacens
{MDC IV, 17).
The thirdrule on the list,statingthata consequence froma dictum
secunis not valid is actuallya reformulation
dumquidto a dictum
of
simpliciter
the fallacysecundum
et
The
last
of
of
secrules
this
quid simpliciter.
couple
tion state the invalidityof consequences froma non-ampliatedterm to
an ampliatedone and vice versa {MDC IV, 19-20).
The next relationshipour anonymousdeals with is convertibility
and
The
first
rule
resembles
of
but
one
IV,
Strode's,
{MDC
22)
correlativity.
46De cons.,
2.1.01,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),42.
47De puniate
artislogicae
tractatus
St. Bonaventure,
N.Y.
, I, 3, ed. Ph. Boehner,
longior
1955,5717"20.
o thistermsee GabrielNuchelmans,
tertium
Foran explanation
Secundum/
adiacens.
Amsterdam
Vicissitudes
Nederlandse
1992pp. 29-30(= Koninklijke
distinction}
ofa logical
vandeAfdeling
Akademie
vanWetenschappen.
Nieuwe
Letterkunde,
Reeks,
Mededelingen
55 no. 10).
49Forotherlogicians
whomentioned
inferential
schemes
to est secundum
pertaining
adiacens
and "est"
tertium
adiacens
, seeNuchelmans
(op.cit.,above,n. 48),pp. 30ff.

18:33:38 PM

198

JOKESPRUYT

The onlyexceptionexplicitlymentionedin our tract


is stateddifferently.50
a mentalact. However,in
is a consequence containinga verb signifying
the subsequentparagraphs,where our authorgoes into the exact nature
of convertibility,
an incorrectconsequenceis broughtup thatis ruled out
Strode's
rule,viz. a consequence that failsdue to distinctsuppositions
by
in antecedentand consequent (MDC IV,25). Our author's second rule
(MDC IV,26) is more precise than the one givenby Strode51in that the
formerrules out consequences in the plural. A littlefurtherdown an
importantadditionto the rule is given,to the effectthat sometimesthe
rule has to be adapted, dependingon the type of correlativesthat are
involved.For example, sometimesinsteadof arguingfromestto est,one
must argue fromestto estvelfiiitor erit(MDC IV,28).
the last relationshipthe anonymous
Having dealt with correlativity,
bringsup fordicussionin thischapteris the one betweentermsthatare
somehowoppositeto each other.The rulescoverall thekindsof opposition
incomcontradictoria,
betweenterms,viz. termini
, contradictoria
, opposita
diparati
, opposita
habitus-privacio
(MDC IV,30-39).
plexa,
privative,
In chapterfiveof the tractconsequencesbetweencategoricalpropositions are discussed.The arrangementof this chapteris tied up withhis
whichfeaturedearlierin the treatise(see above,
discussionof propositions,
The
remarkable
thinghere is that our author explicitly
only
pp. 183-5).
links up some rules of consequence with the doctrineof the probaciones
terminorum
(MDC V, 18-23). Finally,in the last chapterbesides the usual
kindsof hypotheticalpropositions(copulatives,disdiscussionof different
and
conditionals),a separateset of 'consequence' is broughtup,
junctives
divided into causal, expletive,similitudinarie
, temporal,and local ones. Of
these the discussionof causal and temporalseem to go back to Burley.52

50Cf.Strode,
De cons.,
above,n. 18),81: Secundareg2.4.02,ed. Seaton1973{op.cit.,
et
et copuleet predicate;
duarum
ula est:quandosubiecta
convertuntur,
propositionum
et
et proeiusdem
et qualitatis
sunteiusdem
precise
supponunt;
quantitatis
propositiones
termini
consimiliter
se habent
situs;tuncab unaad aliam,conseqeuntia
quo ad ordinem
tenet.
51De cons.,
2.4.03,ed. Seaton1973(op.cit.,above,n. 18),82: Tertiaregulaestquod
illudverbum
in qua predicatur
ad convertentia,
relativa
dicuntur
quia ex propositione
terminus
unussimplex
et subicitur
'est'secundum
relativus,
adiacens,
seqeuitur
propositio
relativus.
in qua subicitur
alterterminus
" De puntate
III 2, ed. Boehner
1955(op.at., above,n. 4-7),
artis
tractatus
longior,
Logicae
124M3113.

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
4

199

remarks
Concluding

From the themesdiscussedI hope to have shown how the presenttreatise on consequenceshas benefitedfrompreviousauthorsand uses material froma numberof traditions.
Particularly
Ralph Strode'sworkappears
to play a major role in our tract. Of course there are differences
too,
not onlyin the ways in whichthe rulesare formulated.The presenttract
seems to have a more strictorganisationthan Strode's. For example,the
modal termsand the different
rules that pertain to them are discussed
in a separatesection.The waysin whichthe authorsformulatetheirrules
is not entirelythe same either,nor are the typesof examples analysed.
Moreover,sometimesStrode has ruleswhich are missingin our tract,or
the other way round. Besides borrowingfromStrode, the treatisealso
containselementsthatgo back to otherimportantworkson logic. As we
have seen, connectionscan be made with Walter Burley,John Buridan,
Paul of Venice, and Richard Billingham.53
Maastricht
ofMaastricht
University

53Sincere
thanks
aredueto Professor
Braakhuis
forhishelpful
comments
on an earlierdraft
ofthispaper.

18:33:38 PM

JOKESPRUYT

200
sigla:
Z
5

=
=
=
Zc
=
Sc
add.
coni.
=
exp.
=
om.
=
=
]
=
?
=
/
< ... > =
=
[. . .]

Zaragoza (BCM), codex 15-57


Sevilla (BCC), codex 7-3-13
manus quae correxitZ
manus quae correxitS
addidit,addiderunt
conieci
expunxit
omittit,omittunt
usque ad
scripsi(t),scripserunt
fortasse
sic
inserui
seclusi
* * *

'z 65v; S 82r]

DE CONSEQJJWCIIS
CAPITULUM PRIMUM
De descriponibus
consequenciarum

1 Consequncia proprieet stricteaccepta describitursic: consequencia


est illacio sive sequela consequentisex antecedente.Ut cum diciturhomo
currit;ergo animal curri,hic talis consequencia diciturquedam illacio
seu habitudo consurgensper intellectumex antecedentead ipsum consequens. Et isto modo accipiendoconsequenciam,omnisconsequenciaest
bona et nulla consequencia est mala, quia ubi est consequencia,ibi est
illacio sive sequela, que non diciturproprienisi de consequencia bona.
Sed non ita stricteaccipiturconsequencia in communi usu logicorum.
Secundumquosdamaaliquando consequenciadiciturbona, aliquando dicitur consequencia mala, ut patet in sequentibus.
a
quosdam]
aliquosS
2 Consequencia large accepta describitursic: consequencia est proposicio racionalisvel condicionalis.Exemplumracionalis,ut cum dicitur'homo
currit;ergo animal currit5.Exemplum condicionalis,ut csi homo currit,
ergo animal curri.Vel aliter:consequenciaest agregatumex antecedente

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A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

201

et consequentecum nota consequencie,ut cum dicitur'homo currit;ergo


animal currit',et huiusmodi.
3

Ex quibus descripcionibusa
patetquod consequenciaest duplex,scilicet
racionalis
et
in hoc
proposicio
proposiciocondicionalis.Et tales differunt
quia in racionali proposicio precedens vocaliter notam consequencie
dicitur'antecedens' et proposicio sequens notam consequencie vocatur
'consequens', sed in condicionali proposicio sequens immediatenotam
consequenciedicitur'antecedens',et aliab proposicio,sive prcdt sive
subsequatur,[ 66r] vocatur'consequens'. Utc cum dicitur'tu es animal,
si tu es homo', hic talis proposicio 'tu es homo' diciturantecedens,et
talis proposicio 'tu es animal' vocatur consequens huius consequencie.
Quidam ponuntproposicionemcausalem esse consequenciamet alii non,
ut cum dicitur'quia homo currit,animal currit';de qua diceturinferius.
a
b
discrecionibus
Z ^ *'Z aliquaS c ut]Zet S
descripcionibusS
4 Antecedensestproposicioprecedensmentaliter
notamconsequencie,ex
dnott
Sed
est
qua
sequi sequens.
consequens
proposiciosequens mentaliternotam consequencie,que denotatursequi ex antecedente.[S 82^]
Ut cum dicitur'homo currit;ergo animalcurrit',hic talisproposicio'homo
currit'precedensnotamconsequenciediciturantecedens,sed talisproposicio 'animal currit'sequens notam consequencievocaturconsequensistius
consequencie.Ex quibus patetquod antecedenssemperpeceditsive antecedit suum consequens,et hoc dupliciter:aliquando enim peceditmentaliteret vocaliterina simul,ut in sillogismoet in consequenciaracionali,
aliquando peceditsolum mentaliter,ut in consequencia condicionali,ut
cum dicitur'animal currit,si homo currit',et huiusmodi.
a in. . .
ut]om.S
5

Consequenciarumaquedam diciturbona, quedam diciturmala. Consequencia bona est consequencia cuius primmet adequatum significatum
antecedentisnon potest esse absque primo et adequato significato13
sui
consequentis.Ut talis consequencia est bona 'homo currit;ergo animal
currit',quia hominemcurrere,quod estprimumet adequatumsignificatum
suic antecedentis,nond potest esse absque hoc, scilicetanimal currere,
sui consequentis.Similiter
quod est primumet adequatum significatum
talisconsequenciaest bona 'si homo est asinus,homo est rudibilis',quia
hominemesse asinum non potestesse nisi sit ita quod homo sit rudibilis,
et huiusmodi.
a
b
Z significato]om.Z sui]5 om.Z d non con"
consequenciarum]/^
consequencia

om
S
tis]
Z
sequen

18:33:38 PM

202

JOKESPRUYT

6 Vel aliter:consequnciabona est cuius oppositumconsequentis non


est natumstarecum suo antecedente.Et ideo talisconsequnciaest bona
'homo currit;ergo animal curri, quia 'nullum animal curri et 'homo
curri repugnantad invicem. Similitertalis consequncia est bona 'si
homo est asinus,homo est rudibilis',quia ly*'nullushomo est rudibilis',
quod est oppositumconsequentis,et lyb'homo est asinus',quod est antecedens istiusconsequencie,repugnantad invicem.
a
sicsaepius
S b 'y]ZhecS
lynullus]^lyhomonullus
Z nichil
[Z 6^1 Consequncia mala est consequncia cuius primmet adeantecedentispotest esse absque primo et adequato
quatum significatum
sui
significato consequentis.Ut talis consequncia non valet 'animal currit; ergo homo curri,quia animai currerepotestesse absque hoc quod
homo currat.Similitertalisconsequncianon valet 'si tu es homo, tu curris',quia te esse hominempotestesse absque hoc quod tu curras.Ex quo
patetquod si, aliquo casu possibiliposito,antecedensalicuiusconsequencie
est verum et consequens falsum,tunc consequncia non valet. Et iste
modus arguendiservaturfrequenterad probandumaliquam consequenciam non esse bonam.
7

[5 83r] Vel aliter:consequenciamala est consequenciacuiusoppositum


Et ideo talisconsequencia
estnatumstarecum suo antecedente.
consequentis
non valeta 'animai currit;ergo homo curri,quia 'nullus homo curri,
quod est oppositumconsequentis,'et animai curri,quod est antecedens
istiusconsequencie,possuntsimulstare,positocasu quod solus asinuscurrat.Ex quo patetquod omne negansaliquam consequenciamhabetadmitiere oppositumconsequentiscum antecedenteeiusdem consequencie.Et
talismodus arguendicommuniterservaturcontranegantemaliquam con8

sequenciam.
a
valet]^ om.Z
9 Ex predictisinfertur
quod ad bonitatemconsequencienon plus requiritur nisi quod consequens sequatur ex antecedenteeiusdem consequencie, sive ambo sint vera sive falsa; et ad consequenciammalam sufficit
quod consequens eius non sequatur ex eius antecedente.Secundo infertur quod concedere consequenciamest concedere eius consequenssequi
ex eius antecedente,sed negare consequenciam est negare eius consequens sequi ex eius antecedente.
10 Sed quidam ponunt proposicionemcausalem esse consequenciam.
Et tunc talis diciturconsequencia bona quando res significataper eius

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A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

203

antecedensest vera causa rei significateper suum consequens,ut cum


dicitur'quia tu es homo, tu es animal'. Sed causalis diciturconsequncia mala quando res significataper eius antecedens51
non est vera causa
rei significate
per suum consequens.Ut cum dicitur'quia tu loqueris,tu
es homo', quia te loqui non est vera causa quod tu sis homo, et cum
dicitur'quia tu curris,tu moveris',positocasu quod sedeas, et huiusmodi.
a
S exconsequens
antecedens]
Z
11

Ex quibus pate quod concedere causalem esse consequenciam [


67r] bonam est concedere causalem esse veram, et econverso,sed concederecausalemesse malam consequenciamseu non bonam est concedere
causalem esse falsam, et econverso. Secundo patet quod ad causalem
veram seu bonam requiriturquod tam antecedensquam consequens sit
verumb,quia antecedensfalsumnon potest esse vera causa sui consequentis.Tercio patet quod predictedescripcionesconsequenciebone vel
consequenciemalecet regulegeneralesconsequenciarumsequentessolum
de consequncia racionali et condicionali,sed non [S 83v]
intelliguntur
de consequenciacausali. Quodd probatursic, quia talis causalis est falsa
seu non bona consequencia'quia tu curris,tu moveris5,
ut dictumestsupra,
tarnenprimmet adequatum significatum
huius antecedentis'tu curris'
non potestesse absque primo et adequato <significato>sui consequentis; vel aliter: oppositum consequentis non est natum stare cum suo
antecedente.Similitertaliscausalis est falsaseuc non bona 'quia tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis',cuius oppositumconsequentisnon est natum stare
cum suo antecedente.Et ita de similibusf.
a
$ bverum]
veraZ$ male]falseS d quod]et S e seu]velZ fet. . . simZ ompatet]
etc.
ilibusJS Z
CAPITULUM SECUNDUM
De regulis
generalibus
1 Regule generalesad probandumaliquam consequenciamesse bonam
vel malam sunt quatuor. Quaruma prima regula talis est:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
nonpotestessesicutprimoet adequate0significatur
per
antecedens
nisisitita sicutprimoet adequate
tunc
significatur
pereiusconsequens,
estbona.
consequencia
Ut cum diciturtu es homo; ergo tu es animal. Sed si alicuius consequencie potestesse sicut primo et adequate significatur
perc antecedens
absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur
per eius

18:33:38 PM

204

JOKESPRUYT

consequens,tunc consequencianon est bona. Ut cum dicitur'tu es homo;


ergo tu loqueris', et huiusmodi.
a
b
S c per]
. . . regula]
adequato
regule
quarum
consequenciarum
primaS adequate]
eiusconsequens
add.necnon
exp.Z
Secunda regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
cumeiusantecedente
ex*contradictorio
consequents
fituna
tuncconsequencia
estbona.
copulativa
impossibili*,
Exemplum:talis consequencia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal5,
quia talis copulativa est impossibilisctu non es animal et tu es homo',
eodem demonstratob.
Sed si alicuius consequencieex contradictorio
consequentiscum eius antecedentefitcopulativapossibilis,tunc consequencia non valet. Exemplum:talis consequencia non valet 'tu moveris;ergo
tu curris',quia taliscopulativaest possibilis'tu non curriscet tu moveris',
et huiusmodi.
b
a
S c curris]
om.S
determinato
ex]om.S demonstratio]
2

[Z 67^ Tercia regula:


Si alicuiusconsequencie
contradictorium
eiusantecedenti
, tunc
consequentis
rpugnt
est
bona.
consequencia
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona 'tu curris;ergo tu non sedes',quia
'tu sedes' et 'tu curris'repugnantad invicem.Sed [S 84r] si alicuiusconsequencie contradictoriumconsequentis stat vel potest stare cum eius
antecedente,tunca consequencia non est bona. Exemplum: talis consequencia non valet 'animal currit;ergo homo curri,quia 'nullus homo
curri et 'animai currit'sunt proposicionessimul stantes,et huiusmodi.
a
tuS
tunc]
4

Quarta regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
ex contradictorio
consequentis
sequiturcontradictorium
a
tunc
bona.
antecedents
eiusdem
est
consequencie, consequencia
Exemplum:talis consequenciaest bona 'homo currit;ergo animai currit',
quia sequitur'nullum animal currit;ergo nullus homo curri. Similiter
talis consequencia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu nonb es asinus', quia
sequitur'tu es asinus; ergo tu non es homo', eodemc demonstrato.
a
om.S
om.S b non]
om.Z c eodemdemonstrato]^
tunc]
5 Ex predictisdescripcionibusconsequenciebone et consequenciemale
inferuntur
quedam consequencie que videnturesse bone etb non sunt
bone. Primo: talis consequencia non valet 'Deus est; ergo hec proposicio
est vera "Deus estc"',quia potestesse sicutprimoet adequate significato

18:33:38 PM

TREATISE
A I5-C. SPANISH
ON CONSEQUENCES

205

per eius antecedens absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate
significatur
per eius consequens,quia, posito tali casu quod eras nulla sit
perd hoc
proposicio,tunc erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur
antecedens'Deus est',tarnennon eritita6sicutprimoet adequatesignificatur
per hoc consequens'hec proposicioestvera "Deus est"', quia talisproposicio non erit.
a
et add.S b et. . . bone]om.S c est]
Z d Per significatur]
Zc$om
predictis]
regulis
c
om.S ita]f
istaS
6 Secundo:talisconsequncianon valethecproposicio"homo est asinus"
est vera; ergo homo est asinus', quia, posito quod eras talis 'proposicio
homo estasinus'significet
Deum esse,tuneerititaasicutbprimoet adequate
significatur
per eius antecedens,tarnennon eritita sicutprimoet adequate
significatur
per eius consequens.Tercio: talisconsequncianon valet 'nulla
proposicioest vera; ergo homo est asinus5,quia, posito casu quod pro
aliquo temporefuturonulla proposicio sit, tunc erit itac sicut primo et
adequate significatur
per eius antecedens,tarnennon eritita sicutprimo
et adequate significatur
per eius consequens.
a
b
. . . ita]Z'S om
$
Z ito]^' om
ita]istaS sicut
7 Quarto: talisconsequncianon valet 'nulla proposicioest negativa;ergo
eodem casu posito.Sed talisconsequncia
omnisproposicioest affirmativa',
est bona 'omnis [S 84^ proposicioest affirmativa;
ergo nulla proposicio
est negativa', quia oppositum consequentis rpugnt eius antecedenti.
Quinto: talis consequncia non valet 'solus asinus demonstratur;
ergo tu
non es homo', quia, posito casu quod post unam horam solus [Z 68r]
asinusdemonstratur
te dicente'iste asinus currit',tunc eritita sicutprimo
et adequate significatur
per eius antecedens; tamena non erit ita sicut
et
primo adequate significatur
per hoc consequens'tu non es homo', quia
asini non oportette desinereesse hominem.
propterdemonstracionem
a
om.Z
tamen]S
8 Consimiliter
concediturtalisproposicio'hoc est et hoc non est', eodem
demonstrato,quia hoc est, demonstratoaSorte, et hoc non est, demonstratoAntichristovel chimera. Ergob hoc est et hoc non est, eodem
demonstrato,idest dum idem demonstratur,
quia verum est quod idem
si
idem
Sortes
Sorti demonstratur,
et
demonstratur,
demonstratur,
quia
licet per utrumque'hoc' non idem
per consequens idem demonstratur,
et huiusmodi. Sed si arguatur 'Antichristusvel chimera
demonstratur,
demonstratur
vel chimeraest', non valet
per lyc"hoc"; ergo Antichristus

18:33:38 PM

206

JOKESPRUYT

vel eius participiumest


consequncia,quiad istud verbum 'demonstatur5
ampliativum,<ita> quod potestverificalide terminosupponentepro re
existentevel non existente,ut dictumest in prima parte huius logice,in
ultima regula ampliacionum.
a demonstrato
b
. . . est]
5 om.Z c
om.Z d quia]quodS
Z'S om.Z ergo]
9

Consequenciarumbonarumquedama est formalisseu bona de forma,


quedam est materialisseu bona de materia. Consequencia formalisest
consequencia bona cui quelibetbconsequencia eic similisin formaseu in
modo arguendi,si formetur,
est bonad,in quibuscumqueterminisfiat,et
est
de
eiusdem
intellectu
sui antecedentis.Exemplum: talis
consequens
scilicethomogcurrit;ergo animalcurri,quiah
consequenciaest formalis6,
talis consequencia ei1 similisir formakest bona, scilicet'asinus currit;
ergo animal currit5et talis consequentiaei similisest bona 'capra currit;
Et ita de omnibus1aliis similibusinmmodo arguendi.
ergo animal currit5.
[5 85r] Consequencia materialisest consequencia bona cui non quelibet
est bona, vel cuius
consequencia similisin modo arguendi,si formetur,
antecedensest impossibilein quo non includitureius consequensaut cuius
consequens est necessariumquod non includiturin eius antecedente.
a
add.Z e
S enimadd.Z b quelibet]
S consequencia
libetS c ei]Som.
Z d bona]
quedam]
1
f
h
g
et
S
S
om.
bona
om.
asinus
S
Z mei]^(0 Z
scilicet]?
Z homo]
formalis]^
quia]
k
j in. . . similis]
com.
S in]S om.Z
modoarguendi
Z 1omnibus]
multis
om.S forma]
10

Ex qua descripcioneapatet quod consequenciamaterialisest triplex.


Quedam enim diciturmaterialisseu bona de materiavel gracia terminorum,quia non quelibet consequencia ei similisin modo arguendi,si
est bona. Utb talis consequencia est bona de materiavel graformetur,
homine.Sed
cia terminorum
ctues animal; ergo tu es homo5,demonstrato
talis consequencia ei similisinc modo arguendinon valet 'tu es animal;
ergo tu es asinus5,cuius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.
Z 68v] Similitertalis consequencia est bona 'tu non es homo; ergo tu
non est animal5,demonstratohomine. Sed talis consequenciaei similisin
modo arguendinon valet ctunon es asinusd;ergo tu non es animal5,cuius
antecedens est verum et consequens falsum,et huiusmodi.Alia dicitur
materialisquia eius antecedens est impossibile,in quo non6 includitur
consequens eiusdem,ut cum dicitur'homo est asinus; ergo baculus stat
in angulo5.Alia diciturmaterialisquia eius consequens est necessarium
quod non includiturin eius antecedente,ut cum dicitur'tu curris;ergo
Deus est5,et huiusmodi.
a
. . . es]Z'S om.
S b ut]etS c in. . . similis]om.S d asinus
descripcione]^
discripcionem
c nonincluditur]
S
includit
Z

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
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ON CONSEQUENCES

207

11

Ex istis inferturquod talis consequencia est materialis'nichilaest;


ergo aliquid est',quia eius antecedensest impossibile,etbconsequenseiusin eius antecedente.Et similitertalis condem non includiturformaliter
'nulla
chimera est; ergo aliquid est', quia eius
materialis
est
sequencia
in eius antecedente.
est
et
non
includitur
formaliter
necessarium
consequens
Similitertalis consequenciaest materialisnichilest; ergo Deus es', quia
eius antecedensest impossibileet consequensnecessarium,et consequens
in antecedente.Et ita de multissimilibusd.
non includiturformaliter
d
c
a
aliisZ
velZ b et. . . antecedente]
om.S estJ^Som.Z similibus]S
nichil]cS
12 Secundo infertur
quod, si alicuiusconsequencieantecedensest impossibilein quo formaliter
includitureius consequens,tunc consequenciaest
formalis;ut cum dicitur'homo est asinus;ergo homo est animai',et huiusmodi. Tercio infertur[S 85*] quod, si alicuius consequencieconsequens
includiturin eius antecedente,tunc conest necessariumquoda formaliter
ut
cum
dicitur
Deus est; ergo Deus est', et huiusest
formalis;
sequencia
modi.
a
om.S
quod]Sf
13 Quarto inferunturdue regule communes. Quarum prima regula
talisest:
a
Ex impossibili
,
sequiturquidlibet
et tunc consequens
hoc
fieri
dupliciter:aliquando formaliter,
potest
quiab
et tunc conseest de intellectusui antecedentis;aliquando materialiterc,
in
sui
ut
quens non est de intellectu antecedentis, patet predictisexemplis. Secunda regula:
ad quidlibet
Necessarium
,
sequitur
fieri
hoc
aliquando materipotest
dupliciter:aliquando formaliter,
quia
ex
nunc
dictis.
ut
aliter, patet

b
a
materialis
Z
ad add.S quia]S quodZ materialiter]5
sequitur]
CAPITULUM TERTIUM
De regulis
generalibus
consequencie
formalis
1 Regule generales consequencie formalissunt decern et octo. Prima
regula:
dus est
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
antecedens
estverum
, consequens
verun.

18:33:38 PM

208

JOKESPRUYT

Exemplum:talis consequencia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal';


cuius antecedensest verum,ergo consequens eiusdem est verum. Unde
diciturcommuniterquod ex vero non sequiturnisi verum,sed ex falso
quandoque verumetbquandoque falsum.Exemplumquod ex falsosequiturc
verum,ut cum dicitur'homo est asinus;ergo homo est animai'. Exemplum
quod ex falso sequatur falsum,ut cum dicitur'homo est asinus; ergo
homo est rudibilis',et huiusmodi.
a
. . . falso]
falsum
S
S b ct'Z om.S c sequitur
Z om
verum]^S
Si quis negatistummodm arguendihabet*admitiereoppositumconsequentisstare0cum antecedente.Et tunc est danda consequencia bona
et formaliscuius antecedens est verum [ 69r] et consequens eiusdem
non est verum, ergo consequens est falsum,cum tale consequens sit
proposicio,et omnis proposicio sit vera vel falsa. Et gracia exempli: sit
Cc illa consequencia estdbona, cuius antecedens6verum sit A, et consequensffalsumsit B. Et tunc arguitursic: C consequencia est bona cuius
antecedensest verum etg consequens falsum.Ergo sicut primo et adequate significateper A, antecedens,potestesse absque hoc quod sit ita
sicut primo et adequate significatur
per B, consequens. Ergo C, consequencia facta ab A ad ipsum B, non est bona, et per te est bona. Eth
per consequenseadem consequenciaeritbona et non bona, quod est contradiccio.
a
e
S b stare] om.S c c]ZcSom.Z d est
... A]
habet]
abet^J
]Ze$om-Z antecedens
antecedens
estverum
A sitZ verum
sitA S rconsequens
... B]S consequens
sitfalsum
B Zg et]om-Shet... consequens]^
ergoS
2

3 Sed contraregulamaarguitursicb:Talis consequencia est bona 'tu es


homo et tu es asinus; ergo tu es asinus', cuius antecedensest verum et
consequensfalsum.[S 86r] Ergo regula falsa. Sed quod antecedenshuius
consequenciesit verumprobaturquia: Talis proposicio'tu es homo' est
vera; que est eius antecedens,accipiendo 'antecedens'de virtutevocabuli
pro ilio quod anteceditseu peceditnotam consequencie,et accipiendo
'consequens0'pro ilio quod sequitur.Quidam dicuntquod in ista regula
et aliis regulissequentibusdebet poni ly 'totale antecedens'etdly 'totale
consequens',accipiendoly 'totale' cathegorice.Sed dico quod non oportet
poni ly 'totale'cathegoricesumptum,nequecsincathegorematice
sumptum,
quia, accipiendoproprie'antecedens'et 'consequens',quicquidestantecedens
alicuius consequencie diciturtotale antecedensf,et econverso.Etg quicquid est consequens alicuius consequentiediciturtotale consequens,et
econverso.Et ideo talis proposicio 'tu es homo' non diciturantecedens

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

209

illiusconsequencie,licet sit pars illiusantecedentis.Et racio est quia pars


non est suum totum,neque totumest sua parsh,ut patet intuenti1.
b
c
a
det. . . consequens]

consequcntiam
regulam]om.S sicJ^'Som.Z consequens]
g
et. . . econverso]
omom.S fantecedens]
om.S e neque. . . sumptum]/
Z
S
consequens
S ethuiusmodi
add.Z
S hpars]om.S 1intuenti]
4

Secunda regula:
estfalsum
eiusboneetformalisconsequens
Si alicuiusconsequencie
, antecedens
estfalsum.
derrf
Exemplum:talisconsequnciaestbona 'tu es asinus;ergo tu non es homo';
cuius consequensest falsum,ergo antecedenseiusdemest falsum,et huiusmodi. Si quis negat istummodum arguendi,habet admittereoppositum
consequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda consequencia bona et
formaliscuius consequens est falsumet antecedenseiusdem non est falsum,ergo antecedensest verum,cum omnisproposiciobsitvera vel falsa.
Et tunc erit consequencia bona et formaliscuius antecedensestcverum
et consequens0falsum,quod est oppositumprime reguleprecedentis.Ex
quo potestinferricontradiccio,sicut in predicta6regula.
a
b
veladd.S c est]eritS consequens]
eritadd.S c pre eiusS proposicio]
eiusdem]
dicta]S
primaZ
Sed talis modus arguendi non valet "antecedensillius consequencie
69^ nunc significainon potest
precise et primariesignificandosicut
esse verumsine consequente,vel nisi consequenssit verum;ergo illa consequencia est bona", quia talis consequencia non valet 'nulla proposicio
estvera;ergotu es asinus',cuiusantecedens3
preciseet primariesignificando
non
esse
sicut nunc significat
verum; ergo non potestesse verum
potest
sine consequentenec cum consequente,quia si tale antecedenssitverum,
sequiturquod aliqua proposicioest vera et nulla proposicioest vera, quod
est contradiccio.
a
S
Z antecedente
antecedens]
5

Secundo: talis modus arguendi non valet "antecedens illius consequenciea potestesse verumsine consequenteutroque preciseet primarie
ergo illa consequencia non valet", quia talis consequencia
significante15;
est bonac ctues homo, [S 86^ ergo tu es animal'; cuius antecedenspotest
esse verumsine consequente,posito casu quod in aliquo futuro0instanti
talisproposiciositvera 'tu es homo', nulla alia6 remanente,et huiusmodi.
Tercio: talis modo arguendi non valet "antecedens illius consequencie
potestesse verum,consequenteexistentefalso;ergo illa consequencianon
valet", quia talis consequencia est bona 'tu es asinus; ergo tu non es
6

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210

JOKESPRUYT

homo'; cuius antecedenspotest esse verum consequenteexistentefalso,


quia illud antecedenspotestimponiad significandum
aliquid verum,consequente remanentefalso,et huiusmodi.
a
b
S c bona]si add.S d futuro]
nonadd.S significante]^
consequencie]
significate
om.
S c alia]aliquaS
7

Quarto: eciam talis modus arguendinon valet "antecedensilliusconfalso,utroquesignificante


sequenciepotestesse verumconsequenteexistente
illa
preciseet primariesicutnunc significat;
consequncianon valet",
ergo
talis
est
bona
'tu
curris;ergo tu nona sedes' posito
quia
consequncia
casu quod sedeas- cuius antecedensestverum,consequenteexistentefalso.
Quod probatursic: Et sit A illud instansin quo tam antecedensquam
consequens illius consequencie sintbfalsum,et tunc arguatursic: in A
instantiantecedensillius consequencieest falsumdum consequensexistit
falsum,utroque significante
preciseet primariesicutnunc significat;
ergo
vel contingenter
vel necessario;sed non necessario;ergo contingenter;
et
in
A
instanti
antecedens
illius
non
per consequens
consequencie potest
esse falsumdum consequensexistitfalsum.Ex quo infertur
quod in eodem
instantiantecedensilliusconsequenciepotestesse verum,consequenteexistentefalso,idest dum consequensexistitfalsum,utroque significante
precise et primariesicut nunc significat,
et huiusmodi.
a
non]om.S b sint]sitS
8

Tercia regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalisantecedens
est necessarium
, consequens
eiusdem
estnecessarium.
Exemplum: talis consequncia est bona 'Deus est; ergo Deus est', cuius
antecedensest necessarium,ergo consequenseiusdemest necessarium,et
huiusmodi.Unde diciturquod ex necessario non sequitur [Z 70r] nisi
necesarium.Si quis negatistummodumarguendi,habet admitiereoppositum consequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda consequenciabona
et formaliscuius antecedensest necessariumet consequens eiusdemnon
est necessarium,ergo tale consequensest contingensvel impossibile,cum
omnis proposiciosit necessariavel contingensvel impossibilis.E gracia
exempli:sit Cb illa consequencia,cuius antecedens0necessariumsit A, et
consequensdcontingensvel impossibilesit B. [5 87r] Et tunc arguitursic:
A est necessarium;ergo sicut primo et adequate significatur
per A non
potestnon esse; et B, sive sit contingenssive sit impossibile,ergo6sicut
primo et adequate significatur
per B potest non esse. Ex quo sequitur
sicut
et
quod
primo adequate significatur
per antecedensA potestessef

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211

absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur8


per conseA
ab
ad
non
est bona.
quens B; ergo C, consequencia facta
ipsum B,
Eth per te est bona. Ergo eadem consequencia est bona et non bona,
quod est contradiccio.
a
A Z c antecedens]
om
Z
utS b C]/S
S estadd.Z d consequens].?
om.Z c erg]f
f et] om.
om.S het. . . tertium
om.Z
esse]^f5 Z g significatur]
bona]S
9 Contra regulam arguitursic: Talis consequencia es bona 'omnis
homo est animal; et tu es homo; ergo tu es animal', cuius antecedensest
necessariumet consequensbcontingens.Ergo illacregulafalsa. Dico quod
tam antecedensquam consequenshuiusconsequencieest contingens.Licet
enim prima pars antecedentissit necessaria,et secunda pars sit contingens, tarnentotumantecedensdiciturcontingens,quodd est una copulativa composita ex una parte necessaria et altera contingenti.Sed talis
modus arguendinon valet "hec proposicio est necessaria; ergo necesse
est esse sicut illa significat",
quia si necesse est esse6 sicut illa significat,
illamf
et per consequensnecesseest illam esse;
necesse
est
ergo
significare,
est
falsum.
Sed
talis
modus
quod
arguendivalet "hec proposicioest necsicut
illam
necesse est
essaria; ergo
primo et adequate significatur
per
esse", vel sic "hec proposicioest necessaria;ergo primumet adequatum
eius necesse est esse", et huiusmodi.
significatum8
a
b
^ Zc c illa]om.Z d quod]S quiaZ e
S contingens
Z Qu0(^
est]om.S consequens]
om.Z
esst]ZcSom.Z fillam]
Z illaS g significatum]^^
10 Quarta regula:
est contingens,
antecedens
bon
? etformalist
Si alicuiusconsequencie
consequens
velimpossibile.
eiusdem
estcontingens
cuius
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona tucurris;ergo tu moveris5,
consequensest contingens,et antecedenssimiliterest contingens.Similiter
talis consequenciaest bona 'tu differsab ente; ergo tu es', cuiuscconsequens est contingenset antecedensimpossibile,et huiusmodi.Si quis negat
istum modum arguendi,habet admittereoppositum consequentiscum
antecedente.Et tuncdest danda consequenciabona et formaliscuius consequens est contingenset antecedenseiusdem non est contingensneque
impossibile,ergo tale antecedensest necessarium,cum omnis proposicio
sit necessariavel contingensvel [S 87^ impossibilis.Et tunc eri consequencia bona et formaliscuius antecedensest necessariumet consequens
estfcontingens,quod est oppositumtertiereguleprecedentis.
a
Sb
estadd.S c
S d tunc]
S
Z tuPos0 Z alicuius
bone]estadd.necnon
f 5 eritZ cuius]
cexp. formalis]
quodadd.Z erit]SestZ est]
sequitur

18:33:38 PM

212

JOKESPRUYT

11 [ 7CT] Quinta regula:


a est
eins
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
antecedens
possibili,consequens
demestpossibile.
Exemplum: talis consequncia est bona etc formalis'tu curris;ergo tu
non sedes', cuius antecedensest possibile,ergo consequens eiusdem est
possibile,et huiusmodi.Si quis negatistummodumarguendi,habetadmitiere oppositumconsequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda consequncia bona et formaliscuius antecedensest possibileet consequenseiusdem non est possibile,ergo tale consequens est impossibile,cum omnis
proposiciosit possibilisveldimpossibilis.Et gracia exempli:sit C illa consequncia, et arguitursic: C consequncia est bona et formaliscuius
antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile;ergo sicut primo et
adequate significateper eius antecedenspotestesse absque hoc quod sit
ita sicutprimo et adequate significatoper eius consequens;ergo C consequncia non est bona, et per te est bona; ergo eadem consequenciaerit
bona et non bonac, quod est contradiccio.
a
b
d
S ex impossibili
antecedens]
om.S possibile]
c et formalis]

om.S velimpossibilis]
om.S c bonaJ^Som.Z
12 Contra regulamarguitursic: Talis consequenciaest bona 'omne currens est asinusa;omnis homo est currens;ergo omnis homo est asinus5,
cuius antecedensest possibileet consequensimpossibile.Ergo regulafalsa.
Dico quod tam antecedensquam consequensilliusconsequencieestimpossibile. Licet enimbutraque pars antecedentissit possibilis,tamen totum
antecedensest impossibile,quia est una copulativacompositaex maiori
et minorique sunt proposicionesincompossibilesc.
a
in S delSc c incompossibiles]
et add.S b enim]
asinus]
ZCSimpossibiles
Z
13 Sexta regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
estimpossibile
eius, antecedens
consequens
1
dem estimpossibile.
Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona 'si homo est asinus, homo est
rudibilis';cuius consequens est impossibile,ergo antecedenseiusdem est
impossibile,et huiusmodi.Si quis negat istum modum arguendi,habet
admitiereoppositumconsequentiscum antecedente.Et tunc est danda
consequenciabona [S 881] et formaliscuius consequensest impossibileet
antecedenseiusdem non est impossibile,ergo tale antecedensest possibile, cum omnis proposiciosit possibilisvel impossibilis.Ex quo infertur
quod erit bona consequencia et formaliscuius antecedenserit possibile

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TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

213

et consequenseritimpossibile.
Quod estoppositumquintereguleprecedentis.
a
S eiusZ
eiusdem]
14

Sed talismodus arguendinon valet "hec proposicioes impossibilis;


ergo non potest esseb sicut ilia significai",quia quelibet proposicio0
sicutillam significat,
mundiimpossibilis
ergopotest
potestesse,significando
esse' sicut ilia significat.Sed iste modus arguendi valet "hec proposicio
est impossibilis;ergo sicut per illam primo et adequate significate non
potestesse". Vel aliter:"hec proposicioest impossibilis;ergo primmet
eius non potestesse", et huiusmodi.
adequatum significatum
a
b
$
om.Z cproposicio
Z est
Zc proposicionum
mundi]
est]om.S esse]c
15 Septima regula:
a sciteah te esseboneantecedens 7
Si alicuiusconsequencie
[Z lr] estsdtuma te
estscituma te esseverum.
esseverum
eiusdem
, consequens
talis
consequncia est bona et scita a te esse bona tues
Exemplum:
tu
es
animal',quia sciseius consequenssequi ex eius antecedente.
homo;ergo
Ergo si antecedensistiusconsequencie est scituma te esse verum,consequencie eiusdem est scitum a te esse verum, et huiusmodi.Quilibet
expertuslogicusvolens istam regulamprobare et alias regulassequentes
potestconsimilesraciones seu probaciones facere. Quare dimitto,causa
brevitatisretinendeet prolixitatisevitande.
a
add.necnon
del.Z b a te]Z anteS
Z$ boneet formalis
consequencie]
16 Sed talis modus arguendinon valet "hec consequncia est bona et
scita a te esse bona, cuius antecedensest scituma te; ergo consequens
eiusdem est scituma te", quia talis consequncia est bona et scita esse
bona 'Deus est; ergo A est', posito casu possibili51
quod lybA sit quedamc
proposicioebrayca significansDeum esse, et hoc sit scituma te, tamen
eius terminosignores;tunc ista consequncia est bona et scita a te esse
bonad,quia tu scis bene consequenssequi ex eius antecedente.Sed istius
consequencieantecedensest scituma te, et consequens eiusdem non est
scitumae te, quia tale consequens non intelligiscuius terminos[S 88^1
ignorasi Ex quo inferturquod iste modus arguendi similiternon valet
"hecgconsequenciaest bona et scita a te esse bona, cuius antecedensest
intellectuma te; ergo consequens eiusdem est intellectuma te", ut patet
in consequencianunc dicta, et huiusmodi.
c
b
a
om.Z ^ a t]Z
Sc quoddam
S om.Z d bona]
om.S y]ZhocS quedam]
possibili]
f
g
S ignores
om.S ignoras]
Z hec]Z om.S

18:33:38 PM

214

JOKESPRUYT

17 Octava regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
scitea te esseboneconsequens
esttibidubium
, antecedens
.
eiusdema.
esttibidubiumvelcreditum
essefalsum
Exemplum:talis consequncia est bona et scita a te esse bona 'rex sedet;
ergo rex sede, cuius consequensest tibi dubium et antecedenseiusdemb
est tibi dubium. Similitertalis consequncia est scita a te esse bona 'rex
sedete nullusrex sedet;ergo rex sede, cuius consequensest tibidubium
et antecedenscreditumesse falsum,quia tale antecedensest copulativa
ex partibusade invicemcontradictoriisf,
et huiusmodi.Sed talis
composita41
modus arguendinon valet "consequensilliusconsequencieest tibidubium
et antecedenseiusdem est tibi dubium vel creditumesse falsum;ergo illa
consequncia estgbona", quiah talis consequncia non valet 'rex sedet;
ergopapa dormit',cuius tam consequensquam antecedensest tibidubium,
et huiusmodi.
a
b
factaZ * ad
Z'S om.
eiusdem]
Z'S om.Z etJ
Z ergS d compositia]^
fZ eiusdem]
h
g
om.
om.
contradicentibus
est
invicem]
Z'S Z contradictoriis]S
Z
^5" Z quia]opposibona]
tumconsequentis
statcumantecedente
add.Z
18 Nona regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalisantecedens
est concedendum,
consequens
eiusdem
estconcedendum.
Exemplum:talis consequncia est bona et formalis'tu es homo; ergo tu
esa animal', cuius antecedensest concedendum,ergo consequenseius est
et huiusmodi.Sed talismodusarguendinon valet"antecedens
concedendum,
illius consequencie [/71"] est concedendumetbconsequens eiusdem est
concedendum;ergo consequencia est bona", quia talis consequncianon
valet 'tu moveris;ergo tu curris',cuius tam antecedensquam consequens
est concedendum0,posito casu quod tu curras,et huiusmodi.
a es

nones asinusS b et]Zom.S c concedendum]


dumadd.S
animal]/^

19 Decima regula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
estnegandum
eius, antecedens
consequens
demestnegandum.
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona et formalis'si tu es asinus,tu non
es homo', cuius consequens est negandum,ergo antecedenseiusdem est
negandum.Similitertalis consequencia est bona [S 89r] 'nichilest; ergo
nullus deus est', cuius consequens est negandum,ergo antecedenseiusdem est negandum,et huiusmodi.
20 Ex istis regulispatet quod si alicuius consequencie antecedensest
concedendum et consequens eiusdem est negandum, illa consequencia

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A I5-C. SPANISH
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215

non valet,licetstetaliquam consequenciamesse bonam cuius antecedens


est negandumet consequens eiusdem est concedendum,ut cum dicitur
'homo est asinus; ergo homo est animal', et huiusmodi.Sed talis modus
arguendi nona valet "consequens illius consequencie est negandum et
antecedenseiusdem est negandum; ergo consequencia estbbona", quia
talisconsequencianon valet tucurris;ergo tu sedes',cuius tam antecedens
quam consequensest negandum,posito casu quod tu non curraseque
sedeas, et huiusmodi.
a non
Z
Z b est]^om
Z'S om
valet]
Undecima regula:
estpurenegativum,
antecedens
boneetformalis
Si alicuiusconsequencie
consequens
nonestaffirmativum.
eiusdem
Exemplum:talis consequencia3est bona et formalis'nullum animal currit;ergo nullushomo curri,cuius antecedensest pure negativumet consequens eiusdem est negativum,et huiusmodi.Unde diciturcommuniter
Sed econverso,
non sequituraffirmativa.
quod ex pura negativaformaliter
bene sequiturnegativa,ut bene sequitur'tu es homo; ergo
ex affirmativa
tu non es asinus', et huiusmodi.Sed primo in regula dicitur0"ex pura
exceptivanegativabene potest
negativa",quia ex proposicioneaffirmativa
Sortem
ut 'nullushomo preter
currit;ergo Sortes cursequi affirmativa,
ri. Sed talis exceptiva non diciturpura negativa, quia in se includit
ex pura negSecundo dicitur"formaliter",
affirmativam.
quia materialiter
ut 'nichilest; ergo Deus est', et huiusmodi.
ativa potestsequi affirmativa,
a consequencia]
om.S bdicitur]
quodadd.Z
21

Dua decima regula:


antecedens
est affirmativum,
boneetformalisconsequens
Si alicuiusconsequencie
nonestpurenegativum.
eiusdem
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona et formalis'homo currit;ergo animal curri,cuius consequensest affirmativum,
'Z ?2r] et antecedenseiusdem non est pure negativum,et huiusmodi.
22

23 Contra istas duas regulas arguitursic: Talis consequencia est bona


et formalis'nichilest;ergoaliquid est',cuius antecedensestpure negativum,
et consequensesta affirmativum.
Ergo iste regule sunt false. Antecedens
probatur, scilicet quod talis consequencia sit bona et formalis,quia:
Formaliter[S 89"] sequitur'nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichilest', quia
ut non est ita
ex oppositoconsequentissequituroppositumantecedentisb,
est
Et
sic:
sic
est.
inde
est.
nichil
quod nichil
sequitur
Ergocaliquid
quod

18:33:38 PM

216

JOKESPRUYT

est. Ergo aliquo modo est quod nichilest,et aliquo modo est quod nichil
estd.Ergo aliquis modus esteetfaliquis modus est. Ergo aliquid est. Ergo8
a primo antecedenteultimumconsequens sequiturformaliter
'nichilest;
ergo aliquid est5.
a S om. b
d
c
S c ergo. . . tertium
est]
Zf antecedents]
est]om.S est]om.S
consequents
8
S a primo
autemantecedente
est]bisinS et. . . est]
^6" om.Z erg antecedente]
Z
24 Dico quod talis consequncia est materialis'nichil est; ergo aliquid est', quia eius antecedensest impossibile,vel consequensnecessarium,
et eius consequensnonaincluditur
in antecedente.Sed ad probaformaliter
cionem potest respondendupliciter.Uno modo quod illabprima consequncia probacionisest materialiset non formalisc'si nichilest; ergo sic
est quod nichilest', quia eius antecedensestdimpossibile,et consequens
non est de intellectusui6 antecedentis.Et ideo non omnes ille consenon includitur'nichil
quenciefsunt bone et formales8.Quare formaliter
est'. Ergo aliquid esth.
a
b
add.S c formalist
formaliter
S d est]
S dicitur
non]bisinS illa]consequncia
Z c su^
S fconsequencie]
add.necnon
del.Z gformales]
S
formalis

antecedentis]
consequents
que
h S ont.
est]
Z
25 Alio modo faciendotalemdistinccionem
de ly 'sic' vel 'ita'. Quoda potest
enim
'sic'
vel
'ita' dicitmodmentitatisb
vel
accipi dupliciter:aliquando
ly
ut
cum
dicitur'homo est; ergo sic est vel ita est quod homo
affirmacionis,
velaffirmacionis
estquodhomoest.Et tune illa
est', idest aliquomodoentitatis
non
valet
de
forma
'nichil
est;
consequncia
ergo sic est quod nichilest',
eius
modo
entitatisest quod nichil
quia
consequenssignificaiquod aliquo
est. Quod esset falsum antecedente supposito, quiac si nichil est, nec
aliquis modus entitatisest, et per consequens neque aliquo modo entitatisest quod nichilest. Aliquando ly 'sic' vel 'ita' dicitmodumnichilitatis
vel negacionis.Etd isto modo concediturilla prima consequencia 'nichil
vel negacionisest
est; ergo sic est quod nichil est'. Via vero nichilitatis
quod nichil est.
a
b
sicsaepius
S c quia]S quodZ det. . . nega emtitatisf/j
quod. . . ita]Z'S om.Z entitatis]
om.S
cionis]
26 Sed negetursecunda consequencia,scilice 'sic est quod nichilest;
ergo aliquo modo est quodb nichil est; ergo aliquis modus es', quia
vel negacio, quia modus nichilitatis
arguitura secundum
quidad simpliter
nis proprievel simpliciter
non est aliquis modus,scilicetentitatis.Et ideo
<non> omnes iste consequencie sunt bone et formales,quia formaliter
non includitur'nichilest; ergo aliquid est'. Consimiliterpotestresponden
ad tale argumentum'nulla chimeraest; ergo sic est quod nulla chimera

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
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217

est; ergo aliquo modo est quod nulla chimeraest et aliquo modo est quod
nulla chimeraest; ergodaliquis modus est et aliquis modus est; ergo aliquid est'; a primo antecedenteade ultimumconsequens sequitur 'nulla
chimera est; ergo [S 90r] aliquid est', cuius antecedens est pure negaEt ita de similibusf.
tivumet consequensaffirmativum.
c
e
a
h
S d ergo. . . alterum
est]^c5om.Z
CSom.Z est]om
si S quod. . . est]
scilicet]
add.Z
et huiusmodi
ad]Z quiaS rsimilibus]
[Z 72"] Tercia decima regula:
boneetformalis
Si alicuiusconsequencie
, illudpotest
aliquidstatcumantecedente
non
.
econverso
sed
starecumdus consequente
,
Exemplum:talisconsequnciaest bona et formalis'homo currit;ergo animal curri.Sed talisproposicio'homo est albus' statcum hoc antecedente
'homo curri,quia simulstant'homo curriet 'homo est albus'. Ergo illa
poteststarecum eius consequente,quia simulstant'animaicurri,et 'homo
est albus', et huiusmodi.Sed dixi in regula "sed non econverso",quia
talis proposicio 'nullus homo curri potest stare cum hoc consequente
'animal curri,sed illa non poteststarecum eius antecedente3,
quia 'nullus homo curri et 'homo curri repugnantad invicem.Sed talis modus
arguendinon valet "ista consequencia est bona; ergo quicquid stat cum
eius antecedentestat cum consequenteeiusdem",quia stat aliquam consequenciamesse bonam, ut inb ista 'homo currit;ergo animai curri,et
quod nichilstetcum eius antecedenteet consequente,et huiusmodi.
a
S b in ista]illeS
antecedente]
consequente
27

Quarta decima regula:


boneetformalis
Si alicuiusconsequencie
, illudpotest
consequent
aliquidrpugnt
econverso.
non
antecedenti
sed
eius
,
repugnare
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona et formalis'homo currit;ergo animal curri. Seda talis proposicio'nullum animal curri vel talis 'nullum
corpus curri rpugnthuic consequenti'animal curri. Ergo ilia potest
repugnarehuic antecedenti'homo curri,et huiusmodi.Sed dixi in regula "sed non econverso",quia talisproposicio'nullushomo currirpugnt huic antecedenti'homo curri, sed illa nonb rpugnteius consequenti,quia simul stant'nullus homo curri et 'animai curri. Sed talis
modus arguendi non valet "ista consequencia est bona; ergo quicquid
rpugnteius consequenti,rpugnteius antecedenti",quia stat aliquam
consequenciamesse bonam et quod nichilrepugna eius antecedentinec
consequenti,etdhuiusmodi.
a
S repugnet
S b non]^Scom.S c rpugnt]
Z d et huiusmodi]
om.S
sed]exemplum
28

18:33:38 PM

218

JOKESPRUYT

Quinta decima regula:


Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
ad antecedens
,
aliquid[S 90"] antecedit
illudpotestantecedere
ad dus consequens,
sed noneconverso.
Exemplum: talis consequncia est bona et formalishomo curri; ergo
animaicurritb.
Sed talisproposicioSortescurritanteceditad hoc antecedens
homo currit,quia bene sequiturSortescurrit;ergo homo currit.Ergo illa
potestantecederead illud consequens animai currit,quiac bene sequitur
Sortescurrit;ergo animai currit.Sed loquendo hic de "bene antecedere"
semper0facitconsequenciambonm. Sed dixi in regula "sed non econverso", quia talisproposicioasinusecurritpotestantecederead illud consequens animai currit,quiaf bene sequiturasinus currit;ergo animai currit.Sed illa non potestantecederead illud antecedenshomo currit,quiag
non sequiturasinuscurrit;ergo homo currit,et huiusmodi.Sed talismodus
arguendinon valet "ista consequencia 'Z 73r] est bona et formalis;ergo
quicquid anteceditad illudhantecedensanteceditad eius consequens",quia
staticonsequenciamesse bonam et quod nichilanteceditad eius antecedens'.
a
Se
estS b currit]
currit]
estS c quia. . . alterum
Z'S om-Z d semper]
quod
currit]
f
asinus
. . . alterum
currit
ex
ilio
antecedente
asinus
currit
S
currit]
animai
sequitur1
quia. . .
om.Z$ stat]
ethuiuscurrit]
om.S gquia]S quodZ hiHud]c
estant^Z s antecedens]
modiadd.Z
29

30

Decima sexta regula:


Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalisaliquidsequitur
ex consequente
, illuda.
.
, sed noneconverso
potestsequiex eiusantecedente
Exemplum:talisconsequenciaest bona et formalishomocurrit;ergo animal curri.Sed talisproposicio'corpuscurrivel 'substanciacurrisequitur
ex tali consequentib'animal curri,quia bene sequitur'animal currit;ergo
corpuscurrivel '<ergo> substanciacurri.Ergocilia potestsequi ex ilio
antecedente'homo curri,quia bene sequitur'homo currit;ergo corpus
curri vel 'ergo substanciacurri,et huiusmodi.Sed dixi in regula "sed
non econverso",quia talisproposicio'racinalecurrisequiturex ilio antecedente'homo curri,quiad bene sequitur'homo currit;ergoracinalecurri. Sed illa non potestsequi ex ilio consequente'animal curri,quia6 non
sequitur 'animal currit;ergo racinale curri, et huiusmodi.Sed talisf
modus arguendi non valet "ista consequencia est bona; ergo quicquid
vel quicquidsequitur
sequiturex consequentesequiturexgeius antecedente,
ad eius consequens sequiturad eius antecedens",quia stat aliquam consequenciam esse bonam et quodh nichilsequiturex eius consequente,et
huiusmodi.
a
b
antecedenti
S c ergo. . . quartum
Zd
illud]
Z aliquisS consequenti]
Z'S om
currit]
c
f
h
g
.
.
.
om.
quia currit]
Z'S
Z quia]5 quodZ talis]
Z'S om.Z ex]om.S quod]om.S

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
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31

Decima septimaregula:
Si alicuiusconsequencie
boneetformalis
ex antecedente
et consealiquidsequitur
, illudpotestsequiex eiusantecedente
quente
perse.
bona
talis
est
et
formalis'homo currit;ergo aniconsequncia
Exemplum:
mal curri.Sed talisproposicioSubstanciacurrisequiturex antecedente
et consequente. Ergo illa potest sequi ex antecedenteper se, ut patet
intuenti.
32 [S 9 1r] Contra istas duasa regulas precedentesarguiturdupliciter.
Primocontradecimamquintamregulamsic. Talis consequnciaest bona
et formalis'pater est; ergo suus filiusest5.Sed ista proposicio'filiusestbi
anteceditad eius antecedens,quia bene sequitur'filiusest; ergo pater est'.
Tamen ipsa non anteceditad eius consequens,quia non sequitur'filius
est; ergo suus filiusest'. Ergo istiusconsequencie bone et formalisaliquid anteceditad eius antecedensquod non potestantecederead eius consequens. Ergo regula es falsa.
a
b
c S om.Z
duas]om.S est]om.S est]
Secunda arguiturcontra decimam sextm regulamsic. Talis consequncia est bona et formalis'bipedalis linea est; ergo pedlis linea est'.
Sed talisproposicio'linea semipedalisest eius maxima medietas'sequitur
ad eius consequens, quia bene sequitur 'pedalisa linea estb; ergo linea
semipedaliscest eius maxima medietas'.Tamen ipsa non sequiturex eius
antecedente,quia non sequitur'bipedalislinea est; ergo linea semipedalis
est eius maxima medietas',cum sitdantecedensverum ' 73*] et consequens falsum.Ergo illius consequenciebone et formalisaliquid sequitur
ex eius consequentequod non sequiturex eius antecedente.Et per consequens regula est falsa.
d
a
b 5 om. c
$
Z semipedalis]
Z'S semipedis
Z S^Z om
Z'S pedisZ est]
pedlis]
33

non variata relacione,quia


34 Dico quod predictereguleintelliguntura
factaalicuiusrelacionisvariacionenon remaneteadem proposicio.Et ideo
ad primm,quando dicitur'pater est; ergo suus filiusest', tunc ly 'suus'
refertur
ad ly 'pater'. Sedb quando diciturin ultima illacione 'filiusest;
ad ly 'filius'.Et sic non remanetillud
ergo suus filiusest', tunc refertur
illi conseidem consequens,sed dicituralia proposiciosimiliscin virtuted
Et
sic
nichil
contra
relacionis
variacionem.
regulam,quia
quenti propter
illud6quod anteceditad tale antecedens'pater est' non anteceditad eius
consequens,sed ad aliam proposicionemsimilemconsequenti.
a
voceZ c iUucl
S d virtute]S
om.Z b sed]5 et Z c similis]
simili
quod]
intelligunturJ^S
Z'S om.Z

18:33:38 PM

220

JOKESPRUYT

35 Ad secundum3respondetur
consimilimodo, quando eius talisproposicio 'linea semipedalisest eius maxima [591^ medietas'infertur
ex consequente, tunc illud relativum'eius' referturad ly* 'pedlis linea'; sed
ex antecedente,tuncrefertur
ad ly 'bipedalislineab'.Et sic
quando infertur
non remaneteadem proposiciopropter0relacionisvariacionem,sed dicitur
alia proposicioque refertur
ad consequens etd alia proposicioque refertur ad antecedens.Et sic non est contra regulam.Et itae de similibus.
a
b

d
S secundam
S bipedalis
secundum]
Z ty]SiUudZ bipedalis
Z' pedlis
Z et. . .
linea]
refertur]
Z'S om.Z e ita]Z sicS
36

Decima octava regula,et ultima


Si sintmulteconsequencie
intermedie
boneetformales
et nonvariate
a
, arguendo
est
bona
et
.
primoad ultimum
consequens consequendaz.
formalis
Exemplum,ut cum dicitur'homo currit,ergo animai currit;et animai
currit,ergo corpus currit;et corpus currit,ergo substanciacurrit;et substanciacurrit,ergo ens currit;ergo a primoantecedentead ultimumcon"homo currit;ergo ens currit"', et huiusmodi.
sequens sequiturformaliter
a
Z'S om.Z
consequencia]
37 Primo diciturin regula "consequencieintermediebone et formales",
intermediarum
fueritconsequencia
quia si aliqua ipsarumconsequenciarum
tunc
a
antecedente
ad
ultimum
mala,
arguendo primo
consequens formaliternon valet consequencia. Ut cum dicitur:si nullum tempusest,
dies non es; et si dies non est, nox est; et si nox est, aliquod tempus
est; ergo a primo antecedentead ultimumconsequens formaliternon
sequitur'si nullumtempusest,aliquod tempusest', quia illa secunda consequencia intermedianon valet 'si dies non est, nox est', quia ex pura
non sequituraffirmativa.
Et dico "formaliter",
negativaformaliter0
quia
talis consequencia potest dici bona de materia, 'si nullum tempus est,
aliquod tempusest', quia eius antecedensdiciturimpossibilesaltemnaturaliter,et consequens non est de intellectuantecedentisc.
a
c
om.Z b formaliter]
S
est]cS
om.S antecedentis]^
consequentis
38

Secundo diciturin regula "et non variate",quia [ 74r] tunc consequencie non dicunturvariate quando solum illud quod est consequens
prioris consequencie es antecedens alterius consequencie immediateb
sequentis,et sic de singulisconsequenciarumintermediarumusque ad
ultimam.Ut patetin primoexemplohuiusregule.Sed consequenciedicuntur variatequando aliquidcfueritantecedens[S 92r] vel pars antecedentis alicuius consequencieintermediequod non fueritconsequens alterius
consequencieimmediate0precedentis.Ut cum dicitur:homo currit,ergo

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A I5-C. SPANISH
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221

animal currit;et animal currit,ergo corpus currit;et corpus currit,et


omne corpus est album, ergo substancia alba currit; ergo a primo
antecedenteusque6ad ultimumconsequensformaliter
non sequiturhomo
currit;ergo substanciaalba currit5,
quia talisproposicio'omne corpus est
album' fuitantecedensvel pars antecedentistercieconsequencie,que non
fuitconsequens secunde consequencie immediatefprecedentis.Et ita de
similibus.
a
S aliquodZ d
intermedie
S c aliquid]
Z'S et Z b immediate
est]
sequentis]
sequentes
r
c
S usquead]Z ad S immediate]
S
intermedie
intermedie
immediate]
CAPITULUM QUARTUM
habitudinem
De regulis
tangentibus
specialibus
terminorum
velproposicionum
1 Regule specialesconsequenciarum
suntmulte.Quarum ordo est triplex.
Primoenimponunturreguleconsequenciarumtangenteshabitudinemterminorum.Secundo ponuntur regule consequenciarumtangenteshabiTercio ponunturreguletangentes
tudinemproposicionumcathegoricarum.
habitudinemproposicionumypoteticarum.De primis est triplexordo.
Primo de consequenciisterminorumab inferioriad suum superius,et
et coreconverso.Secundo de consequenciisterminorumconvertibilium
relativorum.Tercio de consequenciisdisparatorumet aliorum terminoDe quibusper ordinemest agendum.
vel impertinentium.
rumoppositorum
ad superius
terminorum
ab inferiori
De consequenis
2 De consequenciisterminorumab inferioriad suum superiuset econverso ponuntursex regule sequentes.Prima regula:
et sineimpedimento
Ab inferiori
ad suumsuperius
, ides distribucione
affirmative
et verbosignificante
actumanime
habeinte
vimnegacionis
aliis
et diccione
, omnibus
manentibus
omninoconsimilibus,
est
terminis
usdemconsequencie
consequencia
bonaetformalis.
Exemplumarguendoa parte subiecti,ut sequitur'homo currit;ergo animal currit'.Exemplum a parte predicati,ut 'homo currit;ergobhomo
movetur',et huiusmodi.
a
$
etZ et sineZ b erg]^om
idest]S
Ex taliregulepatetquod, arguendoab inferiori
[S 92^ ad suumsuperius
valet.
Ut
non
formaliter
non
sequitur'asinus nona
negative,consequencia
et consequens
animai
non
antecedens
est
verum
currit;ergo
currit',quia

18:33:38 PM

222

JOKESPRUYT

falsum,posito casu quod nullusasinus sitb,se omne animal currat.Sed


dico "formaliter",
quia talis consequncia est bona de materia'tu non es
homo; ergo tu non es animal', demonstratohomine.Secundo patet quod
ab inferioriad suum superiusaffirmative
cum distribucionesuperioriset
Ut non sequitur[Z 74a] 'omnis
inferioris
formaliter
non
valet.
consequencia
homo currit;ergo omne animal curri. Sed dico "formaliter",
quia talis
consequenciaest bona de materia'omnishomo est;ergo omne animalest'.
a
om.Z c sed]bisinS
om.Z b sit]S
non]cS
4 Tercio patet quoda ab inferioriad suum superiuscum distribucione
habente vim negacionis consequencia formaliternon valet, ut sunt lyb
'incipit'e desiniet diccionesexclusivevel exceptivevel reduplicative*1
et similes.Exemplumcum ly 'incipit',ut non sequitur'Sortesincipitesse
albus; ergo Sortes incipitesse coloratus'.Exemplum cum ly 'desinit',ut
non sequitur'Sortesdesinitcurrere;ergo Sortesdesinitmoveri'.Exemplum
cum diccione exclusiva,ut non sequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo tantum homo movetur'.Exemplumcum diccione exceptiva,ut non sequitur
'omnishomo preterSortemcurrit;ergo omnishomo preterSortemmovetur',et huiusmodi.Sed dixi "formaliter",
quia talisconsequenciaest bona
de materia 'Sortes incipit esse homo; ergo Sortes incipit esse animai'.
Similiterista consequenciaest bona de materia'Sortes desinitesse homo;
ergo Sortes desinitesse animai', et huiusmodi.
b
a
add.Z
om-$ et]Z om.S d reduplicative]
scilicet
quod]S om.Z
negative
5 Quarto patetquoda ab inferiori
ad suumsuperiuscum verbosignificante
actum anime consequenciaformaliter
non valet. Ut nonbsequitur'dubito
illud esse hominem;ergo dubitoillud esse animai', et huiusmodi.Sed dixi
"formaliter",
quia talis consequencia est bona de materia 'Sortem scio
esse hominem;ergo Sortemscio esse animai',et ita de similibusin terminis
substancialibus.
a
b
S om.Z
quod]S om.Z nonsequitur]
6 Ultimo ponitur [S 93r] in regula "omnibusaaliis terminiseiusdem
consequenciemanentibusomnino consimilibus".Et ideo talis consequencia non valet 'homo currit;ergo animal disputt'.Similiternon sequitur
'homo currit;ergo asinus movetur',licet in utraque istarumconsequenciarum arguiturab inferioriad suum superiusaffirmative
et sine impedimento. Tamen alii terminieiusdem consequencie non sunt omnino
ut patet intuenti.
consimilesb,
a
S omnisZ$ b consimiles]S
similes
Z
omnibus]

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223

Secunda regula:
Ab inferiori
ad suumsuperins
a partesubiecti
cumnegacione
etfacta
postposita,
debitaconstancia
eiusdem
de eodeminferiori
et sinedistribucione
inferisuperioris
aliis terminis
oriset superioris
eiusdem
manentibus
omnino
, omnibus
consequencie
estbonaetformalis.
consimilibus
, consequencia
'homo
non currit;ergo animainon curri,et huiusut
Exemplum, sequitur
modi. Primodiciturin regula"cum negacionepostposita",quia cum neganon valet. Ut non sequitur'non
cione prepositaconsequencia formaliter
homo currit;et omnishomo est animai; ergo non animai curri.Secundo
dicitur"cum debitaconstanciasubiecti",quia sine constanciasuperiorisde
non valet. Ut non sequitur'asieodema inferiori
consequenciaformaliter
ut dictumfuitbin regula precenus non currit;ergo animai non currit5,
dente. [,Z 75r] Tercio dicitur"sine distribucioneinferioriset superioris",
quia cum tali distribucioneconsequencia formaliternon valet. Ut non
sequitur'omnis homo non currit;et omnis homo est animai; ergo omne
animal non curri. Quarto dicitur"omnibus aliis terminiseiusdem consequencie manentibusomnino consimilibus".Et ideo talis consequencia
non valet 'homo non est albus et omnis homo est animai; ergo animai
non est coloratum',et huiusmodi.
a
b
estS
eodem]
Ze om'Z$
8

Tercia regula:
ethcumdisAb inferiori
ad suumsuperius
, sed2-a partepredicati,
affirmative
et
existentis
in
antecedente
subiecti
eiusdem
tribucione
, conconsequente
afirmativa
estbona.
sequencia
Exemplum,ut <sequitur> 'omnis homo currit;ergo omnis homo moveseud cum distur', et huiusmodi.Primo in regula dicitur"affirmative0",
cum
distribucione
seu
tribucioneaffirmativa,
negativa,
quia negative,
non valet. Ut non sequitur'nullus homo currit;
consequenciaformaliter
ergo nullus homo [S 93^ movetur'. Sed dico "formaliter",quia talis6
consequencia est bona de materia 'nullus homo est homo; ergo nullus
homo est animai', et huiusmodi.
c
a
b
5 d seu. . . affirmativa]
del.Zc c
affirmativa
sed]S om.Z et]$om-Z affirmative]
S
om.
Z
talis]
9

Quarta regula:
seda partesubiecti
ad suumsuperius
Ab inferiori
, cumdiconeexcluaffirmative,
eiusdem
manentibus
et superiori
terminis
siva additainferiori
, ceteris
consequencie
estbonaetformalis.
omnino
consimilibus
, consequencia
Exemplum,utasequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo tantumanimai curri,
et huiusmodi.Sed dixi"a partesubiecti",quia a partepredicaticonsequencia

18:33:38 PM

224

JOKESPRUYT

non valet. Ut non sequitur 'tantumhomo currit;ergo tantumanimai0


movetur',et huiusmodi.
a
b
ut'ZcSom.Z animai]
Zc homoZ$
10 Quinta regula:
A superiori
distributo
ad suuminferius
cumdebdistributum
affirmative
affirmative
ita constancia
eiusdem
de
eoderr
ceteris
conterminis
eiusdem
,
inferiori
superioris
manentibus
omnino
.
est
bona
et
consimilibus,
sequencie
consequencia
formalis
Exemplumarguendoa parte subiecti,ut sequitur'omne animal currit;et
omnis homo est animai; ergo omnis homo currit'.Exemplum a parte
predicati,ut sequiturctues omne animal; et omnishomo est animai; ergo
tu es omnis homo', et huiusmodi.
a
om.Z
eodem]S
11 Ex qua regulapatet quod a superioriad suum inferiussine distribucione consequencia formaliter
non valet. Ut non sequitur'animai currit;
Sed dico "formaliter",
ergo homo currit5.
quia talisconsequenciaest bona
de materia [ 75r] 'tu es animal; ergo tu es homo', demonstratohomine.
Secundo patet quod a superioridistributoaffirmative
ad suum inferius
distributum
affirmative
sine debita constanciasuperiorisde inferiori,
conformaliter
non
Ut
valet.
non sequitur'omne animal currit;ergo
sequencia
omnishomo currit',quia antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod nullushomo sit et omne animal currat.Ultimoponiturin
regula "ceteristerminiseiusdem consequencie manentibusomnino consimilibus",sicut dictumfuitin regulisprecedentibus.a
a
et huiusmodi
add.Z
precedentibus]
12 Sexta regula,et ultima:
A superiori
distributo
ad suuminferius
ceteris
terdistributum
negative
negative,
miniseiusdem
manentibus
omnino
estbona
consimilibus,
consequencie
consequencia
etformalis.
Exemplum arguendo a parte subiecti,ut sequitur'nullumanimal currit;
ergo nullushomo currit'.Exempluma parte [S 94r] predicati,ut sequitur
'tu non es animal; ergo tu non es homo', et huiusmodi.Ex qua regula
patet quod arguendoa superioridistributonegativead suum inferiusdistributumnegativeest bona consequencia,sive arguendocum debita constancia sive arguendo sinea ipsab constanciasuperiorisde inferiori.
a
cumZ b ipsa]debitaS
sine]/c
13 Contra primam regulam, probando3 quod abb inferioriad suum
sine impedimentoconsequencia non valet, <arguitur
superiusaffirmative

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A I5-C. SPANISH
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225

sic>. Et arguitur communiterc


quatuor modis primo sic: talis consequncia non valet 'SorteslegitVergilim;ergo Sortesagit Virgilium'.Secundo
non sequitur'iste est apparens asinus; ergo iste est ens asinus'. Tercio
non sequitur'iste est monacus albus; ergo iste est homo albus'. Quarto
non sequitur'li "homo" est masculinum;ergo ly "animai" est masculinum',
et non sequitur'ly "homo" est species specialissima;ergo ly "animai" est
ad
speciesspecialissima'.In quibus videturper regulamargui ab inferiori
suum superiusaffirmative
etc.
b
c
a
. . . modis]
communiter
S quatuor
modis
Z
probando]. .(?)S ab] ad S communiter
14 Ad primmdico quod quando ly 'legi et 'agit' accipiuntursine
aliquo addito, se habent tamquam inferiuset superius. Et tunc bene
sequitur'Sortes legit; ergo Sortes agit'. Seda quando accipiunturcum
additob,non semperse habent tamquam inferiuset superius,ut cum dicitur 'Sortes legit Vergilim;ergo Sortes agit Vergilim'. Similiternon
potest
sequitur'Sortesamat Petrm;ergo Sortesagit Petrm'.Consimiliter
responden0ad secundumet ad tertium.Ad quartumdico quod quando0
se habenttamquaminferius
ly 'homo' et 'animal' accipiunturpersonaliter,
non se habent [Z 76r]
et superius,sed quando accipiunturmaterialiter,
Ex
tamquaminferiuset superius. quibus patet quod in nulla istarumconsequenciarumarguiturab inferioriad suum superiusaffirmative.
b
a
Z d quando]nonadd.S
S c responden]
S diciZ! om
Z additis
sed]S quiaZ addito]
ad suuminferiusb
15 Contraquintamregulam,probandoquod a superiori21
valet consequncia,arguitursic: talisconaffirmative
et sine distribucione
'numerus
est
bona
est;
ergo binariusest', quiac non est imagsequncia
inabile numerumesse et quod nullus binarius sit, quia si estd aliquis
numerus,oportetquod sit binariusvel maior quam binarius,et talissemper includitnumerumbinarium.[S 94^] Dico quod talisconsequenciaest
bona de materia,et non de forma.Similiterbene sequiturde materia'tu
es animal; ergo tu es homo', demonstratohomine. Et ita de similibus.
a
om.
Z
Z'S inferiori
c quia. . . sit]
Z'S om.Zd est]cS
Zb superiori]
superiori] inferiori
Circa regulaspredictasponunturquinqu regulesequentes,in quibus
arguiturvel videturargui ab inferioriad suum superius,vel econverso.
Prima regulaa:
distraet sinetermino
A tercio
ad ipsumsecundum
adiacensaffirmative
adiacente
a suo
alium
terminm
et
termino
seu
et
hente ampliativi
equivocante impediente
.
estbona, sed noneconverso
consequencia
pncipalisignificato?,
homo
et
'homo
est
ut
est',
albus;
ergo
'sequiturhomo
Exemplum, sequitur
in
Primo
dixi
et
huiusmodi.
homo
currit;ergo
est',
regula "sine termino
16

18:33:38 PM

226

JOKESPRUYT

distrahente",
quia non sequitur'Adam estmortuus;ergoAdam est'.Secundo
dixi "sine terminoampliativo",quia nond sequitur'Antichristus
est genest9.Tercio dixi "sine terminoequivocanteseu
erabilis;ergo Antichristus
impedientealium terminma suo principalisignificato",
quia non sequitur
'Cesar est pictus6;ergo Cesar est5,vel 'Cesar est homo pictus;ergo Cesar
est5.Quarto dixi "sed non econverso55,
quia non sequitur'homo est; ergo
homo est albusf5,vel 'ergo homo curri,et huiusmodi.
a
b
S apliante
om.Z
S d non]cS
quodadd.Z ampliativo]
Z c significato]
significate
c regula]
f
.
.
.
alterum
est
om.
S albus]
pictus
]Z
asinusS
17 Secunda regula:
A secundo
adiacente
ad ipsumtertium
adiacensnegative
etsinetermino
distrahente
et ampliativo
e termino
seu
alium
terminm
a
suoprinequivocante impediente
est
bona
sed
non
econverso.
,
cipalisignificato,
consequemia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'nullus homo est; ergobnullus homo es albus5,
et sequitur'nullushomo est; ergo nullushomo curri,et huiusmodi.Primo
dixi in regula "sine terminodistrahente,quia nond sequitur'Adam non
est; ergo Adam non est mortuus5.Secundo dixi "sine terminoamplianon est; ergo Antichristus
non est
tivo55,
quia non sequitur'Antichristus
Tercio dixi "sine terminoequivocante
generabilisvel [Z 76"] generandus5.
seu impedientealium terminma suo principalisignificato55,
quia non
'Cesar
non
Cesar
non
est
vele
Cesar
non
est; ergo
sequitur
pictus5
'ergo
est homo pictus5.Quarto dixi "sed non econverso55,
quia non sequitur
'nullus homo est albusf;ergo nullus homo est5,et huiusmodi.
a
a Z b erg]c
om.Z c est]f
om.Z d nonsequitur]
nonS c vel]om.
et]cS
sequitur
f
S albus]
Z asinusS
18 [S 95r] Tercia regula:
A dictosecundum
nonvalet,
quidad dictum
simpliciter
consequncia
sed accipiendo "dictumsecundumquid55stricte.Quod potestfieriquatuor
modis.Primocum terminodiminuentestricteaccepto.Et ideo non sequitur
'Ethiopsest albus secundumdentes;ergo Ethiopsest albus5.Similiternon
sequitur'chimera est ens fictum;ergo chimera est ensa5.Secundo cum
terminodistrahente,
ut non sequitur'homo est homo mortuus;ergo homo
est homo5.Tertio cum terminoampliativo,ut non sequitur'Antichristus
est homo generabilis;ergoAntichristus
est homo5,et non sequitur'chimera
est ens opinabile; ergo chimera est ens5. Quarto cum terminoequivocante seu impedientealium terminma suo principalisignificato,
ut non
'iste
estb
homo
iste
est
homo5.
Unde
iste
terminus
sequitur
pictus; ergo
'homo5per se significat
hominemverum,sed cum adiunccionehuius termini 'pictus5equivocaturcad significandum
hominempictum,et per contunc
a
suo
sequens
impeditur
principali significato,quia principaliter

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

227

significaihominemverum,et minus principalitersignificai0rem pictam


cum terminoadiuncto,que proprienon diciturhomo, et huiusmodi.
a
b
S homoestZ c equivocatur
ad significandum]^
ens]om.Sd esthomo]
impeditur
quod
. . . que]cumtaliadiunccione
S significai
essepictum
sedS
significaret
significante
19 Quarta regula:
a ad
tamaffirmative
A termino
nonampliato
,
ipsumampliatimi*,
quamnegative
nonvalet.
formaliter
consequncia
ut non sequitur 'omne currensest homo; ergo
Exemplum affirmative,
omne currenspotestesse homo'. Similiternon sequiturc'Deus est creans;
ergo Deus de necessitateest creans',et huiusmodi.Sed dixi "formaliter",
quia talis consequencia est bona ded materia'Deus est; ergo Deus potest
esse', et talis consequencia est bona 'homo est; ergo homo potestesse',
non est;
et huiusmodi.Exemplumnegative,ut non sequitur'Antichristus
non est;
non potestesse', et non sequitur'Antichristus
ergo Antichristus
non
Sed
dixi
talis
est
Antichristus
"formaliter",
quia
generabilis'.
ergo
non
Deus
de
materia
'Deus
non
est
bona
est; ergo
potest
consequencia
esse', et huiusmodi.
b
a
S c sequitur]
S valetZ d de mate compilatum
Z$ ampliatimi]
ampliato]
ampliativo
om.
S
ria]
20 Quinta regula,et ultima:
a
A termino
, tam[ 77r] affirmative
quamnegampliatoad ipsumnonampliatum
non
valet
.
ative
, consequencia
[S 95r]formaliter
estbgenerabilis;ergo
ut non sequitur'Antichristus
Exemplumaffirmative,
Antichristus
essec;
est',et non sequitur'Antichristus
potest
ergoAntichristus
est'. Similiternon sequitur'omne creans necessarioest Deus; ergo omne
creans est Deus', et huiusmodi.Sed dixi "formaliter",
quia talis consequencia est bona de materia 'Deus potest esse; ergo Deus est', quia in
Deo, qui est purissimusactus, non distat actus a potencia. Exemplum
negative,ut non sequitur'nullumanimal de necessitateest currens;ergo
nullumanimal est currens',et non sequitur'nullusdeus de necessitateest
creans;ergo nullusdeus est creans'. Sed dixi "formaliter",
quia talisconnon
Deus
non est',
materia
'Deus
est
de
bona
esse;
ergo
potest
sequencia
et huiusmodi.
a
add.S
nonestZ$ c esse]antichristus
S ampliativo
Z b est]f
ampliato]
et correlativos
terminos
convertibles
De regulis
tangentibus
et correlativorum
convertibilium
21 De consequenciisterminoruma
ponuntur tresregule sequentes.Prima regula:

18:33:38 PM

228

JOKESPRUYT

sineverbosignificante
actum
Ab uno convertibili
ad reliquum
suumconvertibile,
anime
tam
bona
.
est
, consequncia
,
quamnegative
affirmative
ut sequitur'homo currit;ergo risibile0curri,et
Exemplum affirmative,
sequiturctues homo; ergo tu es risibilis'.Exemplumcnegative,ut sequitur
nullushomo currit;ergo nullum risibilecurri. Et sequitur'tu non es
homo; ergo tu non es risibilis',et huiusmodi.Sed diciturin regula "sine
verbosignificante
actumanime",quia cum verbosignificante
actumanime
consequencia formaliternon valet. Ut non sequitur 'scio istum esse
hominem;ergodscio istumesse risibilem',quia stat quod sciam et intelligam aliquem esse hominem,seu racionem6formalemquare est homo,
ignorandofseu nesciendogeius propriampassionem.
a
c
om.S b risibile]
. . . risibilis]^
S rationale
om.S d ergo. . .
Z exemplum
terminorum],
e
racionalem
Sf
formalem
formaliter
om.S racionem
hominem]
formalem]^
Z racione
g
et
non
hoc
suam
add.
ignorando]
intelligendo propriam
passionem Zm nesciendo]
neciendo^S
Ex qua regula patet quoda
ah diffinicione
ad suumdiffinitum
tamaffirmative
consearguendo
quamnegative
quenciaestbona, et econverso.
ut sequitur'tu es homo; ergo tu es animalracinale
Exemplumaffirmative,
mortale',et econverso.Exemplumcnegative,ut sequitur'tu non es homo;
ergo tu non es animal racinale mortale',et huiusmodi.
22

b
S c exemplum
. . . mortale]
S om.Z
quod]quareS a diffinicione]
ad diffinicionem

23 [S 96r] Terminiconvertibili
suntmultplices.Primoterminisinonimi,
ut 'Marcusa', 'Tullius', 'Cicerob' Secundo species et sua propria passio,
ut suntly 'homo' et lyc'risibilis0'
et ly 'asinus' et 'rudibilis6',
et ly 'equus' et
et huiusmodi. Tercio diffinicioet suum diffinitum,
ut ly
ly hinnibilisf,
'homo' et ly8'animal racinale mortale'.Quarto discripcioet suum disdicunturproposicionesque mutuo
criptum,et similes.Similiterconvertibilia
sehsequuntur,' 77^ ut suntproposicionesequipollentesad invicem.Et
proposicioconvertenset sua conversa1,et proposicioexponibiliset copulativa compositaex omnibussuis exponentibus^,
et proposicioresolubilisk
et copulativa facta ex omnibus suis resolventibus,
cum quibus convertiedam
et1
sua
tur;
describens,et similes,de quibus
proposiciodescriptibilis
inferiusdicetur,ubi determinatur"1
de consequenciiscathegoricarum.
a
b
et
add.
S
scicero
om'
S c ly]Z om.S d risibilis]
sicsaepius
Z
marcus]
cicero]
resibilis)
f
S c rudibilis]
S
hinnibile
resibilis hinnibilis]
boset mugibilis
S g ly]^om.S hse]^ om.
Z
S 1conversa]
conversoi
S kresolubilis]
S1
m
(!) S exponentibus]^
compositis
exponibilis
cum
determinantur
S
et]^
Z determinatur]^

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

229

24 Contra regulam arguitur sic, quia non sequitur 'iste asinus est
risibilisa;ergo iste asinus est homo', quia antecedensest verum etb consequens falsum,posito casu quod iste asinus sit Sortisc.Secundo nond
sequitur'risibileest propriumhominis;ergo homo est propriumhominis5.
Tercio, isti terminisunt convertibiles:ly 'homo5 et 'tantumhomo5,sed
non sequitur'homo est; ergo tantumhomo est5.Ergo regula est falsa.
a
S
$ c sortis]
5 sortes
idesthomoadd.Zmb ci]Z om
Z d non]om
risibilis]
consimiliumcasuum
25 Ad primumdico quod ly 'homo5et ly 'risibilis5
Sed ly 'homo5 nominativicasus et ly 'risibilis5
sunt terminiconvertibiles.
ut patet in proposito.Ad secundum
non
sunt
casus
convertibilia,
genitivi
sunt
dico quod quando ly 'risibile5et lya'homo5accipiunturpersonaliterb,
in
ut
sed quando accipiunturmaterialiter,
terminiconvertibiles,
proposito,
Ad terciumdico quod ly 'homo5et 'tantumhomo5
non suntconvertibilia.
Sed talis proposicio 'tantumhomo est5potest accipi
nonc convertuntur.
modo
de subiectoexcluso,et tunc sequituret convertitur
unod
dupliciter:
cum illa [.S 96"] 'homo es5, alio modo exclusiveseu tamquam proposicio
proprie exclusiva, et tune non sequitur ex illa 'homo est5. Et ita de
similibusf.

a
S primo
5 om.Z d unomodo]
. . . accipiuntur]
om"
$ b personaliter
com.Z non]
WZ
e
est
add.
S de
et
aliud
homo
est
homo
nichil
et
quam
Z est] significai
quodaliquidquod
add.Zmfsimilibus]
et huiusadditasubiecto
in quintaregulade exclusivis
hochabetur
modiadd.Z
26 Secunda regula:
cumisto
a partesubiteti
suumcorrelatiuum
ad reliquum
Ab unocorrelativorum
adiacente
tam
verbo' es <singulari>de secundo
, con,
affirmative
quamnegative
estbona.
sequncia
ut sequitur'pater est; ergo filiusest5,et sequitur
Exemplumaffirmative,
'dominus est; ergo servus est5,et sequitur 'agens est; ergo patiens est5.
Exemplum negative,ut sequitur'pater non est; ergo filiusnon est5,et
huiusmodi.Primo dixi in regula "a parte subiecti55,
quia a parte predicati consequencianon valet,ut non sequitur'tu es pater; ergo tu es filius5.
Secundo dixi "cum isto verbo 'es5 singulari55,
quia cum verbo plurali
'filii
non
ut
non
sunt; ergo patres sunt5.
valet,
sequitur
consequencia
non
Similitercum verbo de preteritoconsequencia
valet,ut non sequitur
'pater fuit;ergo filiusfuit5.Similitercum verbo de futuroconsequencia
non valet,ut non sequitur'pater erit;ergo filiuserit5.Similitercum verbo
adiectivoconsequencianon valet,ut non sequitur'pater15
currit;ergo filius
cum
tercio adiacente
dixi
"de
secundo
currit5.Tercio
adiacente55,quia
non valet,ut non sequitur'pater est bonus; ergo
consequenciaformaliter
filiusest bonus5,et huiusmodi.

18:33:38 PM

230

JOKESPRUYT

a est
estZ om.S b pater. . . sequitur]
om.S
singulari]
cor27 Quidam dicuntquod ly 'parens' et 'filians'suntproprie3[
bene
et
non
et
relative,
sequitur'parens est; ergo
lyb'pater5 'filius',quia
filiansest', et econverso,sed non sequitur'paterest; ergo filiusest', neque
econverso,quiac statesse patremet habebitfiliam,et non filium.Similiter
potestesse filiusquia habeatdmatrem,et none patrem,et istudstatfsatis
simplicitateopinionis.Alii dicuntquod ly 'pater' et 'filiusg'possuntaccipi
dupliciter.Uno modo logicaliterseu in communigenere,et tunc dicuntur11
proprie correlativasicut ly 'parens' [S 97r] et 'filians'.Alio modo
seu in masculinogenere,et tunc simpliciternon dicuntur
gramaticaliter
correlativanisi cum disiunccioneutriusquesexus- ut sunt1ly 'pater veP
mater',et ly 'filiusvel filia' , et tuncsequitur'paterest; ergofiliusvel filia
est', et econverso 'filiusest; ergo pater vel mater est', et huiusmodi.Et
istudest satisdefendibilis
opininionis.Consimiliterpotestdici de istiscorrelativis'dominus' et 'servus',et 'magister'et 'discipulus',et huiusmodi.
a
b

6
S
habebat
S om.
Z quia]^5" om.Z habeat]S
Z ty]^omZ c non]
proprie]
fstat. . . propria
g

est
satisfacere
bene
add.necnon
Zh
opinionis] 1
opinionis
filius]
quia
sequitur
exp.
S dicuntur]^
S sunt]
dicunt
om.S j vel]et Z
28 Sed talis regula non est generalisomnibuscorrelativis,
nisi arguitur
cum tali adiunccionea'est' vel 'fuit'vel 'eri vel 'poteritesse'. Et rcio
est: AJiquandoenim consequncia valet cum isto verbo 'est' de secundo
adiacente,ut 'pater est; ergo filiusest'. Aliquando consequenciavalet cum
ly 'est' vel 'fuit',utb sequitur'quantum est; ergo quantum est vel fuit'.
Aliquando consequencia valet cum lyc 'est' vel 'eri, ut sequitur'prius
est; ergo poteriusest vel eri. Dum enim priorpars motusvel temporis
est, pars posterior0non est, sed erit vel poteritesse. Ideo non sequitur
'hoc prius est; ergo suum posteriusest', et huiusmodi.Aliquando consequencia valet cum lye 'est' vel 'poteritesse', ut sequitur'scibile est; ergo
sciencia est vel poteritesse'. Similitersequitur'productumest; ergo productibileest vel poteritesse', et huiusmodi.Unde talis materia correlativorumtangitmateriamrelacionumf.Que est altiorisspeculacionis8.Et
ideo de hac materia supersedeo,causa brevitatisretinendeet puerorum
faciliorisintelleccionisservandeh.
a
c
d
S b utsequitur]
adiunccio
S motus
adiunccione]
om.S ly]5hocverboZ posterior]
f
c
8
taverboZ relacionum]
S relativi
S
Z
posterioris
ly]^
Z
speculacionis]/
speculaciones
h
conservande
S
servande]/^
29 Tercia regula,et ultima:
Ab active?ad suamh
consimili
modo
, terminis
, consequenpassivem
supponentibus
cia estbona, et econverso.

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

231

Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortescenat piscem0;ergo piscisdcenatura Sorte'.


Similitersequitur'intelligorosam; ergo a me intelligitur
rosa', et econverso6.Sed dixi in regula "terminissupponentibusconsimilimodo". Etf
ideo talis consequenciagnon valet 'omnis homo videt aliquem [ 78^
hominem;ergo aliquis homo videturab omni homine', [S 97*] quia eius
antecedensestverumet consequensfalsum,positocasu quod omnishomo
videat semethipsum et nullushomo videaturab omni homine. Sed bene
sequitur'omnis homo vide aliquem hominem;ergo ab homine videtur^
aliquis homo', etkhuiusmodi.
a
S
S b suam]suumS c piscem]
S d piseis]picemS c econverso]
activa]activam
picem
f 5 om.
h
g
S videatZ } videS
om.
se S 1videt]
huiusmodi
Z et]
Z
Z
semet]/
consequencia]
k
S videatur
S om.Z
Z et huiusmodi]
tur]
De consequendis
terminorum
et oppositorum
disparatorum
30

De consequenciisterminorumdisparatorumet aliorum terminorum


oppositorumponunturquinqu regule sequentes.Prima regula:
De quoeumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
de presenti
et sineimpediab
eodem
est
suumdismento
unum
,
negabile
reliquum
affirmatur disparatorum
paratum.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes non est asinus', et
non valet,quia ex pura
huiusmodi.Sed econversoconsequenciaformaliter
ut
non
formaliter
non
sequitur'Sortes non
sequituraffirmativa;
negativa
est asinus; ergo Sortes est homo', quia antecedensest verum eta consequens falsum,posito casu quod nullus Sortes sit. Unde diciturcommuniterquod ab uno disparatorum
affirmative
ad reliquumnegativeest bona
sed
non
econverso.
consequencia,
a
et]Z om.S
31 Primoin reguladixi "de quocumqueterminoin recto",quia de aliquo
terminoina obliquo possuntaffirmari
duo terminidisparati,ut cumbdicitur'Sortisest asinuset Sortisest capra', et huiusmodi.Secundo dixi "cum
verbo substantivode presenti",quia cum verbo adiectivo consequencia
formaliter
non valet. Ut non sequitur'Sortes videthominem;ergo Sortes
non videtasinum',quia antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod Sortesvideathominemet asinum.Tercio dixi "sine impedimento",quia cum aliqua diccione habente vim negacionisconsequencia
non valet.Ut non sequiturtantumhomo est homo; ergo tantumhomo non
est asinus,quia antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,et huiusmodi.
a S om. b
in]
Z cum]^om.S

18:33:38 PM

232

JOKESPRUYT

Secunda regula:
De quocumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
de presenti
et sineimpedimento
unumoppositorum
contrariorum
, tammediatorum
affirmatur
quamimmediab eodemestnegabile
suumcontrarium.
atorum,
reliquum
mediatorumtamain concreto0quam in
[ 98r] Exemplumcontrariorum
ut
'Sortes
est
abstracto, sequitur
albus; ergo Sortes non est niger', et
sequitur'istud accidens est albedo; ergo istud accidens non est nigredo',
et huiusmodi0.Exemplumcontrariorum
immediatorumtam concretorum
ut
Sortesd
est sanus; ergo Sortes non est
quam abstractorum, sequitur
et
'hoc
accidens
est
sanitas;ergo hoc accidensnon est egrieger', sequitur
tudo'. Similitersequitur'hec virtusest iusticia;ergo hec virtusnon est
et huiusmodi.Sed econversoformaliter
iniusticia6',
consequncianon valet,
ex
formaliter
non
affirmativa.
Ut non sequitur
quia
pura negativa
sequitur
'Sortes
non
est albus; ergo Sortes est niger',quia antecedensest
[Z 79r]
verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod nullusSortessit,velfposito casu quod Sortesnon sit albusgneque niger,sed sit medio colore coloratus.Sed cum constanciain contrariisimmediatish
valet consequncia,
uti sequitur'Sortes non est sanus et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est eger', et
huiusmodi.Et predictecondicionesregulepossuntdeclararisicutin regula precedenti.
a
om.Z b concreto]
rectoZ huiusmodi]^
S d sortes
econverso
. . . sequitur]
tam]cS

om.S e iniusticia]
iusticia
S fvel]S sedZ 8 albus]
in mediatis
S himmediatis]
S1
Z om
ut]Z et 5
32

33

Tercia regula:
De quocumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
et sineterminis
depresenti
divinissivecorrelavis
unumcontradictorium
et ab eodem
affirmatur
incomplexo,
estnegabile
suum
contradictorum
reliquum
incomplexorum.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est homo; ergo Sortesnon est non-homo',
et sequitur'Sortes est non-asinus;ergo Sortes nona est asinus', et huiusmodi. Sed econversoformaliter
consequncianon valet,quia ex pura negativa formaliter
non sequituraffirmativa.
Ut non sequitur'Sortesnon est
Sortes
estb
homo; ergo
non-homo',quia antecedensest verumet consequens falsum,posito casu quod nullus Sortes sit. Similiternon sequitur
'chimeranon est animai; ergo chimeraest nonc-animal',quia antecedens
[S 98^] est verum et consequens falsum.Sed econversocum constancia
subiectivalet consequncia, ut sequitur'Sortes non est homo et Sortes
est; ergo Sortesest non-homo',et sequitur'Sortesnon est asinuset idemd
Sortes est; ergo Sortes6est non-asinus',et huiusmodi.
a non
nonestZ d idem]
om.
est]estnon& estS b estnon]nonestS c estnon]/c
c
S sortes]
Z'S om.Z

18:33:38 PM

TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES
A I5-C. SPANISH

233

Primo dixi in regula "de quocumque terminoin recto", quia iste


proposicionessuntvere 'Sortisest asinus' et 'Sortes est nona-asinus',posito casu quod asinus et capra sint Sortis, et huiusmodi. Secundo dixi
"cum verbo substantivo",quia cum verbo adiectivo tales proposiciones
sunt vere 'Sortes videt hominem' et 'Sortes videt non-hominem',posito
casu quod Sortes videat hominemet asinum, et huiusmodi.Tercio dixi
"cumbverbo de presenti",quia cum verbo substantivode preteritotales
proposicionessuntvere 'Sortes fuitalbusc etd'Sortes fuitnon-albus',posfuitalbusfetgalioh tempore
ito casu quod Sortes uno temporepreterito6
telles
de
futuro
cum
verbo
fuitnon-albus.Similiter
proposicionessuntvere
et huiusSorteseritalbus1et Sorteseritnon-albuspro diversistemporibus,
cum
termodi. Quarto dixi "sine terminisdivinissive^correlativis",
quia
minisdivinistales proposicionessunt vere 'Deus estkpater' et 'Deus est1
non-pater';et racio est quia Deus est pater et Deus est filius,qui est nonpater. IZ 79*] Ergo Deus est pateret Deus est non-pater,ut patetintuenti.
a est
om.S c albus]asinusS d et. . . albusJ^Som.Z e
S b cumverbo]/
non]nonest
f
g
bisinS halio]aliquoS 1albus]posS om.Z albus]asinusS et. . . tempore]
preterito]
k ^6" et
add.
necnon
itocasuquodSortesunotempore
Z seuS est]
exp.Z sive]
preterito
1est et
z
]ZCS Z
34

35 Ex ista regula patetatalis regula communis:


et de nullosimulambo
contradictorum
dicitur
alterum
De quolibet
,
incomplexorum
c eademre existente
cum
seu
termino
idestde quocumque
pro
singulari supponenti
d de
divinisseu correlain rectiscasibuset sineterminis
verbosubstantivo
presenti
unumcontradictorum
tivisaffirmatur
, et de nullotali termino
incomplexorum
in
simul
contradictoria
ambo
affirmantuf
Unde diciturfquia talis proposicioest vera tu es homo, etgtalis copulativa est falsa tu [S 99r] es homo et tu es non-homo,et huiusmodi.

b
a
add.S add.necnon
Z om.S
Z fProeadem]
Z'S suppono
exp.Zc supponente]
dpatet]quodS subiecto
affirmatur
sicsaepius
Zc om.Z$ 8
dicitur]
Z affirmantur]^
substantivo]
et]ZCom.ZS
36 Contra regulam arguitursic. Teiles proposicionessunt vere 'Sortes
albo et alio exisest albus' et 'Sortes est non-albusa',uno Sorte existente0
tentenigro.Ergo de eodem terminoinc recto cum verbo substantivode
duo contradictoria
incomplexa.
presentiet sine terminisdivinisdaffirmatur
istud argumentumvel simevitandum
ad
falsa.
es
Quidam
Ergo regula
ile ponerentin regula "de quocumque terminosingulariseu discreto".
Sedfnon oportet,quia licetille proposicionessintverein quibus affirmantur
duo contradictoriaincomplexa,tarnencum hocg stat quod exh utraque
illarumpotest sequi proposicio negativa in qua negabituralterumcon-

18:33:38 PM

234

JOKESPRUYT

tradictorum
incomplexorum.Unde si Sortesest albus,bene sequiturquod
non est albus, et1si Sortes non est albus, bene sequitur
Sortes
aliquis
Sortes
est albus, quia omnes iste proposicionesstan simul
quod aliquis
sine contradiccione,posito casu predicto.Consimilekargumentumpotest
fiericontra secundam regulamprecedentemde oppositiscontrariis,quia
tales proposicionesstant1simul 'Sortes est albus5et 'Sortes est niger',uno
Sorte existentealbo et alio existentenigro,et huiusmodi.
a
undeadd.Zb sorte
sorteSc in]S om.Zd divinis]
albus]
existente]
modoexistente
c S om. fsed
idemZ g hoc]S verboZ hex]5 inZ 1et. . . alterum
Z est]
Z
albus]^
non]f
1
om.S j stant]
S suntZ
S consimiliter
S suntZ kconsimile]
Z stant]
37

Quarta regula:
De quocumque
termino
in rectocumverbosubstantivo
depresenti
unum
qffirmatur
ab
eodem
est
suum
.
oppositorum
privative,
negabile
privative
reliquum
oppositum
Exemplum, ut sequitur*'Sortes est videns; ergo Sortes non est cecus'.
Similitersequitur'Sortes est cecus; ergo Sortes non est videns',et huiusmodi. Sed econversoconsequenciaformaliter
non valet,quia ex pura negativa formaliter
non sequituraffirmativa.
Ut non sequitur'Sortes non [
80r] est cecus; ergo Sortes est videns',quia antecedensest verumet consequens falsum,posito casu quod nichilbsit Sortes. Sed cum constancia
et temporedeterminatovalet consequencia, ut sequitur'Sortes non est
cecus; et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est videns',et huiusmodic.Et dixi "cum
temporedeterminato",quia canis non diciturproprie'cecus' ante novem
dies. Et ideo sine tali temporedeterminato,non sequiturd'iste canis non
est videns,et iste canis est; ergo iste canis est cecus', et huiusmodi.Et
predictecondicionesregulepossuntdeclaran sicut in regula precedente.
a
S om.Z b nichil
sitsortes]
S nullus
sortes
sitZ c huiusmodi]
seddixicumtemsequitur]
valet
determinato
ut
nonestcecuset sortes
sortes
estergo
pore
consequencia sequitur
sortes
estvidens
add.necnon
exp.Z d sequitur]
om.S
39 [S 99"] Quinta regula,et ultima:
A nomine
habitusaffirmative
cumistoverbocesad normtsue opposite
privacio3
nis cumistoverbo'potes
estbona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est videns;ergo Sortespotest0esse cecus'.
Sed econverso,a nomine privacionisaffirmative
cum isto verbo est ad
nomen sui habituscum isto verbo 'potest',consequencia formaliter
non
saltem
naturaliter
ut
non
est
'Sortes
valet,
cecus; ergo
loquendo,
sequitur
Sortespotes esse videns',et huiusmodi.Unde secundumAristotilem,
in
, abd habitu possibile est devenirein privacionem,sed a
Postpredicamentis
privacionead habitmimpossibilisest regressio6.
a

S b potest]
Se
potest]
possunt
Z$ potest]
Z$ d at>habitu]
habitm
poterit
poterit
S regressus
scilicet
habitu
add.ZT et huiusmodi
add.Z
Z sequente
regressio]

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

235

CAPITULUM QUINTUM
De consequenciis
proposicionum
cathegoricarum
1 De consequenciisproposicionumcathegoricarumest quintuplexordo.
concernentbus
habitudinem
terminorum
infinitoruma
Primode consequenciis
et privativorumb
et suorumoppositorum.Secundo de consequenciisconcernentbusquantitatemcproposicionum.Tercio de consequenciisconcernentbus
probacionesproposicionumQuarto de consequenciisproposiet reduplicativarum.
cionumexclusivarum,
Quinto,et ultimo,
exceptivarumd
sensumcompositumet sensumdivisum.
de consequenciisconcernentbus
De quibus per ordinemest agendum.
a
. . . conS c quantitatem
infini
tivorumf/jZ h privativorum]
privatorum
infinitorum]S
d
S
.
.
.
et
om.
exceptivarum
proposicionum
cernentbus]^^Z exceptivarumreduplicativarum]
etreduplicativorum
Z
habitudinem
terminorum
concementibus
De consequenciis
infinitorum,
et suorum
oppositorum
privativorum
infinitoruma
2 De consequenciisconcementibushabitudinemterminorum
et suorumoppositorum
et privativorumb
ponunturquatuorregulesequentes.
Prima regula:
depredicato
ad negativam
depredicato
Ab afirmativa
finitoilliusconsiminfinito
depresenti
etsineteretin rectis
casibuscumverbo
substantivo
iliumc
subiectorum
estbona.
minisdivinis,
consequencia
estdnon-iustus;ergo Sortes non6 est ius'Sortest
ut
Exemplum, sequitur
et
huiusmodi.
tus',
b
a
S c consimilium]Z
similio privatorum
infinitivorumf/J
Z privativorum]
infinitorum]iS
e
d
rumS estnon]nonestS nonest]estnonS
3 Primo dixi in regula "consimiliumsubiectorum",quia si sint dissimiliumsubiectorum,
consequencia[ 80*] non valet,ut non sequitur'Sortes
esta non-iustus;ergo Plato non est iustus'. Secundo dixi "in rectiscasibus", quia in obliquis casibus consequencia non valet, ut non sequitur
'Sortesest non-asinus;ergo Sortisnon est asinus'. Tercio dixi "cum verbo
substantivo",quia cum verbo adiectivonon valetbconsequencia,ut non
sequitur'Sortesvidetnon-asinum;ergo Sortesnon videtasinum' Quarto
dixi "de presenti",quia cum verbo de preteritovel de futuro[S 100r]
consequencia0non valet, ut non sequitur 'Sortes fuit non-iustus;ergo
Sortesnon fuitiustus',et huiusmodi.Quinto dixi "sine terminisdivinis",
quia cumdterminisdivinisnon sequitur'Deus6 est non-pater;ergo Deusf

18:33:38 PM

236

JOKESPRUYT

non est pater', quia istarumconsequenciarumantecedenciapossuntesse


vera, consequentibusexistentibusfalsis.Sed hec regula comprehenditur
in terciaregulasupradictaterminorum
contradictoriorum
incomplexorum,
ut patet intuenti.
a est
om.Z consequencia
nonestS b valet. . . nonJ^iS
... ut]Som.Z d cum]
5 in
e non] add. f
Z deus]filius
Zm deus]estadd.necnon
exp.Z
4

Secunda regula:
a
A negativa
depredicato
depredicato
illiusconsimfinitoad qffirmativam
infinito
iliumsubiectorum
in rectiscasibuset cumverbosubstantivo
de presenti
, consenon
,
quencia
formaliter valet
non sequituraffirmativa.
quia ex pura negativaformaliter
Exemplum,ut
non sequitur'Sortes non est iustus;ergo Sortesest non-iustus',quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum,nullo Sorte existente.Sed cum
constanciaetb debito modo valet consequencia,ut sequitur'Sortes non
estiustusc;et idem Sortesest; ergo Sortesest non-iustus'.Similiter0
sequitur
'tu non es asinus;et tu es; ergotu escnon-asinus',
et huiusmodi.Condiciones
huius reguleintelliguntur
sicut in regula precedentef.
a ad . . .
b
d
om.S et]Z seuS c iustus]
nonadd.Z c es non
infinito]^
ergoadd.S similiter]
]Z
nones S rprecedente]
add.
S
patet
5

Tercia regula:
Ab affirmativa
de predicato
ad qffirmativam
de predicato
illius
privativo
infinito
consimilium
subiectorum
in rectis
casibusetcumverbo
substantivo
depresenti^
conestbona.
sequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est iniustus;ergo Sortes est non-iustus',et
et huiusmodi.Sed
sequitur'Deus est infinitusa;
ergo Deus est non-finitus',
econversoconsequencia formaliternon valet. Ut non sequitur'lapis est
non-iustus;ergo lapis est iniustusb',quia antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,quia exc consequentesequiturquodd lapis est aptus natus
esse iustus,quod est falsum.Aliquando valet consequenciade materia,ut
sequitur'Sortes est non-iustus;ergo Sortes est iniustus'.Similiterbene6
et sequitur
sequitur'punctusest non-divisibilis;
ergopunctusestindivisibilis',
'celum est non-corruptibile;
celum
est
etf
ergo
incorruptibile', sequitur
'Deus est non-mortalis;ergo Deus est immortalis',quia in terminisconnotantibusactum et potenciam talis negacio 'non' etg illa privado 'inh'
negan seu privant*actum etkpotenciam,ut patet in prima parte huius1
logice, octava"1et nona divisione"terminorum.
a
finitus
S b iniustus]
noniustusS c ex consequente]
S eiusantecedente
infinitus]
Zd
c
f
h
1
8
om.
S
S
non
5
ut
S
est
om

S
quod]
bene]
Z et]
Z m]Z
Z et]
negant]
negatS j

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

237

S ket poteciam]
om.S 1huius]
om.
om.S moctava. . . terminorum]S
privant]
n privt
de omnibus
S
Z divisione]
6

Quarta regula,et ultima:


a
depredicato
Ab afirmativa
depredicato
finitoseupositivi
privativoad negativam
c de
in rectiscasibus,et cumverbosubstantivo
illiusconsimilium
subiectorum
presenti[S 100^ consequencia
estbona.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes est iniustus;ergo Sortesnon est iustus',et
ergo Deus non est finitus',et huiusmodi.Sed
sequitur'Deus est infinitus;
econversoformaliternon valet consequencia0,edam quando6 arguitur
cum constanciaseu debito modo, ut non sequitur'lapis non est iustus;
et lapis est; ergo lapis est iniustus',et huiusmodi.Aliquando consequensicut in regula precedente,
cia valet de materia seu gracia terminorum,
ut sequitur'Sortesnonfest iustus;et idem Sortesest; ergo Sortesest iniustus'. Similitersequitur 'punctus non est divisibiliset punctus est; ergo
'
punctusest indivisibilis, et sic de multisaliis similibusg.
c
b
a
S d consequencia]
subiecto

Z$ positivo]positoS substantivo]
privativo]
privato
g
est
non
^
om.
S
om.S c quando]quodZ$ fnonest
similibus]/
]Z
De consequenciis
concementibus
proposionum
quantitatem
7 De consequenciisconcementibusquantitatem3
proposicionumponuntur octo regulesequentes.Prima regula:
siveaffirmative
sivenegavelindenitam)
Ab universali
ad sua<m> particularem
est
bona.
tive,consequencia
ut sequitur 'quilibet homo currit;ergo quidam
Exemplum affirmative,
homo curri vel 'homo currit',et sequitur'necesse est Deum esse; ergo
possibileest Deum esse', et huiusmodi.Exemplum negative,ut sequitur
'nullushomo currit;ergo quidam homo non curri vel 'homo non currit,et sequitur'impossibileest hominemesse asinum; ergo possibile est
hominem0non esse asinum', et huiusmodi.Ex ista regula patet quod a
ad eundem stantemdeterminate6
terminostanteconfuse0et distribuibile0
valet consequencia.
a
b
S commune
S cconfuse]
S quantitatum(7j
non]nonhominem
Ze hominem
quantitatem]
d
S determinante
(!) Z
Z distribuibile]^
determinate]
distributive^
8 Sed contraregulamarguitursic: Talis consequencia non valet 'nullus
homo est animal; ergo homo nona est animal', et arguiturab universali
negativam.Ergo regulaestbfalsa.Antecedens
negativaad suam indefinitam
probatur:posito casu quod nullus homo masculus sit, tunccantecedens

18:33:38 PM

238

JOKESPRUYT

est verum,ut patet per casum; et consequensestdfalsum,quia eius contradictorium


est verum,scilicet'omnishomo est animal',ut patetintuenti.
a
b S om. 0
d
om.
S
^
Sc
non]
Z tunc]enimadd.Z est]om
est]
9 Ad istud argumentumvel simile potest dici quod talis proposicio
indefinita'homo non est animal' potestconsideralidupliciter.Uno modo
inquantumly 'homo' supponitpro masculis,et istomodo diciturindefinita
illiusuniversalis'nullus homo est animal'; e tunc ilia consequenciabest
bona, et tam antecedensquam consequens est verum,posito casu predicto.Alio modo inquantumly 'homo' supponitpro femellis,et istomodo
non diciturindefinitaillius universalis.Et tunc consequncia non valet,
et per consequens non est contra [Z 81r] regulam,ut patet intuenti.
a et om.S b
S om.Z
]Z
consequencia]
10 Vel aliterpotestdici quod illa proposicioindefinita'homo non est
animai3'non est proprievelbsimplicitersingularisindefinitailliusuniversalis 'nullushomo est animal', quia proposicionisuniversaliscuius subiectum solum supponitpro masculis,sua particularisvel indefinitaest de
subiectosupponente[S 10lr] solumcpro masculis,ut 'quilibethomo est
animai', etd 'quidam homo es animal' vel 'homo masculusest animai'.
Sed proposicionisuniversaliscuius subiectumsupponitsolum pro femellis, sua particularisvel indefinitaest de subiecto supponentesolum pro
femellis,ut 'quilibet homo est animai' et 'quidam homo est animai' vel
'homo femellaest animai. Sed proposicionisuniversaliscuius subiectum
sua particularis
vel indefinita
supponitindifferenter
pro masculiset femellis,
estfde subiectosupponenteindifferenter
masculis
velg
femellis.
pro
Exemplum
de proposicionibus
ut 'omnishomo est animai' et 'aliquishomo
affirmativis,
est animai' vel 'homo est animalh.'Exemplum de proposicionibus1
negativis,ut 'nichiPhomo est animai'et 'aliquidhomo non estanimai'vel 'homo
non est animai', et huiusmodi.Et talis particularispotestdari dupliciter:
uno modo cum signo particularineutrigeneris,ut 'aliquid homo est animal', alio modo cum disiunccionesignormparticulariummasculiniet
femininigeneris,ut 'aliquis vel aliqua homo est animai', et huiusmodi.
a
S om. b ve1. . . singularis]
velsimpliciter
$ c solum]
S om.Z 6 et]sedS
animal]
Z omc est
f
S
animal]bisinS est]et S om.Z 8 vel]5 et Z h animal]^om.S 1proposicionibus]
nullusS
probacionibus
Z nichil]
1 1 Secunda regula:
A particulari
velindefinita
ad suamuniversalem
nonvalet.
formaliter
consequencia
ut non sequitur'quidam homo currit;ergo quiliExemplumaffirmative,
bet homo currit'.Exemplum negative,ut non sequitur 'quidam homo

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

239

non currit;ergo nullus homo curri,et huiusmodi.Ex ista regula patet


quod a terminostantedeterminatead eundem stantemconfuse3et disnon valet. Aliquando valet consequntributive,
consequencia formaliter
cia de materia,et hoc dupliciter.Primo ex necessariis,utbbene sequitur
'quidam homo est animal; ergo quilibet homo est animal', et sequitur
'Deus est; ergo omnisdeus est'. Similitersequitur'quidam homo noncest
asinus; ergo nullusdhomo est asinus'. Secundo ex impossibilibus6,ut
sequitur 'quidam homo est asinus; ergo quilibet homofest asinus', et
sequitur'Deus non est; ergo nullus deus est', et huiusmodi.
a confuse]^
om.Z c
S b ut'Zet S c non]om.S d nullus. . . ergo]
sicsaepius
commune
f
non
add
.
S
Z
imposicionibushomo]
impossibilibus]
12 Tercia regula:
sed
valetconsequencia,
cumconstancia
ad eiussingulrem
Ab universali
afirmativa
noneconverso.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'quilibet homo currit;et iste est homo; ergo iste
homo curri, et huiusmodi.Sed si arguatursine constancia,non valet
consequencia. [Z 8 H Ut non sequitur'quilibet homo [S 101"] est animal; ergo iste homo est animai', quia antecedensest necessariumet consequens esta contingens.Vel aliterb,quia post mille annos poteritesse
sicutprimoet adequate significatur
per illud antecedensc,et tunenon erit
ita sicut primo et adequate significatur
per illud consequens, quia ille
tune non6eritf.
homo qui per tale consequensdenotaturdvel significatur,
Aliquando valet consequencia de materia,ut sequitur 'omnis sol lucet;
ergo iste sol lucet'. Similitersequitur'omnis deus est; ergo iste Deus est'.
Similitersequitur'quilibet homo est asinus; ergogiste homo est asinus',
et huiusmodi.
d
c
b
a
demonstratur
. . . illud]
Z om.S denotatur]
ZCSom.Z antecedens
est]om.S aliter]
r
c
add.Z 8
in
dictum
est
S
sicut
om.
S non]<Sc
regulaprecedente
erit]
Z denominatur
S
.
om.
.
.

asinus]
ergo
13 Quarta regula:
cumdebenumeratis
ad omneseiussingulares
Ab universali
sufficienter
afirmativa
econverso.
et
valetconsequencia
ita constancia
,
Exempluma,ut sequitur 'quilibet homo est animai; et isti sunt omnes
hominesmasculi;ergo iste homo est animai, etbiste homo est animai, et
istechomo est animai, et sic de singulis'.Exemplumdeconverso,ut bene
sequitur'iste homo est animai,et iste homo est animai, et sic de singulis;
et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo quilibet homo est animai', et
huiusmodi.Sede si arguatursine constancia,non valet consequencia. Ut
non sequitur'quilibethomo est animai; ergo iste homo est animai,et iste

18:33:38 PM

240

JOKESPRUYT

homofest animal, et sic de singulis',quia antecedensest necessariumet


consequens est8contingens.Vel aliter,quia post mille annos potent esse
non erit
illud antecedens,tarnen1
sicutprimoet adequate significatur
per11
ita sicut primo et adequate significatur
illud
per*
consequens, quia illi
hominesqui per tale consequens denotantui*vel significantur,
tune non
in
dictum
est
valet
sicut
erunt,
regula precedente.Aliquando
consequncia de materia,ut sequitur'quilibethomo est asinus; ergo iste homo est
asinus et iste homo est asinus, et sic de singulis',quia ex impossibili1
sequiturquidlibet"1.
a
c
et S b et. . . alterum
isti dexemplum]
etadd.Z
animal]^om.S iste]
ut]
fhomo. . .
e exemplum
h .Z
1
S
et
om.
S
m.
S
o. . significatur]
sed] Z
Zc
Z S est]
animal]
Z"
Z
per
et tuncS j per. . . alterum
om-$ k denotantur]
demonstrantur
tarnen]

consequens]
Z
Z
om.S 1impossibili]
S possibiliZ mquidlibet]
et huiusmodi
add.Z
14 Quinta regula:
Ab universali
ad einssingulrem
eiussingulares
a, velad omnes
negativa
sufficiente
numerata valetconsequncia,
sive
cum
constancia
sivearguituf
sinecon,
arguitur
sed
non
econverso.
stancia,
Exemplum ab universaliadd eius singulrem,ut sequitur 'nullus homo
currit;ergo iste homo non curri.Exemplum6ab universaliad <omnes>
eius singulares,ut 'nullus homo currit;ergo iste homo <non> curritet
iste homo non currit',et sic de singulisf.
Sed econverso,scilicetgsi arguitur11
cum constancia,valet consequncia,ut sequitur[5 102r] 'iste homo
non curritet iste homo non currit,et sic de singulis,et isti sunt omnes
hominesmasculi; ergo nullus homo curri,et1huiusmodi.Sed si arguitur sine constancia,formaliternon valet consequncia. Ut non sequitur
'iste homo non curritet iste homo non curritet sic de singulis;ergo nullus homo curri, quia post [ 82r] mille annos antecedenspoteritesse
verum et consequens falsum,quia illi homines qui per illud antecedens
notanturjvel significa<n>turnon erunt,ut patet intuenti.
a
S c arguitur]
S bnumeratas]
arguatur
singulrem]
numeratis
singulares
Zd ad] omnes
c
f
add.necnon
.
.
.
alterum
S
om.
ab universali
exp.Z exemplum
currit] Z singulis]
exemplum
ad omneseiussingulares
utsequitur
nullus
homocurrit
homononcurrit
etiste
ergoiste
1
homononcurrit
et sicde singulis
add.Z g scilicet]
sedS om.Z harguitur]
S arguatur
Z
ethuiusmodi]
S om.Z* notantur]
demonstrantur
S
Z numeratur
15 Sexta regula:
A particulari
ad suamindenitam}
siveaffirmative
sivenegative,
est
consequncia
bonaetformalis
, et econverso.
ut sequitur'aliquid homo currit;ergo homo curri,
Exemplumaffirmative,
et econverso.Exemplum negative,ut sequitur'aliquid homo non currit;
ergohomo non curri,et econverso.Ex istaregulapatetquod proposicionis

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241

indefinitecuius subiectumsupponitsolum pro masculis,sua particularis


est de subiecto supponentesolum pro masculis,ut 'asinus currit;ergo
cuius subiectumsolum
quidam asinuscurrit'.Seda proposicionisindefinite
supponitpro femellis,sua particularisest de subiecto supponentesolum
pro femellis,ut 'asina currit;ergo quedam asina currit'.Sed proposicionis indefinite
cuius subiectumsupponitindifferenter
pro masculiset femelsuab
est
subiecto
indifferenter
de
lis,
particularis
supponente
pro masculis
et femellis,ut 'homo currit'et 'aliquid homo curri. Sed talisparticularis
potestdari dupliciter.Uno modo cum signo particularineutrigeneris,ut
'aliquid homo currit'.Alio modo cum disiunccionesignormparticularium, scilicetmasculinicet femininigeneris,ut 'aliquis vel aliqua homo
sicut dictumfuitin prima regula precedente.
curritd',
a sed. . . alterum
b
c
S d currit]^
feminini
om.S sua. . . femellis]
om.S masculini]
currit]
om.S
16 Septima regula:
A particulari
velindefinita
ad aliquameiussingulrem
non
formaliter
consequncia
valet.
ut non sequitur'homo est animal; ergo iste homo
Exemplumaffirmative,
est animal', quia antecedensest necessariumet consequens esta contingens. Exemplum negative,ut non sequitur'homo non currit;ergo iste
homo non curri, et huiusmodi.Aliquando consequncia est bona de
materia,ut sequitur'Deus est; ergo iste Deus est', quia tam antecedens
quam consequens est necessarium.Similitersequitur'quidam homo est
asinus; ergo iste homo est asinus', quia ex impossibilisequiturquidlibetb.
a S om. b
add.Z
Z$ et huiusmodi
Z quidlibet]
quodlibet
est]
17 Octava regula,et ultima:
ad omneeiussingulares
numeratasi
et disA particulari
velindefinita
sufficienter
.
valetconsequncia
cumdebitaconstancia
iunctive
, et econverso
[S 102^ sumptas
homo
est
et
isti
sunt
omnes
ut
animai;
Exemplum, sequitur 'quidamb
hominesmasculi; ergo iste homo est animai, velc iste homo est animai,
et sic de singulis'.Sedd econverso cum constancia subiectivalet consequncia. Exemplum,ut <sequitur> 'iste homo est animai vel iste homo
est animai; et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo quidam homo est
animai65.[ 82v] Sed dicitui^in regula "cum debita constancia",quia si
arguitursine constancia,non valet consequncia. Ut non sequitur'homo
est animai; ergogiste homo est animai vel iste homo est animai, et sic
de singulis',quia antecedensest necessariumet consequens contingens.
Vel aliter,quia post mille annos antecedenspoteritesse verum et consequens falsum,ut patet intuenti.Similiter,si arguitureconverso sine

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242

JOKESPRUYT

constancia,non valet consequncia. Ut non sequitur'iste homo non est


animai vel iste homo non est animai, ethsic de singulis;ergo homo non
est animai', quia post mille annos potent esse sicut primo et adequate
et non eritita sicutprimoet adequatesignificatur
significatur
per antecedens1
eius
ut
per
consequens, patet intuenti.
a
d
aniS bquidam]quiS c vel. . . animal]
numeratis
numeratas]
om.S sed. . . alterimi
f
c
8
om.
S
et
om.
S om.Z h
huiusmodi
add.
S

animal]

mal]
Z
animai]
dicitur]
erg
et. . . animal]^om.S 1antecedens
. . . per]om.S
De consequenciis
concementibus
probaciones
proposicionum
18 De consequenciisconcementibusprobacionesproposicionumponuntur sex regule sequentes.Prima regula:
Ab exponibili
ad omneseiusexponentes
simulsumptas
valetconsequencopulative
cia, et econverso.
Exemplum,u sequitur'omnis homo est animai; ergo homo est animai
et nichilest homo quin illud sit animal', et econverso.Similitersequitur
'tantum homo currit;ergo homo curritet nichil non-homo curri, et
econverso.Sed ab exponibilicopulativead unam eius exponentemvalet
consequncia,sed non econverso.Ut sequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo
homo currit',et sequitur'tantumhomo currit;ergo nichilnon-homocurrit'. Sed econversonon valet consequncia,ut non sequitur'homo currit; ergo tantumhomo currit',et non sequitur'nichil non-homocurrit;
ergo tantumhomo currit',et huiusmodi.Aliquando valet consequncia
de materia,ut bene sequitur 'homo est homo; ergo tantumhomo est
homo'. Similitersequitur'homo est asinus;ergo tantumhomo est asinus',
quia ex impossibilisequiturquidlibetb.
a ut
S om.S b quidlibet].S
add.S
sequitur]
quodlibet
Z et huiusmodi
19 Secunda regula <est> quod
a disiunctive
Ab exponibili
secundumb
ad
modumexponendi
disiunctive
duplicem
sui modum
cumdisiunccione
valetconsequncia
.
, et econverso
utrumque
exponendi
Ex qua regula patet quod ab exponibilichuius verbi 'incipit'vel huius
verbi'desinit'ad utrumquesui modum exponendicum disiunccionevalet
consequncia,et econverso.Et si arguaturad unum [S 103r]eius modum
exponendivel econverso,non sempervalet consequncia.Ut non sequitur
'Sortes incipitesse; ergo in presentiinstantiSortes non est, etdimmediate post instanspresensSortes eri. Similiternon sequitur'Sortesincipit
currere;ergo in presentiinstantiSortes [ 83r] currit,et non immediate
ante6instanspresens Sortes curreba, et huiusmodi.Sed si arguaturad
unum modum exponendi secumfconvertibilium,
valet consequncia,et
econverso.Exemplumhuiusverbi'incipit',utgbene sequitur'Sortesincipit

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ON CONSEQUENCES

243

esse; ergo in presentiinstantiSortes est et non immediateante presens


instansSortes fuit',eth econverso. Similitersequitur'Sortes incipitcurrere;ergo in presentiinstantiSortesnon curritet immediatepost instans
de
presensSortes curre, et econverso.Consimiliterpotestexemplificari
intuenti.
ut
ly 'desinit', patet
b
a
ex impossiseuZ seuPerS c exponibili]
ex impossibili
(!) S secundum]
exponibili]^
e
d et
S
5 post^ Z fsecmconvertibilium]
S
sed
modo
mediate
S
Z
ante]
immediate] h
bi'i(f)
S
seuconvertibile
Z 8 ui]Zet ^ et]Zom
20 Tercia regula:
nonvalet.
Aa resolubili
velad unamillarum
ad omne
dus resolventes
consequncia
'homo
est aniut
non
affirmativis
de
sequitur
proposicionibus,
Exemplum
est
necesantecedens
hoc
est
animai
etc
est
hoc
homo', quia
mai1';ergo
sarium et consequens contingens. Vel aliter, quia postd mille annos
antecedenseri verumet consequensfalsum.Exemplumde negativis,ut
non sequitur'chimera non est animai; ergo hoc non est animai et hoc
est chimera',quia antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,et huiusmodi. Aliquando valet consequncia de materia,ut bene sequitur'Deus
estens; ergohoc estens et hoc estDeus', quia tam antecedensquam consequens est necessarium.Similitersequitur'homo est asinus;ergo hoc est asinus et hoc est homo', quia ex impossibilisequiturquidlibet.Et huiusmodi.
aa
om.S d post]^S,c
et hocesthomoadd.S 0 et. . . homo]
S om.Z b animai]
resolubili]
om.S e erit]SestZ
21 Quarta regula:
valet
seu resolubilem
ad suamresolutam
simulsumptis
Ab7"omnibus
resolventibus
de
subiecuniversales
sint
nate
, si talesresolventes
inferre
proposiciones
consequncia
tiscircumlocutis.
ut sequitur'hoc est animal; et hocb est homo;
Exemplumdea affirmativis,
animai'.
homo
est
Exemplum de negativis,ut 'hocc non currit;et
ergo
hoc est homo; ergo homo nond currit',et huiusmodi.Sed dixi in regula
"si tales resolventessint nate inferreproposicionesuniversalesde subiecet ideo non [S 103"] sequitur'hoc est pater; et hoc est
tis circumlocutis";
filius
est
filius;ergo
pater', quiae, capta prima resolvente,non sequitur
'hoc est pater; ergo quicquid est hoc est pater', quia filiusest aliquid
quod est hoc, tamen filiusnon est pate/. Similiter,capta secunda resolvente,non sequitur'hoc est filius;ergo omne quod est hoc, est filius',
quia pater est aliquid quod est hoc, tamenpater non est filius.Unde licet
enimidem Deus sitpater et filius,tamenpater non est filius,neque econfideigcatholiceChristiane.
verso. Ut patet secundumdeterminacionem
c
b
a ab
nonS e
S d noncurrit]
S
homo
homo
S
om.
Z& currit
hoc]
omnibus] Z f hoc]
hocestpater
nonsequitur
resolvente
Z quiacaptasecunda
Z om.S pater]
quia. . . pater]
etc.S
add.S g fideicatholice
fideiChristiane
Christiane]

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244

JOKESPRUYT

22 Quinta regula:
estbona
A descriptxbili
ad einsdescribentem
,
consequencia
acceptadescriptibiliter
et econverso.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'necesse est Deum esse; ergo talis proposicioest
Deum esse', et econnecessaria"Deus est",primoet adequate significans
et
dixi
in
huiusmodi.
Sed
verso,
regula "accepta descriptibiliter",
quia
talis proposicio 'necesse est Deum esse5,vel aliqua similis,potest accipi
Uno modo descriptibiliter,
et tunc bene sequitur'necesse est
tripliciter.
Deum esse; ergo talisproposicioest necessaria"Deus est", primoet adequate significansDeum esse', et econverso.Alio modo exponibilitervel
et tuncnon sequitur'necesseest Deum esse; ergotalisproposiresolubiliter,
cio est necessaria "Deus est"', quiaa antecedensest necessariumet consequens contingens.Vel aliter,quia potest esse sicut primo et adequate
significatur
per antecedensabsque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significateper consequens. Ut patet intuenti.
a
quia]S etZ
23 Sexta regula,et ultima:
A proposicione
habente
ad omnessuas causassimul
plurescausassue veritatis
cum
disiuncone
valet
et
econverso
.
,
acceptas
consequencia
Exemplum,u sequitur'non tantumhomo est animal; ergo nullushomo
est animal vel aliquid non-homoest animal', etbeconverso.Et si arguatur
ad unam illarumcausarum,non valet consequencia.Ut non sequitur'non
tantumhomo est animal; ergo nullushomo es animal', quia antecedens
est verumet consequensfalsum.Sed si arguatureconversoab una causa
veritatisad proposicionemhabentemplures causas veritatis,consequencia est bona. Utd bene sequitur'aliquid non-homoest animal; ergo non
tantumhomo est animal'. Et ita de omnibusoppositisexclusivarum,
exceptivarum,et aliarumproposicionumexponibilium,que habentprobariper
suas causas veritatis,ut dictumfuitsuperius,ubi determinatur
de probacionibusproposicionum6.
a ut
ut Z b et]om.S c est]homoestadd.Z d ut]^et Z* proposisequitur]^
sequitur
S
etc.
add.
cionum]
De consequenciis
et reduplicativas
concemenbus
exclusivas,
proposiciones
exceptivas
24 [S 104r]De consequenciisproposicionumexclusivarum,
exceptivarum
et reduplicativarum
ponunturquatuor regulae sequentes.Prima regula:
Ab exclusiva
ad suamuniversalem
de terminis
affirmativa
qffirmativam
transposi
tisrectis
nonampliativo
estbona
depresenti
,
mplibuetcumverbo
consequencia
et econverso.

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245

Exemplum,ut sequitur'tantumanimal est homo; ergo omnis homo est


animal', [ 84r] et econverso. Similitersequitur 'tantum ammalia sunt
homines;ergo omnes hominessunt ammalia', et huiusmodi.
a
terminorum
add.Zm
simplicibus]
quibusnonsitaggregata
25 Primodixi in regula"de terminisrectis";ideo talisconsequencianon
valet 'cuiuslibethominisaest asinus; ergo tantum asinusbest hominis0,
quia antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod omnis
homo habeat asinum et capram. Secundo dixi "simplicibus";ideo talis
consequencia non valet omnis homo vel asinus est homo; ergo tantum
homo est asinus vel homo, quia antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,suppositoquod in antecedentesolum unadpars subiectidistribuatur.
Tercio dixi "cum verbo de presentinon ampliativo";ideo talis consequencia non valet 'tantumanimal fuithomo; ergo omnis homo fuitanimal', quia antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,posito casu quod
Sortes nunc incipiatesse homo sive animai. Similiternon sequitur'tantum verumeritverum;ergo omne verum eritverum',quia huius consequencie antecedens es verum et consequens falsum,ut <patet> per
eorum exponentes,posito talifcasu quod nuncsintvere iste tresproposiciones 'Deus est' et 'celum movetur'et 'hoc instansest', sed post hoc
instansnichileritverumnisi aliquid istarum'Deus est' vel 'celum movetur',et tercia eritfalsa,scilicet8'hoc instansest'. Et huiusmodi.
c
a
S asinusZ d una]scilicet
S hominis
S b asinus]
prima
Z hominis]
hominis]
homines
si S
casuquodtalinuncS 8 scilicet]
eritZ fta^ nunc]
add.Zmc estJ
26 Ex ista regulapatet quod proposicioexclusivatermininumeralis,ut
'tantumduodecim sunt apostoli Dei' debet considerali dupliciter.Uno
Et tunc
modo inquantumfitexclusio racione alietatisvel infinitacionis.
est proposiciofalsa et sibi correspondeiuniversalisaccepta divisiveque
est falsa,ut 'tantumduodecimsuntapostoliDei; ergo omnes apostoliDei
suntduodecim'.Alio modo inquantumfitexclusioracione pluralitatis.Et
tunc est proposiciovera et sibi correspondeiuniversalisaccepta collective
que est vera,ut patetper earum exponentesseu probantes.Secundo patet
quod talis proposicio exclusiva 'tantum unum est' potest [S 104^ considerali dupliciter.Uno modo si fiat exclusioaracione alietatisvel infinitacionis.Et tunc est proposiciovera, cui correspondeihecb universalis
'omne ens est bonum', que est vera. Et isto modo valet consequencia
'tantumunum est; ergo omne ens est unum'. Alio modo inquantumfit
Et tunc proposicioest falsa, cui corresponexclusioracione pluralitatis0.
falsa'omnia suntunum'. Ut patetper earumexponentes.
dei hec universalis
Tercio patet quod si talis proposicioexceptivasit vera 'tantumhomo etd

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246

JOKESPRUYT

asinus et capra currun5,posito talifcasu quod non plura quam ista tria
currant,tuncgsibi debet correspondereuniversalisaccepta collective,que
est vera. Et istomodo valet consequncia'tantumhomo et asinuset capra
currunt;ergo omnia currenda sunt homo et asinus et capra', quia tam
antecedensquam consequenssunt verah,ut patet intuenti.
a
om.S b hec. . . correspondei]
om.Z c pluralitatis]
S d et]ZCest
alietatis
exclusio]
ZCS
e
f
h
8
omnia
add.
S
S
currencia
om.
nunc
S
ZS currunt]
^
vera]
Z om.S
ergo
tali]
tunei
27 Secunda regula:
Ab exceptiva
ad exclusivam
sibicorrespondentes?
, cuiussubiecnegativa
affirmativam
tumestpars extracaptaetpredicatum
cum
estaggregatum
ex termino
distributo
residuo
eiusdem
et
est
bona
econverso.
,
proposicionis
exceptive,
consequncia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'nullus homo preterSortem currit;ergo tantum
Sortes est aliquis homo currens5,
et econverso.Similitersequitur'nullum
animal preterhominemest racinale; ergo tantumhomo est [Z 84r] animal0racinale5,et huiusmodi.Ex ista regulapatetquod talisconsequncia
non valet cnullushomo preterSortem currit;ergo tantumSortes currit5,
quia antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,posito casu quod nullus homo curratnisiSorteset cum hoc asinuscurrat.Similiternon sequitur
'nullum animal preter hominem est racinale; ergo tantum homo est
racionalis5,quia ista non est sua exclusiva,sed illa tantumhomo est animal racinale0.Et huiusmodi.
a
S b animalracinale]
S racionalis
Z correspondente
correspondentem]
Z c racinale]
Z'S
om.Z
28 Tercia regula:
Ab exceptiva
ad exclusivam
sibi correspondentem
, cuius
affirmativa
affirmativam
subiectum
estpars extracaptaetpredicatum
estaggregatum
ex termino
distributo
cumresiduoeiusdem
ultimotermino
,
proposicionis
exceptiva,
preposita
negacione
estbona, et econverso.
consequena
Exemplum,ut sequitur'omne ens preteraccidens [S 105r] est substanet econverso.Similiter
cia; ergo tantumaccidens est ens non-substancia5,
'omne animal preterhominem estb irracionale;ergo tantumhomo est
animal non-irracionale5.
Similitersequitur 'omnis homo preter Sortem
tantum
Sortes
est homo non-currens5,
et huiusmodi.
currit;ergo
a
b
sedS est]Sc om.S
exceptive]
29 Quarta regula,et ultima:
A reduplicativa
ad suampreiacentem
estconsequena
bona, sed noneconverso.
u
'homo
Exemplumaffirmative, sequitur
inquantumanimai est corpus;
ergo homo est corpus5.Exemplumnegative,ut sequiturb'homo inquan-

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247

tumanimalnon estlapis; ergo homo non est lapis', et huiusmodi.Similiter


valetconsequncia,
sed noneconverso.
Ab exclusiva
ad suampracentem
Ut sequitur'tantumhomo est animai racinale; ergo homo est animai
racinale',et huiusmodi0.Sed
nonvaletconsequncia,
Ab exceptiva
ad suampracentem
equeeconverso.
Sortem
'omnis
homo
ut
non
currit;ergo omnis
sequitur
preter
Exemplum,
homo currit'.Similiternon sequitur'nullus homo preterSortem currit;
ergo nullus homo currit',et huiusmodi.Et racio est quia omnis exceptivapropriaet sua preiacensrepugnantad invicem,ut dictumfuitsuperius
de probacionibusexceptivarumd.
a S om. nonadd.S b
S om.Z huiusmodi]
utnonsequitur
add.
exemplum
sequitur]
Zd
ut]
et
huiusmodi
add.Z
necnon
exp.Z exceptivarum]
et sensum
concernentibus
sensum
divisum
De consequenis
compositum
sensumcompositumet sensumdivi30 De consequenciisconcernentibus
sum poniturtalis regula generalis:
a b sensu
ad sensumdivisum
vel econverso
forconsequencia
composito
Arguendo
nonvaktc.
maliter
Et talissensuscompositusveldsensusdivisuspotestfierimultismodis. De
quibus hice ponuntursex regule [ 85r] sequentes.

a
S om.Z
S om.Z d ve^sensus]
sicsaepius
om.Z$ b a sensu]assensu
Z$ valet]
e arguendo]
om.
hic] Z
31

Prima regula:
in proposicione
velformaliter
modalis
Terminus
fadt sensum
subsequens
precedens
dictum
eius
sensum
divisum.
intermediat
sed
, facit
,
quando
compositum
Ex quo patet quod talis consequencia non valet inquantumarguitura
sensu compositoad sensum divisum'impossibileest te currerevelocius
est te currerevelocius quam tuc curquam tua curris;ergo impossibile15
est
verum
et consequensfalsum.Secundo patet
antecedens
eius
ris',quia
quod talisconsequencianon valet,in qua arguitura sensu divisoad sensum compositum'album possibileest esse nigrum;ergo posssibileest [S
105"] album esse nigrum',quia eius antecedensest verumet consequens
falsum,et huiusmodi.Aliquando valet consequencia de materia,ut bene
sequitur'necesse est Deum esse; ergo Deum necesse est esse', quia eiusd
consequencieconsequens6est necessarium;quod potestsequi adf quodlibet. Similitersequitur'hominempossibileest esse asinum; ergo possibile
est hominemesse asinum', quia huius consequencie antecedensest impossibile; ex quo potest sequi quidlibet. Similitersequiturpossibile est

18:33:38 PM

248

JOKESPRUYT

hominemesse animal; ergo hominempossibileest esse animal,quia huius


consequencie oppositum consequentis rpugnt antecedenti.Et ita de
similibus.
a
b
estte]te possibile
estS c tu]Z om.S d eius]
huiusZ c con"
tu]Zom.S impossibile
f
antecedens
S ad quodlibet]
S
sequens]
ex quolibet
32

Secunda regula:
Terminus
communis
stansdeterminate
divisum
, sed quandostatconfat sensum
fise tantuma.
fat sensum
compositum.
Ideo talisconsequncianon valet 'scio alterumcontradictorium
esse verum;
- in
alterum
contradictorium
scio
esse
verum'
ergo
qua arguitura sensu
compositoad sensum divisum quia antecedenshuius consequencie est
verumet consequensfalsum,positisvel demonstrates
istisduobus contradictoriis'rex sede et 'nullusrex sede, quorum neutrumscio esse verum.
Ex qua regula patet quod a terminostantedeterminatead eundem stantem confusetantumet econverso,formaliter15
consequncianon valet,ut
patet intuenti.
a
S om.Z b formaliter]
S om.Z
tantum]
33

Tercia regula:
3
taliumterminorum
in
Quilibet
-ta,-tumvel (totus
-ta,-tum9,
'infinitos,
precedens
tenetwr
et
tune
sensum
divisum
sed
;
proposicione
sincathegorematice, fat
quando
seuponitur
a partepredicati
tenetwr
et tunc
subsequitur
cathegorematice,
facitsensumcompositum.
Exemplum de ly 'infinitus,-taa, -tum', ut talis consequncia non valet
in qua arguitura sensu diviso ad [ 85"] sensum compositum'infinite
partes sunt in contnuo;ergo partes in continuosunt infinite'.Similiter0
non sequitur'infinitasuntfinita0;
vel non sequitur
ergo finitasuntinfinita',
'infinitihomines sunt finitid;ergo finiti6hominessunt infiniti',et huiusmodi, quia cuiuslibetistarumconsequenciarumantecedensest verum et
consequens falsum.Exemplum de ly 'totus,-ta, -tumf',ut non sequitur
'totusSortesest minorSorte; ergo minorSorte [S 106r] est totusSortes'.
Similiternon sequitur'in oculo meo est totumquod est in mundo; ergo
totum quod est in mundo est in oculo meo', et huiusmodi.Sed quid
significanttales proposicionesaccepte in sensu diviso et quid in sensu
composito,dictum fuitsuperiushin prima parte huius logice1,in sexta*
regula supposicionum.
a ta
d
om.S b similiter
. . . alterum
tum]
Z'S om~Z c finita]
infinita]
ZS infinita^
Z'S
finiti]
e
ta
S infiniti
om.S g significant]
S hsuperiusJS
om.
infinitif
Zc
finiti]
Z
tum]
significans
1
S ] sexta]
S octavaZ
Z logice]^logices

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249

34

Quarta regula:
et precedens
Tale relativum
suumantecedens
verbum
sui
qui sequensimmediate
sensum
antecedentis
,
facit
compositum
ut cum dicitur'omne animal quoda est racinale est homo'. Sed
verbum
sui antecedentis
divisum
, tune
,
fadt sensum
quandosubsequitur
ut cum dicitur'omne animal est racinale6quod est homoc' Etd ideo
talis consequncianon valet 'omne animal quod est racinale est homo;
ergoomne animalest racinalequod est homo'. Antecedensenimsignificat
quod omne animal racinale est homo, quod est verum,sed consequens
significatquod omne animal est racinale, et omne6 animal est homo,
quod est falsum.Similiternon sequitur'omnis homo qui est albus currit;ergo omnis homo curritqui est albus', quia antecedensest verumet
consequensfalsum,posito casu quod solus Sortessit albus et solus Sortes
currat,et huiusmodi.
c
a
racinale
S d et. . . alterum
om.S b racinale]
Z'S om.
homoS homo]
homo]
quod]
c
S
homme
(!)
Z omne]^
35

Quinta regula:
solurr
terminos
etnonproposiciones
Coniunccio
fat sensum
coniungens
copulativa
divisum.
sed coniungens
fadt sensum
proposiciones
compositum,
Ex qua regulapatetquod a proposicionecathegoricade copulatoextremo
vel ad alterameius partemconsead copulativamsibibcorrespondentem
formaliter
non
tunc
valet;
arguitura sensu compositoad sensum
quncia
divisum.Exemplum a parte subiecti,ut non sequitur 'Sortes et Plato
dixerunttotumpsalterium0;ergo Sortes dixit totum salteriumet Plato
dixit totumpsalterium',quia huius consequenciedantecedensest verum
et consequensfalsum,positotali casu quod Sortesdixi unam medietatem
et Plato dixitfalterammedietatem,et huiusmodi.Exempluma partepredicati, ut non sequitur'tu es corpus et anima; ergo tu es corpus et tu es
anima'. [ 86r] Similiternon sequitur'tu non es homo et asinus; ergo
tu non es homoget tu non es asinus'. Similiternon sequitur'tuhdiffers
[S 106^] ab1 homine et aW asino; ergo tu differsab homine et tu differs
ab asinok',quia cuiuslibetistarumconsequenciarumantecedensest verum
et consequensfalsum,et1copulativa falsa. Aliquando valet consequencia
de materia,ut bene sequitur'Deus et homo sunt;ergo Deus est et homo
est'. Similitersequitur'tu es homo et animai; ergo tu es homo et tu es
animal'. Similitersequitur'Sortes et Plato curruntm;
ergo Sortes curritet
Plato currit'.Similitersequitur'Sorteset Plato biberuntvinum;ergo Sorte
bibitvinum et Plato bibit vinum', et huiusmodi".
d
a
salterium
sicsaepius
S bsibi]bisinS c psalterium]
Z$ huiusconsequencie]^
Z om
solum]
1
f
h
g
S
om.
S dixerit
dixerit
eiusS e dixit]
Z dixit]
Z homo]c.S Z tu]es odi-necnon
exp.Z

18:33:38 PM

250

JOKESPRUYT

k
suntet tunones
ab] omniadd.S Jab] omniadd.S ad asino]tues et homoet asinus
homoet asinusergotudiffers
ab omnihomine
et ab asinusadd.Z1et]^estZ mcur"
runt
. . . alteram
om.Z
Z om-$ net huiusmodi]S
Plato]
36 Secundo patet quod aa copulativa ad proposicionemde copulato
extremosibi correrspondentem
non valet.Et tunc
consequenciaformaliter
arguitura sensudivisoad sensumcompositum.Exemplum,u non sequitur
'Sortes est homo et Plato est homo; ergo Sorteset Plato sunthomo', sed
sequitur'Sortes et Plato sunt homines'. Similiternon sequitur'Sortes est
in domo et Plato est in domo; ergo Sortes et Plato sunt in domo', sed
bene sequitur'Sortes et Plato sunt inc domo vel in domibus'.Aliquando
valet consequencia de materia,ut sequitur'Deus est et homo est; ergo
Deus et homo sunt5.Similitersequitur'Sortes <currit> et Plato currit;
ergo Sortes et Plato currun,et ita de multissimilibus.
aa
S b ut]Zom.S c in domovel]S om.Z
ad copulativam
copulativa]
37

Sexta regula et ultima:


Coniunccio
disiunctiva
terminos
et nonproposiciones
comconiungens
facitsensum
sed
sensum
diisum.
positum, coniungens
proposiciones
fat
Ex qua regulapatetquod a proposicionecathegoricade disiunctoextremo
ad disiunctivamsibia correspondentem
vel ad alterameiusbpartemconsequencia formaliternon valet. Et tunc arguitura sensu compositoad
sensum divisum. Exemplum a parte subiecti, ut non sequitur 'omnis
est verad; ergo omnis proposicio est
proposicio vel eius contradictoria0
vera vel omniseius contradictoria6
contradictorium
Z estveraf' Exemplum
a parte predicati,ut non sequitur'omne animal est racinale vel irracionale; ergo omne animal est racinalevel omne animal est irrationale'.
Similiternong sequitur'omnis proposicio est vera vel falsa; ergo omnis
proposicioest vera vel omnisproposicioest falsa',et huiusmodi.Aliquando
valet consequencia de materia,ut bene sequitur'omnis homo vel asinus
est homo; ergo omnis homo est homo vel omnishasinus est homo1'.[S
107r] Similitersequitur'tu es homo vel asinus; ergo tu es homo vel tu
es asinus', et huiusmodi.
a
d
om.Z b eius]disiunctive
add.Zc contradictoria]
S contradictorium
sibi]/'S
Z vera]et
8
verum
add.Zccontradictorium
S
et
verum
add.
non
Z* contradictoria]
fvera]
Z
sequitur]
1
om.S homnis]
asinusS
Z& om.S homo]
38 Secundo patet <quod> a disiunctivaad proposicionemde disiuncto
extremosibi correspondentem
non valet; [,Z 86^1
consequenciaformaliter
et tunc arguitura sensu diviso ad sensum compositum.Exemplum,ut
non sequitur'tu non es homo vel tu non es asinus; ergo tu non es homo
vel asinus'. Similiternon sequitur'tua nonbdiffers
ab hominecvel tu nond

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251

ab asino; ergo tu none differs


differs
ab hominevel ab asino', quia cuiuslibet istarumconsequenciarumantecedensest verum et consequens falsum. Aliquando valet consequncia de materia,ut bene sequitur'tu es
homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es homo velfasinus'. Similitersequitur
'homo curritvel asinus currit;ergo homo vel asinus curri,et ita de multis similibus.
a Z om.S b
om. c homine
. . . ab]om.S 6 non]
om.S c non]Zcom.Z$
non]f
f tu] tues add.
S
vel]
CAPITULUM SEXTUM
De consequenciis
proposicionum
ypoteticarum
1 De consequenciisproposicionumaypoteticarumest multiplexordo.
Primo de consequenciiscopulativarum.Secundo de consequenciisdisiunctivarum.Tercio de consequenciis condicionaliumvelb racionalium.
Quarto de consequenciis causalium. Quinto0, per ordinem, de consequenciis aliarum specierumproposicionumypoteticarum.
c
a
. S b velracionalium]
hecS
om
om.S quinto]
proposicionum]
De consequenciis
copulativarum
De consequenciiscopulativarumponunturtresregulsequentes.Prima
regula:
A totacopulativa
ad alteram
utsuepartes
eiuspartem
prinsignificativa
principales
est
bona.
ciplemconsequena
Exemplum,ut sequitur'homo curritet asinus currit;ergo homo currit5,
ut sue partesprincipales0",
e huiusmodi.Sed dixi in regula "significativa
quia predictaconsequenciacnon valet, posito casu quod illa copulativa
que est antecedenssit imposita ad significandumDeum esse vel aliud
verumex quo non sequatur eiusdconsequens.
a et
S om.Z b principales]
Z c consequencia]
S d eius]
Z'S om
huiusmodi]
consequenciam
ad 5
2

Secunda regula:
A parteprincipali
ad eiuscopulativam
utsuepartesprinsignificativarrf
copulative
nonvalet.
cipalesconsequencia
formaliter
Exemplum,ut non sequitur 'homo currit;ergo homob curritet asinus
currit',quia huius consequencieantecedensest verum et consequensfalsum, posito casu quod homo curratet nullus asinus currat.Aliquando
valet consequenciade [S 107"] materia,quando copulativafitex duabus

18:33:38 PM

252

JOKESPRUYT

partibusquarum una pars sequiturex alia, et arguiturex parte que antecedit ad aliam. Et potestfieriquatuor vel quinqu modis. Primo quando
adc invicem,ut bene'sequitur
partesprincipalescopulativesuntconvertibiles
'homo currit;ergo homo curritet racinale0curri.Secundo quando una
pars copulativeest inferiorad aliam, ut sequitur'homo currit;ergo homo
curritet animai curri.Tercio quando una pars copulativeex qua arguitur es impossibilis,ut sequitur'homo est asinus; ergo homo est asinus
et tu curris'.Quarto quando una pars copulativeest necessariaet alia
pars ex qua arguiturest contingens,[ 87r] ut sequitur1'tu curris;ergo
tu curriset Deus est'. Quinto quando una pars copulativeest contingens,
ut sequiturad aliam quarum nullaguna est convertibilis,
nec inferiornec
impossibilisneque necessaria,ut bene sequitur'tu curris;ergo tu curris
et tu non sedes', et huiusmodi.
a
S b homo. . . et]Z'S om-Z c ad]Som.Z d racinale]
S
significativam]
Z significativa
c
risibile
om.S fsequitur
. . . contingens]^
om.S g nulla]
unaS
Z est. . . arguitur]
4

Tercia regula:
A totacopulativa
ut suepartesad disiunctivam
de partibusormino
significativa
consimilibus
est
bona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'homo curritet asinus currit;ergo homo currit
vela asinus curri.Sed econversonon valet consequencia,ut non sequitur
'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es homo et tu es asinus', quia
antecedensest verum et consequens falsumb.
a
b
et huiusmodi
add.S
vel] etZ falsum]
De consequenciis
disiunctwarum
5

De consequenciisdisiunctivarum
ponunturtresregulesequentes.Prima
regula:
A parteprincipali
disiunctive
ad dus disiunctivtam
ut suepartes
significativam*
est
bona.
principales
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'tu es homo; ergo tu es homo vel tu es asinus'.
Sed dixi in regula "significativa
ut sue partesprincipales",quia predictab
consequencianon valet,posito casu quod aliquac disiunctivaque est conte esse capram vel aliudd falsum,
sequens sit impositaad significandum
non
ex
eius
antecedente.
quod
sequatur
a
S bpredicta
S c alisignificativam]
consequencia]
predictam
consequenciam
d significativa
illa
S
qua] Z aliud] aliquidZ
6

Secunda regula:
A totadisiunctiva
ut sue partespncipales
ad alterameiuspartem
significativa
non
valet.
principlem
consequena
formaliter

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Exemplum,ut non sequitur'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es asinus', quia huiusconsequencieantecedensest verumet consequensfalsum.
Aliquandovaletconsequnciade materia,quando disiunctivafitex duabus
partibusquarum una pars sequiturad alteramet arguituraa disiunctiva
ad suambpartemquec sequitur.Et potestfieriquatuor vel quinqu modis.
Primo [S 108r] quando partes principalesdisiunctivesunt convertibiles
ad invicem,ut sequiturhomocurritvel racinale currit;ergo homo curri. Secundo quando una pars disiunctive est inferiorad aliam, ut
sequiturhomocurritvel animal currit;ergo animai currit'.Tercio quando
disiunctivaest impossibilis,ut sequitur'homo est asinus vel nullus deus
est; ergo homo est asinus', quia ex impossibilisequiturquidlibet.Quarto
quando una pars disiunctiveest necessaria et alia pars disiunctive0est
contingenset concluditurpars necessaria, ut sequitur 'Deus est vel tu
curris;ergo Deus est', quia6 necessariumfsequiturad quidlibet. Quinto
quando una pars disiunctiveest impossibiliset alia possibiliset conciuditurpars possibilis,ut sequitur'tu currisvel tu es [Z 87v] asinus; ergo tu
et huiusmodi.
curris5,
aa
S om.Z c
S b suam]om.S c que]om.S d disiunctive]
ad disiunctivam
disiunctiva]
f
ad
S
add.
necessario^
Z
necessarium]
quia]
7

Tercia regula:
f ut suepartesprinpalescumcontradictorio
unius
A totadisiunctiva
significativo
estbona.
dus partem
consequena
principlem
partisprinpalisad alteram
es asinusc;
vel
es
sed
tu
nonb
'tu
es
homo
tu
ut
asinus;
sequitur
Exemplum,
tu
et
huiusmodi.
es
homo',
ergo
b

a
Z$chomoS
^6" om.Z asinus]
Z'S omZ non]
significativa]
8 Contra regulamaarguitursic. Talis consequncia non valet 'rex sedet
vel nullusrex sedet; sed nullusrex sedet; ergo rex sedet',quia huius consequencie antecedensest verum et consequens falsum,posito casu quod
nullus rex sedeat. Ergo regula falsa. Secundo arguitursic. Talis consequncia non valet 'tu es asinusvel manus mea est clausa; sed manus mea
nonb est clausa; ergo tu es asinus', quia huius consequencie antecedens
illa
est verumet consequensfalsum,posito tali casu quod dum profertur
contradisiunctivasit ita quod manus mea sit clausa, sed dum profertur
dictoriumilliuspartsnulla manus mea sit clausa. A similinon sequitur
'tu es asinus vel tu sedes; sed tu non sedesc; ergo tu esd asinus', quia
antecedensest verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quode dum proconferturillafdisiunctivasit ita quod tu sedeas, sed dum quod profertur
illiuspartisgsit ita quod tu non sedeash,et huiusmodi.
tradictorium
a
S nullaZ c sedes]
Z es asinusS d es asinus]
sedesS e quod]
Z bfnon]
Z'S regulas
regula]
h
g
S
om.

om.
S

sedesadd.necnon

partis] Z sedeas] sedesS


profertur]
exp.Z

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254

JOKESPRUYT

9 Ad primumdico quod arguiturnona per regulam,quia arguitura


uniuspartisad eandem partemcuius accipdisiunctivacum contradictoria
et non arguiturad alterameius partemprinciplem.
iturcontradictorium,
Ut patetbene advertenti[S 108^] Ad secundumvel ad tertiumdico quod
in eodem instantitemporis,quia sic intelliguntur
omnes
regulabintelligitur
regule consequenciarumc.
a
b
beneadd.S c consequenciarum]
om.S
non]om.S regula]
De consequenciis
condionalium
10 De consequenciiscondicionaliumvel racionaliumponunturtresregule
sequentes.Prima regula:
A* condicionali
cumsuo antecedente
ad eiusconsequens
estconsequncia
bona.
Exemplum,ut bene sequitur'si tu es homo, tu es animal; sed tu es homo;
de condicionalisignificativa
ergo tu es animal'. Sed illa regula intelligitur
ut sue partes,et sic debent intelligiomnes regule sequentes.
Secunda regula:
b contradictorio
A condionali
cum
ad contadictorium
antecedents
eiusconsequentis
demconsequencia
estbona.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'si tu es asinus,tu es rudibilis;sed tu non es rudibilis; ergo tu non es asinus', et huiusmodi.
Tercia regula: [ 88r]
Ac racional
1ad condicionalem
de partibusomnino
consimilibus
est
consequencia
bona.
Exemplum, ut sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal; ergo si tu es
homo tu es animal', et ita de similibus6.
aa
h
d
add.S c a] condicionali
add.necnon
condicionali
]Zom.S cum]suo
exp.Z racionali]
e
S add.necnon
add.S
exp.Z similibus]
exemplis
De consequenciis
causalium
11

De consequenciiscausalium ponunturtres regule sequentes.Prima


regula:
A causalisignificativa
utsuepartesprindpales
ad alteram
duspartem
pnpalem
estbona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'quia sol lucet, dies est; ergo sol lucet vela diesb
est'. Sedc econversonon valet consequencia,ut non sequitur'proficisveld
doleo; ergo quia proficisdoleo', et huiusmodie.
Secunda regula:
A causaliad condicionalem
departibus
omnino
consimilibus
estbona.
consequma
ut
sol
si
dies
sol
lucet,
est; ergo8
lucet, dies
Exemplumf, sequitur'quia

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A I5-C. SPANISH
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255

est5.Sed econverso non valet consequncia, ut non sequitur 'si tu es


asinus, tu es rudibilis;ergo quia tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis5,
quia illah
condicionalisest vera, se causalis est falsa,et per consequenshuius consequencie antecedensest verum et consequens falsum.
Tercia regula:
departibus
A causaliad copulativam
omnino
consimilibus
estbona.
consequencia
Exemplum*,ut sequitur'quia sol lucet, [S 109r] dies est; ergo sol lucet
et dies est'. Sed econversonon valetconsequencia,ut non sequitur'proficis
et doleok;ergo quia proficis,doleo1', et huiusmodi.
b
a
com.
doleoZ om-$ c
deusS c sed]nonadd.S d veldoleo]
vel]ergoadd.Z dies]
h ergo
f
8

b
171
facit
bonamcon
om.
S
ethuiusmodi]
om.
Z
i^a]
exemplum] Z erg est]

1
dolesS
S om.Z kdoleo]
add.Z" 1sed]5 etZ* exemplum]
Z dolesS doleo]>
sequenciam
De consequenciis
expletivarum
12 De consequenciisexpletivarum
ponunturdue regulesequentes.Prima
regula:
dus partem
indicativi^
ad alteram
Ab expletiva
expartibus
prndpalem
composita
estbona.
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'tu es homo quamvis tua sedes; ergo tu es homo5
vel 'ergobtu sedes'. Sed econversonon valetconsequencia,ut non sequitur
'tu es homo; ergo tu es homo quamvis tu sedes', quia antecedens est
verumet consequensfalsum,posito casu quod non sedeas. Similiternon
sequitur'tu curris;ergo tu currisquamvis tu sedes5,et huiusmodi.
Secunda regula:
departibusomnino
ad copulativam
expartibus
indicativis
Ab expletiva
composita
estbona.
consimilibus
consequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'tu es homo quamvis tu sedes; ergo tu es homo
et tu sedes5,et econverso,etc huiusmodi.
b
a
c
Sc huiusmodisS om.Z
tu]bisinS ergo]om.S et huiusmodi]
De consequenciis
similitudinarie
13 De consequenciissimilitudinarie
ponunturdue regulesequentes.Prima
regula:
eiuspartem
utsuepartesad alteram
A similitudinaria
prin[ 88^ significativa
bona.
est
ciplemconsequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes curritsicut Plato currit;ergo Sortes curri vel 'ergoa Plato currit5.Sed econverso non valet, ut non sequitur
'aquila volat; ergo tu volas sicut aquila volat5,quia antecedensest verum
et consequensfalsum,et huiusmodi.

18:33:38 PM

256

JOKESPRUYT

Secunda regula:
A similitudinaria
est
ad copulativam
departibus
ormino
consimilibus
consequencia
bona.
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes curritsicut Plato currit;ergo Sortes currit et Plato currit'.Similitersequitur'tu volas sicut aquila volat; ergo tu
volas et aquila volat'. Sed econverso non valet consequencia, ut non
sequitur'Sortes curritet Plato sedet; ergo SortescurritsicutPlato sede.
Similiternon sequitur'tu es albus et corvus est niger;ergo tu es albus
sicut corvus est niger',et huiusmodi.
a
S om.Z
ergo]
De consequenciis
localium
14

De consequenciislocalium ponunturdue regule sequentes. Prima


regula:
A localisignificativa
ut suepartesprincipales
ad alteram
dus partem
prinpakm
est
bona.
consequencia
Exemplum, [5 109"] ut sequitur'Deus est ubi homo est; ergo Deus est'
vel 'ergo homo est'. Sed econversoconsequencianon valet,ut non sequitur
'Sortes sedet; ergo Sortes sedet ubi Plato sedet', et huiusmodi.
Secunda regula:
A localiad copulativam
departibusomnino
consimilibus
estbona.
consequencia
ut
Exemplum, sequitur'Deus est ubi homo est; ergo Deus est et homo
est'. Sed econversonon valet consequencia,ut non sequitur'Sortessedet
et Plato sedet; ergo Sortes sedet ubi Plato sedet', et huiusmodi.
De consequenciis
temporalium
15

De consequenciistemporaliumponunturdue regulesequentes.Prima
regula:
A temporali
ut suepartesprinpalefad alteram
eiuspartem
significativa
princiestbona.
plemconsequencia
Exemplum,ut sequitur'Sortes curritdum Plato currit;ergo Sortes currit'vel 'ergo Plato currit'.Sed econversonon valet consequencia,ut non
sequitur'sedebo; ergo sedebo quando curram',et huiusmodi.
Secunda regula:
A temporali
ad copulativam
departibus
omnino
consimilibus
estbona.
consequencia
Utb sequitur'Sortes curritdum Plato currit;ergo Sortes curritet Plato
currit'.Similitersequitur'sedebo quando curram;ergo sedebo et curram'.

18:33:38 PM

A I5-C. SPANISH
TREATISE
ON CONSEQUENCES

257

Et econversonon valet consequncia,ut non sequitur'sedebo et curram;


ergo sedebo quando curram',et huiusmodi.
a
S om.Zb ut]et S
principales]
16 [,Z 89r] Et hec suntadieta de consequenciisseu argumentacionibus.
Et per consequensde terciaparte huius logice.
a sunt]
S sintZ

18:33:38 PM

A ForcedMarch TowardsBeatitude:
s Histoire of theBeatificVision
ChristianTrottmann'
KENT EMERY,JR.

Christian
XII
La vision
sa dfinition
desdisputes
Trottmann,
beatifique
scolastiques
parBenot
coleFranaise
de Rome,Rome1995899 pp. with3 plates(Bibliothque
des coles
Athnes
et de Rome289).
Franaises
The medieval discussion of the beatificvision involvesfundamental
of intelligent
questionsabout the metaphysicaland psychologicalstructure
creaturesin relationto God; it testsnoetic theoriesat theirouterlimits;
it disputesthe ultimateethicalends of human life;it entailslogical paradoxes that require sophisticatedtreatment;it likewiseinvolves crucial
hermeneuticalquestionsabout the interpretation
of "divine" and human
In
his
doctoral
the
from
thesis,
writings.
abridged(!)
topicalvantagepoint
of the beatificvision (than which only one can be higher),Christian
Trottmannsurveysthe universalprogressof medievaltheoriesof knowledge, focusingon the thirteenthand early fourteenthcenturiesuntil
Benedict XII's dogmaticConstitution,Benedictus
Deus (1336), but casting
his sightbackwardsto the early Church fathersand glancingforwardto
the theologicaldiscussionsof our own day.
Trottmann'sbook is an encyclopediaand willbe the standardreferencework concerningthe beatificvision foryears to come. For thisreason it
meritsa long review.His study,moreover,suggestscountlesstopics for
furtherresearch;he himselfpromisesseveralcriticaleditions(pp. 1-2),a
completestudyof the process againstDurand of Saint-Pourain(p. 592
n. 12), and monographson the noetic statusof theologyand on synderesis, whichwill offer"une critiquede la raison pure et une critiquede la
raison pratique au Moyen Age" (p. 818 n. 1).
Trottmannmeans further
to exemplify
a proper,correctivemethodfor
medieval
intellectual
interpreting
history.Alludingto a recentbook on
medievaltheoriesof vision,whichexcludesfromitspurviewthe theological
topic of the beatificvision (p. 9), he states:
L'histoire
de la pensemdivale
a tropsouffert
d'unelecture
quiprenait
positiviste
au piedde la lettre
ancilla
etconsidrait
l'adage:"Philosophia
theologiae"
quela philoso Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,1999

Vivarium
37,2

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259

Lesrapports
entre
science,
philosoAgetaittouffe
parla thologie.
phieduMoyen
etdialectiques,
comme
en
en ce sicle,
n'taient-ils
pasrciproques
phieetthologie
hisconclusions
intheform
bene
: Trottmann
d'autres?
frequently
expresses
(p. 10;nota
ofrhetorical
questions).
will persuade readers that movementsin
Trottmann'sdemonstrations
medievaltheologyand philosophywere reciprocaland inextricably
related,
and thatquestionsconcerningthe beatificvisionwere centralto the major
intellectualdisputesof the thirteenth
century.Nevertheless,he formally
excludesfromhis own treatment"specifically
theological"questionsconof
human
Christ's
vision
the
beatific
soul,the beatifiedand natural
cerning
knowledgeof angels (see the referenceto S.D. Dumont, p. 10), and the
glorifiedconditionof the resurrectedbody (p. 8 n. 1). Likewise,only in
passingdoes he mentionthe specialproblemsconcerningthe soul's knowledge of the Trinity(e.g., pp. 364-65), the highestobject of Christiancontemplationin this world and presumablyin the next. No one, I think,
would wish Trottmann'sbook to be any longer.To address all of these
related topics in the thoughtof any author would probably require an
independentmonograph;moreover,to introducethemwould obscurethe
conceptualclarityof Trottmann'sundeviatingnarrativeline.
The book is divided into threeparts. As a prelude, the firstchapter
fromthe
surveys"the heritageof ten centuriesof theologicalreflection,"
Peter
Lombard.
and
Bernard
of
Clairvaux
fathers
to
Naturally
early
enough,Trottmannpays most attentionto those authors(e.g., Augustine,
pseudo-Dionysius,Eriugena,Bernard)whose textswere contestedin the
laterScholasticdisputes.Otherwise,he strivesto establisha dialecticrelaof God and Augustine's
tionbetweenGreekdoctrinesof the unknowability
doctrineof the immediatevisionof the divineessence,and betweenintellectualistand affectiveconceptionsof beatitude.
Trottmanndivideshis book into two major parts,according
Thereafter,
on the one hand, and Quando?
to an orderof questions,Quid?et Quomodo?
conon the other.For Trottmann,thisdivisionis more than rhetorically
venient,forthe orderof questions,he argues,followsan innerlogic that
correspondsto the emphases in the chronologicalsequence of debates.
The firstdivision"What?"and "How?" embracesthe Scholasticphilosophical and theologicaldiscussionsof the thirteenth
century.It is subdivided
and
historical
to
phases established
categories
according doxographical
more or less securelyby modernhistorians(see below). The last division
of thebook "When?" comprisesthe dramatic"reaction"ofJohnXXII and
the subsequentdisputes,concludingwith the dogmatic Constitutionof
BenedictXII. In thissection,Trottmannoffersa paraphrase-commentary

18:33:50 PM

260

KENTEMERY,
JR.

of nearlyeveryitemin the debate, editedor newlyuncoveredfrommanuscripts,and a detailed examinationof all the historicalevents.
In effect,Trottmannhas yoked togetherwhat could be two separate
books.He unifieshis huge narrativeby meansof a philosophicalconception
of Histoire.His conception,not surprisingly,
is dialectical. Thus, each
dialecticalphase of the thirteenth-century
discussionwas propelledby a
new penetrationof Aristotle'stheoryof knowledge,and was delimitedby
successivetheologicalCondemnations(1210, 1241, 1277). Each "wave"
of Aristoteliantheoryengendereda reactionand an alternativeinterpretation,motivatedespecially,Trottmannargues,by a concernto preserve
or meet the theologicalrequirementsof the beatificvision,and to distinguishits elevated cognitionfromordinaryknowledge.The dialectical
Scholasticthoughtculminatedin the "perprocess of thirteenth-century
fectsynthesis"of Thomas Aquinas, who understoodAristotlebetterthan
resolvedthe noeticissuesinvolved
anyone else, and who mostsuccessfully
in the beatificvisionby way of his doctrineof the lumen
Afterwards,
gforiae.
of alreadyestabprogressivemovementseemed to stallamidstrefinements
lished positionsand responsesto criticisms,untilPope John XXII reinvigoratedthe dialectic and extended its historicalrange by asking the
question "When?" The new dialecticalmovementinitiatedby thisquestion,and the "archaic" way in whichit was proposed,in turn,demanded
a more comprehensivehistoricalsynthesis,
thistimebetweenpatristicand
monastic theology,on the one hand, and Scholastic theology,on the
other.This synthesiswas achieved privatelyby the "ProvidentialMan,"
Jacques Fournier,who later became Pope Benedict XII. Having taken
"two stepsforward"as a theologian,however,as Pope he "took one step
backwards,"leaving out of his dogmatic Constitutionthe most innovative and satisfying
ideas of his personal synthesis.However disappointing
his decisionmightbe, he thusleftopen the possibilityfora later,higher
.
synthesisin the on-goingdialecticalprocess of Histoire
The thirteenth-century
dialecticis kickedoffby the writingsof David
of Dinant and Amauryof Bne, whichwere condemnedat Paris in 1210.
and "pantheistic"readingof Aristotle,
Accordingto David's "materialistic"
matter
and God are essentiallyone thing;accordingly,the
spirit{mens),
unitybetween the knowerand the thingknown,like the unitybetween
matterand form,constitutesonly one being. The consequencesof this
"materialisticpantheism"in regard to the human mind's knowledgeof
God are patent:one mustneeds conclude thatthe individualsoul cannot
know God, and that its substance,the universalmens
, plays the passive
role of "matter"in union with the "form"of God, therebyconstituting

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one realitywithhim (pp. 118-19). The ideas of the "spirituals"who followed Amauryand who conceived that the unitybetween the knower
and thingknown was realized in God or in his eternal creativeIdeas,
while not materialistic
were no less "pantheistic."In the largerscheme
of things,whetherTrottmann'sinterpretation
of David of Dinans "naive"
or
is
correct
"nuanced"
seems relativelyunimsufficiently
comprehension
he
that
such
it
portant,except
places
weightupon as the startingpoint
of the dialecticalprocess.It seems,however,that many of the fragments
attributedto David were in fact not writtenby him and date fromthe
1260s, that David's notion of matterderivesmore fromtwelfth-century
Platonic sources than from Aristotle,and that the characterizationof
David as a "materialistic"philosopherhas its originsin polemics of the
laterthirteenth
In
century,notablyin Thomas Aquinas' Summatheologiae.1
otherwords, at its beginningthe historicaldialectic purportedlyset in
motionby David of Dinant is vexed with chronologicaland interpretive
questions.
AdoptingEtienne Gilson's term,Trottmannlabels the next "wave" of
the receptionof AristotleL'augustinisme
avicennisant.
Because it "conforms
Trottmannargues,Avicenna's
moreto thedominantAugustinin
Platonism,"
ofAristotle'snoetictheoryprovided"an advantageousalterinterpretation
native to the materialisticreading of Aristotle"proposed by David of
Dinant (p. 130). Accordingto Avicenna,an intelligiblespecies,servingas
a mean betweenthe possibleintellectand its object, is the firstobject in
everycognitiveact, even in the highestreaches of spiritualknowledge.
Because Avicenna's teachingrendersimpossiblea pantheisticinterpretation of the knowledgeof God, theologianswere "seduced" into applying
it to the questionof the beatificvision:
n'est-il
L'intrt
desthologiens
du dbutdu XIIIesiclepourAvicenne
pasd'abord
dansle cadrehistorique
despremires
condemnations
de 1210-1225?
pistmologique
la connaissance
humaine
en tantqu'illumination,
ilsonten vue
Lorsqu'ils
pensent
ordinaire
aussibienla connaissance
que celledonnepar grce,voirela vision
batifique
(pp. 151-2).
In interpreting
the Condemnationsof 1241, which affirmedthat in
the beatificvisionsouls see the essence of God immediatelywithoutany
1 See thestudy
Anzulewicz
andMartin
Davidvon
Pickav,
byAndreas
Speer,Henryk
Dinant
unddieFragmente
der"Quaternuli
und
York,in: Studien
(Leiden-New
forthcoming
The textmostat question
is thelongfragTextezurGeistesgeschichte
desMittelalters).
deDinando
in: Studia
mentG in: Davidis
Quarternulorum
, ed. M. Kurdzilaek,
fragmenta
, 3 (1963).
Mediewistyczne

18:33:50 PM

262

KENTEMERY,
JR.

intervening
speciesor "theophanies,"Trottmannattemptsto reconcilethe
interpretationsof P.-M. de Contenson and Gilson, which emphasize
"l'enjeu pistmologiquede la pntrationavicennienne,"with those of
M.-D. Chenu and H.-F. Dondaine,whichemphasizetheencounterbetween
Greek and Latin theologicaltraditions(p. 185). Those theologianswho
were touched by the Condemnations(Stephen of Venisy,John Pagus,
Hugh of Saint-Cher,Guerric of Saint-Quentin)tried to reconcile the
Aristotelianrequirementof a union betweenthe knowerand the object
known and the Greek theologicalidea of the unknowability
of God by
to
the
of
notion
(and Eriugenian)
resorting
pseudo-Dionysian
"theophanies"
as the object of the soul's knowledgein the beatificvision. William of
Auvergne,who authoredthe Condemnationsof 1241, like Avicennarecognized the need foran impressedspeciesin everyact of ordinaryknowlof the immediacyof the beatific
edge, but saved the Latin understanding
visionby purgingAvicenna'steachingof its cosmologicalinconveniences
and reconcilingit withAugustine'steachingsabout the soul. Thus, in the
beatificvision the image of the soul itself,elevated by grace and glory,
becomes the medium
quothe divineessence is seen. (Withmanyvariations,
other theologiansadopted this basic approach for decades.) But while
such solutionsas William'spreventeda pantheisticidentitybetweenthe
soul and God, and avoided the "heretical"idea thatsome createdsimilitude other than the soul itselfintervenedin its beatificvision of God,
theyyet, in Trottmann'seyes, sacrificedthe theologicalrequirementof
of Avicenna's noetic teaching
immediacy.Concerningthe attractiveness
for"Augustinin"
direct
the
nexus
betweenthe Condemnations
theologians,
of 1210 and 1241, and the as yet unsatisfactory
outcome,Trottmannis
he says,
emphatic.Avicenna'sinterpretation,
ainside penser
commeintentionelle
et nonsubstantielle,
l'unionde l'intelpermet
lectavecsonobjet.Ainsi,voulant
se sauverde Pcueilpanthiste
d'unenotique
navement
aristotlicienne
en laquellele sujetconnaissant
ne ferait
comprise
qu'un
avecl'objetconnu(Dieudansla vision
avicennisant
va tre
batifique)
l'augustinisme
Il devaiten effet
amen nierl'immdiatet
de cettevision.
interncessairement
Voulant
le voilede quelquesimilitude.
poserentrela divineessenceet l'intellect
la transcendance
sauver
de Dieu dansla visionbatifique
il en perdl'immdiatet
(p. 150).
of theCondemAlthoughTrottmannattemptsto balance interpretations
nations of 1241, he in fact confersmore weight on the. influenceof
of Aristotle,
Avicenna,as his dialecticalpattern,propelledby interpretations
seems to require. In general, Trottmannseldom lingerson "Platonic"
contributions
to the discussion,save Augustine's,and he rarelyevaluates

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thempositively.In this account,it is theologians'stubbornadherenceto


the "neo-Platonic"noeticconceptionsof Augustine(p. 60 et passim)that
retardstheirunderstandingand proper applicationof Aristotle'stheory,
and whichdrivesthemtowards"voluntaristic"
solutionsconcerningbeatitude that are peripheralto the progressof intellect(and do not fiteasilyinto the schemeof the book). One sensesthatone has heard thisstory
before.Trottmann'sremarksabout recent"neo-Platonic"interpretations
of Albertthe Great and Thomas Aquinas may shed lighton thismatter:
Sansdnier
l'influence
de DenyssurAlbert
etThomas.
. . . nouspersisthologique
fort
de la continuit
de septsicles
tons considrer,
de tradition,
que leurphilosoaristotlicienne.
... La grandeur
desdeuxmatres
de l'Ecole
phieestprincipalement
dominicaine
nersidet-elle
. . . Nousrefusons
doncde faire
pasdanscettesynthse?.
et plusencorede Thomas,des philosophes
causede
d'Albert,
no-platoniciens
l'influence
de Denyssurleurthologie.
Maisnousrefusons
aussibiend'enfairede
de leurthologie
celleattribue

au Stagirite
parla rduction
pursaristotliciens
leurpoque(p. 297 n. 49).
Afterthe Condemnationsof 1241, whichsupposedlyresolvedthe question"What?"concerningthe beatificvision,theologiansturnedtheirattentionto the question"How?" In doingso, theyrespondedto, and benefitted
LatinAverroism"
the "first
from,thenextwave ofAristotelian
interpretation,
in the facultyof Arts (1225-1265). Relyingheavilyon studiesby R.-A.
of
Gauthier,Trottmannemphasizesthe interplaybetweeninterpretations
Aristotle'snoetic theoryand ethics.The "principalcharacteristic"
of the
in contrastwith"thesecondLatinAverroism,"
Artists'
noeticinterpretations,
consistsin makingthe agent and possible intellectsfacultiesof the individualsoul (pp. 212, 218), as Albertand Thomas did later(see n. 10 below).
In the treatiseshe recounts,Trottmanndiscoversa new synthesis
between
Averrosand Augustine,for which he coins a new term:L'augustinisme
averroismi.
The consequences of this synthesisfor the conceptionof the
soul's beatitude(and by implicationforthe theologyof the beatificvision)
are to be foundin contemporary
commentarieson theNichomachean
Ethics.
Influencedby Christianideas, thesecommentators
that
stressed
truebeatitude lies beyondthe naturalcapacitiesof the soul and mustbe received
passivelyfromGod. In theirconceptionof beatitude,theycelebratedthe
"la conlifein the termsof traditionalChristianmysticism:
contemplative
naissanceamoureusede Dieu, par la partiesuprieurede l'me (intellect
spculatif,
pratique,voire partiedsidrative)sans la mdiationdes phantasmes" (p. 241). AlthoughTrottmannis sympathetictowardsthe "first
Latin Averroists"insofaras their doctrinesconcerningthe passive and
agent intellectspoint in the rightdirection,he is severelycriticalof their
their "concordismenaf, mais aussi
"naivelyChristian"interpretations,

18:33:50 PM

264

KENTEMERY,
JR.

trs fragile,"their"betrayal"of the text of Aristotle,their"clericalism"


and "prudery"(pp. 242-43). Trottmannventsthisdispleasurebecause the
commentatorsneglectand denigratethe civic and politicalvirtuestaught
themon the altar of Christiancontemplation.Of
by Aristotle,sacrificing
the
who were not obliged to respectthe integrity
course,
commentators,
of Aristotle'sthought,may simplyhave been persuaded by Augustine's
as Bonaventureseems
analysisof pagan virtuesin lightof theirintentions,
to have been whenhe warnedagainstthe deceptiveness
Ethics.
ofAristotle's
This "naively concordisi, too Christian" (p. 243) interpretationof
Aristotlenecessitateda dialecticalresponse,whichTrottmanncalls "la lacisationd'Aristote"(p. 246 et passim). This time,the new interpretation
was moved by the theologians,Albertthe Great, especiallyin his course
on the Ethicsin 1248-1252,and Thomas Aquinas; at the same time,the
new perceptionof Aristotleresultedin the "second Latin Averroism"of
the Arts faculty,which was the subject of the Condemnationsof 1277.
Trottmann'sanalysisof the "second Averroism"is based largelyon three
commentarieson the Ethicsoriginallystudiedby Gauthier,withless reference to Siger of Brabant and Boethiusof Dacia. He characterizesthis
movementas displayingthe "Vanit des philosophes:l'litismeintellectualiste"(p. 279), because it posited an intellectualbeatitudepossiblein
this life for those few who are adept in philosophicalspeculation.This
Trottmann
notion,evidently,
challengedChristiandoctrineon manyfronts.
of the Condemnations
accepts Alain de Libera's powerfulinterpretation
of 1277 as being primarilydirectedat the strictlyphilosophic,contemplative,"ethicalideal" of the Artists,whichunderminedthe need forrevelation and grace. In thiscontext,Trottmannargues,the questionof the
beatificvision, which differentiates
Christianbeatitude fromits natural
and
the
limits
of
human knowing,was centraland
competitors
exposes
if
not
paramount,implicitly
alwaysexplicitly.It is withinthiscontextthat
one must interpretAlbert's and Thomas' teachingsconcerninghuman
beatitude(see pp. 279-82).
"Withoutdoubt," Trottmannsays, Albertthe Great is "the fatherof
radicalAristotelianism,
but despitethis,he remainsa theologian"(p. 292);
inversely,while Albert labors to distinguishChristianfromphilosophic
beatitude,he "remainsin a certainway dependenton Aristotelianelitism" (p. 258). In his commentaryon the firstbook of the Sentences
, Albert
the
between
natural
exercise
in the
of
reason
distinguishes
philosophic
lightof its own agent intellect;mysticalcontemplationwithinthe giftsof
faithand wisdom,conceived in termsof the "metaphysicsof flux"Uber
de causis
), the theophaniesof pseudo-Dionysius,and the "two faces of the

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soul" (knowledgeof sensiblethingsby way of abstractionfromphantasms,


knowledgeof spiritualrealitiesby way of illumination);and the beatific
vision,conceivedin termsof Gos interiorpresencein thesoul (Augustine).
In his commentaryon pseudo-Dionysius'MysticalTheobgy
, Albertis more
to
intellectualist,"
arguing(according Trottmann)a complete
"deliberately
break betweenthe ordinaryprocessesof naturalknowledgeand the negative way of mysticalcontemplation,which,while enteringa "cloud of
stillattainsa directcontactwithGod, peradhesionem
intellectus.
unknowing,"
What is attainedby mysticalcontemplation,however,is not a transitory
visionof the divineessence but theophaniesthatexpressthe divinegoodness throughits greatesteffects(pp. 293-94).
Trottmanndevotes his most detailed analysisto a text fromAlbert's
a fouron the Celestial
, whereinAlbertdistinguishes
commentary
Hierarchy
and
is
is
vision.What at stake Albert'sunderstandfoldhierarchyof light
of natural,mysticaland beatificknowledgeof God.
ing of the continuity
The firsttwo degrees pertain to the knowledgeof God in via; the last
degree,whereinthe soul "sees an object which is God in a lightwhich
is God," refersexpresslyto the beatificvision. Albert'sdefinitionof the
thirddegreeis ratherambiguous.Here the soul sees "an object which is
trulyGod in a divinelightwhich is not God"; one does not see in this
lightas in a mean, however,as one sees a thingin its image; rather,by
the intellect,God is seen immethe effectof thislight,whichstrengthens
diately(p. 296). Respectingthe hierarchicalstructureof the text,the fact
thatbeatitudeis mentionedexplicitlyonlyin the last degree,the tradition
and Albert'steachingelsewhere,E.-H. Wber
of Dionysiancommentary,
arguesthatthe thirddegree refersto the knowledgeof mysticaltheology
in the shadow of faith(whichforAlbertis a "light").This interpretation
establishes the continuityof knowledge possible in via and in patria.
Trottmann,on the otherhand, prefersto interpretAlbert'sthirddegree
in a way that "approaches the meaning of Saint Thomas" (p. 298), as
pertainingexclusivelyto the beatificvision. His reading findsin "the
the intellect"an anticdivinelightwhichis not God . . . whichstrengthens
of
the
lumengloriae.Thus, if
more
definition
of
Thomas'
precise
ipation
Albertconceivesthe causalityof "the lightwhichis God" (fourthdegree)
in "neo-Platonic"terms,like Thomas he conceives"the lightwhichis not
God" (thirddegree) in Aristotelianterms(p. 297). In thisway he grapples with the distinctionbetween created and uncreated glory in the
beatificvision,if less coherentlythan Thomas.
Thus Trottmannstrivesto demonstratethatAlbert,like Thomas after
betweenthe soul's beatific
him,establisheda "fundamentaldiscontinuity"

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KENTEMERY,
JR.

knowledgeof God and any it can have in via (p. 298). Such a discontiis contradictedby two questions(recently
edited)
nuityin Albert'sthinking
De raptuand De visione
Dei inpatria
, in which Albertargues thatthe mystical raptureexperiencedby some saintswhile stillin thislifeapproaches
the formof the beatificvision ("est similegloriaeper aliquem modum"),
that "elevatio haec est quodammodo praeternaturam,in quodammodo
supra, et quodammodo contra," and that its intellectualvision occurs
withoutimagesor phantasms("in raptuomnes convertuntur
ad intelligentiam,et in ilia percipiuntde luminedivino,quantumpossunt,unaquaeque
secundum proportionempropriam sibi").2 Moreover, Alain de Libera
showsthatAlbertallowed the possibility
of a naturalcontemplative
felicity
in this life, by way of the conjunctionor continuationof the possible
intellectwith the agent intellect;3a fortiori
, thispossibilitywould seem to
admita supernaturalmysticalcognitionof God in thislife.Rathersophistically,Trottmannadduces de Libera's evidenceto reduce Wber's interis forced
pretationad absurdum
(p. 299). Trottmann'soverallinterpretation
his
historical
to
which
Albert
once
more
thesis,according
by
larger
appears
as an imperfectprecursorof his student,movingthe rightinterpretation
of Aristotleforwardbut still infectedby "neo-Platonic" elements.So
Trottmannconfirmsa longstandinghistoriographical
tradition,in the face
of the major reassessmentof Albert'steachingin the last few decades.4
of a philosophBeyond doubt,however,Albertadmittedthe possibility
ical cognitionthatThomas denies:the knowledgeof separatedsubstances.
2 The two
are editedbyA. Fries,W. Kbeland H. Anzulewicz
in: Sancti
questions
Doctoris
Ecclesiae
Alberti
. . Opera
omnia
i.W. 1993,
25.2,Mnster
(Cologne
Magni.
Edition)
85-101.Forthequotations,
see 86b,92b,93b.
Trottmann's
thatthephilosopher's
beatitude
"consiste
recevoir
la
rapidinference
forme
mmede la divine
essence
de l'intellect"
parcontinuation
(p. 299)seemsunjustified
Albert
he quotes,
whichspeaksofunderstanding
substances.
bythetextfrom
separated
Trottmann
doesnotrefer
toa seeming
contradiction
Albert's
varSurprisingly,
among
iousstatements
aboutthebeatific
which
wasremarked
medieval
thinkers.
vision,
byother
notesthatin hiscommentary
on De divinis
Albert
nominibus,
DenystheCarthusian
says
thateventheblessed
soulscannot
knowthequidestofthedivine
butonlyitsquia
essence,
est
. Denyscomments:
"Verum
istudnonvidetur
ritesonare,
, habetur
quiacognitio
quiaest
etiamin praesenti;
et perspeculum
in aenigmate,
obscura,
estquetaliscognitio
quae
mentem
creatam
contentare
etquietare
nonvalet.
. . . Insuper
de hacipsamateria
Albertus,
virvaldecatholicus,
in aliislocismelius
on De mystica
(seeDenys'commentary
scripsit"
absolutiones
a.1, inDoctoris
ecstatici
D. Dionysii
Cartusiani
theobgia:
Difficultatum
praecipuarum
Opera
omnia
16:482-83).
Twoobservations
should
be made:(1) likesomeofhisDominican
confrres
before1241,Albert,
movedby thedrift
of Dionysius'
text,hereis still
perhaps
influenced
ofGod'sunknowability
notion
eveninthebeatific
vision;
bytheGreek
(2)howeverdefined,
in Albert's
mindthere
is a gradedcontinuity
between
thesoul'sknowledge
ofGodinviaandinpatria
a knowledge
, in thisinstance,
quiaest.

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This possibilityfollowsfromAlbert'sunderstandingof the soul as "an


incorporealsubstancemovingthebody" (p. 284), an independentintellectual substance,whose "essence" cannot be identifiedwiththe formof the
body, and whose facultyof intellectis more than a simple power, but
thatby which a man is man and the soul is more than a soul (p. 286).
Trottmannnotesthesedefinitions
but he does not exploretheirprofound
for
Albert's
whole
teaching,and the way in which they
consequences
with that of Thomas Aquinas.
make it incommensurate
of Scholasticdiscussions
Thomas Aquinas achievedthe perfectsynthesis
the
beatific
vision.
Trottmann's
account
of Thomas' teaching
concerning
the
of
"un
is straightforward.
avicenniAvoiding compromises
augustinisme
sant ou averrosant,"Thomas developed a "radicallyAristoteliannoetic"
for ordinaryknowledge,which he adapted or altered adroitlyto satisfy
the special theologicalrequirementsof the beatificvision (p. 303). As an
intellectualcreature,man has a naturaldesireforthe knowledgeof God,
whichcannotbe fullysatisfiedexceptby an immediatevisionof the divine
essence. But this natural desire cannot be accomplishedby man's own
naturalpowers,and so must be accomplishedthroughthe supernatural
means of grace and glory,which predispose and elevate his nature.
Because, as faithteaches, the beatificvision of God's essence must be
intuitiveand immediate(face to face),it cannot be mediatedby any created species or medium
in quo; thus, in the beatificvision it is the very
essence of God that is the formof the passive intellect.But how can a
uncreatedform?
created,finiteintellectbe renderedcapable of the infinite,
This is accomplishedthroughthe lightof glory[lumen
gloriae
), which is a
created supernaturalhabit that confersan ultimateformaldisposition
upon the soul, renderingit deiformand capable of receivingthe divine
essence as its object, and servingas a medium
sub quo (not in quo) the
beatifiedsoul sees God. It is not the efficientcausalityof the light of
glorythat makes possible the actualizationof the intellectby the divine
form;ratherit is the presenceof the divine essence itself,as the actualizingformof the blessedintellect,thatrequiresits dispositionby the light
of glory.In thisway the influenceof the divine essence and the lightof
in the beatificvision (pp. 313-16).
gloryoperate simultaneously
to
the
According Trottmann, advantagesof Thomas' teachingare these:
it emphasizesthe difference
between ordinaryknowledge,based on the
informationof the intellectby species abstractedfrommaterial things,
and beatificknowledge,in which the intellectis informedby the divine
essence itself,thanksto the strengthening
influenceof the lightof glory;

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268

KENTEMERY,
JR.

while based on a "realistepistemologa,"it saves the faith,for it is the


essence of God itselfthat is seen, withoutsome medium
in quo, intuitively
and not abstractly;
whileattainingthe essenceof God direcdy,thebeatified
intellectdoes not comprehendGod's infinite
and so the tranintelligibility,
scendence of God is preserved(p. 318). In termsof Trottmann'shistorical dialectic, the advantages of Thomas' doctrineare also social and
political.By keepingman dependenton sense in this world (knowledge
thatthe intelalwaysby way of phantasms);by foreclosingany possibility
lect's natural desire can be satisfiedby any but supernaturalmeans; by
radicallyseparatingthe knowledgeof God possible in via fromthat in
; by conceivingthat even in the next world the beatifiedsoul is a
patria
passive recipientof an infused,supernaturalgift,Thomas thoroughly
underminedthe elitistphilosophersof his own day and, indeed,prevented
the claims of any philosophia
divina
past, presentor future.
Trottmannemphasizesotherfeaturesof Thomas' teachingthatbecame
prominentin the laterdebates.The essenceof man's beatitudeis an intellectual vision, fromwhich fruitionin the will flowsas a consequence;
God is as quick to rewardas to punish,so that the soul, whereinchiefly
meritis acquired, is rewardedwith its desire as soon as it is separated
fromthe body in death; the subsequentgloryof the resurrectedbody
will be mediatedby the soul; changingfroman earlierposition,Thomas
concludesthatthe soul's reunionwithits body will bringonlyan "extensive", not an "intensive",augmentationof beatitude.
Yet, the triumphthat Thomas achieved by establishinga sharp "discontinuity"betweenthe soul's ordinaryand beatificcognitionmay entail
some losses, as Trottmannhimselfacknowledges,or even some incoherence, as othersperceived.Thus, forexample,Thomas is silentabout the
role played in the beatificvision by the soul's most noble faculty,the
agent intellect,which performsthe most decisiveoperationin the soul's
knowledgein via. Since the beatifiedsoul no longer needs to abstract
species fromphantasms,what role could the agent intellectplay? It is
this seemingcontradictionin Thomas' account that Dietrichof Freiberg
in Trottmann'sopinion.5
attemptedto correct,unsuccessfully
which he himself
Thomas' "synthesis"yields another "discontinuity,"
elaborates.Althoughman's finalbeatitudepertainsessentiallyto the intellect, in via the facultiesof his soul, in termsof theirnearnessto God, are
reversed.Human knowledgein thisworldproceedsnecessarilyby way of
abstractionfrom sensible realitiesand the representationof intelligible
5 See below,269.

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species.Thus, we know inferiorsensibleobjects in a mannermore noble


than theirbeing. We do not know superiorrealities,however,except by
way of species that are inferiorto theirbeing. In contrast,love in the
will attains realities directly,without the mediation of species. Thus,
althoughin itselfthe will is a facultyless noble than the intellect,it is
- more
able to attain realitiessuperiorto it- God in particular
direcdy
than the intellect.In thisworld,then,it is betterto know than to love
realitiesthat are inferiorto us, but it is betterto love realitiesthat are
superiorto us notablyGod thanto knowthemaccordingto the inferior
knowledgethatwe can have of them(pp. 259-60). This argumententails
a further"discontinuity":
it seems to eliminateany "intellectualist"
interpretationof mysticaltheology,and certainlyany contemplationof God
thatis beyondall images (pseudo-Dionysius),
whichwould providea link
in viato beatificknowledge.Thus, it seemsthatany directmysticalcontact
with God in via- if any at all can occur- must needs be accomplished
in the will,whichoutrunsthe intellect,as the Victorinesand
by affection
Bonaventuretaught.In thisway, too, Thomas undercutsan "aristocratic"
stillevidentin Albert,to the advantageof even the simplest
intellectualism,
"old Christianwoman, who knows more about God and the soul than
all the philosopherstogether"(pp. 259-60).
Withinthecontextof Trottmann'sdialecticalnarrative,
Thomas Aquinas
standsout as the stalwartdefenderof the cognitiveachievementsof the
separatedsoul. As far as the next world is concerned,thisprofileseems
it is fromthe portraitof Thomas in standard
accurate.But how different
historiesof medievalphilosophy,wherehe standsout as the peerlessadvocate of the unicityof substantialformin the human compositeand its
noetic consequent,the necessaryrecourseto phantasmsin everyact of
knowledge.This portraittoo seems accurate,as far as thisworld is concerned.The "discontinuity"
impliedby these diversenarrativesunderlies
all the others.Indeed, in the thirteenth
centuryand thereafter
many theologians and philosophers(e.g., Henry Bate) sharplycriticizedThomas'
"radicallyAristotelian"doctrinesconcerningthe human compositeand
the soul's necessaryrecourseto phantasms;some judged that theyjeopardized the soul's immortality
itself,prior to any speculationabout its
beatificknowledge.Trottmanndoes not pursue this "discontinuity"
very
far; to have done so would have led him far afield into the order of
being (whichfor some reason he wishes to avoid).6
6 We knownowthatThomas'
doctrine
oftheunicity
ofsubstantial
form
philosophical

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270

KENTEMERY,
JR.

"
"
, and theorderofknowing
followsnature
followstheorderof being,
Operation
Curiously,according to Trottmann'sthoroughrecitationsof the early
disputes,it is the "Augustinin"proponentsof the argufourteenth-century
ment that the soul's beatitudeincreases"intensively"
when reunitedwith
its body who most oftenappeal to thisgeneralprinciple.The Franciscan
Arnaud of Clermont,forexample,arguesthatas the human subjectneeds
a body in order to performits most noble act, i.e., intellection,so the
separatedsoul, because it as yet lacks the perfectionof its being,will not
be able to realize its most perfectoperationuntilreunitedwithits body
(pp. 620-21; Trottmannjudges the argument"specious"). On behalfof
an "intensive"increase,an anonymous"CarmeliteBachelor" attemptsto
establisha similarparallel betweenthe ordersof being and of knowing,
and betweenknowledgein via and knowledgeinpatria
. Whereas Arnaud
to
an
from
the
Carmelite
Thomas,
Bachelor, ironiresponds
objection
cally,adduces Thomas' support(p. 633; Trottmannjudges the argument
"feeble"). Contrariwise,one wonders why the Dominicans, Armand of
Belvzer and John of Naples, arguingthat the separated soul does not
requirea body forits perfectoperationand essentialbeatitude,foundit
of
necessaryor at least convenientto adopt Albertthe Great's definition
the soul as "an intellectualsubstance that subsistsby itself"(pp. 568,
576). Thomas Aquinas himselfchanged his mind on thisquestion,at first
maintainingthat the soul's beatitude will increase "intensively"when
reunitedto its body but later concludingthat reunionwould bringonly
an "extensive"increase. TrottmannmentionsThomas' reversalseveral
reatimes,but he does not search deeply the intrinsicor circumstantial
sons that mightserve to explain it.
If, as Thomas teaches,the human soul, which is last in the hierarchy
of Intelligenceshavingonly a potencyforknowledge,by naturehas need
of body in orderto know,would it not seem that,accordingto the principle that"grace and gloryperfectbut do not destroynature,"the soul must
await reunionwithits body beforeit partakesits fullcognitivebeatitude?
in thehumancomposite
camecloseto beingcondemned
at Parisin 1277.The many
a plurality
in thehuman
ora forma
ofhisdoctrine
offorms
opponents
posited
composite
theexistential
oftheseparated
soul.Thomas'doc, in partto preserve
reality
corporeitatis
trineraisedproblems
Christ's
intoHell,
threedaysin thetomband descent
regarding
Hisdoctrine
an heated
wasvindicated,
at theCouncil
of
however,
producing
controversy.
Vienne(1311-12),
which
declared
that"therational,
intellectual
soulis byitsownnature
theform
ofthebody."Trottmann
orpriorquesmentions
anyofthesematters
scarcely
tionsin theorderofbeing;thisis so,I think,
tolimit
hisdiscussion
becausehe wishes
to
theacceptably
modern
terrain
of "epistemology,"
thatis, to "unecritique
de la raison
de la raisonpratique"
pureet unecritique
(p. 818 n. 1).

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Moreover,consideringthe separated soul's ratherweak naturalcapacity


forknowledge,which Thomas posits in his Quaestiones
de anima
disputatae
(see especiallyqq. 15, 18, 20) and elsewhere,does not its knowledgein
the lightof gloryseem to lack a sufficient
groundin nature?At the end
of the Middle Ages, from an "intellectualist"perspective,Denys the
Carthusiansummarizedthe objectionsto Thomas' doctrineof phantasms
that it implies. The doctrinerisksmaking the
and the "discontinuity"
soul's immortality
undemonstrable;it is contraryto the teachingof "all
the betterPeripateticphilosophers";it denies the possibilityof mystical
contemplation"withoutimages," contraryto the authorityof pseudoDionysius and the ample testimonyof the saints. Furthermore,if the
human soul by nature cannot operate in a completelyspiritualmanner,
nor attain any knowledge
nor know itselfimmediatelyby self-reflection,
of separatedsubstances,what is the natural operationpurportedlyperfectedby grace and glory?Thomas' laconic response,that the act of the
beatifiedsoul is different
because the conditionof its natureis different,
a
in
, which simplyassertswhat must be
is,
principi
Denys' mind, petitio
In
of
such
the
objections,it does not seem whollysurprisproved.
light
ing thatlaterThomistswere constrainedto conceivesome naturalground
- to account forits beatificknowlin the soul- an "obedientialpotency"
edge. Howeverseriousone mayjudge theseobjectionsto be, and however
adequatelyThomistsmightanswer them,Trottmanndoes not envision
the problem.This is so, I suspect,because withinthe contextof his historical dialectic the "discontinuity"establishedby Thomas appears so
neatlyadvantageous.
Followingthe advice of E.-H. Wber,Trottmannpresentsonlya "skeleton" of the extended treatmentof Meister Eckhart found in his thesis
(p. 325 n. 140). The advice was well-taken.For the sake of his dialectical scheme,TrottmannpresentsEckhartas one who criticizedthe doctrineof the lumen
gloriae(pp. 328-30). He is wrong about Eckhart,who
says:
deumperessentiam
. . . requiritur
. . . visiodeiperessenad videndum
lumen
gloriae.
tiamestquidemimpossibilis
intellectui
creatoex purisnaturalibus,
autem
possibilis
in clari. . . "in eandemimaginem
transformamur
a claritate
ex supernaturalibus.
insupernaturale
inlumen
lumine
eta lumine
tandem
idesta naturali
tatem",
gratiae
gloriae.7
7 Fora discussion
ofEckhars
doctrine
ofbeatitude
and criticism
see
ofTrottmann,
alsPrinziep
undiel:Versuch
ber
des"Opus
Wouter
dieEinheitsmetaphysik
Einheit
Goris,
tripartitum"
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
Meister
Leiden-New
York1997,360-72
Eckharts,
(Studien
libri
ExodiandSermo
desMittelalters,
59).I havetakenthequotations
(Eckhart,
Expositio
Goris,362nn.126-28.
XLIX)from

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KENTEMERY,
JR.

Exhibitinghis usual aversionto "neo-Platonism,"Trottmanncensures


Meister Eckhartall over again, withoutmuch regard for the effortsof
modernscholarsto exoneratehim:
d'unebatitude
d'uneeschatologie
future
Que reste-t-il
pourcettemtaphysique
nele fait-il
desexigences
Le no-platonisme
manatiste
d'Eckhart
passiste?
passortir
au nomde laquelle
il prche?
. . . Maissa lecture
de Denys
de la doctrine
de l'Eglise
influence
arabeet sonsensdu nantne le font-ils
prle pripattisme
pas sortir
du cadred'unethologie
chrtienne?
(p. 330).
proprement
Despite Trottmann's claims for the "perfectsynthesis"of Thomas
Aquinas, the absence of the agent intellectin Thomas' account of the
in
beatificvision would seem to be a serious lacuna and inconsistency
relationto his generaltheoryof knowledge.Dietrichof Freibergattempted
to redressthis omissionby explainingthe separated soul's beatitudein
termsof its most noble faculty,the agent intellect(pp. 330-6). For some
modernscholars,Dietrichshould be praised forhis "mtaphysiquede la
conversion"and forhis theologicalreconciliation,
concerningthe beatific
of
"la
mdiation
et
...
l'immdiatet
vision,
dionysienne
augustinienne
mme la fine pointe de l'aristotlismearabe."8 Predictably,Trottmann
evaluates Dietrich's accomplishmentotherwise.Preciselybecause of his
"Platonic"and "Augustinin"predispositions,
Trottmannsays,Dietrichis
unable to understandThomas' teachingabout the lumengloriae
, and his
own solutionis theologicallyunsatisfactory,
because it does not conceive
"le caractresurnaturelde la visionbatifiquepuisqu'ellene procde pas
d'une grce" (p. 335).
The forwardmotion of Trottmann'snarrativestalls in his treatment
of late thirteenthand early fourteenth-century
theologians,whom he
classifiesaccordingto their"Augustinin"(and "voluntarist"),
"nominalist"
or "Dominican" positions.These pure strainssometimesbecame contaminated;the Thomism of Peter of Palude, for example, is "markedby
Scotism and even nominalism"(p. 390), whateverthat mightmean. In
termsof the symmetry
of his book, wherebythe Condemnationsof 1210
and 1241 spurrednew developmentsin the doctrineof the beatificvision,
one is a bit surprisedthat,accordingto Trottmann'saccount, the great
Condemnationsof 1277 did not seem to have the same fruitful
effect,
even though questions concerninghuman beatitude were among their
chief concerns. (Perhaps this is because Trottmannconsiderssolutions
8 Alainde Libera,La mystique
le Grand
rhnane
d'Albert
Matre
2nded.,Paris
Eckhart,
at p. 176.
1994,163-229,
quotation

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that locate beatitude primarilyin the will or which treat logical and
semanticquestionsarisingfromthe mysteryto be historicallyretrogressive.) In this heterogenoussection,Trottmannpresentsthe teachingsof
in some instances(Henryof Ghent,
variousmastersin a seriesof vignettes;
the
at
"secondFranciscanschool,"includthe
court
of
Viterbo,
theologians
he has publishedseparately.
he
rsums
of
articles
Duns
Scotus) gives
ing
for
the
This tacticcreated some problems
editingof the book, forlater
in the textthereare referencesto pointsthatmusthave been established
in the thesisbut are absent in the summaries.The reader, then, may
wish to acquire the articlesto accompany the bulkyvolume.
The dialecticalmovementof the narrativeagain gathersfullsteam in
the last part,which treatsthe debates provokedbyJohn XXII and their
culminationin the papal Constitutionof BenedictXII. This part,which
bringsto lightseveralunstudiedtexts,representsTrottmann'smost "original contribution
to scholarship."
John XXII's centralidea about human beatitude,firstpresentedin a
seriesof sermonshe preached in Avignonin 1331, is this:elect separated
souls mustwait for the fullnessof beatitudeand the vision of God face
to face untiltheyare reunitedwiththeirbodies, and untilthe finaljudgment at the end of time,when the totalityof the mysticalbody will be
assembledin gloryunder its head and Christwill hand over his rule to
the Father.Untilthattime,electseparatedsouls contemplateGod through
to "an archaictheological
a visionof the humanityof Christ.By returning
tradition,the old jurist Pope" thus "invitedhis contemporariesto reflect
on thecollectiveand eschatologicaldimensionof salvation,"and challenged
theprevailingScholastictheology,which,conceivingthe worldas eternal,9
tendedto focuson the destinyof individualsouls afterdeath and seemed
to "push back the eschatologicalreckoningto infinity"
(p. 455).
9 "La rflexion
porter
surle destin
individuel
desmes
avaiteu tendance
scolastique
le mondecomme
. . . N'ytait-elle
pensant
aprsla mort.
pasinvite
parunephilosophie
ternel
ainsirepousser
l'infini
l'cheance
etsemblant
eschatologique?"
(p.455).Trottmann
thephilosophers
whosewritings
in hisexpression,
foralthough
shouldbe morecareful
didnotteach
thattheworld
is eternal,
whatScholastic
readargued
theologian
theologians
in timeandwillbejudgedat a definite
endoftime?
thatin facttheworldwascreated
and
andinfidel
sometheologians
totheheathen
philosophers,
(e.g.,Bonaventure
Contrary
oftheworldin timecouldbe proved
ofGhent)
byreaHenry
judgedthatthecreation
contrast
andeffect.
Thenagain,
is sacrificed
forrhetorical
son.Too often,
exactexpression
itwasnot
in theentire
a presupposition
embedded
thestatement
mayreflect
argument:
the
altered
or transformed
Scholastic
, thatradically
bysacrascriptum
theology,
governed
in "waves"of
of ancientphilosophy,
butancientphilosophy
(assimilated
conceptions
theoutcome
oftheological
thatpredetermined
Aristotelian
speculation.
interpretation)

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JR.

The Pope's "archaic" theologicalmethod consistedof an appeal to


abundant scripturaltexts,interpreted"literally,"and to patristicand
monasticauthorities,
notablyBernardof Clairvaux.The originalcollection
of theseauthoritiescommissionedby the Pope was enlargedseveraltimes;
disputesabout theirinterpretation
permeate the subsequentdiscussions,
a
them
dimension.
giving
John XXII thus turnedhis
strongexegetical
back on a "centuryof theologicalreflection";at the same time, by a
certain"cunningof reason" he liftedthe historicaldialecticinto a more
widely encompassingsphere, which embraced patristicand "monastic"
theologyat one pole and Scholastic theologyat the other. Trottmann
brands the Pope's initiative"reactionary,"as the dialecticalpatternof his
narrativerequires.Outside the plot-line,however,one mightjust as well
considerit "forwardlooking,"to the "Christianhumanism"of Renaissance
philologists,the developmentof "positivetheology"in the sixteenthcenof the recentpast.
tury,and even to la nouvelle
thologie
To my mind, Trottmann'saccount of the reasons underlying
John
XXII's startlingthesisconstitutes
the finesthistoricalanalysisin his book
(pp. 446-53). Followingthe lead of A. Tabarroni, he argues thatJohn
XXII's motiveswere ecclesiologicaland political and that his idea of
Christianbeatitudewas designed to exclude as impossiblevarious ideas
that were fuelingrebellionagainstecclesiasticalauthoritythroughoutthe
westernChurch. By assertingthat the beatificvision cannot be attained
untilafterthe lastjudgment,when the Churchis finallyunitedcompletely
under its head, and that untilthen the jurisdictionof the human Christ
and of the Vicar of his mysticalbody on earthextendsto all souls,John
XXII intendedto reinforcethe papacy's power of the keysand its claim
to a plenitudeof spiritualand temporal authority.By withholdingthe
visionof the divineessence untilafterthe lastjudgment,he undermined,
a fortiori
, the pretensionsof "Averroists,Spiritualsand Beghards" to a
beatitudein thislifeand any argumentsof spirituallibertythattheycould
derivefromit. Likewise,by declaringthat mankindhas only one beatific
end, whichis not completeforany soul untilthe lastjudgment,the Pope
attemptedto undercutargumentsthattherewere two autonomouspowers,
spiritualand temporal,each withits own finality(p. 469: e.g., Dante, De
monarchia
, pp. 456-70). However "reactionary"his theologyand politics,
John XXII yet receivesTrottmann'spraise for drawingattentionto the
"social, ecclesial and eschatologicaldimensions"of the Church and the
communionof saints,and for exposing a major problem in contemporaryScholastictheology:ifsouls are alreadyjudged, rewardedor punished

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immediatelyupon death,what remainsto be judged in the generaljudgment?(p. 820).


In his treatmentof the disputesprovoked by John XXII's opinion,
and geoTrottmannclassifiestextsand authorsnot only chronologically
also
about
their
intellectual
but
by strongpersonaljudgments
graphically,
and low politicalor personalmotives
quality,theological"professionalism,"
Hence, in the firstround of
(e.g., inquisitorialzeal, clericalpreferment).
debatesthepolemicaloppositionofWilliamof Ockhamand otherFranciscan
exiledat Munichis markedby politicalbad faith.Interestingly,
"schismatics"
in lightof his otherinnovations,Ockham's argumentsabout the beatific
vision are largelytraditional,reflectingthe "theologygenerallyreceived
by his contemporaries"(pp. 484-92). In turn,the defendersof the Pope,
FranoisChristiani(a "personalityof the second rank,"whose arguments
"lack theologicalforcebut not rhetorical
vehemence,"p. 501), and Annibal
who rejectedall "Scholasticrationas "reactionaries"
Ceccano, are classified
were
and
who
motivated
mainlyby personal animosity
ality" (p. 523),
againsttheiropponents(Thomas Waleys and Durand of Saint-Pourain).
In a second round, happily,the disputesachieved a highertone and
became "a true theologicalcontroversy"(pp. 523-83). In round three,
however,the disputesonce more became "envenomed,"taintedby bitter
concern for
rivalrybetween the mendicantorders or by a time-serving
clericalpreferment
(pp. 585-648). Finally,Trottmannmaps the spread of
the disputesbeyond Avignon,to the court of PhilippeVI and thence to
of Paris (Guiral Ot, Nicholas of Lyre,pp. 714-43). In this
the University
the
reached lay as well as clerical circles.
round,
controversy
The disputesinstigatedby John XXII revolve around interpretations
of scripturaland patristicauthorities;the nature of the separated soul's
knowledge(abstractiveor intuitive);the object of the soul's beatificknowledge (divineessenceor humanityof Christ);and whetherthe soul's reunion
withitsbody yieldsan "intensive"or merely"extensive"increasein beatitude.Althoughthe disputeproducedsome importantnew argumentsand
the common stockof argumentationsoon became reptellingcriticisms,
etitious.Along the way, the weary reader will findwelcome reliefin the
freshif traditionalapproach taken in a "humble critiqueby a priestof
the Teutonic Order" (pp. 650-80), and in the "humanist"approach taken
by the "PhilosopherKing," Robert of Anjou (pp. 695-713).
The reader will agree withTrottmannthat the controversy
eventually
reached an "impasse." Then there appeared the "ProvidentialMan,"
JacquesFournier,thefuturePope BenedictXII. Fournierwas well-prepared

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to resolve the dialecticaldilemma posed by the theologicalinitiativeof


John XXII. As a Cistercianmonk, he was steeped in "monastictheolof Bernardof Clairvaux,whosewritings
ogy" and in the spirituality
played
such a crucial role in the disputes;trainedat the Universityof Paris, he
was adept in Scholasticreasoning;he was experiencedin administration,
having been a bishop in two sees beforebeing elevated to the papacy.
Althoughhe criticizesthe inquisitorialactivitiesof others,Trottmanndispatches Fournier's role as an Inquisitor, so closely documented by
E. Le Roy Ladurie, in two sentences:"Montaillou
nous a laiss l'image
d'un inquisiteurmticuleuxet, somme toute,assez modr puisqu'il ne
brla jamais que quarte de ses clients!Mais ce ne futl qu'un passage
dans une vie de moine et de thologien,d'homme d'glise et d'homme
de Dieu" (p. 745). Apparently,Great Men who are forcesof Historyare
immuneto thepettymoralcriticisms
thatapplyto ordinaryhumanbeings.
For Trottmann,Jacques Fournier'ssequence of treatisesDe statuanimarumsanctorum
antegenerale
iudicium
representsthe syntheticculmination
of the medieval discussionsconcerningthe beatificvision. In these treatises,Fourniersummonsall of his skillsas a monasticand Scholastictheologian to reconcile the common teaching that separated souls, at the
momentof theirparticularjudgment,partakean immediatevisionof the
divine essence, withJohn XXII's fundamentalinsightthat a fullbeatitude awaits the consummationof the economyof salvationin the general
judgment.Withinthe parametersof the conventionalScholasticdebate,
Fournierarguesforan intensiveaugmentationof beatitudewhen the soul
is reunitedwithitsbody. More exceptionally,
he also findspersuasivereasons foran augmentationof cognitivebeatitudeat the generaljudgment,
therebypreserving
John XXII's exegeticaland ecclesiologicalinsightsif
not theirfaultyarticulation.Fournierestablishesthe theoreticalfoundation fora cognitiveaugmentationby way of threeanalogies,whichargue
that one comprehendsan art more fullywhen one knows the purposes
of the artistand his techniquesof production,a cause more fullywhen
one knowsits many effects,
and a principlemore fullywhen one knows
the many consequencesthatflowfromit. In the last analogy,Trottmann
detectsthe influenceof Duns Scotus' "formaldistinction"(pp. 753-55).
is his specification
of the
Jacques Fournier'smost originalcontribution
new knowledgeobtained at the finaljudgment:the meritsand demerits
of men as seen by God, the secret intentionsof theirhearts,in short,
the Book of divineprescienceand predestination.
Save God's willto reveal
themin specificinstances,thesethingsremainhiddenuntilthe finaljudgmentnot only to viatores
and separatedhuman souls but also to beatified

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angels.Otherwise,human beingsmightdespairor become presumptuous,


angels mightwithholdtheirassistanceand separatedsouls theirintercesvain or unnecessary.Although
sion,whichtheywould see to be ultimately
Trottmanndoes not say so, thislast argumentseemsto presupposeScotus'
notion of the radical freedomof the blessed angels and saints even in
the beatificvision. (Elsewhere,Trottmanndeclares that Scotus5doctrine
jeopardizes "the substantialand eternal character of deification,"and
of the conscience
anticipates"a modernitywhereinthe psycho-theology
the
In
vision
of Gos preabandons a metaphysics,"
any event,
p. 360.)
at the lastjudgmentwill surelyyielda readincrease
destinationmanifested
in beatitude,sinceit fulfills
a legitimate
desireof theblessedmind,increases
mutual knowledgeamong the elect, and reveals the deep reasons for
God's mysterious
and withdrawing
of grace,which
bestowing,withholding
are now incomprehensible
to created intelligencesand can even appear
absurd (pp. 749, 752). Fournier'sargumentrestoresthe social and collectivedimensionof beatitude,foreach soul (and angel) mustwait upon
the accomplishment
of the whole in orderto experienceall thatGod has
promised.
In the course of his treatise,Fournier displays his exegetical and
Scholasticskills,"reconcilingthe apparent contradictions"of the fathers
(p. 747) and achievinga "real" and "authenticdialecticalsurpassing"of
rational"difficulties"
and "oppositions"(pp. 772, 810). His exegeticalskills
are especiallyevidentin his interpretation
of textsby Saint Bernard(pp.
762-72); here, according to Trottmann,Fournier employs a "remarkable . . . regressivemethod"that restoresboth the letterand the spiritof
Bernard'stexts"againstthe erroneousreadingsproposed by John XXII
and his partisans"whilepreservingthosemeaningsfavorableto the Pope's
more profoundinsight(pp. 771-2). Thus Fournierachieves a "splendide
synthseentrela thologiescolastiqueet celle plus mystiquede Bernard,
entre les conceptionsmodernes de la lumire et la traditiongrecque
hritedu Damascne!" (p. 778). As Fournierresolvesone exegeticaland
afteranother,Trottmannbecomesincreasingly
dialecticaldifficulty
exclamatory(pp. 792-3).
In termsof Trottmann'splot, Benedict XII's dogmatic Constitution
Deus is an anti-climax.Althoughon severalpointsit reflects"the
Benedictas
doctrinalprogress"accomplishedin "a centuryof Scholasticdisputes,"it
to the opinionofJohnXXII (p. 823).
appears to be a simplecounter-step
The Constitutiondeclaresthatimmediatelyupon its separationfromthe
body, a soul that is purifiedfromsin will partake an intuitive,face to
facevisionof the divineessence,whichmanifests
itselfto the soul nakedly,

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KENTEMERY,
JR.

creature
clearlyand openly;thisvisionis unmediatedby any intervening
or created similitude(pp. 802-7). In this definition,
Trottmanndiscerns
the influenceof Duns Scotus (p. 804). Since Scotus keeps appearing,in
Jacques Fournier'smastersynthesisand in his finalword on the matter
as Pope, one wonderswhy he does not hold a more prominentplace in
Trottmann'sbook (see pp. 359-60). Significantly,
Benedict'sConstitution
makes no referenceto the lumen
gloriaenor to the relationbetweencreated and uncreatedgrace in the beatificvision.It venturesnothingabout
the relationbetweenparticularand generaljudgmentsor about any augmentationof beatitudeat the resurrection
or generaljudgment.Thus, in
his ConstitutionBenedictXII abandoned the surpassingideas of his private treatiseand retreatedfromhis own synthesisof patristic,monastic,
Deus
mysticaland Scholastictheologies.So, as Trottmannsays,Benedictas
leftunresolvedthe dialecticaloppositionbetween "a collectiveand historicalconceptionof eschatology,"expressedmythically
and imaginatively,
and an individual,a-temporalconception of eschatology,expressedin
abstract,metaphysicalterms,whichsets aside the "cosmic" dimensionsof
salvation (pp. 814-5). Doubtless, as Trottmannconjectures,Benedict's
restraint
was governedby his desireto avoid the likelyoppositionof both
Dominicansand Franciscans,and to put to resta disputethathad caused
turmoilthroughoutthe Church. It is possible, however,that Benedict
exercisedintellectual
judgmentas well as politicalprudence,decidingthat
most questions concerningthe "How?" and "When?" of beatitudefall
withinthe realm of probable opinion and are thereforeunsuitablefor
dogmaticdeclaration.
* * *
One may summarizeTrottmann'sargumentthus:The "materialistic"
and
of David of Dinant provokedthe Condem"pantheistic"Aristotelianism
nationsof 1210, whichbegat Uavgustinisme
avicennisant
(Gilson);thismovementprovokedthe Condemnationsof 1241, whichbegat "the firstLatin
Averroism"(Gauthier)or L3augus
tinisme
averroismi'
the wanton piety of
10CarlosBazn,WasThere
Euer
a "First
inMiscellanea
Mediaevalia
Averroism"?
(forthcoming
on
andA. Speer)establishes
thatnoneoftheLatincommentators
27, ed.J.A. Aertsen
Aristotle's
De anima
between
doctrine
that
Averros'
distinctive
1230and 1260adopted
boththeAgent
andMaterial
areseparate
doctrine
that
Intellects
substances
oranyother
is distinctively
thatall oftheGreekandSemitic
commentators
Averroistic;
unanimously
heldthattheAgent
Intellect
is a separate
thatall oftheearlyLatincommensubstance;
in contrast,
intellects
arepartsofthehuman
tators,
arguedthattheagentandpossible

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the firstAverroistsnecessitateda correction;this necessitygave birthto


of his
twins,namely,to "la lacisationd'Aristote"or rightinterpretation
thought,whichwas preparedby Albertand perfectedby Thomas Aquinas
(i.e., Jacob), and to the erroneous "second Averroism"(Gauthier)and
"radical Aristotelianism"(Van Steenberghen)of the Arts Faculty (i.e.,
gloriaerepresentsthe synEsau). Thomas Aquinas' doctrineof the lumen
thesisof Scholasticdiscussionson the beatificvision,and in a longerperspective,establishesthe thesisof this cadence in the historicaldialectic.
The Condemnationsof 1277, which denied the claims of radical Aristotelians,divertedtheologiansinto "reactionary"by-pathsuntil,mustering the troopsof scriptural,patristicand "monastic"theology(Leclercq),
John XXII outflankedthe entireScholasticdebate and threwdown the
gauntletof the great antithesis.In private treatises,Jacques Fournier
but as Pope BenedictXII he retreated
accomplisheda highersynthesis,
his retreatleaves the taskof
to the priorScholasticthesis.Providentially,
a highersynthesisto us. Besides popular pietyand traditionaltheology,
the main thingstandingin the way of a new "developmentof doctrine"
Benedictus
Dens.Trottmann'sdialecticalengineprovides
is the Constitution
the obstacle.
a means forcircumventing
Indeed, Trottmann'sperceptionsof the medieval disputes(and dislike
of "Platonism")seem to be shaped by presenttheologicalpreoccupations.
In termshe echoes, advocates of la nouvelle
called for a "horithologie
zontal, temporal,collectiveor cosmic" eschatology,in contrastwith the
"vertical,a-temporal,individualistic"
conceptionof medievalScholasticism.
Most modernbiblical scholarsdeny any scripturalwarrantfor the docof the soul. Waging war against philosophical
trineof the immortality
oftenexploitingThomas Aquinas'
"dualisms,"Christianphenomenologists,
of soul
(and doctrineof phantasms),stressthe inseparability
anthropology
and body;11some extrapolatethe eschatologicalimplications,speakingof
theentrance
ofAverros'
writsoul;thatthisdoctrine
appeared
amongtheLatinsbefore
tothem,
withan eyetotheological
Thus
orthodoxy.
probably
ings,andthatitis original
isempty
theterm
"First
LatinAverroism,"
assumed
from
ofmeanGauthier,
byTrottmann
and general
abouttheuse ofcategories
ing,anditsuse "raisessomecritical
questions
in theHistory
ofIdeas."Hereandthroughwhendefining
currents
ofthought
complex
toconstruct
hissweeping
andterms
thephilousessuchcategories
dialectic;
out,Trottmann
as a wholeis onlyas cogentas theaccuracy
ofeachof itssupposed
sophical
pattern
failthetest.
Thepattern
On thisscore,
several
piecesofTrottmann's
pattern
might
phases.
as a frame
itbecomes
when
retain
someutility
misleading
uponwhichtohangmaterial;
ofwriters
andtexts.
itpredetermines
interpretations
11Instructively,
Vmiatis
thepapalencyclical
splendor
(1993)formoralpurposes
emphaetanima
in theEnglish
and
. . . corpore
unus"
sizes"theunity
(italics
text),
ofthehuman
person

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KENTEMERY,
JR.

the beatitudeof the "person" instead of the "soul," while disregarding


Thomas' actual argumentsin his commentaryon the Sentences
and elsewhere. In order to escape the embarrassmentof an intermediatecondition of separatedsouls, Catholic as well as Protestanttheologianshypothesize a simultaneityof eschatological events for each person at the
junctureof time and eternity,
pointingto the Assumptionof the Blessed
Virgin Mary as the model for all. Neo-orthodoxtheologians,defending
some utilityfor the notion of "soul," defineit as "nothingother than
man's relatednessto truth";appealing to Thomas, theyagree that there
is no such thingas a "body-freesoul," in the sense that throughouthis
lifeman "interiorizesmatter,"and "even in death he does not relinquish
thisconnection."Lex orandi
"The Missal of Paul VI dared to
, lexcredenti:
of
the
soul
here
and
and
thatin timorousfashion,otherthere,
speak
only
wise avoidingall mentionof it wherepossible";in itsLiturgyof the Dead,
it suppressedthe termanimaaltogether.In sum, nearlyall accept the historicalargumentthatthe immortality
of the soul was an alien Hellenistic
of
into
the
the
import
Gospel, and a "de-platonizedeschatology"
purity
An officialreviis "now almostuniversallyaccepted in Catholic circles."12
sion of doctrineappears imminent.
For his part,Trottmanntinglesat the prospectof a new synthesis,
presaged by Jacques Fournier,which will not only set us straighton the
beatificvision but reveal the verymeaning of History:
de l'gliseestau coeurdesproccuQui plusest, notrepoqueo la thologie
des
sonregard
surla dimension
etsocialede la communion
pations,
eschatologique
saintsrevt nosyeuxuneactualit
semble
dansBenedictas
Deus
nouvelle.
[Benot]
etindividuelle.
SesTraits
nousrvlent
une
dfinir
unevision
immdiate
batifique
rflexion
surla communion
finale
dessaints,
surl'glisetellequ'ellesera
profonde
et doitse
Si la sensde l'Histoire
transcendant
sa finalit.
demeure
ayantaccompli
la communion
ensontatfinale
recle
rvler
encetteeschatologie
dessaints
ultime,
la vrit
Le jugement
ainsiunsens
de ce qu'elleestactuellement.
dernier
y retrouve
tantau plande l'Histoire
grandiose
que de l'Eschatologie
(p. 811).
For thoseless inclinedto propheticreadingsof "the signsof the times,"
Trottmann'sinvestigations
raise large philosophicquestions.Everyphilosfor
proposedhistorically
explainingthe mysteries
ophy provesinadequate
in thewilling
andsoulareinseparable
: in theperson,
declares
that"In fact,body
agentand
"
in theEnglish
orfalltogether
in thedeliberate
act they
stand
text).The
( 48-50;italics
whatthesestatements
meanforeschatological
doctrines.
doesnotpursue
encyclical
12Fora summary
Death
andEternal
seeJoseph
ofthese
discussions,
Eschatology:
Ratzinger,
andAidanNichols,
D.C. 1988(vol.9 of
Michael
Waldstein
, trans.
O.P.,Washington,
Life
areatxiii,105,107-8,
andJohann
Thequotations
Auer,
248,
Theology).
Ratzinger
Dogmatic
258-9.

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by Christianfaith.Each philosophyreveal