Vivarium

Volume

27
1989

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXVII (1989)

L.M. De Rijk

Semanticsand Metaphysics
in Gilbert
1
ofPoitiers

JolBiard

Les sophismesdu savoir:Albertde

Saxe entreJeanBuridanetGuillaume
36
Heytesbury

MiriamEliav-Feldon

GrandDesignsThePeace Plans ofthe

Late Renaissance
51

Reviews

77

JosephA. Buijs

Attributes
ofActioninMaimonides

C.H. Kneepkens

TheQuaestionesgrammaticales
ofthe
MS Oxford,CorpusChristiCollege
250: AnEditionoftheThird
1
Collection
103

L.A. Kennedy

TheFifteenth
and Divine
Century
AbsolutePower

85

125

Reviews

153

BooksReceived

162

12:29:06 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 1 (1989)
Semanticsand Metaphysicsin Gilbertof Poitiers
A Chapter of Twelfth-Century Platonism (2)*
L. M. DE RIJ

2 Gilbert's View of Transcendent Reality

Gilbert's world consists of quite a lot of singular subsistentobjects
which owe their being and 'being-a-something' to a collection of
forms,both subsistentialand accidental. Well, God has created this
world afterwhat in the Platonic traditionwas called the 'exemplary
Forms'. For Gilbert, creation and concretionare two complementary
notionswhich play an importantrole in his ontology. Creation is the
receptionof a total formor collection of subsistentiae; it is also called
generation.As a natural process it amounts to 'beginning to be-of-acertain-kind'.1

2.1 Creation and Concretion

Creation and generationprimarilyconcern the substantial(or total)
form(collectionofsubsistentiae
) whereas the accidental forms('accidentia' in Porretanusage) come into being qua as many adaptations to the
subsistentiae.Nielsen seems to be wrong to oppose concretionagainst
creation (and generation) in such a way that concretion would only
relate to the coming into existence (generation) of accidental forms.
To my mind, creation and concretionare materiallythe same (as far
as the created world is concerned. There* is a formal difference
between the two, however: 'creatio' refersto the production resulting
fromGod's activity('causation out of nothing'), whereas 'concretio'
refersto the process by which participatedformsbecome embodied in
matter. Here are some of the basic texts:
* Part is foundin this
26 (1988),73-112.
(1)
Journal,
1 I prefer
thistoNielsen'srendering
(p. 69): "beginstobelongtoa genus",where
alicuius
is ignored
rather
and,moreimportantly,
'genus'is takenin itsextensional
thanitsintensional
sense.
1

12:29:13 PM

Heb.199,19-20:
nonmodocreatasedetiamconcreta
sunt.
omnianaturalia
All naturaithings
are notonlycreatedbutalso solidified
['enmattered'].
Trin.87,56-9:multasuntquevocantur
etaliaqueinsubutcorporum
'forme',
figure
estautalisistentibus
creatione
seuconcretione
autaliquid
fiunt;
quibusid cuiinsunt,
ordinedemonstratur.
quidessedoctrine
and other
Thereare manythingswhichare called'forms',suchas bodilyfigures
> due to
< things
in subsistente
or concretion;
thingswhichoriginate
by creation
to 'be-awhichthatin whichtheyinhereeither'is-a-something'
or is demonstrated
an orderly
learnedargument.
something'
through
Ibid.88,87-8:.... ERIS FIGURAMque, cumlapissolvitur
calore,in ipsocreatur.
in a stonewhenthelatteris dissolved
.... theshapeofbronze,whichoriginates
by
heat.
Eut.255,74-256,78:
Generadonamqueestingressus
in substantiam.
Ideoquequicalicuiusgeneris
esse,idrectedicitur
quidpercreationem
incipit
Quoduti'generari'.
convenit.
Hec enimomnianonsemper
que omnibustemporalibus
atqueperpetuis
fuerunt.
Ideoquequicquidsecundumquodlibetgenussunt,[sc. hec omnia]per
hocesseceperunt.
generationem
is indeedthefirst
dueto
Generation
Hencewhatever,
stepontheroadtosubstance.
Thisat
said'to be generated'.
creation,
nature,is truly
beginstobe ofsomegeneric
leasthappenstoalltemporal
andperpetual
forallthesehavenotalwaysbeen.
things,
whatever
Therefore,
theyareandofwhatever
genus,theyhadbeguntobe thisgenus
through
generation.
Trin.84,54-6:Creationamquesubsistentiam
sit.
inessefacitutcuiinestab ea aliquid
Concretio
veroeidemsubsistentie
naturasposterions
accommodai
rationis
ut, cui
cumillinsunt,
nonsit.
simplex
Forcreation
causesa subsistential
formto inhere<in something
> so thatthatin
whichitinheres
dueto it[viz.thatform].
on theother
Concretion,
'is-a-something'
thesamesubsistential
rank
form
withsomenatures
ofsecondary
hand,accommodates
so thatthatinwhichtheyinhere
withthat<form> is notan incomposite.
together
It should be noted in thisconnection that the nature
rationis
posterions
mentioned above are not necessarily accidental forms, as Nielsen
seems to assume. This' may be gathered from Trin. 89,18-9 where
Gilbert speaks of " posterions rationisnaturas aliquas velse componentes
vel sibi adiacentes": it is quite clear in this context that by 'nature
componentes' Gilbert means subsistential forms. In fact, by our
author explicitlyspeaks of theconcretion
of genus and difference,as well
as of the creationof accidents:
Trin.144,79-81:omnesubsistens
multorum
etdiferentie
et
quibusest,idestgeneris
concretione
subsistit.
accidentis,
Each subsistent
due to theconcretion
subsists
of themultitude
ofconstituents
by
whichit is,viz. genus,differentia
and accident.
2

12:29:13 PM

....
bid.88,87-8:.... FIGURAM
, que ... creaur
thefigure
which.... is created.
siveextrinsecus
affixa
sint.
accidentia sivein eiscreata
Ibid.1,18,8-9;
<to them>from
outside.
theaccidents,
whether
attached
created
inthemormerely
Similarly, at Trin. 84,73 where he says that th immanent forms
never go withoutthe matter they are embodied in, Gilbert uses the
term concretione
for the concretion of all kinds of forms in matter,
the
forms. For the text, see below, p. 12.
subsistential
including
of accidents: "et
Finally, at Eut. 292,23-4 Gilbertspeaks of the creation
has
in
ille
etiam
eodem
ex habitu
creantur
preter
que
[sc. subsistentias]
where
are
meant
and
coniunctorum",
quantities
qualities
(see 292,278). For the text see our third section below (3.21).
The terms 'creation' and ' concretion' are used in connection both
with subsistentialand accidental forms. They indicate the embodiment of formsthroughparticipationor the diffusionof PerfectBeing,
so to speak. This brings us to a number of items all in some way
related to the origin and actuad rise of natural bodies.
2.2 Esse and essentia
As we have already seen in our firstsection (1.1-1.4), a thing's subor id quo is also called its esse.As faras natural bodies are consistentia
cerned, thatnature is theiresse{Eut. 242,3-5; quoted above, part one,
p. 107). This esseis not the substance (or the id quod) itselfbut that by
whichthe latteris {Heb. 196,242), although it is true thatthe essesometimesis called 'substentia' (i.e. in a broader sense, standingfora subsistentialform; see above, part one, p. 80).
The esseof natural bodies arises fromtheirform(s): "... naturalibus
quorum omnium esse ex forma est" {Trin. 89,6); cfr. ibid. 82,1-4,
quoted below, p. 8. In natural bodies we findmore than one subsistentia. Accordingly,there is a multiplicityof esse. This multitudeallows
Gilbert to speak of 'whatever mode of being' {quodlibet
esse)of subsistent things{Trin. 82,1-2). At Trin. I, cap. 40 he exemplifiesthis for
man (as opposed to God). If someone when speaking about somebody
says 'he is a man', he chooses only one mode of being (the subsistential one, to be sure) fromthe whole collection of the modes of being
of that man:
2 Cf. Trin.95,80-2:"Est igitur
homocorpusnonab eo ex quo ipseconstat
corpore,
sedab illiuscorporis
esse.Estet idemhomospiritus
nonab eo ex quo ipseconstat
sed ab illiusspiritus
.
esse11
spiritu,
3

12:29:13 PM

Trin.123,30-7:... cum de aliquo dicitur:'est homo' ... is qui predicatur

esse
HOMO, quamvissit homo,NON tarnenEST INTEGRE hoc IPSUM quod
HOMO. Idest:nontotum3
essequodestin eo quod
predicatur
quo estpredicatur
essehomo.Sed qui hocde aliquodicit,plurima
dicitur
quibusidemipseestde ipso
adhucdicenda(idestqualitates
quibusestqualis,et quantitates
quibusestquantus)
reliquit.
... Whenonesaysofsomebody:
hewhois predicated
to
'be is a man' ..., although
be a man < indeed> is a man,he is notsimplyand entirely
just thatwhichis
predicated
('called'),'man'. I meantosay:in thathe is saidto be a manhe is not
saidtobe all thatwhichheis through
thecomplete
essebywhichheis.Whoever
says
thisaboutsomebody,
stillleavesquitea lotofmodesofbeingbywhichthesameman
is unsaidofhim,viz. thequalitiesbywhichhe is such-and-such,
andthequantities
bywhichhe is ofa certainsize.
Similarly,ifa man is just, he is a man by one ofhis subsistentialforms
and just by another: 4'aliud est id quo est homo, aliud id quo est
iustus" (Trin. 124,69); cf. ibid. 81,80-1.
Of course, something's esse(id quo est) and the thing itself(id quod
est) are mutually related:
Eut.278,8-279,12:
... etesseet idquodestcuiusdam
corsortii
ratione
sinese essenon
utcorporalitas
etcorpus;actunamquecorporalitas
nichilestnisisitincorpossunt,
pore,et corpusnonestquodvocaturnisiin ipsositcorporalitas
que esteiusesse.
and 'being'and 'thatwhichis', e.g. 'beingcorporeal'and 'body',cannotdo
without
indeedisactually
eachother,
owingtoa certain
partnership;
'beingcorporeal'
unlessitinheres
in a body,anda bodyis notwhatitis called[viz.a body]
nothing
unless'beingcorporeal',
whichis itsesse,is present
in it.
However, thereis yet a distinctionto be made between the two. This
distinctionis very importantand elucidated by Gilbert in many ways.
First of all he mentions it in his exposition of the famous second
Theorem of De hebdomadibus
(Heb. 193,51-195,6; see above, part one
76
and
81
p.
ff.). Moreover, the distinctioncomes up in his extensive
discussion of 'natura' (see ibid., p. 106 ff.). At Trin. 92,90 ff.Gilbert
argues thatesseand id quodestare genericallydifferent,as well as con"
ceptually: esse vero et id quod est nec eiusdem generis nec eiusdem
sunt rationis" (Eut. 293,57-8).
To be sure, the ontic value of the differentforms(subsistentialor
the accidental
accidental) is not identical either. Unlike the subsistentiae
formsare not the esseof the subsistentthingsas is patentlyclear from
Eut. 260,94-5, quoted ibid., p. 110 and Heb. 209,91 ff.quoted ibid.,
p. 103: esse of accidents is merelyadesse(sc. subsistentiis),ratherthan
inesse(sc. subsistentibus).
3 UnlikeHringI prefer
thereading
ofMS Zwettl
253tothat(toto)
oftheother
(totum)
MSS.
4

12:29:13 PM

Of course, the widest divergence on this score is that between the

and their companions, i.e. the accidents (quantity and
subsistentiae
on
the one hand, and the 'accessories' subsumed under the
quality)
'status'
on the other. In Trin. 123,55- 125,17, the veraessendi
heading
ratio(or vereessendisensus
) of the formeris set alongside the quedam
extrinsecus
collatioof the latter (123,55; 124,60; 125,1; 126,45; 135,2;
As
may be expected, what is elsewhere called status(see ibid.,
136,22).
104
is
p.
ff.) associated with the sensuscollationis(136,29-30). When
discussing participatioand habituswe will come across these notions
again.
'Essentia' is seldom used by Gilbert to indicate created essences (see
e.g. at Eut. 278,84). Essences occurring in natural bodies {nativa)are
usually designated by the term 'substantia' (in its secondary sense, of
course; see part one, p. 80). So 'substantiae' stands for'subsistentiae
particularitersubstantes', as is explicitlysaid at Eut. 279,31-2:
Eut.278,7-279,14:
Attende
dixerit
essentias
nuncdicitsubstantias
quod,cumsuperius
in particularibus
esse.Quia namqueet esseet idquodestcuiusdamconsortii
ratione
sinese essenonpossunt.... [seeabove,p. 4]...., recte,supposito
quolibethorum
duorumnominum
sensusilliusque sequitur
dic(hocest'essentia'vel'substantia'),
tionisad eorum[viz. nominum]
aut accidentaliter
quodlibetaut consequenter
redditur4.
first
Notethathe [Boethius]
said'essences'and nowsays'substances'
tobe present
in theparticulars.
Forsinceduetoa certain
partnership,
'being'and'thatwhichis'
cannotdo without
> whichever
ofthetwo
eachother
[... seeabove,p. 4], < therefore
terms
is putas thesubjectoftheproposition,
thesense
(viz. 'essence'or 'substance')
ofthepredicate
term5
is construed
witheither
oneofthemin terms
ofeither
natural
or incidental
relatedness.
Ibid.279,29-33:Attende
subquod,cumpriusdixerit"essentiein particularibus
in particularibus
stant",deindeex eodemsensu"substantie
capiuntsubstantiam",
nuncidemvolensintelligi
ait "subsistentias
cumtamen
substantes",
particulariter
aliudsubstantia.
aliudsitessentia,
aliudsubsistentia,
Notethat,whereas
he saidbefore:"essencessubsistin particulars",
andnextwhen
thesamehad"substances
obtaintheirstateofsubstance
inparticulars",
he
meaning
now(wanting
thesame)speaksof"subsistentiae
us tounderstand
subsisting
particuand 'substance'are not
larly",<and that> eventhough'essence','subsistentia'
quitethesamething.
4 Forthe'connexioconsequentialis
vs. accidentalis'
see Eut.346,61ff.
distinction,
dePoitiers:
and L. M. de Rijk,Gilbert
sesvuessmantiques
etmtaphysiques
de
, in: Gilbert
Poitiers
etsescontemporains.
Auxorigines
dela logica
modernorum.
Actesduseptime
Symd'histoire
de la logiqueet de la smantique
mdivales.
Centre
posiumeuropen
d'Etudessuprieures
de civilisation
mdivale
de Poitiers,
Poitiers
17-22Juin1985,
ditsparJeanJolivet
et Alainde Libera,Napoli1987,147-171esp. p. 164-8.
5 litt,'of thetermthatfollows',
i.e. 'is in secondposition'.
5

12:29:13 PM

In point of fact Essentia' is commonly used to stand for God's

Being(ness)6. Well, whenever the term is used to designate God's
Nature it runs parallel to 'subsistentia' as used in the case ofcreatures.
This may be gathered frompassages such as the followingone:
TRIUM estUNA tantum
Manifestum
estIGITUR quodhorum
Trin.166,1-167,17:
latinevero,sicutdictum
est,substantia
dicitur,
SUBSTANTIA,quegrecequidemusya
essentia.
velsubsistentia
dicatur,
vel,utexpressius
thatofthethreeDivinePersonsthereisjustone substance
It is obvious,therefore,
or 'subwhichis called'usya'in Greek,andin Latin,as hasbeensaid,'substantia'
'essentia'.
when
about
sistentia'
or,to putit moreexpressly
speaking
God]
[viz.
2.3 Formaand Idea
Small wonder that in the Platonic ontologylike Gilbert's doctrine
of being undoubtedlyis, the notion of 'forma' is of paramount importance. The termis used to referto both God's Being as well as all kinds
of being occurring in our world:
esseomnium,
ostendit
divinamvocaverat
Trin.89,5-6:Quod formam
[sc. Boethius]
esseex forma
a naturalibus
nonabhorrere
est;cf.ibid.88,76-8.
quorumomnium
is
Boethius
showedthattheformer
BycallingtheDivineFormtheesseofall things
whichall owetheiresseto theirform.
variancewithnaturalthings
notat complete
Gilbert follows Boethius in
In his commentary on De hebdomadibus
mean
esse.
(Heb. 196,34; cf. 193,49). The
using the termformaessendito
foregoingdiscussion has made it quite clear that the subsistentiae(id
quo or ea quibus) in factare forms(see above, part one, p. 76). 'Forma'
is a term which has many differentsenses and so is 'materia', as
Gilbert argues at the beginning of the long exposition on matterand
form in his commentaryon Boethius' De Trinitate(80,62-3). God is
called the Prima Forma:
dicitur.NamessentiaDei, quo opifice
Trin.81,90-3:'Forma'quoquemultipliciter
etomnequodsicinest
et quicquidestesseundeilludestaliquid
estquicquidestaliquid
Forma
dicitur.
ei quodestaliquidutei quodestesseadsit,Prima
ofwhomas the
'Form',too,is saidin manyways.FortheessenceofGod,in virtue
and(2) whatever
isthatkindofbeingthrough
Creator
'is-a-something',
(1) whatever

6 See e.g. Trin.61,17-20;79,15;81,90;82,16;86,10;87,49;87,63;90,26-9;99,4-5;

169,70-4.As God is unasolitaria
109,18;112,32-3;113,41-5;120,59;
'
' 166,1-167,2;
'
essentia
; see Trin.113,50-6;166,88.
(Trin.120,72),in hiscases essens= subsistens'
6

12:29:13 PM

whichtheformer
and (3) whatever
inheresin thatwhich'is-a'is-a-something',
suchthatitaccompanics
thatesse1
Form';cf.87,63
is, is called'Primary
something'
88,75and 89,5-6.
It is clear fromGilbert's words that God's Essence, called 'Primary
Form' is the cause of all natural bodies, including theirontic constituents. Indeed, God is said to be the Creator (Cause) of
(a) the id quod having some determinate,imperfectbeing: 'quicquid
est aliqui
(b) the 'being' out of which that id quod is some determinate thing;
are meant
hereby its subsistentiae
all
kinds of being that inhere in the id quodin such a way that they
(c)
; hereby, of course, the
accompany (one of) the subsistentiae
'accidents' quantity and quality are meant whose mode of being
is oftendescribed as an adesse.
Next the fourelementarybodies, fire, air, water and earth, are discussed. (For the next passages, cf. Calcidius, In TimaeumPlatonis, nrs
302-3 = pp. 276,12-277,8 and 345,21 ff.ed. Waszink). They, too are
entitledto the name 'forma', as theyare no longer formlessmatterbut
consist of primarymatter as informedby an intelligiblespecies:
Ibid.81,94-82,100:
idestignis,aer,aqua, terra,
substantie,
Quatuorquoquesincere
nonquidemqueinsilvamutuam
concretionem
haberepredicta
sunt,sedque exsilva
etintelligibili
sensiles
speciesunt, quibusdemumhematerie
ignee,aeree,aquatiles,
terree
deducte
scilicet
omniacontinentis
sinus
sunt,corporum
que nutricule
suscipit
- eorundem
ideegrece,latineveroforme
sunt.
exemplaria
corporum
cognominate
- I mean,notthosewhich
Alsothefourgenuine
viz.fire,
earth
substances,
air,water,
weresaidbefore
to havemutualconcretion
in primordial
butrather
those
matter,
whichconsistofprimordial
matter
and an intelligible
species,outofwhichfinally
thosepiecesoffiery,
or eartlymatter
arededuced,thatis to say,the
aery,watery
elements
of bodieswhichthelap of theall-containing
foster
mother
exemplary
- , <well> in Greektheyarecalledthe'ideai' and in Latinthe'formae'of
bears
thosebodies.
In a thirdsense 'forma' is used to signifyall those modes of being
which are elsewhere called subsistentiae
(see above, part one, p. 82):
7 'ei quod estesse' is merely
a paraphrasis
forthedativecase of thegerundesse
toGreektieinai).It cannotbe stressed
toooften
thattheformula
idquod
(equivalent
estpreceding
a special(technical)
termservesto setoffthelatter.E.g. "id quodest
'ambulare'nonestidemquod'currere'" means" 'to walk'is notthesameas 'to
run' or 'id quodestambulare'maystandfortheword(concept,
notion)ofwalksuchparaphrases
in genitive
or dative
ing.In suchcases,Latingrammar
requires
case.So thefamous
'in eo quodestesse'certainly
formula
doesnotmeansomething
like'inthatwhichis being'(letalone'in thatwhichbeingis') butjust'in
mysterious
view
(its)being'('in essendo',as is theusageofthelaterMiddleAges).The correct
is found
inNielsen,
p. 50. See alsoL. M. de Rijk,article
quotedbelow,p. 16,n. 16.
7

12:29:13 PM

subsistentium
esseexquounumquodIbid.82,1-4:Illudetiamquorumlibet
quodlibet
estessemateria,
, et quodeorumque sibiadsuntprcdictum
que eorumestaliquid
ut
omnium
dicitur
subsistentium
eorundem
'forma'; corporalitas
corporum
[sc.
diciturforma.
duetowhicheachofthem
Alsoeverymodeofbeingofeverysubsistent
whatsoever,
of thosethingswhich
and which,as we havesaid,is thematter
'is-a-something'
in thesamewayas 'beingcorit,is calleda 'form'ofthosesubsistents
accompany
> ofall bodies.
poreal'<is calledtheforma
A fourthuse of 'forma' covers the 'accidentia' (for which Gilbert
usually takes the term 'accidens'; see ibid., p. 101 ff.). Our author
introduces this sense in a somewhat remarkableway. He startsfrom
one of the ways in which Aristotle( Categ. 8,10all ff.) describes the
category of 'quality', (viz.) "shape and a thing's external form,and
in addition, straightnessand curvedness and anything like these".
Gilbert, then, extends the group, in a seeminglyharmless way, by
adding a multitude of 'things', for which he uses the word 'cetera'
('the rest'). Thereupon he presentshis own definitionof 'accidentia'.
Thus the whole group is implicitlycharacterizedas covering all those
thingsthatinherein the subsistentthingsas 'concomitants' ('companions' as they are elsewhere called) of the potencies of the subsistents'
:
subsistentiae
illudquartum
Ibid.82,5-7:Dicituretiamforma
genusqualitatis
quodestcorporum
ex
insuntut eorumpotentiam
sequantur8
figura,et ceteraque ita subsistentibus
sunt.
quibusaliquid
kindofquality,
theshapeofbodies,is alsocalled'form',andso arethe
Thatfourth
of
suchas to makethemconcomitant
otherthings
whichinherein subsistent
things
ofthoseelements
due to whichthey'are-a-something'.
thepotency
Then Gilbert recapitulates this rather complicated situation by
explaining the variety of ways in which matterand formare related
to eachother in natural bodies:
etideosimplex
alia informis
estquodmateriarum
Ibid.82,8-14:Ex hismanifestum
enimesseipsorum
etideononsimplex
(utcorpora).Multiplex
(utyle),alia formata
esseSimplicia.
Et hecutraetque plurima
illiadsuntinipsis,illanequaquamsinunt
et 'materie'
Que verosuntessesubsistentium,
que tantum'materie'appellantur.
et 'forme',divisimtamen;eorumscilicetque sibiassunt,'materie',et
dicuntur
eorumque ex eis suntaliquid
, 'forme'.
and therefore
Fromthisit is clearthatone <typeof> 'matter'is formless
simple
and, therefore,
non-simple
(e.g. bodies).For their
(e.g. 'yle') theotherinformed
it
ofelements
whichaccompany
modeofbeingtogether
withthemultitude
multiple
8 The sameformula
orpotestatem
velspecierum]
('potentiam
[sc. generum
sequi')
as usedtocharacterize
is foundat Trin.81,80-9;
themodeofbeingoftheaccidents
97,41;Heb.195,14-6;196,26-8;209,88-90;Eut.260,7-8.
8

12:29:13 PM

[i.e. thismodeofbeing]in them,byno meansallowsthemtobe simple.Andthese

whicharetheesseofthesubsistents
buttheelements
twoareonlynamed'matter',
and'form',yetdistinctively:
arecalledboth'matter'
<theyarecalled> thematter
whichdue to them
themand the'form'ofthosethings
ofthatwhichaccompanies
'
.
are-a-something'
Next Gilbert comes to distinguish two kinds of 'forma simplex', a
Form withoutmatter,that is, ( = God) and the exemplary Forms. In
God, of course, no compositionor adessecan be found (since He is his
Being):
ut Opificis
alia nulliusmaterie
et ideosimplex,
Trin.82,15-9:Similiter
formarum
constat
essentia
equeilliin
qua Ipsevereest.Nequeenimipsaex multisessentiis
OpificeadsuntaliquaquorumOpifexvel ipsa essevel dicipossintaliqua ratione
materia.
such
immaterial
oftheforms
thereis onecompletely
Likewise
and,therefore,
simple,
is.Forthis< essence
> doesnotconsist
as theessence
oftheMakerbywhichHe truly
it in the Maker,
of a multitude
of essencesnor do certainthingsaccompany
either
theMakerorthis< essence
> couldinanywaybe orbe
< things
> ofwhich9
calledthe'matter'.10
The exemplary Forms in God are simple as well, for they, too, are
immaterial. We should note the differencebetween the expressions
'forma nullius materie' ('a formwithoutany kind of composition', in
fact) and 'forma sine materia' ('a formwithoutmatter'; 'a formfree
frommatter'). Gilbert identifiesformsof the latterkind with what he
has earlier called before (81,94-82,98) the pure substances (or
essences) afterwhich corporeal things are created:
substantie
Ibid.82,19-83,28:
Illequoquesincere
sunt,sine
que corporum
exemplaria
ex
materiaformesuntet ideo simplices.Non enimsuntid quod esse dicuntur
essematerie.
essentia
neceidemassistunt
ineisquorumillevelipsapossint
multiplici
nonideoestquod illisinsintatquehereant
'inesse'dicuntur
Namquod sensilibus
sintet
sedquia,cumab eisabstracte
inestcorpori),
inabstracte
corporalitas
(qualiter
eis minimeconcrete,tarnen,quasi e regione11
apposite,ut ab illis tamquam
consorab Opificededucantur,
deductionis
sensilia
tamquam
imagines
exemplaribus
tiononmodosensilibus
ipse,sed et ipsissensiliainessedicuntur.
9 The aforesaid
cf.ibid.82,21-2(see next
'things'aremeant.Fortheconstruction,
wherequorum
standsfor< aliqua> quorum.
quotation),
10'matter'in thesenseof'substrate'
(cf. Trin.83,29-30,quotedbelow).
11Fortheexpression
Liberdecorpore
etsanguine
e regione
, cf.PaschasiusRadbertus,
Domini
ed. MigneP.L. 120,1268A, wheretheauthorsaysthathe has addedthe
initials
ofhissources'namesin thecorresponding
placesin themargin:"Et contra
ex initionominis
e
librimargine
litteras
doctorum
quaequeineiusdem
quos praemisi
curavi;propter
quae monuidevotus".See
regione
figere
quodlegesecuruset perfice
alsoPlato,Timaeus
45A(inCalcidius'translation,
p. 41 ed. Waszink)andCalcidius,
In Timaeum
Platonis
, p. 129,12-3and 136,14ed. Waszink.
9

12:29:13 PM

whichare theexemplars
ofthebodies,arealsowithout
Thosegenuinesubstances,
matter
and,therefore,
simple.Indeedtheyarenotthatwhichtheyaresaidtobedue
norarethere< otherthings
toan essencethatis multiple,
> inthebodiesthataccomor
> ofwhichthey[viz.thegenuine
substances]
panyit[viz.theiressence],< things
in
this< simpleessence
Forthattheyaresaidtobe present
> couldbe thematter.
is notbecausetheyarepresent
andinhereinthemas enmattered
thesensible
things
as in thewayin whichcorporality
is ina body,but
(whichtheyarenot,actually12),
thesensible
from
rather
becauseofthefollowing:
things
theyareseparated
although
as their
as theyaresituated
and by no meanscoalescewiththem,yetnevertheless
so to speak,suchthatthesensiblethingsare deducedas imagesbythe
antipodes
thatnotonly
indeduction
itisduetothispartnership
themas exemplars,
Makerfrom
in thesensible
butalsothelatter<are saidtobe
things
theyaresaidtobe present
> in them.Cf. Trin.99,2-10,quotedbelow,p. 14.
present
So these immaterialForms, servingas the exemplaria afterwhich the
Maker has created the sensible bodies, are said to inherein the bodies
informedby them. On the other hand, the exemplary formswhen
becoming immanent in things have something in common with the
bodies ('deductionis13consortio') in virtue of the act of productions.
Thus the bodies are even said to inhere in these Forms.
As to the immanentforms,as subsistentia
theyinherein a subsistent,
inferior
formswhich accompany
and in turn are substratesto other,
them( adesse). Therefore,theyare called 'matter' as well as 'form'. But
the 'accidents' are only named 'forms':
nonmodo'forme'sedetiam
esse
Ibid.83,29-32:Que verosuntsubsistentium
,
'materie'nuncupantur.
Figurevero sensiliumet ceteraque in subsistentibus
et non'materie'.
eorundem
essesecuntur,
'forme'tantum
cognominantur,
arenotonly
> whicharetheesseofthesubsistents....
those< subsistentiae
However,
andall
called'form'butalso 'matter'.The shapesofthesensible
however,
things,
totheiresse,areonlynamed
areconcomitant
otherthings
which,inthesubsistents,
'form',and not'matter'.
The Divine Form, the transcendent exemplary Forms and also
primordial matter are entirelydevoid of change ('motion'), due to
theirsimplicityand abstractness,whereas the sensible bodies are subject to change:
materia(idestyle)et
Ibid.83,33-7:His ita divisis,addendumestquod primaria
suntet
idee) eoquod simplices
primarieforme(idestusia Opificiset sensilium
debentquodsunt),omnimotu
vel istemateriis
abstracte
(nonenimvelillaformis
12myrendering
It shouldbe recalled
ofthenon
construction.
plusconjunctive
' followed aquod
reason
deniesnotonlya presented
that' nonquod
by modusconjunctivus
butalso the'fact'adducedas a reason.
13For deduci
of thenatural
to theproduction
(creationand concretion)
referring
suoconformativa
deducbodies,seee.g. Trin.85,99.Cf.ibid.100,19:"ab exempli
tione";see below,p. 15.
10

12:29:13 PM

carent.Que vero inabstracta

a se invicematque concretasunt,idestsensilia,
moventur.
itshouldbe addedthatprimordial
matter
After
thisdivision
(i.t.yle)andtheprimary
Forms(i.e. theUsia oftheMakerand theidealforms
ofthesensiblethings)
are
devoidofanymotionbecausetheyare simpleand abstract
the
(ofcourse,neither
former
owesitsbeingtoanyforms
nordo thelatter[i.e. the
[i.e. primordial
matter]
Butthosethings
whicharea combination
owetheirbeingtomatter.
primary
Forms]
ofmatter
and form(i.e. thesensiblethings)
are subjectto motion.
So much for the simple, bodiless Forms. What about the forms
which, as subsistentialor accidental forms,are embodied in matter?
Qua embodied formsthey are subject to change. It should be noticed
that Gilbert calls them 'motum habentes', rather than 'moventes';
presumably because he wishes to emphasize that it is the body that
moves ('changes') ratherthan the embodied formitself.However this
may be, Gilbertargues thatwhen taken apart frommatterby abstraction, the same embodied (or 'immanent') forms may be said to be
changeless. To be sure, they are notchangeless, yet one is allowed to
take them in a differentway than they really are:
Ibid.83,38-41:Formeverosensilium
habentes,
quamvisinabstracte
ideoquemotum
si tamenabstractim
hac vereabstractorum
imitatione
sinemotuesse
attendantur,
dicuntur.
Nonenimtantum
sicutisuntverumetiamaliterquamsintresaliquesepe
vereconcipiuntur.
No matter
howenmattered
theforms
ofthesensible
areand,accordingly,
have
things
iftheyareattended
toabstractively,
motion,
nonetheless,
theyaresaidtobe without
motion
duetothelikeness
Indeed,
theythenhavewiththereallyimmaterial
things.
somethings
often
aretruly
conceived
ofnotonlyinthewaytheyarebutalsootherwisethantheyare.
In the commentaryon De hebdomadibus
, however, Gilbert expresses
the immanent form's close connection with matter in a much more
drastical way: when taken apart from matter the embodied form is
considered 'not to be', so to speak (iquodammodo
):
Heb.194,93-195,99:
IPSUM ENIM quodperabstractionem
ab ilioin
quadammodo
ESSE NONDUM EST. Nonait:'nonest'sed'nondum
quo est,intellectus
separat,
est'.Dumenimipsamillamsimplicem
formam
ut in seipsaestintuemur
puramque
nonest,eoquodnonqualiter
(quodestearnaliterquamsitattendere),
quodammodo
attenditur
est.Etsienimabstractim
esttameninabstracta.
attenditur,
<A thing's
> beingitself
whichtheintellect
so to speak,
byabstraction
separates,
from
thatinwhichitis present
lacksactuality
does
[litt.4s notyet'].He [Boethius]
notsay"is not"but"is notyet".Foras longas we arelooking
at thatsimpleand
suchas itisbyitself
toitotherwise
thanitis), itis not,
pureform
(thatis, attending
so tospeak,becauseitis notthewayitis attended
to.Foralthough
itis attended
to
it < still> is enmattered.
abstractively,
11

12:29:13 PM

Still, in order to obtain true knowledge about them and the bodies
they inhere in, the formsshould be taken apart frommatter:
aliterquam
inabstractas
formas
Ibid.84,70-4:Alia verospeculatio,
que nativorum
sint, idest abstractim,considrt,ex fine quo illud facit grece quidem
vocatur.Recteutique.Cumenimsint
MATHEMATICA,latineverodisciplinalis
non sint,quid tarnenibi sintoportet
idestcum nisi in concretione
inabstracte,
id quodestessealiquid
speculatio
perfecte
capitnisi
equeenimrationalis
intelligi.
teneat.
disciplinalis
quoqueid undeilludest,quid sitfirmiter
forms
ofthenatural
whichconsiders
theenmattered
Another
<typeof> speculation,
is calledinGreek'mathmatik'
otherwise
thantheyare,I meanabstractively,
things
And
thoseforms.14
ithasinthusconsidering
theobjective
inLatin'disciplinalis'
, after
thatis, < although
so. Foralthough
they> only
theyareenmattered,
quiterightly
howtheyareoverthere.Noteven
onehastounderstand
arebywayofconcretion,
<a thing's
> 'being-a-something'
rationalspeculation
completely
comprehends
art' also firmly
unlessthe'disciplinai
graspsthenatureof thatfromwhichthat
< thing
> originates.
The word 'over there' (ibid., 84,74) apparently requires some
emphasis: it refersto the area the embodied formscome from, the
transcendentdomain, that is. (Cf. Plato's use of ekeito referto the
transcendentWorld of Forms). So the human mind cannot really
know what it is to be a body or to be coloured (essecoloratura
), unless
it triesto know what 'corporality' or colour (or rather'colouredness')
is. Such knowledge can only be acquired by perceivingthe embodied
forms as though they were without matter; nonetheless they will
always be embodied and although they may be viewed apart from
their matter, they cannot, of course, viewed as if they were
immaterial. Gilbert is quite explicit on this score:
ENIM FORMAS CORPORUM
Ibid.85,85-6: [sc. speculatio
disciplinalis]
esse sinemateria',sed
SPECULATUR SINE MATERIA. Non dico 'speculatur
sinemateria'.
'speculatur
> matthebodilyforms
Forit[viz.the'disciplinai
apartfrom< their
art']considers
them
but:itconsiders
ter.I do notmean:itconsiders
themas beingwithout
matter,
> matter.
without
< their
Again, in the actual world the real thing(in Gilbert's words: reiactus)
forms:
only contains theformaeessendias embodied
continet
actusformas
inabstractas.
Undesupponit:
Ibid.85,92-6:Rei etenim
semper
AB HIS corporibus
QUE FORME CUM IN MATERIASINT, idestincorporibus,
SEPARARI NON POSSUNT. Ideoque quod mathematica
speculatiodicitur
methonomica
ab acturei;quodvero'sinemotu',a modospeculandi
'inabstracta',
denominatio
est.
14litt,'withwhichitdoesthis'.
12

12:29:13 PM

The actualthingalwayscontains
theforms
enmattered.
Hencehe adds:sincethe
forms
arepresent
in matter,
thatis, in bodies,theycannotbe separated
fromthese
bodies.Therefore,
that'mathematical'
iscalled'inabstracted',
is,infact,
speculation
a metonymical
denomination
after
theobject'sactualstatus,whereas
theappellation
'without
motion'is one afterthemodeofspeculation.
Ibid.89,10-1:quodunumquodque
subsistentium
est
forma
, estex propria
aliquid
que
inestmaterie.
Thateachofthesubsistents
is duetotheproperform
whichinheres
'is-a-something'
in < its> matter.
As to the embodied forms, their collection, called 'tota forma
substantie' is never simple (simplex),to be sure. Indeed it always consists of a set of subsistentiae
and differentiales
(some subsistentiae
generales
and one specialis, that is) accompanied by their 'accidents' or accidental forms(viz. quantities and qualities). The number of the 'accidents'
of course is greater still:
Ibid.90,42-91,55:
enimsubsistentis
Cuiuslibet
totaforma
substantie
nonsimplex
est
multo
atqueillorumque totiipsivel singuliseius partibusadsuntaccidentium,
numerosior
estmultitudo.
ut de aliquo
dicuntur,
Que tamenomniade subsistente
homine
totaforma
substantie
homo,et omnegenusomnisque
qua ipseestperfectus
differentia
exquibusestipsacomposita,
utcorporalitas
etanimatio
ethuiusmodi
alie;
etdeniqueomniaqueveltotiilliforme
velaliquibus
adsunt,
(uthumanitati
risibilitas)
et scientia,que adestrationalitati),
et
partibuseius (ut color,qui corporalitati,
alia infinita.
huiusmodi
The totalsubstantial
form
ofeachsubsistent
is notsimpleand themultitude
ofthe
accidents
whichaccompany
thewholethingitself
oreverysinglepartofitis much
morenumerous.
However,
theyareallsaidofthesubsistent.
E.g. thetotalsubstantial
form
isa complete
man<is said> ofsomeman,andeachgenus
bywhichsomebody
ordifferentia
ofwhichitis composed,
suchas corporality,
orbeinganimate
andthe
likeand,inshort,
all thatwhichaccompanies
either
thetotalform
(suchas manhood
is accompanied
or somepartsofit(suchas colour,
by'beingcapableoflaughing'),
whichaccompanies
and knowing,
whichaccompanies
and
corporality
rationality);
infinitely
manyothersuchthings.
The total substantialformis also rightlycalled 'being-a-something'
fromthe viewpoint of its ontic effectivity:
Ibid.91,51-55:Ipsorum
dicuntur
ab efficiendo,
naturaest
quoqueque de subsistente
Namet ea que esttotaformasubstantie
nonmodoex eo quod
multiplex.
hominis,
sedetex eo quodalia partesuieundemfacit
ipsatotaeuminquo estfacithominem,
alia sensibilem,
alia rationalem,
rectedicitur
essealiquid.
animatum,
Alsothenatureofthosethings
whicharesaidofa subsistent
becauseoftheireffects
Foralsothetotalsubstantial
form
ofmanis rightly
said'being-auponit,is multiple.
notonlybecauseas a wholeitmakestheoneinwhichitispresent
a man
something',
butalsobecausebyoneofitsotherpartsitmakeshimanimate,
sensible,
byanother
rational.
byanother
Cf. ibid. 124,68-9, quoted above, p. 5. As early as at Trin. 74,99 f.
Gilbert speaks of 'pluralitas que est secundum formam generis'.
13

12:29:13 PM

In his commentary on Boethius, ContraEutychenGilbert confines

himselfto discussing 'forma' in the sense of an embodied form,a subsistentia,that is, or in the sense of accidental forms.See Eut. 261,38262,42, quoted above, part one, p. 83 and 262,43-50.
As to the term 'idea', Gilbert uses this expression to referto the
transcendentForms, which, togetherwith God and primordialmatter, are the formal object of the tertiaspeculatio
, the intellectual(or
if
or,
wish,
theological
you
metaphysical) speculation:
Ibid.85,97-100:
Tertiaverospeculatio,
inipsoeorum
queomnianativatranscendens
, vel idea,a qua tamquam
(scilicetvelOpifice,quo auctoresunt
quolibetprincipio
deductasunt,velyle,in qua locatasunt)figit
intuitum,
perexcellentiam
exempli
'intellectualis'
vocatur.
all naturalbodies,fixesits
The third<type of> speculation,
which,transcending
itself
to whomtheyare,orthe
gazeupontheirPrinciple
(eithertheirMakerthanks
inwhichtheyare
from
whichtheyarededuced,orthehyl(matter)
form
exemplary
parexcellence.
located),is called'intellectual'
Earlier on these formswere called corporum
exemplaria
(81,97-82,100
quoted above, p. 7) and sensiliumidee(83,34, quoted above, p. 10).
They are also considered to inhere in the four elements, though
definitelynot as their'matter'; rathertheyare presentin the elements
as exemplaria.Indeed, they are of a pure nature:
Trin.99,2-10:Nametsicontingat
ut'inesse'dicatur
scripturis
(utsepeintheologicis
- nontamenut materie.
Divinitas
dicitur
divinitas
inessePatriaut ideeelementis),
esseutessentia
inEo quivereest
utexemplaria
eniminPatredicitur
; etideeinelementis
Namnequeideeinelementis
inhisque suntearundem
imagines.
nequeusiainPatre
concreta
sintquorumex earum
suntquibusin ipsisaccidentia
createsubsistentie
illedicantur,
materie.
causisipsasint,etex effectu
ItaquenecPateraliquorum
prorsuntaccidentium.
ex ideismaterie
susnecelementa
Ideoquenequeusianequeydee
'materie'.
cognominantur
itmayhappenthatit [viz.theimmaterial,
Foralthough
transcendent
Form]is said
treatises
isoften
saidtoinhere
intheFather,
to'inherein'(e.g. intheological
Divinity
ortheexemplary
Formsintheelements),
<said toinhere
<theyare> not,however
in them> as theirmatter.
ForDivinity
is said to be present
in theFatheras the
in theelements
Essencein Him whotrulyij; and theforms
in that
quaexemplars
theexemplary
whichis likenesses
oftheseforms.
Forneither
Formspresent
in the
elements
northeusiaintheFatherarecreated
subsistentiae
withwhichtheaccidents
inthemcouldcoalescesuchthattheythemselves,
owingtothecausesoftheaccidents,
wouldbe thematerial
substrates
ofthoseaccidents,
andthe
[viz.thesubsistentiae],
abeffectu,
wouldbecalledso. Henceneither
theFather
subsistentiae,
bydenomination
noraretheelements
istheaccident
whatsoever
madeoutoftheexemplary
ofanything
Therefore
ofaccidents.
neither
usianortheexemplary
Formsthematter
Formsare
named'matter'.
Gilbertjoins Boethius in preserving
In his commentaryon De Trinitate
the name 'forma' for the transcendentForms, and referringto the
14

12:29:13 PM

' or
. See 99,12 ff.,where the proimmanentformsby ' icones
'imagines1
duction of the bodily world is pictured:
Ibid.99,12-100,23.
EQUE ENIM ESSET veronomineFORMA SED potius
IMAGO. Recte utique. EX HIS ENIM FORMIS QUE SUNT PRETER
- non
MATERIAM,idestexsinceris
substantiis
etaereetaqua etterra)
(ignescilicet
habent
concretionem
sedque suntexsilvaetintelligibili
utiquehisqueinylemutuam
- ISTE FORME QUE SUNT IN MATERIA ET ei
specie,que suntideesensilium
CORPUS EFFICIUNT, quadam exempliab
advenientes,
quod est essematerie
suoconformativa
deductione
VENERUNT. Ac perhocillesincere'idee'
exempli
NAM CETERAS QUE IN
et veronomine'forme'vocantur.
(idestexemplares)
CORPORIBUS SUNT VOCANTES 'FORMAS' hocnomine
ABUTIMUR DUM
nonydeesed ydearum
SINT icones,idestIMAGINES. Quod utiquenomeneis
meliusconvenit.
Forit[theTranscendent
be a form
butrather
somelikeness.
Form]wouldnottruly
Thisis correctly
Fortheforms
whichare enmattered
saidbyBoethius.
and which
thebody,have,bya deduction
whichmakesthesamjoiningmaterial
being,produce
from
itsexemplar,
thoseFormswhicharewithout
viz.
matter,
pleresemble
originated
thegenuine
substances
notfrom
the
air,waterandearth)andcertainly
namely,
(fire,
oneswhichcometogether
in matter,
butrather
theoneswhichconsist
of
coalescing
andan intelligible
matter
ofthesensible
primordial
species(whicharetheexemplars
ideae
arealsotruly
named'forms'.
For
(viz.exemplars)
bodies).Hencethesegenuine
whencalling
theotherforms
whicharepresent
inbodies,'forms'
weabusethatname
theiricones
as theyare notideaebutrather
a namewhich,forsure,
, i.e. likenesses,
better
suitsthem.
In the commentaryon De hebdomadibus
the process is described in
similar terms:
Heb. 195,0-7:AT VERO id QUOD EST, ACCEPTA in se FORMA ESSENDI,
idestea quam abstractim
intellectus
concipitsubsistentia
(que acceptiodicitur
huius(que
'generano'),EST ATQUE materie(que grece'yle' dicitur)formeque
grece'ysiosis'vocatur)concursu,
opificeilia formaque nominatur
'ysia', iuxta
illiusquod15dicitur'ydea', ycon(hocestilliusexemplaris
et
exemplar
exemplum
habetestcorpus
ethomo
eoquodutessecorporalitatem
imago)CONSISTIT; utcorpus
eoquodhumanitatem.
theform
whichgivesitbeing(i.e.
However
thatwhichis- as soonas ithasreceived
thesubsistentia
whichtheintellect
conceives
whichis
abstractively
of),a reception
- is and, aftertheconcourse
called'generation'
ofmatter
(whichis called'yle' in
(whichiscalled'ysiosis'inGreek),duetotheactionoftheform
Greek),anditsform,
theexemplar
named'ysia',<and that> after
ofthat<form> [viz.theysia],which
is called'idea',comesintoexistence
as 'ycon'i.e. a sampleandlikeness
of
exemplar
thatexemplary
form.E.g. becausea bodyhascorporality
as itsbeingit 'is-a-body',
andbecauseithas manhood
it 'is-a-man'.
15quodis thereading
foundintworather
badmanuscripts.
I wouldprefer
However,
ittotheusualreading
thetextas follows:
iuxtaexemplar
illius[sc.
que. I understand
forme
dicitur
que nominatur
ysia]quod[sc.exemplar]
ydea'.The usualreading
que
mustleadtotheincorrect
viewthattheforma
is calledbothysiaandydea(unlessone
takesquetostandforquodbysocalled'attractio',
Gilbert
never
but,tomyknowledge,
'classical'construction).
usessucha highly
15

12:29:13 PM

3 The Ontological Structureof Natural Bodies

In the previous two sectionsthe constituentsof the natural bodies were
discussed as well as theirprinciples,God, the exemplary Forms (idee)
and primordial matter. Now, we have to consider the basic process
through which all sublunary being (all 'creatural being' if you like)
comes into existence. Here the pivotal notions are 'participado' and
'habitus'.
3.1 Participatio
and habitus
Gilbert distinguishesbetween two kinds of participatio
, viz. partakof
esse
He
with
them
when comof
esse
deals
and
aliquid.
partaking
ing
: "Omne quod est,
mentingupon the sixthTheorem ofDe hebdomadibus
16ut
est
esse
alio
vero
eo
sit,
participai ut aliquidsit":
quod
participt
aliest4'quodest,participare
Heb.198,96-199,6:
(qua dictum
Suprain regulatertia,
dicebatidquodestcumsuoessealiudhaberequiddam.
quo potest")participationem
Undeinquartaapertedicebat:4'Id quodest,haberealiquidpreterquam
quodipsum
dicens:4'estautem
clausulaponebat
estpotest".Inquo- (etiametineo quodintertie
etinfinesecundesubiungens
, cumessesusceperit",
"quodest,acceptaessendi
aliquid
esseparticipatio
est.
ostendit
forma,
quoniamhabereipsum
est")- patenter
in something
In thethirdrule(whichruns:"thatwhichis can participate
else") he
withitsownbeing'participation.
Hencein
elsetogether
called'to havesomething
besideswhat
stated:"thatwhichis can possesssomething
thefourth
ruleheclearly
- (and alsobythatwhichhe statedat theendofthethirdrule
it is itself'.Bythat
whenithasacquiredbeing"andbyadding,at the
whensaying:"it is-a-something
theformwhich
endofthesecondrule;"thatwhichis is as soonas it has received
is parof 'being-itself
showedthatthepossession
providesbeing")- he patently
ticipation.
Next Gilbert explains the sixth theorem:
PARTICIPAT EO
Ibid.199,7-16:OMNE QUOD EST, scilicet
omnesubsistens,
sedad hoctantum
UT eo SIT.
ESSE, nonquidemuteo sitaliquid
QUOD EST eius17
' =
16'participt
in esse' rather
thanthe(rather
eo quodestesse
'partakes
clumsy)
in thatwhichis itsesse1;
seemsto
see above,p. 7, n. 7. However,
Gilbert
'partakes
in thelatterway;see 199,7-8.On topof that,as all Mediaeval
taketheformula
reads:"Omnequodestetc." Forthe(correct)
authors
Gilbert
omission
ofestbysome
ofourMSS, seeL. M. de Rijk,OnBoethius'
A Chapter
Notion
SemanofBeing:
ofBoethian
andReference
inMedieval
tics
Kretzmann
Studies
, in: Norman
(ed.),Meaning
Philosophy.
in MemoryofJanPinborg.Synthese
Historical
Textsand Studiesin the
Library.
ofLogicandPhilosophy,
eds.N. Kretzmann
andG. Nuchelmans.
Vol. 32.
History
Dordrecht
etc.1988,1-29.
'
17In Boethius'
eoquodestesse( = "participates
statement
inBeing")where
participt
idquodestesseis undoubtedly
theLatinparaphrasis
ofGreektoeinai(seealsoL. M.
takestheinfinitive
esse
de Rijk,article
mostremarkably
quotedabove,n. 15)Gilbert
tomeana thing's
thantheSourceofBeingwhichthings
esse,rather
proper
partake
16

12:29:13 PM

CumeodemVERO idemsubsistens
quodamALIO PARTICIPATUT eo SIT ALInaturapriorest,altera
qua eo quodestesseparticipai,
QUID. Sed illaparticipatio
veroposterior.
AC PER HOC. Quasi: quiavidelicet
essealiUndeinfert:
nonpotest
sit, ID QUOD EST (sicutdictum
nisipriusnaturaliter
quid.
est)PARTICIPAT EO
priusUT deindePARTICIPET
QUOD EST ESSE UT SIT. EST VERO naturaliter
sit.
ALIO QUOLIBET quo aliquid
notinorder
thatis,i.e. everysubsistent,
itsbeingas a share17,
possesses
Everything
the
tothereby
butjustto be.Together
withthis'being',however,
'be-a-something'
in something
elsein orderto thereby
samesubsistent
participates
be-a-something'.
in 'being'isnaturally
Butthatparticipation
bywhichitparticipates
priortotheother
one. Fromthishe infers:
"hence(meaning:sincea thingapparently
cannot'be-ait is) thatwhichis (as wassaid)participates
unless,bynaturalpriority,
something'
itis in orderto additionally
in 'being'in orderto be,but,bynaturalpriority,
parin anything
elsewhatsoever
ticipate
owingto whichit 'is-a-something'.
Some pages later on this is furtherexplained. What is possesses some
nature by which it is, and some nature by which it is-a-something
. Well
this 'possessing a nature' is participation. As forthis nature, we have
to distinguishbetween 'primary nature' and 'secondary nature'. A
thing's 'Primary nature' is only preceded by the Primordial Cause
(God) and is called generalissimasubsistentia.A thing's 'secondary
nature' is the companion {comes)of the primaryone which also contains the cause of the former(secondarilyto its FirstCause, of course).
The secondary nature, then, belongs to the potency of the primary
nature. As is easily seen, the subsistentiae are to be taken as the
primary nature, the so-called 'accidents' as the secondary nature.
Accordingly,a twofoldparticipationmay be distinguished:
: Adquoddicimus
Heb.208,64-209,81
quod'participado'
(sicutetinhisque premisse
suntregulis
dicitur
modis.Cumenimsubsistens
inse alisignificatum
est),pluribus
sithabet,dicitur
quidutnaturam
qua sitvelaliquid
quodipsumea naturaparticipt.
Naturaveroque,quoniaminestsubsistenti,
dicitur
ab eo participan,
alia itaprima
estutnullamprese quamsequatur
nisiprimordialem
habeatcausam;utea queomni
inestgeneralissima
Aliahuiusprimequodammodo
subsistenti
subsistentia.
comesest
illamquoqueitacausamhabetutad potentiam
eius
et,postcausamprimordialem,
etproprietate,
ipsapertineat
qua sineea nonessepossit,adhereat.... [this'natura'
is a collective
andsubaltern
nameofall differentiae
genera;forthetext,see partone,
subsistenti
verumetiamilio
p. 106] He omnesnonmodohabituilioquo inherent
eiuspredicta
'haberi'.
dicuntur
adherent,
potestate
atqueproprietate
quo generibus
Ac perhocduplicirationeparticipantur.
intheprevious
Wereply
that(as hasalsobeenindicated
is used
rules)'participation'
inmanysenses.Forwhena subsistent
initas thenature
hassomething
duetowhich
it is or is-a-something
in thatnature.The nature,however,
, it is said to participate
in byit,is either
in thesubsistent
is saidto be participated
which,sinceit inheres
in. Hencemytranslation
itsbeingas a share{viz.in Beingitself).
Or are
'possesses
tothespecialidealForminwhicheachthing
wetotakeeiusessetorefer
participates?
I doubtit.
17

12:29:13 PM

thatithasno othercausepreceding
itbuttheprimordial
tosuchan extent
primary
in eachsubsistent);
or itis, so
subsistentia
cause(forit is themostgeneric
inhering
natureand has,secondto theprimordial
ofthisprimary
to speak,thecompanion
nature
> as itscause,tosuchanextent,
causealsothis< primary
indeed,thatitpertoitinbeinga property
without
which
itcantainstothelatter'
s potency
andadheres
aresaidtobe 'had' notonlybythemodeof'having'due
notbe .... Allthesenatures
towhichtheyinherein thesubsistent
butalsobythemodeof'having'duetowhich
theaforesaid
through
potency
theyadhereto thegenera[i.e. generic
subsistentiae]
in.
and property.
Henceit is in a twofold
sensethattheyarepartaken
The second kind of participationis dealt with at Heb. 198,97-8: "par.
ticipationem dicebat id quod est cumsuo essealiud haberequiddavrC
However, since by partaking in any of these modes of being (the
and all subaltern modes, including the differential
generalissubsistentia
subsistentiae
the
generation (or corruption, in case of the absence of
)
of
participation) a body is involved, the inherenceof such subsistentiae
is to be viewed as taking place 'by substance' rather than by participation':
in quo habentfieri,
Ibid.209,82-5:Quoniamtamenharumaccessionesubsistens
nontamparticipatione
etdecessione
quamsubstantia
(sicut
corrumpitur,
generatur
inessedicuntur.
generaipsaquibusadsuntvelspeciesde quibussunt)subsistenti
thatthesubsistent
in whichtheycome
sinceitis a resultoftheiraddition
However,
it passesaway,theyaresaidto
intoexistence
is generated
andbytheirwithdrawal
rather
thanbyparticipation
inthesubsistent
be present
essentially
(justas thegenera
whichtheyaccompany
or thespeciesconcerned).
themselves
For that reason, this improper sort of participation is opposed
against the true participationoccurring in the case of accidentia.The
accidents are properlysaid of their(subsistent)substratessecundum
par, they are not said secundumse, idesttamquamesse. {Trin.
ticipationem
209,86-210,95, quoted ibid., p. 103). Gilbert often distinguishes
between the generic, differentialand specificmodes of being on the
one hand, and that of the accidentia on the otherby referringto their
diverse ways of participation.See Trin. 117,78-83 and 118,95 ff.;see
ibid., p. 84.
and esseexparticipatione
Next, the distinctionbetween esseexsubstantia
is defined in terms of 'be-ing' and 'having somethingin addition to
this be-ing' respectively:
Ibid.210,16-20:Quod enimaliudsitexparticipatione
esse
, aliudveroexsubstantia
,
manifeste
cumaliquidiames' et in
docuitin tertiareguladicens"fitparticipatio
quartaubiait:"id quodesthaberealiquidpreterquam
quodipsumestpotest",etin
finesexte,cumde omniquodestloquens,dixit:"estveroutparticipet
alioquolibet".
is different
That 'beingbyparticipation'
from'beingbyessence'Boethius
clearly
inthethirdrulebysaying:"participation
is effected
whensomething
already
taught
18

12:29:13 PM

is" andinthefourth
elsebesides
rulebysaying:"thatwhichiscanpossesssomething
whatitis itself',andat theendofthesixthrulewherespeaking
ofall thatwhichis
in anything
elsewhatsoever".
he said: "but it is in orderto participate
This view of participation is quite understandably also found in
Gilbert's comment on the fourthaxiom:
Ibid.196,39-43:
regulaquodammodo
Ideonamque
sensum
prccedentis
explanat.
idquodestparticipare
estquoniamID ipsumQUOD EST, POTEST
aliquodictum
HABERE ALIQUID PRETER QUAM illudsitQUOD IPSUM quod estEST,
idestpreter
cumipsa
quamsitessequo ipsumest.Ut corpuspreter
corporalitatem
habetcolorem.
qua estcorporalitate
Thisruleexplains
themeaning
oftheprevious
one,we might
say.Forthatwhichis
is saidtoparticipate
in something
elsefortheveryreasonthat'whatis' can possess
elsebesidesthatwhich
itself
thething
is,i.e. besidesthemodeofbeingdue
something
to whichitis. E.g. besidesitscorporality
a body<also> has colourtogether
with
theverycorporality
due to whichit is.
So, again, participationin the proper sense of the word is associated
with the so-called accidentia.
A similar line of though is found some pages furtheron. Unlike the
mode of being describedearlieras esseexsubstantia
, participationis now
identifiedwith accidentalis
{Trin. 215,27-8); see also 210,6.
participatio
So much forparticipationas faras subsistentiae
and formaeaccidentales
Porretan
are
concerned. What about the seven remaining
(in
sense)
Aristoteliancategories? In dealing with these categories our author
never speaks of 'participatio'18,but of some sort of 'having':
Ibid. 124,87-125,94:
RELIQUA VERO septemgenerumaccidentia[in the
Aristotelian
sense,to be sure]NEQUE DE DEO NEQUE DE CETERIS vera
essendirationePREDICANTUR. NAM UBI, idestlocus, POTEST quidem
PREDICARI VEL DE HOMINE VEL DE DEO; DE HOMINE UT cumdieimus
"homoestIN FORO", DE DEO UT cumdieimus
"Deus estUBIQUE". SED ITA
dicitur
velhomoessein forovel Deus esseubiqueUT, quamvisin predicando
ea
dicatur'est',NON tamenitadicatur
QUASI IPSA RES DE QUA DICITUR SIT
ID, idesthabeatesseeo, QUOD PREDIOATUR.
The remaining
sevenaccidental
areneither
ofGod norofthe
categories
predicated
otherthingsin a trulyessential
way.For,it is true,'Where',i.e. place,maybe
ofa manorofGod(ofa man,e.g. whenwesay:'a manis ontheforum',
predicated
- buta manis saidtobe on theforum
ofGodwhensaying
e.g. 'Godis everywhere')
orGod tobe everywhere
in sucha waythatalthough
in usingthosepredicates
one
18Theremaybedoubtsconccrning
useoftheterm'participatio
Gilbert's
extrinseca'.
At Trin.123,57-9it seemsto be usedas an equivalent
ofwhatelsewhere
is called
'accidental
i.e. 'participation
ofaccidental
forms'.
at88,68However,
participation',
9 itis rather
usedas a general
termcovering
all modesofbeingwhicharedifferent
thesubstantial
from
modeofbeingpropertoGod,suchthatextrinseca
seemstobe a
ofallkindsofparticipation
pejorative
epitheton
(as opposedtoIPSUM ESSE), rather
thana restrictive
attribute.
19

12:29:13 PM

says'ii' it is notmeantas ifthethingitselfwhichis spokenof is thatwhichis

i.e. <it is notas ifit> owesitsbeingto thatwhichis predicated.
predicated,
This leads us to say a few words on the related notion of 'habitus'.
Properlyspeaking, habitus19is materiallyidentical withparticipatio.
The formaldifferencebetween the two is that participationrefersto
the transcendentForm partaken in (which is indicated by the ablative
case), whereas habereor habitusare rather concerned with the share
something'has' ('possesses') due to some act of partaking.So both the
and the participationof some essealiquid
participationof essesimpliciter
in addition to the essesimpliciter
is called 'habitus':
Heb.199,4-6:Utrumque
et quo habetur
habitm
igitur
ipsumesseet quo
(videlicet
aliudaliquidcumipsoab unosolo,idestab eo quodest),inhacsextaregulamanifeste
'participationem'
appellat.
In thissixthrulehe clearly
callsbothmodesof'having'(viz.boththeonebywhich
onesinglething(i.e. 'thatwhichis') possesses
just'be-ing'as wellas thatmodeby
withit [i.e. 'be-ing']ithas something
which,together
else)'participation'.
Accordingly 'habere' and 'habitus' also occur elsewhere in the same
broad sense:
inse aliquidutnaturam
Ibid.208,65-209,67:
Cumenimsubsistens
qua sitvelaliquid
sithabet,dicitur
quod ipsumea naturaparticipt.
Forwhena subsistent
has something
in it as thenaturedue to whichit is or is-ain thatnature.
, it is saidto participate
something
Ibid.209,79-81:He omnesnonmodohabituilio.... dicuntur
haberi.See above,p.
17.
Eut.293,67-8:In hocigitur
unoidquodesthabetessequoestetea queipsumessequoquo
modoscquuntur.
In thissinglething,
theidquodpossesses
theessebywhichitis as wellas thatwhich
in whatever
to thisesse.
wayis subsequent
This broad sense of 'habere' clearly expresses a mutual relationship
since that which has, 'is had' at the same time. So the id quodestnot
only has some things but is also 'had' by them: their diversityis
deduced from this feature:
Ibid.293,68-294,72:
habentidquodest
Ipsumquoqueesseetea que ipsumsequuntur,
de quo veredicantur.
nonpossent.
Nichil
Que nisidiversaessent,haberehaberique
enimomninovelessein se velhaberese potest aliquomodosibiconiungi.
19Of course,we are notconcerned
herewiththeAristotelian
ofhabere
category
whichis opposedtodisposition
(echein
), (as at Irin. 163,18)northehabitus
beingboth
ofthem
8,8b26 ff;thissenseis found
justonesenseofquality
(seeArist.,Categ.
e.g.
at Trin.57,22).
20

12:29:13 PM

toitpossesstheidquodofwhichtheyare
Alsothisesseandthatwhichis subsequent
said.Well,iftheywerenotdiversethings,
theycouldnotpossessandbe postruly
initself
orpossessitself
norbe connected
canbepresent
sessed,forabsolutely
nothing
withitself
in somewayor another.
However, unlike 'participado', the term 'habitus' ('habere') is also
used to indicate an object's having some featuredesignated by one of
the remaining seven Aristotelian categories, which Gilbert usually
refersto by the collective name 'extrinsecus affixa' (see part one,
p. 101):
scilicet
vel
Trin.129,13-5:Ceteraveroque quolibetmodosibiinvicem
adunantur,
habitu
....
velextrnseco
cuiuslibet
concretionis
intrinseco
appositionis
withoneanother,
i.e. either
whichinanywayareunited
Theotherthings,
however,
mode
orbytheextrinsic
modeof'having'whichis concretion
ofhaving
bytheintrinsic
inanyjuxtaposition
whatsoever
which
consists
Eut. 281,84-5:... QUIBUSDAM que in se velextrinsecus
dicuntur
affixahabere
ACCIDENTIBUS. Cf.ibid.282,2-3.
> as attached
.... certain
or< only
accidents
whichtheyaresaidtohaveinthemselves
tothemselves
without.
from
3.2 On the Diverse modiconiungendi
As we have stated before (above, part one, p. 74) Gilbert's world
consists of a number of entities,each of which is a singular unity or
'self-containedwhole'. Each of these wholes is to some degree complete in itself.This raises the question of what preciselycauses the id
quodto be more thanjust an aggregate of participated formstogether
with their 'accessories' ('extrinsecus affixa'). This problem is solved
by our author in his discussion about the diversemodes of conjunction
found in natural bodies {nativa).
When commenting upon Boethius' words "Quem coniunctionis
modum Greci vocant kataparathesin", Gilbert comes to speak about
'appositio' (Eut. 290,80: hocest secundum appositionem), and, in
general, the diverse modes of conjunction. He begins by remarking
that Boethius rightlysuggeststhat there are several ways in which all
sorts of thingswhatsoever (quelibet)are connected. First, there is the
rather tenuous way of conjunction called 'appositio'. It occurs
whenever two things are brought together without either of them
being qualitativelyaffectedby that process, e.g. when two stones are
merely put togetheror a piece of wood is mounted in gold:
Eut. 290,82-291,93:Diligenterattendequod his verbisbreviteret obscure
estdiversos
scilicet
esseconiungendi
modos.Aitenimquodduo
significatum
quelibet
21

12:29:13 PM

itasibiconiunguntur
nichilex alterius
In
corpora
quodinalterum
pervenit
qualitate.
utinalterum
ex alterius
quo innuit
quodctiamitasibiinvicem
aliquaconiunguntur
locoquidemalter
aliquidperveniat.
Nigerenimlapis,albolapidiappositus,
qualitate
dicitur
alteriiuxtaest.Sedequequi nigerest,albiqualitate
'albus',equequialbus
est nigriqualitatedicitur'niger'.Lignoautemferrum
vcl aurumapponitur.
Et
dicitur
habitulignum
vel'auratum',
sednonquidemappositionis
ipsum'ferratum'
dumferri
velauriqualitaspredicatur
de ligno.
tothefactthatbythesewordsbriefly
You havetopaycareful
attention
andobscurely
thattherearediverse
all kindofthings.
is indicated
modesofconnecting
Forhesays
thattwobodiesaremutually
insucha waythatnothing
connected
oftheone'squality
theother.By thishe signalsthatit alsohappensthatcertainthings
are
penetrates
insucha waythatsomething
connected
oftheone'squality
doespenetrate
mutually
theother.Forwhena blackstoneis putbesidea whiteone,oneis nexttotheother
in location,
theblackone is calledwhitedue to thequalityofthewhite
yetneither
onenoris thewhiteonecalledblacktrough
thequalityoftheblackone.Butironor
toa pieceofwoodandthen,byan appositional
goldis attached
wayof'having',the
wooditself
is called'ironed'['coveredor 'gilded',butstillthequalityof
with-iron']
ironor goldis notpredicated
ofthewood.
In all such cases no real unity is produced {ibid. 291,4-8). However,
a real composition occurs when e.g. one animal comes into being out
of a conjunction of soul and body. In order to obtain a clear view of
the nature of such a composition, Gilbert presents an account of the
differenttypes of combination {ibid. 291,9-12).
3.21 Coniunctio,
sitio,commixtio
compo
He startshis inquiryby reviewingBoethius' expositionson the matter in De hebdomadibus
and his own comments upon the seventh and
Theorems
eighth
{ibid. 292,13-9). Next he goes on to definethe notion
of persona20and to explain the notion of unity involved:
estunumessealiquidinquo diversasibiinvicem
Eut.292,20-32:
Undemanifestum
: omnesspeciales
etheex quibusspeciales
coniuncta
condicuntur.
Cui unisuntesse
stantsubsistentie
illorum
et,preter
coniunguntur
que in ipso[sc.uno]sibiinvicem
exhabituconiunctorum.
Uthomini,
has,illeetiamque ineodemcreantur
quiexcorsibiconiunctis
unusest,suntesseomnescorporis
subporeet spiritu
atquespiritus
Idemverohomoex his
concursu.
sistentie
etaliequedamque inipsoex eorumfiunt
et mensurisintervallaribus
adsuntqualitatibus
que subsistentiis
aliquidest. Et
ita fitquod utrumque

quoniamhominisex corporeet spiritucompositio

omnesillequas mododiximus
alterum
in eo confunditur,
subsistentie
et qualitates
immoetiamintervallarium
termini
dc ipsorectedicuntur.
et intervallares
mensure,
20UnlikeHring(whoseemstoassumethatunum
isdefined
here:seehisIndex,s.v.
shouldbe supplied(from291,10-2)as thesubjectof
UNUM) I thinkthatpersonam
esseunum
thatis one' (rather
than
, whereunum
aliquidstandsfor'something
aliquid
The sameformula
'someunity'= aliquodunum).
unum
aliquidis foundat 291,4unum
at 341,9.
292,36.At 328,44theexpression
quidis foundand unum
aliquid
22

12:29:13 PM

are
in whichdiversethings
Henceitis manifest
that'onesinglething'is something
ofall specialsubsistentiae
ofthe
Its 'being'consists
saidtobe mutually
connected.
whichthespecial
in it,andthesubsistentiae
connected
elements
whicharemutually
in itas a resultofits
onesconsist
of,andbesidesthemalsotheoneswhichoriginate
thoseelements.
bytheconnection
E.g. fora man,whois onewholeconsisting
having
ofbodyand souland some
> subsistentiae
ofbodyand soul,all the < respective
makeup his'being'.But
others
whicharisein himas a resultoftheirconcurrence
which
due to thosequalitiesand spatialdimensions
thesameman'is-a-something'
ofbodyandsoulis perthesubsistentiae.
Andsinceman'scomposition
accompany
thesetwonoroneofthemis stirred
formed
insucha waythatneither
up inhim,all
andeventhedelineations
andspatialdimensions,
theaforesaid
subsistentiae,
qualities
ofthelatteraretrulysaidofhim.
This kind of conjunction is called compostilo,
which is to be well disfrom
the
more
substantial
sort
of
tinguished
conjunction called commixtio
:
Ibid.292,33-6:
Hecenimspiritus
coniunctio
est,noncommixcorporisque
compositio
tio.Nonenimomniscompositio
commixtio
estcomest,sicutnonomnisconiunctio
Omnisverocommixtio
est:unumenimaliquidinsesemixtacompositio.
compositio
ponunt.
ofsoulandbodyis a composition,
Thisconjunction
rather
thana mixture.
Fornot
is a mixture,
is nota composition
either.
every
composition
justas everyconjunction
Buteverymixture
is a composition,
as indeedtheelements
mixedmakeup someone
thing.
Next 'commixtio' is characterized as the strongestformof conjunction: the components lose their proper qualities and the compositum
does not maintain them either and so a quality of another sort
emerges:
Ibid.292,37-40:
Sed velalterius
velutriusque
confundit.
qualitates
aliquasmixtura
Utcumalbumnigrumque
albiet
miscentur,
nequecompositum
equecomponentia
sed alterius
colore.
nigiretinent
qualitates,
specieiafficiuntur
The mixing
confuses
somequalitiesofeitheroneor bothofthem.E.g. whenwhite
thetwocomponents
northecompound
andblackaremixedup,neither
ofwhiteand
blackmaintain
theirqualitiesbuttheyare affected
kind.
bya colourofa different
At Eut. 327,20 'commixtio' is defined as percompositionem
and
confusio
said to be accomplished in only threeways: eitherA is transferredinto
B, or into A, or one of the two loses its proper form. Well, as far
as natural bodies and their qualities are concerned, the incorporeal
natures (such as whiteness and blackness) cannot be said to be
involved in any mixture; ratherthey are 'confused' as a resultof the
mixing of there substrates. Indeed, only the formsthemselves(only
the accidental (qualitative) formsare meant) are subject to confusion,
their substratescertainlyare not:
23

12:29:13 PM

videturquod eorumque veremiscentur

Eut.327,27-33:Hic dicendum
corporum
cordicuntur
tarnen
naturenonnisi
'misceri';persubiectorum
perdenominationem
'confundi'.Ut
recteet absquedenominationis
tropodicuntur
porummixturam
albedoet nigredonequaquammiscentur
sunt),albi tarnen
(quoniamincorporales
illa vero
confunduntur.
Igitursola ilia que suntmisceri,
atque nigripermixtione
contingit.
quibussuntconfundi
thatthenatures
ofthebodieswhicharetruly
It shouldbe remarked
here,I think,
themixing
oftheir
butthrough
mixedup aresaid 'to be mixed'bydenomination,
andwithout
itis truly
usagethattheyaresaid'to
anydenominative
bodilysubstrates
and blackncss
are by no meansmixedup (theyare
be confused'.E.g. whiteness
and
ofthewhitething
buttheyareconfused
duetothemixture
indeedincorporeal),
thethings
thatare, but'being
theblackthing.
Therefore,
'beingmixedup' onlybefits
confused'< befits
> theelements
bywhichtheyare.
which are present in some body are conHowever, the subsistentiae
nected, rather than confused, as may appear from Trin. 167,18:
estanimal
... ipsumanimalquodexeis[viz.soulandbody]constat
Trin.167,15-20:
constat.
subsistentiis
illiusanimeatqueilliuscorporis
a forma
Que
que ex omnibus
confusione
velutrarumque
de eo quodsinealterius
etiamsingularum
partium
singule
Euticen
De quo inexpositione
libriquiContra
expartibus,
constat
scriptus
predicantur.
est,pleniusdicetur.
whichconsists
ofsoulandbodyis an animaldue toa formmade
The animalitself
thesubofthatsoulandthatbody.One byone,including
up byallthesubsistentiae
of <two>
ofthatwhichconsists
sistentiae
ofeachofitsparts,theyare predicated
ofeither
orbothofthem.We shallmorefully
therebeinga confusion
partswithout
ofthebookentitled
Contra
discussthisin ourexposition
Eutychen.
Therefore, it is ignorantpeople ( imperiti
) who are of the opinion that
the conjunction involved is really a confusion, and who go as far as
to draw the consequences from this erroneous view for logical
predication:
ex hoc quod ait: "non vel corpusvel
Putantquidamimperiti
Trin.95,87-96,99:
sinealteroliceat,idestquodnonsitvera
alterum
anima"quodetiamdicihorm
dictiosi quisdicat'homoestcorpus'nonaddens'et anima';autsi dicat'homoest
- opinantes
utunumcomponant
anima'nonaddens'etcorpus'
quod,exquo diversa
adeositex illaconiunctione
coniuncta
confusum,
ut,sicutcum
sunt,esseutriusque
albumet nigrum
quodex illisfit, 'album' 'nigrum'dicitur,
permiscentur,
itaquod <quod> ex
colorisex illapermixtione
sedcuiusdam
alterius
provenientis
sed
sit
ali<ud>
nomen
constat
neutrius
diversis
quidex eo quod
deinceps
suscipiat
etexhocsensudictum
esse'homoestcorpusetanima',non
expermixtione
provenit;
ex permixquodipsesitcorpusvelanima,sedquodipsesitquiddamquodprovenit
tioneque ex corporis
et animeconiunctione
contingit.
Someignorant
saying:"noteither
peoplethink(and thaton thebasisofBoethius
i.e. that
bodyor soul") thatone is notevenallowedto use thesetermsseparately,
ifoneweretosay:'a manisa body',without
itwouldnotbea correct
locution
adding
'and a soul',or 'a manis a soul',without
adding'and a body'.Fortheyareofthe
areconnected
inordertomakeupone
things
opinionthatas soonas < two> diverse
is confused
to suchan
thing,the'be-ing'ofeachofthem,due to thatconjunction,
24

12:29:13 PM

extent
thatjustlikewhena whitethingand a blackone are mixedup, thatwhich
arisesfromthemis neither
called'a whitething'nor'a blackthing',butrather
a
- , so thatthatwhichconcolourwhicharisesfrom
thatmixture
beingofa different
sistsofdiverse
doesnothenceforth
assumethenameofonecomponent
components
butis something
different
as a resultofitscomingforth
outofthemixture.
Andin
their
viewitis inthissensethatonesays4a manis a body-and-soul',
notindeedthat
hewouldbe a body,ora soul,butrather
thatheis something
whichcomesforth
out
ofthemixture
whichis achievedthough
theconjunction
ofbodyand soul.
will reveal that in Gilbert's
However, the discussion in ContraEutychen
view (96,100-2) no conjunction occurs in the strongformof a 'confusion' (Gilbert refersto Eut. 345,40 ff.).
'
Returning, now to the notion of composition it is negatively
defined as a formof composition which occurs withoutthere being a
'commixtio' (or 'confusio', as may be clear from the previous
discussion):
Eut.293,41-5:Que verosinecommixtione
fitcompositio
suas
ipsiscomponentibus
etuteedemdicantur
naturasretinet
de composito
facit.Sicutcorporis
quascumque
etspiritus
nature
nonmodode corpore
etspiritu
verumetiamde homine
veredicunad compositionem
tur,et aliequedamque in ipso(sicutdictum
est)ex eorumfiunt
concursu.
The composition
without
maintains
thepropernatures
ofits
occurring
anymixture
andmakesthembe saidofthecompound.
ofbodyand
components
E.g. thenatures
mindaretruly
saidnotonlyofbodyandmindbutalsoofman,andso aresomeother
natures
as wehavesaid,comeintobeingduetotheircoming
forthe
which,
together
composition.
Gilbert draws our attentionto the importantfact that, although the
component parts may be genericallydifferent(because as such they
referto different
modes of subsisting),as being presentin a compound
has:
in aliquo) they share in the same mode of being
entity(Gilbert
to
which they make up a thing's 'complete being'). And
(owing
apparently it is this common mode of being that is also involved in
logicalipredication:
Eut.293,46-56:
In quodiligenter
estattendendum
quod,etsiquandoquenoneiusdem
sintgeneris
que sibiin compositionibus
coniunguntur,
sempertamenin aliquosunt
eiusdemrationis.
diversi
sint,inhoctamen
Quamvisenimcorpusetspiritus
generis
sunteiusdemrationis
quod utraquehisque predicantur
sunt,ipsa vero
supposita
estpredican.Numquamenimidquodestpredicatur,
sedesseet quodilli
impossibile
adestpredicabile
deeo quodest.Simplices
est,etsinetropononnisi
quoquesubsistence diversorum
suntgenerum,
utrationalitas,
animatio.Una tamenearumestratio
totum
essecomponunt.
qua eorumque suntessedicuntur
ideoqueid quod est21
21The formula
id quodest(or hocquodest, or (hoc)quoddico)is hereusedonlyto
thewordsitprecedes.
So 'id quodesttotum
est'justmeans:'entire
emphasize
being'
(litt,'thatwhichwe understand
by 'entirebeing')'.
25

12:29:13 PM

observed
thatalthough
thecomponents
sometimes22
are
Herebyitshouldbe carefully
> theyalwaysareofthesame
notofthesamegenus,as foundinsome< compound
nevertheless
ratio23.
Foralthough
different,
bodyand mindaregenerically
theyare
ofthesameratioin thatbothofthemare thesubstrates
ofthatwhichis said <of
be predicated.
man> , whereas
Indeedtheidquodestis never
theycannotthemselves
itis predicable;
but'being'andwhataccompanies
andthatin a proper
predicated,
such
tooaregenerically
manner
different,
onlyoftheidquodest.Simplesubsistentiae,
as 'beingrational'or 'beinganimated'.Yet theratiobywhichtheyare calledthe
'being'ofthatwhichis,is one <and thesame> andthatis whytheymakeup <a
> complete
thing's
being.
the
ontic
differencebetween the id quod and its esseis both
However,
an ontological and a conceptual differenceand is such as to only allow
theirlinkingup to be a 'coniunctio' of the narrowesttype,ratherthan
a 'compositio' (let alone a 'confusio'):
Ibid.293,57-8:Esseveroetidquodestneceiusdemgeneris
neceiusdemsuntrationis.
Et iccircoillorum
coniunctio
essenonpotest.
compositio
ofthesamegenus
However,
'being'and'that-which-is'
[or'theidquodest]areneither
norofthesame'ratio'.Thatis whytheirconjunction
cannotbe a composition.
However, the entityarising from such a conjunction still may be
viewed as some unity ('something one': unumquiddam),no matter
whetherit is simple or compound. This bringsus to the related notions
of 'unio' and 'unitas'.
3.22 'Unio' and ' unitas'
In all the cases we have spoken of above there is, indeed, a unity
consisting of subsistentiae together with their 'accidents' even
includingmere 'accessories' (the so-called 'extrinsecusaffixa'; see part
one p. 101):
Ibid.293,59-66:
habitu24
interveniente
unumquiddamest
Quodamtamenrationali
utineo idquodestetessevel
sivecompositum).
Quod itamensconcipit
(sive simplex
22Cf. Trin.117,84-118,91.
23In contexts
suchas ourstheterm'ratio',as opposedto 'genus'seemsto refer
toan object'smodeofbeingandthespecialaspectunderwhichwe
indiscriminately
attendtotheobject.So 'genus'seemstorefer
toa kind(or
(moreorlessobjectively)
ofbeingin theoutsideworld,whereas'ratio'mayrefer
toanymodeof
'category')
beinewhatsoever,
inasmuch
as it is conceptually
singledoutbyhumanthought.
24To mymindthishabitus
butrather
rationalis
isnotmerely
somelogicalscheme
some
a certainlogicalapproachon thepartof human
structure
ontological
involving
'Thisclearly
ourtextwheretheunityis saidtobein thefirst
appearsfrom
thought.
thelogicalapproach
is takenas consequential
totheontological
situaplace,whereas
at Heb.204,30-5,quotedbelow,p. 31.
tion.Cf. theuse ofthisformula
26

12:29:13 PM

etratione
essediversacumassensione
Videtenim25
in
quodei adest
percipiat.
genere
iliounoetipsumessequo idquodestsit,et etiamidquodestquodilioessesit;videtet
ratione
assuntquidemipsiesse
vero,velextrinsecus
, insunt
quedamaliaqueproprietatis
ei quodest.
affiguntur,
Yetwhena certain
mentalattitude
comesin,it [i.e. thatwhole]is something
one,
orcompound.
as tonoticewith
either
Andthemindgraspsitinsucha manner
simple
thatinittheidquodestandits'be-ing',as wellas thatwhichaccompanies
agreement
thelatter,
andconceptually
Foritseesinthatunity
arcgenerically
different.
boththe
bywhichthatwhichis is as wellas theidquodestwhichis due to that
'being'itself
> whichin themannerof properties,
'being';it also sees someother< features
the'esse' butinherein theidquodestor areextrinsecally
to it.
attached
accompany
Gilbert underlines,again, the diversityof the constituentson the one
hand, and the id quodest, on the other(forthe text,see above, p. 25-6).
He argues that this diversityis not removed by the conjunction. In
otherwords, the conjunction does not involve a 'compositio' or 'commixtio':
Ibid.294,73-5:
Diversaigitur
inter
se suntquesibiinvicem
Sedsiomni
coniunguntur.
a sediversa
sunt
minime
genereomniqueratione
[supply:
]: etsiin unoconiungantur,
tarnen
velin eo commisceri
velilludcomponere
possunt.
Whatisjoinedtogether
is mutually
different.
Butiftheyareentirely
both
different,
andconceptually,
in one
generically
theycannotin theleastbe mixedup together
in it.
thingnorcan theycomposethis,although
theyare joinedtogether
Next Gilbert sets out to explain the differencebetween a conjunction
and a composition by summing up the differentmodes in which
diverse elements may be connected, i.e. the differentways of 'con-

junction':

Ibid.294,76-82:
Ex hisigiturapparetdiversos
essemodosdiversasibiinvicem
conEtquandoqueunumesse[it.id]inquo diversa
sibiconiunguntur,
iungendi.
quandoque verononesseunum.Unumquoquein quo diversaconiunguntur
quandoque
In eo autemquodcompositum
esse,quandoquecompositum.
simplex
est,quandoque
alterum,quandoqueutrumque,quandoqueneutrumcomponenscommixtione
confundi.
Henceitisclearthat(1) therearedifferent
modesofjoiningdifferent
things
together;
thatin whichdifferent
arejoinedtogether
is one thing,some(2) sometimes
things
timesnot;(3) theonething
inwhichdifferent
arejoinedtogether
insometimes
things
sometimes
oneofthe
simple,sometimes
compound;
(4) in thatwhichis compound
eitherbothof them,sometimes
noneof themare
component
parts,sometimes
mingled
together
bymixture.
25enimintroduces
an explanation
whichstates,moreprecisely,
thenatureof the
aforesaid
mental
in themind'sperceiving
howthe
operation,
sayingthatitconsists
elements
idquodand idquoarelinkedtogether.
27

12:29:13 PM

The presenttextmay be parallelled witha passage occurringfurther

on in the same work:
diceret[sc. Boethius]
Dei
Ibid.341,5-14:SupracumcontraNestorium
disputans
coniunctionem
nonfierikataparathesin
(hocestsecundum
appositionem)
hominisque
Et alia
fuisserecordor
diversos
essemodosdiversasibiinvicem
dictum
coniungendi.
(exquibus
(exquibusnonfitunum),aliaveropercompositionem
quidemperappositionem
alia percommixtionem
unumaliquidfit)coniungi.
Que veropercompositionem,
alia sinecommixtione.
estquoniamomne
velutriusque,
Undemanifestum
alterius
ex utrorumque
comex utrisquecomponentibus,
aut eiusproprietas
compositum
sicutsubdivisio
consistere
Sed hocmultipliciter,
naturis
dicitur.
predicta
ponentium
declarat.
of
saidthattheconjunction
WhenBoethius
above,whenarguing
againstNestorius,
didnothappenkataparathesin
God andman[inChrist]
, i.e. inthewayofjuxtaposiI remember,
modesofjoiningdifferent
thattherearedifferent
tion,itwasremarked
from
which
viz.thatsomethings
arejoinedtogether
byjuxtaposition,
things
together,
fromwhichsomeonething
notsomeonethingarises,whileothers
bycomposition,
arepartly
doesarise.Well,theonesthatarcjoinedtogether
joined
bycomposition
without
ofthecomponents,
such
ofoneor another
partly
together
bysomemixture
is saidtoconsist
ofitstwo
thateverything
a mixture.
Henceitis manifest
compound
> ofthenatures
ofthesetwocom<is saidtoconsist
anditsproperty
components,
divisionreveals.
in a multifarious
that,however,
way,as theaforesaid
ponents,
The followingscheme may be made, now:
appositio
which no unity arises)
s.s.
compositio
=
sine
'coniunctio
(
commixtione' )
<(from coniunctio
s.s.26'^
= compositio s.lX
(from which some N.
.
commixtio
seu confusio
unity arises)
Some pages further on in the Contra Eutychencommentary the
ontological situation and the correspondinglogical approach are described by startingfromthe well-knownmetaphysical adagium 'ens
(Boethius has esse) et unum convertuntur':
multarum
locusetperse
EstENIM philosophis
Eut.300,72-301,85:
propositionum
CONVERTITUR.
nota propositio
quod ESSE ATQUE UNUM universaliter
enimest,unumest.ET QUODCUMQUE UNUM EST, EST. Verbi
Quodcumque
sicutetpluralitatem
reisingularis
supposite
proprietas
namquesingularitatem
exigit,
diversitas.
nonpotestproprietatum
illaque uniconvenire
verbirerum
suppositarum
verbo
velneget,
siveunumsivemultade ipsoaffirmet
Utsiquisde Platoneloquatur,
hocfaciet.Noncnimdicet:'Platolegunsed 'legi,nee'Platosunt'sed
singulari
26s.l. = sensu
strictiore
sense').
('in thestrict
('in thelargesense');s.s. = sensu
largiori
28

12:29:13 PM

'esthomoalbusastrologus';
ethuiusmodi
alia. Si veroPlatonem
etCiceronem
supverbitropo
ponat,nondicet,'Platoet Ciceroest' sed 'sunthecvel illa' (nisiforte
nominis
ut 'omniaCesar
predicati
singularitas
singularitati
ipsiusverbireddatur,
dicit'sunt',de pluribus,
erat').Ergoquicumque
qui verodicit'est',de unose loqui
secundum
precepta
significai.
gramaticorum
A certain
runs:44'beingand'one' are
maxime
andevident
philosophical
proposition
convertible".
Forwhatever
is one,is. Indeed,the
is,is oneandwhatever
universally
nature
ofthesingular
thesingular
form
oftheverb,
proper
thing
supposited
requires
oftheproperties
ofthethings
whichcannotpertain
justas thediversity
supposited
toonesinglething
thepluralform
oftheverb.E.g. ifsomebody
requires
speaksabout
whether
he affirms
verb,no matter
Plato,he doesso by meansofa singular
(or
onething
ormanythings
abouthim.Forhewillnotsay:'Platoread'but
just
denies)
' reads'no morethan'Platoarea whiteman <who is> an
but'Platois
,
astrologer'
... etc.
ifhemakesPlatoandCicerohissubject,
hewillnotsay:
'; andsoon. However,
PlatoandCiceroisbutarethisorthat',unlessperhaps,
useoftheverb,
bya figurative
thesingular
numberof theverbis adaptedto thesingularnumberof thenoun
wasCaesar'[Lucan,De bello
suchas in 'Everything
civili111,108].
Therepredicated
' '
whoever
tothegrammatical
fore,
rules,thatheisspeaksaysareindicates,
according
hewhosays'iV, <does so> aboutjustone
whereas
ingaboutmorethanoneperson,
singleperson.
To be sure, there are two kinds of unum, a simple and a compound
one. However, each of them is one due to the singularityof its proper
form,(see also 300,65) even when the unumdoes not forman integral
whole (and is an 'unum disgregatum'):
Eut.301,86-95:Est autemilludunumquandoquesimplex(ut anima),quandoque
compositum
(ut animal);et aliquandocontinuum
(ut corpusanimalis),aliquando
itaet compositum
sue proprietatis
disgregatum
(ut acervus).Tamensicutsimplex,
estunum.Necmodoillaque linearum
suarumterminis
sunt
singularitate
interpositis
continua
iunctissima
(utcorpusanimalis)autquolibetalio modosinedisgregatione
verumETIAM EA QUE
(utipsumanimalabsquespiritus
corporisque
dissolutione),
EX PLURIBUS a se invicemdisgregatis
CONIUNGUNTUR UT ACERVUS
CHORUS tritici
autleguminum
lapidum(authuiusmodi
aliorum),
(authuiusmodi
sueTAMEN proprietatis
UNUM SUNT.
aliorum),
singularitate
is simple(suchas thesoul),sometimes
Well,thissinglethingsometimes
compound
continuous
(suchas an animal);and, again,sometimes
(suchas thebodyof an
discrete
animal),sometimes
(suchas a heap).Yet,in thesamewayas a simpleone
a compound
someunitybythesingularity
forms
ofitsownproper
nature.Not
thing
onlytheoneswhicharecontinuous
bydelineation
(suchas thebodyofan animal)
oraretightly
joinedin someotherwaywithout
anykindofdiscretion
(suchas the
animalitself
thedissolution
ofthemindfrom
thebody),butalsotheones
apartfrom
whicharejoinedtogether
outofa plurality
ofdiscrete
elements,
(suchas a heapof
stonesorsomething
likethator a collection
ofcornor pulseor something
likethat)
arenonetheless
one singlethingdue to thesingularity
oftheirpropernatures.
Admittedlyall natural bodies are compound unities (cf. Trin. 89,8
quoted part one, p. 77). Still a natural body owes its unity to the
singularityof its proper nature, since nothingis an unumunless by the
singularityof its proper form(300, 65;301 ,88-9). A compound entity,
29

12:29:13 PM

however, is one and many at the same time; it is indeed manydue to

the unity of each of its natural constituentsdesignated by the diverse
categories which each referto some mode of being27;neverthelessit
is one owing to the unityof the subsistens
itself,which (transcendental)
concurs
with28
the
subsistentiae
or
unityalways
inheringin the subsistens
In otherwords: the unity
the accidents accompanying the subsistentiae.
of the subsistens (substrate) overrules the separate unities of each of
the constituentsand forces its own unity upon the latter:
Hic commemorandum
Trin.175,10-176,24:
videtur
a se diverquodunitasomnium
soruminquolibetfacultatum
comesest.Namde quocumgenerepredicamentorum
idpredicato
ab eodemsibiindito
quidemesthocquodnomine
quealiquidpredicatur,
etverbisubstantivi
sed
essesignificatur,
compositione
(cuiusamminiculo
predicatur)
unitate
estunum.
Utalbumalbedine
estsedunitate
coacipsicoaccidente
quidemalbum
cidentealbediniunum
, et simulalbedineet eius comitunitateest albumunum.
de uno, quodammodo
cummultapredicantur
illudunumestmulta,
Quapropter
estmultis.
eiusquodmultis
est,est
quoniamscilicet
Quamvisenimnonsitnumerus
tarnennumeruset eorumquorumunoquoqueest,et unitatum
illisaccidentium
est.Cum verounumpredicatur
de multis,multasunt
quarumunaquaqueunum
multasuntmulta.Namiuxtanumerum
eorumque
unum,etcummultade multis,
estedamearumque eisaccidunt
unorum
predicantur
perquandamconformationem
numerus
unitatum.
At thispointofourdiscussion
one shouldremember,
it seems,thatin all kindof
ofall themutually
different
Forof
disciplines,
unityis thecompanion
categories.
ofwhichsomething
is predicated,
duetothepredicate,
this[subject]
isthat
anything
whichit is signified
to be by thenamewhichis assignedto it on thepartofthat
andtheactofcomposing
verbbywhichthe
predicate
performed
bythesubstantive
is accomplished,
due to theunityoccurring
withthatpredicate
itis one
predication
whiteness
butbytheunityconcurring
with
thing.
E.g. a whitethingis white
through
thewhiteness
itis oneand,through
thecombination
ofwhiteness
andtheunityconwiththis< whiteness
is
whena plurality
>, it is onewhite
Therefore,
thing.
curring
ofonething,thatone thing,to someextent,
is a plurality,
sincedue to
predicated
a plurality
ofelements
itis. Foralthough
thereis nota 'beingmany'ofthatwhich
duetoa plurality
ofthings
ofthoseelements
is,thereis a plurality
byeachofwhich
itis andoftheunitiesconcurring
withthoseelements,
duetowhich[unities]
it[the
is one singlething.Forin proportion
to thenumber
ofthosesingle
thinginvolved]
thereis,bya certain
alsoa number
ofunities
concurthings
predicated
conformity,
ringwiththethings
predicated.
27Ofcourse,thefirst
alonearemeant;cf.above,p. 5.
threeAristotelian
categories
28'unitatecoaccidente'.
Van Elswijkis definitely
wrongin speaking
(178) of'une
toutprdicat'.First,onehasto think
rattache
of(ontological)
forme
accidentelle
'coaccidente'
naturesratherthan(logical)predicates.
Besides,moreimportantly,
connotation
of'extrinsecality'
doesnotcontaintheslightest
or 'chance'butrather
thatwhenever
a qualityoccurs,(' accidi
meanstounderline
), then,without
exception,
theunityalsooccurs(' co-accidi
Gilbert
hasperquandam
conformationem
). At 176,25-6
actofforming')
and at 86,23of'concretionis
consortio'.
('by a simultaneous
30

12:29:13 PM

In his commentaryon De hebdomadibus

the nature of the unityof material thingswas described in a similar way. There natural unity was
which may be defined as
opposed to the logical one, called similitudo,
a
unio
diversorum
as
Gilbert repeats, not a
, definitely lunio'
quedam
unitas(203,10-2):
Heb. 203,13-204,27:
Illam enimque vero nominediciturunitatem
sola nature
facit.Que naturaquandoqueinunotantum
est(utquelibetilla
singularis
proprietas
qua supercelestis
aliquisunumaliquidest),quandoqueinmultis
spiritus
que etsinon
saltemalterius
numero
constat
essediversa.Utquelibethumnicorporis
alterutrius,
naturaque nonmodoincorpore
hominis
verumetiaminipsoqui excorpore
constat,
in homine,essedicituret de ipso hominepredicatur,
videlicet
cumtarnen
corpus
hominis
nonetcorporis
ethominis
sedtantummodo
hominis
numero
difatquehomo
frant.
Nonenimcorpushominis
estnature
sueproprietate
aliudunumquamhomo,
sedhomomultarum
naturarum
suarumproprietatibus
estaliudunumquamhominis
non'sibiunita'sedvere'unum
corpus.Undehomoet corpus,ex quo ipseconstat,
Nontamenquodcorpusilludomnino
sitidemquodhomo,sed
atqueidem'dicuntur.
quodhomoidemomninoquodcorpusilludest.
Theunity
whichrightly
bearsthename< 'unity'
> is causedbytheuniqueproperty
ofa singular
nature.Thisnatureis sometimes
in one singlething(suchas
present
duetowhichsomesupercelestial
Mindis somesinglething),
sometimes
everynature
ina plurality
ofthings,
ofwhich,
eveniftheyarenotentirely
distinct
innumber,
the
is quitecertain.E.g. eachnaturefoundin a humanbody
however,
non-identity,
whichis < indeed
> saidtobe notonlyina man'sbodybutalsointheonewhoconsistsofa body,viz. theman,andis predicated
ofthemanhimself,
'man's
although
theelemental
of 'man' ratherthan
body'and 'man' onlydiffer
through
plurality
a plurality
ofa manandhisbody.Indeed,a man'sbodyis not,bytheprothrough
ofhisnature,a unitywhichis different
fromtheman < himself
>, whereas,
perty
due totheproperties
ofthemanynatures
in him,manis a unitydifferent
residing
from
theman'sbody.Hencea manand thebodyofwhichhe consists
arenotsaid
to be 'united'buttruly'one and thesamething'.Thatdoesnotamounttosaying
thatthatbodyis quitethesameas theman,butrather
theotherwayround.
In contextssuch as the previous one Gilbert uses 'unio' to mean all
'going together'of numericallydifferentthings. The diverse kinds of
unio' are enumerated at Heb. 204,28-35:
Ibid.204,28-35:
Unioverosemperillorum
estque diversasuntutriusque
numero.
Sedhecestmodisexdiversitate
rationum
diversis.
Aliter
namquesibiunitadicuntur
materia
utquodamrationali
habituunumsubsistens
sit.Aliterparset
atqueforma
ex eis,naturali
autrationali
habituunumtotum
sitautaliarum
parsutquodconstat
rationum
autlingueautritusautlegisautlociautaffectus
consortiis.
Ut,incivilibus,
uniusconsortio
dicantur
multi"una gensunuspopulusunusconventus
unumcor",
et huiusmodi.
A unionalwaysconcerns
thoseelements
whicharecompletely
different
in number.
tothediversity
ofconceptual
Well,itoccursindifferent
waysaccording
approaches.
andform
aresaidtobe unitedsuchthatthereisonesingle
Indeed,inonewaymatter
torational
consideration.
In another
subsistent,
according
wayonepartandanother
< aresaidtobe united
> , suchthatwhatconsists
ofthemis onewholeaccording
to
thephysical
orrational
consideration.
Or according
toan association
ofotherconcep31

12:29:13 PM

andcivilaffairs
a plurality
ofindividuals
iscalled:
tuaiapproaches,
suchas inpolitics
in the
onespirit'etc.due to theirsharing
'one nation,one people,onecommunity,
or affection.
samelanguage,customs,
law,residence,
Its counterpart,'unitas' was already defined at Trin. 106,42-5:
Trin.106,42-5:....quodestUNUM, RES EST unitati
cuiscilicet
velipsa
subiecta,
unitasinest(ut albo)veladest(ut albedini).UNITAS veroestid QUO ipsumcui
inestet ipsumcui adestDICIMUS UNUM, ut 'albumunum','albedouna'.
Whatis oneis a thingwhichis a bearerofunity;i.e. eitherunityitself
inheres
in it
it(as is thecaseinwhiteness).
(as is thecasein 'a whitething')oraccompanies
Unity
in whichitinheres
is thatbywhichwecalltheentity
andthatwhichitaccompanies
or 'one whiteness'.
'one thing',e.g. 'one white-thing'
In the commentarieson De Trin. and ContraEutychen
Gilbert presents
a more detailed account on the differenttypes of 'unio' by opposing
them against one another:
diversaquidemsunt,sednonduo. Diversa
Trin.76,56-71:Platoveroeteiusspiritus
eius
eius,nonautemspiritus
vere,quoniamPlatoestquicquidestnaturaliter
spiritus
constat
omnino
diversa
estquicquidestipse.Etratione
sunt,quoniamPlatoexspiritu
Duo veroprorsus
nonsunt,eoquodsimilitudine
etPlatonem
suusconstituit.
spiritus
de spiritu
de Piatone,altcrum
quidduo
ipsiusdicatur,
aliquorum,
quorumalterum
Si quisigitur
ab hoc
nonpotest.vere'unitas',non'unio'vocatur.
sintassignari
rationis
convenit
unodiversum
ut,omni
cogitet,
proportione
aliquidin naturalibus
rationesemota,aliudnaturequoque singularitate
similitudinis
et dissimilitudinis
huncaliumhominem
velhunelapidem.Dicuntur
uthuichomini
unumilliopponat,
sedmultarum
unumetidem,nonnatureuniussingularitate
etiammultasubsistentia
'unusvelidemhomo'
similitudinis
fitunione. cnimplureshomines
que ratione
et pluraanimalia'unumvel idemanimai'essedicuntur.
butnottwo< numerically
different
entities
Platoandhismindareindeedtwodiverse
hismind,
sincePlatois whatever
>. Rightly
<theyaresaidto be> diverse,
things
Platois. Andconceptually
intheorderofnature,
is,buthismindisnotwhatever
they
arecompletely
sincePlatoconsists
ofa mindandhismindisoneofhiscondifferent,
two
stituents.
, because,duetothesimilarity
However,
theyarenotin everyrespect
ofhismind,youcannot
theoneofwhichissaidofPlato,theother
ofcertain
elements
are. Well,thisis rightly
calleda 'unity',not
assignwhatthetwopartsproperly
ifsomebody
conceives
ofsomething
amongthenatural
<just> a 'union'.Therefore,
fromthatunity,ithappensbyanalogythat,apartfromall
whichis distinct
things
he opposestoit,alsobythesingularity
ofsimilarity
anddissimilarity,
consideration
<fromit>; e.g. <he opposes>
ofitsnature,someotherunitywhichis different
to thismanherethatothermanor thatstone.<It> also < happensthat> many
ofone <and
subsistents
arecalled'oneandthesamething',notdue thesingularity
> whicharises
invirtue
oftheunionofmany< natures
butrather
thesame> nature
ofmen
to this< union>, indeed,a plurality
becauseoftheirsimilarity.
According
' and a
.
ofanimals' oneor thesameanimal*
is called' oneor thesameman
plurality
etqualitates
secundum
Ibid.155,2-7;
quantitates
quas 'equalia'et 'similia'dicuntur,
istevero
secundum
etvilitas
nonadeodiverse
sunt(sicutpotestas
quasille'dominus',
unumsunt;nonquidemea que exsingularitate
sedquodammodo
'servus'dicuntur),
unione.
sedea que ex proportione
estunitate,
comparatur
32

12:29:13 PM

arecalled
The quantities
and qualitiesin virtueofwhichthey[viz.createdthings]
powerand vileness
'equal or 'similar',are notall thatdiverse(e.g. theposition
< respectively
> in virtueofwhichone is called'master',theother'servant')but
notby theunitythatarisesfrom
rather
theyare 'one' to someextent;certainly
butbytheunionwhichis achievedbyproportion.
singularity
Ibid.168,30-32:
essentiarum
Nam Arriani....tamunionediversarum
quamunius
essentie
singularitate
negantPatremet Filiumuniusessesubstantie.
FortheArians....assertthattheFatherandtheSonarenotofone <and thesame>
ofone
invirtue
essences
northesingularity
neither
ofanyunionofdiverse
substance,
and thesamesubstance.
Et tantain Ilio estsubhac horumnominum
nondico
Heb.200,36-40:
diversitate,
etsimplicis
'rerum
uni'sed'reisingularis
etindividue
unitas',utde eo veredicatur
nonmodo'Deus est', 'Deus estpotens','Deus estsapiens'verumetiam'Deus est
'Deus estipsasapientia';et huiusmodi.
ipsaessentia','Deus estipsapotentia',
so greata- I
ofthesenames[attributes],
Andin Him[God]is, underthediversity
do notsay'unionofentities',
but- 'unityof<one> singular,
simpleandindividual
thatofhimtrulyis saidnotonly'God is', 'God is powerful'
<and> 'God
entity'
is wise'butalso'God is Beingitself,'God is Poweritself,'God is Wisdomitself,
andthelike.
NAM SI SINGULAnongenerali
unionesedea que ex proIbid.217,4-218,8:
IDEM omnino
ESSENT QUOD IPSA SUBSTANreisingularis
estunitate,
prietate
unitateESSET
ex proprietatis
est, IDEM similiter
TIA, idestid quo subsistens
etQUOD BONM, idestbonitas,
GRAVITASQUOD COLOR etquodrotunditas
ET BONM idemQUOD GRAVITAS. Et similiter
in ceteris.
Foriftheseseparate< attributes
> werecompletely
thesameas theiressenceitself
means:thatbywhichthesubsistent
somegeneral
(Boethius
is) not<only> through
unionbutbytheunitywhicharisesfromthepropernatureofthesingular
thing,
thenlikewise,
dueto theunityoftheirpropernatures,
heaviness
wouldbe thesame
as colour,roundness
andgood,i.e. goodness,
and good < wouldbe thesame> as
heaviness.
in othercases.
Andlikewise
However, our author also speaks of some unitaswhich is effectedby
unio. This happens in all those cases when things which are
numericallydifferentare broughttogetherbecause of theirgeneric or
specificconformity.In such cases, there is not only numerical diversity between the things themselvesbut also between their subsistent
natures:
Trin.76,72-77,82:
Ab hocigituruno diversum
ut nonmodo
quis cogitans
oportet
essentia
verumetiamdissimilitudine
etcomparatione
oppositum
comparet
opponat,
et lapidemanimali.Et hecgenerevelspeciediversadicuntur.
utequumhomini
Et
alterasicutilia que diversarum
naturarum
adunatconformitas,
generevel specie
unumdicuntur.
In hacquamfacituniounitate
estnumerus
nonmodosubsemper
sistentium
verum
etiamsubsistentiarum.
Sicutenimnonnisi
numero
itanondiversa,
nisisecundum
numerum
diversapossuntesseconformia.
Nonenimsimiliter
esset
homoCato sicutCiceronisisubsistentie
quibusuterquealiquidest, essentetiam
numero
diverse.Earumquenumeralis
diversitas
eos numerofacitessediversos.
33

12:29:13 PM

whensomebody
is goingto conceiveof something
different
fromthis
Therefore,
heshouldadducefora comparison
whatis opposite
toitnotonlysubstantially
unity,
butalsobyitsdissimilar
andheshouldaccomplish
theopposition
nature,
bycompartheman[mentioned
anda stoneagainst
ingthetwoitems,
e.g. a horseagainst
before]
theanimal.Well,thesearecalledgenerically
[viz.'animalandstone']orspecifically
andtheotherpairs['man'and'animal'and'horse'
[viz.'man'and'horse']diverse,
and'stone',respectively],
liketheformer
oftheir
diverse
pairswhichtheconformity
natures
orspecifically
one'. In sucha unityas caused
unites,arecalled'generically
notonlyofsubsistents
butalsoofsubsistentiae.
bya unionthereis stilla plurality,
Ofcourse,
different
canbe conformable,
likewise
justas onlywhennumerically
things
ofwhatis numerically
< inthem
different
> . ForCato
theycanbe so onlyinvirtue
wouldnotbe a mansimilar
toCiceroifnotthesubsistentiae
bywhicheachofthem
wereequallynumerically
It is thenumerical
of
different.
'is-a-something'
diversity
these< subsistentiae
> thatmakesthemnumerically
different.
Whoever is fullyaware of the special position of what Gilbert calls
accidents' as
, will not be surprisedin
compared with real subsistentiae
unlike
the
the
do not confernumerical
accidents
that,
latter,
reading
to
the
subsistent
diversity
things(' substrates'), but merelymake the
numerical diversity manifest. Quite obviously our author corrects
Boethius on this account, by means of what was later labeled expositio
:
reverentialis
Ibid. 77,83-90:Hanc autemin naturalibus
non modosubsistentium
numeralem
verumetiamsubsistentiarum
eorumque adsuntsubsistentiis
diversitatem
illisin
eisdemsubsistentibus
accidentium
nonquidemfacit,sed probat.Et
dissimilitudo
accidentium
diversitatis
dissimilitudo
tarnen,
quia numeralis
aliquorum
semperest
consortio
comes,hociunctissime
proeo quoddebuitdicere'probat'dicit
proprietatis
SED earnque estin NUMERO DIFFERENTIAM
'facit',cumsecutusadiungit:
dissimilium
ACCIDENTIUM VARITAS FACIT.
thisdiversity
foundinthedomainofnatural
bodiesbetween
notonlysubHowever,
sistents
butalsosubsistentiae
is admittedly
notcaused,butrather
demonstrated
by
thedissimilarity
oftheaccidents
whichaccompany
thosesubsistentiae
< present
> in
thesubsistents
involved.Nonetheless,
sincethedissimilarity
ofcertain
accidents
is
ofthenumerical
Boethius
in subsequently
alwaysthecompanion
diversity,
saying:
"Now numerical
difference
is causedby thevariety
of thedissimilar
accidents",
ofsaying'demonstrates',
instead
whichheshouldhavesaid,says'causes'duetoclose
association
ofthesetwocontiguous
properties.
POSTSCRIPT
In his shortstudyon Gilbert of Poitiers (in A Historyof TwelfthCentury
Western
, ed. Peter Dronke, Cambridge 1988, 328-52) John
Philosophy
Marenbon rightlyargues thatwhen presentingan account of Gilbert's
thought one should not separate his philosophy from his theology.
However, I fully disagree with his suggestion (p. 351) that as a
metaphysician Gilbert proves to have been a thinkerwhose "treat34

12:29:13 PM

ment is inadequate and confused". On the contrary,when dealing

withreallyintricatetheologicalproblemsGilbertof Poitiers,like many
other Medieval thinkers(e.g. Thomas Aquinas), develops his (Neo4
Platonic) metaphysicsas a 'clear-minded and subtle writer", and so
thereseems to be no reason at all to oppose Gilbert against people like
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and others. They were all real
philosophers,albeit in a theological context,which as suchconfronted
them with a series of genuinely philosophical issues. In fact, why
should any historianof philosophy approach only Gilbert of Poitiers
"as a thinker who tackled a set of changeless (jzV!) metaphysical
problems- identical(V!) to those which faced, forinstance, Plato and
Aristotle,or Kant and Hegel"?
Papenweg 17
6261 NE Mheer
The Netherlands

35

12:29:13 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 1 (1989)
Les sophismesdu savoir.
Albertde Saxe entreJean Buridan et
Guillaume Heytesbury
JOL BIARD

La rflexionsur la notion de savoir a, au XIVe sicle, une composante proprement pistmologique qui concerne le sujet de la
science- physique ou ventuellementthologique- , mais aussi des

aspects plus proprementlogiques, lorsqu'il s'agit de comprendreles

traits spcifiques de propositions comportant des verbes tels que
savoir, croireou douter. Ces propositionssont tudies dans les
recueils de sophismes qui ont cours aussi bien Paris qu' Oxford.
Mais les dmarches sont assez diffrentes.Albert de Saxe, qui tudie
puis enseigne Paris une priode o Jean Buridan est la figurela
plus influentede la facultdes arts, examine dans ses Sophismataplusieurs noncs contenant le verbe savoir. La plupart d'entre eux
sont des exemples typiques, de formulationsouvent ancienne; c'est
donc moins le sophisme lui-mme qui est significatifdu dessein de
l'auteur que les moyens conceptuels mis en uvre pour le rsoudre.
Je voudrais examiner le traitementqu'Albert en propose, pour tenter
de situerce dernierpar rapportaux Sophismata
de Jean Buridan, d'une
recueils
de sophismesen proveet
au
connu
des
part, par rapport plus
nance d'Oxford, d'autre part, savoir celui de Guillaume Heytesbury.

*
*
On dnombre dans le recueil d'Albert six sophismes comportantle
verbe savoir. On peut, pour des raisons qui s'claireront par la
suite, y ajouter un sophisme avec le verbe croire. Ces sophismessont
les suivants:
(1) Nullus homo potest scire quod aliquis homo potest scire 2e
partie, sophisme 33;
(2) Sortes potest scire quod Deus non potest scire 2e partie, soph.
34;
(3) Sortes seit tantum tres homines currere 2e partie, soph 47;
seit
3e
scire
plura quam
partie, soph. 20;
(4) Sortes potest
36

12:29:20 PM

(5) A Sortes seit esse verum 3e partie, soph. 32;

(6) A Sortes seit esse A 3e partie, soph. 33;
Sortes
suum
credit esse asinum- 3e partie, soph. 34.
patrem
(7)
Les deux premierssophismes ont un traitcommun: la proposition
ambigu est explicite l'aide d'exemples contenantle termese, c'est-dire, selon la terminologiemdivale, un relatifd'identit rciproque. A vrai dire, le raisonnementd'Albert porte plus sur ce pronom
que sur le verbe savoir.
Dans les deux cas, l'nonc est faux. L "improbatio
du premier est
sommaire: elle repose sur la vrit de la proposition contradictoire,
elle-mme affirme au moyen d'une tautologie. Improbatur
sophisma: eius contradictoriumest verum, ergo ipsum est falsum.
Consequentia tenet. Antecedens patet quia contradictoriumest "aliquis homo potest scire quod aliquis homo potest scire", et hoc est
verum1. L'improbatiodu second est encore plus rapide: Sortes non
potest scire nisi verum. Sed Deus seit omne verum. Ergo Sortes non
potest scire quod Deus non potest scire2.
Les deux sophismes tant tenus pour faux, c'est dans la rfutation
de la probatioqu se trouventles indications les plus instructives.Dans
les deux cas, le raisonnementfallacieux s'appuie sur l'quivoque du
pronomse. Dans le sophisme (1), l'ide que Socrate ne peut pas savoir
ce que Platon sait- proposition que sert d'antcdent la
- est elle-mmejustifiepar l'argument suivant: Sordmonstration
tes non potest scire se esse Platonem, et hoc Plato potest scire,
Plato potest scire se esse Sortem, quod Sortes potest scire, et sic de
aliis3. Un tel raisonnement reviendrait ne pas tenir compte des
caractristiquesparticuliresdu pronom se et prendre l'expression
se esse Platonem, enchsse dans la proposition totale, comme une
propositiondont le sens est tabli et ne change pas.
Dans sa rfutation,Albertconsidre au contraireles deux occurrences de se esse Platonem comme deux noncs diffrents:Quando
diciturPlato scire se esse Platonem, conceditur, hoc est idem quod
Sortes denotatur scire4 Le verbe denotare
thmatise gnralementle
renvoi d'une proposition son signifi,que celui-ci soit une entitsui
generisou qu'il se rduise la significationdes termes; ici, il recouvre
1 Albertde Saxe,
, Paris1490,sign.fVIII ra.
2 Id., ibid.,fVIII Sophismata
rb.
3 Id.. ibid.
4 Id., ibid.
, fVIII ra.
37

12:29:20 PM

 la foisle renvoide la propositioninfinitive son signifiet la relation

du verbe scire,qui fonctionnecomme verbe d'attitude propositionnelle, son objet. Le rapportentrele savoir et son objet est donc diffrent,mais cettediffrenceest prsenteau sein mme de la proposition
infinitivese esse Platonem, selon individu auquel renvoie le sujet
de cette proposition. L'ambigut surgitainsi de la prsence dans la
c'est--dire, au sens mdival du mot,
propositiond'un terme relatif,
d'un terme qui renvoie quelque chose qui a t pos
.
antrieurement5
Le premiersophisme est cet gard assez allusif:il introduitsimplement l'ide de relatiflorsqu'il affirmeque le verbe savoir a un
objet diffrentdans chacune des propositions: Cum enim dicitur
4'Sortes non
potest scire se esse Platonem et Plato hoc potest scire",
hoc relativum"hoc" aliud refertin una quam in alia6. Le deuxime
sophisme est plus prcis: l'auteur n'affirmepas seulementque l'objet
du savoir, anaphoris par "hoc", est diffrentdans les deux propositions, il explicite cette diffrence:Non est idem quod in premissis
denotatur Sortem scire posse et quod Deum non posse scire, propter
hoc quod relativum "se" aliud refertin una et aliud in alia7explication qui peut aisment tre transpose pour le sophisme prcdent.
la relatifse, c'est-La diffrencevient de ce quoi renvoie {refert)
dire ce qui a t pos antrieurementet qu'il rappelle. Il s'agit par
consquent du sujet logico-grammatical du verbe scire. Le relatifse
n'intervientdonc pas ici en raison de la rflexivitqu'il introduirait
il n'est pas question des paradoxes pragmatiques tels que le
Menteur- , mais dans la mesure o il rappelle par anaphore le sujet
du verbe savoir, sujet qui par rapport la proposition enchsse
peut tre considr comme sujet de l'nonciation. Le traitementlogique des propositionscontenant le verbe savoir implique donc ce
stade une certaine conception de ce qu'est le savoir, conception que
l'on peut caractriserpar deux traitsqui ne sont pas particulirement
5 Cf.JeanBuridan,
Summulae
IV, iv,d. M. E. Reina,in: Rivistacritica
dialecticae,
di storiadella filosofia,
1957,fase.II & III, 175-208et 323-352,p. 336: [...]
lesauteursdu XIVe sicle
relativum,
quia reipriuslataesivedictaerccordativum;
suivent
du termerelatif
Priscien
dansla dfiniton
cf.Priscien,
au sensgrammatical:
Institutiones
XVII, ix, 56, d. M. Hertz,Lipsiae1860,vol. 2, p. 141:
grammaticae,
Accidit
relatio
intertia
nominaperrecorpersonna,
pronomini
perquampraedicta
dationem
id estperpronomen
pronominantur,
significantur.
6 Albertde Saxe,Sohismata,
sien,fVIII ra.
7 Id., ibid.,f VIII rb.
38

12:29:20 PM

originaux, mme s'ils ne sont pas partout prsents: le savoir a pour

objet premierdes propositions,par exemple ici se esse Platonem, et
de tellespropositionsne peuvent tre comprises que si on les rfreau
sujet qui les nonce.
Comment ces thsespeuvent-ellestre situes par rapportaux diffrent paradigmes thoriques du XIVe sicle?
L'ide selon laquelle le savoir a pour objet premierdes propositions
est assez largement partage, mme si elle donne lieu un dbat,
comme en tmoigne par exemple l'uvre de Grgoire de Rimini.
Admise par Guillaume d'Ockham, cette thse se retrouve aussi bien
chez des auteurs qui dveloppent une logique fondesur les proprits
des termesque chez les calculateurs d'Oxford. Par-del leurs diffrences, ces courantsont en commun la pratique de ce que J. Murdoch
a appel l'analyse propositionnelle.Jean Buridan s'en explique concernantl'objet de la science {scientia)dans la premirequestion sur le
8. Guillaume Heytesbury,quant lui, prsuppose
livre I de la Physique
galement au cours de son argumentationque savoir, c'est savoir des
propositions9.Sur ce point, Albert ne fait donc que reprendre des
ides largementpartages, qui ne sauraient suffire signer formellementune dpendance l'gard de tel ou tel de ses prdcesseurs.Toutefois,pour ce qui est de ces sophismes, le faitde se limiter l'analyse
logique du rapportentrele verbe scireet son objet (y comprisla proposition qu'il rgit), nous carte d'une rflexionpistmologique gnrale sur le subjectum
de la scientia(c'est--dire ce dont elle traite), et la
dmarche reste assez proche de celle de Guillaume Heytesbury. En
revanche, la tendance rfrerces noncs, non seulement l'tat de
choses qu'ils dcrivent ou signifient,mais aussi au locuteur qui les
profreest prsente chez Jean Buridan plus fortementqu'ailleurs:
partirde l'ide, en elle-mme banale, selon laquelle le savoir suppose
un assentiment,Jean Buridan accentue la dimension pragmatique de
l'nonc scientifique10,comme en tmoigne en particulierson traitement des insolubles. De ce point de vue, Albertserait proche de son
matre parisien.
8 Cf.JeanBuridan,
odoPhysicorum
libros
Aristotelis
, Paris1509,f II
Quaestiones
super
va.
9 Cf.Guillaume
illaconclusio
, soph.20: [...] concedipotest
Heytesbury,
Sophismata
et aliquandopauciores.
quodaliquandoscivitDeus plurespropositiones
10Cf.JeanBuridan,
, p. 147: Scientiaautemnonest in nobisnisisit
Sophismata
alicuiusenuntiationis.
Et requiritur
ad scientiam
assenquodhomocumcertitudine
tiatenuntiatione
vera.
39

12:29:20 PM

Peut-on ensuite tirer quelque enseignement des considrations

qu'Albert de Saxe introduitsur les relatifs?On notera d'abord que
Jean Buridan accorde peu d'importance aux relatifsdans ses Sophismata. Un passage leur est consacr dans les Summulaedialecticae
mais il
est de peu d'intrtpour notrepropos11.Aprs la dfinitionet les divisions habituellesen la matire,Jean Buridan introduitdeux rglesqui
caractrisentce type de termes. L'une concerne la manire dont la
supposition d'un terme relatifpeut tre distribue. L'autre pose que
le relatifse se trouve toujours dans la mme proposition catgorique
- et lorsqu'il
que son antcdent par exemple Sortis diligit se
semble que ce ne soit pas le cas, il ne se rapporte un antcdent en
dehors de la proposition que par la mdiation d'un autre relatifqui
se trouve, lui, dans la mme proposition- par exemple Sortes currit
et ipse diligitse. A l'vidence, Jean Buridan ne prend pas en considration des propositions semblables celles qui sont examines par
Albert. Et lorsque, par la suite, il tudiera les verbes signifiantdes
actes de l'esprit, il ne sera plus question des relatifs.Il apparat donc
que la question des relatifsn'est pas relie celle des verbes cognitifs;
une telle conjonction, telle qu'elle se trouve chez Albert, n'a pu tre
inspire ce dernier par les seuls textes de Jean Buridan.
En revanche, un tel rapprochementaurait pu tre suggr par le
etdivisode Guillaume Heytesbury.Parmi les
Tractatus
desensucomposito
suscitant
divers
modes d'ambigut selon la composition
expressions
et la division, se trouventaussi bien les relatifsque les verbes signifiant
un acte de l'esprit, quoique les uns et les autres soient mentionns
l'occasion de modes diffrents,et que, parmi les exemples de relatifs
qui sont donns, ne se trouve pas de relatifrciproque tel que se12.Ce
rapprochement vaut toutefoisd'tre signal, ds lors que, dans les
autres sophismes, la distinctiondu sens compos et du sens divis va
tre le principal moyen utilis par Albert pour rsoudre les difficults
lies au verbe savoir.
Je laisse de ct le sophisme (3), trs bref et sans intrtpour notre
propos. Les sophismes (4), (5) et (6) sont aussi assez courts,mais plus
instructifs.
11Cf. Summulae
dialecticae
, IV, iv, pp. 336 sqq.
12Danssonrecueil
comGuillaume
examine
unsophisme
de sophismes,
Heytesbury
se: il s'agitdu sophisme
ut vincant
le relatif
13,Istipugnant
se; maisson
portant
ici parAlbert.
traitement
estassezloigndes questions
envisages
40

12:29:20 PM

Sortes potest scire plura quam seit- sophisme (4) - est tenu pour
vrai. Le casus est le suivant: Socrate ne sait, c'est--dire ne connat
comme vraies, que deux propositionset, demain, il en saura trois. La
conclusion est patente ds lors que ce futurest assimil un possible.
Ici encore, c'est la rfutationde Yimprobatio
qui importe. Cette dernire repose sur une double infrence: Si Sortes potest scire plura
quam seit,possible est Sortes scire plura quam seit. Et per consequens
hec propositioest possibilis: "Sortes seit plura quam seit"13. L'infrence est refuse cause de la distinctionqui doit tre faite entre le
sens divis et le sens compos; l'argumentation qui passe de l'un
l'autre est fausse.
La mme raison est mise en avant pour les sophismes (5) et (6),
ainsi que pour le sophisme (7). Le sophisme (5), a Sortes seit esse
verum est vrai dans le cas o a dsigne la proposition Deus est, et
o Socrate ignore quelle est cette proposition tout en sachant qu'elle
est vraie. Etant donn ce casus, la probatiova de soi. La rfutationde
Yimprobatio
comprend deux arguments. Le premier consiste refuser
la conversiona Sortes seit esse verum, ergo aliquid verum Sortes seit
esse a. Bien que peu d'explications soient donnes, il est clair que ce
refusest motiv par le faitque a , qui tait initialementhors du champ
de scire,passerait l'intrieurde ce champ. La conversionvalable conduirait la propositionaliquid quod Sortes seit esse verum est a. Le
second argumentfait nouveau intervenirla distinctiondu sens compos et du sens divis: [...] negatur consequentia "a Sortes seit esse
verum, ergo Sortes seit a esse verum", ex eo quod arguitur a sensu
diviso ad sensum compositum14.
Le raisonnementest similaire pour les sophismes (6) et (7). Il suffit
ici de mentionnerles conclusions: Nego consequentiam ex eo quod
arguitur a sensu diviso vero ad sensum compositum falsum15;Ad
[improbationem]patrem suum Sortes creditesse asinum, ergo Sortes
credit patrem suum esse asinum, negatur consequentia ex eo quod
arguitura sensu diviso vero ad sensum compositumfalsum16. C'est
donc la distinctiondu sens compos et du sens divis qui est mise au
premier plan, et qui est mise en uvre pour rsoudre les difficults
engendrespar ce type de sophismes, comportantle verbe savoir ou
le verbe croire. Une telle dmarche n'est pas celle de Jean Buridan.
13Albertde Saxe,Sophismata
, sign.1 VII va.
14Id ibid.tm II rb.
15Id., ibid
. , m II va.
16Id.yibid.,m II vb.
41

12:29:20 PM

Dans ses Consequentiae

, plus prcismentdans le livre II, portant sur
les consquences entre propositionsmodales, celui-ci faitbien appel
cettedistinction;mais il prend alors les modalits en un sens restreint,
incluant les quatre modalits au sens strictainsi que vrai et faux;
le problme qui nous occupe ici n'est pas voqu. Une telle dmarche
voque bien plutt celle de Guillaume Heytesbury.
A. Maier a montrcommentGuillaume Heytesburya systmatis
la rflexionsur le sens compos et le sens divis17.Cette distinction,
dont le principe se fonde sur un passage des Rfutations
sophistiques
d'Aristote18,a t utilise de plus en plus frquemmentau XIIIe sicle, mais les rgles et les exemples restaientpars dans des traitsou
dans des chapitresd'ouvrages portantsur les fallacie. En l'tat actuel
des connaissances, Guillaume Heytesburyparat avoir t le premier
rassembleret organiser tous ces matriaux dans un traitqui soit
spcialement dvolu ce sujet.
Dans le De sensu compositoet diviso, Guillaume Heytesbury prte
attentionau verbe scire.Enumrant d'abord des exemples qui incitent
penser que la consquence est souvent fausse si l'on argumentedu
sens compos au sens divis, ou inversement19,il cite, entre autres,
Tu scis alterum istorum esse verum, ergo alterum istorum scis esse
verum puis, plus proche de ce que nous avons ici, Tu scis a propositionem esse veram, igitura propositionem scis esse veram20.Par la
suite, classant en neuf modes21les diverscas o il fautdistinguerentre
le sens compos et le sens divis, il mentionneen avant-dernireposition les termes verbaux signifiantun acte de l'intellect, parmi lesquels figurele verbe scio. Comme il est prcis ultrieurement,on a
affaireau sens divis lorsque le verbe signifiantun acte de la volont
ou de l'intellect est plac entre le terme l'accusatif et l'infinitif,
comme dans a propositionem scis esse falsam; il est alors dnot
(idenotatur
) que a est une proposition que l'on sait tre fausse. Le sens
17Cf. A. Maier,Il Tractatus
di Guglielmo
desensucomposito
etdiviso
, in:
Heytesbury
de cette
Rivistacriticadi storiadellafilosofia,
21 (1966),243-263;surl'historique
cf. Id., Terminologia
, Roma 1972,chap.VII,
distinction,
logicadellatardascolastica
p. 499-600.
18Cf. Aristote,
, 166a 22 sqq.
Rfutations
sophistiques
19Cf.Guillaume
etdiviso,
Venise1494,f2ra.
Tractatus
desensu
Heytesbury,
composito
20Id., ibid.
21Le nombre
de modesvariede 9 8, de mmeque leurordre,selonlesditions:
Attitudes
sensus
divisus
andPropositional
cf. ce proposN. Kretzmann,
Sensus
,
compositum,
de 1494,o lesverbes
ici l'dition
in:Medioevo,VII (1981),195-229.
Jemerfre
le huitime
mode.
les actesde l'espritconstitutent
signifiant
42

12:29:20 PM

compos est celui o le verbe cognitifprcde l'ensemble de la propositioninfinitive,comme dans tu scis a propositionemesse falsam, et
il est dnot par l que l'on sait que la proposition a est fausse. Ces
propositionset les termesqui y figurentont un certainnombre de propritsque nous ne pouvons dtaillerici, mais l'importantest que, de
manire gnrale, c'est--dire en dehors d'exceptions qui proviennent
de la prsence de tel ou tel terme,comme par exemple le dmonstratif
hoc, il n'est pas valable d'infrer un sens de l'autre.
Le mme doctrine se retrouvedans le De scireet dubitare
, texte qui,
sicle
une influau
XIVe
N.
semble
avoir
exerc
Kretzmann,
d'aprs
ence plus grande que le De sensucomposito
etdiviso.Ce texte,qui constitue en faitle deuxime traitdes Regulsolvendi
a pour objet
sophismata,
propre, comme son titrel'indique, les verbes signifiantdes actes de
l'esprit. Or ici encore, le lien est troitentreles particularitssmantiques engendrespar ces verbes- ainsi que par les modalits- et la distinctiondes sens compos et divis:
propositiones
quedamin sensucomposito
quibus
[...] aliquandoaccipiuntur
insensudivisoque nonconvertuntur
consimiles
sumuntur
cumillisacceptisin
sensucomposito.
Itemsciendum
fiunt
propositiones
quodhuiusmodi
perterminosactumvelhabitm
animeimportantes
[...]22.
Guillaume Heytesbury explique alors que des propositions telles
que scio a esse verum et a scio esse verum ne peuvent pas se convertirl'une en l'autre quoiqu'elles se ressemblent,car l'une est prise
au sens compos et l'autre au sens divis. Il est ais de discernerles
deux grce la rgle suivante: lorsque l'un des termesantrieurement
23d'une
numrs prcde ou suit le dictum
proposition,l'ensemble est
comprendreau sens compos; lorsque ce termeest plac l'intrieur
du dictum
, la proposition totale est comprendre au sens divis.
L'auteur poursuiten expliquant, exemples l'appui, commentde telles propositionsne sont pas convertibleset ce qui en rsulte pour les
inferencessyllogistiques.Il s'ensuit quelques paradoxes- par exemple
possibile est me scire aliquem propositionemesse veram, quam nscio esse veram24,que l'on rsout aisment en distinguantle sens compos et le sens divis. Conformmentau sujet du trait,les exemples
22Guillaume
Repulae
solvendi
Heytesbury,
sophismata
, II, op.cit.,f 13ra.
23La notion
dedictum
n'a iciaucunechargeontologique.
Le dictum
d'une
propositionis
estcettemmeproposition,
formule
l'infinitif;
cf.De scire
etdubitare
proposition
,
f 13rb.
24Cf. ibid.,f 14rb.
43

12:29:20 PM

dvelopps concernentles actes de la volont et surtoutceux de l'intellect: savoir, croire, douter...

Albert de Saxe est beaucoup plus succinct que Guillaume Heytesbury, mais en faisant principalementappel cette distinctionpour
rsoudre les sophismes lis au verbe savoir, il adopte une dmarche
qui parait fairecho celle du logicien anglais. Serait-ce tout simplement un lieu commun? Le cas de Jean Buridan montre prcisment
que non, du moins Paris.
Jean Buridan, en effet,examine bien des sophismes engendrs par
des verbes signifiantdes actes de l'esprit (intellectionou volont). Ceci
le conduit galement considrerque, de rgle gnrale, la proposition o un objet tombe dans le champ d'un verbe intentionnelet celle
o ce mme objet ne tombe pas dans ce champ ne sont pas convertibles. De ce fait,on retrouvela diffrenceentre sens compos et sens
divis. Toutefois, cettedistinctionne constituepas pour Jean Buridan
le moyen de rsolutiondes sophismes. Il est bien connu qu'il labore
alors une solution originale, fonde sur la notion smantique d'appellation de raison25.Albert de Saxe, qui crit aprs Jean Buridan et qui
ne peut pas ne pas connatre les Sophismatardigs par ce dernier,
voque-t-ill'appellation de raison? Telle est ici la question. Le testen
la matire nous est fourni par le septime et dernier des sophismes
recenss au dbut de cet article26.
Sortes patrem suum credit esse asinum. Comme toujours dans les
sophismes du XIVe sicle, il faut commencer par prciser le casus, la
situation fictivedans laquelle l'nonc prend sens. Ici, l'on suppose
que le pre de Socrate est revtud'une peau d'ne et marche quatre
pattes. Le vrit du sophisme se dmontre de la manire suivante:
Hoc Sortes creditesse asinum, hoc est pater suus, ergo patrem suum
creditesse asinum27La rfutation,quant elle, procde comme suit:
Sortes patrem suum creditesse asinum, ergo Sortes creditquod pater
suus est asinus; hoc est falsum; la faussetde l'antcdent rsulterait
25Jesuisrevenu
surcettenotion,
dansLecheval
commentateurs,
aprsde nombreux
deBuridan.
etphilosophie
dulangage
dansl'analyse
d'unverbe
intentionnel
, in: O.
Logique
Pluta(d.), De Philosophie
im14. und15. Jahrhundert
. Michalski,
, in memoriam
Amsterdam
1988,119-137.
26Pourl'tudede ce sophisme,
deslments
dansun article
je reprends
dvelopps
intitul
Verbes
etappellation
delaforme
Albert
deSaxe, paratre
selon
dansles
cognitifs
Actesdu VIIIe Congrsde la Socitinternationale
pourl'tudede la philosophie
mdivale.
27Albertde Saxe,Sophismata
, XXXIV, sign,m II vb.
44

12:29:20 PM

de la faussetdu consquent. Mais le sophisme est tenu pour vrai, si

bien que Yimprobatio
doit tre rfute;elle peut l'tre en invoquant la
non-validit d'une consquence qui infrele sens compos du sens
divis. Dans son principe, le mode de rsolution propos par Albert
de Saxe est donc identique celui que nous avons rencontrprcdemment,
Un sophisme semblable est examin par Jean Buridan: Tu credis
te esse asinum28. En dpit d'une formulationinitiale un peu diffrente,qui accentue le paradoxe, le casuspermetde rapprocherles deux
sophismes. Car si l'on croit que l'on est un ne, c'est parce que l'on
croit que son propre pre est un ne. La probatioest voisine de celle
qui est propose par Albert. Yimprobatioest plus expditive: on ne
croitpas que l'on est un ne, parce que l'on sait que l'on n'est pas un
ne.
Mais si les sophismes paraissent similaires, la rsolution diffre.
Tout d'abord, le sophisme doit tre ni, c'est--direque la proposition
initialeestfausse, alors que chez Albertelle tait vraie;sans doute est-ce
telle qu'elle a t reformule.
cause de l'vidence de Yimprobatio
Reste alors rfuterla probatio.En admettant le casus, on peut aller
jusqu' concder: patrem meum credo esse asinum29. Pour quelle
raison? Jean Buridan reste ici assez elliptique: quia patrem meum
credebam esse assinum, sed non secundum hanc propositionem
"pater meus est asinus" sed secundum istam "hoc est asinus".
Ainsi, il ne faitnullementappel la distinctiondu sens compos et du
sens divis, qui aurait pu tre ici pertinente.Il n'explicite pas plus son
raisonnement, mais il suffitde le replacer dans son contexte pour
l'clairer.
Pour toute la srie de sophismes dans laquelle celui-ci prend place,
Jean Buridan a introduitla ncessit de recourir ce qu'il nomme
appellation de raison30.Celle-ci rsultede la prsence de verbes tels
que comprendre,connatre, savoir, et elle ne doit tre prise en
compte que lorsque le terme suit un tel verbe. Il est clair que selon la
28JeanBuridan,
IV, 11, p. 73.
Sophismata,
29Id. , ibid.
, d. 81.
30Cf. Id.yibid.,pp. 72-73:
istasophismasciendum
estquod istaverba
Propter
de quibuspostdicemus,
etparticipia
"intelligo",
"cognosco","scio" ethuiusmodi,
et nominaindedescendentia
cum quibusconstruuntur
[...] faciuntin terminis
terminos
cum
quosdammodosspecialesappellationum
[...]. Talia verbafaciunt
quibus construuntur
appellare rationessecundumquas impositasunt ad
significandum.
45

12:29:20 PM

thorie buridanienne, la diffrenceentre patrem meum credo esse

asinum et credo patrem meum esse asinum est essentiellementque
dans la premire proposition le terme n'appelle pas la raison selon
- pour que
laquelle cet individu est compris et significomme pre
la proposition soit vraie, il suffitdonc que je croie que ceci, de
manire indtermine, est un ne - , tandis que dans la seconde
proposition,le termeappelle sa raison, c'est--dire,pour aller vite, le
concept qui le rend signifiant.Par l s'claire la formulationburidanienne: de mon pre, je croyais que c'tait un ne, non pas selon la
proposition"mon pre est un ne" mais selon la proposition"ceci est
un ne".
Rien de tel ne se trouvechez Albertde Saxe. Le sophisme 33 parat
bien s'approcher de cette ide, mais il s'y agit en vritde tout autre
chose. A l'argumentationqui a t prsenteplus haut, l'auteur ajoute
ceci:
Et ideo
hocverbum
seit,appellaisuamformam.
Quandoenimli a sequitur
hocverbum
hecestfalsaa Sortesseitesseidemipsia. Quandoenimpecedit
Sortesa
Et ideohecbeneconceditur
seit,tuncnonappellaisuamformam.
ipsia seitesseidem.
Ce qui est ici nomm appellation de la formeest un phnomne
rsultant du fait qu'une expression suit un verbe intentionnel.On
pourrait donc au premier abord faire l'hypothse qu'il s'agit d'une
reformulationde la doctrineburidanienne, attribuantun type spcifique d'appellation aux termes qui suivent un verbe signifiantun acte
de l'esprit. Mais il faudraitalors attribuer Albert une confusionsingulirepour quelqu'un qui devait tre familierde la doctrineburidanienne - entredeux choses que le matrede Bthune s'attache prcisment diffrencier:le renvoi appellatifd'un terme sa forme,
ou ce que Marsile d'Inghen nommera plus rigoureusementson
signififormel,et l'appellation de raison, qui seule caractrise,selon
Jean Buridan, les verbes signifiantdes actes de l'esprit. On peut avancer une autre hypothse,selon laquelle l'appellation de la formeselon
Albert n'est ni l'appellation du signifi formel, ni l'appellation de
raison.
Il faut commencer par remarquer que l'exemple n'est pas propre
Buridan, donc ne lui est pas ncessairementemprunt,d'autant que
la formulationd'Albert est un peu diffrente.En revanche, on trouve
une fois de plus le mme nonc chez Guillaume Heytesbury,parmi
les exemples relevantdu huitimemode de divisionet de composition:
Patrem tuum credis esse asinum, igitur credis patrem tuum esse
46

12:29:20 PM

asinum31.Mais ici encore, Heytesburyse contented'opposer le sens

compos et le sens divis. Il nous reste donc expliquer l'usage
qu'Albert fait de l'appellation, ce que l'on peut faire en se tournant
vers le chapitre 11 de la Perutilislogica.
Tout en manifestantsans doute l'importance prise par le concept
d'appellation dans les discussions propresau milieu parisien, ce chapitre s'carte, par son contenu, de la doctrine buridanienne. En vertu
du vieil adage selon lequel le prdicat appelle sa forme,l'appellation
y est prsentecomme une propritdu prdicat. Mais il ne s'agit ni
de rduite immdiatement l'appellation un cas de supposition
(comme le faisait Guillaume d'Ockham), ni de nommer appellation
tout renvoi des choses que le terme signifieet pour lesquelles il ne
suppose pas (comme chez Jean Buridan), ni plus forte raison
(comme c'tait le cas avec Guillaume de Sherwood) de penser par l
le renvoi une forme commune. Que le prdicat appelle sa forme
signifie que, prcisment dans la forme mentale ou vocale selon
laquelle un terme se trouve prdiqu dans une proposition, il peut se
vrifier,dans une autre proposition au prsent, du pronom dmonstratifqui renvoie ce pour quoi suppose le sujet de la premire32.Si
l'homme est un animal est vraie, je peux dire ceci est un animal
en montrantun homme, le prdicat devant conserverla formequ'il
a dans la propositioninitiale. La formesemble donc ici tire dans
le sens de la configurationdu terme, sa formelogique ou grammaticale.
Aprs avoir numr des rgles qui concernent l'appellation dans
une propositionau prsent, au pass, au futurpuis la modalit du
possible, Albert ajoute une cinquime rgle qui prend en compte les
verbes tels qu' intelligo,scio, cognosco.Ils ne sont pas dsigns, par
l'expression habituelle, comme des verbes signifiantdes actes de
l'esprit. Mais ils sont caractrisspar le faitque, lorsqu'ils sont suivis
et non pas seulement d'un adjectifou seulement d'un
d'une complexio
substantif,l'adjectif n'appelle pas seulement sa forme- au sens qui
- donc ici son
a t prcis plus haut - mais galement sa complexio
union, sa conjonction avec un substantif.En revanche, ce n'est pas
le cas si le termeprcde le verbe. Par exemple, il est vrai que Deum
trinum et unum cognovit Aristoteles; cette proposition quivaut
hoc cognovitAristoteles,o hoc renverrait Dieu. Mais Aristote31Guillaume
Tractatus
desensu
etdiviso
, f 3va.
Heytesbury,
composito
32Cf. Albert
de Saxe,Perutilis
, Venise1522,f 16rb.
logica
47

12:29:20 PM

les cognovitDeum unum et trinumest faux parce que cela impliquerait que non seulement le Philosophe et connu Dieu, ce qui tait le
cas, mais encore qu'il l'et connu comme un et trine, ce qui n'tait
pas le cas33. On retrouvedes phnomnes voisins de ceux qui ont t
tudis par Jean Buridan. Selon sa place dans une proposition, une
expression qui renvoie certaineschoses ne s'y rfrepas de la mme
manire, si bien que son contenu de connaissance - ce qu'elle donne
comprendre,donc sa signification,en un sens large - est diffrent.
Mais Albert se garde d'introduire l'ide d'appellation de raison, l
mme o Buridan y faisait appel, par exemple propos de l'nonc
canonique, d'inspiration aristotlicienne, Sortem venientem tu
cognoscis.
Cette dmarche s'tend aux cas o la complexio
qui suit le verbe est
une proposition. Supposons par exemple que a signifiela proposition
Deus est mais que tu l'ignores. a scis esse verum doit tre tenue
pour vraie: il suffitpour cela que hoc scias esse verum, hoc renvoyant au sujet de la proposition a scis esse verum. En revanche,
d'aucune chose vraie tu ne sais que c'est a puisque par hypothsetu
ignores que Deus est est la propositiona. On peut donc estimerque
dans le cas o la proposition suit le verbe, elle appelle sa forme. A
l'vidence, cela implique ici que le savoir ou la croyance porte sur la
propositionDeus est elle-mme, ou plus prcismentque l'on sache
que a signifie Deus est. La forme n'est donc pas simplement ici
l'identit soi matrielledu terme,bien qu'elle l'implique, ni un renvoi smantique, d'un type spcifique, qui devrait tre distingu des
relationshabituelles de significationet de supposition, mais l'identit
du termesignifiantcomme tel, qu'il soit simple ou complexe. Le sens
de cette notion n'est pas facile prciser, mais il est clair que celle-ci
est sensiblementdiffrentede la ratioburidanienne.
Mme si, dans la Perutilislogica, Albert de Saxe reste assez allusif
concernantce dernierexemple, cela suffit clairer les quelques phrases des Sophismataqui avaient initialementretenu notre attention.Le
sophisme XXXIII prcise: Quando enim li a sequitur hoc verbum
44
seit", appellai suam formam34;et le sophisme XXXIV: Sortes in
dicto casu in universali patrem suum seit esse hominem sed ignort
hoc in propria formaet in particulari[,..]35. En effet,Socrate sait de
33On peutsouligner
au passagequ'on trouvele mmeexemplechezGuillaume
Averros.
attribu
Heytesbury,
34Albertde Saxe,Sophismata
, XXXIII, sien,m II va.
35Id., ibid.
, m II vb.
48

12:29:20 PM

manire gnrale que son pre est un homme - il tient, juste titre,
cette propositionpour vraie - mais d'aprs le casus, la formepropre
de la croyancede Socrate ce momentest ceci est un ne, le pronom
ceci renvoyant un individu qui est son pre, alors mme qu'il
ignore cette identi. Toute proposition qui suit le verbe croire ou
savoir appelle sa forme,ce qui fondela non-substituabilitd'expressions de rfrencequivalente, pour peu qu'elles soientde formediffrente.L'appellation de la forme ne recouvre donc pas une simple
confusionentreles deux typesd'appellation distinguspar Jean Buridan. Albertcherche laborer, en intgrantles phnomnes smantiques que son an expliquait grce l'appellation de raison, une thorie de l'appellation qui s'appuie sur la seule notion de forme,et il se
dmarque ainsi dlibrmentde la thorie buridanienne.
*

La manire dont Albert de Saxe analyse les noncs contenant le

verbe savoir manifestepar consquent un cart avec les thoriesde
Jean Buridan, cart d'autant plus remarquable qu'il parat fortimprobable qu'Albert ait ignor ces thories. D'ailleurs, la place accorde
l'appellation n'est sans doute pas sans rapportavec l'importance que
Jean Buridan avait redonne ce concept. Le faitqu'il inclut dans ses
rgles concernant l'appellation le cas des verbes cognitifsconfirme
qu'il s'insre dans un contexte doctrinal fortementmarqu par Jean
Buridan. Pourtant, ce ne sont pas les Sophismatadu philosophe picard
qui lui serventde modle quand il rdige son propre recueil de sophismes. Du moins pour ce qui est des sophismes du savoir, ni la formulation littraledes exemples, ni les principes qui guident l'analyse ne
sont ceux de son an, dans ce qu'ils avaient de spcifique. En revanche, bien des traitsvoquent les textesde Guillaume Heytesbury. On
sait que ce logicien tait connu Paris ds l'poque de Grgoire de
Rimini. Mais Albert de Saxe contribue diffuser Paris un stylede
reflectionsur le savoir qui n'est identique ni la rflexionpistmologique sur le sujet de la science, ni la rflexionde Jean Buridan sur
les verbes signifiantdes actes de l'esprit, cette dernire impliquant
toute une smantique qui n'est pas exactement celle d'Albert.
La voie choisie lie troitementla distinctiondu sens compos et du
sens divis d'une part, l'tude des verbes signifiantdes actes de l'esprit
d'autre part. En un certainsens, rien n'est moins original que d'utiliser la distinctiondu sens compos et du sens divis dans l'analyse
49

12:29:20 PM

sophismatique. La forcede Guillaume Heytesburyfutpluttde systmatiserla rflexionsur cette distinctionet de la dvelopper pour ellemme. Il semble, d'aprs N. Kretzmann36,que cette systmatisation
etdivison'ait pas eu
que reprsentepar excellence le De sensucomposito
de postritdirecte avant le milieu du XVe sicle. Cependant, Guillaume Heytesburyscelle, dans le deuxime traitde ses Regulae, le lien
entrel'usage de cettedistinctionet l'analyse des verbes d'attitudepropositionelle- auxquels il rattacheles modalits. Cela trouvedes prolongements chez de nombreux auteurs. En un sens, Albert de Saxe
prend place dans cetteligne. Ce n'est pas que, sur ce point, il perfectionne la thorie: ses analyses sont succinctes,en regard des dveloppements que l'on trouve chez le logicien d'Oxford. Mais c'est ces
mmes principes qu'il fait appel, plus ou moins explicitement,dans
ses Sophismata.Ainsi, dans ce domaine, Albert de Saxe est plus un
relais pour l'introductionou la diffusionen France d'une dmarche
inspire d'auteurs oxoniens, en ce cas prcis de Guillaume Heytesbury, qu'il n'est proprementparler un disciple de Jean Buridan.
Paris
CNRS
36Cf. N. Kretzmann,
art.cit.

50

12:29:20 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 1 (1989)
Grand Designs
The Peace Plans of theLate Renaissance

MIRIAM ELIAV-FELDON

The frustrationof intellectualswho attemptto cure mankind of its

folliesis perennial and proverbial. Reactions to this frustration,at all
times, range fromresignationto revolution. In the sixteenthcentury
resignation received philosophical expression in Neostoicism which
taughtthewise man how to survivein adversityand preservehis peace
of mind and moral rectitude,and as an extreme example of revolutionaryreaction one could cite the Mnsterite attemptto establish a
New Jerusalem by force. In between these two poles lies the field of
utopias: literarydescriptionsof thingsas theyshould be, visions to be
aspired to but oftenwithout a prescriptionas to how they are to be
attained. For this weakness- the absence of a precise bridge leading
from reality to ideal- utopias are frequentlydismissed as ' 'melancholic sighs" which are not calls foraction. Yet not all utopists were
armchair intellectualsindulging in day dreams, and one of the tantalizing aspects of the study of their visions is the attemptto deduce
the means by which they hoped to realize the dream, or, in other
words, what they considered to be possible agents of change.
Most Renaissance utopias were blueprintsfora single perfectcommunityexistingwithinan unreformedworld. Thus theirauthors had
to contendwith the question of the relationsof theirideal societywith
the rest of the still-imperfect
world. In certain cases the problem was
solved by locating the Utopian countryin such a remote place that it
would be cut offfrom the rest of civilization, hidden and protected
from its evils; other utopists imagined their perfectcommunity as
strongenough to repel any invader and even, when necessary, to conquer neighboursand impose upon themthe ideal way oflife; and some
visionaries claimed that the securityof their land would be assured
since its Utopian simplicity, austerity and absence of gold would
deflectthe envy and greed of potential enemies. Yet in none of the
51

12:29:26 PM

more famous dreams of social perfectionis therea vision of an entirely

warless world.1
But is it true to say, then, thatin the earlymodern period "war was
taken for granted as a fixed necessity of human life"2? Was war
accepted fatalistically?Although the explanations of war and violence
in the sixteenthcentury, as John Hale points out,3 were becoming
more complex and more secular, one still often encountered the
insistencethat they were part and parcel of God's design, a scourge
or punishment for human sins, an unavoidable aspect of life in this
vale of tears. Non-theological analyses also frequentlyexplained the
phenomenon of war as determinedby powers beyond human control
such as astral influences; and, with some new psychologicalinsights,
as consequences of man's natural inclinationto violence which could
not be completely eradicated. Indeed, for most people in the late
Renaissance, war, like the plague, was an inevitable natural disaster.
Yet the sixteenthcenturywas also the period of the firstmassive attack
on the glorificationof militancy,as well as the firstserious attemptto
regardviolence as a curable human folly.And therewere at least a few
individuals who dared envisage an entirelywarless world, forbesides
the ideal imaginarysingle community,therewere several universalist
utopias and blueprintsforinternationalpeace.4 But were these "mere
chimeras"? Were their authors offeringonly "things one may wish
for... but not hope for"?5 If not, by what means did they thinkthat
theirprogrammescould be realized? To whom or to what could they
pin their hopes for the attainmentof these grand designs?
1 On thequestion
ofwarinutopias,seeS. Avineri,
WarandSlavery
inMore'
s Utopia
,
in: International
Reviewof Social History,7 (1962), 260-290;MiriamEliavSocieties
Feldon,Realistic
1516-1630,
oftheRenaissance,
Utopias:TheIdealImaginary
Oxford1982.
2 GeorgeClark,WarandSociety
intheSeventeenth
1958,p. 6.
Century,
Cambridge
3 JohnR. Hale, WarandPublic
intheFifteenth
andSixteenth
in: Past
Centuries,
Opinion
andPresent,
22(1962),18-35;Id. Sixteenth-Century
in:
Explanations
ofWarandViolence,
51 (1971),3-26.
Pastand Present,
4 The distinction
between
thecityutopia(inspired
byVenice)and theuniversalist
ed origini
utopia(inspiredby Rome) was madeby Rodolfode Mattei,Contenuto
nelSeicento
universalista
di filosofia
deldiritto,
10
dell'ideale
, in: Rivistainternazionale
(1930),391-401.
5 It wasThomasMore's concluding
remark
in Utopia
whichsuggested
thatthedeswasmerewishful
hissuccessors
oftheidealsociety
inthegenreall
thinking;
cription
thattheirownvision,unlikethoseoftheirpredecessors,
wasnotan imposprotested
- e.g. RobertBurton,("A Utopiaof Mine Own") in theAnatomy
sibledream
of
andBaconas composers
of
Plato,More,Andreae,
, dismisses
Campanella
Melancholy
butmerechimeras",
(London1926,Vol. I, p. 117).
"wittyfictions,
52

12:29:26 PM

Propagandists for peace, throughout the ages, have been

4
stigmatizedby theircontemporariesat best as naive or 'enthusiasts"
(i.e. madmen) and at worstas cowards, traitorsand criminalsagainst
society. Historiographytoo tends on the whole to relegate them to the
"rubbish bin" of History. It is mostly historians who feel personal
sympathyforthe dreamers, members of pacifistsects or supportersof
groups seekingpeaceful solutionsto today's conflicts,thatdevote their
attentionto the historyof the quest forpeace.6 Althoughthis does not
necessarilydetractfromthe scholarlyvalidityof theirresearch,at least
some of the studies have a hagiographical flavour. It is a subject on
which it is particularlydifficultto remain detached and unbiased.
Nevertheless,historianscannot ignore the corpus of peace literature
forit provides a valuable collectionof documents reflectingtheirown
times- reflectionson changing political realities, opinions on particular acts of belligerency,certain strains of political thought,views
of human nature, contemporaryhopes and aspirations, and what at
the time were considered to be feasible solutions. For attitudesto war
and peace are importantnot solely as links in a chain of ideas stretching fromAntiquityto our day, but as windows into the minds of
those expressing them.
Many of the thoughtson peace expressed in the sixteenthand early
seventeenthcenturieshad precedentsin Greek, Roman, early Christian and medieval literature. As with Renaissance philosophy in
general, few of the ideas were completely original. It is in the particularsyncreticblend of various conceptions, and in the fusionof old
and new ideals that we must seek the uniqueness of that period's
attitudes.But mainly, it was the quantity
of peace literaturewhich constituteda novel quality. Therefore, the firstquestion to be asked is
why was there such a sudden "explosion" of peace efforts?
Firstand foremost,because thiswas a particularlywarringera. The
subject of wars in the early-modernperiod has been studied sufficiently not to need repetition.7 One needs only to stress the
appearance of new factors: the crystallizationof the nation states in
conflictwith the imperial claims and designs of the Habsburgs; the
whole range of implicationsof the developmentof firearms;the Refor6 Forexample,we owemuchofourknowledge
to Menofthehistory
ofpacifism
suchas HaroldS. BenderandJohnHowardYoder.
nonitehistorians
7 Foran excellent
war:JohnR. Hale,
to thesubjectofearly-modern
introduction
620, London1985.
inRenaissance
WarandSociety
, J450-1
Europe
53

12:29:26 PM

mation which led to the era of religious wars, both civil and international; the new arenas of conflictwith the beginning of the colonial
age; and finally the Turkish policies of expansion which were feltto
menace almost every European state. Consequently, war was more
prevalent, more devastating, more ideologically motivated, consuming more economic resources and affectingmore people than ever
before.
The printingpress is another obvious reason. The vast quantityof
peace literaturecould be accounted forsimplyby the factthatthe postGutenberg era has bequeathed to posterityindiscriminatelyevery
printedword. And growingliteracy greatlyaccelerated by the invention of printing considerably enlarged the reading and concerned
public.
But in addition to political and technological reasons, there were
intellectual developments to which the proliferation of anti-war
literature could be attributed. Renaissance culture begot the first
generations of lay intellectuals and freed them from the contemptus
mundiand the prohibition imposed by theology on imagining ideal
states-of-affairsin this world- the necessary conditions for the
appearance of the Utopian genre; the large storehouses of classical
ideals and philosophies which it opened offerednew inspirationsand
influences;while the newly-discoveredlands overseas suggestedalternative modes of social relations. On the otherhand, the fragmentation
of Christendom in the aftermathof the Reformationkindled aspirations forre-unificationand, at the same time,led to a grudgingacceptance of pluralityand a heated debate on toleration.
And it was also the Reformation and the numerous sects which
mushroomed in its wake that led to the spread of pacifism. The term
'
'
'pacifism' should be reserved, I believe, only fornon-resistance,the
originally-Christianabsolute prohibitionon the participationin war.8
44
Though neither universal nor officiar', this was undoubtedly the
predominant doctrine of the churches in the early centuries, until
eschatological hopes for imminent redemption died out, and until
Christianitybecame the state religion of an empire beleaguered by
barbarians. From the fourthcenturyonwards the Church retainedthe
ideal of peace only in its imagery of the City of God, and in "voca8 Forthehistory
inparticular
recommended
arePeter
ofpacifism
history,
throughout
The
inEurope
to1914, Princeton
1972;andJamesTurnerJohnson,
Brock,Pacifism
MoralTraditions
in Western
Cultural
1987.
, Princeton
Quest
JorPeace:Three
History
54

12:29:26 PM

tional pacifism" of the clergyand the monastic orders. It attempted

to restrainbloodshed amongst Christians by the elaboration of a Just
War theory,and by chanelling militaryaggression towards holy wars
against the infideland the heretic. Amongst those regarded as heretics
were medieval dissidents for whom absolute pacifismwas a mark of
the true Christian.
But the pacifismof medieval sects is poorlydocumented. Beforethe
printing-pressand without the approval of the spiritual rulers of
Europe, they had little chance of leaving behind them sufficient
evidence oftheirprecise beliefs.It is thereforeonly in the fifteenth
centhat
we
a
encounter
first
time
full
for
the
and
tury
comprehensive
exposition of a pacifistideology in the teachings of Peter Chelick,
the leader of the the Bohemian Brethren; and only with the
appearance of Anabaptist groups in the 1520,s did pacifismbecome a
widespread phenomenon, a definitehallmark of a large number of
sects spread throughoutEurope. "The Sword is outside the perfection
of Christ", they declared, and thereforeno true Christian should
wield it.
Yet, paradoxical thoughit may sound, the pacifistsof the sixteenth
and early-seventeenth
centurieswere not seekersof peace. Their nonresistanceand rejectionof violence were part of theirseparationismor
withdrawl. The Sword, they said, was ordained by God and was
necessary for the governmentof the non-perfectworld which would
continue to exist until the next divine interventionin the course of
history.Furthermore,sufferingwas an importantsign of belonging to
the minorityof the elect. If violence were to cease, the whole world:
view of the pacifistsectarians would lose its raisond'tre
"theGospelanditsadherents
arenottobe protected
bythesword,norarethey
thustoprotect
themselves...
TrueChristian
believers
aresheepamongwolves,
inanguish
andaffliction,
tribulation,
sheepforslaughter:
theymustbe baptized
anddeath;theymustbe triedwithfire,andmustreach
persecution,
suffering
thefatherland
ofeternal
theirbodily,
butbymortifying
their
rest,notbykilling
enemies".9
spiritual,
And although there were pacifistsalso amongst spiritualistsand sectarians who did not share this Anabaptist theology of martyrdom,
even their pacifism- of men such as Sebastian Franck or Faustus
Socinus- was not profferedto all mankind but only to the small
9 FromConradGrebel'sletter
toThomasMntzer,
quotedin GeorgeH. Williams
andAngelM. Mergal(eds.),Spiritual
andAnabaptist
Writers,
1957,p. 80.
Philadelphia
55

12:29:26 PM

minorityof exceptional men capable of being guided by the spiritof

Christ. They had no pretensions of reformingthe world.
It was only in the second half of the seventeenthcentury,with the
appearance of the Quakers, that pacifistsectarianismjoined the camp
world advocates. For the Quakers regarded themof peace-in-thisselves as true Christians whose mission was to leaven the world, not
to leave it; the Gospel of love became in theirhands moral praxis to
be taughtto all mankind, not only a mode of worshipwithinthe communityof the elect. And it was thereforea Quaker who is oftencited
as the first pacifist to have composed a peace plan for human
"
society- William Penn's Essay towards the Present and Future
Peace of Europe by the Establishmentof an European Diet, Parliament or Estates" (1693).
Should we then exclude the pacifistsectarians fromour discussion
of peace effortsin the late Renaissance? Not altogether.For, despite
their intentions, the pacifists' contribution to changing attitudes
towards war was considerable. Firstly,because by theirmessage and
example they helped spread the ideal of peace and the negation of
violence as contraryto Christ's teachings. They penetratedlayers of
the population which had no access to the words of the humanists.
Their courage and martyrdomaroused admiration even in the hearts
of those who were not members or supporters.In fact,in this respect
'
"
theywere indeed subversive' enough forthe powers-that-beto need
to resort to counter-propaganda to justify their military activities.
They kept alive the debate on the religiousjustificationof aggressive
behaviour and forcedtheologiansto apply theirbest scholasticabilities
in order to refutethe pacifists' claim that forChristians every use of
force was illicit.10 And, most importantly perhaps, it was their
spiritual heirs who were to become in futuregenerations the torchbearers of world-directedpacifismwhich is stillinfluentialin Western
civilization.
Erasmus was one of the sources of inspiration for several of the
pacifistideologists,yethe supplied a much largerarsenal of arguments
against war than the purely theological. It is indeed to Erasmian
works
humanism that we owe the vast majorityof sixteenth-century
the
New
as
to
which presentedviolence not only contrary
Testament,
but also as contraryto nature, as immoral, unprofitable,beastly and
10Cf. WalterF. Bense,ParisTheologians
on WarandPeace,1521-1529,
in: Church
41 (1972) 168-185.
History,
56

12:29:26 PM

horrible.Many of the writingson the subject- poetry,drama, essays

and pamphlets- were often but direct translationsor adaptations of
Erasmus's own literaryproduction,11since it would have been really
quite difficultto add to or improve on the brilliance and thoroughness
of the master's QuerelaPads. When his name became anathema to the
establishment,the copyingand borrowingof his ideas continuedwithout acknowledgement of the source. He thus amply deserves the
honour of having the entire traditionnamed afterhim.12
For by no means did all humanists share the Erasmian negation of
violence. "Humanism", as we well know, did not necessarilydenote
humanitarianism. Many humanists continued the Just War tradition;13many mined the classical sources in order to glamorize particular militaryactivitiesof their governments;and, needless to say,
the Machiavellian strippingof political force from moral considerations was also part of the humanist tradition.Furthermore,even with
many of the Erasmians one suspects that their motivation was not
necessarilya deep-feltpityforhuman sufferingbut ratherthe intellectual's desire for serenityand peace of mind, as well as an aesthetic
revulsion in view of the chaos created by war.
Whatever theirmotives, however, this massive Erasmian output of
condemnation, particularlyof the violent activities of rulers, though
it did not perhaps affectthe course of politicalevents, resultedin a new
ethos forthe communityof scholars and merchants,forall those who
could profitfromtranquillity.The essential quality of this ethos was
the deglorificationof war and of the militaryvirtues, a direct attack
upon chivalric, patriotic and crusading values. Moreover, it denied
the fatalisticacceptance of war and presented it as a formof human
folly,a man-made evil due to the vices of rulersdrunk on power and
greed, which could be overcome by listening to the voice of reason.
Education, based on Christian and classical ethics, was the key. The
11JamesHutton,
Erasmus
andFrance:
thePropaganda
inStudiesintheRenaisforPeace,
NewYork,1984;
sance,8 (1961),103-127;Id. Themes
ofPeaceinRenaissance
Poetry,
fora critique
ofErasmus's
seeP. Brachin,Voxclamantis
indeserto,
in: Collopacifism,
I, Paris1972.
Turonensia,
quiaErasmiana
12JamesTurner
andtheLimitation
Reason,
1975;
Johnson,
Ideology,
ofWar,Princeton
andtheRestraint
1981.
ofWar,Princeton
Id.,JustWarTradition
13On thevariety
ofthehumanists:
ofattitudes
R. H. Bainton,Christian
Attitudes
Toward
WarandPeace,
London1961; RobertT. Adams,TheBetter
PartofValor
: More,
Colet
andVives
onHumanism,
Seattle1962;J. A.
Erasmus,
War,andPeace,1496-1535,
TheState,WarandPeace
: Spanish
Political
intheRenaisFernndez-Santamaria,
Thought
1977.
sance,
1516-1559,
Cambridge
57

12:29:26 PM

Christian Prince could be converted to the ideal of peace; the Christian Church could returnto its mission of love and universal concord.
Once enlightened, the rulers would agree to resolve all conflictsby
arbitrationrather than by force. Then all of society would reap the
benefitsof peace which are always immeasurably greater than any
spoils of war.
Education for the lites and arbitration as means for preventing
armed conflictwere the sole definitemeasures which Erasmus himself
and most of his disciples could offer.It is in the denunciation of war,
rather than in solutions to it, that lies their importance. And their
weakness resides not solely in the absence of concrete proposals and
in the total reliance on the good will of princes, but also in the
loophole, leftgrudginglyopen by Erasmus, forjust wars a loophole
that could easily grow into a wide gate to admit practicallyevery act
of hostility.
Since religionwas, in the centuryafterthe Reformation,one of the
main causes of bloodshed and the most frequentjustificationforwar,
the issues of toleration and peace were naturally bound together.14
There could be no end to violence, many pronounced, unless a solution were found to the enmities over religious beliefs. The solution
could be one of two kinds: re-unificationor acceptance of diversity.
Re-unificationcould be attained by reducingChristianityto its essen, retaining only the common
tials, stripping it of the adiaphora
denominators which were mostly within the realm of beliefs and
disregardingdifferenceswhich were mainly in manners of worship.
For many Catholics, heirs to the spiritualist movement within
Catholicism in the 1520*8, the hope forreunion was oftenattached to
the conciliar ideal even long afterthe Council ofTrent had proved the
intransigenceof the Militant Church.15The Joachite tradition,which
enjoyed a revival in the sixteenthcentury,16could be used to interpret
the confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism as an
apocalyptic stage signaling the imminentcoming of the Kingdom of
God and the reign of peace and unity. But once more, it was the Eras14Joseph
andtheReformation
Lecler,Toleration
, 2 vols.,NewYork1960(first
published
in French,1955).
15On conciliar
Eretici
italiani
del
cf.DelioCantimori,
century,
hopesinthesixteenth
:
and Conformity
Florence1967 (1939); Id., Submission
ricerche
storiche
,
Cinquecento:
'Nicodemism
' andthe
in: E.
Solution
totheReligious
Question,
ofa Conciliar
Expectations
Cochrane(ed.), TheLateItalianRenaissance
, London1970.
16MarjorieReeves, TheInfluence
in
in theLateMiddleAges:a Study
of Prophecy
Oxford1969.
Joachimism.
58

12:29:26 PM

mian philosophiaChristiwhich produced the best eirenic literatureand

the most significantsearch for the unifyingaspects of Christianityoftenfromthe pens of exiles such as Acontius, Castellio, Celsi, who
togetherformed a "third camp" fightingfor survival between the
hammer of intolerant Calvinism and the anvil of intransigent
Catholicism.
The polarizarion, fragmentation,intolerance and persecution of
dissidents,produced a phenomenon unique to the sixteenthcentury:
the practice of religious dissimulation or, in the name it was given
then, Nicodemism.17Individuals and groups who could not flee and
had no appetite formartyrdom,concealed theirbeliefsand outwardly
practised the religion of the state. Necessity soon developed into an
ideology: external forms of worship were insignificantto salvation
whichwas dependenton innerbeliefsonly; therefore,therewas no sin
in participatingin any formof devotion, as long as one remained true
in one's heart to the spiritof God. Adapted to a divided and battling
Christendom, but sustained by a unifyingvision, some nicodemites
congregated in clandestine sects, the most famous of which was the
Family of Love.18 Hendrik Niclaes, the founderof the sect, produced
two texts which could possibly be interpretedas peace utopias: the
TerraPads , and the OrdoSacerdotis.
But the firstwas more of an allegory
in which the pilgrimagefromthe world of darkness into the Land of
Peace was probablyintendedto depict the passage fromthisworld into
the afterlife;and the second was concerned largely with the priestly
hierarchyand theecclesiasticalorganization of the ideal sect preparing
the world for the New Jerusalem. Most of the known personalities
connected with the Family of Love, however, did not remain forlong
attached to the messianic and charismaticpretensionsof the founder
and lefthis banner to followinstead the milder,more humanistic,Barrefeltwhose version of spiritualistnicodemism is known as Hielism.
Among them were printers,cartographers, scholars and merchants
adapting Erasmianism to the necessities of the era of the wars of
religion. As we shall see, one of the more interestingpeace plans was
penned by an Italian, Francesco Pucci, who was well acquainted with
Familism and built his entire programme of reformationaround the
core of a secret society.
17D. Cantimori,
II Nicodemismo:
e dissimulazione
Simulazione
op.cit.; CarloGinzburg,
del'500,Turin1979.
religiosa
nell'Europa
18AlastairHamilton,
TheFamily
1981.
, Cambridge
ofLove
59

12:29:26 PM

But while many dreamtof re-unificationon the basis ofa simplified,

tolerant, spiritualist Christianity, there were others who, more
realisticallyperhaps, advocated the acceptance of thefactthatWestern
Christendomwas to remain divided, thatunitywould not be achieved
eitherby coercion or by conciliation, and that it was advisable, from
a utilitarianpoint ofview, to learn how to live peacefullywithreligious
plurality.This was the attitudewhich in France came to be known as
"politique", stressingthe needs of the stateabove those of the church.
A fewexceptional individuals, most notablyDirck VolkertszoonCoornhert,19went even furtherin theircall to accept pluralityof beliefsnot
only grudginglyand provisionallybut out of convictionin the virtues
of diversity.
Eirenism and toleration, however, did not always coincide with
political anti-militarism.A good example would be Hugo Grotius, an
Arminian who persistentlycalled for conciliation between the churches and aided his friend,Jean Hotman, in publishinghis collectedlist
of eirenica,20
yet is best known forhis internationallaw, a law based on
the assumption that aggressive relations between states could be
restrainedbut not eradicated.
A furtherintellectualtraditionrelevantto our study,one which was
also characteristicof the late Renaissance, expresses betterthan any
other the combination of optismisticexhilaration and helplessnessof
many of its best minds. Neoplatonism inspired the search for

'oneness", for unity and concord, through avenues of knowledge

which today are mostlygrouped under the title "occult". Astrology,
alchemy, Cabala, Hermeticism, as well as personal revelations,
divinationsand prophecieswere scrutinizedin orderto findthe secrets
of the universe and the keys for its manipulation. Various adepts of
this prisca theologia
, from Pico della Mirandola to Giordano Bruno,
believed that Man was endowed with the ability to comprehend the
mysteriesof God's designs and to aid in bringingabout the returnto
original harmony. This search, in some of the cases, had a political
mundi, a universal state where all barriers
facet as well- the concordia
between men would be abolished for ever.21
19Thierry
deconscience
surla libert
A l'aurore
modernes:
desliberts
Coornhcrt,
Synode
Paris1979.
Volkoff,
JosephLeclerand Marius-Franois
(1582),trans,and introd.
20G. H. M. Posthumous
in:
Literature,
Syllabus
ofEirenical
Meyjes,JeanHotman's
andtheContinent
andReformation:
DerekBaker(ed.), Reform
, Oxford1979,
England
175-193.
21On theseaspectsofRenaissance
see theworksofEugenioGarin,D. P.
thought
Walker,FrancesYates,and FranoisSecret.
60

12:29:26 PM

All these traditions- sectarian pacifism, Erasmian humanism,

eirenism, nicodemism and hermeticism- combined to form the
backgroundforthe handfulof peace programmesof the sixteenthand
early-seventeenthcenturies. The brief outline of these traditionseach of which has received ample attention from historians- was
necessary in order to emphasize the particular atmosphere in which
these proposals were conceived, an atmosphere totallydifferentfrom
eitherthat of the early fourteenthcenturywhich produced the peace
plans of Pierre Dubois, Dante and Marsilius of Padua, or, on the
other hand, the Enlightenmentwhich created the 4'perpetual peace' '
visions of Leibniz, Rousseau and Kant. War may be a perennial
curse, intellectuals may be always attempting to find means of
eradicatingit, but it is the specificconditionsand the ideals of the particularperiod which give shape and contentto the proposed solutions.
It is to the particularityof the late-Renaissance corpus of peace plans
that I should like to draw attention,withouthowever losing sight of
the varietywithinit, while focussingespecially on the instrumentsby
which these plans were supposed to materialize- since the means are
more determinedby the 'mental cage" of a specificperiod than the
end which is shaped by universal human aspirations.
The one major motivationforEuropeans to cease infightingand to
unite their forceswas the fear of the Turk. It was this peril which
forced even Erasmus to admit that certain defensive wars could be
justified.According to the vicissitudesin Europe's self-confidencethe
plans or calls fora Christian alliance against Islam, ever since the first
Crusade, were either defensive or offensive.In the early fourteenth
TerraeSanccenturythis urge produced Pierre Dubois' Recuperatione
tae;22 in the middle of the fifteenthcentury it motivated the grand
design of the Hussite King George Podiebrad of Bohemia;23 and its
lattermanifestationswere projectsencouraged by the crusading ambitions of Pope Paul V in the early seventeenthcentury.24That the
Ottomans were uppermost in European minds in the sixteenthcen25
tury is evident from the proliferation of Turcica, an enormous
22PierreDubois,TheRecovery
I. Brandt,
', trans,and intr.Walther
oftheHolyLand.
NewYork1956.
23Frederick
G. Heymann,
Princeton
1965;Otakar
George
ofBohemia,
KingofHeretics,
inEuropean
King:Bohemia
Ruteers1965.
Odloilk,TheHussite
Affairs,
1440-1471,
24ForotherCrusadeplansseeArmando
Christiana
Saitta,DallaResPublica
agliStati
Unitidi Europa
, Rome1948.
25C. Gllner,
Turcica:
Dieeuropaischen
Trkendrucke
desXVIJahrhunderts,
I: 1501-1550,
61

12:29:26 PM

amount of literatureof all kinds expressingthe fear, the curiosityand

the admiration aroused by the Ottoman Empire. Some suggested a
concerted war to drive the Moslems out of European territoriesand
to liberate the Holy Land; others proposed peaceful measures of
conversion- it was the old debate of Crusade versus Mission which
had begun afterthe destructionof the crusading state in the thirteenth
century.Although none of these projectswere inspiredby a desire for
universal peace, they are nonetheless importantas practical suggestions on how to put a stop to wars between political entitieswhich considered themselvesas belonging to the same brotherhoodand having
a common foe. This particulargenre practicallydisappeared afterthe
middle of the seventeenthcenturyas the power and the threatof the
Ottomans dwindled.
Crusade
One of the last examples of this genre was Ottavio Pallavicino's
4
'Repubblica Cristiana"26- an unpublished textfound in the Vatican
archives. It is dedicated to Pope Paul V and thus can be dated to the
years of his reign between 1605 to 1621. ApparentlyPaul V, like his
predecessorClement VII, by workingtowardsa coalition of European
states against the Turks, inspired several plans of this kind.
Pallavicino' s proposal is of the offensivetype: shocked, as he says, by
the plightof the Christiancommunitiesunder the Turkish yoke which
he had witnessed while touring the Middle East, he calls upon the
European princes to forgean alliance and to liberate all the conquered
Christian territories,fromHungary, throughConstantinople, to the
Holy Land. In the manner of all his predecessors in the genre, he
deplores the discord amongst the Christian nations which facilitates
the Turkish expansion. His firststep is thereforethe formationof a
league of all the rulers of what he considers to be the major powers
(including non-Catholics such as the king of England and the Duke of
Moscow, but without a mention of the northern states such as
Sweden). These states are to send their ambassadors to a Diet, the
supreme governing body of the alliance, and plan together the
necessary steps towards the desired goal. Strangely, Pallavicino does
Berlin1961;RobertH. Schwoebel,
Conversion
the
Coexistence,
, andtheCrusade
against
Turks
12 (1965),164-187.
, in: Studiesin theRenaissance,
26EdithPsztor,La Repubblica
di Ottavio
Pallavicino
Cristiana
, in: Rivistadi studi
18 (1951),67-84.
politiciinternazionali,
62

12:29:26 PM

not present this body as an international tribunal for arbitration

amongst its participants,and relies on the assumption that the princes
would keep the peace solelybecause of the oath of allegiance that they
take and theirdedication to the common cause. He draws a detailed
plan forthe organization and deploymentof the armies which would
attack the enemy on seven frontsand, if necessary, call the Persians
to their aid.
Pallavicino, however, goes beyond the call for a crusade to
envisage, in a utopia of sorts, the Christian republic to be created in
the liberated territories.He uses the term 4'Christian Republic" to
denote both the alliance of European governments,and the imaginary
state to be established after the conquest. The participants in the
League would relinquish any claim theymighthave on the liberated
areas and accept the creation of an internationally-governednew
entity. Once the crusade is crowned with success, a Senate of their
representativeswould rule over the new republic fromits seat in Constantinople.He describesin detail the functionsof the Senate in governing the new Christian Republic which would be a model of unity: it
would have one currency,one army, Latin as its common language,
one book of law- civil and criminal. As for religion, Pallavicino
rejects any thought of conversion by force- the Senate would pro' and wait until
claim " libertdi Conscienti
by colonization and gentle
the
all
inhabitants
would
become
persuasion
good Roman Catholics.
The defeatof the Turk and the creationof a Christian Republic would
herald ' 'un'altro secolo di Pace, come quello d'Ottaviano, et all'hora
si far unum Ovile et unus Pastor, tanto bramato". The new state,
created by the European states, would serve as a bulwark against any
potentialenemy; the two Christian Republics- the European alliance
and the new state- would thus be mutuallydependent, politicallyand
economically, to the benefitof both.
An alliance of princes, a crusade to defeat Ottoman power and a
creation of an internationally-governedChristian state on reconquered territory,are the componentsof Pallavicino' s peace vision.
It clearlysuffersfromseveral weaknesses: the absence of a machinery
for the setdementof disputes between the parties of the alliance and
the assumption, against all historical evidence, that they would be
easily persuaded to forget all differencesand grievances and participate together in a fight against a common enemy; complete
disregardof the wishes of the populace in the reconquered territories
who mightnot be necessarilymore contentunder this hybridgovern63

12:29:26 PM

ment, which was to keep them separated fromtheirco-nationals and

co-religionistsand tryto convert them to Roman Catholicism, than
under the relatively-tolerant
Ottoman rule; and the supposition,again
common cause of governing togethera
that
the
highly improbable,
new political entity would continue to serve the same purpose of
pacificationas the need to fighta common enemy. Pallavicino flatteringly reminds the princes of the past glories of theirancestors at the
time of the firstcrusade; yet the crusades ended in total disaster for
Christendom- whywould he assume that thistime it would herald an
age of peace? As most of his contemporaries,he pays the customary
lip-serviceto an idealized Pax Romana- yet his plan had no similarity
whatsoever to the relative peace attained by an empire at the apogee
of its power. Conventional, pedestrian, not too profound in its
political theory,Pallavicino's textis neverthelessan interestingdocument, for this obscure figureexpresses aspirations and hopes which
were probably more common than the sophisticated visions of the
more imaginative thinkers.
Balanceof Power
Anotherversionof "a war to end all wars" was offeredby the Duke
of Sully,27ministerand adviser to Henri IV to whom he attributedthe
plan. Its aim, he says, is "to establish peace in Europe and convert
the continual wars among its several princes into a perpetual war
against the infidels" (p. 47). But this was merely a hackneyed formula; he was far more concerned with the might of the Habsburgs
which he regarded as the main cause of the constant wars within
Christendom. His real aim is "the humbling of the house of Austria
(p. 27)", and what he proposes is "to divide Europe equally among
a certain number of powers and in such a manner that none of them
mighthave cause eitherof envy or fearfromthe possessions or powers
of the others"- in otherwords, a balance of power. And the firststep
should be "to divest the house of Austria of the empire and of all the
possessions in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries; in a word, to
reduce it to the sole kingdom of Spain (p. 35)", but to leave it all its
domains overseas in Asia, Africaand America. Obviously, Sully does
27Sully's
IV. From
theMemoirs
deBthune
Grand
ducdeSully
Design
ofMaximilien
ofHenry
withan introduction
Publications,
(1559-1641),
byDavigOgg,The Grotius
Society
1921,no. 2.
64

12:29:26 PM

not expect the Habsburgs to accept his scheme withoutresistanceand

thereforeplans in detail the militarypreparations of the European
coalition of nations united in their hostilityto the Empire.
The attainmentof peace by a violentre-arrangementof the political
map was a suggestion that would have horrified the Erasmian
humanistswho constantlypreached to the princes to preservethestatus
de resttdeschosespresentes",
was Aubert's28sucquo: "Soyezdonccontents
cint advice to the rulers whose ambitions were the cause of all strife.
But Sully, a pragmaticpolitican,would have derided such a sentiment
as naive: to expect a prince to be contentwith his lot was a contradiction in terms. In formingan alliance of rulers one should appeal not
to theirreason or good will but to theirgreed- all the states involved
stood to gain fromthe dismembermentof the Habsburg empire and,
although Sully protests that his project would bring no benefit to
France, it would make her the leader of European affairsand freeher
fromcompetitionwith and fear fromits paramount enemy. Peace, he
promises, would only enrich the coffersof the princes since it would
allow them "to save... those immense sums which the maintenance of
so many thousand soldiers, so many fortifiedplaces, and so many
militaryexpenses requires (p. 30)".
Unlike Pallavicino, Sully does not rely on the good faith of the
princes in keeping the peace once their collective goal has been
achieved. He thereforeproposes a general council, representingall the
statesof Europe, which would "deliberate on any affairswhich might
occur; ...discuss the differentinterests,pacify the quarrels, clear up
and determine all the civil, political and religious affairsof Europe,
whetherwithinitselfor with its neighbours (p. 42)". He devotes two
paragraphs to the compositionof this senate and its location but does
not elaborate on itsfunctionsor powers. It is also leftunclear as to how
it would share its arbitratingresponsibilitieswiththe Pope whom Sully
would compensate fordeprivinghim of his spiritualsupremacyby the
honour of being the mediator between the princes (p. 33).
A furtherpeculiarityof Sully's plan is the exclusion of Russia: "the
grand duke of Muscovy or czar of Russia. . . ought to be treated like
the Sultan of Turkey, deprived of his possessions in Europe, and confined to Asia only (p. 33)". The justificationis religious: "being in
part stillidolatersand in part schismatics... that there scarce remains
any conformitywith us among them (p. 32)". For Sully, himselfa
28Guillaume
dela paixetlesmoyens
Oraison
del'entretenir,
Paris1559,p. 12.
Aubert,
65

12:29:26 PM

Huguenot and servant to the most politiqueof princes, was willing to

admit threelegitimatereligions- Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinistbut he was strictlyagainst toleration"as thereis nothingin all respects
so pernicious as a libertyin belief(p. 32)". Basically he condones the
"cuius regio, eius religio" principle, and demands an iron hand
against all sects and religious innovations.
Sully's "grand design" has received far more praise and acclaim
fromhistoriansthan it trulydeserves.29Afterexpressingthe banal sentiment that "the happiness of mankind can never arise from war
(p. 22)", he proceeds to unfolda comprehensiveplan foran enormous
militaryoperation; while eulogizing Henry the Great's love of peace
and disinterested effortsto procure the happiness of Europe, he
describes the negotiations, plots in fact, to secure the alliance of
several princes to bring about the downfall of France's enemy.
Nowhere does he express any concern forthe well-beingof thepopulation, but only for the self-servingambitions of the princes. Furthermore, he is totallyEuropean-centred, regardingall territoriesoutside
Europe or in its peripherysimplyas propertyto be carved up or used
for bargain; and his "eirenism" is nothing but an admission that
Western Christendom has by now three distinctchurches, and that
each sovereign state has the rightto choose one of them as its dominant religion. What he calls "the happiest invention" of a European
senate was not original at all: it had been proposed, more precisely
and comprehensively,by Pierre Dubois in 1306, by King George of
Bohemia and his advisers in 1464, and Sully probably borrowed it
from a younger campatriot, Emeric Cruc. He should not be
regarded, I believe, as a spiritualprecursorto the "perennial peace"
of the philosophers of the Enlightenmentdespite the tributepaid to
him by the Abb of Saint Pierre, Rousseau and Kant. In fact,
although conceived during the reign of Henri IV and Philip II and
reflectingthe political needs of France in thatperiod, what Sully's plan
suggestedwas in the process of materializing in its general outline if
first
when
it
in
was
not detail
published (in 1638): forwhat was the
Thirty Years' War if not a great battle against the Habsburgs and a
29Sullyover-praised
etdesoninfluL. Lange,Histoire
inChristian
deladoctrine
Pacifique
The
surledveloppement
international
V. Souleyman,
ence
dudroit
, Paris,1927;Elizabeth
France
Vision
PeaceinSeventeenth
andEighteenth, London1941;Sylvester
ofWorld
Century
PeaceThrough
Plans
SixCenturies
, Chicago1943.Sully'sinfluforWorld
J. Hemleben,
und
traced by Fritz Dickmann,Friedensrecht
ence over futurepeace-seekers
1971.
, Gttingen
Friedenssicherung
66

12:29:26 PM

creation of a new balance of power in Europe? It is Richelieu, rather

than Kant, who should be considered an heir of Sully's, forhis militant policies were much nearer in intentionto Sully's design than the
"perennial peace" which was, in many respects,the intellectualreaction to the bitterlesson of the firstgreat internationalwar.
Trade
Le NouveauCyneby meric Cruc,30 on the other hand, has not
received the recognitionit deserves. It is undoubtedly the firstknown
truly universalist peace plan which calmly accepts the plurality of
political entities,religions,beliefsand customs, and offersa blueprint
forpeaceful co-existenceand harmonious relationsbetween all of them
withoutan attemptto impose any formof unity. Except forbeing both
French, less than one generationapart, Sully and Cruc had verylittle
in common. The one a ministerof the crown whose life was devoted
to the administrationof France's political and financial affairs,the
other a monk or schoolteacher who spent all his years in classical
studiesand academic wrangles; the one, a Huguenot, approved of the
Edict of Nantes but opposed any larger measure of toleration, the
other,a son ofone of the most militantleaders of the Catholic League,
advocated complete libertyof religion. Sully wanted an alliance of
European powers only, excluding even Russia; Cruc extended his
peace to illthe nations of the world, even claiming that the firststep
ought to be the end of aggression towards the Turk. If one is to judge
these programmesnot by the degree of theirrealism but by the commitmentto peace, there is no doubt that Cruc's deserves the higher
marks.
Le Nouveau Cyneis unique, not only in comparison with Sully's
plan, because unlike any of the otherprojects its main emphasis is on
commerce. Trade forCruc is both the means and the end ofhis entire
proposal: trade, not land, is the source of prosperity;economic prosperityof the countryshould be the firstobject of every ruler; war is
economically ruinous because of the expense involved and because it
harms trade- therefore,for these purely material interests,all rulers
30mericCruc,Le Nouveau
ThomasWilling
Balch,
Cyne
(1623),trans,andintrod.
SaittaUnriformatore
delRichelieu:
E.
1909;Armando
Philadelphia
contemporaneo
pacifista
in Rivistastorica
Universal
Cruc,
italiana,63 ( 1951^),180-215;MiriamEliav-Feldon,
Peace
: theVision
in: H. Ben-Israel
et al. (eds.),
Cruc,
ofTrade
fortheBenefit
ofEmeric
andNationalism
inEurope
andAmerica,
1986.
Ideology
Religion,
Jerusalem
67

12:29:26 PM

should always preferpeace to war. This is the essence of Cruc's argument. At the heightof Mercantilism, he was advocating freetrade; at
the height of the drogeance
ethic, when the aristocracyin France was
all
to
draw
it
could
clear
lines of demarcation between itselfand
doing
the merchant classes, Cruc was calling upon the king to become a
merchantand a money-lenderinstead of a militaryadventurer.To use
modern idiom, if Sully was proposing a kind of European Nato
alliance, Cruc - with a surprisinggrasp of the political possibilities
inherent in the commerical revolution- was suggesting a universal
Common Market: "to see men go here and there freely,and mix
togetherwithoutany hinderance of country,ceremonies,or othersuch
like differences,as if the earth were as it really is, a city common to
all (p. 66)' ' The concerted effortsof the rulers, once peace was
attained, would be directed to make riversnavigable, abolish piracy,
regulate prices, standardize measures and coins, minimalize taxes on
trade. The common interestsand economic benefitswould bind ail
nations togetherand prevent wars for ever.
An international court of arbitration, an assembly to which all
rulers- including the Turkish Sultan, the Emperor of China, the
King of Persia and even PresterJohn- would send their delegates,
was to settleall disputes. A prince who would not obey the decisions
of the court would suffersanctions and even be "pursued by arms"
by the other members. If Cruc did not mention delegates fromthe
New World, it was simplybecause by the beginningof the seventeenth
century it was regarded indisputably as the domain of European
monarchiesand according to his principleof freezingthestatusquo, the
old political entitiesin the American continenthad no longer a right
to an independent existence.
The second half of Le Nouveau Cyneis concerned with internal
affairs- a blueprintfor government;it is a text that falls somewhere
between the "mirrors-for-princes"literature,books of remonstrance
and utopias. Daring and imaginativeas he may have been in his proposals forinternationalrelations,Cruc turnsout to be strictlyconservative in social matters. Except forhis demand to bestow honour on
productive occupations, particularlyon the merchant, in all other
respects he would maintain the existing order, a hierarchical structure, strictdiscipline and controlover morals, enforcementof law and
order. The changes which he suggests are all but correction of
abuses - the conventional attack upon venality of offices,corruption
in the church, excessive taxation, inefficiencyof the law courts, poor
68

12:29:26 PM

education. The idea of revolt appalls him, and in the same manner
that he cadisupon the princes to accept loss of honour or territoryin
order to maintain peace, so he demands of theirsubjects to bow even
to tyranny:"Tyranny is unfortunate,I confess,but popular furyand
confusionis stillmore to be feared(p. 176)". The same rule he applies
to religionfor,althoughhe accepts all existingchurches,he would not
sufferany furtherinnovations since every reformerleads to turmoil:
44Such
people must be anticipated, and forbiddento dogmatize either
in public or in private, under penalty of rigorous punishment (p.
168)". To attempt change, even for a justified cause, disturbs the
peace in internaland externalaffairsthe economic price is too high.
This is the unifying assumption that underlies his plan both for
universal peace and for the ideal monarchy.
"That depends on your Majesties, Great Monarchs. You can
appease all the troubles of the world, and place your peoples in obedience to the laws of nature, and of your own (p. 136)". In the age
of nascent Absolutism, when the masses had no legitimatechannel of
voicing theirdesires, and when the consoling belief in Progress was
not as yet intellectually available - who but the prince could
administer the cure? If, like Cruc, one chose not to wait for the
interventionof God and the fulfilmentof some prophecy, if one was
trained by Montaigne and Bodin to scepticism, who could be the
saviour but the all-powerfulruler?
SecretSociety
Francesco Pucci, on the other hand, combined in his Formad'una
catholica(1581)31 all the agents of change considered possible
repubblica
in his time- the hand of God, secular rulers, a church council, occult
knowledge- togetherwith an avantgarde, a select group of people who
would organize themselvesin a clandestine networkand prepare the
Great Reform. His is the one and only universal-peace vision of the
sixteenthcenturywhich adds an element of reformby pressure from
below ratherthan imposed fromabove. But how does a secretsociety
influencethe course of events? Obviously, it cannot resort to open
31LuigiFirpo,GliScritti
Secret
di Francesco
Pucci
, Turin1957;MiriamEliav-Feldon,
ofMedieval
Pucci
andPeacePlans:theCaseofFrancesco
Societies
, in:TheJournal
, Utopias
Le
MiriamEliav-Feldon,
andRenaissance
Studies,14(1984),139-158;ElieBarnavi,
etvrit
dansla Renaissance
Paris
deFrancesco
Pucci:utopie,
hrsie
tardive,
religieuse
priple
1988.
69

12:29:26 PM

propaganda; and Pucci, extremelyradical in his religion but just as

conservative in his social thought, would not have it involved in
revolutionary activities or any form of violent subversion. There
remains but slow, painstaking,clandestine attemptsto convertpotential allies- preferablypeople of influence. Once enough people join
this virtuous republic, they would persuade the rulers to convene a
Holy Council which, divinely inspired and able to overcome the
resistanceof evil prelates, would settleall controversies,trulyreform
Christianityand unite all of mankind in a rational-naturalreligion.
Peace and concord will reign ever after.
The detailed programme forthe organization of the secretrepublic
remindsone, in some aspects, of Anabaptist sects: moral supervision,
the ban as the ultimate punishment,communitiesdispersed throughout Europe and holding central meetings in friendlyterritoriesor in
market-townswhere theycould disguise themselvesas merchants.But
there the similarityends. Pucci' s 44citizens" are not the Elect, but
'
simply 'lovers of truth"; they do not separate themselvesfromthe
world to await the momentof theirexclusive salvation,but prepare the
ground fora true and final reformationand a restorationof a prelapsarian state of harmony forthe entire human race; theyare exhorted
to serve the magistratesin strictobedience, not to disengage fromcivil
society and suffermartyrdom. If at all, this Catholic Republic is
closest to the organization of the Family of Love which may indeed
have been its source of inspiration. Spiritualist,eirenic, tolerantand,
most of all, nicodemistic- permitting its members to practise
dissimulation, participate in the compulsory rituals of the state's
of kindred
churchwhile secretlyadhering to theirbeliefs- a fraternity
spirits tied by masonic bonds, yearning for the reunification of
mankind on the basis of a Christianitypurified of all unnecessary
dogma. Pucci also shared with the Familists his perfectionism the
beliefin the fundamentalgoodness of man whichenables him to attain
perfectionon earth, to freehimselffromoriginal sin, and to returnto
prelapsarian immortalityand harmony. In the early seventeenthcentury, it was the Rosicrucians who attracted men of similar inclinations. The historyof the connectionsbetween the Family of Love and
the Fraternityof the Rosy Cross stillremains to be told; as forPucci,
we know that he could have had an indirect influence on Johann
Valentin Andreae, one of the main personalitiesin the Rosicrucian
episode, throughTommaso Campanella with whom Pucci shared a
cell in the prison of the Inquisition in Rome. In any case, in the late
70

12:29:26 PM

Renaissance secret societies, real or imaginary, were quite a widespread phenomenon which had its roots both in nicodemism and in
hermeticism.But it was only Francesco Pucci, as faras we know, who
explicitlyelaborated a plan forthe organization of such a clandestine
as a step towards universal peace.
fraternity
Admittedly,his vision of the world afterthe Great Reform remains
vague. As a tormentedheretic, who travelled all over Europe at the
time when the confessionalcamps were becoming deeply entrenched
and when even in places of relative liberty men of his kind were
persecuted, his only concern was religion; he had practically no
political interests.Therefore,his ideal was a world of one pastor, one
fold- all of mankind, including Moslems, Jews and pagans, united in
one faithin a God whose designs he, Pucci, was one of the rare few
to understand. It was to this dream that he devoted all his efforts,
debating, disputing,appealing to all the high and mighty,conceiving
a comprehensive plan for an underground utopia which never
materialized, and finally sacrificinghis life. His Forma cannot be
regarded perhaps as one of the grand designs, but it reflectsbetter
than others a firstshiftfrom the absolute reliance of most political
reformersof the time on the good will of princes.
Pansophia
Francesco Pucci stood at the intersection of the circles of
nicodemites and occultists. From Ficino and Pico della Mirandola,
throughAgrippa, Paracelsus, Postel and John Dee, Campanella and
Giordano Bruno, down to Jan Amos Comenius, an intensive search
forthe secretsof creation and means to manipulate it was carried out
by these adepts of a prisca theologia.In alchemy, astrology, Cabala,
ancient oriental wisdom, Lullism32and Joachimism they sought the
keys to the universe. Their contributionto the emergence of modern
science is controversial,33but there can be no question as to their
introductionof an alternative philosophy, religion, cosmology and
medicine, which undermined the established world-view. Many of
32PaoloRossi,TheLegacy
LullinSixteenth-Century
, in:Medievaland
ofRamon
Thought
Renaissance
Lull himself
wrotea "panStudies,5 (1961), 182-213;interestingly,
- Blanquerna
- whichwas first
in 1521.
sophic"utopia
published
33Cf. RobertW. Westman
andAstronomical
TheYatesThesis
Reform:
MagicalReform
in:R. S. Westman
andJ. E. McGuire(eds.),Hermeticism
andtheScientific
Reconsidered,
Los Angeles1977.
Revolution,
71

12:29:26 PM

mundi
these men shared a vision of a concordia
, a political reflectionof
of
and
restoration
the
universal harmony
oneness; and each one of
them saw himselfas the chosen midwifeto this re-birth.
For the modern reader much of theirwritingsis incomprehensible,
an eclecticmumbo-jumbo withscientificpretensions.But in theirtime
'
they did not constitute a 'lunatic fringe". Admittedly some of
them- namely, Postel, Paracelsus, Campanella - were branded mad;
all of them were considered dangerous hereticsnot only by Rome but
also by the established Protestantchurches and by all universities;all
of them sufferedpersecution,imprisonment,exile, and Bruno's burning in 1600 symbolized their martyrdom.Yet these magihad a great
many followers,powerfulpatrons even at royal courts; in fact, they
were the luminaries of a late-Renaissance culture- Hermetic
Neoplatonism- which served as an ideology for "parties" that were
tryingto overturnone or the other of the dominatingestablishments,
whetherpolitical, religious or scientific.
It is not an easy task to extricate from their visions the concrete,
practical means by which they thought the world could be
transformed,but the effortis worthwhilebecause, eventually, it was
precisely these elements which survived the discreditof their worldview to be absorbed, purged of occultism, into modern thought.
Basically, the common denominator of all their plans for achieving
universal harmony was knowledge, knowledge mastered and shared
by all mankind. Therefore it is appropriate, I believe, to adopt for
theirgrand designs the termassociated with the last zealot in thisconstellationof prophets- Comenius's Pansophia.34 Let us glance briefly
at the list of their innovative measures.
Guillaume Postel35 dreamed of a world united in one faith (an
extended and simplifiedChristianitywhich could accomodate Jews,
Moslems, pagans), one king (the Most Catholic King of France) and
one law (a code translatedfromthe Law of Nature). According to him
the ' 4sword and lance" in the fightforthe complete restitutionof concordia, was the printingpress- that exciting invention which would
bring knowledge and its benefits to every man. Paracelsus36 con34F. E. and F. P. Manuel,Utopian
in theWestern
World
, Harvard,1979,
Thought
thechapter
entitled
especially
"Pansophia".
35W. J. Bouwsma,
Concordia
Mundi:TheCareer
andThought
Postel
ofGuillaume
(151015811 Harvard1957.
36WalterPagel,Paracelsus,
TheParacelBasle,NewYork1958;HughTrevor-Roper,
sianMovement
, in: Renaissance
, London1986,149-199.
Essays
72

12:29:26 PM

- iatrochemistryand alchemy- to the arsenal of

tributed chemistry
weapons forthe transformationof this world. His messiah was 'Elias
Artista'- the prophetElijah turned alchemist; and his revolutionwas
to be carriedout by battalionsof surgeons and chemiststrainedto cure
not only disease but also the madness and sin of war, to transmutethe
age of iron into an age of gold. John Dee37 added the dimension of
practical mathematics,in particular the art of navigation, as a tool to
encompass the entireworld and to create a unifiedempire, preferably
under the rule of Astreae- Queen Elizabeth. Tommaso Campanella,38the only one of our enthusiaststo head an actual revolt,an
attemptto realize a utopia by forceand to build a concretesmall-scale
model forhis ideal of a universal theocracy,was bold enough to propose eugenic breeding to create one perfecthuman race, ruled by the
King of Spain, or by the Pope, or by the King of France... Johann
Valentin Andreae,39an eirenic Lutheran ministerand a Rosicrucian,
undoubtedly inspired by the Calabrian monk, adopted the Utopian
methodto elaborate particularlyon methods of education- but unlike
the early humanists,the education project was designed not forkings
but forthe masses; and the contentof the programmeof learning was
no longer just the ethics of the Gospel and the classics, but all
knowledge: the entireand finitestorehouseof knowledge to be gained
frombooks as well as fromexperience and experiment.
It was in Jan Amos Comenius40 that all these strains merged
together.A pacifistby virtue of belonging to the Bohemian Brethren
(it is he, ratherthan Penn, who should be considered the firstpacifist
to fightforworld peace), an ardent advocate of reconciliationamong
all non-Catholic denominations, a propagandist fora world council of
'
peace, a promoterof invisible colleges and of educational, social and
economic reforms,a Paracelsian and a Rosicrucian with the added
37PeterJ. French, Dee:theWorld anElizabethan , London1984
John
of
Magus
(1972);
Frances
A. Yates,John
Dee: Christian
in: TheOccult
intheElizabethan
Cabalisi,
Philosophy
, London1983(1979),79-93.
Age
38L. Blanchet,
di Tommaso
, Paris1920;PaoloTreves,La filosofia
Campanella
politica
Monarchia
Messiae
, Bari 1930; LuigiFirpo(ed.), Tommaso
Campanella
,
Campanella:
Turin1960.
39F. E. Held,Johann
Valentin
Andreae
's Christianopolis:
anIdealState
CenoftheSeventeenth
Oxford1916;FrancesA. Yates,TheRosicrucian
tury,
, London1972.
Enlightenment
40G. H. Turnbull,
Hartlib
andComenius
, Liverpool
1947;HughTrevor-Roper,
Dury,
Three
ThePhilosophers
Revolution
theReformation
and
, in: Religion,
Foreigners:
ofthePuritan
SocialChange,
London,1984(1967),237-293;
JiinaPopelov,TheSignificance
ofComenius
Culture
andthePeaceMovement,
forWorld
Prague1956.
73

12:29:26 PM

respectabilityof (vulgar) Baconianism, it was he who transportedthe

Neoplatonist majestic vision over the chasm of the ThirtyYears War.
His enormous output of writings,although mysticalfromthe firstand
becoming crankierin his old age, was rich withpracticalpolitical suggestions such as allowing self-determinationto small nations, abandoning secret diplomacy, promoting international intellectual cooperation, and inventing a new universal language. Comenius's
Reign of Light, a universal brotherhood of men united by
encyclopaedic knowledge, with its centre in Cromwell's England or,
in his last years, in Charles X's Swedish empire, was an anachronistic
vision inheritedfroma previous age - the Grand Design of the late
Renaissance, of the "Rudolfine moment",41 of the "Rosicrucian
Enlightenment''
It was not as yet the optimisticbelief in Progress which inspired
these men, but some of its componentswere already there: technology
and science in the service of humanity- though not for the creation
of an unprecedented future,but for the restorationof a mythological
past of unity;knowledgeas an agent of change, throughthe education
of all mankind- yet not accumulated infinite knowledge, but
enlightenmentrediscovered;the scientistas the midwifeof universal
happiness- but a scientistin the robes of the magus.They had not
totallyabandoned the dependence on heroic rulers, and their hopes
soared high whenevertheybelieved that a mightyprince- Henri IV,
Elizabeth, Rudolf, the Elector Palatine, Cromwell, Charles X - was
inclined to theirprogramme. Although theyrejected dogmatic Christianity,it would be wrong to see them as early Deists or atheists; for
even when theyridiculed on rationalistprinciplesthe miracle of transubstantiation or of the virgin birth, they were often beguiled by
crackpot prophetsand constantlysearched foromens, signs, portents
- and
of wonders to come. In other words, fora political reformation
thisis the aspect withwhichwe are concerned- theydid not altogether
abandon the belief that essentially it would be imposed fromabove:
a millenniumhastened by the work of an emperor with the aid of the
magi.
An imposed reformation,but with a difference;and the difference
lies with the additional agents of change: enlightenment, secret

41R. J. W. Evans,Rudolf
A Study
II andhisWorld:
inIntellectual
1576-1612,
History
Oxford1984(1973).
74

12:29:26 PM

societies and utopias. Samuel Hartlib,42Comenius's followerand the

author of Marcaria, clarified the connection between the singlecommunityutopia and the universal plans: the aim of the firstwas
"the buildingofChristian societiesin small models". This was probably not true of the early sixteenth-centuryutopists- More, for
instance, had only England in mind when presentinghis model- but
it was certainly the case for Campanella when he attempted to
establish his City of the Sun, of Andreae'a Christianopolis and of
Bacon's New Atlantis: these were all small-scale models for a world
reformation.As forsecretsocieties- Postellani, Giordanisti, Rosicrucians, invisiblecolleges, whetherreal or imaginary,were supposed to
be working clandestinelytowards the ultimate goal: converting the
entireworld. It was Pucci' s plan in hermeticgarb. And the cement for
it all was the spread of practical, useful knowledge "to the effecting
of all things possible"43- the grandest of all grand designs.
In China, in 1885, a Confucian philosopher composed a plan for
"The Great Unity", foran age of complete peace and equality when
all the boundaries between people would be abolished. It bears
Panastonishingresemblanceto the visions of the seventeenth-century
sophists,althoughthereis not the slightestindication that K'ang YuWei has ever heard of any of them.44 Today, in New York, an
organizationnamed the InstituteforWorld Order is workingtowards
very similar ends embellished with modern concerns for ecology,
Third World development and women's rights; one of its major
advocates, Richard Falk, appropriatelylabels his projects "relevant
utopias".45 The forms,the contentsand the solutions may vary, but
the desire foruniversal peace continues to emerge in all cultures and
at all times: perhaps it is just as much inherentin human nature as
the destructiveinstinct.
In 1932 Sigmund Freud, in reply to Albert Einstein's anguished
question "why war?", wrote pessimistically:
"We assumethathumaninstincts
are oftwokinds:thosethatconserve
and
whichwe call 'erotic'...;and secondly,
theinstincts
to destroy
andkill,
unify,
whichweassimilate
as theaggressive
ordestructive
itmight
instincts...
wellbe
42CharlesWebster,
TheAuthorship
andSignificance
in: PastandPresent,
56
ofMacaria,
(1972).
43FrancisBacon,TheAdvancement
andNewAtlantis,
Oxford1974,p. 288.
ofLearning
44Ta T'ungShu,TheOneWorld
trans,andintr.Laurence
Philosophy
ofK'angYu-Wei,
G. Thompson,
London1958.
45Johnson,
TheQuest
forPeace,pp. 267-276.
75

12:29:26 PM

calledthe'deathinstinct'...
thereis nolikelihood
ofourbeingabletosuppress
itintoa channel
.. whatwemaytryis todivert
tendencies.
humanity's
aggressive
otherthanthatofwarfare".
His own hope was based on a particular kind of progress- the
gradual strengtheningof the intellect which tends to master our
instinctivelife- and the collectivedread fromthe scale of futurewars.
But "how long have we to wait before the rest of men turn pacifist?
Impossible to say...".46 The two intellectualgiants of the presentcenturywere stillafflictedwith the same frustrationas the utopistsof the
late Renaissance.
Tel Aviv University
Department
of History
46The exchange
in 1933underthe
Einstein
and Freudwasfirst
between
published
inOttoNathanand Heinz
in Englishtranslation
titleWarumKrieg?;itis included
OnPeace
Norden(eds.),Einstein
, NewYork1960,pp. 185-203.

76

12:29:26 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 1 (1989)
Reviews

Donati
L. Holtz,A. Kibret- Corpus
Liberinpartibus
, ed. . Lfstedt,
Smaragdus,
Continuatio
MediaevalisLXVIII, Turnhout
1986.
Christianorum
tothatselectgroupofCarolSmaragdus
alongwithAlcuinandRemigius,
belongs,
whoareoften
mentioned
butlittleread.Butwhereas
inthecase
ingiangrammarians
- for,
oftheothertwothescholarly
has littleexcuseforthisbehaviour
community
however
inconvenient
ordownright
editions
be,
inadequate
existing
may theydo at
- as faras Smaragdus
leastexist
is concerned,
theabsenceofanycomplete
edition
has
actedup untilnowbothas a deterrent
andas thejustification
forthisneglect.
He has
suffered
morethanmostgrammarians
fromthepernicious
nineteenth-century
practiceofpublishing
a practice
whichtellsus moreabouttheexcerpters
than
extracts,
aboutSmaragdus.
The publication
ofthiseditionmakesavailablethefirst
complete
textofthegrammar.
The editionis basedon unpublished
material
by AdeleKibre,one of Charles
Beeson'spupilsat Chicago,whocompleted
herdissertation
in 1930.1Although
her
conclusions
as tothemanuscript
aredescribed
as stillvalid(p. V), her
relationships
workin factincluded
a fullcollation
ofonlytwoofthetwenty
manuscripts,
leaving
Holtzand Lfstedt
a largeamountofcollating
to do. Thiswas splitapproximately
forthe textand
evenlybetweenthem;Lfstedtwas additionally
responsible
andforthechapter
ZurSprache
Holtzcontributed
thebulkofthe
, whilst
apparatus,
introduction
and improvements
to textand apparatus.
Fordateandprovenance
Holtzfollows
Rdle.2In addition,
he positsclosecontact
withthecourtofCharlemagne,
inferred
fromSmaragdus's
withInsular
familiarity
sources
related
tothoseusedbypseudo-Clemens
andAlcuin,hisinterest
inFrankish
as wellas inVisigothic
ofCarolus
inexamples
names,andthree
appearances
(p. XII).
Contactwiththecourtcouldexplainhisknowledge
ofJulianofToledo'sgrammar
also his acquaintance
withTheodulf
ofOrleansand Benedict
of
(and conceivably
fora possibleSpanishconAniane,adducedbyRdleandHoltz(p. X) as evidence
andcontact
withAlcuinhisheavyuse ofPriscian's
Institutiones
nection)
grammatical
thatSmaragdus
(Holtzsuggests
mighthavestudiedunderAlcuin,p. XLVI). The
identification
ofhisothersources
someproblems.
As Holtzremarks
posestheeditors
n'est
d'autres
duhautMoyen
, un
(p. XXXVIII), Smaragdus
pas,comme
grammairiens
Age
decentons
arereworded
andrearranged
to suchan extent
that
; hisborrowings
faiseur
it is often
difficult
to be confident
oftheirorigin.BesidesDonatus'sArsmaior
, only
Institutiones
Priscian's
andPompeius
seemtohavebeenusedthroughout;
grammaricae
weredemonstrably
Phocas,Diomedesand Isidore'sEtymologiae
employed
onlyat a
fewpoints;andfortherest,theeditors
arecommendably
cautious.4
Giventheextensivereworking
andourownuncertainty
as tothenatureoftherelationship
obtaining
as theArsBernensis
theArsAmbianensis,
and
, pseudo-Clemens,
amongsuchgrammars
Holtzcontents
himself
withshowing
is often
thatSmaragdus
closerto
Malsachanus,
oneormoreoftheseworksthantotheultimate
Classicalsourceofthedoctrine
(pp.
77

12:29:42 PM

only21 hadbeenusedbyearliergramXLII-XLVI). Of the750biblicalexamples,

Holtzfinds
evidence
fortheuseofa kindofcard
marians
(p. XLVIII). Interestingly,
indexin theircompilation.
ofthework'ssurvival
and transmission
The discussion
(p. LXIX-LXV)is based
ontheevidence
furnished
andthesurviving
library
bymedieval
catalogues
primarily
fromthegrammar
haveyetbeen
Holtzpointsoutthatno quotations
manuscripts.
on linguistic
is difandsimilarly,
thatitsinfluence
foundinlatergrammars
thought
stillremains
tobe done.Evenwith
toassess.In bothareasthebasicresearch
ficult
ofthegramas tothesurvival
conclusions
thiscaveat,Holtzcomestosomeconfident
v <s. xi>, le
italien
marin thepost-Carolingian
period:si l'onmet partle tmoin
manuscrits
Erfurt
<s. xii> , letmoin
f <s. xii> , liauxdeux
cisterciens
florilge
anonyme
b <s. xiHxiii>
e <s. xii/
xiii> z <s. xiii/xiv
> , etlesrestes
dutmoin
incertaine,
, d'origine
decatalogues
n'estplusni copie
niconnue
desauteurs
la grammaire
deSmaragde
, sinon
(p.
fair
raisesseveralissuesofinterpretation.
First,itis scarcely
LXV). Thisstatement
It wasnotthecataloguer's
evidence.
tosimultaneously
useanddismiss
job
catalogue
theGlastonbury
to tellus whichbookswerestillin use,although
entry
catalogue's
thatonecopy
degrammatica
inutilis
DuolibriSmaragdi
, alter
, unusbonus
mightsuggest
incatalogues
references
tothegrammar
wasso wornas tobe useless.5
Of thetwelve
withsurviving
of theeleventh
to fifteenth
centuries,
onlythreecan be identified
forsomenineadditional
evidence
copiesof
manuscripts
(p. LX f.); therestprovide
But of the six monasteries
unknowndate- Carolingianor post-Carolingian.
inquestion)
themownedeightoftheninemanuscripts
five(whichbetween
involved,
whichareunlikely
tohaveownedmanyearlymanufoundations
arepost-Carolingian
is infavour
ofmosthavingbeenpost-Carolingian.
thebalanceofprobability
scripts;
shouldbe compared
furnished
theevidence
manuscripts
bythesurviving
Secondly,
as indicating
itcanbe interpreted
before
withthatforothercontemporary
grammars
ofthesurdistribution
orneglect.
Letus compare
thechronological
either
popularity
withthatoffiveotherninth-century
s grammar
ofSmaragdus'
vivingmanuscripts
Sedulius
on thesecondbookoftheArsmaior
commentaries
, thoseby Murethach,
and Remigius,and also
ArsLaureshamensis
, Erchanbert,
Scottus,theanonymous
on theArsminor-*
s commentary
Remigius'

Smaragdus
Murethach
Sedulius
ArsLaur.
Erchanbert
mai.
Remigius
min.
Remigius

s.ix

s.x

s.xi

s.xii

s.xiii

12
9
1
11
11
1

2
57

1
2

4
2

1-1
12
5

1
-

1
9

onthesecondbook
commentaries
itappearsthattwoninth-century
Fromthsefigures
theothers,
faroutstripped
and Murethach,
oftheArsmaior
, thoseby Smaragdus
but
andtenth
theninth
inpopularity
whether
IrishorContinental,
centuries,
during
also
on theArsminor
s commentary
bothwereovertaken
, andprobably
byRemigius'
andtheparsAlcuin'sgrammar
arenotavailable,
forwhichfigures
notably
byworks
ofthelaterninth
versions
oftheInstitutiones
andabbreviated
grammaticae
inggrammars
centuries.
and subsequent
comesup
doctrine
totracetheinfluence
ofSmaragdus's
grammatical
Anyattempt
intothesourcesoflatergrammars
(and thelackof
againsttheabsenceofresearch
and the lack of a comprehensive
reliableeditionsof the majority),
studyof
etsesaucetdoctrine:
Thesection
headedPdagogie
owndoctrine.
Smaragde
Smaragdus's
78

12:29:42 PM

tores(pp. XXXII-XLIX) is in essencea discussion

ofthesources,whileLfstedt's
ais Grammatiker
undEtymolog
(pp. LXXXIII-LXXXVI) is a list,notof
Smaragdus
ofgrammatical
distinctive
contributions
to thedevelopment
doctrine,
Smaragdus's
earliergrammarians
in the
ThatSmaragdus
standsapartfrom
butofhismistakes.9
ofgrammar
andtheFaith,notonlyinhisheavyuse
profound
degreeofintegration
ofexemplificatory
material
from
theBiblebutalsoinhistheological
of
interpretation
suchas theexistence
ofeightpartsof speech,has attracted
phenomena
linguistic
at leastsincethetimeofCharlesThurot;10
attention
butthenatureandsignificance
a commonfateforpreofhisgrammatical
doctrine
perse has goneunrecognised,
modistic
Threenoteworthy
features
can be mentioned
here.First,
grammarians.
shareswithBoniface
theunusualcharacteristic
Smaragdus
(foran earlymedieval
ofexplaining
in a preface
thepurposeofhiswork,although
he is less
grammarian)
thanBoniface
as to hisworking
methods.
he takesintoaccount
explicit
Secondly,
beenincorporated
intomodern
aspectsoflanguageuse whichhaveonlyrecently
inhisdetailed
undertheheading
ofpragmatics,
ofthevarious
uses
analysis
linguistics
ofquisintheBible(8T, 56-79),hisdiscussion
oftheconnotations
ofipseandiste(8T,
and
discussed,
115-137)
byLateLatingrammarians),
(an issueraised,butscarcely
ofthedifferent
usesoftheimperative
might
(9T, 146-164).A modernsemiotician
- ofwhicharticulate
marvelat thelistofthefourteen
ways
speechis onlyone- in
which
his
thespeaker
make
known
emotions
from
may
(15T, 6-12),ranging
clearing
thethroatto winking.
and
Is it fairto accuseSmaragdus
ofconfusing
grammar
suchmatters
findtheirwayintogrammars
do notoften
exegesis
(p. LVI)? Granted,
at thisdate,butin principle
theyhad neverceasedto formpartoftheprogramme
ofgrammatical
as periodicreferences
intertogrammatica
as thescientia
instruction,
historeos
remind
us.n It wasgrammarians
who,at leastintheory,
pretandi
poetas
atque
werestillresponsible
forimparting
thetechniques
as found,
forexample,
ofexegesis
inthethird
bookoftheArsmaior.
The works
ofVirgilius
MaroGrammaticus,
a cenofbiblical
turyanda halfearlier,can in partbe readas a guideto thetechniques
can moreappropriately
be regarded
as one ofthefewearly
exegesis.12
Smaragdus
topaymorethanlipservice
medieval
togrammatica
defined.
grammarians
broadly
third
contribution
to
studies
lies
in
the
major
Smaragdus's
grammatical
importance
he attaches
to form.The history
of Western
can be seenas a gradual
linguistics
toform,
from
theheavyemphasis
on semantic
and functional
features
in
awakening
thegrammars
ofAntiquity
to thegradualemergence
ofphonetics,
and
morphology
relateddisciplines
fromtheRenaissance
onwards.13
The needto teachLatinas a
intheBritish
IslesandGermanic
meantthat
foreign
language
partsoftheContinent
from
theseventh
onscholars
wereconfronted
witha problem
withwhichthey
century
wereill-equipped
todeal,namely,
thedescription
ofLatin.As theDeclina
oftheforms
and similartextsshow,therewas initially
tiones
nominum
littleformal
analysis:the
members
ofa paradigm
weresimply
listedoneafteranother,
andwherescribes(or
to shorten
theirtaskbygiving
attemped
perhaps
authors)
endings
only,theresultis
often
inconsistent.14
One ofthefruits
whichSmaragdus
derived
from
hisclosestudy
ofPriscian
wasa moreanalytical
toform
thanis foundin mostLateLatin
approach
oranyearlymedieval
Forexample,
inhisdiscussion
ofverbtenseshe
grammarians.
oftenses
suchas thefollowing:
givesrulesfortherecognition
quodtempus
(sc.praeteritum
inindicatiuo
modo
inomnibus
etinconiugationibus
etdeclinatione
actiua
inperfectum)
formis
quinidestinabam
iniebam
inibam,
, inebam,
, inuebam
qutantummodo
cognoscitur
regulis,
(9T,
itwouldhavebeenifhehadgeneralised
a little
further,
814-817).Howmuchsimpler
thesuffix
-bam
as thesignoftheimperfect!
Butevento generalise
tothe
identifying
he does,isolating
extent
a setofcharacteristic
terminations
foreachtense,is a step
inthedirection
ofmorphological
In theabsenceofconcepts
suchas rootand
analysis.
suchanalysis
couldprogress
wasone ofthepioneers
affix,
onlyslowly.Smaragdus
initsdevelopment.15
Theextensive
circulation
ofhisgrammar
is initself
a guarantee
79

12:29:42 PM

wide
ofLatinwasachieving
oftheforms
thatthisnewapproachto thedescription
oflinguistic
form
andwasthereby
toshapetheperception
bylater
helping
exposure,
standsoutfrom
hiscontemporaries,
and
In thesethreeareasSmaragdus
generations.
it is herethathisinfluence,
director indirect,
shouldbe sought.
ownchapter
is one thing(and to be applauded);
To retainSmaragdus's
division
ofreferences,
so thattheverbis discussed
at 9T,
to makeit thebasisofthesystem
wasnotan altogether
42ff.
happydecision,
giventhecounter(T = text,P = preface),
sincethenounoccupiesthefirst
sevenchapters,
thepronoun
is
intuitive
numbering:
as
8 rather
than2, andso on. The indexprovides
pagenumbers
giventhenumber
references.
wellas chapter
mistaken
references
inthefontes
Thereareoccasional
, e.g. 8T,284-287isattributed
to Mais. 194,16:read8T,280-282cf.Mals. 194,5-11?-At p.LXXXVI n.25 read,
auspietaundauis' rather
than'...und uis' in viewofthederivation
surely,'Pictauis
ex
aue
picta.
quoted:
Cambridge

VivienLaw

'
1 Prolegomena
totheUnpublished
TextofSmaragdus
onDonatus
De partibus
Commentary
orationis.
2 F. Rdle,Studien
zu Smaragd
vonSaint-Mihiel
, MediumAevum29, Mnchen1974,
pp. 13-20.
3 On evidence
forAlcuin'sinterest
intheInstitutions
seeJ.R.O'Donnell,
grammaticae
in: LatinScript
Alcuin's
andLetters
A.D. 400-900
Priscian,
, edd.J.J.O'Meara andB.
in theearlier
Middle
Naumann,Leiden1976,222-35,and V. Law, Linguistics
Ages:
andCarolingian
theInsular
of thePhilological
, in: Transactions
grammarians
Society
1985,171-93,esp. p. 185f.
4 The quaestiones
on p. LXII n. 19 and on p.
in Berne83 mentioned
grammaticales
XCIII f.(in Hagen'sfragmentary
wereattributed
toGodescalcandprinted
edition)
in fullby D.C. Lambotin Oeuvres
etgrammaticales
de Godescalc
d'Orbais,
thologiques
SacrumLovaniense
20, Louvain1945,351-496.
Spicilegium
5 JohnLelandrecorded
whenhe passedthrough
onlyone copyof thegrammar
before1539:fora rccent
manuGlastonbury
shortly
studyofhislistofGlastonbury
seeJ.P. Carley,JohnLelandandthecontents
libraries:
Dissolution
scripts
ofEnglish
pre40 (1986),107-20.
, in: Scriptorium,
Glastonbury
Abbey
6 The figures
in theeditions
aretakenfromthedataprovided
ofMurethach
byL.
andSeduliusScottus
CCCM
Holtz,CCCM 40,theArsLaureshamensis
byB. Lfstedt,
40AandB, Erchanbert
from
the
byW.V. Clausen(Chicago1948),andforRemigius
articles
manuscrit
ducommentaire
deRemi
d'Auxerre
/'Arsmaior
byC. Jeudy,Unnouveau
deDonat
andHeroes:
inMedieval
inHonour
Studies
Culture
, in: Saints
, Scholars
ofCharles
W.Jones
Minnesota
, edd.M.H. KingandW.M. Stevens,
1979,113-25,
Collegeville,
andIsrallegrammairien
etla tradition
Ars
ducommentaire
deRemid'Auxerre
manuscrite
minordeDonat
3rdseries,28 (1977),185-248.Wherea dateis
, in: StudiMedievali,
is entered
inmychartundertheearlier
givenas 's.ix-x'or thelike,themanuscript
ofthetwocenturies.
7 Including
thefragment
in Kln,Hist.Archiv,
by.
Fragni.W* 210,described
14-15
destextes,
Nouveaux
detextes
in: Revued'histoire
Jeudy,
fragments
grammaticaux,
(1984-1985),131-41.
8 Cf.theScalprum
ofwhichthereareonemanuscript
oftheeleventh
Prisciani,
century
inaddition
references
ofthetwelfth
andone
andfourofthetwelfth,
totwocatalogue
eachofthethirteenth,
LeScalprum
Prisfourteenth
andfifteenth
centuries
(C. Jeudy,
cianietsatradition
manuscrite
destextes,
982-1
, in: Revued'histoire
12-13(1
983),181-93).
9 Cf. Rdlep. 54 f. Atleastone ofthepurported
errors
(p. LXXXIV) restson a
80

12:29:42 PM

inueniuntur
etinquartum
remarks
Whenat 9T, 50If. Smaragdus
misunderstanding.
dormito
toverbswhichhavea full
dormiturio
dormisco
deducere
, herefers
, utdormio
gradm
anddormisco
arefreanddoesnotmeantoimplythatdormiturio
oiformae
complement
forms.
quentative
10Notices
desdoctrines
etextraits
dedivers
manuscrits
latins
l'histoire
grammaticales
pourservir
au Moyen
, Paris1869,repr.1964.This themewasAdeveloped
byJ. Leclercq,
Age
chrtienne
etla grammaire
, in: Revuedu MoyenAgelatin,4 (1948),15-22.
Smaragde
11On thisthemesee M. Irvine,Bedethegrammarian
andthescope
studies
ofgrammatical
ineighth-century
Northumbria
, in: Anglo-Saxon
England,15 (1986),15-44.
12V. Law,Learning
toreadwiththeoculimentis:Virgilius
MaroGrammaticus
, in: The
Sacred
Word
, ed. J. Milbank,Oxfordforthcoming.
13Fora survey
andits
in thislightseeV. Law,Language
oflinguistics
ofthehistory
forththehistory
ed. N.E. Collinge,
students:
, in:Encyclopaedia
ofLinguistics,
oflinguistics
coming.
14E.g. inthecopyoftheDeclinationes
nominum
inParis,B.N. lat. 13025,f.41va,the
& pi nes.
is setoutas follows:
haeccogitati!
onis.
onionem.tio.tione
declension
ofcogitatio
nes.bus.
. onibj.nes.
15Smaragdus's
thana psychological
fora formal
rather
basisfortheorderpreference
ofthesameinclination
verborum
symptom
ingoftheformae
(cf.
(9T, 415-26)is another
p. XLI).

NielsJ. Green-Pedersen,
TheTradition
intheMiddle
oftheTopics
Ages.TheCommentaries
'
onAristotle's
andBoethius'
. SeriesAnalytica.
in Logic,
Topics'
Investigations
of Language.Mnchen-Wien
Ontologyand the Philosophy
(Philosophia
Verlag),1984.
Ifthere
isanyone
towrite
a bookonthetradition
ofthe'Topics'intheMidqualified
dleAges,itis certainly
Dr. NielsJ. Green-Pedersen
G.(henceforth:
(Copenhagen)
a number
ofarticles
and madeseveraltexteditions,
in which
P.). G.-P. haswritten
he hasgivenevidence
ofhisvastknowledge
ofthistradition.
In 1984he published
theabovementioned
bookwhichpresents
a comprehensive
viewofthewayinwhich
theMedievalphilosophers
andelaborate
Aristotle's
, Boethius'
interpret
Topica
DedifandIn Ciceronis
thefoundations
ofthescience
con, andconceive
ferentiis
Topicis
Topica
tainedin thesebooks.
In partI G.-P.explains
whatAristotle's
is concerned
the
with,atleastfrom
Topics
oftheMedievaltradition.
a discipline
The Topics
viewpoint
present
(calleddialectic)
heldopinions
ina dispute.It isdifficult
whichhasthetasktotestcommonly
tointerofthe'topos'or 'locus'.Itsfunction
canbe seeneither
as
pretAristotle's
conception
an 'instruction'
is directed
toa 'place'wherehecanfindan argubywhichsomeone
ment,e.g. fromthegenus
(thisis theinterpretation
givenby E. Stump),or as a
is
'reason',a logicallaw, expressedin a metalanguage,
e.g. 'whensomething
ofa genus,itisalsopredicated
ofa species'(thisistheinterpretation
predicated
given
therearegoodreasonsforbothviews.The imporbyW. A. de Pater).G.-P. thinks
tantthingforhisexposition
is thatAristotle
lefttohissuccessors
a bookcontaining
listsoflociwhichconsistofthesetwodifferent
elements.
thismaybe,inBoethius'
However
commentaries
Aristotle's
havebeen
instructions
intosentences
whicharecalled'maxims'(maximae
developed
propositions),
e.g. 'that
to whichthedefinition
ofthegenusdoesnotbelong,is nota speciesofthegenus
defined',
Thenumber
ofmaxims
is unlimited,
buttheycanbe takentogether
bythe
ofthemaxim'(differentia
'difference
thatcanbe determined
on thebasisof
maximae)
81

12:29:42 PM

is: a diffinitheterms
usedinthemaxims.Forthemaximgivenabove,thedifferentia
tione
('fromthedefinition').
theMedievalapproach
tothesources.He characterizes
In partII G.-P. sketches
ontheclassical
dealswithquestions
commented
thewayinwhichtheMedievais
texts,
on theTopics
whether
or nottherewas a 'standard'
Commentator
(just
concerning
was formanyotherworksofAristotle
as e.g. Averroes
(bytheway,G.-P. can not
in Aristotle's
and
howtheMedievaissaw a structure
candidate)),
givea definite
Boethius'eyes,and discusses
the
Boethius'work,howtheyreadAristotle
through
etc.
thefivepredicables
and thefourpredicate-types
distinction
between
important
oftheTopics
intheMiddle
Thelargest
partofthebook(partIII) is onthedoctrine
thedevelopment
from
about1000up tothe15thcentury.
Ages.HereG.-P. sketches
viz.
hediscusses
ofMedievaltextson threequestions,
In thissection
quitea number
in arguments,
and in whatclasses
ofa locus
howto conceive
, howa locusfunctions
thecommentaries
on the
thelocicanbe divided.In thefirst
place,G.-P. hasstudied
and Boethius,whereasthe textbooks
worksby Aristotle
,
, Compendia
(Summulae
areusedas supplements.
Introductions)
Medievalauthors
suchas Abelard,
thetextsofwellknown
G.-P.notonlydiscusses
of whommostworksare
Peterof Spain,and RadulphusBritoi.e. philosophers,
ofwhomthetractsare
and anonymous
authors,
edited,butalso ratherunknown
In the AppendicesG.-P. gives
sometimes
only availablein manuscriptform.
textsanda listofCommentaries
ofthesehitherto
ofa selection
unprinted
fragments
and Boethius'Topics.
on Aristotle's
wonder
andexcellent
book.One might
a fascinating
In myviewG.-P. haswritten
ofa smallpartofAristotle's
howa bookontheinterpretations
logiccanbeinteresting,
: 'the
Sir David Ross's opinionon Aristotle's
if one remembers
Topics
especially
modeofthought'
discussion
, 1964(1923):59). G.-P.
(Aristotle
belongstoa by-gone
thata studyoftheTopics,orofa philosopher's
hasshown,however,
interpretation
ofa locusand itsfunction,
(their
partofMedievalculture
bringsto lighta specific
on
an excellent
andthatsucha studyprovides
abouta dispute),
perspective
thoughts
In thetexton thecoverofthebook,G.-P. menproblems.
important
philosophical
forofargumentation,
thetheory
aboutdialectic,
axiomatics,
tionssome:problems
as wellas thedistincofconsequences
modallogicandthetheory
universais,
malism,
and iudicium
inventio
tionsbetween
Topics)
( = Aristotle's
object-and meta-language,
To thislistI add
and secondintentions.
Posteriora
), and first
Analytica
( = Aristotle's
alsoshedlighton an author's
on theTopics
thata studyofcommentaries
conception
as wellas
and truth,
ofproof,
definition,
(andsupposition)
signification
plausibility
between
theirauctoritates
on thewaytheMedievaisinterpret
, andon thedistinction
variousphilosophical
genres.
he often
cautiousin his statements:
G.-P. has donea finejob: he is extremely
arevery
the
texts
His
of
is
reached.
minimum
bare
a
them
until
analyses
qualifies
ofOckham
remarks
withG.-P.'s bookthepuzzling
byWilliam
good.Unfortunately,
are notyetsolved(p. 304). The styleofthebookis clear,thesumon plausibility
to the
mariesaddedto thepartsin whichthebookis divided,and theconclusion
historical
andtherefore
The workis welldocumented
wholebook,areveryhelpful.
literature
ina strict
sense.It is up todateas tosecondary
(O. Bird,E. Stump,etc.).
on theTopicsandtheTheoryofConsequences
The chapter
(partIII, E), inwhich
forthe
G.-P. discusseshowtheTopics is an important
partof thebackground
is especially
ofconsequences,
ofthetheory
interesting.
development
Use oftheindexesgivesgoodresults.
E. P. Bos

Leiden

82

12:30:49 PM

II Merowingische
WalterBerschin,
undEpochenstil
imlateinischen
Mittelalter.
Biographie
Italien
imfrhen
unddieInseln
Mittelalter.
, Spanien
Biographie.
(QuellenundUntersuzurlateinischen
des Mittelalters,
Band9), AntonHiersechungen
Philologie
mannVerlag,Stuttgart
1988,XII, 338 S.
schnell
ZweiJahrenachdemersten
25, 1987,S. 79-80)isterfreulich
(sieheVivarium
undEpochenstil
erschienen.
Whrend
der
derzweiteBanddesHandbuches
Biographie
desGrossenabschliesst,
wirdhierdie Periode
ersteBandmitdenDialogenGregors
wobeidas siebente
vonca. 600n. Chr.bisca. 900n. Chr.behandelt,
Jahrhundert,
bilindemdieBiographie
literarische
diewichtigste
war,denSchwerpunkt
Gattung
einerZeit,in
det.Die Csuram Ende,derAnfang
also des zehnten
Jahrhunderts,
in eineschwere
Krise
derNormannen
das lateinische
Schrifttum
derdie Angriffe
istjedochnichtfrGallien,Germanien,
brachten,
EnglandundRomeingehalten,
Reform
GebietewodieKarolingische
ihrenEinfluss
hat;frdieseGebiete
ausgebt
die "Karolingische
BiohltderBandschoneherinne,dennderAutorbeabsichtigt,
Bandzu behandeln.
graphie"imfolgenden
In methodischer
Hinsicht
schliesst
sichderzweiteBandbei demvorangehenden
wirdauchhierineinersehrweiten
desBegriffes
an;derBegriff
Bedeutung
Biographie
ordo
istdas Werk,indemnichtweniger
als 150Bioverwendet.
Durchseinenlucidus
Wahl
Schonausdertreffsicheren
werden,
besprochen
bequemzu bentzen.
graphien
Er verdes Materialshervor.
WerkegehtBerschins
derbehandelten
Beherrschung
hervorzuheben
stehtes, das Wesentliche
zu whlen,das Charakteristische
und
Erbietetfesselnde
Werkezu behandeln,
hatten.
ParadieeinenNachhall
namentlich
den Lesermittels
funktioneller
und nichtseltenausfhrlicher
digmataund fhrt
weisserbeiseinenDarlegungen
res.Undimmer
denKernherauszuZitateinmedias
schlen.
bietetdie gutgentzte
dieregionalen
Die geographische
Mglichkeit,
Anordnung
und sichtbar
in den Typender Biographie
hervorzuheben
zu
Verschiedenheiten
oderwelcheArtvonBiographie
in einem
wo neueStrukturen
auftauchen,
machen,
Gebietoderin einerPeriodevorherrscht.
bestimmten
werden
stilistische
undsprachliche
undAnalysen
Nichtselten
Bemerkungen
geboindiespteLatiten,wobeiderAutorsichebensomitdenallgemeinen
Einfuhrungen
weimitdenjeweiligen
zu deneinzelStudien
nittunddasVulgrlatein
sprachlichcn
wohlvertraut
nenSchriftstellern
zeigt.Auchhatereinscharfes
AugefrdieHerkunft
von Motiven.Beispielsweise
sei hierder Hinweisauf die lterePassionsliteratur
derPassioAJrae
anlsslich
derBesprechung
hervorgehoben
(S. 85-86):"in dervon
Zeitenan immer
wieder
das gewollte
Missverstndnis
ltesten
derChristen
vorrmischenGerichten
vorkommt."
OhnedasswirdamitdenWertdes Buchesschmlern
wollen,seieneinigekleine
oderHinzufgungen,
dieallerdings
nurEinzelheiten
Korrekturen
erlaubt.
betreffen,
dass das Abstractum
consolatio
AufS. 1011bemerkt
kirchenlateinisch
in
Berschin,
vorkommt
miteinemHinweisaufdasGlossarium
konkreten
mehreren
Bedeutungen
ist die Formulierung
von Ducange.Statt"kirchenlateinisch"
"im christlichen
knntemanu.a. auchaufE. Lfstedt,
Latein"zu bevorzugen.
Frconsolatio
Late
hinweisen.
Latin
, Oslo 1959,S. 148/149
e dextra
AufS. 32 (11. Zeilevonunten)lesemanstattduodeeim
luposadvenire
etdextralevaquemediosadstare.
luposadvenire
levaquemediosadstare:duodeeim
AufS. 62 wirdeineStelleausderEligiusvita
diealsvorbildlich
(II 15)besprochen,
undreprsentativ
frdie Wunderdermerowingischen
wird
Heiligenbeschrieben
vonGefangenen,
ein Erdbeben,
das Zertrmmern
derRie(wunderbare
Befreiung
manO. Wcinreich,
Gebet
Wundertypus
vergleiche
gelnusw.;frdiesenstereotypen
undWunder.
II Trffnung
imWunderundZauber
derAntike
, Stuttgart
glaube
1929):ostia
carceris
soluta.Bei diesemTextwrezu
patefacta
omniaquevinculaconpeditorum
83

12:30:56 PM

dassdie endgltige
nochdeutlich
erwhnen,
Quelle,die auchin derFormulierung
Act.Ap.16,26ist:etstatim
durchschimmert
apertasuntomniaostiaetuniversorum
vinculasolutasunt.
teri(S. 144) "Nscioqua occasione
Die Anfangsworte
der VitaS. Fortunati
by
pres
scribere
vitambeatispapa et Petrusarchidiaconus)
(se. Gregorius
praetermiserunt
"Ich weissnicht,
warumsiees unterBerschin:
bersetzt
simiFortunati
presbyteri"
Vielleicht
wre
Fortunatus
zu beschreiben."
Priesters
dasLebendesseligsten
liessen,
sie es..."
Grundunterliessen
besser:"Aus irgendeinem
eineTextentstellung,
welche
vonBraulioenthlt
Der Anfang
derVitaS. Aemiliani
in den jngerenHss. glattgestrichen
ist, wobeijedoch weitervom
allerdings
die anscheinend
wurde.RichtigbehltBerschin
Text abgewichen
ursprnglichen
bei: Igitura
versehenen
Konstruktion
crux
mit
einem
in
der
klare,
Ausgabe
weniger
+ nosquoquedicendiratio+ ; (mitderUbersetzung:
eiusprincipio,
conversatione,
auchwirunsere
seinemBeginn,
"AlsomitseinerBekehrung,
Darlegung").
beginnen
zu
beiconversatione
als Apposition
Die vonBerschin
Lsungprincipio
vorgeschlagene
einVerbumducit
Es istmglich,
dassvordicendi
istzweifellos
betrachten,
richtig.
= conversio
H. Hoppensehemanweiter
ist.Zu conversalo
ausgefallen
(homoiareton!)
in:Graecitas
etLatinitas
Christianorum
Unetude
Conversado.
brouwers,
smasiologique,
I 2, Nijmegen1964,S. 89-92.
Primaeva,
Supplementa
in
aufdemGebietdes Wortschatzes
von Besonderheiten
Bei der Besprechung
sichan manBerschin
bemerkt
(S. 40),dassdieColumbanvita
Jonas'VitaColumbani
chenStellen"wieeinebunginderSynonymik"
liest,wobeiereineSerievon6 Beiexquirium
vocant).Hierwre
quamvulgohomines
spielengibt(Typus:ferusculam,
wreeineDiffenichtisoliert
ausserdem
dassdie Erscheinung
zu erwhnen,
dasteht;
Die Formel
ntzlich
derdargebotenen
quam{quem,
quos
Beispiele
gewesen.
renzierung
nichteindeutig
vocant
istnmlich
Bedeutungen
wegenderverschiedenen
usw.)vulgo
aufunterschiedlicher
vonvulgo
Ebene,gangbare
(dasWorteausderUmgangssprache
Es istweiter
Termini
undtechnische
Worte,wieauchfremdsprachliche
bezeichnet).
bei
steht.Es gibtcharakteristische
klar,dassJonashierin einerTradition
Beispiele
. 19,2intextis
... quasvulgomattas
iuncivirgulis
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vocant;Hist.
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Franc.
vocant;ibid.9,28pateris
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demGrossen
bacchinon
(Dial. 2,2,avisquaevulgomerulavocavocant)undGregor
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undbentzt.
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einenHinweisauf
Um so mehrfalltes auf,dassmanfreinenRufintext
(S. 211108)
wennderAutor
MignePL 21, col. 461 findet.Es ist auch nichtganz korrekt,
"mit einembedeutsamen
schreibt:
Anklangan die erstenWorteder Kirchengeessemedicodicunt
des Rufinus
schichte
des Eusebiusin der Ubersetzung
(Peritorum
vonRufinselbst(vgl.Th.
sichhierumeineselbstndige
rum
praefatio
)." Es handelt
Schriftsteller
Christliche
II 2, S. 951, Griechische
Mommsen,Eusebius
, Werke
9 = ManlioSimonetti,
, CCL 20,S. 267).AufS. 274isteinHinRufini
Opera
Tyranni
De diversis
weisaufAugustinus,
83, c. 56, PL 40,1841)durchdieErwhquaestionibus
CCL
(aus 1975)zu ersetzen:
nungderneuenAusgabevonAlmutMutzenbecher
44A, S. 95/96.
durchseineFllevonEinzelheiten
Buchgeschrieben,
Berschin
hateinanregendes
aber
ein Handbuchund Nachschlagewerk,
und Gedankenreichtum
zugleicherzeit
wieder
eineStudie,die immer
undAbwechslung
durchseinenstilistischen
Sorgfalt
bereichert
istumeinneuesStandardwerk
Die Biographie
zumWeiterlesen
einladet.
worden.
Nijmegen

G. J. M. Bartelink

84

12:30:56 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 2 (1989)
Attributesof Action in Maimonides
JOSEPH A. BUIJS

ofHimis an
thatwe predicate
It hasbecomecleartoyouthateveryattribute
ofHis
is intended
fortheapprehension
attribute
ofactionor, iftheattribute
oftheprivation
ofthe
thenegation
essenceandnotofHis action,it signifies
inquestion.( Guide
attribute
I, 58)
ofthePerplexed
In The Guideof thePerplexed
, Maimonides classifies predicates into
those that signify(i) definitions,(ii) parts of definitions,(iii) qualities,
(iv) relations,and (v) actions.1The issue thatconcerns him is whether
any attributesare trulypredicable of God. He goes on to argue that
only the last category,attributesof action, are predicable of God. The
others would result in false propositions. Thus, he reinterpretsany
referenceto traditionaldivine attributesas signifyingeither negative
attributesor attributesof action.
A reinterpretationin terms of negative attributesamounts to talk
about God's essence. But such talkcannot say what God is; it can only
say what God is not. More specifically,Maimonides contends, we
may ascribe perfectionsto God, provided we mean to deny the corresponding imperfection.Thus, we can say "God is powerful" and
'God is knowing," but these ascriptions are intelligibleonly if we
understandthemto mean, respectively,"God is not weak" and "God
is not ignorant." A reinterpretationin terms of attributesof action,
on the otherhand, does not referto the divine essence at all. Instead,
it amounts to talk about the effectsof divine agency in the world. Thus
we can say "God is just" provided we mean by this that God produced a just event or state of affairs;similarlyto say "God is knowing," on this reinterpretation, means that God produced an
intelligent, orderly world. Ascribing actions to God in the way
Maimonides suggests purportedly avoids those difficulties that
generate a negative interpretationof divine attributes.
1 Throughout
translation
aretotheEnglish
totheGuide
references
byShlomoPines,
occursin I,
ofpredicables
andclassification
discussion
Chicago1963.Maimonides'
52, p. 114-9.
85

12:21:52 PM

Here I want to explore the philosophical import of Maimonides'

attributesof action. In particularI want to address the followingquestions: How do attributes of action logically differ from other
predicates? What justifiestheiraffirmationof God! Do such affirmations avoid those difficultiesthat generate a negative interpretationof
divine attributes? I intend to show that in attributes of action
Maimonides proposes a viable alternativealongside negativelanguage
about God - an alternative that mollifies the usual charge of
agnosticism.
I
While recent commentatorshave focussed, both criticallyand constructively,on Maimonides' so-called negative theology, they have
tended to gloss over the other aspect, namely, a reinterpretationof
attributesas actions.21. M. Bochnski, forinstance, analyzes the logic
of negative attributesbut not that of attributesof action.3 In a recent
studycomparing Avicenna, Maimonides and Aquinas, David B. Burrell remarks,
couldnotseehowwecouldalterourcharacteristic
manner
BecauseMaimonides
whenit cameto divinity,
ofattributing
norcouldhe attenuate
thetraditional
confession
thatGod is one,he hadrecourse
to a radicalagnosticism
regarding
we use to praiseGod....4
thestatements
However, it is not obvious that the charge of a radical agnosticism
stands up in light of Maimonides' attemptto provide a positive way
of talking about God in terms of actions. Yet Burrell gives no consideration to attributesof action and their apparentlydistinctlogical
status in Maimonides. Alexander Broadie correctly summarizes
Maimonides viewpoint on attributesof action:
2 Somerecent
Maimonides
onNegative
constructive
studiesarebyHarryA. Wolfson,
in
Attributes
Volume
, in: LouisGinsberg
, NewYork1945,411-46,andreprinted
Jubilee
andIslamic
, ed. Arthur
Hyman,NewYork1977,
EssaysinMedieval
Jewish
Philosophy
onMan}sKnowledge
Maimonides
andAquinas
180-218;IsaacFranck,
ofGod: A Twentiethandreprinted
38 (1985),591-615,
, in:The ReviewofMetaphysics,
Perspective
Century
inMaimonides,
A Collection
, ed. JosephA. Buijs,NotreDame 1988,
ofCritical
Essays
andAquinas
, in:The Review
284-305;andmyreplyTheNegative
ofMaimonides
Theology
41 (1988),723-38.
ofMetaphysics,
3 See I. M. Bochenski,
TheLogicofReligion
, NewYork1965,p. 111-4.
4 DavidB. Burrell,
theUnknowable
Maimonides
God: Ibn-Sina,
, Notre
, Aquinas
Knowing
Dame, Indiana1986,p. 57.
86

12:21:52 PM

thatMaimonides
attribuTheonlyexception
allowstothethesisthataffirmative
tioncannotbe madetruly
ofGod concerns
God's actions.Forhe holdsGod's
buttofollow
actionsnottobe partofGod,thatis,partofHis nature,
from
that
nature.3
Since actions do not describe God's nature, Broadie apparentlydoes
not see in themany helpfulsolution to the dilemma of eitheraccepting
univocal predication of God and its implicit anthropomorphismor
equivocal predication and its implicitagnosticism.6But, like Burrell,
he faultsMaimonides on the grounds of his negative theologywithout
considering attributesof action. And although Isaac Franck defends
negative theology,he considers Maimonides to be ambivalent or even
inconsistentabout an otherwisethoroughlynegative theology,rather
than to offera legitimate alternative in attributesof action. About
attributes of action, Franck remarks, 4'This modification of his
negative theologyis surely a Maimonidean equivocation. It is noted
by Aquinas in his De PotentiaDei and is properlycriticizedby him."7
But in adopting Aquinas' criticism,Franck also followsAquinas in
misunderstandingattributesof action.
Two earlier, textual studies brought out the originality of
Maimonides' attributesof action. Tracing Maimonides' classification
of predicables to the influenceof Aristotle,Harry A. Wolfson nevertheless concludes:
This classification
of attributes
quiteapartfromitsspecific
by Maimonides,
in its bearinguponthegeneral
application,
maybe considered,
theological
ofthenatureoflogicaljudgment,
as a newand independent
revision
problem
- oneon a parwiththerevision
ofAristotle's
listofpredicables
introduced
by
and perhapseven of greaterimportance
thanthe Porphyrian
Porphyry,
revision.8
But Wolfsonleaves aside an importantphilosophical question: "What
Maimonides really means by action that is not a relation is not the
subject of the present paper."9 Seymour Feldman does take up this
5 AlexanderBroadie,Maimonides
andAquinason theNamesof God, in: Religious
Studies,23 (1987),p. 159.
6 See ibid.,p. 161.
7 Franck,
Maimonides
andAquinas
, in: Maimonides
, ed. Buijs,' p. 286.
8 HarryA. Wolfson,
TheAristotelian
andMaimonides
Division
Predicables
, in:
ofAttributes
inMemory
andStudies
, ed. IsraelDavidson,NewYork1938,
Essays
ofLindaR. Miller
listofdefinition
andaccidents,
p. 234.To Aristotle's
(orspecies),genus,properties,
had addedspecific
difference.
Porphyry
9 Ibid.,p. 227.
87

12:21:52 PM

issue somewhat but his intent is to show that Latin scholastics

misunderstoodMaimonides on thispoint. According to Feldman, the
distinctionbetween relations and actions in Maimonides
notonlyan originalfeature
ofattributes,
but
ofhisoveralltheory
constitutes
alsotheessential
failedeither
thattheScholastics
torecognizc
pointofhistheory
at all or to appreciate
fully.10
Unlike his predecessors who included actions under relations and
allowed both to be predicated of God, 4'Maimonides sharply
distinguishesbetween these two typesof predications and allows only
one of them to be ascribed to God."11 And although Feldman, like
Wolfson, lays out the textual contextof Maimonides' theoryof divine
attributesunderstood as actions, he notes that "it is not the purpose
of this paper to construct an argument in behalf of Maimonides'
theoryof attributes."12
A few recent interpretershave noted the significanceof attributes
of action in Maimonides' understandingof specificdivine attributes.
Thus ArthurHyman shows that talk about divine wisdom and divine
will in Maimonides
oftheworld.Since
canrefer
produced
byGod,thatis properties
onlytoeffects
seemtobe a signofwisdom,
orderandregularity
disorder
and
forMaimonides
a signofwill,itistheorderanddisorder
intheworldthat
appearing
irregularity
ofdivinewisdomandwill.13
yieldtheinterpretations
Similarly, Lenn Evan Goodman argues that matter and form,
philosophically associated with disorder and order in the natural
world, are forMaimonides the only means by which to know anything
of God. And he goes on to argue
or form
thatMaimonides
matter
withthewillofGod, and thought
identified
to be mere
withthetraditional
ofwisdom,
bothofwhichhe believed
attribute
God's act.14
humanwaysofrecognizing
' DoctrineDivine
10SeymourFeldman,A Scholastic
Misinterpretation
ofMaimonides
of
in
Attributes
, in: Journalof JewishStudies,19 (1968), [23-39]and reprinted
Maimonides
, ed. Buijs,p. 269.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.,p. 270.
13Arthur
inMedieval
PhilosoonCreation
andEmanation
, in:Studies
Hyman,Maimonides
D.C. 1987,p. 57-8.
ed. JohnF. Wippel,Washington,
phy,
'
14LennE. Goodman,
asAttributes
Matter
andForm
, in:
Philosophy
ofGodinMaimonides
D.C. 1988,p. 87.
A Straight
et al., Washington,
Path
, ed. RuthLink-Salinger
88

12:21:52 PM

But while both Hyman and Goodman utilize Maimonides' understanding of attributesof action, neitherof them explain why or how
actions are predicable of God without implying anything about the
divine essence.
A philosophicalexplanation, I believe, restson Maimonides' theory
of predication and his understandingof agency as a distinctkind of
causality differentfrom natural causation. I will proceed by first
outliningthe general problem and frameworkof Maimonides' discussion of divine attributesand then offeringa philosophical clarification
of his theoryregarding attributesof action.
II
For Maimonides, as for others in the medieval tradition, the
problem of language about God poses a dilemma, arising fromtwo
opposing poles: the transcendentnature of the divine reality,on the
one hand, and limitationsinherentin human conceptualization and
language, on the other.15The one risks total agnosticism and the
other, a false anthropomorphism.
PhilosophicallyMaimonides approaches the problem fromwithina
metaphysicaland epistemological framework.16
Maimonides begins his formal discussion of divine attributesby
maintaining, like Aristotle,that only propositions are truth-bearers.
His insistenceon true beliefsover mere verbal assertionsand his definitionof beliefsas involvingan intellectualapprehension of the reality
of thingsimplythatboth meaningfullanguage and truebeliefsexpress
propositions that correspond to reality.17The problem of language
about God, then, is bound by beliefsabout the realityof God, which
can only derive fromdemonstrationsof his existence.
But demonstrationsof God's existence, according to Maimonides,
15Fora brief,
clearstatement
oftheproblem
in theJewish,Islamicand Christian
medieval
tradition
see Burrcll,TheUnknowable
God, p. 1-4.
16Forthedifferent
inthequestion
ofdivineattributes
philosophical
problems
implicit
see myMaimonides
andtheProblem
Divine
Attributes
in: Thought.
, forthcoming
of
17See Guide
butthenotionthat
I, 50,p. 111: "beliefis notthenotionthatisuttered,
is represented
inthesoulwhenithasbeenaverred
ofitthatitis in factjustas ithas
beenrepresented."
FortheAristotelian
influence
behindtheseclaimssee Wolfson,
Aristotelian
Predicables
, p. 203-4.
89

12:21:52 PM

show that God exists of necessityas a totallyuncaused being.18As a

consequence, God is neitherontologicallycomposite nor comparable
to anythingelse. If God were composite, then He would need some
cause to explain His existenceas a unifiedentity;and ifHe were comparable to anythingelse, then there would be some feature in common. But there cannot be anything in common between an
ontologically necessary existent and everything else that is
ontologicallydependent on it. And even ifthiswere possible, it would
imply an additional feature and thus composition in God. For
Maimonides, God is absolutely simple, single and unique. It also
followsthatGod has neitheressential nor accidental attributes.For on
an Aristotelian understanding of attributes, accidental attributes
would imply that the divine reality is composite and essential
attributeswould imply that it is both composite and caused.19 Moreover, since no attributes pertain to the divine reality by which to
apprehend it, we cannot apprehend what it is; we can only apprehend
the fact that it is.20
The implication for theological language is that language purportedlydescriptiveof what a thing is, could not meaningfullyapply
to God in the same sense. This is so because meaningfullanguage
expresses true beliefsand truebeliefsabout the realityof thingswithin
human experience do implyboth composition and comparison. They
imply composition, because what is apprehended within human
experience is contingentand caused, the result of matter and form.
Moreover, theyimplycomparison, because the concepts by which the
realityof such thingsare comprehendeddesignate universais,features
held in common by several entities. Thus any descriptivelanguage
that implies compositionin the nature of an entityor comparison with
other things must be literally false when applied to God. For this
18See Guide
II, 1, p. 243-52;butalsoI, 57,p. 132and58,p. 135.Whatisestablished
in BookI.
ofdivineattributes
in thediscussion
in BookII is presupposed
19See Guide
haveonlya conceptual
as universais
attributes
I, 51,p. 112-3.Although
as well;seeHarry
ofthings
statusinthereality
status,theyhavea distinct
ontological
and
inRationalism
andUniversais
onModes
A. Wolfson,
Maimonides
, Judaism,
, in:Studies
in
Universalism
, ed. Raphael Loewe, London 1966, p. 311-21,and reprinted
andtheProblem
Maimonides
of
, ed. Buijs,p. 166-74;and alsohisearlierstudy,Cresas
Attributes
Divine
Review,n.s. 7 (1916),p. 12.
, in:JewishQuarterly
20See Guide
thefactthatHe is and
I, 58, p. 135: ... weareonlyabletoapprehend
His quiddity."
cannotapprehend
90

12:21:52 PM

reason Maimonides insists on a total equivocal use of terms in their

application to God and other things.21
Maimonides is neverthelessfaced with religious tradition,with its
extensiveand seeminglymeaningfultalk about God; he is also aware
of a human need to acquire knowledge of God, expressed by way of
language. Maimonides' immediate response to thispressureis to urge
a reinterpretationof language about God. But then one problem is
how language about God is to be reinterpreted,while respectingthe
absolutelysimple and incomparable nature of God. Another problem
is whetherwe are leftwith any knowledge of God at all. For even in
a reinterpretedsense language about God must express true beliefs
otherwiseit is pure fancifullanguage. And if no knowledge is possible
at all, then we are leftwith silence.
At this point Maimonides gives a logical twist to the problem of
theological language. Since only propositions are truth-bearers,any
question about meaningfullanguage as well as true beliefs reduce to
the question whether"God" can serve as the subject in a logical proposition.22This question, in turn, forceshim to look anew at predication in general and at kinds of predicables in particular.
Maimonides advances conditions of predication in connectionwith
a reductioargument against the supposition that either essential or
accidental attributesmight pertain to God.
Terms used as predicates in a proposition, Maimonides admits,
may designate either an essence or accidents. Now when terms
designate an essence, he goes on to argue, they may do so either by
simplyidentifyingit or by explaining it. Maimonides' example forthe
21See GuideI, 52, p. 114 and 56, p. 131. Evenan analogicaluse oflanguageis
an analogical
useofterms
becauseon Maimonides'
excluded,
presupunderstanding
ofanalogicallanguage
His rejection
betweentwoentities.
posessomecomparison
thathisrejection
doesnot
deserves
moreattention
in itsownright.Somesuggest
has a morerestrictive
affect
theThomistic
ofanalogy,becauseMaimonides
theory
de
M. T.-L. Penido,LesAttributs
ofanalogythanAquinas;see,forinstance,
concept
in: RevueNo-scolastique
de Philosophie,
26 (1924),137-63;
Dieud'aprs
Mamonide,
Termsin Aristotle
and
or HarryA. Wolfson,TheAmphibolous
, ArabicPhilosophy
in
Maimonides
Review,31 (1938), 151-73,and reprinted
, in: HarvardTheological
andReligion
and GeorgeH.
Studies
intheHistory
, ed. IsadoreTwersky
ofPhilosophy
Vol. I, Cambridge,
Mass. 1973,455-77.I believethata Maimonidean
Williams,
ofanalogy.
can be generated
theory
againsttheThomistic
argument
22Wolfsonemphasizedthislogicaldimensionof the problemof attributes
in
Predicables
Cresas
see Wolfson,
, p. 201-2.
, p. 2-5,andAristotelian
Maimonides;
91

12:21:52 PM

firstusage is as if we said "Man is man" and forthe second, as ifwe

said 4'Man is a rational animal."23 The latter illustratesan instance
of predication, the formerdoes not. His examples also indicate that
propositionsthat explain an essence are informativeabout their subject, whereas those that simply identifyit are uninformative.
The logical moral is not only that predication requires a relation
between subject and predicate but also that the propositionbe informative about its subject. But these conditions are met, only if there
is an ontological distinctionbetween what the subject termdesignates
and what the predicate term designates. There is such a distinction
between an entityand its accidental attributes,which are added to its
essence.24 There is also such a distinctionbetween an entityand its
essential attributes,for essential attributesconstitutethe causal components of a composite entity.25Conventional Aristotelianpredication, namely, essential and accidental predication, satisfiesthese conditions. The requisite ontological distinctionis assured because the
predicate terms are general, designating universal attributes.But a
problem arises when predicate termsare singular. These Aristotleheld
to point out, ratherthan describe, a subject. He did not consider that
propositions with singular predicate terms constitute instances of
predication.26While "Socrates is a man" expresses an instance of
predication, "Socrates is this man" or "This man is Socrates" does
not. Applied to God, this conclusion means that if general termswere
predicated of God, designating either essential or accidental
attributes,the propositions would be false. Thus "God" could not
stand as the subject term in such a proposition and stillhave it constitutean instance of predication. But if termswere applied to God as
singular termsor names, then "God" could stand as the subject term
in a (nominal) proposition,but the propositionwould remain uninformative, asserting tautologously that God is God.27
On the one hand, language about God apparentlydemands the use
of singular terms that would identify,but not describe, the divine
23See GuideI, 51, p. 113.
24See GuideI, 51, p. 113,and 52, p. 115.
25See GuideI, 52, p. 115.
26See Wolfson,
Cresas
, p. 5-6.
27Thislogicalconclusion
confirms
thatterms
can onlybe
Maimonides'
contention
to God and otherthings.
appliedequivocally
92

12:21:52 PM

reality.On the other,singulartermsdo not seem to satisfythe general

conditions for predication. Not content to leave the issue here,
Maimonides looks at predicables anew, to see whetherthere are any
singular termsapplicable to God that neverthelesssatisfythe general
conditions for predication, that is, of designating an ontological
distinctionbetween subject and predicate. He finds such a predicate
in terms designating actions.
As mentioned at the outset, Maimonides classifies predicates into
those that signify(i) definitions,(ii) parts of definitions,(iii) qualities,
(iv) relations,and (v) actions.28Wolfson has shown how Maimonides
arrived at this list by combining Aristotle's ten categories, the
developed Aristotelian list of four predicables, and Porphyry's
modification.29What interests us here is Maimonides' concern
whetherany of the terms on his list are trulypredicable of God. He
excludes the firstthree, namely, termsdesignating (i) definitions,(ii)
parts of definitions,and (iii) qualities frombeing predicable of God.
The first two indicate essential predication; the third accidental
predication. Any of these, if predicated of God, would entail a
multiplicityin God's essence. For accidental predication presupposes
accidents that are added to an essence, while essential predication
presupposes essential attributesthat are distinctcausal components.30
The fourth,termsdesignating(iv) relations,do not directlyreferto an
essence or to accidents. Nevertheless,according to Maimonides, relational attributesdo presuppose some attributesin the thingsrelated:
corporeal attributesfor temporal and spatial relations, a likeness or
similarityfor other relations.31Thus relational predicates fall under
either essential or accidental predication and are likewise excluded.
Only terms signifying (v) actions Maimonides allows to be
predicable of God. If so, then such predication must differfromboth
essential and accidental predication,otherwiseit would violate restric28See GuideI, 52, p. 114-9.
29SeeWolfson,
Aristotelian
Predicables
a listoffive
maintained
, p. 201-34.Maimonides
as did Prophyry;
he maintained
thedistinction
between
essential
and
predicables,
accidentalpredication,
as did Aristotle.
He includedin his own classification
torefer
understood
toanyofthetencategories
as wellas thosedesignating
predicates
a definition
or specific
difference.
accidents,
species),genus,property,
(or
30See GuideI, 52, p. 114-5;and alsoWolfson,
Cresas
, p. 10-3.
31See GuideI, 57, p. 116-8.
93

12:21:52 PM

tions imposed on language about God. Yet it must also satisfythe conditions of predication in general, otherwise the propositions cannot
form the basis of true beliefs.
How do attributes of action satisfy these demands? First, such
predicates do not designate an essence but the products or effectsof
an essence. They designate a definiteact, a specificevent or state of
affairsproduced by an agent. Thus this kind of predicate term may
be considered a singular term. Maimonides' example in the Guideis
"Zayd built this wall" or "Zayd made this garment."32 Second,
actions are not to be confused with habits or dispositionsin the agent,
the art or skill by which acts may be produced.33 Since habits fall
under qualities, attributes of action do not designate the usual
accidents, i.e., qualities or relations, either. Thus since attributesof
action implyneitheressential nor accidental attributes,theyviolate no
restrictionson language about God. Yet what the predicate term
designates is ontologically distinct from what the subject term
designates. Propositions with attributes of action are informative
about theirsubject, not in saying what it is, but in saying what it did
or may do.
Maimonides is proposing a differentkind of predicationin addition
to the usual Aristotelianessential and accidental predication. He sees
- explicitlystated in his Treatiseon Logic- in two structhe difference
turallydifferentpropositions: propositions of the third adjacent and
propositionsof the second adjacent.34The distinctionmay be put this
way. A proposition of the third adjacent takes the formof
1) A is P;
and a proposition of the second adjacent takes the formof
2) A o's.
4
32See Guide
I, 52,p. 119.WhilePines(see note1 above)uses 'action,"Goodman
in
and trans.L. E.
Rambam
the
Moses
Maimonides
selected
,
, Readings
of
Philosophy
(
theArabic
Goodman,NewYork1976,p. 83) uses"work"totranslate
JiHandthe
Hebrewpeculah.
The termsare clearlylinkedto both"verb" and "action"; see
Aristotelian
Predicables
, p. 231.
Wolfson,
33See GuideI, 52, p. 118: "I do notintendto signify
bythewords,hisaction,the
- as whenyousaya carpenter
ofan artthatbelongstohimwhois described
habitus
- inasmuch
tothespeciesofquality,
as thisbelongs
as wehavementioned.
ora smith
ButI intendto signify
bytheword,hisaction,theactionthathe whois described
has performed."
Aristotelian
Predicables
See also Wolfson,
, p. 219-20.
94

12:21:52 PM

In (1) "P" stands fora descriptiveterm that is grammaticallya noun

or adjective; in (2) "0" stands for a descriptive term that is grammaticallya verb. In (1), propositionsof the thirdadjacent, the relation
of predication is expressed by the copula "is", either explicitlyor
implicitly;in (2), propositionsof the second adjacent, the relation of
predication is expressed directlyby the predicate term, without the
need of the copula "is".35
While Maimonides simply notes the distinction in his Treatiseon
Logic, in the contextof the Guidehe exploits it.36For therehe indicates
that not all propositionsare instances of predication. Those are not
which are uninformativeabout their subject, because they imply no
ontological distinction.But that is so only in (1) when its predicate
termis singular,ratherthan general. But (2) does implyan ontological
distinction,even when its predicate term is singular. When (1) is an
instance of predication, P either explains A (in the case of essential
predication) or describes A (in the case of accidental predication); the
relation of predicationis one of inclusion. In (2), 0 not only describes
a stateof affairsbut also identifiesA as the agent of thatstateof affairs.
In other words, a relation of identityin (1) does not give an instance
of predication, but in (2) identityis the relation of predication. A
clearer reformulationof (2) then is
3) A is the one who (may, did) 0.
Here "is" expresses a relation of identitybetween a subject and the
agent of an act.37
34See Maimonides,
Treatise
onLogic
, trans.IsraelEfros,NewYork1938,ch. 3, p.
37. Aristotle
thedistinction
in De Interpretation
suggests
(v, 19a5-18); Ammonius
labelledthetwokindsofpropositions;
Lectures
seeSirWilliamHamilton,
onLogic
, 2nd
Cannstatt
ed., ed. H. L. ManselandJohnVeitch(Stuttgart-Bad
1969;originally
in 1866),Vol. I, p. 228-30.
published
35Unlikeformalized
modern
logic,theAristotelian
subject-predicate
logicstillmaintainsa linguistic
structure.
36The Treatise
onLogiccan be takenas presupposed
in theGuide-,
see,forinstance,
4
Guide
, 'EpistleDedicatory,"
p. 3, and I, 55, p. 129;and morerecently
Raymond
L. Weiss,OntheScope
Knew
Path
, ed.
, in:Straight
ofMaimonides'
Logic,Or,What
Joseph
p. 255-65.
Link-Salinger,
37This interpretation
differs
fromWolfson'sconclusion
in his earlystudyof the
inwhich
hemaintained
thatforMaimonides
therelation
ofpredication
canproblem
notbe oneofidentity;
see Wolfson,
Cresas
stillincluded
, p. 4-6.ButthereWolfson
actions
underrelations,
relations
as distinct
from
other
external
callingthemdynamic
relations.
He alsoconsidered
Maimonides'
ofattributes
tobe "typicalrather
theory
thanoriginal"(ibid.,p. 24)- a viewhe revised
laterin "Aristotelian
Predicables."
95

12:21:52 PM

Since in language about God only singular terms amounting to a

statementof identitycould uphold the divine simplicityand incomparability, only terms designating actions could be predicated
truthfullyand positively of God. Other predicates can only be
predicated negatively of God. Consequently, traditional language
about God can be reinterpretedinto true propositionsprovided terms
predicated of God are understood as either negative attributesor
attributesof action.38Maimonides explicitlydevelops the latterinterpretationforthe traditionalattributesof knowledge, power, will, and
life; it is also the interpretationexpanded by Hyman and Goodman
in showing that, for Maimonide, talk about divine knowledge refers
to order in the world and talk about divine will to disorder.39
Ill
Answering several difficulties may serve not only to clarify
Maimonides' view on attributesof action but tojustifytheirlegitimate
application to God.
The distinctionbetween (1), propositionsof the thirdadjacent, and
(2), propositionsof the second adjacent, it may be objected, is not a
logical distinction,because any proposition in the formof (2) can be
reformulatedinto a propositionin the formof (1). We can as well say
"S builds a house" and "S is building a house" or "S built a house"
and "S was building a house" (and so for other tenses). But for
Maimonides statementsin the formif(2) do not translateinto (1) and
retain the same meaning. English, and otherlanguages, is ambiguous
here in a way thatthe language of Maimonides is not. In Hebrew (and
Arabic) the two sentences ''S is building a house" and "S builds a
house" (or parallel sentences in other tenses) are grammaticallyas
well as semanticallydifferent.40
The firstsentenceuses a verbal adjective with the copula understood. The second sentence has a tensed
verb, with neitheran explicit nor implicitcopula. The connotationof
38See Guide
thatwe
I, 58, p. 136:"It hasbecomeclearto youthateveryattribute
is intendeforthe
of Him is an attribute
of actionor, if theattribute
predicate
ofthe
thenegation
ofHis essenceand notofHis action,it signifies
apprehension
in question."
oftheattribute
privation
39See GuideI, 53, p. 121-122and notes13 and 14,above.
40See Wolfson,
Aristotelian
Predicables
, p. 229-31.
96

12:21:52 PM

the firstsentence is to describe the subject as "a builder (of houses)";

it refersto the art or habit of building, a quality in the agent. The connotation of the second sentence is to describe the result or effectof
building. By themselves, Maimonides suggests, attributesof action
say nothingabout how the agent produced the event or stateof affairs;
it says only that it did.
This explains Maimonides' reinterpretationof traditional divine
attributesinto attributesof action. Claims about divine knowledge or
divine mercy, for instance, are to be taken to referto specificevents
or states of affairsof which God is the agent. But even in the case of
attributesof action, Maimonides suggests, termsare used equivocally
in theirapplication to God and human beings.41From a human point
of view, Maimonides would describe certain acts in relation to
acquired habits or dispositions. But in the case of God actions cannot
be understoodto implyaccidental or essential attributes,as theydo in
the case of human beings. Thus, forexample, "God is merciful," on
Maimonides' reinterpretation,means ''God is the one who did this
(which we consider an act of mercy)."
Another objection- raised by Aquinas and more recently taken
over from him by Franck- argues that a reinterpretationinto
attributesof action would allow any terms whatsoever to be ascribed
to God because such terms referto the effectsof God's agency and
God is ultimatelythe cause of anythingthatexists.42On Maimonides'
formula,according to Aquinas, we can say God is angrybecause God
is the cause of anger. Likewise, then, we can say God is fireor God
is corporeal, because God is the cause of fireand the cause of material
bodies. However, Aquinas' mistake here is twofold. First, he interpretsMaimonides' attributesof action as causal attributes;second, he
misses Maimonides' stricturethat descriptive terms are applied to
God only because we interpret actions a certain way. It is not
Maimonides' contention to claim, as did the Latin Scholastics, that
God is mercifulbecause He is the cause of mercy.43And so it is like41See Guide
hereis notthatHe possesses
moralqualiI, 54,p. 123-8:"The meaning
actionsresembling
theactionsthatin us proceedfrom
ties,butthatHe performs
- I meanfrom
moralqualities
ofthesoul;themeaning
is notthatHe, may
aptitudes
He be exalted,possesses
ofthesoul" (p. 124).
aptitudes
42See Franck,Maimonides
andAquinas
, in: Maimonides
, ed. Buijs,p. 286. Aquinas
raisestheobjection
in De Potentia
Dei, Q.7, a.5, andSumma
I, Q.13, a.2.
Theologiae
" bee relaman,Misinterpretation
, m Maimonides
, ed. Buijs,p. 272-3.
97

12:21:52 PM

wise not correctto suggest that God is firebecause he is the cause of

fireor thatGod is corporeal because he is the cause of materialbodies.
Such causal language presupposes a relationof likenessbetween cause
and effect,a relationMaimonides denies to God. Attributesof action
are not unique to theological language. We could say, for example,
4'So and so set a
fire," but fromthis it does not followthat "So and
so is fire." What, according to Maimonides, we could presumablysay
appropriatelyis "God is the one who made fire" or "God is the one
who made material bodies."
Maimonides would defendhis position furtherby distinguishingthe
results of agency from the effectsof natural causation. In a salient
discussion of causality, Maimonides firstnotes a differencebetween
"proximate" or "intermediate" causes and an ultimate cause, "the
'
FirstCause of all things. ,44He goes on to list threekindsof proximate
causes: accidental, essential or natural, and voluntary. The first,
accidental causation, refersto chance. The second, essentialor natural
causation, to the Aristoteliancauses involved in natural change. The
third, voluntarycausation, Maimonides furtherdivides into animal
instinctand human freechoice.45What interestsus here is the distinction between natural causation and free choice or human agency.
Now natural causation, on an Aristotelianunderstanding,fallsinto
the categoryof action and passion. That is, one entityis by its essence
or nature a certain kind of cause because of an active dispositionand
another entityis a certain kind of effectbecause of a passive, receptive
disposition. Natural causation also entails the principle that causes
Thus causal predication, that is, to say that X
produce like effects.46
causes Y, for Maimonides, amounts to relational predication, as is
evident as well in the scholastic formula"God is mercifulbecause He
is the cause of mercy." By referringto natural causes or natural
effects,in an Aristotelian sense, propositions imply a relation of
similarityand thus presuppose attributeson the part of two entities.
44GuideII, 48, p. 409.
45See GuideII, 48, p. 410-1.
46Someoftheelements
in Physics
arecontained
ofcausality
s theory
ofAristotle
II,
, in:
III, 1, 200bl2-201bl5.See also Feldman,Misinterpretation
3, 194bl6-195b30;
Maimonides
I, 53,p. 120:"However,hewhoknowsthe
, ed. Buijs,p. 273;andGuide
ofoneactivequalalloftheseactionsbyvirtue
natureoffire,knowsthatitperforms
heat."
ity,namely,
98

12:21:52 PM

But having distinguished attributes of action from relational

predicates, and having distinguished actions from dispositions, it
follows that actions, for Maimonides, are not to be confused with
natural causation.
In other words, the realm of human agency- and even more so of
divine agency- is not that of natural causation. The resultsof natural
causation issue from entities that are alike in certain respects. The
results of human agency issue from the intellectand will.47Indeed,
Maimonides adopts the language of emanation to explain agency as
distinctfromnatural causation. Natural causation applies to material
bodies interactingand effectingeach other; emanation applies to the
agency of immaterial entities, such as intellects.48What is produced
by way of the intellectand will, then, results by way of emanation.
The implicationof Maimonides' discussion of attributesof action as
applied to God is that divine agency is neithercomparable to natural
causation nor to human agency. In particular, God cannot be understood to be the cause of the world in any usual - i.e., Aristotelian,
physical- sense of that term.49Not only do the notions of cause and
effectimplya relationof similarityand thus distinctfeatures,theyalso
Thus ifGod
implya necessaryconnectionbetween cause and effect.50
were a cause of a natural kind, that would imply, first,that God had
a certainfeaturesimilarto itseffect,and, second, thatthe effectresults
necessarily, given its cause. Neither implication is acceptable to

47See, forinstance,
GuideI, 53, p. 121;II, 48, p. 410-1;III, 17, p. 469; and III,
25, p. 502-3.
48Seehischaracterization
ofimmaterial
oftheagency
entities
interms
of"overflow"
incontrast
withtheagencyofmaterial
in Guide
entities
II, 12,p. 277-80.Fora more
ofMaimonides'
detailed
discussion
ofcausality
seeArthur
Maimonides
theory
Hyman,
onCausality
andPhilosophy
, in: Maimonides
, ed. ShlomoPinesand Yirmiyahu
Yovel,
Dordrecht
1986,especially,
p. 162-5.
49Maimonides
inconsidering
Godtobetheefficient,
formal
agreeswithphilosophers
andfinalcauseoftheworld.Buthe doesso cautiously.
Forthisis tobe understood
inthesenseofultimate
orfirst
cause.Andinthatcase,Maimonides
seesnodifference
incallingGod "cause" or "maker,"i.e., ultimate
I, 69, p. 166-7.
agent;see Guide
We mayaskherewhyGodcannotalsobe considered
thematerial
causeoftheworld
in thesenseofultimate
causeor ground?
Butwe mustremember
hisinsistence
on
a totalequivocaluseofterms
whenitcomestotalking
aboutGod.Thesenotions
are
outin
to whattheyusuallymeanin a humancontext.
spelled
50See GuideI,opposition
69, p. 166-7.
99

12:21:52 PM

Maimonides, for differentreasons.51 Divine agency must also differ

fromhuman agency, first,because human agency is quite limited in
its capabilities and, second, because human agency involves acquired
dispositions or habits as well as knowledge.52Thus, the world as a
whole and certain featuresof it are in effectattributedto the agency
of God, because neithernatural causation nor human agency suffices
to explain them. For example, in human affairsorder is the resultof
knowledge. If neither natural causation nor human agency can adequately explain the order in the world, thenby a process ofelimination
it is attributableto divine agency.53 But precisely how or why such
order is brought about by divine agency we cannot comprehend. In
keeping with their logical function, attributesof action identifyan
agent. They neitherdescribe the agent nor explain the act.
IV
Some final comments are in order.
First, Hyman suggest that, on Maimonides' view, only accidental
attributesare to be reinterpretedas actional attributesin the case of
God whereas essential attributesreceive a negative reinterpretation:
of God signify
or
attributes
It remainsthatessential
by negation
predicated
whileaccidental
attributes,
amongwhichthereare
"negationof privation,"
ofaction.54
as attributes
signify
qualities,habitsand dispositions,
True, only what we consider essential attributes,i.e., perfections,are
predicable of God and then signifyby "the negation of privation."55
51To thefirst
as noted,he objectsin termsofGod's incomparability;
implication,
oftheworldwhichwould
to thesecondhe objectsin connection
withtheeternity
entaila totalnecessitarian
worldview;
see,GuideII, 25, p. 328-9;andalsoHyman,
Maimonides
onCreation
, in: Studies
, ed. Wippel,p. 45-61.
52See Guide
humanknowledge
anddivine
between
I, 54,p. 124.Forthedistinction
GuideI, 69, p. 163-6;III, 20, p. 480-2.
see,forinstance,
knowledge
53See, forinstance,
andForm
Path
Goodman,Matter
, ed. Link-Salinger,
, in:Straight
onCreation
, in: Studies
, ed. Wippel,p. 45-61.
p. 86-97;and Hyman,Maimonides
54Hyman,Maimonides
onCausality
, in:Maimonides
, ed. PinesandYovel,p. 166;see
alsohisMaimonides
onCreation
, in:Studies
, ed. Wippel,p. 54: "Forthecaseofessential
to complete
attributes
Maimonides
holdsthattheymustbe predicated
according
... For thecase of
and thattheysignify
equivocation
by "negationof privation.'
ofaction."
as attributes
accidental
attributes
he holdsthattheymustbe understood
55See Guide
tosomeofthemthatthey
withregard
I, 53,p. 123:"it maybe believed
ofa perfection
whichareunderare attributes
indicative
likenedto ourperfection,
there
stoodbyus." See alsoI, 59, p. 139;60, p. 143:"in God,mayHe be exalted,
is nothing
to thesamespeciesas theattributes
thatareregarded
byus as
belonging
aredeficiencies
withregardto God."
butthatall theseattributes
perfections,
100

12:21:52 PM

But accidental attributesare simplyto be denied to God.56 However,

such attributes as knowledge and will, Maimonides himself lists
among the traditionalessential attributes. He also reinterpretsthem
both actionally and negatively.57 Thus essential and accidental
attributescan be handled by a negative interpretationwhen applied
to God, albeit in different
ways; theycan also be handled by a reinteras
attributes
of
action.58
Both formsof reinterpretationare
pretation
more on an equal footingthan Hyman allows.
The dual interpretationalso raises a question about the purpose of
each. Maimonides suggeststhat negative attributesserve a theoretical
function, the contemplation of the divine reality within human
limits;59attributesof action serve a practical function,the imitationof
God within human lives.60
Secondly, it is somewhat surprisingto find Maimonides' contribution to the theoryof predicationmissing fromthe historyof logic.61As
an assessmentof the TreatiseonLogic, Nicholas Rescher is quite correct
when he writes,4'Maimonides' logic treatisecontributesnothingnew:
it is a standard compendium of Arabic logical terminology.Its main
importancelies in its role in transmittingthistraditionto theJews."62
But thisis also a workwrittenin Maimonides' youth; it only mentions
the distinctionbetween propositionsof the thirdadjacent and propositions of the second adjacent. In his more mature thinkingin the Guide
56See GuideI, 55, 128-9.
57See GuideI, 53, p.
p. 121-3;57, p. 132;58, p. 135-6.
58One maywellwonderwhether
theothertraditional
essential
suchas
attributes,
lifeandpower,couldalsobe reinterpreted
as attributes
of
existence,
unity,
eternity,
actionandwhatthatreinterpretation
wouldbe.
59See Guide
I, 58, p. 135: "As forthenegative
attributes,
theyarethosethatmust
toHim,mayHe be exalted,
be believed
withregard
fornonotionofmultiplicity
can
attachto Himin anyrespect
on accountofthem;and,moreover,
the
theyconduct
mindtowards
theutmost
reachthatmanmayattainintheapprehension
ofHim,may
He be exalted."See also I, 59, p. 137-43.
60See GuideI, 54, p. 127-8;III, 54, p. 638.
61Thereis no mention
ofthedistinction
between
ofthethirdadjacent
propositions
and propositions
of thesecondadjacent,norof Maimonides,
in suchstudiesas
William
KnealeandMarthaKneale,TheDevelopment
, Oxford1962andI. M.
ofLogic
A History
, tr.Ivo Thomas,2nded., NewYork1970(lrst
Bochnski,
ofFormal
Logic
of NotreDame 1961). An otherwise
extensivebibliography,
ed., University
Ashworth's
listsno references
to Maimonides'Treatise
onLogic
; see
study,likewise,
E. J. Ashworth,
TheTradition
Grammar
Anselm
to
ofMedieval
LogicandSpeculative
from
A Bibliography
theEndoftheSeventeenth
1836Onwards
, Toronto1978.
Century.
from
62NicholasRescher,TheDevelopment
, Pittsburgh
1964,p. 181.
ofArabic
Logic
101

12:21:52 PM

and in connectionwith the problem of theologicallanguage, however,

Maimonides exploited that distinctionto develop a distinctform of
predication and a distinctkind of predicate. Contrary,to Burrellwho
sees a failure in Maimonides "to alter our characteristicmanner of
attributing/' Maimonides did precisely that.63 He broadened the
usual understandingof predicationby includingpropositionsthatdescribe actions in contrastto essences and theirrelated natural causes.
Finally, does thisformof predicationwhen applied to God avoid the
dilemma of either anthropomorphismor agnosticism? It does avoid
anthropomorphismprovided attributesof action are understood properly. For in attributingspecific acts to divine agency, attributesof
action ascribe what is distinctiveand unique to God and only to God.
If agnosticism is overcome only by a comprehension of the divine
essence, then attributes of action do not avoid this horn of the
dilemma. Negative language is intended to provide a systematicprocess of removing God from human conceptualization. Language in
termsof attributesof action have the effectof identifyingGod as the
agent of certainevents in the world or of certainfeaturesof the world.
The conception of divine agency, however, is still in human terms
and, like negation, by way of exclusion or contrast. Yet on
Maimonides' view, we are not totally at a loss regarding a human
comprehension of God; nor is the content of such a comprehension
exclusively negative. And this, Maimonides would maintain, is the
best one could attain given the totallytranscendentrealityof God and
the limitationsof human knowledge.
Edmonton, Alberta
3
St. Josephs College
63Burrell,TheUnknowable
God
, p. 57.

102

12:21:52 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 2 (1989)
The Quaestionesgrammaticalesof the
MS Oxford
, Corpus Christi College 250:
An Edition of the Third Collection1
C. H. KNEEPKENS

The thirdand last collectionof grammaticalquaestiones

thathas been
in
the
Christi
,
preserved
manuscriptOxfordCorpus
College250 , is in ff.
60va - 6 Ivb. 2 The textstartshalfwaydown the leftcolumn of f. 60v.
Immediately preceding it is an anonymous gloss commentary on
books 12 and 13 of Priscian's Institutiones
.3 Thus it forms
grammaticae
a codicological unity with this commentary, although the hands of
both texts show manifestdifferences.
The collectionconsists of fifteenquaestiones
and notaeof various size
and contents. It is a patchwork of mainly syntacticand semanticosyntacticmaterial,and one looks in vain fora systematicarrangement
of the topics by the master who was responsible for its compilation.
The quaestiones
comprise the followingitems:
- the reference and the determinative function of the relative
4
(pro)noun4 in relativeclauses 'with internaldependence", e.g. qui in
the sentence (tu es dignusqui regasrempublicam'; we find this topic,
which is oftendiscussed in the grammatical works of the second half
of the twelfthcentury,interalia in the fourteenthquaestioof the second
collectionof thiscodex5, in Ralph of Beauvais' LiberTytan6, and in the
1 Fortheeditions
ofthefirst
andsecondcollections,
seethisJournal,
21 (1983),1-34,
and 23 (1985),98-123.
2 Forananalysis
ofthemanuscript,
seeKneepkens
1983, p. 1-3;thelogicaltreatise
preservedinff.18ra-24r
hasbeeneditedwithan extensive
introduction
bySt. Ebbesen,
K. M. Fredborg
andL. O. Nielsen,in: Cahiersde l'Institut
du Moyengegrccet
latin(CIMAGL). 46, 1983.
3 Cf. BursillHall1981,no. 192.10.4.
One hastobearin mindthat,generally,
thegrammarians,
whofollowed
Priscian
in thisrespect,
considered
therelative
wordquito be a nounandnota pronoun.
5 See Kneepkens
1985, p. 121-3.
6 On p.
31, 23-5;theeditionofthistextis forthcoming.
103

12:22:05 PM

second section of the grammatical quaestioneswhich have been preserved in the MS Mnchen
y Clm 172101 {la)
- the differencebetween the relatio
; this
personalisand inpersonalis
is
not
to
the
well-known
distinction
however,
opposition,
equivalent
between the relatiopersonalisand the relatiosimplexor indifferens*'
for it
is based on the nominal, which implies personal, and the adverbial,
which implies non-personal, significationof a word; this distinction
also plays a role in the ninth and twelfthquestions of the second
collection9 {IIa)
- the scope of the
negation; this nota manifestlycomes from a
logical treatise or collection; it has confrontedthe scribe with insurmountable difficulties:as it is in the manuscript,the textis clearlycorrupt and had to be emended in several places10 {Ilia)
- the defence of the classificationof the
participle as a separate
an
grammatical category and not as
adjective noun, notwithstanding
the fact that it shows the same syntacticbehaviour as the adjective
noun {IVa)
- the semantics of the proper name and
naming sentences; in the
the
author
is
what
discusses
the object of the interpresent quaestio
rogative sentence 'quis uocaturiste'u ; thisdiscussion is tied up withthe
discussion on the distinction between the Aristotelian categories of
' isteest
7 On f. 106rwe read: "Queriturde hac constructione
rem
dignus
qui regat
.
In
hac
constructione
hoc
relatiuum
et
etrespectu
istius
publicam'
ponitur
qui relatiue
debetsecumponiexeademparteorationis;
dictionis
dici
ergocongrue
potest
' iste iste;ergo
rem
estdignus'
.
quiregat
publicam
SOLUTIO.
Ad hocdicuntquidamquodhocnomenquinonponitur
ibiin ui rclatiui,
sedponitur
inui orationis,
ettantum
ualetquantum
hecoratio' utipse', etnonhabet
ibi nominalem
sed pronominalem.
relationem,
Nosautemdicimus
hocnomenquitantum
ualetquantum
hecconiunctio
ut;
quod
et estsensus:' isteestdignus
idest
rem
ut,regat
qui,
publicam'
8 Forthedistinction
between
therelatio
and therelatio
or indifferens
,
personalis
simplex
thelatter
alsocalledgeneralis
sometimes
seeKneepkens
1977, andRosier
1976,Kneepkens
1985.
9 Ed. Kneepkens
1985, p. 113and 118.
10I wishtothank
Prof.L. M. de Rijkforhiscritical
onthetextofthisnota.
comment
11Questions
ofthissurface
structure
arerejected
byRobertBlundas ungrammatical;
' iste
heonlyacceptsthemwhenthepronoun
isteis putintothetruesubjcctposition:
1987, vol.Ill, p. 45). RobertofParisandtheanonymous
quisuocatur
(ed. Kneepkens
master
ofthetenth
ofthesecondcollection
1985, p. 114)accept
quaestio
(ed. Kneepkens
thistypeofquestion
without
Blund's
comment;
anyfurther
theydo notevenmention
wordorder(ed. Kneepkens
1987, vol.II, p. 54sqq.).Bothgrammarians,
conhowever,
sidertheinterrogative
nounquisto be thepredicate
noun.
104

12:22:05 PM

substantiaand qualitas and the Priscianic ( = Stoic) substantiaand

and the
qualitas, the latterof which is divided into the qualitascommunis
qualitaspropriaor privata^the author's view, who holds that this interrogative sentence asks forthepropriaqualitas, is shared e.g. by Robert
of Paris12and the anonymous masterof the tenthquaestioof the second
collection13{Va)
- the significativefunctionof the interrogative(pro)noun, used in
subject position, i.e. whether it puts something or somebody as the
subject or bearer of the proposition; in this connection the
phenomenon of sententialtransitivityin non-predicativesentences is
also discussed (F/a)14
- the constructionalbehaviour of the distributivesigns; we findthe
textof this quaestioalmost verbally in the Summa 'Absolutacuiuslibe of
Petrus Hispanus (non-papa)15(VIIa)
- the constructionalstatus of the dependent interrogativeclause
(VIIIa)
- the linguisticphenomenon of conceptio
and the differencebetween
the
and
author
presents views on these subjects
apposition
conceptio
fromthose already known from
whichforthe greaterpart are different
the writingsof Robertus of Paris, Robert Blund, Petrus Hispanus
Londinensis11
; in this quaestio
(non-papa)16and the Quaestiode appositione
we findthe only referenceto logic in thiscollection: the author equates
the improperapposition, i.e. of the type ' ciuitasLaudunum' withwhat
18
in logic is called coniunctim
praedicareor subicere (IXa)
- the constructionalstatus of a special type of the ablativuscompara'
iusto/ solito' type19;the author's solution that
tionis
, viz. the crudelior
' is also found in Robertus of Paris'
4
4
theseablativiare used adverbialiter'
Summa20(Xa)
12Ed. Kneepkens
1987, vol. II, p. 54.
13See Kneepkens
1985, p. 114-6.
14See in thisconnection
also PetrusHelias,In minorem
, ed. J. Toison,p. 57, 46-8,
whodeniesthestatusofproposition
to interrogative
utterances.
15See below,p. 108(n. 29).
16See Kneepkens
1987, vol. , p. 153sqq.and 497sqq.
17Foran editionofthisquaestio
seeKneepkens
1987, vol. I, p. 675-6.
18See e.g. Garlandus
Dialctica
, ed. L. M. de ijk,Assen1959,p. 76,
Compotista,
32sqq.
19Forthisnotionsee Szantyr
1965, p. 108.
20Cf. ed. Kneepkens
1987, vol. II, p. 158,25sqq.; see also vol. I, p. 260-2.
105

12:22:05 PM

- the syntagmatic structure {figura

) of the indefinite relative
(pro)noun quisqus{XIa)
- the semantic contents of the proper name, if used in a naming
utterance, and the semantico-syntacticfunctionof the vocative verb:
the question is raised whetherthisverb acts as a link between the subject (person) and the proper quality or between the subject (person)
and the proper noun {XIIa)
- the semantic differencebetween the nominal and pronominal
vocative cases {XIIIa)
- the linguisticstatus of sentences, uttered in a corruptedway, as
'uider, 'satin', etc.21;the twelfth-century
grammariansmust have considered it an importanttopic, forwe find it discussed by Robertus of
, who opposes an opinion of
Paris22, the author of the gloss Promisimus
a master Stephan of Rheims23,and the anonymous masterof the gloss
commentary on Priscian, Inst. gram. XII-XIII, which precedes this
third collection in CCC 250 24 {XIVa)
- the semantics of the demonstrativeadverbs: what is demonstrated
by these words, and what is the relationshipbetween the relativeand
the demonstrativeor between the interrogativeand the demonstrative
meaning functionsof adverbs as eccumand ecquid{XVa).
Since direct indications are lacking, it is difficultto fixexactlydate
and place of composition of this collection, which has been handed
down to us anonymously. The circumstancesare virtuallythe same as
those of the second collection: Paleographical and codicological data
21Thesediscussions
Inst.gram.I, 40-1(ed. Hertz).
go backto Priscian,
22Cf. hisSumma
1987, vol. II), p. 297,28-30.
(ed. Kneepkens
23MS Oxford,
Bodl.Laud.lat.67, f. 71vb;see alsoHunt1950.p. 50.
4
24Thetextrunsas follows
etaliudapostrophe
(f.57ra): 'Estenimaliudapostrophus
et aliud anastrophe.
Nam apostrophus
est nota accentusque soletfierisupra
sillabamhuiusdictionis
uiden
posteriorem
, licetquidamdicanthancdictionem
proferri
dicentes
ab hoc
fidestperconuersionem,
perapostrophum,
quod .e. aufertur
uerbouides,
ultimam
. Hecautemrationonsufficit,
producati
quiasepealiquauocalis
naturaliter
subtracta
consonante
utduoquandoponitur
longa
, ut
corripitur
produos
inEneide'Si duopreterea
tales
Ideatulisset
tercia
[terra
Verg.]uiros'[Verg.,Aen.XI, 285.s. a
6; cf.Prise.,Inst.gram.
VII, 28, ed. Hertz,vol.I, p. 310,23-5].Sic subtracta
uides
.e licetetsequatur.n.,que estde alia dictione.
Namuiden
oratioest
corupitur
utin Orthographia
I, 41, ed. Hertz,vol.I, p. 32, 6-7]probatum
[Prise.,Inst.gram.
est.Si autemin huiusmodi
dictionibus
fieret
conuersio
utipsidicunt,
coniunctioni,
dicendum
essetuenprouisneetsten
dicatur
satinetuinconstat
prosatisne.Ergocum
"
.s. subtrahi
de uerboet .e. autem<de> coniunctione.
106

12:22:05 PM

do not permita date of compositionlater than the firstdecades of the

thirteenthcentury,whereas on the grounds of contents we have to
locate it in the last quarter of the twelfthcenturyat the latest. Maybe
a hint about provenance and date is hidden in the use of the names
of the cityof Laon {Laudunum)and the river the Rhine instead of the
usual Rome, Paris, Tiber and Seine in quaestioIXa (about appositio
and conceptio).
If thisallows us to situate the compositionof thisquaestio
in NorthernFrance, the occurrenceof the name of Leo as a dean - also
an unusual name in this context- might point to Rheims, since the
only dean of this name in NorthernFrance during the second part of
the twelfthcenturyknown to us, is Leo, dean of the chapter of Notre
Dame cathedral of Rheims, who held this position fromabout 1130
until 1166. This would imply that in any case this quaestiomust have
been writtenin the sixties of the twelfthcenturyat the latest.
Such an early dating findssupportin some docrinal data. In quaestio
XIVa we find a division of the transitiveconstructioninto
- in
personis tantum
constructiotransitiva- in actu
- in utroque.
This division, also defended by Robertus of Paris, was heavily
attacked by the Anonymus of the quaestioVaof the firstcollection and
by Robert Blund.25Actually, we find more correspondencesbetween
Robertus of Paris' Summaand some of the quaestiones
of the presentcollection. For instance, the argument brought forwardin quaestioXIIa
that in the sentence ' istevocatur
Socrates'the proper name Socratesdoes
not have any meaning, and thereforecould be leftout withoutdamagof the construction,and the zVzjta/zto-reasoning
of the
ing the perfectio
coniunctio
, can be foundalmost verballyin Robertus' Summa.26
expletiva
The occurrenceof a deviant quotation of Vergil's Gergica
, III, 528:
Pascuntur siluis et uictu simplicis herbe
in quaestioIa is also in favour of an early date of composition. For I
have only found this variant reading in the Liber Tytanof Ralph of
25See theintroduction
totheedition
ofthefirst
collection
inthisJournal,
21 (1983),
1987, vol. I, p. 558.
p. 4-5and Kneepkens
26Ci. Robertus
van Prijs,Summa,
ed. Kneepkens
1987, vol. IT,p. 53, 9-11.
107

12:22:05 PM

Beauvais, whose activitiesmust be placed in the sixtiesof the twelfth

, a treatiseclosely
centuryat the latest,whereas even the Verbapreceptiva
with
works27
the
same
line
of
Ralph's
quotes
cognate
Vergil but in the
traditionalwording!
On the other hand, quaestioVIIa interfereswith an early dating of
the whole collection. As has been observed above, this quaestiocor1
responds to such an extent with a section of the Absolutacuiuslibet'2*
that one cannot consider it to be accidental: Either this quaestiois
' or the author of the 4Absoluta
' has incorderived fromthe 'Absoluta
porated this quaestioin his work.29
Having completed the editions of the three collections of grammatical quaestiones
and notaeof the MS Oxford
> CorpusChristiCollege250 ,
we may conclude that these collections, though not arranged in a
systematic way, present a wealthy of material for sharpening our
insight into the achievements of the grammarians of the second half
of the twelfthcentury in the field of linguistics, especially on the
borderline between semantics and syntax. For unlike the more com, which in a concise form
prehensive textbooks, the summae
established
theories
as the results of the
systematically present
of
one
the
of quaestiones
reflections
collections
often
master,
linguistic
27Forthisworkand itsrelationship
to RalphofBeauvaissee Hunt1950, p. 14and
Donatum
theintroduction
to RalphofBeauvais,Glosesuper
, ed. C. H. Kneepkens,
Nijmegen1982.p. XI-XII.
28Cf. ed. Kneepkens
1987 vol. IV, p. 66.
29However,we haveto bear in mindthatthereis seriousevidencethatPetrus
in
theauthorofthe'Absoluta
', appealedto existing
quaestiones
Hispanus{non-papa),
wefindthesamediscussion
forhisSumma.
Forinstance,
ordertogetholdofmaterial
VIaofthesecondcolofthescopeoftheuniversal
signinPetrus'workandinquaestio
thesame
1985, p. 110-1),albeitnotinexactly
lectioninMS CCC250(ed. Kneepkens
itwiththepropositions
ForPetrusHispanusillustrates
wording.
homine
habetur
aliquod
capud
(x) ab omni
and
homine.
ab omni
capudhabetur
(x) aliquod
it is illustrated
whereasin thesecondcollection,
bymeansofthepropositions
homini
estaliquod
capud
(x) cuiuslibet
and
hominis.
(x) aliquod
capudestcuiuslibet
toboththegrammarians
ofsuchpropositions
The twoauthors
assignthediscussion
1987
ofthistopicsee Kneepkens
and thelogicians.
(ForPetrusHispanus'discussion
(2), p. 150-2).
108

12:22:05 PM

provide us withvarious opinions which were given fortheirown sake

and not deliberatelyput in juxtaposition or opposition withina larger
framework,thus showing in detail the struggleof the twelfth-century
grammarians to establish the organization of syntax.30
LIST OF BOOKS

AND ARTICLES

REFERRED

TO

G. L. Bursill-Hall,
A Census
LatinGrammatical
ofMedieval
Manuscripts,
Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt
1981
St. Ebbesen,K. M. Fredborg,
L. O. Nielsen,Compendium
Porretanum
excodice
logicae
Oxoniensi
Christi
250: A ManualofPorretan
Doctrine
Collegii
Corporis
bya Pupilof
Gilbert's
du MoyenAgegrecetlatin(CIMAGL), 46
, in: Cahiersde L'Institut
(1983),III-XVII & 1-113
R. W. Hunt,Studies
intheTwelfth
onPriscian
IL TheSchool
,
Century,
ofRalphofBeauvais
in: Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies,II (1950), 1-56 (reprinted
in:
R. W. Hunt,Collected
ontheHistory
intheMiddle
, ed. by
Papers
ofGrammar
Ages
G. L. Bursill-Hall,
Amsterdam
1980)
C. H. Kneepkens,
liMulier
A NoteontheEarlyDevelopment
Salvavit":
QuaeDamnavit
of
theRelatio
14 (1976),1-25
, in: Vivarium,
simplex
C. H. Kneepkens,
TheRelatio
intheGrammatical
Tracts
and
simplex
oftheLateTwelfth
. in: Vivarium,
15 (1977),1-30
EarlyThirteenth
Century
C. H. Kneepkens
Donatum,
(ed.), RalphofBeauvais,Glosesuper
Nijmegen1982
lhe Quaestiones
C. H. Kneepkens,
Christi
grammaticales
oftheMS Oxford,
Corpus
College
250: AnEdition
21 (1983),1-34
, in: Vivarium,
oftheFirstCollection
C. H. Kneepkens,
TheQuaestiones
Christi
grammaticales
oftheMS Oxford,
Corpus
College
250:AnEdition
Collection
23 (1985),98-123
, in: Vivarium,
oftheSecond
C. H. Kneepkens,
HetIudicium
Constructionis.
HetLeerstuk
vandeConstructio
inde2de
en inleidende
studie
, Deel I: Een verkennende
Helftvande 12deEeuw
, Deel
II: Eenkritische
vanRobertus
vanParijs,Summa'Breve
si, Deel III: Een
uitgave
kritische
vanRobert
Summa
inarte
Deel IV: Eenwerkuitgave
Blund,
uitgave
grammatica,
1Absoluta
vanPetrus
Summa
cuius
libe, Nijmegen1987
Hispanus
(non-papa),
C. H. Kneepkens,
Abomni
homine
habetur
ontheConcept
aliquod
capud:A note
ofWordin12th-Century
Order
Grammatical
25 (1987),146-53.
, in: Vivarium,
Thought
IrneRosier,Relatifs
etrelatives
danslestraits
terministes
desXIIeetXIIIesicles
, premire
23 (1985),1-22
partie,dans:Vivarium,
L. M. de Rijk(ed.), Garlandus
Dialctica
, Assen1959
Compotista,
A. Szantyr,
Lateinische
undStilistik,
vonJ. B. Hofmann,
neubearbeiter
vonA.
Syntax
Mnchen1965
Szantyr,
HeliasonPriscianus
minor
, in: Cahiersde
JamesE. Toison(ed.), TheSumma
ofPetrus
l'Institut
du MoyenAgegrecet latin,27 (1978)
TEXT31
The Quaestiones
on ff.60va-61vb
30Thanksaredue to Drs. Th. Harmsenfor
ofthistext.
helpwiththetranslation
31The orthography
but the
adoptedhereis based on thatof the manuscript,
andcapitalization
havebeenadaptedto modern
paragraphing,
punctuation
usage.
109

12:22:05 PM

QVAESTIO Ia
tv es DiGNVSQVi regas rem publicam. Qui non referturad suppositum, quia semper trahiturin eanden partemorationiscum suo antecedenti. Nec is est sensus: tu qui regas1 rempublicam,es dignus.
Item. Hoc nomen qui tantum ponitur ad determinationemhuius
nominis dignus;ergo ad ipsum uel ad nil refertur.
Item. Referturad aliquid; ergo ad positum uel subintellectum.Non
erit facile assignare ad quod subintellectumnisi ad hoc nomen homo.
Cum dicitur ltu es homodignusqui regasrempublicam homonon exigit
hunc nominatiuum dignus ad sui determinationem; ergo sine eo
conuenienter dicitur ' tu es homoqui regasrempublicam'.
soLVTio. Ad adiectiuum nomen referturet ponitur inproprie. Licet
enim retineatnominis accidentia, aduerbialem habet significationem,
et ponitur pro ut coniunctione, ut 4meditor
tacitus'.
contra. Hoc ad illud referturet secundam facit notitiam, cuius per
illud facta est prima. Sed per illud tantum de accidentali qualitate;
. 'Seminituoqui estXristus* et ' consiusipsesiti*.
ergo per hoc. Instantia
Item. Hoc uerbum regassignificaiibi rem ut in altero intelligitur,
et est personale; ergo ut est in re nominatiui. Nullus nominatiuuscum
eo construiturnec intelligiturnisi dignus;ergo significairem ut in eo
intelligituractus uerbi. Et sic non tantum constructionem,sed etiam
siluis et uictu
significationem2nominatiui habebit. Instantia.'Pascuntur
simplicisherbe*.Herbesignificairem que potest determinan adiectiua
qualitate, nec aliud3 adiectiuum additur uel subintelligiturnisi simplicis,; ergo significationeillius determinatur.
Item. Qui ponitur pro ut9
ergo eo subtracto et reliquis manentibus
'
potest addi. Instantia*. Ego lego'. Ego ibi ponitur pro Petrus.
Item. 'Tu es dignusin quemtransferatur
reipublice'. Hic est senregnum
sus: utin te; ergo habet non tantum constructionem,sed etiam significationem < pro > nominis. Licet in expositione ponatur te, non oportet quod eius habet intellectum.
Dicimus tamen quod qui ibi habet uim nominatiui, habet uim nominis, referturad dignus.Que omnia secundum uocem intellige.

III, 528
a) Gal.3, 16 b) Cato,Disi. I, 17,2c) cf.Vcrg.Georg.
MS 2) aduerbii
MS, sedexp.MS 3) aliorumMS 4) itemMS
J)suprascr.
110

12:22:05 PM

QVAESTIO IIa
Notandum quod relatio fitpersonaliteret inpersonaliter.Inpersonali'
'
ter, ut qualiterlegitSocrates
, taliterPlato*. Personaliter,ut qualis estiste,
talis estUle'.
Item. Personaliter fit duobus modis: substantiue et adiectiue.
Adiectiue potestfieriin dissimiligenere, numero, casu, ut ' uideofilium
tantihominis
quantafuithecmulier' Substantiue in dissimilicasu tantum,

uideo
Robertm
cuijaueo'
ut
QVAESTIO Illa
'
cum dicitur Socrates<non> estid

Nota quod
quod esthomo' hoc uerbum est sustineturab hoc nominatiuo homo'et remouetur indefinite
esse id quod est <homo a> Socrate, quod uerum est quia1 'homo'
non est 'Socrates'. Cum autem dicitur' Socrates
estid quodnonesthomo',
estsustineturab hoc nomine <ad>
quod refertid, et remouetur [/.
60vb] ab eo <id> quod <est> Socratem esse hominem. Quod falsum est, quia Socrates est id quod est homo.
quia ... quodMS
l) quod ... quia]scripsi
QVAESTIO IVa
Questio est cum participiumadiciatur nomini substantiuointransitiue
et cum possit poni substantiue in neutro genere, quare non dicatur
adiectiuum.
soLVTio. Sicut species primitiua et deriuatiua dicuntur in respectu
ideo quia ubi non est primitiuum, non oportet queri deriuatiua unde cum omne participiumsit in deriuatione, superfluumesset querere cuius speciei sit - , sic cum substantiuumet adiectiuum dicantur
in respectu nullumque participium sit substantiuum, non est dicendum quod aliquod sit adiectiuum sicut neque pronomen. Nullum
enim pronomen in eo quod pronomen est, est adiectiuum.
QVAESTIO Va
iste? Hac questione queritur de re nominis uel uerbi.
Qvis VOCATVR
Non uerbi; ergo de re nominis; ergo de substantia uel proprietate
111

12:22:05 PM

substantie. Si de proprietate,ergo conuenienterpotestei reddi nomen

adiectiuum.
Item. Hic fit questio de qualitate; aliquod nomen conuenienter
potest ei responden; ergo illud potest illam qualitatem determinare;
ergo sumitur ab aliqua proprietate.
Item. In hac interrogationeponitur hoc interrogatiuumsubstantie
quis, quod est tantum interrogatiuumsubstantie; ergo uel inproprie
ponitur uel querit de substantia.
Item. Hic 'quis est isteV queritur de substantia et hic 'quis uocatur
isteVqueriturde qualitate. Hoc nomen quisest tantuminterrogatiuum
substantie. In prima ponitur proprie; ergo in secunda inproprie.
Item. Hoc nomen potestquerere de substantiaet qualitate et quantitate; et est nomen substantie et nec qualitatis nec quantitatis.
Quando querit de substantia, proprie ponitur et quando de quantitate, inproprie ponitur; ergo quando de qualitate, inproprie.
Item. In hac interrogationequeritur de qualitate; ergo non oportet
nomen substantiuum ei responden.
Item. Si hac interrogationequeritur de substantia, ergo potest ei
pronomen responden.
Item. Questio est de substantia; ergo illud quod respondetur,debet
cercius significarequam quod ponitur in interrogatione.
Propter huiusmodi dicimus quoniam neque de substantia neque de
qualitate queritur, sed de propria qualitate. Propria uero qualitas non
est qualitas.
QVAESTIO Via
Queri potest utrum in hac constructioneqvis videt socratem? quis
supponat locutioni. Dicimus quoniam sic est, sed interrogatiue,idest
hoc modo ut querat de supposito. Nec quis ibi uere supponit, sed quasi
ficte:quendam modum loquendi, quando est interrogatiuum.Et hec
de supposito
interrogatiouult sibi talem responsionem,ut certificetur
9 uel
ad
ut
uidet
Socratem?
pertinente illum,
(quis
Virgilius aliquid tale. Et
tale suppositum significaiquis, quod ad substantiamproprie pertinet,
ut quale ad qualitatem.
Contra hoc obicitur. In hac constructioneponitur uerbum transitiuum et in usu transeundi; et hic nominatiuus construiturcum hoc
uerbo uidetintransitiue,obliquus transitiue; ergo persona significata
112

12:22:05 PM

nominatiuo ostenditur agere per uerbum in personam significatam

obliquo; ergo agit uel transituel eius ostensio est falsa. Instantiain hoc
9
' Socratesnon
legitVirgiliumet in omnibus imperatiuiset interrogatiuis
et optatiuisorationibus. In omnibus enim istisnon fittransitiode persona ad personam.
Concedi tarnenpotest quod hec constructio'quis uidetSocratemVsit
transitiua.Nil tamen ostenditurtransirnec transitetiam, immo queriturquis agat. Sicut dicitur predicatiua propositio non tantum ea in
qua aliquid predicaturde aliquo sed in qua etiam aliquid remouetur,
sic non dicitur ilia constructiotantum transitiua in qua fittransitio,
sed etiam ilia in qua ostenditurnon transiruel in qua aliquis modus
'
'
loquendi transitiueponitur, ut lfac ignem' utinamlegeremVirgilium

QVAESTIO Vila
De pluralibus quoque distributiuorum querendum est que eorum
nominatiuis pronominum iungantur et que non. Nam bene dicitur
1omniaista suntalba sed non ' omnia istorum1
nisi per subauditionem.
'
' et non 4
Econuerso bene dicitur lquelibetistorum
quelibetista'.
nominatiuus
scilicet
simul
iste,
ista,plura
Quia
quasi collectiue supSed
tamen
ad
notandum quod eorum cuilibet conuenit predicaponit.
tum, addimus omnia, quod distributionisuim habet. Vnde non dicam
omniaistasunt
quatuor, nisi quodlibet eorum esset quatuor, quia colliet
distribuii.
Sed quelibetmagis distribuitet minus colligit. Et ideo
git
magis exigit genitiuum, qui distributionisproprius est, quam plurlem nominatiuum, qui semper colligit.
'
'
Queri etiam solet utrumcongrue dicatur alteristiusetillius et lquili'
betistiuset llorum' Quod ex eo uidebitur, quod sicut pro isticurrun
dicimus "isteetUlecurrun
uidetur posse dici cistius
, similiterpro istorum
'
et illius alter per conceptionem. Nec inuenies in aliis instantiam, ut
' miseret
istorum, similiter' istiuset illius'.
Licet autem non irrationabiliterdici posse uideatur, auferendum
tamen est quoniam contra usum est. Vel si ratio reddenda: quia rpu'
gnt singularitasdistributioni.Dicimus enim omnishomolegi, non
tamen omnisisteuel alius, quia rpugnt istecum omnis.Et tamen in
aliis bene dicitur ' < omnis> homocurrit;ergoisteuel alius' . Preterea in
' notari
ista ' alteristorum
potest transitio,ibi uero nulla.
113

12:22:05 PM

QVAESTIO Villa
ego scio Qvis socrates sit. In hac constructioneponitur hoc nomen
quis, quod est tantuminterrogatiuumuel relatiuum. Nec interrogatiue
nec relatiue hic ponitur; ergo inproprie.
Item. Quia scis "tu", conuenienter repondetur: "Scio quis sim" .
'

1
Ergo hec oratio quis egosim transitiueconstruiturcum uerbo uel quis
non construebaturtransitiuein2 illa: Prima persona ostendituragere
in terciam; nulla diccio ponitur post uerbum, que significaiterciam
personam preterhoc nomen quis; ergo res eius ostendituribi paciens
uel nulla, [f.61ra]
Queratur etiam de resolutione per passiuum et de conceptione
utrum possit dici 4quis egosim et quis tu sis, scitura me'.
solvtio. Hec oratio non construituribi cum ilio uerbo transitiueuel
intransitiue, sed intelligiturhoc prononem hoc, ad quod fieri potest
relatio.
*) quidMS 2) cumMS, sedcon. MSc
QVAESTIO IXa
Videndum est quid sit conceptio et que sit differentiainterappositionem et conceptionem.
in
diccionum
ad eandemremrelatarum
coniunctio
Appositio est inmediata
eodemgenereet casu et numero.
Cum autem dicitur 4Marcus Tullius Cicero', hic Ciceroinmediate non
apponitur huic nominiMarcus. Interponiturenim Tullius. Sed non hoc
4
modo intelligitur,sed sine coniunctione. Secundum hoc etiam ciuitas
'
Laudunum est incongrua appositio, cum fiatin dissimiligenere. Et hec
appositio in dialetica dicitur coniunctim predicare uel subicere.
Viso quid sit appositio, considerandum est quomodo fiat,idest quo
ordine.
4
Ego ipsedisputo'. Queritur quomodo hec uox ipseiungaturhuic uoci
ego et quare potius ipse quam ego apponatur.
Dicimus quia ipsenon ponitur ibi in personali proprietate,sed construendipotestate.Et euocatur a prima persona ad hoc ut eandem rem
4
significetet eiusdem sit persone, ut tu qui legis,disputas'. Et quod ipse
apponatur huic uoci ego,potest notri ex uerbo prime persone quod
ibi adiungitur.
114

12:22:05 PM

'

Queritur etiam hic Marcus TulliusCicero que ibi apponantur et cui.

Ad hoc dicimus quod Tullius, Ciceroapponuntur huic nomini Marcus, quia primo ponitur in ordine et quia est prenomen et inde maiorem habet dignitatem.Similiter' magister
Petrus': Petrusapponitur huic
nomini magister
, quia magister
primo ponitur in ordine.
Fit autem appositio uel propterdiscretionem,ut ' ego ipse lego', uel
'
propter excellentiam, ut ipse rexueni, uel propter equiuocationem
'
excutiendam, ut Marcus Tullius Cicero, - apponitur enim Tullius
Ciceroad differentiamalterius Marci - uel propterdeterminationem
'
Petrus Quia hoc nomen apellatiuum magister
apellationis, ut magister
multis potest conuenire, unde apponitur Petrus.Sed possum dicere
' Leo
decanus' si uelim determinareofficiumcirca ipsum. Et tunc apponitur decanus.
Quandoque apponitur adiectiuum uel participium ad determinan'
'
dum, ut hocalbum' 'homolegens' In hac appositione ciuitasLaudu'
num' fiumenRenus apponuntur propria apellatiuis. Quod inde conici
'
potest,quia adiciturei adiectiuum conforme,ut flumenRenusestdulce'
'
non dulcis'
nontantum
ad persoConceptio est quandouna uocefit documentum
pertinens
namcuiusestuox,sed etiamad aliam rem, ut ' egoet tu legimus1
.
Videndum est quod prima persona concipit secundam et non econuerso, ut dicit Priscianus.a Sed dubium est utrum uox prime uocem
secunde concipiat uel res rem uel uocem uel econuerso.
Si prima persona dicatur concipere secundam, quia uox prime
uocem secunde copulai, eadem ratione dici potest quod secunda primam concipit, quia secunda copulatur prime et econuerso, ut ' egoet
tu , ' tu et ego91).
Item. Si res dicatur concipere rem, hoc falsum est, quia conceptio
fitin constructione,in re autem non.
Item. Si res dicatur concipere uocem, hoc item falsum est. Nulla
enim societas inter rem et uocem.
Relinquitur ergo quod uox concipit uocem, ut documentum faciat
non tantum pertinensad rem suam, sed ad aliam.
Sciendum etiam quod conceptio quandoque est pronominalis,
quandoque uerbalis:
'
. In hac enim uoce <nos> res de se
Pronominalis, ut nos legimus1
facit
documentum
de
alio
uel aliis.
loquens

115

12:22:05 PM

'
. Per hoc uerbum legimusostenditur
Verbalis, ut ego et tu legimus1
tu
discernitur
que persona concipiatur cum prima.
conceptio; per
Et nota quod uox non significaiillam personam que concipitur,sed
connumerat. Cum enim dicitur ' noslegimus'
, non significaturhic persona que concipitur,sed connumeratur,idest in documento ponitur.
Hec enim uox noslicet sit pluralis, tarnenunam personam loquentem
de se sicut eius singularisostendit. Vnde a pronomine alio differuel
nomine. Cum enim hoc pronomen tu unam personam significai,eius
pluralis plures consignificatsecundo modo, idest ut ad quos sermo
.
dirigitur.Nomina etiam in plurali apellatione multiplicantut homines
Secunda non concipit primam, quia ubicumque poniturpronomen
prime persone, significaturres de se loquens. Oportet ergo uerbum
'
.
prime persone apponi. Non enim dicitur egoettulegitis',sed 'legimus1
ut
uerbum
enim
tanquam
concipientis persone apponatur
Oportet
indigniori.
Secunda uero concipit terciam, sed non econuerso, quia uerbum
secunde ei apponitur.
Conceptio uero terciarum personarum non proprie est conceptio,
quia uerbum conueniens utrique persone apponitur et dubium est que
tercia persona concipiatur et que concipiat, nisi demonstratione
certificetur.
'
De hac constructione4egoettulegimussic obicitur. Isti duo nominatiui cum uerbo prime persone construuntur2intransitiue;illud uerbum est alicuius persone; illi duo nominatiui sunt alicuius persone uel
aliquarum; ergo ibi sunt eiusdem uel earundem cum uerbo. Si eiusdem, ergo prime.
Item. Isti duo nominatiui non construunturcum uerbo nec aliquis
[/. 61rb) eorum; perfectaest constructio;ergo ibi ponuntur absolute.
Hec constructiohabet resolutionemper passiuum uersis nominatiuis
in oblquos; ergo non uterque illorum obliquorum transitiue cum
uerbo construitur.
Item. In hac constructioneponunturdicciones diuersarumpersonarum; et significantdiuersas personas; ergo constructiotransitiuaest in
personis.
Item. Hoc pronomen tu construiturcum uerbo prime persone; et
non habet ex se ita construi; ergo aliunde. A pronomine prime persone hoc habet sic poni; ergo non est impossible primam personam
euocare secundam.
116

12:22:05 PM

Item. In hac constructioneest conceptio personarum; alia diccione

significaturpersona concipiens, alia persona concepta; ergo in hac
oratione sunt dicciones diuersarum personarum. Vel si < c > : In hac
oratione non sunt dicciones diuersarum personarum; in hac constructione est conceptio peronarum; ergo indeterminata;ergo concipiens et
concepta non significanturdiuersis diccionibus.
soLVTio. In hac constructionenon ponuntur quatuor dicciones, sed
una diccio posita cum oratione constante ex tribus diccionibus. Hec
enim oratio ' egoet tu' loco nominatiui redditpersonam uerbo et nulla
eius pars cum uerbo construitur.
'
Sed contrahoc sic obicitur. ' Ego ettulegimusest oratio; ergo est con'
grua diccionum ordinatio; ergo duarum uel plurium. Instantia. Iste
uocaturbuba'. Hec est congrua diccionum ordinatio; ergo duarum uel
plurium. Si trium,ergo bubaeritdiccio; quod falsumest. Dicitur enim
ordinatiodiccionum siue fiatex diccionibus siue ex aliquibus loco diccionum positis. Potest tamen concedi quod hec diccio egoet hec diccio
tu sint in hac oratione; neutra tamen reddit personam uerbo.
XVII, 141
a) Prise.Inst.gram.
MS
MS, sedexp.et egoadd.Msc2) construatur
*) et econuerso
QVAESTIO Xa
socrates est CRVDELiOR
ivsTOuel ALBiORsolito. In hac constructione
construiturhoc comparatiuum cum hoc ablatiuo; ergo ex ui positiui
uel ex ui gradus. Sed positiuum cum ilio obliquo facit soloecismum;
ergo1ex ui gradus ita construitur;ergo uel ibi fitcomparatio eiusdem
ad se uel est transitioin personis. Si ibi est transitioin personis, et
nominatiuo et obliquo significaturaliqua persona; et non nominatiuo
que obliquo; ergo diuersa ostendunturparticiparere positiui uel negatiua est oratio.
Item. Cum ilio ablatiuo construiturex ui gradus. lile ablatiuus
habet nominatiuum; ergo cum ilio2 nominatiuo interpositaquam.
Item. Hoc comparatiuum construiturcum hoc ablatiuo; ergo uel
ablatiuus ille significaipersonam ad quam fitcomparatio uel determinai excessum. Significatpersonam ad quam fitcomparatio. Locutio
est affirmatiua.Ergo res positiui inest et rei nominatiui et obliqui.
Altericum au < g> mento determinatexcessum. Ergo potestei apponi
alter ablatiuus significanspersonam ad quam fitcomparatio, ut dica117

12:22:05 PM

tur ' Socrates

estalbiorPlatonesolito' ; quod nichilest nisi itemmagisaduerbium apponitur, ut 4SocratesestalbiorPlatonemagissolito'.
soLVTio. Hoc comparatiuum construiturcum hoc ablatiuo, sed aduerestmaioruigintiannis' Vnde aduerbiabialiterposito, ut in ista ' Socrates
lem habet expositionemibi: Habet plus quam uigintiannos. Et in hac
4Socratesestalbiorsolito' est
comparatio eiusdem ad se secundum diuersum tempus, in alia eiusdem ad se secundum accidens. Et utraque
constructionon est transitiua, quia ablatiuus inpersonaliterponitur.
1add.MSc 2 ablatiuoMS, sedexp.
QVAESTIO Xla
Hoc nomen quisqusest alicuius figure;ergo simplicisuel composite
uel decomposite. Simplicis: Sed hoc nomen declinatur ex utraque
parte; ergo est compositum1.
Item. Hoc nomen deriuatur ab hoc nomine aliquis; non per compositionem; ergo est patrium uel gentileuel possessiuum. Hoc falsumest
secundum quosdam
qui dicunt geminationem non esse
compositionem2.
Item. Hoc nomen est simplicis figure, quod imitatur secundam
declinationem pronominis; ergo genitiuus superat nominatiuum una
sillaba uel pluribus uel par est ei. Si tantumuna, ergo penultimagenitiui indifferensest. Si pluribus, ergo tantum corripitur.Si par, ergo
penultima genitiui tantum producitur.
Item. Si simplex est, ergo constat tantum ex litterisuel sillabis. Si
autem compositum est, ergo potestdiuidi in duas intelligibilespartes;
ergo in plures; ergo in diuersas; ergo non in unam solam geminatam.
Item. Potest diuidi in duas partes intelligibiles,et non descendit a
diccione composita; ergo est tantum composita.
Item. Est decompositum; ergo a composito deriuatum.
Item. Deriuatur a composito et seruat compaginem sui compositi;
ergo est tantum decompositum.
Dicendum est quod quisqusest compositum per geminationem. Est
enim geminatio species compositionis. Vnde Priscianus in Constructio: "ea que per geminationem componuntur uel assumunt
nibusA
-cumque
"; de quo -cumqueautem nondum discussum est an sit compositio an sillabica adiectio.
a) Prise.Inst.gram.XVII, 45
... geminationem
MS, sedcon.MSc2)compositionem
MS,sedtransp.
') decompositum
MSc
118

12:22:05 PM

QVAESTIO Xlla
De uerbo uocatiuo queri solet utrum propriam qualitatem uel solum
proprium nomen copulat.
'
MarSi propriam qualitatem copulat, sic obicitur: Iste homouocatur
cus'. Hec oratio istehomoidem prorsus significatin supposito [/. 6Iva]
quod hoc proprium nomen in apposito, et in eisdem accidentibus
ponitur cum ilio; ergo uel nusquam apponitur uel hie potest apponi
hec oratio et illud nomen supponi1, ut dicatur 'Marcus uocaturiste
homo'.
Item sic. Posito quod hoc nomen Socratesconueniat duobus: 'uterque
Socrates'
. Hoc propriumnomen Socratessignificaihic proistorum
uocatur
alicuius:
istiusuel illius uel utriusque. Quodcumque
priam qualitatem
horum dixerit,probabitur locutio esse falsa.
Item. Nomen equiuocum semel prolatum non potest in diuersis
significationibusaccipl. Et ita oportetquod hic unam solam propriam
qualitatem significet:uel istiusuel illius. Et copulatur per hoc uerbum
in propria ui retenta.Ergo hec
suppositodesignato hac diccione uterque
locutio est falsa. Quod quidam recipiunt, cum tarnen Priscianusa
dicat 1uterque
Scipionesuocamin'.
Item. 4Iste uocaturSocrates<et Ule uocaturSocrates
> ' Hoc proprium
nomen equiuocum est ad illas duas proprias qualitates; et ex nullo
adiuncto determinaturibi aliqua eius significatio;ergo hec locutio est
ambigua.
Item. ' Iste uocabitur
asinus'. Quod sic constet: Hoc nomen erit pro'
nomen
iste?'
istius;
prium
ergo ad hanc interrogationem quis uocabitur
4isteuocabitur
asinus'
.
Hoc
asinus
hic
nomen
potest responden
popriam
qualitatem significaiuel communem. Nullam communem significat
nisi secundum quam conuenit huic et aliis asinis; ergo secundum hanc
'
asinus'.
significationemfalso dicitur isteuocabitur
Item. Si propriam qualitatem significathie, et propriam substantiam et in omni figura, et est nomen; ergo proprium.
Item. ' Iste uocaturMarcus', 4isteuocaturTullius'. Hoc nomen Tuliius
prorsus significatin hac oratione quod hoc nomen Marcus in ilia. Et
reliqua omnia idem significanthie et ibi et eodem modo; ergo iste non
potestuocari Marcus, quin uocetur Tullius, uel: ergo si uocatur Marcus, uocatur Tullius.
Item. Posito quod iste oblitus sit proprii nominis huius, sed non
dubitat de propria qualitate. Iste dubitat de proprio nomine tantum
119

12:22:05 PM

et querit de proprio nomine, et certificaturde proprio nomine tantum

'
' ergo hoc uerbum tantum
per hanc responsionem isteuocaturSocrates'
hic copulai nomen proprium.
'Iste
<Item>.
incipituocariTullius, desinituocariMarcus9. Quid dicitur? Non quod desinit habere hoc nomen.
Potest et ad hoc dici quod hoc uerbum non tantum copulai propriam qualitatem nec tantum proprium nomen, sed illa coniunctim.
lile uero diciturdubitare de propria qualitate, quia dubitai de adiunctione proprii nominis ad illam qualitatem.
Dicentibus quod uerbum uocatiuum tantum copulai proprium
non signiSocrates'.Hoc nomen Socrates
nomen sic obicitur. 'Iste uocatur
ficai hic propriam qualitatem, hic non significai substantiam cum
qualitate; ergo non poniturin ui nominis; quod falsumest, licet enim
non tantumin tali ui nominis, tarnennominaliter.Instantia.Expletiua
coniunctio non significai copulationem uel disiunctionem; ergo non
poniturin ui coniunctionis. Vel: Sum non significaiaccionem uel passionem; ergo non ponitur in ui uerbi.
Item. Hoc nomen Socratesnichil hic significai;ergo hic uel nusquam
materialiterponitur. Hoc nichil est, scilicet materialiterponi. Nam
"
4
in hac conquando dicitur "Socrates estnomen, Socratesnon ponitur
'
'
struction nec supponit uerbo, sed hec oratio hecdiccio supponit, que
intelligitur. Vel si etiam conuenienter dicatur materialiter poni,
pocius est argumentumin contrarium.Nam et ibi poniturad se ipsum
significandumet ita ibi aliquid significai.
. Hoc proprium nomen hic nec aliquid
Item. 4Iste uocaturSocrates'
nec
consignificat;ergo eo subtractonon minus erit perfecta
significai
constructio.Instantia.In littera et sillabah uel coniunctione.
Item. 'Quis uocaturiste?'. Hic poniturquis interrogatiuecum pronomine; ergo querit de propria qualitate; ergo in responsionequa certificatur querens, ponitur diccio significanspropriam qualitatem. Potest
dici quod querit de propria qualitate, idestde nomine significantepropriam qualitatem. Et tale nomen respondetur.
. Nulla diccio signifcatiua
Socrates'
Item. 'Quis uocaturiste?Isteuocatur
alicuius intellectusponiturin responsioneque non ponatur in interrogatione. Et nullum intellectumsignificaihic, que non significetibi;
ergo hac responsione non certificaturinterrogans.Instantia. (Vocatur
.
isteSocrates?Iste uocaturSocrates'
4
Item. Qu e ri potest an hec oratio uocaturSocrates'ibi significetali120

12:22:05 PM

quem intellectumet si compositum uel simplicem. Potest dici quod

significatnominationem et ita aliquem intellectum.
'Breue
. gram.
si, ed. Kneepkens,
XVII, 196b) cf.Rob. Par. Summm
a) Prise.Inst
53, 13sqq.
MS
l) supponi]appositi
QVAESTIO XlIIa
Hec est differentiauoeatiui nominis et pronominis, quod uocatiuus
nominis apostrophaticenott demonstrationemet qualitatem demonstrai et patituresse absens quod demonstratur,ut O Cesar' bene diciturabsente Cesare. Pronomen econuerso cum apostropha et mere rem
demonstratnec patitur rem remotam, sed quandoque prope, ut iste,
quandoque eminus, ut Ule.
QVAESTIO XIVa
Videnest aliqua uox; ergo est significatala uel non. Si signifcatiua,
ergo ad placitum uel non. Si ad placitum, ergo oratio uel pars orationis. <Si>
dictio, ergo simplex uel composita uel decomposita. Si
simplex, ergo simplex uerbum [/. 61vb] uel non. Si uerbum simplex,
et est alicuius coniugationis; ergo prime uel secunde uel alterius. Si1
secunde et secunde persone presentsindicatiui modi, ergo desinit in
-es
productam.
Item. Si uerbum compositum ex uerbo et prepositioneuel uerbo et
coniunctione, ergo ex uerbo et prepositione. Dicit enim Priscianus3
quod hec est differentiainter prepositionemet coniunctionem, quod
prepositiocum uerbo componitur,coniunctio uero non. Sic ergo non
est uox simplex uel composita. Quod sit decomposita, nemo admittet.
Et ita non erit diccio. Sed est oratio uel pars orationis; ergo oratio;
ergo congrua diccionum ordinatio; ergo aliqua eius pars est diccio; hec
diccio uidesest eius pars; ergo hec diccio uideset hec oratio sunt pares
in quantitate.
Item. Hec uox uidenconstatex duabus sillabis tantum, et constatex
duabus diccionibus; ergo utraque illarum diccionum est monosillaba.
Item. Hec uox uidenconstatex duabus diccionibus. Quelibet littera
huius uocis est pars principalis diccionis preter extremam litteram;
ergo nulla pars huius uocis est secunda diccio, uel extrema litteraest
121

12:22:05 PM

diccio; et ita n erit diccio et est littera; ergo per se uocem facit; ergo
est uocalis. Si negeturquamlibet partem preterextremamesse partem
prime diccionis, quia e pars est coniunctionis, sed hoc falsum. Sic
enim eiceretur-essillaba et -e <que> sequebatur, n prepo <er >etur.
Et ita non fietapostrophus, sed transmutatiolitterarum.Post apostrophum tantum una littera tolletur. Videnest aliqua oratio constans ex
uerbo in -es desinente et hac coniunctione -ne. Et proferturper apostrophum; ergo tolliturextrema consonans uerbi et extrema uocalis
coniunctionis: quod in aliis idiciturPyrena,diciturnunc2Pyrren'
.
Item. Si non est uox significatiua,ergo non est oratio; ergo non est
interrogatiuaoratio; ergo non debetur ei responsio, uel: <non> est
diccio interrogatineposita.
Item. Conuenienter respondetur4Videntuillum?uide. Ergo satisfacit interrogantiet interrogationiuel alteri tantum. Si3 utrique, ergo
interrogationiquam ille protulit, uel alii. Sed nil protulit nisi hoc
luidentu ilium?'; ergo interrogatioest; ergo oratio. Si interrogantiet
non interrogationi,ergo conuenientius posset responden.
Item. lilis qui dicunt orationem esse, non tarnenuidenesse uocem

significatiuam,sic obicitur: Videntu illum?'. Hec uox est oratio; ergo

eius aliqua est constructio;ergo transitiuauel non transitiua;ergo uel
in personis tantum uel in actu uel in utroque. Si in utroque et ibi
ponuntur dicciones que diuersas personas significant,ergo ibi aliqua
uox actum uel passionem significai; ergo ibi est uerbum uel participium uel gerundiuum uel aliquid loco alicuius eorum positum. Sed
nullum eorum ibi est; ergo aliquid positum loco alicuius eorum. Sed
nil positum loco participiiuel gerundiui; ergo positum loco uerbi; ergo
loco diccionis.
Item. Ibi nulla uox ponitur que actum uel passionem significet;
constructioest transitiua; ergo in personis tantum.
Item. Hec constructioest transitiua in personis et actu; hec diccio
tu significaipersonam agentem et nominatiue; hec diccio illumpersonam pacientem et oblique; ergo cum uoce significanteactum uel passionem hec transitiue,illa intransitiueconstruitur.
Item. Hic nominatiuus tu ponitur in hac constructioneperfecta;
cum nullo transitiueuel intransitiueconstruitur;ergo nec exigit nec
exigiturab aliquo uerbo; ergo absolute ponitur. Et ita non significai
personam agentem.
122

12:22:05 PM

Item. 4VidenSocratesistum
?' Soloecismus est interhanc uocem uiden
et hanc Socratesex conformitatepersone. Hec uox Socratesest alicuius
persone. Ergo hec uox uidenuel aliqua eius pars est alterius persone.
Hec uox est alicuius persone; ergo est diccio et aliqua eius pars; ergo
est oratio uel ipsa non4 est constructibiliscum aliquo.
'
Denique. Videntuilium?'Hec uox est oratio; nullum uerbum habet
partem sui. Est perfectauel inperfecta;ergo inperfecta.
XIV, 3
a) Prise.Inst.gram.
J)add.MSc2) nonMS 3) add.MSc4) suntMS, sedexp.

QVAESTIO XVa
De aduerbiis demonstratiuisquid eis demonstretur,questio est, ut
'eccePalemn'.a Cum nichil significetaduerbium ad quod possit fieri
demonstratio,uidetur quod fiatad substantiamillius nominis. Ex quo
sic. ' Ecce ego lego'. Eadem substantia et nonnisi eadem demonstratur
his duabus diccionibus, et ex eadem parte orationis; ergo ibi est geminata substantie demonstratio.
Item. Eccumhabet intellectumdemonstratiuumet relatiuum. Et illa
duo referunturad idem, quia ad significationemhuius diccionis; ergo
ilia demonstatiue et1 relatiue2ponitur.
Item. Cum demonstratio semper sit in prima noticia, relatio in
secunda uel tercia,numquam hec poteruntiungi ad idem suppositum.
Item. Ecquid. Demonstratio fit ad significationemhuius nominis
quid; ergo eius significatiodiffiniturdemonstratiue; ergo non tantum
interrogatiue.Nam interrogatiorpugnt demonstrationi.
solvtio. Omne aduerbium demonstratiuumsolam demonstrationem
consignificatsicut uocatiuum uocationem et locale locum et temporale
tempus. Et demonstratio huiusmodi referturad uerbum. Quod3
ostenditPriscianusb, ubi ostendit affinitatemsignificantiumsubstantiam ad uerba substantiua, quia ponunturper eclipsim eorum, ut 4quis
furoro dues' S Iterum hoc addit de aduerbiis demonstratiuis 'eccetibi
Ausonietellus' Quoniam fitdemonstratioad essentiam uerbi, intelligiturestuel adest.Sic in his diccionibus ecquidet eccumnon erit repugnantia, quia cum in eis sit intellectus demonstrationis secundum
123

12:22:05 PM

principium,numquam tarnenillud referturad earum significationem

sed uerborum quibus addiciuntur uel que subintelliguntur.
XVII, 80 c) Luc. Phars.I, 8 d) Verg.Aen.Ill,
a) Verg.Eel.3, 30 h)Prise.Inst.gram.
477
MS inmarg.
inf.
^interMS etMSc 2) add.MSc3) quod ... subintelliguntur
Nijmegen
KatholiekeUniversiteit

124

12:22:05 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 2 (1989)
The FifteenthCenturyand Divine AbsolutePower
L. A. KENNEDY, C.S.B.

Divine absolute power is usually considered to be God's power

looked at without taking into consideration His wisdom or His
goodness, what God could do in virtue of His power alone. This
notion was not much made use of before 1300 A.D. because it was
thoughtthat God never acts in virtue of His power alone, but always
in concert with His wisdom and goodness. Earlier writershad considered that it was a contradictionforGod to act against His wisdom
or goodness. To say that God could by His absolute power do
whateveris not a contradiction,and to include in thispower the ability
to act independentlyof divine wisdom and goodness, was to ascribe
to God abilities not only novel but sometimes abhorrent.
An earlierstudyhas shown thatthe new philosophical climate began
with Duns Scotus and spread rapidly among Franciscans, being
assisted especiallyby William of Ockham.1 It is known, however, that
it was not limited to Franciscans, and indeed that it was to dominate
the thoughtof the whole fourteenthcentury. The person most under
its influencewas Peter of Ailly (1350-1420), who commented on the
in 1376-77.2 Peter used the notion of divine absolute power
Sentences
to remove nearly all necessityin the physical, intellectual,moral, and
supernaturalorders.
Afterits heyday in the late fourteenthcentury, the doctrine continued in existenceup to the time of the Reformationin the early sixteenthcentury,influencingthe teaching of Martin Luther in important ways. It is the purpose of the presentarticle to show the presence
of this teaching in the fifteenthcentury, particularly in the final
1 L.A. Kennedy,
Absolute
Power
Franciscans
andDivine
FourEarly
, to
century
-fourteenthappearsoon.
2 L.A. Kennedy,
Peter
andtheHarvest
, Lewiston,
Philosophy
ofFourteenth-Century
ofAilly
NY 1986.
125

12:22:11 PM

decades. For this purpose nine writers will be studied, three

Nominalists, three Scotists, and three Thomists (or near-Thomists).
The choice of persons to be studied has been dictated by the importance of the authorsand also by the availabilityof printedtexts. In the
case of all but Cajetan, the texts consulted have been commentaries
on Peter Lombard's Sentences.
In Cajetan's case, since his commentary
on the Sentences
has not been published, his commentaryon Aquinas' s
Summa Theologiaehas been used.
The three Nominalists are Gabriel Biel, John Major, and James
Almain. The term ' 'Nominalist' ' has no generally agreed meaning;
here it will stand fora self-confessedfollowerof William of Ockham.
Biel (c. 1410-1495) taught at Tbingen from 1484 on. His Sentences
(which terminatesat the 23rd distinctionof Book Four) was published
in Tbingen shortlyafterhis death. Major (1467-1550) obtained his
M.A. and D.Th. degrees in Paris in 1495 and 1506 respectively.His
Sentences
was published from1509 on in Paris. Almain (c. 1480-1515),
with
Major the leading Parisian Nominalist, obtained his M.A.
along
degree in Paris, and his D.Th. degree therein 1512. Only Book Three
of his commentary on the Sentences
has been published, in Paris in
1516. 3
The threeScotistsare all Franciscan, two of them French, the other
after
German.4 Nicholas de Orbellis (d. 1475) finishedhis Sentences
1465. It was firstpublished at Paris in 1488. Paul Scriptoris(c. 14621505) was Guardian and Lector of his communityin Tbingen. Book
was published therein 1498. 5 Nicholas Deny se (d.
One of his Sentences
6
published therein 1504.
1509), Guardian in Rouen, had his Sentences
The threeThomists are John Capreolus (c. 1380-1444), of France;
Denys the Carthusian (c. 1402-1471), of Germany; and Cardinal
Cajetan (1469-1534), of Italy.
3 Forbiographies
ofalltheninemenstudied,
seeNewCatholic
, Dictionnaire
Encyclopedia
undKirche
de Thologie
, andF. Stegmller,
, Lexikon
Catholique
frTheologie
Repertorium
inSententias
Petri
1947.ForAlmainseealsoR.G.
Commentariorum
Lombardi,
Wrzburg
losestudios
deFrancisco
deParisdurante
deVitoria,
La Universidad
O.P. (1507Villoslada,
is No. XIV ofAnalecta
Rome1938,pp. 165-79.Thismonograph
Gregoriana.
1522),
4 See E. Wegerich,
des15.Jahrhunderts
Notizen
ber
Franziskanerlehrer
,
Bio-bibliographische
in: Franziskanische
Studien,29 (1942),150-197.
5 See F. Landmann,
inderletzen
Zeit
ZumPredigtwesen
derStrassburger
Franziskanerprovinz
desMittelalters
, in: Franziskanische
Studien,15 (1928),329-39.
6 See Antonianum
, 1 (1926),p. 299.
126

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The works to which we shall referare the following:

Gabriel Biel, Sentences
(C ollector
ium), Tbingen 1973-84
, Paris 1519-28
John Major, Sentences
, Book III, Paris 1518
James Almain, Sentences
Nicholas de Orbellis, Sentences
( Compendium
), Paris 1517
Paul Scriptoris,Sentences
, Book I, Tbingen 1498
Nicholas Denyse, Sentences
, Rouen 1504
( ResolutioTheologorum)
Sentences
1589
Venice
,
John Capreolus,
, in Opera Omnia, Tournai 1896Denys the Carthusian, Sentences
1935, v. 19-25
Cardinal Cajetan, Commentary
on the Summa Theologiae
, in St.
Thomas Aquinas, OperaOmnia, Rome 1882f., v. 4-12
It should be kept in mind that the printed commentaries of Biel,
Almain, and Scriptorisare incomplete.
The topics concerningwhich at least one of our authors broughtin
the notion of divine absolute power can be placed under fiveheadings:
the general principle, the physical order, the intellectualorder, the
moral order, and the supernatural order.
The GeneralPrinciple
Gabriel Biel teaches that,in so faras creaturesare concerned,God
is bound by no necessity.
... Deusnihilagitad extrade necessitate
necaliquidaliuda se vultnecessario.7
God could, forinstance, annihilate someone who loved Him, and this
without injustice.
Possetergoannihilare
noniniuste
se; quod,si faceret,
faceret,
diligentem
quia
nemoei dicit"Cur itafacis?".8
God's will is never wrong because it is rightby definition.His will,
as concerns creatures, is His rightreason.
Etquodinfertur,
Deusnonpotest
contrarectam
verum
est.Sed recta
rationem,
ratioquantumad exteriora
estvoluntas
sua.9
7 I, d. 17,q. 1, a. 3, dub. 3; 421.
p.
8 Ibid.,coroll.
1; 423.
9 Ibid.; 422.
127

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Nicholas de Orbellis teaches that everylaw is in God's power; no

law is rightsimplybecause the divine intellectsays.so, but only after
the divine will has accepted and adopted it.
... quialexetrectitudo
Nullanamquelexestrectanisi
legisestineiuspotestate.
divinaacceptante
eststatuta.10
quatenusa volntate
For Paul Scriptoris also, the divine will, though it gets knowledge
of objects fromthe divine intellect,does not need the intellectto direct
it; it is impossible for the divine will to err.
Voluntasdivina,licetnonhabeatde se noticiam
obiectisedostendatur
sibiab
tarnennon indigetintellectu
ut directivo,
intellectu,
quia nullomodopotest
errare.11
... quicquidpotestdivinavoluntasestsecundum
legemquia ipsasua volitio
semperestlexiusta.12
For these writers,then, a Nominalist and two Scotists, the divine
will is necessitated in no way as regards creatures, not even by the
divine intellectfindinga necessary relationshipin them.
The PhysicalOrder
For John Major, God could change matter into spirit.
Deus potesttransubstantiare
panemin angelm,...13
He could also make the same physical being present in several places
at the same time, just as it would be if it had only one location.
... Deus potestponereillud[quodcumque]
in pluribus
corpuscircumscriptive
.14
locistotquotei libet
John admits that this would raise a number of problems, but thinks
that theycan be solved. For example, Sortes can be weighed down by
carrying a load at Paris, but this would not impede him at Rome,
where he is not carryinganything.
DatonamquequodSorteshabeatlibraminhumeris
suisParisiis,
nonpropterea
impediiRomaein qua nonhabetlibram.15
10I, d. 45, q. 1; f. 15vb.
11I, prologue;f. 32vb.See also 34ra.
12I, d. 44; 180vb.
13IV, d. 10,q. 4; f. 51rb.
14Ibid.; 51va.
15Ibid.; 52va.
128

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He could even be killed at Rome and not at Paris.

PonaturSortesRomaeet Parisiis.PotestoccidiRomaeet nonParisiis.'6
He could even meet himselfas he was journeying fromRome to Paris
and from Paris to Rome. If he met himselfon a narrow bridge at
Lyon, so narrowthattwo bodies could not pass at once, could the two
Sorteses fuse in order to pass, and then become two again?
PonaturSortesRomaeet Parisiiset obvietsibiin locoangustosuperpontem
an manebitin unolocotantum
an in duobus?17
Lugdunensem.
Quaeritur
John answers that they could.
Sortes could also be in the state of grace in one location and in the
state of mortal sin in another, be beatified in one location and suffer
in another, and be beatified absolutely and be in hell in another
location.
... potestaliquishaberegratiamet mortalepeccatum
simulet semelsi Deo
placeat;et puniripoenasensuset beatificari.18
... licetpossitpuniripoenadamniin A locoet beatificari
simpliciter.19
What would happen to Sortes, dying in the state of grace and in the
state of mortal sin? God could do what He wanted.
Si petasquidDeusfaceret
iliocasudato,dicoquodpotest
facere
quicquidvelit.20
God could even multiplyone loaf (it remainingthe same loaf throughout) so that a whole army could eat it.
Eodemmodoconcedoquod ... unuspanispotestsufficere
exercitui
....21
Nicholas Denyse also holds that God could change anythinginto
anything.
... in creaturis
converti
potestquodlibetin quodlibet.22
This includes changing matter into spirit, and a substance into a
relation.23
16Ibid.; 52ra.
17Ibid.; 52vb.
18Ibid.; 51vb.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.; 52va.
22Tractate6,
2, 5; f.04h.
23Ibid.; Pla. part q.
129

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These two men, therefore,a Nominalist and a Scotist, see no structure intrinsicto matterwhich limits divine action in regard to it, as
has been described.
The Intellectual
Order
As regards knowledge, John Major teaches that God could cause
in us intuitiveknowledge of a non-existingthing. Now, when we have
knowledge of a thing that includes the knowledge that it exists, we
have intuitive knowledge. To teach that God could create in us
intuitive knowledge of a non-existent thing is to raise a serious
problem: how do we know that, when we have knowledge of a thing
which seems to exist, it actually does exist? William of Ockham held
that, if God gave us intuitiveknowledge of a non-existent,somehow
He would indicate to us that it did not exist. John, however, has no
such teaching. And, of course, if we cannot be sure that a particular
thingwhich seems to exist reallydoes so, how can we be sure that the
world around us exists?John seems to be quite unconcernedabout this
problem.24
Paul Scriptoris agrees with Major in this matter. Absolute
evidence can be had concerningnecessarymattersbut also concerning
contingentmatters,for example, that I exist, that I am alive. However, concerning the contingentmatter of the world around us, we
cannot have absolute evidence, since God can preserve sensations in
us afterHe has destroyed the objects they present to us.
absolutanonsolumestde necessariis
licetpotissime
sitde eis.Nam
... evidentia
circa
itaevidentes
suntquodnonpotestdecipiintellectus
quedamcontingentes
autemestquod
ipsas,ut "Ego sum", "Ego vivo,"et sicde aliis.Impossibile
extrinseco
habereevidentiam
de aliquosensibili
absoltam Nam
viator
possit
et destruere
conservare
sensationem
remsensatam....25
Deo estpossibile
Paul thinks,however, that we need not worryabout the existence of
the external world. If a miracle is not being performed,it would be
irrational to doubt in a matterlike this, since, if we did, everything
would be in doubt.
24The textis toolongtoquote.See I, d. 3, q. 1; ff.31ra-33rb.
AlsoI, d. 3, qq. 9-11;
see Quodlibet
ForOckham'steaching
42va-45rb.
VI, q. 6.
25I, d. 42; f. 1178ra.See also I, d. 3; 90va.
130

12:22:11 PM

nullofactomiraculo
velmirabili,
stantedivinainfluentia
et
Attamen,
generali
essecertide talibus,et irrationabile
esset
solitocursunature,satispossumus
omniaessedubia.26
dubitare,
quia sequeretur
Paul, however,raises an even more importantworryabout the mind's
abilityto arrive at truth. He says that holding that God could cause
in us the power to dissent fromthe principleof non-contradiction,the
firstprincipleof all truth,would not contradictthe Christian faithbut
would ratheragree with it, since it would enhance the divine power
tremendously.However, it would also destroy faith since a person
would have to assent to the contradictoryof each article of faith to
which he assented.
etconsentire
Dissentire
eiuscontradictorio
noncontradicit
fidei
primoprincipio
nostresedmagisconsentit,
scilicet,
quia hocponitDeumesseomnipotentem,
Nihilominus
tamen,ex conseposseDeumcausaredissensum
primiprincipii.
in bona consequentia
quent^ taliserraretin fidequia ad hoc sequeretur
cuiuslibet
articuli
fidei.27
oppositum
Paul teaches, nevertheless,thatGod can cause us to be mistakenabout
the firstprinciple.But, no doubt to avoid having God seem to be evil,
he says that God can do so only throughsecondary causes.
sinecausissecundis....28
Deus nonpotest
causareerrorem
de primoprincipio
Moreover, this is possible only by God's absolute power.
Sed secundumnaturamcausissecundisinditamnon potest[Deus] causare
dissensum
... licetabsolutapotentia
possit,...29
primiprincipii
Thus, as concerns the intellectualorder, a Nominalist and a Scotist
hold that God can cause intuitiveknowledge of non-existingthings,
withoutus knowing that they do not exist. Neither is worried about
the consequences of this. And Scriptoristeaches that God can cause
our intellectto deny the principleof non-contradiction.He is not worried about the consequences of this, either, but a person so affected
could be sure of absolutelynothing; nor would he have even probable
knowledge of anything.

26I, d. 3; 90va.
27Ibid.; 90vb.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
131

12:22:11 PM

The Moral Order

How flexibleis the moral order? Is it so optional thatGod can make
what is now rightto be wrong, and what is now wrong to be right?
A good testcase in answering this question is the case of love of God,
which in the presentdispensation is the act or dispositionwhich makes
all othermoral qualities to be good. Is it possible forGod to make love
of Him evil, or hatred of Him good?
Gabriel Biel says that God, by Himself, could cause an act of
hatred of Himself. Since He co-acts with creatures when they hate
Him, He could by Himselfproduce an act of hatredof God, since God
can do by Himself whatever He can do along with creatures.
... si creatura
... Deumodit,... odiumcausatDeusutcausapartialis Quidpotestcausareut causa totalisin
quid autemDeus causatut causa partialis
generecausaeefficientis.30
John Major teaches the same doctrineas Biel, thoughhe holds that
such an act of hate would not exist in the will of a rational being.
extrasubiectum
se solo.31
OdiumDei Deus potestproducere
And, in this case, John says, therewould be nothingwrong with this
act of hatred of God.
Deusse soloproducat
siillamqualitatcm
essesinedifformitate
OdiumDei potest
extrasubiectum.32
John also thinksthat God could forbidlove of Himself. And, if one
were to love God while the prohibitionlasted, he would sin.
dilectio
... Deus potest
Dei. Ergo,factailiaprohibitione,
dilectionem
prohibcre
Dei eritpeccatum.33
And, since God could do this for a time, He could do it for all time.
dilectionem
sui perunum
Et qua rationepotestprohibcre
[text:discretionem]
tempusparvum,eadem rationepotesthanc dilectionem
prohiberein
perpetuum.34
30III, d. 12,q. 1, a. 2, dub. 1; p. 212.
31III, d. 37, q. 8; f. 102ra.See also I, d. 17, q. 8; 64rb.
32II, d. 37, q. 2; 145rb.
33I, d. 17,q. 8; 63rb.
" III, d. 37,
q. 9; 103rb.
132

12:22:11 PM

Similarly,God could decree that love of Him was an importantthing

or a less importantthing,as He wished. And, since He could do this,
He could make it worthless.
Deus potestfacerequoddilectioDei eritminusbonaet magisbonapersuam
vel maiorem.ErgoDeus potestfacerequod eritnon
minorem
acceptationem
bona.35
James Almain disagrees with Major on this point, claiming that
God could not prohibitus fromloving Him. But the reason forthis,
forJames, is not a moralreason; it is a logicalone: that is, if a person
carriedout such a prohibition,he would be obeying God and thusloving Him.
... negoquodDeus potestprohibere
dilectionem
sui. Implicat
contradictionem
- 36Patetquiaveltuncadimplet
etdiligit
Deumet,sidiligit
Deum,
preceptum
nonadimplet
preceptum.37
James does not seem to realize thatobedience can have a motive other
than love, for example, fear. If he realized this, he would have to
admit that, according to his principles, God couldforbid us to love
Him.
Paul Scriptoris teaches that the moral order in which we exist is
not essentiallyrelated to our final end. Actions are not good in themselves; they are good only because God chooses them.
Istiactusa Deo ordinati
nonsuntnaturaliter
etrealiter
dignivitaeterna.... res
estbonaquia Deus vulteam,et nonDeus vulteam quia estbona.38
Thus God could change the laws He has made. Changing a universal
law is in itselfvery difficult,but of course nothingis difficultforGod.
Deus ergononsolumpotestiudiciaimmutare
sedetiamleges,quamvisiudicia
sitfacilius.39
immutare
... universalem
... licetproprie
estdificillimum
nullasitdifficultas
legemtollere
in Deo.40
We thereforesee that the three Nominalists, and one Scotist, apply
the notion of divine absolute power to the moral order. They teach,
35Ibid.
36III, d. 17,q. 1; f. 93vb.
37Ibid.
38I, Prologue;f. 74a.
39I, d. 44; 181ra.
40Ibid.
133

12:22:11 PM

explicitly or implicitly,that the present moral order, based on the

primacyof love, is not necessaryand, in so faras moralityitselfis concerned, could be changed.
The Supernatural
Order
(a) Divine Foreknowledge
John Major was well aware of the problem concerning divine
foreknowledge. If God knows what contingencies will take place
because He now sees them taking place, His knowledge depends on
creatures,and thatwill not do. If, on the otherhand, God knows what
contingencieswill take place because He has decreed that theywill do
so, independentlyof the will of freecreatures,He is responsibleforall
their actions, including sins.
... velDeus prescit
futura
suntquia Deus
sunt,velideofutura
quia illafutura
illa.Nonprimm
essentcauseprescientie
Dei,
quia tuncresipsefuture
prescit
ut
Dei essetcausarerum
Nonsecundum
quodestfalsum.
quia tuncprescientia
et perconsequens
nonsolumbonorumsed
essentfuture,
ipsesitprescientia
etiammalorum.41
essecausasprescientie
resfuturas
esseutdenotetur
Unussensuspotest
qua Deus
et iliaestfalsa.42
resessefuturas;
prescit
John is more convinced thathuman beings are freethan he is thatGod
knows the futureinfallibly.It is the latter,therefore,that gives way.
... videturtamenquod [Tullius] movebaturvalidioriargumento
quam
Dei: ut salvaret
liberum
arbitrium.43
Aristoteles
ad negandam
prescientiam
God has said thatAntichristwill come but, since thisis a futureevent,
it is possible that he will not come. God, therefore,could be mistaken.
Dei de futuris
statreiproducibilis
Cum prescientia
contingentia.44
et
esse futurum,
Ergo etiambene sequitur"Deus iudicatAntichristum
noneveniet;ergoDeus potestdecipl."45
Antichristus
possibiliter
And, of course, ifGod could be mistaken,what he reveals to us could
be mistaken also.
concedendo
Respondetur
quodfidespotestessede falso...,46
41I, d. 39, q. 1; f. 96va.
42Ibid.; 96vb.
43Ibid.; 95va.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.; 96ra.
46III, d. 23, q. 8; 45va.
134

12:22:11 PM

John prefers,however, to softenhis language when speaking of this

teaching. The question is raised whethersomeone whose name is written in the Book of Life can have it erased by divine absolute power.
... scriptus
inlibrovitenonpotest
necdamnari;
deieri;igitur
ergopredestinatus
nonpotestreproban.47
John prefersto say rather that it was never writtenthere.
... deleriminuspropriecapiturut tantumvaletsicutnon scribi.Et hoc est
de potentia
Dei absoluta.48
possibile
He would rathersay that "revelation" is not reallyrevelationthan say
that it can be false.
Sed nonestpossibile
nihilaliudestnisi
quodreveladositde falsoquia revelatio
veri... a Deo
manifestatio
Si revelatum
nonsitverum,assensuseiusnon
estrevelatio
.... Revelatiopotestessenonrevelatio.49
If revelation turns out to be false it is not held by faithbut by error
and false faith.
... si iudicium
illudsitde falso,nonestfidessederroret perfidia.50
The revelationgiven by Christ could be false, but we cannot say that
He can lie, since He does not have the intentionof deceiving.
Nec Christus
et intentione
fallendi.
potestdicerefalsum..., dicereassertorie
falsampotestproducere,
nonestdubium.51
Quod propositionem
But these are semantic matters.
Gabriel Biel also teaches that God, by His absolute power, could
lie to us, that is, assert what is false. This would not be sinful,however, because there is no power above God forbiddingHim to lie, as
there is for a creature.
Sed an Deus possitrevelarefalsum,
nonvideoquinpossit Et, si mentiri
estdicere,asserere,
vel revelare
nonvideoquinDeus hoc
falsum,
simpliciter
absoluta.Nontarnen
sicomnemendacium
eritpeccatum,
sed
possitde potentia
solummendacium
a creatura
contralegemprolatum.52
47I, d. 40, q. 1; 96vb.
48Ibid.
49III, d. 23, q. 10; 45va.
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52III, d. 12,q. 1, a. 2, conc.2, dub. 1; p. 211.
135

12:22:11 PM

Paul Scriptoris agrees that all the contingentevents mentioned in

Scriptureare such thattheirtakingplace could have been, or may still
be, prevented. Thus Abraham could have merited by believing
falsehood, and we can merit as well by believing falsehood as by
believing truth; merit comes from believing what God tells us to
believe, independentlyof the truthof what we believe.
in Scriptura
essefalsa.... Etper
... omniacontingentia
Sacracontenta
possunt
4'Abraham
in fidefalsa,"et
meruit
omnesistesuntconcedende,
consequens
"Homo potestitabenemereri
perfidemfalsamsicutveram,"quia homonon
eo quodDeus
meretur
fideitaquodilludquodcreditsitverumsedquia credit
ita credere.53
sibiprecipit
Christ has said that therewill be a Day ofJudgment. But this is only
a contingentmatter. God could falsifythis promise.
... quia Christus
asscruit
illam"Dies iudiciierit,"ideoestvera.Propter
hoc
Christi
assertaest
Sed tamassertio
tamennonestnecessaria.
quampropositio
Dei estfalsificare
illam"Dies iudiciierit."54
.... Sic in potestate
contingens
Paul insists,however, that, when God deceives us, He does not do it
improperlybut properly.
nondeordinata
intentione
fallendi
In casuautemquo Deusdecipcret
hominem,
sed ordinata....55
deciperet
Paul says however that, though God by His absolute power could
falsifyanythingprophesied, in fact He never does so.
Ex quo sequitur
prophete
potestfierideceptioet errorde
quod ... certitudo
nunestomnmodo
Dei absoluta;et tamenin reiveritate
certitudo;
potentia
licetposset.56
falsificare,
quamcnimDeus vulttalespropositiones
One wonders at his confidencein this matter.If someone can swallow
the camel that God could deceive us, how can he strain out the gnat
that He would never do so?
We thus see two Nominalists and one Scotist teaching that God
could deceive us.
Grace
(b) Sanctifying
The more traditional Christian teaching concerning sanctifying
grace was that it is an entityin the human or angelic being, divinizing
53I, d. 39; f. 173rb.
54Ibid.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.; 173ra.
136

12:22:11 PM

it and making it pleasing to God, capable of meriting,and worthyof

divine life.The fourteenthand fifteenth
centurywriterswho were concernedwithdivine absolute power eitherdid not consider it in thisway
or consideredthatGod could change drasticallythe role of sanctifying
grace in human (and angelic) life. All agreed, however, that grace and
charityalways go together.
For Gabriel Biel, a person could be pleasing to God, could merit,
and could gain eternal life, without grace.
Dei absolutaaliquispotestesseacceptusDeo et carussineomni
De potentia
formasibiinhaerentc.57
actumessemeritorium
Non includit
contradictionem
sineomnihabitusuperinhaerenti.58
naturali
formaliter
sua absolutaviatorisactumet
Deus acceptare
potestad gloriamde potentia
noninfusagratum
faciente
naturam,
gratia.59
Gabriel draws the line, however, at God accepting the person or the
acts of someone in mortal sin. Only a person in the state of nature,
not in the stateof mortal sin, is envisaged in the position taken above.
SedDeusposset,
si veliet,alicuiinpurisnaturalibus
... darebeatitudinem 60
Gabriel also teaches that God could refuseto accept the acts of a person in the state of grace, and refuse to grant him eternal life.
Actusviatorispotestex caritateelici et nullatenus
a Deo ad praemium
acceptari.61
in animaposita,potestDeus eumnonaccepsupernaturali
Quacumqueforma
taread vitamaeternam.62
... Deus,quemcumque
merecontingenter,
libere,et misericorditer
beatificat,
beatificat
ex gratiasua, nonex quacumqucformaveldonocollato.63
God could annihilate grace in the soul of thejust, and even annihilate
the person himself.
Potestillamformam
annihilare
cumanimacui inhaeret.64
noniniustefaceret 65
Possetergoannihilare
se; quod,si faceret,
diligentem
57I, d. 17,q.
58I, d. 17,q.
59I, d. 17,q.
60I, d. 17,q.
61I, d. 17,q.
62I, d. 17,q.
63Ibid.
64Ibid.
65I, d. 17,q.

1, a.
1, a.
1, a.
1, a.
1, a.
1, a.

2, conc.1; p. 415.
2; 425.
3, dub. 3, coroll.2; 423.
2, conc.1; 415.
3, dub. 3, coroll.1; 422.
2, conc.3: 416.

1, a. 3, dub. 3, coroll.1; 423.

137

12:22:11 PM

As for a person in mortal sin, God, by His absolute power, could

leave his sin unpunished, even while leaving the sinnerin his sin. One
reason for this is that God could leave the sinner unpunished for a
time, and thus could leave him foreverunpunished. Another is that
God could simply annihilate the sinner.
Dei potentiam
absoltam
Quia secundum
potestDeus velienonpunirepcccatorem
immomanentem
in peccatis.66
absqueomniactionepeccatoris,
ad tempus(noncnimstatim
Quia Deus potestvelienonpunirepeccatorem
nonpunireperpetuo.67
punit),ergopotestveliepeccatorem
Deus potestvelie peccatorem
annihilare
et ita non aeternaliter
simpliciter
punire.68
John Major agrees with Biel that God could reward with eternal
life persons not in the state of grace.
Deus potestaliquemsalvarede potentia
absolutasinecharitatc.69
Dei.70
Aliquispotestessebeatussinegratia,de potentia
A person could enjoy the Beatific Vision without loving God.
Deumvidereclare... necDeumdiligere...
Possibileestintcllectum
creatum
Deuspotest
nonconcurrere
ad unum,concurrendo
nam,cumiliadistinguantur,
cum[alio].71
John also agrees with Biel that God could refuse to accept as
meritoriousan act performedin the state of grace.
Nullusactusexistens
involntate
meritorius.
Probatio:
estintrinsece
quemlibet
actumDeus libereacceptai...,72
John also teaches that God can remitmortalsin withoutgiving grace.
Deus potestremittere
nuncculpammortalem
in Socrate,non infundendo
gratiam.73
He says also thatthe same person could gain meritand demeritat the
same time, and be in the state of grace and the state of mortal sin at
the same time.
66IV, d. 14,a. 2, conc.1; 426.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69I, d. 17,q. 1; f. 46rb-vb.
70III, d. 2, q. 2; 6vb.
71IV, d. 49, q. 8; 366vb.
72I, d. 17,q. 8; 63rb.
73III, d. 2, q. 2; 6vb.
138

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... sequitur
simulet semel...,74
et demereri
quodidempossitmereri
... potestaliquishaberegratiamet mortalepeccatumsimulet semelsi Deo
placeat....75
James Almain agrees with Major on this last point: that the same
soul could be in the state of grace (possess charity)and in the state of
mortal sin at the same time.
mihiquoddilectio
. .. videtur
stetcumpeccato.... TunciniliocasuSortespeccat
et diligitDeum superomnia,ut videturmanifeste.
mortaliter
Ergo propositum.76
Nicholas de Orbellis teaches that God could accept persons lacking grace.
... licetnon sit necessarium
ponerehabitmsupernaturalem
gratificantem
Dei absoltam,
loquendode necessitate
respiciente
potentiam
quia Deus de
beatificabilem
. .. existentem
absoluta
benepotuisset
naturam
potentia
acceptare
in primisnaturalibus.77
God could also remit mortal sins without the person guilty of them
doing anything.
... quiapossetDeusde potentia
absolutaremittere
sineomni
[peccatamortalia]
actuilliuscui remittit.78
God could also reward with eternal life someone, like Judas, dying in
mortal sin.
Etsicdepotentia
absolutapotest
salvareIudam,liceta sapientia
eiuslexuniversalisemanaverit
malusdamnabitur.79
quod omnisfinaliter
For Paul Scriptoris too, God's absolute power has fullfreedomin
regard to the soul's divinization and to its love of God. God could
accept a person who does not possess charity; He could accept as
meritoriousan act lacking charity; and He could reward with eternal
life a person lacking charity.
Esseincharitate
obiective
estalicuiessecharum,
sedesseincharitate
subiective
esthaberecharitatem
ut formam Possibiletarnenest quod aliquissitin
charitate
primomodoet nonsecundomodo.80
74IV, d. 10,q. 4; 51rb.
75Ibid.; 51vb.
76III, d. 17,q. 1; f. 88vb.
77I, d. 17,q. 2; f. h3vb.
78IV, d. 14,q. 1; cc8vb.
79I, d. 45, q. 1; L5vb.
80I, d. 17; f. 146va.
139

12:22:11 PM

estde potentia
Dei ordinata
actummeritorium
elicerequinduplex
Impossibile
causanaturalis
concurrat
... etcaritasinfusa.... Possibile
tarnen
estde potentia
Dei absolutasinecharitate
infusa....81
De potentia
Dei absolutapotestsalvarihomosinecharitate
...,82
It is also possible for a person having charityto be damned.
. .. possibile
estdamnatum
hominem
haberecaritatem
sineacceptatione
divina
83
For Paul, charityhas no intrinsicclaim on God's acceptance. This
acceptance is tied to charityonly in the present dispensation. Moral
goodness, absolutely speaking, is divine acceptance. A person could
become morally good or evil withouta change in him; only a change
in his relationshipto God would be required.
Nihilabsolutum
inactuvelhabitunonmoraliter
veladquiritur
bonodimittitur
ex hocquodsitmoraliter
bonus.84
Sinemutatione
absolutaactusethabituspossunt
effici
moraliter
bonivelmali,
sed nonsinemutatione
respectiva.85
God has, defacto, made the possession of charitya conditionforgaining eternallife,but He could, if He wished, choose any being to serve
this purpose, other than one intrinsicallyevil.
hanccondiQuamquamillehabitusqui estchantashabeata divinavolntate
tionemquod habensearnestsic dignus[vitaeterna],tarnen
Dei
de potentia
absolutaessetDeo possibile
hancconditionem
cui
ponerein omnientepositivo
nonintrinsece
estannexamaliciamoralis,...86
Paul can thereforesay thatcharitycould be compatible withhatred of
God, though he proposes this rather than asserts it.
Ex dictispatetpossibile
essecreaturam
... (quodtamennon
haberecaritatem
assero)cumodioDei ...,87
Nicholas Denyse also teaches that one could be pleasing to God,
and accepted into eternal life, without charity.
Dei absolutapotestquisessegratusDeo et mereri
De potentia
vitameternam
Dei ordinata.88
absquegratiacreata,sednonde potentia
81Ibid.; 146vb.
82I, prologue;lOrb.See also ibid.,f. lOra;and I, d. 17, f. 148va.
83I, d. 1; 50va.
84I, d. 17; 144rb.
85Ibid.; 144va.
86Ibid.; 147vb.
87I, d. 1; 50va.
88Tract5, part2, portion
3, q. 67; f. L4h.
140

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God could forgivea person without the person being sorry.

offensa
Homooffensus
absquehoc quod offendens
potestremitiere
peniteat;
ergomultomagisDeus
... nonprobatniside potentia
absolutaDei.89
God, absolutely speaking, does not have to reward good or punish
evil, though there is a good reason for Him actually doing so.
Necetiamestnecessarium
absolute
quodDeusaliquemremuneret
quantuncunmalum;potesttamenprobabiliter
perque bonmvel puniatquantuncunque
suaden.90
In summingup the teachingof the threeNominalists and the three
Scotistson the nature of grace and its accompanying charity,we find
the general attitudethat in the presentdispensation grace is necessary
forbeing pleasing to God, formeriting,and forenteringeternal life;
in another dispensation it could be quite unnecessary; and anything
else not intrinsicallyevil, or nothingat all, could take its place. Correspondingly,the state of mortal sin is displeasing to God only in the
present order of things; in another order it could be accepted, and
even rewarded with eternal friendshipwith God. One could be in the
state of grace and the state of mortal sin at the same time. The reason
forall thisis thatgrace could mean simplybeing accepted by God, not
somethingintrinsicto the soul which divinizes it.
(c) The BeatificVision
Gabriel Biel holds that it could be possible forsomeone to see the
divine essence and not enjoy it; indeed, he could even refuseto enjoy
it. Also, by divine absolute power, a person who does not love God
could see the divine essence.
Vidensdivinamessentiam
et carensfruitione
beatifica
potestnolleillamfruitionem.91
Vidensdivinam
Dei potentiam
carensperabsoltam
dilectione
essentiam,
Dei,
potestnolleDeum.92

89Tract6, part3, 1; P3h.

q.
90Tract7, part
2, q. 1; CC2a.
91I, d. 1, q. 6, a. 2, conc.3; 124.
p.
92Ibid.;conc.4; 124.
141

12:22:11 PM

John Major teaches too that a person could behold the divine
essence and not enjoy it.
sine
Animapotestessebeatapernotitiam
intuitivam
Dei, que estbeatitudo,
fruitione.91
One could also see the divine essence clearlywithoutloving God. The
reason forthese doctrinesis thatGod can separate whateverare really
distinctfromeach other, and love of God, the vision of God, and the
enjoymentof God, are reallydistinctfromeach other. This separation
is possible, of course, only by God's absolute power.
estintellectum
creatum
Possibile
Deumvidereclareet nongauderenecDeum
Deus potestnonconcurrere
ad unum,
nam,cumiliadistinguantur,
diligere...
concurrendo
cumaliis.94
Nonestnaturaliter
possibile
quodaliquisvideatDeumetnongaudeat,velnon
diligat.95
Also, a person could be beatified and still suffer.
9f
...potestaliquis...puniripoenasensuset beatifican.
He could even be beatified absolutely, in one place, and sufferthe
pain of the damned in another, though he could not be beatifiedand
damned, both absolutely, at the same time.
Nontarnen
et damnaripoenadamniin eodemtempotest[aliquis]beatifican
pore...,licetpossitpuniripoenadamniin A locoet beatifican
simpliciter.97
Nicholas de Orbellis is not pleased withthe doctrinethata Beatus
could See God clearly and not enjoy the Beatific Vision, since
Nicholas realizes that no Beatus ever refusesto enjoy it. He therefore
says that, of itself,the will of the Beatus is freeto refuseto enjoy the
BeatificVision but that God necessitatesit to enjoy it. This teaching
does not bring in divine absolute power.
sue ad obiectum
coniunctionis
Secura quoque est anima de perpetuitate
...licetinultimo
finenonsitaliquisdefectus
beatificum.98
boni,voluntas
tamen,
cumsitliber,potestnonelicereactumvolendicircaipsum."Voluntasenim
93IV, d. 2, 2; f. f6rb.
94IV, d. 49,q.q. 8; 366vb.
95Ibid.
96IV, d. 10, 4; 51vb.
q.
97Ibid.
98IV, d. 49; f. tt3a.
99I, d. 1, q. 2; b6b.
142

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beatilibereetcontingenter
elicitactumdilectionis
in Deumquantum
estde se.
Cumhoctarnen
statnecessitas
a Deo conservante
beatitudinis
volunperpetuo
tatemin taliactu.100
enimbeati,licetnonpossitnonfrui,nontarnen
Voluntas
estexse ad hocdeterdivina....101
minata,seda volntate
It is clear that Nicholas is opposed to many teachings, currentin his
day, dealing with the BeatificVision. He says that it is betterto work
towards obtaining the Beatific Vision than to consider the many
recklessteachings about this subject. We realize that Nicholas is not
being anti-intellectualbut is being careful about the deposit of faith.
However, he does not identifyconcern with divine absolute power as
the root of many of the problems.
De multisdubiisque circa beatitudinem
queri possent,causa brevitatis,
utilius
estad ipsamobtinendam
laborare
Siquidem,
suspendo.
quamvariadubia
circaipsamcuriosediscutere.102
Paul Scriptoris agrees with Biel and Major that one could see the
divine essence and not enjoy it.
Ex dictispatetpossibileesse creaturam
haberecaritatem,
lumenglorie,et
visionem
sinefruitione103
divineessentie
He also agree with Major that one could see the divine essence and
not love God. One could even possess charity,the lightof glory,and
a clear vision of God, and be damned.
Ex dictispatetpossibile
.. lumenglorieetvisionem
essecreaturam
habere.
divine
essentie...cumodioDei....104
....possibileest damnatumhominemhaberecaritatemsine acceptatione
lumenglorieet ciaramvisionem.105
divina...;similiter
And Paul adds thatone could see the divine essence withoutseeing the
Divine Persons, and see one Person without another.
De potentia
absolutapotestDeus ostendere
essentiam
sinepersonis,
et unam
sinealia, nontarnen
de potentia
ordinata.106
personam

100I, d. 10,q. 1; g4b.

101Ibid.; e4c.
102IV, d. 50; tt3c.
103I, d. 1; f. 50va.
104Ibid.
105Ibid.
106Ibid.; 46ra.
143

12:22:11 PM

A Beatus is never certain about the continuance of his beatitude, even

ifGod has assured him that it will last forever.Yet Paul feelssure that
God would never use His absolute power to break such an assurance.
Ex quo sequitur
fierideceptio
eterrorde potentia
beati...potest
quodsecuritas
Dei absoluta;ettarnen
in reiveritate
estomnmodo
enim
certitudo;
numquam
licetposset.107
Deus vulttalespropositiones
falsificare,
For Nicholas Denyse, enjoymentis not of the essence of beatitude.
Nonestdelectatio
de essentiabeatitudinis.108
For this reason God could, by His absolute power, withholdenjoyment of the Beatific Vision, or withdrawit afterit has commenced.
...si Deus sitcausatotalisetimmediata
fruitionis,
potest
ipsamnoncausarevel
absoluteloquendo.109
conservare,
God could also have a Beatus enjoy the divine essence but not the
divine attributesor the Divine Persons, or enjoy one Person and not
another.
Beatusde potentia
Dei absolutapotestfruiessentia,
nonfruendo
attributis
nec
fruendo
et fruiuna persona,nonfruendo
alia.110
personis;
God could also annihilate a Beatus, since everycreatureis contingent.
Dicendumergo...quodnichil[aliud]a Deo habetesseformaliter
necessarium
sed simpliciter
dicitur
habereesseincorTamen,aliquodcreatum
contingens.
ruptibleproquantonon... potestdestruiab aliquocreatosed tantum
potest
annichilari
a Deo nonconservante.
Et hocmodopotestconcedibeatitudinem
esseincorruptibilem.111
On the subject of beatitude, then, two Nominalists and three
Scotistsuse the notion of divine absolute power to allow the possibility
of separating the Beatific Vision from the enjoyment of it, breaking
up the content of this Vision, or questioning its perpetuity.
(d) The Incarnation
Two questions were raised concerning the Incarnation: (1) could
God sin in a nature assumed? (2) what natures could be assumed
107I, d. 39; 173ra.
108Tract7, part3, portion
3, q. 1; f. DD2c.
109Ibid.; q. 4; DD3g.
110Tract2, part2,
3, q. 1; Eld.
111Tract7, part3, portion
3, q. 4; DD3f.
portion
144

12:22:11 PM

hypostaticallyby God? As regards the firstquestion, Gabriel Biel

teaches that, though God could not sin in a rational nature assumed,
the nature itselfcould admit of sin if it were set aside by God.
Naturaassumptain se considerata
peccata.Nam natura
potuitadmittere
assumpta
potuita Verbodimitti....112
What is strikingin thisdoctrineis not what it says explicitlybut in two
thingsit says implicitly:that God could assume a rational nature and
then set it aside; and that this nature, after being set aside, would
belong to a person. The firstquestions the wisdom of God in assuming
a nature; the second makes two extreme assumptions: that the nature
would belong to another person; and that it would still be the same
individual nature which had been assumed.
Another strange doctrine adopted by Gabriel is that God could
assume an already existingrational nature. Gabriel says that it would
not have been fittingfor the Son of God to assume the individual
nature of Adam.113Now, the individual nature of Adam can belong
only to Adam. If the person of Adam ceases to be, so does his nature
as his nature.
As regards the second question, John Major holds that God could
assume an irrational nature such as that of an ass. He could also
assume a rational nature deprived of grace. This latter nature could
not be a sinfulone, but it could be one not pleasing {grata)to God.
naturam
irrationalem.114
Verbumpotestassumere
illius:Deus estasinus....115
Concedopossibilitatem
creaturam
rationalem
Deus potestassumere
sinegratia.116
Naturapotestassumiet nonesseDeo grata.117
Sed Deus nonpotestassumere
peccatum.118
Sed inconveniens
est,etperconsequens
pecimpossibile,
quodDeusassumat
catumet peccet.119
And, even by divine absolute power, an assumed nature could not sin.
est quod humanitas
Verboconiuncta
Impossibile
peccet....Nuncloquorde
Dei absoluta.120
potentia
112III, d. 1, q. 2; p. 37.
113III, d. 12, 1, a. 3, dub. 3; 213-214.
114IV, d. 2, q.q.1; f. 5vb.
115Ibid.; 6ra.
116IV, d. 2, q. 2; 6rb.
117Ibid.; 6va.
118III, d. 2, q. 1; 6ra.
119Ibid.
120III, d. 12,q. 1; 19vb.
145

12:22:11 PM

John is aware that other theologians admit that Christ and God can
sin, but he finds this position horrendous. It is a contradiction.
et quod
...si humanitas
quod Deus peccaret...
assumptapeccaret,
sequeretur
labiisconcedunt
Deumposse
admittere
esthorrendum....
Aliquiincircumcisis
peccare.121
Contradictionem
implicaiquodDeus peccet.122
John, however, does not think that is a contradiction for God to
assume a pre-existinghuman nature, such as Plato's, or that of a sinful man (his sins being purged in being assumed).
Platonem....123
Deus potestassumere
ei suamculpam.124
remitiendo
Potesttarnen
[Deus]caperehominem,
Besides thislast doctrine,John also agrees with Biel thatChrist could
set aside His human nature, and that it would then belong to another
person, and would be able to sin.
Humanitas
pernaturam.125
separatanonestimpeccabilis
James Almain agrees withhis teacherMajor thatGod could assume
an irrational nature, and that He could assume a rational nature
deprived of grace.
ad illam
autpersonaliter
autsaltemquantum
sibiunirehypostatice
Deuspotest
sive rationalem
sive irraindifferenter
quamlibetcreaturam
dependentiam
tionalem....Et credomagishuicopinioniquamopposite.126
.... eritconcedendum
quod illa natura[humana]situnitaquamvisnonsitin
gratia 127
James also agrees with Major that the humanityof Christ cannot sin,
even by divine absolute power, while it is united to Christ, but it can
be set aside and then, in its new person, sin.
etiam de potentiaabsoluta,humanam
Ergo implicat[contradictionem],
unitmVerbo[text:herb]peccare....128
naturam
et
Christiin se considerata
Secundaconclusio:humanitas
potestsimpliciter
a divinitate
et
Christipotestessederelieta
absolutepeccare.Patet:humanitas
velagere
omitiere
non...donatagratiaetadiutorio
resistente,
quo factopoterit
contradictamen
rectum.129
121Ibid.
122Ibid.
123III, d. 2, q. 1; 6vb.
124Ibid.
125III, d. 12, q. 1; 19vb.
126III, d. 1, q. 2; f. 5rb.
127Ibid.; 6vb.
128III, d. 12,q. 1; 29va.
129Ibid.; 29rb.
146

12:22:11 PM

These threeNominalists are not followedvery farby the Scotists in

thismatter.Nicholas de Orbellis simplyinsiststhatChristcould not
and Nicholas Denyse, while admittingthat
sin in His humanity,130
thatit would not
God could assume an irrationalnature,131suggests132
be fitting.He also says that it is not possible for a Divine Person to
assume an already existingperson,133but goes on to contradictthis,
apparently,claiming that it would not have been fittingforChrist to
have assumed Adam.134
It is unfortunate that Paul Scriptoris's commentary on the
covers only Book One. Perhaps Paul would have gone further
Sentences
than did the two Nicholases concerningthe Incarnation, since he tends
to be more extreme than they.
Summing up the teaching of the Nominalists and Scotists concerning the Incarnation, we see that the Nominalists teach thatGod could
assume an irrationalnature or a non-graced rational one, that it could
be set aside and belong to anotherperson, and thatGod could assume
the nature of an already existing person; and that the Scotists are
much more reserved on these points. This is in accord with the
teachingsof Ockham and Scotus. Ockham had taughtthat God could
assume an irrationalnature,135thatHe could set aside a human nature
He had assumed,136and that He could assume a human nature which
could sin,137whereas Scotus had taught only the firstof these.138
The classic example of speculation on divine absolute power as
related to the Incarnation is a work by Nicholas Oresme, De Communicatione
Idiomatum.Nicholas was born about 1320, and died in
1382, having been Bishop of Lisieux from1377. 139The textwas published by Borchertin 1940. 140In this work Nicholas discusses a great
130III, d. 12; f. et3va.
131Tract4, part1, portion
1, q. 8; f. L3c-e.
132Ad 3.
133Tract4, part1, portion
1, q. 1; Lib.
134Tract4, part1, portion
1, q. 5; L2e.
135Reportata
NewYork1967f.)VI,
, III, q. 1; in OperaTheologica
(St. Bonaventure,
33-34.
136Ibid.; II, q. 1; V, 15.
137Ibid.; III, q. 10; VI, 350.
138OpusOxoniense
, III, d. 2, q. 1; in OperaOmnia
(Lyons1637)VII, f. 431ra-b.
139Thisbiographical
Dictionnaire
deThologie
andLexikon
information
isfrom
Catholique
undKirche.
frTheologie
140E. Borchert,
DerEinfluss
desNominausmus
desSptscholastik
,
aufdie Christologie
Mnsteri.W. 1940( = Beitrge
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
undTheologiedes
Mittelalters,
XXXV) l*-45*.
147

12:22:11 PM

many cases made possible by an application of the notion of divine

absolute power. For example: Christ settingaside His humanity; this
humanity belonging to another human being yet remaining the
humanity Christ had assumed; and the other person now being the
son of Mary, Christ having ceased to be so.141Another example: the
Second Person of the Trinity,having set aside His presenthumanity,
assumes the humanityof an adult who is (or was) the son of Bertha;
the Son of God will now not be the son of Bertha but it can be said
thatBertha begot the humanityof the Son ofGod; and the adult whose
humanity was assumed does not become God, but his humanity
becomes divine.142And, if this adult had had a son beforehand,the
Son of God would not be a father,but would have the humanityof
someone who was. And, if this humanity were set aside, it would
belong again to the son of Bertha.143
,
Also, ifthe Son of God assumed the devil, Lucifer ( quodestpossibile
Dei
the
nature
assumed
absoluta
secundumdoctores
de
,
angelic
potentia
),
would cease to be sinfuland damned; the Son of God would be an
angel but not Lucifer.144Christ could also assume the humanityof the
Blessed Virgin. If He were then to beget a child througha woman,
and then assume the child, He would be His own fatherand would
also have two mothers.145
This gives a sampling of the cases Nicholas found it necessary to
discuss in order to consider the possibilitiesof divine absolute power.
Borchert shows, in his lengthyhistorical introductionto Nicholas's
work,146that these ideas were widespread in the fourteenthcentury,
and reportsthe argumentofJohn Hiltalingen of Basel, O.E. S.A. (d.
1392), in a disputation against Nicholas, defending the proposition
that, ifGod the Father were to have assumed the Virgin Mary before
she conceived the humanity of God the Son, and the Son were then
to have set aside the human nature He had assumed, He would have
been the son of a woman and yet purely God.147Borchertalso reports
141Ibid.; 9*-17*,34*.
142Ibid.; 17*-21*.
143Ibid.; 21*-23*.
144Ibid.; 26*-27*.
145Ibid.; 28*-30*.
146Ibid.; 9*.
147Ibid.; 139.
148

12:22:11 PM

the case presented by Arnold of Sehnsen in which God assumes the

angelic nature of Lucifer and then sets it aside; it would then become
the nature of Lucifer again, but would be purifiedof sin, and Lucifer
would then not be damned.
Nicholas of Oresme says that he has written his work not in a
asserendo
;148cumomnireverentia
pertinaciter
dogmatic manner (nihiltarnen
tarnen
ettimore,
salvasemper
ethumilitate
,149and withthe purfidemanente)
of
of
the
the
union
of
the two natures in
relationship
pose
explaining
Christ and of defending this doctrine against adversaries ( Veritas
sacratissime
unionis. . . perfectius
, et ex hocadversuspugnantes
poteritintelligi
1
50
meliussustineri)
.
* **
We have now shown the applications of the doctrine of divine
absolute power to fiveareas of teaching dealt with in the late fifteenth
century.We have seen thatboth Nominalists and Scotistsmade these
applications. Thomists, however, were quite different.The three
whom we have chosen do not explicitlyoppose, as a general principal,
the use of the notion of divine absolute power, but theydo oppose particular applications of it. John Capreolus vigorously opposes its
application in the matterof God assuming a nature which is able to
sin or to be damned.
- quodDeumpeccare
- nonsolumestinconveniens,
immohereticum 151
scilicet
estDeumessedamnatum.152
erronea,
....propositio....est
possibile
Capreolus seems however to thinkthat God could assume the nature
of an already existinghuman person. He does not say so explicitlybut
does say that God could not assume a human nature already condemned to hell.
....proprieloquendopersonadivinanon potestassumerenaturamhominis
damnati....153
In this he differsfromhis master, Aquinas, who denies that God can
assume an already existingnature under any conditions.154
148Ibid.; 9*.
149Ibid.; 37*.
150Ibid.; 9*. See also Marsilius
ofInhen(c.1330-1396),
ibid.,145.
151III, d. 12,q. 1; f. 94rb.
152Ibid.
153Ibid.
154Summa
, III, 4, 2c.
Theologiae
149

12:22:11 PM

On the question of grace Capreolus is different from the

Nominalists and Scotists. He realized thattheywere making grace not
necessary for salvation, by divine absolute power, because they
thought it unfittingfor God to be necessitated by a creature. But
Capreolus teaches that it is not unfittingfor God to be bound to
reward grace and charity because, in being so bound, He is really
bound not to creatures but to Himself, to His own goodness.
- ille qui meretur
non proprieconstituit
Deum sibi debitorem,
sed Deus,
movensvoluntatem
ad opus meritorium
et
informatum,
gratiaeet charitate
volensquod taliactuireddatur
vitaaeterna,debitor
estsibimet....155
...si...Deus perimpossibile
nonredderet
Deusnonfacerct
iniustum
praemium,
creaturae
sed suae voluntati
et bonitati,
sibiquoddecetearn.156
denegando
Denys the Carthusian, like Capreolus, opposes many of the
teachingswe have encountered. He teaches clearlythatGod could not
do anythingagainst His wisdom or goodness.
necfacitnecaliquidfacere
consistt,
QuumqueDeussapiensoptimusque
potest
quod nondcceateumfacere.157
sed sapientiali
virtute
est.158
Nequeenimtemeraria,
omnipotens
Also thatgrace is necessaryto please God.159And thatmeritoriousacts
are binding on God.
ad ita agendumconstrinxit,
et debitorum
conSicqueseipsumquodammodo
stituit.160
Also that visioand fruitioare inseparable in the Beatific Vision.
visioincludithoc velieet ipsamfruitionem
ut comIpsa quoque beatifica
imoistaincludunt
se invicem....161
plementa;
And gaudiumis essential also.162And beatitude is perpetual.163And
God could not assume an irrational nature.
....ita irrationalem
naturamassumeresupergloriosissimo
Creatorinullatenus
convenit,nec ulla potentiapotestcompetere...
quoniam...sapientiae
atque
ac sit....164
justitiaederogatut brutum
appeletur
155II, d. 27, q. 1; f. 456ra.
156Ibid.
157IV, d. 46, q. 3; XXV, 356C.
158II, d. 18,q. 2; XXII, 181C'.
159II, d. 26, q. 1; XXII, 324B.
160II, d. 27, q. 2; XXII, 348C.
161IV, d. 49, q. 1; XXV, 404B'.
162IV, d. 49, q. 6; XXV, 429-431.
163IV, d. 49, q. 5; XXV, 427-429.AlsoI, d. 1, q. 3; XIX, 118C'.
,64III, d. 2, q. 2; XXIII, 72D,A'
150

12:22:11 PM

We find in Denys, nevertheless,three matterson which he could be

considered to be making concessions to the advocates of the application of divine absolute power. In claiming that God cannot reward or
punish anyone beyond his deserts, Denys adds that this is true of
God's ordinarypower, giving the impressionthat it mightbe possible
by His absolute power.
aut pluspunireiquampecSi autemalicuiminusconferret
quamei debetur,
cavit,hoc essetcontrajustitiaeordinem;nec Deus hoc posset,loquendode
ordinata....165
potentia
Denys also says that it would have been unfittingfor Christ to have
assumed Adam,166but does not state that it would have been impossible. And, in statingthatGod could not damn St. Peter or save Judas
even by His absolute power unless He could find some way of doing
itjustly, Denys seems to leave himselfopen to the possibilitythat this
might be done.
damnareetJudamsalvarede potentia
Idcirco,si potestPetrum
absoluta,hoc
eumhocfaceresecundum
nonestnisiquia deceret
aliquemjustitiaeordinem,
nec aliterpossethoc facere.Propterea,
si faceret;
nihilpotestDeus facerede
itatarnen
absolutaquinpossitetiamilludfacere
de potentia
ordinata,
potentia
ad ordinem
est,adspiciendo
quod semperfacitquod meliuset rationabilius
universi.167
Denys thereforedoes not seem to be as opposed as is Capreolus to
applicationsof the notion of divine absolute power, but, on the whole,
he is not favorable to these applications. But Cardinal Cajetan is
consistentlyopposed to them, those, forexample, dealing with divine
foreknowledge,168
grace and charity,169and the Incarnation.170
The Thomists, then, and especially Capreolus and Cajetan, the
more authenticThomists, contrastsharplywith the Nominalists and
Scotists regarding attitudes to the notion of divine absolute power.
Conclusionsand Comments
At this point it is possible to draw some conclusions fromwhat we
have seen, or to make some comments.
165IV, d. 46, q. 1; XXV, 348A.
166III, d. 12,q. 3; XXIII, 222C.
167IV, d. 46, q. 3; XXV, 356C.
168At I, 14, 13.
169AtMI, 113,2.
170At III, 4, 1-3.
151

12:22:11 PM

1. On the eve of the Reformationmany philosophersand theologians

were making extensive applications of the notion of divine absolute
power.
2. This was true of Nominalists and Scotists,thoughnot of Thomists,
particularlythe more explicitlyThomistic ones.
3. Except forthe matterof the Incarnation, thereseems to be littleor
no differencebetween Nominalists and Scotists in these doctrines.
4. This is true even of a Scotist like Paul Scriptoris,who claimed to
do nothingbut followScotus. At the beginningofhis workhe says that
he is simplyexplaining Scotus, and at the end he says thathe has carried out his intention.
Doctoris[Joannis
taliaet tantaet clarssima
prefati
Duns]scriptaenodare
studeboprofacltate
ingeniimei....171
mihiapparuit
esse
inprincipio
Hoc dixerim
subprotestatione
dieta,etquantum
de intentione
Doctoris.172
Yet Paul went far beyond Scotus, influenced, subconsciously no
doubt, by the heady philosophical climate in which he lived.
London, Canada
BresciaCollege
171Prologue;f. 2r.
172Explicit;183rb.

152

12:22:11 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 2 (1989)
Reviews

MassimoParodi,Il Conflitto
deiPensieri
: Studio
suAnselmo
d'Aosta
, (Quodlibet
3, Ricerchee strumenti
difilosofia
LubrinaEditore,
Pierluigi
medievale)
Bergamo1988.
ofpostThestudy
ofthepolitical-social-cultural
context
beginswitha rapidreview
withthetensions
of theperiodsketched
Benedictine
in.
monasticism,
Carolingian
Anselmis setin thisworldand it is suggested
thatin his Monologion
, and more
in the Proslogion
of theological,
, he soughta synthesis
especially
metaphysical,
withlove,in a 'model
andprinciples,
rational,
assumptions
philosophical,
mystical
ofrationality'.
We areled in succeeding
thequestions
whicharise
chapters
through
inconnection
withfaithandcontemplation;
theanalogiesandimagesoftheTrinity
theproblems
oftalking
aboutGodand
which
Anselm
employs
(indebttoAugustine);
discussionof
man; being,knowing,'knowingthroughlove'; to a concluding
Anselm's'modelofrationality'.
It is a weakness
ofthestudythatitconcentrates
so
first
booksandtheinfluence
on himofAugustine
uponAnselm's
heavily
(especially
intheDe Trinitate),
thereis a goodrangeofcontemporary
andCarolingian
although
andcontrasts.
The realdifficulty
witha bookofthissortis tosayanything
parallels
newwithout
Anselm'sintentions.
It is perhapsdoubtful
whether
thereis
distorting
to quitethedegreesuggested
'crisis'and 'conflict'
here.Anselm'swas aboveall a
calmmindin matters
of faith;he experienced
conflict
arena,
onlyin thepolitical
whereitwasthrust
hands,andinbothcaseshe recoiled
uponhim,andat Roscelin's
towinhisopponents
andsought
toa position
from
itsunpleasantness
hehimself
saw
to be straightforwardly
reasonable.Nevertheless,
thisis a sensitiveand often
aboutAnselm.
studywithsomenewinsights
penetrating
G. R. Evans

Cambridge

Die Erzhlung
der mittelalterlichen
WolfgangKemp, SermoCorporeus.
,
Glasfenster
Mnchen1987
Schirmer/Mosel,
The titleofthebookhas beentakenfromthe13th-century
tiennede
preacher
whosaidthatifonewantedto reachthelaymen,
hadto be on
Bourbon,
preaching
concrete
insteadofabstract
ideas.The subtitle
refers
to theactualsubjectof
things
thebook,thestained-glass
windows
and thestories
thatare toldin them.We have
herea studyon the development
of narrative
and the underlying
structures,
exemplified
bymeansofa fewwellchosenstories.It is noton all thestained-glass
windows
ofthewholeperiodofthemiddleages,buton thoseofthecrucialperiod
153

12:22:23 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 2 (1989)
Reviews

MassimoParodi,Il Conflitto
deiPensieri
: Studio
suAnselmo
d'Aosta
, (Quodlibet
3, Ricerchee strumenti
difilosofia
LubrinaEditore,
Pierluigi
medievale)
Bergamo1988.
ofpostThestudy
ofthepolitical-social-cultural
context
beginswitha rapidreview
withthetensions
of theperiodsketched
Benedictine
in.
monasticism,
Carolingian
Anselmis setin thisworldand it is suggested
thatin his Monologion
, and more
in the Proslogion
of theological,
, he soughta synthesis
especially
metaphysical,
withlove,in a 'model
andprinciples,
rational,
assumptions
philosophical,
mystical
ofrationality'.
We areled in succeeding
thequestions
whicharise
chapters
through
inconnection
withfaithandcontemplation;
theanalogiesandimagesoftheTrinity
theproblems
oftalking
aboutGodand
which
Anselm
employs
(indebttoAugustine);
discussionof
man; being,knowing,'knowingthroughlove'; to a concluding
Anselm's'modelofrationality'.
It is a weakness
ofthestudythatitconcentrates
so
first
booksandtheinfluence
on himofAugustine
uponAnselm's
heavily
(especially
intheDe Trinitate),
thereis a goodrangeofcontemporary
andCarolingian
although
andcontrasts.
The realdifficulty
witha bookofthissortis tosayanything
parallels
newwithout
Anselm'sintentions.
It is perhapsdoubtful
whether
thereis
distorting
to quitethedegreesuggested
'crisis'and 'conflict'
here.Anselm'swas aboveall a
calmmindin matters
of faith;he experienced
conflict
arena,
onlyin thepolitical
whereitwasthrust
hands,andinbothcaseshe recoiled
uponhim,andat Roscelin's
towinhisopponents
andsought
toa position
from
itsunpleasantness
hehimself
saw
to be straightforwardly
reasonable.Nevertheless,
thisis a sensitiveand often
aboutAnselm.
studywithsomenewinsights
penetrating
G. R. Evans

Cambridge

Die Erzhlung
der mittelalterlichen
WolfgangKemp, SermoCorporeus.
,
Glasfenster
Mnchen1987
Schirmer/Mosel,
The titleofthebookhas beentakenfromthe13th-century
tiennede
preacher
whosaidthatifonewantedto reachthelaymen,
hadto be on
Bourbon,
preaching
concrete
insteadofabstract
ideas.The subtitle
refers
to theactualsubjectof
things
thebook,thestained-glass
windows
and thestories
thatare toldin them.We have
herea studyon the development
of narrative
and the underlying
structures,
exemplified
bymeansofa fewwellchosenstories.It is noton all thestained-glass
windows
ofthewholeperiodofthemiddleages,buton thoseofthecrucialperiod
153

12:22:28 PM

of 1150-1250
and especially
on someoutstanding
examples(foremost
amongthem
thosedepicting
of Chartres,
the parableof the ProdigalSon) in thecathedrals
andSensatthebeginning
ofthe13thcentury.
In thisperiodtherapidchange
Bourges
from"theological"towards"narrative"windowsis so clearand universal
that,
totheauthor,thefirst
narrative
is not,as mostly
according
greatperiodofpictorial
takenforgranted,
thatofthe14th-century
fresco
inItalybutthatofthestainedcycles
oftheearly13thcentury
in France.
glasswindows
hasnotpaidadequateattention
thatofart-historians,
research,
Scholarly
including
to stained-glass
windows.
Yet theyare a threatened
takesits
speciesand pollution
sharehere.Adequatephotographs
often
do notexist,andwhentheydo, itis onlyin
a fewmonumental
detailsor in a toovaguewhole.Butnarrative
werenot
windows
onlyputup fortheirlightand colourin theopenedup churchwall,as theauthor
remarks.
The "overalllogic"ofthemanyscenesofthestained-glass
windows
rightly
ofc. 1200asksforinterpretation
anditisjustas valuablea subjectforstudyas that
oftherelation
to thepicture
ofc. 1300.
ofthefigures
planein painting
We undoubtedly
haveherean important
bookon narrative,
in whichtheauthor
and veryconvincing
way. There are no superficial
arguesin an authoritative
iswellfounded
notonlytothealready
statements,
references,
everything
byextensive
mentioned
methods
ofthetime,butalsototheexisting
narrative
methods
preaching
ofothermediasuchas folk-tale
literature
and themimeofjongleurs.
The bookis dividedintothreeparts.Partoneis on thegeneral
structures
ofnaritself
and thenarrators
and thelastpartis on the
rative;nextcomesthenarrative
ofthewindows
oftheearly13thcentury.
patrons
a detailed
inthefirst
After
window
description,
partofthebook,ofthestained-glass
oftheProdigal
whichwindow
remains
theLeitmotif
forthe
SoninChartres
cathedral,
restofthebook,theexisting
theories
on narration
andthedifferent
as set
categories
andWeitzmann
arecommented
Thesecondhalf
onandrefined.
up bye.g. Wickhoff
ofthefirst
dealswithwhatmight
be calledtheproto-method
ofmedieval
partmainly
and itschronological
interaction
withnarration.
narrative,
typology,
thisauthor
Fromthetwoviewsontypology
arguesthatitisnotthestrict
interpretationthatisvalid.Itisnotonlyusedforthetheological
explanation
(inthethree
phases
ofantelegem,
oftheOld andNewTestament,
sublegeandsubgratia)
anditis notonly
metwithin Christian
scenesand texts.The typological
is a far
wayofvisualizing
moregeneralwayof medievalthinking
and outlookon life.The waytheBibles
Moralises
are workedout pointsto sucha moregeneralviewand it can also be
detected
in e.g. theemergent
musicofthetimeandin thenarrative
polyphonous
canalsobe seenas a first
innarstructure
oftheGrailstory.
Buttypology
experiment
ration.The first
andare
medieval
windows
dateto themiddleofthe12thcentury
in nature.Thenthereis a gradualdevelopment
fromtypological
tonartypological
remains
tobe usedtogivea fixedframework
tootherwise
rativewindows.
Typology
narratives.
Itisfascinating
endless
toseehowtheauthor
thedevelopexplains
reading
mentofe.g. thetypological
window
oftheGoodSamaritan
at Senstoa mixture
of
in thewindowoftheNewTestament
andnarrative
elements
at Bourges
typological
to thepurelynarrative
windowoftheProdigalSon at Chartres.
The geometrical
seenin thestained-glass
windows
wereusedas a means.
patterns
in tooabstract
are hereexamined
Oftenexplained
theories
suchpatterns
as to the
intricate
ofnarrative
There
from
waystheywereusedintheemancipation
typology.
inthewaythestories
areoften
different
axestobediscerned
aretold,suchas horizontalsequences
The supofimages,vertical
anti-thetical
pairsandcircular
sequences.
withsuchaxes.Gradually
the
porting
geometrical
patterns
mayormaynotcoincide
narrative
an autonomous
visualmethod
ofpresenting
a story.
systematical
emerges,
154

12:22:28 PM

In parttwotheauthorstarts
toexpandon therelation
ofthebiblicaltextsandthe
scenesofthewindows
textsmatter
andhowtheprimary
lessandlessin theelaborationofnarrative
ofthewindows.
Thisis alsoexplained
sequences
bygoingintothe
narrative
oftheepicCourtois
d'Arras
and othermedievalliterary
stories
of
structure
a popularnature.
In themacro-structure
ofthetimewesee thatwiththeriseofheresies
in the12th
and 13thcentury
theBiblebecomesa forbidden
bookforlaymento read.As a reactionsermons
andthestructure
ofthesesermons
showsthatstrong
growinimportance
stress
stories
tobe ableto reachthelaymen.The preachers
waslaidon concrete
can
be seenas thecompetitors
ofthejongleurs
incatching
It is in this
people'sattention.
on theonesidefolktales,themime
can be detected
between
waythatparallellisms
ofthejongleurs
andthesermons
ofthepreachers
andon theothersidethenarrative
methods
ofthestained-glass
windows.
Andthere
wasinfluence
theonemedium
from
on theother.Suchparallellismes
canexplaincertain
andinfluences
which
elements,
otherwise
wouldremainvague,as e.g. somespecific
ofthefigures
gestures
depicted
in thewindows.
After
thevitrearii
counselors
and thestory-tellers
the
, thetheological
parexcellence
itis thepatrons
ofthestained-glass
windows
thatarepaidattention
to in
jongleurs
shareof thelaymen,especially
the
partthree.After1200we see an evergreater
in guildsandfraternities,
inproviding
thefinances
forthekeeping
laymen
organised
andfortheacquisition
ofchurch
furniture.
It is indeedat
up ofthechurch
building
toseehardly
first
inthestories
founded
chosen
anytheologically
sightstrange
system
forthedifferent
ina church
windows
It is,as clearly
statedby
stained-glass
building.
theauthor,
whattheguildswantedand whattheclergy
allowed.Suchinsights,
by
theway,oftenarguedaboutin opposition
to former
authors,in thiscase against
the overallunityof architecture
as a criterion
for
GeorgeDuby who proclaims
makepleasantandenlightening
everything,
reading.
Moststained-glass
intheform
windows
havea signature
ofoneortwoscenesdepicofa certain
oftheProdigal
Son at Chartingtheactivities
guild,notso thewindow
tres.Thiswithotherarguments
builtup in thecourseofthebookbringstheauthor
tohismostconspicuous
wordedconclusion
thatthiswindow
yetagaincarefully
may
havebeenfinanced
ofthetown.On first
thismayseem
bytheprostitutes
thoughts
Yet theattitude
ofthechurchtowards
at thetimewasat
preposterous.
prostitution
leastambiguous,
as proved
inthesphere
ofliterature
andofjudicialmatbyinstances
tersbrought
thevalueattached
to people'sdressis
up bytheauthor.In thisrespect
mantle
oftheProdigal
important;
taking
awaysomebody's
(whathappensinthestory
thanusingprostitutes'
matSon)is farworsean actofbehaviour
moneyforchurch
ters.Theinteraction
ofseveralspheres
ofmedieval
in
becomesverypregnant
society
thispartofthebook.Andevenifone wouldnotbe inclinedto accepttheauthor's
ofthepatrons
ofthestained-glass
oftheProdigalSoninChartres
window
arguments
cathedral
to finddefinite
one gets
(butitwouldbe difficult
prooffortheopposite),
to knowa loton thefunctioning
ofa medieval
in general.
citysociety
Thestained-glass
windows
arenottreated
inthisbookas a mereart-historical
subfieldofmedieval
Thewinject.Theyarelookeduponinthefarbroader
cityculture.
dowsforma mirror,
eventhefocusforthewholemedieval
society
livingin a town
rounda cathedral.
Itishardtofindfaults
inthebookandtheargumentation
isextensiveand compelling.
This important
on highmedieval
studygivesnew insights
on medieval
on medievalcityculture.The book
windows,
literature,
stained-glass
makesstimulating
recommended.
readingandmustbe highly
Nijmegen

H. A. Tummers
155

12:22:28 PM

Editedby RichardC. Dales and Edward

De decern
mandatis.
RobertGrosseteste,
Press
forThe British
B. King.Published
Academy
byThe OxfordUniversity
Britannici
MediiAevi,X)
1987(= Auctores
De DccemMandatis(henceforth
DDM) has a prominent
placeamongthepastoral
forhis
andtheologian
thefamous
ofRobertGrosseteste,
reputed
philosopher
writings
whodiedas bishopofLincolnin 1253.In thisworkGrosseteste
andsanctity,
learning
dealsin an elaboratemannerwithMoses'sDecalogue,a textwhichundoubtedly
Thiscommentary,
ofMediaevalpastoraltheology.
a keystone
shouldbe considered
foruniversity
wasnotintended
intheearlythirties,
written
inallprobability
teaching
who
ofpriests
leveleducation
to thesecondary
in ordertocontribute
butcomposed
1 It appearsfromthemanuscript
tradition
and
withthecuraanimarum.
werecharged
thatitwas
andlibrary
authors
inworksofothermediaeval
thereferences
catalogues,
attenserious
received
thatthistreatise
notuntilthemiddleofthefourteenth
century
whichall exceptone
in twenty-four
tion.The texthasbeenpreserved
manuscripts,
later.Thusthereception
or somewhat
dateto themiddleofthefourteenth
century
biblicalwritings
thecourseofthatofmostofGrosseteste's
ofDDM follows
history
and
as has alreadybeenobserved
byBerylSmalley:"The workswehaveclassified
listedas 'Biblical'belongtoverydifferent
They
history.
types;yetall havea similar
at first
and studiedlater".2
are neglected
is thatin theMiddleAgesonly
Another
peculiaraspectof thiswork'shistory
a latethirteenth-century
inthiswork:Apartfrom
an interest
showed
authors
English
it
to BerylSmalley
who,according
quotedfrom
(ca. 1320-1384),
Wycliff
paraphrase,
viciorum
and Alexander
, werethe
Carpenter
(fl. 1939)in his Destruction
copiously,
to use it.3However,
first
authors
giventheboomofDDM Mss in thelateMiddle
authors
musthaveusedthistext,buttheinfluence
other
that
is
obvious
it
many
Ages,
forthemostpartis stillopentofurther
literature
onLatinorMiddleEnglish
pastoral
research.
edition
ofDDM byR. C. DalesandE. B. King
critical
ofthefirst
Theappearance
on
ofGrosseteste
on theinfluence
marksa newandimportant
stagein theresearch
in which
a conciseintroduction
in lateMediaevalEngland.After
pastoraltheology
of
a survey
followed
DDM is placedin a generalhistorical
context,
bya summary,
theLatintextis reproduced,
of theirrelationship,
theMss and a briefdiscussion
and
A bibliography
and an apparatus
criticus
fontium.
by an apparatus
accompanied
areappended.
verborum
etpotiorum
and rerum
indices
locorum
, auctorum
scripturarum
and
textedition,
ofa modern
meetstherequirements
thisarrangement
Although
fortheirshare,itis regrettable
commended
canbyhighly
andcompositor
theprinter
the
ofconsiderable
areguilty
tohavetorecordthattheeditors
Discussing
bungling.
statethatthe
theeditors
ofediting
theMss andtheprinciples
between
relationship
- one originalcopyis supposedto haveexistedin the
peculiartexttransmission
atdifferent
as theexemplar
andmayhaveserved
at
Franciscans
of
the
Oxford,
library
- wasan impediment
ofa stemma.Nevertheless
totheconstruction
times
theyclaim
as a cora textwhichwecanacceptwithconfidence
tohavebeenable"to construct
1 Cf. J. Goeringand F. Mantello(ed.), Introduction
to: RobertGrosseteste,
Dei, Toronto1984,p. 6.
Templm
2 Cf.B. Smalley,TheBiblical
Scholar
andBishop.
in:Robert
Grosseteste.
Scholar,
Essays
ofhisDeath.EditedbyD. A. Callus,
oftheSeventh
inCommemoration
Centenary
Oxford1955,70-97.
1 Op.cit.(n. 2) p. 83.
156

12:22:34 PM

rectrecord
ofwhatGrosseteste
wrote"bymeansofa semi-critical
method.
However,
onecannotavoidtheimpression
thatthismethod,
in thiscasedefensible
in
though
hasresulted
in a lackofaccuracy
withdisastrous
fortheLatin
itself,
consequences,
textpresented
is so faulty
thatthequestioncouldevenbe raisedwhythegeneral
editors
forthisrenowned
Britannici
MediiAevi,have
series,theAuctorcs
responsible
notintervened.
sucha scathing
theburdenofprooflieswiththe
Havingpronounced
judgement
reviewer.
Thatis whyI present
belowa selection
ofthemajormistakes
and errors
whicha first
readingofthetextlaysbare:
et ... scripta):cf.in ipsaandque (4,27-28)
4,26:quadamreadquedam(sc. reperta
inhocprimodecalogimandato
venera9,15ff.: Taliumimpietas
expresse
percutitur;
cionemautemetcukuram
soliDeo debitasaliispestat.
veloracionibus
Quicumque,
vel sacrificiis
vel quibuslibet
et nititur
obsequiis,ab alio quam Deo intendit,
The present
makesthissentence
The problem
optinere...
punctuation
unintelligible.
is thatthesubject
ofpestat
is theQuicumque
ofthefollowing
so thatwehave
sentence,
toread:Taliumimpietas
inhocprimodccalogimandato
Venera
expresse
percutitur.
cionemautemet cukuram
soliDeo debitasaliispestat
vel
oracionibus
quicumque
velsacrificiis
velquibuslibet
ab alioquamDeo intendit
etnititur
obsequiis
optinere...
is a common
orscribalerrorforsignifican
as alsoappearsfrom
15,14:signari
reading
thefollowing
significata
(15,15)
exteriori
materia
dashes
15,17:The sentence
Sculptio...de
oughtto be placedbetween
readresecantur
condiciones
16,9:resecatur
(thesubjectis cetere
(16,6))
20,9:indexreadiudex
21,9ff.:
Licetautemimitacio
reialterasita recuiusestimitacio,
tarnen,
quia imitacio
remcuiusestimitacio
nonhabetesse,necpotest
preter
esse;etipsarescuius
intelligi
- permodumquo frequentissime
est imitacioipsiimitacioni
causa est subsistendi
- congruefreattribuitur
cause quod convenit
causato,quod convenitimitacioni
reicuiusestimitacio...
attribuitur
The present
doesnotmake
quenter
punctuation
oftheverbofthemainclauseattribuitur
is therelative
clause
anysense,forthesubject
imitacioni
reialterasita recuius
; soonehastoread:Licetautemimitacio
quodconvenit
estimitacio,
tamenquia imitacio
remcuiusestimitacio,
nonhabetessenec
preter
esseetipsarescuiusestimitacio,
causaestsubsistendi,
potest
intelligi
ipsiimitacioni
attribuitur
causequodconvenit
permodumquo frequentissime
causato,quodconvenitimitacioni
attribuitur
reicuiusestimitacio...
congruefrequenter
21,24:quodreadquem
: etforte
intellexit
21,25ff.
quodmagisspccialiter
iniquitatem
patrum
quamse,dixit
visitaturum
in filiosusque in tertiam
et quartamgeneracionem.
Esse ydolatrie
innuitin verboquodadiungit...The punctuation
has to be altered:Et
impietatem
forte
intellexit
quodmagisspecialiter
iniquitatem
patrum
quamse dixitvisitaturum
infilios
etquartam
esseydolatrie
innuit
usqueintertiam
generacionem,
impietatem,
in verboquodadiungit
21,32ff
.: Postquamsalubriter
a maloperpenecomminacionem,
deterruit
dulciter
allicitad bonumperprmii
etetiamperipsiuspromittentis
insinuatam
promissionem
transmittit
ad determinatas
etpaucas
bonitatem,
que penasmalemeritorum
patrum
filiorum
Probonisveropatrum
miseretur
etbenefacitfiliis...
meritis,
generaciones.
read
: Postquamsalubriter
deterruit
a maloperpenecomminacionem,
dulciter
allicit
ad bonumper prmiipromissionem
et etiamper ipsiuspromittentis
insinuatam
ad determinatas
transmittit
etpaucas
bonitatem,
que penasmalemeritorum
patrum
filiorum
miseretur
etbenefacitfiliis...
generaciones,
probonisveropatrummeritis
22,6and 22,9:signarereadsignificare
readirasceretur
22,14:irascaretur
157

12:22:34 PM

22,15:meritaDominumque ergareadmeritaDominiqueerga
: Perfectam
hiefacitDominus,cumostendit
22,29ff.
itaquepersuasionem
preceptum
suumet fieridebitum
et transgredi
illicitum.
Insuperpossescireet velieesseapud
et remunerandos
se ad puniendos
observatores,
ipsiusquepunicionis
transgressores
hiefacit
read:Perfectam
et remuneracionis
latitudinem
explicat
itaquepersuasionem
suumet fieridebitumet transgredi
illicitum,
Dominus,cumostendit
preceptum
et
insuperposse scilicetet velie esse apud se ad puniendostransgressores
remunerandos
observatoresipsiusque punicioniset remuneracionis
explicat
latitudinem
cum,tamenverenihilsint,hecautemread:.Quia
23,11:quia et hecessedicuntur,
cumtamenverenihilsint,hecautem...
et hecessedicuntur,
readcredulitati
24,20:credulitate
24,24:FiliusreadFilium
MS L) ille
25,31: illeestread(following
26,11:sactireadsancti
readadhibetur
27,20:adhibeatur
27,23:nilfacit,nisireadnilfacitnisi
28.7 : iudicioestgladioreadiudicioet gladio
28,17:sermonem.
insuper...
Insuper...readsermonem,
readdeputataut
30,16:deputaut
readdoctrina
30,32:doctrini
33,15:quietamreadquietem
34,11: et,si readetsi
read<ad> adepeionem
34,12:adepeionem
Sed readnitentes,
sed ... frequenter;
35,14:nitentes.
in italics,foritis usedmaterially
andis thesubject
35,21:quievit
oughttobe printed
ofprefiguravit
35,26:ipsius.readipsius?
39,2 : divinisreaddominis
42,19:natosreadnatus
readpericlitan
tem
43,14:and 43,16:periclinantem
readtegmine
44,23:regimine
45,20:contem
pritreadcontempserit
readauferte
46.8 : Auferete
48,5 : penales.Ac readpenalesac
readfunibus
50,5 : finibus
50,11:gchenne.
Qui readgehenne,
qui
readpotestas.
50,12:potestas?
50,14:etsireadet si
readnutricis
50,29:nutritis
50,31:docuit;velquod readdocuit.Vel quod
50,34:etsireadet si
readimpetentes?
51,1 : impetentes.
51,5 : que readquam
54,16:eternam.
Quis readeternam,
quis
inlibroDe civitate
Dei dicit:,,De quodam... readUnde
56,22ff.:UndeAugustinus
in libroDe civitate
Dei dicitde quodamqui gloriabatur
de ocio:eum
Augustinus
minusfortasse
dii falsidecepissent...
56,24:ociumreadociosum
or Quia
57,5 : QuantoreadQuandoquidem
has to be replacedby the readingof the MSS
57,7 : The readingiuvamentum
158

12:22:34 PM

inordertomakesense
bonarum
DCRViLnLcR,iuvancium"
artium)
(sc.omnium
..")
57,7 : bona.Et readbonaet (themainclausestartsat ,,igitur
circumscriptis.
andfuit
57,11:eandem.Unde... suente.Igiturreadeandem,unde... suente,igitur;
readsuit
Resttreadsubditur),
restt
60,15:subditur).
readperimens
63,30:periniens
64,13:DeumreadDei or Domini
readvindictam
64,15:vindicatam
..morte,readsegregando,
: segregando,
tamgraviter
64,19ff.
delinquunt
quantum.
tamgraviter
delinquunt,
quantum... morte?
readpeccasset
65,18:preccasset
readconverso
66,28-9:econtrario
readvioltsacramentum,
67,24:violt,sacramentum
67,31:obvitreadobviant
68,31:quamsitgraviusculpareadquamsitgravisculpa
mustbe replaced
oftheMSS CRVi
74,24-27:The reading
impediende
bythereading
in orderto createa well-formed
Latinsentence
whichmakessense
impediendi
readparvum,
77,13:parvumderelinquit
derelinquunt
readabsolvit
80,24:obsolvit
reada nigropreciosiorque
82,31:a nigro.Preciosiorque
83,18:maioribus
que dicipossentreadmaioribus
quamdicipossent
etfallere
readfallinolunt
etfallere
nolunt
uolunt(cf.August.Conf.
84,7 : fallinolunt
10, 23)
theseremarks,
we havereasontobe grateful
totheeditors
Finally,
notwithstanding
forproviding
us withtheeditio
ofa longwantedimportant
source,whichwill
princeps
inviteand facilitate
newresearch
on a highly
partofMediaevalculture.
interesting
Butit is hopedthatifin thefuture
a secondeditionofthistextwillappear,more
justicewillbe doneto theLatinofthelearnedbishopofLincoln.
Nijmegen

C. H. Kneepkens

Libri1-4, ediditPaulusHossfeld
Albertus
MagniOpera
(Alberti
Magnus,Physica.
1987
Omnia,tomusIV parsI), Aschendorff
Westfalorum)
(Monasteri
thisdidnot
wastheology,
Albert
theGreat'sprincipal
academicinterest
Although
- from1251till1271- "to make
a twenty-year
himfrom
undertaking
project
prevent
Aristotelian
totheLatins"theentire
I, tract.1 cap.
philosophy
(Cf.Phys.
intelligible
i. p- ')
withAlbert's
theAristotelian
started
Thiswholeenterprise
ofparaphrasing
corpus
in 1251/1252,
afterseveralyearsof beggingby
, a workthatwas written
Physica
in sucha waythattheywouldhave
a bookon physics
brethern
Albert's
"to compose
thebooksofAristoofnature
andthereby
a complete
science
understand
competently
tle" (Cf. Phys.I, tract.1 cap. 1, p. 1).
as a regent
masterat theDominican
hisparaphrase
ofthePhysics
Albertstarted
librinaturales
werenotyet
at Cologne,at a timewhenAristotle's
studium
generale
oneofthefirst
Continenattheuniversity
ofParis.ThismakesAlbert
adopted
officially
He playeda dominant
role
ofAristotle.
the"newlearning"
talthinkers
toassimilate
159

12:22:34 PM

inordertomakesense
bonarum
DCRViLnLcR,iuvancium"
artium)
(sc.omnium
..")
57,7 : bona.Et readbonaet (themainclausestartsat ,,igitur
circumscriptis.
andfuit
57,11:eandem.Unde... suente.Igiturreadeandem,unde... suente,igitur;
readsuit
Resttreadsubditur),
restt
60,15:subditur).
readperimens
63,30:periniens
64,13:DeumreadDei or Domini
readvindictam
64,15:vindicatam
..morte,readsegregando,
: segregando,
tamgraviter
64,19ff.
delinquunt
quantum.
tamgraviter
delinquunt,
quantum... morte?
readpeccasset
65,18:preccasset
readconverso
66,28-9:econtrario
readvioltsacramentum,
67,24:violt,sacramentum
67,31:obvitreadobviant
68,31:quamsitgraviusculpareadquamsitgravisculpa
mustbe replaced
oftheMSS CRVi
74,24-27:The reading
impediende
bythereading
in orderto createa well-formed
Latinsentence
whichmakessense
impediendi
readparvum,
77,13:parvumderelinquit
derelinquunt
readabsolvit
80,24:obsolvit
reada nigropreciosiorque
82,31:a nigro.Preciosiorque
83,18:maioribus
que dicipossentreadmaioribus
quamdicipossent
etfallere
readfallinolunt
etfallere
nolunt
uolunt(cf.August.Conf.
84,7 : fallinolunt
10, 23)
theseremarks,
we havereasontobe grateful
totheeditors
Finally,
notwithstanding
forproviding
us withtheeditio
ofa longwantedimportant
source,whichwill
princeps
inviteand facilitate
newresearch
on a highly
partofMediaevalculture.
interesting
Butit is hopedthatifin thefuture
a secondeditionofthistextwillappear,more
justicewillbe doneto theLatinofthelearnedbishopofLincoln.
Nijmegen

C. H. Kneepkens

Libri1-4, ediditPaulusHossfeld
Albertus
MagniOpera
(Alberti
Magnus,Physica.
1987
Omnia,tomusIV parsI), Aschendorff
Westfalorum)
(Monasteri
thisdidnot
wastheology,
Albert
theGreat'sprincipal
academicinterest
Although
- from1251till1271- "to make
a twenty-year
himfrom
undertaking
project
prevent
Aristotelian
totheLatins"theentire
I, tract.1 cap.
philosophy
(Cf.Phys.
intelligible
i. p- ')
withAlbert's
theAristotelian
started
Thiswholeenterprise
ofparaphrasing
corpus
in 1251/1252,
afterseveralyearsof beggingby
, a workthatwas written
Physica
in sucha waythattheywouldhave
a bookon physics
brethern
Albert's
"to compose
thebooksofAristoofnature
andthereby
a complete
science
understand
competently
tle" (Cf. Phys.I, tract.1 cap. 1, p. 1).
as a regent
masterat theDominican
hisparaphrase
ofthePhysics
Albertstarted
librinaturales
werenotyet
at Cologne,at a timewhenAristotle's
studium
generale
oneofthefirst
Continenattheuniversity
ofParis.ThismakesAlbert
adopted
officially
He playeda dominant
role
ofAristotle.
the"newlearning"
talthinkers
toassimilate
159

12:22:44 PM

in thereception
ofboththePhilosopher
and hisArabiccommentators.
A fewyears
laterAristotle's
weretobecomethefocalpointofallbasicproblems
ofnatural
Physics
science.However,
unlikeAlbert,
mostmagisti
did notbother
todealwiththeother
librinaturales
etcorruptione
, etc.
, likeDe celo
, De generatone
Itisdifficult
toevaluatethedirect
influence
ofAlbert's
on natural
writings
philosowerenotdelivered
as lectures
intheclassroom,
butweremeant
phy.His paraphrases
to be readbystudents
in ordertocometo gripswithAristotle.
It is beyonddisputethathisworkswerewidelyreadbyhisnearandnotso near
Weonlyhavetothink
of"Albertism"
attheuniversities
ofParisand
contemporaries.
influence
on Italianauthors,
on thosebelonging
to
Cologne,andofAlbert's
notably
thePaduanintcllcctual
milieuofthelatefifteenth
and earlysixteenth
centuries.
A moredetailedstudyofAlbert'snaturalphilosophy
andoftheplaceitholdsin
medievalthought,
however,may now have gaineda majorimpetuswiththe
ofthefirst
critical
edition
ofAlbert's
appearance
partofthefirst
Physica
(BooksI-IV).
The editionis byP. Hossfeld,
whohasalreadydonecreditable
workwithhiseditionsofotherphysical
worksofAlbertus
etcorruptione).
(e.g. De celo,De generatione
Hossfeld's
editionis a greatimprovement
on theunreliable,
butmuchusededition
ofBorgnet.
The editionofthePhysica
is preceded
thatdiscusses,
by an introduction
among
otherthings,
thedateofcomposition,
thetranslations
latinus
ofAristoteles
thatAlbert
hasused,and,mostimportant
ofall,thevalueofthemanuscripts
andoldereditions
ofAlbert'sPhysica
thatare stillextant.
- BookVIII, treatises
A fragment
of Albert'sPhysica
3 and 4- survives
in his
a
It
decisive
role
in
the
selection
of
the
On thebasis
autograph. played
manuscripts.
ofa smallpartofthisautographic
fragment
(BookVIII, tract.4 cap. 7), theeditor
hasselected
sixoutofmorethanforty
to reconstruct
a textofAlbert's
manuscripts
So fromtheoutsetitis clearthathe aimsat editing
as
a textofthePhysica
Physica.
it might
havebeenwritten
byAlberthimself.
Itmaybe observed
inthiscase,thesuccessoftheeditor's
that,especially
enterprise
ofreconstructing
a textofAlbert'sautograph,
or a textthatcomesverycloseto it,
ofthemanuscripts:
do thesixselected
that
depends
uponthehomogenity
manuscripts
a "good" textifcollated
with(partof)theautographic
alsopresent
present
fragment,
a "good" textsin theremaining
thatis nothandeddownin
95% of thePhysica
Of coursewe are notable to answerthisquestion.We can,however,
autograph?
hascertainly
establish
thatHossfeld
suppliedus witha textthatmakessense.
In ordertocheckthereliability
ofhisbasicmanuscripts,
theeditorhascollated
his
edition
withfiveothermanuscripts
an incomplete
(twoofwhichonlycontain
copyof
Albert'stext).The results
of thiscollation
theoriginal
gaveno reasonto amplify
number
ofsixmanuscripts.
The editor'sdecision
toeditAlbert's
hislackof
"original"textprobably
explains
interest
intextual
tradition.
In anycase,theeditordoesnotdiscussthepossibility
of
inthemorethanforty
inwhichthistext
anylinesofaffiliation
discerning
manuscripts
has comedownto us.
Understandable
as thismaybe, theeditorcould,however,
have provided
the
readerwithsomedeeperinsight
intotheaffiliation
ofhissixbasicmanuscripts,
and
ofhisreasonsforselecting
his
justthosefivemanuscripts
againstwhichhe checked
edition.
ofmanuscripts
As thingsstandnow,hisselection
mightgiveriseto confusion.
H is puzzling.
theeditor's
choiceofthebasicmanuscript
tothe
Especially
According
becauseitis similar
totheautograph
ofthePhysica
editoritis a goodmanuscript,
(p.
xiv:"... quia codiciautographo
similis
thismanuscript
wasnot
est..."). However,
160

12:22:44 PM

De celo.Did a comparison
usedfortheedition
ofAlbert's
withthecomplete
autograph
H was notcloseenought
to itsoriginal?
ofDe celoshowthatthemanuscript
tobe saidaboutAlbert's
method
ofdealingwithAristotle's
A wordremains
Physics
he usedofthistext.
oftheversions
and consequently
on Aristotle
are
As has alreadybeenmentioned
above,Albert'scommentaries
Albert
weavespassagestakenfrom
Aristotle's
textintoa unitywithhis
paraphrases:
insentences
andnotinfrequently
orpartsofsentences
taken
ownremarks,
alsobrings
Thismethodofwriting
authenticum
caused
fromAverros'
permodum
commentary.
thatthestudyofphilosophy
on thepartofRogerBacon.He complained
resentment
method
hisfailures
ofwriting,
hadbeencorrupted
because,duetoAlbert'sspecific
"Andso thewholemobat Parisrefers
tohim(i.e. Albert
tookontheairofauthority:
or Avicenna,
or Averros,
and otherauctores
."
theGreat)as to Aristotle,
task
method
facilitated
the
of
determineditor's
Be thisatitmay,Albert's
probably
of Aristode's
wereused. According
to theeditor,
Physics
ingwhichtranslation(s)
Latintranslatio
vetus
and theArabicLatin
Albertnotonlymadeuse of theGreektoMichaelScot,butalsooftheso-called
translatio
vaticana
translation
attributed
(from
thefewvariantreadings
theeditoradducesas
theGreek).In myopinion,however,
arenotconvincing.
One shouldbearin mindthatthe
proofforthislastcontention
as stemming
fromthetranslatio
vaticana
whichtheeditoridentified
variants
, could
in Albert'scopyofthetranslatio
vetus
havebeeninterlinear
variants
actually
(which
is givensupport
after
thetranslatio
Thissuggestion
bytheeditor's
originated
vaticana).
thatAlbert
assimilates
interlinear
inhisowntextthat
ownremark
variants
frequently
textthatAlbertwasusing.
are due to thecopyofAristotle's
whichpresents
a useful
is accompanied
The textofAlbert's
byan apparatus
Physica
on the basis of five
of the translatio
vetus
, itselfestablished
"working-edition"
manuscipts.
citedbyAlbert,an indexof
The volumeis roundedoffbyan indexofauthors
citedby theeditor,an indexrerum
authors
etvocabulorum,
an
ancientand medieval
authors
referred
to in thefootnotes,
indexofmodern
and a listofsignsused.
Nijmegen

J. M. M. H. Thijssen

161

12:22:44 PM

Vivarium
XXVII, 2 (1989)
BooksReceived

andRenaissance
Vol. 11(1986),186p. Mediaeval
Conference,
Proceedings
ofthePatristic,
TwoGrids
Saint
Contents
: L. Verheijen,
O.S. A., TheConfessions
of
of
Augustine:
s Advance
: TheFunctions
andofReading
onHeorot
; G. I. Berlin,Grendel'
Composition
Another
M. S. Burrows,
Lookat theSources
of De consolatione
ofAnticipation;
' Echo
'
Doctrine
: Boethius
'; J. C. Cavadini,
ofAugustine's
of Providentia
philosophiae
Male
andtheAugustinin
Claudius
Tradition
; S. L. Clark,SaidandUnsaid,
ofTurin
Eneide
andFemale:
andLeft
vonVeldeke's
OutinHeinrich
; S. Davis,The
Left,
Leaving,
s Dialogues
inAbelard'
; C. T. Eby,Nicholas
ofCusaandMedieval
ofVirtues
Unity
- AntiUntuned
Reassessment
; AnHistorical
; Gw. Echard,TheString
Cosmology
M. S. Grant,TheQuestion
Bud'sDe transitu;
ofGuillaume
of
Aspects
Reformation
' Conte
intheFirstContinuation
de Troyes
duGraal;Ch. Gross,
ofChrtien
Integrity
theEternity
William
: A Curious
Grammatical
oftheWorld;
ofConches
Argument
Against
: Hlinand
onSuperfluous
Monastic
Construction
B. M. Kienzle,TheHouseoftheLord
;
inMedieval
S. Samples,TheCourtly
P. Ranft,TheRuleofSt.Augustine
Monasticism;
T.
inBeowulf;
Heorot
andDragon-Slaying
GodinHartmann's
Erec;R. L. Schlichler,
A Computer
IndexofMedieval
Castilian
Fueros
M. Vann& N. Meiechen,
Robert
De decern
cd. by R. C. Dales and E. B. King,Oxford
Grosseteste,
mandatis,
Britannici
MediiAevi,X), XIX + 107
Press,Oxford1987(Auctores
University
p. ISBN 0 19 7260578
at the
Phrisius
oftheInternational
Conference
(1444-1485
Rodolphus
Agricola
). Proceedings
28-30October
and A. J. Vander1985,ed. F. Akkcrman
University
ofGroningen,
: Main
jagt,Brill,Leiden1988,XVI + 358 p. ISBN 90 04 085998 - Contents
F. Akkerman,
andGroningen.
A humanist
onhisorigin;
lectures:
J. IJsewijn,
Agricola
s influas a Greek
scholar
Distinctive
; L. Jardine,
discipline:
Rudolph
Agricola'
Agricola
inthehumanities
unddieGeschichte
ence
onmethodical
; E. Kessler,
; A.
thinking
Agricola
andbiography:
Notizie
inItaliadi Rodolfo
Sottili,
; - History
Agricola
peril soggiorno
C. H. Edskcs,
secretarius
derStadtGroningen;
F. J. Bakker,Roeloff
Huusman,
andtheorgan
; R. E. O. Ekkart,Theportraits
of
Rudolph
Agricola
oftheMartinikerk
andhisbooks
, withsome
Rudolph
J. M. M. Hermans,Rudolph
Agricola
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Agricola
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andLiterature
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Agricola
Jacobus
Arbeit
am TextdesTacitus
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Conradus
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early
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Agricola
Erasmi
Marsile
Cornelius
Aurelius
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praeceptor
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del'Axiochos
etleurs
traductions
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Agricola
Agricola
Rudolph
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Pomponazzi
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F. Muller,Le De inventione
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P. vander
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circaorationes
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J. B. Trapp,TheLegacy
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Changes
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UlrichG. Leinsle,Methodologie
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163

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Genova1987( = Pubblicazioni,
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: Alessandro
Contents
Neckm
a curadi GiovanniGarbugino
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Favolisti
LatiniMedieval
III . Universit
di Genova.Istituto
di FilologiaClassicae
Genova1988( = Pubblicazioni,
Medievale,
118),205p. IT ISSN 0025-0852
: Ademaro
Contents
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Favole
e di P. Gatti.
, a curadi F. Bertini
to
JorgeJ. E. Graciaand DouglasDavis, TheMetaphysics
ofGoodandEvilAccording
Surez
, Pilosophia
Verlag,Mnchen1988,304 p. ISBN 3 88405075 3
I 2000Annidell'Arspoetica.
Universit
di Genova.Istituto
di FilologiaClassicae
Medievale,Genova1988(= Pubblicazioni,
119),80 p. IT ISSN 0025-0852
: P. Grimal,
Contents
L'eclectisme
D. Lanza,
dansl'Art
d'Horace,
philosophique
poetique
" alle
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Da Aristotele
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L.
delArspoetica;
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Le istituzioni
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Anceschi,
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22 (1987), Stuttgart
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1989,350 p. ISSN 0076-9762.Contents
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NeueDimensionen
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derTopikK.-D. Fischer,*Universorum
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Frhmittelalterliche
Forschung;
ferramentorum
Listen
Instrumente
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Vorbild
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Number
R. G. Babcock,lhe 'proverbium
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antiquum
'
S. Dionysii'
Lapidge,TheLost PassioMetrica
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byHilduinofSaint-Denis
vonCorvey
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Stiene,
Agius
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C. Ratkowitsch,
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Baudri
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Speech
'
'
F.
Les
de MarcusValerius
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';
Dolbeau,
Emigration
Bucoliques
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derTragdien
Senecas
beiBernardus
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Silvestris
, Petrus
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undMarbod
Pictor
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the'Carmen
Cam; J. J. Gwara,TheHeroicVision
of
'
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D. Y. Yates& R. H. Rouse,TheExtracts
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fromYsengrimus
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Besprechungen
-Selbstanzeige
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Veritas
siveVaritas.
unddasBuchVonden
Niewhner,
Lessings
Toleranzparabel
dreiBetrgern
, VerlagLambertSchneider,Heidelberg1988, 428 p. ISBN
3 7953 0761 9
vonAutrecourt
Nicolaus
Neu herausgegeben
vonRuediImbachundDominik
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vonDominikPerler,FelixMeinerVerlag,Hamburg1988,
LXXIII & 105p. ISBN 3 7873 07524
Onthemedieval
from
theItalian
, eds.U. EcoandC. Marmo.Translated
Theory
ofSigns
by Shona Kelly, John Benjamins PublishingCompany, Amster1989,IX & 224 p. ISBN 90 272 3293 8 (hardbd.)2108 1
dam/Philadelphia
(paperbd.)
Revista
XXIX (1988),434p. ISSN 0211-612X.Contents
: Serafn
Martn,
Agustiniana,
Sistematizacin
dela Iglesia
enSanIsidoro
deSevilla
elmtodo
, segn
teolgica
;
alegrico
ManuelRiobGonzlez,Fenomenologica
dela codificacin
enSanAgustn
;
lingstica
SantosSagubal,El preanuncio
sobrela resurreccin
de los muertos.
Anastasiologa
veterotestamentaria
deldualismo
; GonzaloTejerinaAria,La superacin
y judaica
laicos.Balance
dela ltima
; JessDomnguez
Sanabria,
clrigosespaola
eclesiologa
- El reto
Mansedumbre
cristiana
desermanso
decorazn
: JosLuis Caas
evanglico
Anlisis
delaobrateatral
deDieu",deGabriel
"UnHomme
Marcel
Fernndez,
; Rafael
sobre
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encastellano
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bibliogrfica

164

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