Analysis of Nile water pollution control strategies: a case study using the decision support

system for water quality management

In Egypt, the pollutant effluents to the water system stem from several sources.

1. The disposal of Untreated or semi treated domesticf into The Nile.

2. The low level of sanitation in rural areas makes the river the perfect place for disposal of sewage.
3. Industrial establishments which do not comply with the laws dump their untreated wastewater into
surface water bodies like the Nile.
4. Excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides, despite reducing the level of use of agro- chemicals
during the past decade is another source.

Extensive drainage reuse within the Nile delta and direct drainage spillage into the Nile River along the
valley increase the effect of agricultural pollution as well. More land will be reclaimed and more industrial
areas will be constructed which will add more pollutants to the system if the effluents from these areas are
not treated in future.

This case study deals with the Decision Support System for Water Quality Management (DSSWQM),
developed by Delft Hydraulics, which was applied to the Nile River to provide preliminary answers on the
cost-effectiveness of the alternative investments that can be made to improve the Nile water quality inside
Egypt. Alternative strategy measures include treatment at the source, raising the capacity/efficiency of
existing treatment plants, and treatment at the recipient. These measures have been combined in
different ways to form different strategic options. The preliminary assessment results on costs and water
quality indicate that treatment "at-source" will not be cost- effective if made only for some of the point
sources along the Nile. On the other hand, if made for all point sources, treatment "at-source" will be very
costly. Therefore, planners should investigate the optimal combination of treatment "at- recipient" and
treatment "at-source" measures. On that basis, the standards for the pollutants' concentrations in the Nile
River may be reviewed. The new standards should be related to the type of water use and the type of
treatment "at- recipient".

Air Pollution : A case study

During the late 1980s it became clear that California's growing air pollution problem could not
improve without some very substantial changes. Motor vehicles were targeted as being a major
contributor to this problem due to the fact that conventional gasoline-powered and diesel
vehicles constitute over 60% of the smog-forming pollutants in California. This fact spurred a
move to evaluate various solutions to the mobile source air pollution problem. One of the most
progressive solutions put on the table was further development of the zero emission vehicle
(ZEV). By 1990, the California Air Resource Board (CARB) had determined that even
significant improvements in gasoline and diesel powered combustion engines could not possibly
make them clean enough to meet the stringent reductions in air pollution mandated by the state
of California. Either driving would have to be restricted or a switch to nonpolluting vehicles
would have to be made. CARB decided that a switch to vehicles without tailpipe or evaporative
emissions made the most sense and adopted the Low Emission Vehicle and Clean Fuels
regulations.
The Low Emission Vehicle and Clean Fuels regulations included requirements which outlined
ZEV production for the seven largest auto producers through the year 2003. According to the
original plan, ZEVs would constitute 2% of total production in 1998, 5% in 2001, and 10% in
2003 and beyond. However, the interests of car manufacturers and oil industries were
acknowledged in a court decision which modified the requirements. The 1998 and 2001
requirements were changed to a fixed 3,750 vehicles in each year. The original ten percent
requirement for 2003 was not changed.
In order to help auto manufacturers meet these regulations, economic incentives were created on
the federal, state, and local level. These incentives were adopted in order to help off-set the cost
of such an expensive change in technology. The lead-acid, nickel-metal hydride, and lithium ion
batteries presently being used in ZEVs are still in the development stage and are being produced
in very limited quantities causing their price to remain extremely high. For this reason, the
government introduced incentives which attempt to bring the price of the ZEV to a level
comparable with conventional vehicles in order to ensure that auto manufacturers are able to sell
their prototype vehicles and meet the requirements set for 1998, 2001, and 2003.
The first incentives, adopted in 1992, were at the Federal level. The government offered a 10%
tax credit (up to $4,000) on the cost of a ZEV. The federal incentives also included a $100,000
business tax deduction for electric recharging facilities.Finally, the federal government
eliminated the luxury tax on alternative fuel vehicles.
In analyzing the success of a few applied incentives it is important to first see that the incentives
fail to make the price of a zero emission vehicle comparable to conventional vehicles. Because
the battery technology is so new the price has remained very high since they cost between
$30,000 and $50,000 which keeps price of these electric vehicles between $50, 000 and $60,000.
On average ZEVs still cost about $450 per month including the incentives. Some manufactures
such as Honda and General Motors are leasing electric vehicles at more reasonable monthly rates
making the electric vehicle a more realistic choice but this is due to more efficient production.
Overall ZEVs are so expensive that even with incentives the vehicles remain in same price range
as a luxury automobiles.
Because the available incentives do not serve to bring the price of a ZEV down to a level
comparable with the average gas-powered vehicle, they do not serve to significantly increase the
quantity of ZEVs demanded. This means that the incentives are not realized by the consumer.
The environmentally concerned upper middle class consumer who leases a ZEV would probably
have done so even if the incentives did not exist. It is very unlikely that a rational consumer who
is not particularly environmentally concerned would lease an electric car for $450 per month,
especially when one considers that the average ZEV only gets around 100 miles per charge.
These cars are not yet practical in terms of price or utility. At this point, consumers must have a
high willingness to pay for environmental improvement in order to even consider leasing a ZEV.
It is also important to note that the supply of ZEVs is presently incapable of accommodating
further increases in demand. If the incentives were any stronger, runaway demand might result.
Presently, very few ZEVs are being efficiently mass produced and capacity constraints exist
which limit the desired effect of incentives. Production numbers will remain low as manufactures
continue to improve their technology. So far these manufacturers are only attempting to meet the
requirements adopted by the CARB. As production of ZEVs matures and the price of the
technology falls, the auto industry will be able to supply more vehicles at a lower price. Until
then, enough environmentally conscious individuals with relatively high incomes have to be
willing to purchase ZEVs at the available high price. So far, manufacturers have been able to sell
all of the ZEVs that they have produced despite this prototype price. So, despite the fact that the
incentives did not bring price down enough to create a rational decision between a ZEV and a
conventional vehicle, they still improved the price of ZEVs slightly and have served to aid
manufacturers in covering some of the expenses of small-scale ZEV production .
The incentives which have been provided for the three thousand ZEVs on California's roadways
today have helped the auto industry with its transition to electric battery technology. When a car
is leased, the $9,000 in available incentives goes straight to the auto manufacturer. This has made
the prospect of actually selling these electric vehicles more realistic but has also served simply to
cushion the manufacturer. In addition to federal funds received from the Department of Energy,
the incentives are essentially a means of reducing the financial burden resulting from a
significant change in technology. Even with the softening of the original Californian ZEV
requirements, it is still a very difficult change for these producers to make. With production still
at prototype levels and battery technology just now becoming realistic, the available incentives
help carry the burden of the expensive change to the production of electric vehicles by supplying
the manufacturer with $9,000 from the government for each ZEV that they sell.
It is clear that once this difficult transition is over, the mass production of ZEVs will make these
vehicles available to the middle class consumer without incentives and California will finally
have a chance to achieve a more sustainable level of air pollution. Presently only five percent of
Californians live in areas which meet the state's standards for clean air and moving to ZEVs will
allow for the improvement of this figure. Battery powered zero emission vehicles are
significantly cleaner than any other vehicle. The average vehicle produces 580 pounds of smog-
forming gasses (ROG +NOx) while electric vehicles produce less than 5 pounds of smog-
forming gasses (this includes the power plant emissions which result from recharging ZEVs).
With the total emissions of a ZEV being less than one hundredth of the average vehicle,
achieving the ten percent ZEV regulation in 2003 and beyond will allow for sustainable healthier
air in California. Government intervention is necessary to make this change feasible and federal,
state, and local incentives have been a successful method of supporting auto manufacturers
compliance with California's transition to the ZEV. Despite the fact that these incentives have
not boosted sales or lowered price significantly they do serve to inject public funds into an
industry which would have had a very hard time initiating such a transformation without
financial assistance.
Green House Gas Emission Reduction And Biomass: A case study

In 1986, Stockholm Energi realized that it's plant in Hasselby needed renovating in
order to acquire a continued license to emit pollutants before its permit expired in
1993. This new permit would require a decrease in pollutants emitted by the facility,
but the current system in Hasselby was a coal and oil burning plant which would not
be able to meet the new required standards for 1993. Aware of technological
innovations that occur over time that can make some energy systems cost effective
in the future which may not be cost effective now, the Stockholm Energi board
began looking for a solution six years before the deadline for the permit application
was due.

The initial choice by the board was to renovate or re-invest in another coal burning
facility, which was voted on and accepted in 1987. Due to the good condition of the
present system, it was said that it could be renovated fairly inexpensively with flue
gas cleaners or they could either build a new, lower emitting system that was more
expensive. Although both solutions would have reduced the emission of pollutants,
they both had fairly large fixed and variable costs.

By 1989, technological innovations made possible a cost effective natural gas

system that cost about 90% less than the coal investment project and was a cleaner
source of energy. The obstacle presented to Stockholm energi was that it would
take approximately five years for the system to be installed and operational and the
permit application needed to be submitted by 1992. The reason for the delay in
establishing a natural gas system was because of the time dimension involved with
laying piping to get the natural gas to Hasselby. Due to the delays and the rapidly
approaching deadline for a new system, the board began looking for a temporary
solution to meet the energy demands for the year beginning 1993.

The first short term solution the board considered was a heat pump system, despite
some significant problems with this system. The first was that the system required
electricity to run it. This was a problem mainly due to the phase out of nuclear
energy. The option of powering the system with fuel oil was politically undesirable
due to carbon emissions taxes and other new pollutant regulations. The heat pump
system was cost effective because the Hasselby plant had access to a heat pump,
thus the refusal to implement this system was one of political and social pressures
rather than of economic principles.

The deadline was near for the permit application when in 1991 technology gave rise
to a fourth alternative, a biomass system. This system was found to be very cost
effective and environmentally sound- appealing to both economists and politicians
alike. Although this solution was a bit more expensive than the natural gas solution,
it was by far the cheapest and most politically acceptable solution for the short run.
The planners realized that, not only did this system reduce the emission of GHG's
from a coal fired plant, but its source of energy was waste that is transformed into
combustible pellets. This was even more appealing when the waste problem of the
Stockholm area was considered.

As it turned out, the waste site in northern Stockholm at Uppsala was near capacity
and it was estimated that it would reach capacity within seven to ten years. This
made biomass all the more viable, not only for its low investment costs but also
because it could help reduce the burden on the Uppsala disposal site. This lead to
the decision to adopt a short term biomass solution in June of 1991.

This solution to the energy problem became even more appealing in 1992 when
technology made the biomass system even cheaper than natural gas. Since a plan
had already been initiated to use a natural gas system, the planners designed a
combined system which used both natural gas and biomass for the long run energy
demand of the Hasselby system. This was both environmentally and economically
acceptable due to the reduced emissions of GHG's associated with fossil fuels and
the low investment costs associated with the planned system.

The situation in Sweden is parallel to the situation often faced by energy planners in
the United States. Here, we see a mix of economic viability and political
partisanship in the determination of system adoptions. Yet, in the United States the
emphasis seems to be more on economics than social concerns for environmentally
sustainable approaches. Also, the fact that the Swedish planners began preparation
very early causes one to think that technological advances are a more recognized
by countries other than the United States. The Swedish case presents us with a
solution to a planning dilemma that is both economically viable and environmentally
sustainable, an aspect that appears to be lacking in the United States' case.