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Article 96

Uy vs. CA
Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. His wife, Gilda, filed a petition to be allowed as sole
administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to
discharge his functions. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda.
Teodoro, son of the spouses, filed a motion for consideration contending that the petition made by Gilda was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it should follow the ruled governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on
the merits.
During pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son-in-law for a lower price.
Issue: whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article
124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelve million pesos, with
the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of
eight million pesos.
Held:
In the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the
Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal
property due to illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the appointment of a judicial guardian of the
person or estate or both of such incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, petitioner
earlier had filed such a petition for judicial guardianship.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court
did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did
not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be
granted.

Article 101
De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
Facts:
Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only
abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and praying for (1) separation of property,
(2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
Severino, on the other hand, denied having abandoning his wife and children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the
filing of the action, he started to live separately from his wife. When he transferred his living quarters to his office in
Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her
a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily
because at home he could not concentrate on his work as she always quarreled with him, while in Mandalagan he could pass
the nights in peace. Since 1953 he stayed in Manila for some duration of time to manage their expanding business and look
for market outlets for their texboard products. Even the plaintiff admitted in both her original and amended complaints that
"sometime in 1953, because of the expanding business of the herein parties, the defendant established an office in the City of
Manila, wherein some of the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured or produced in the business enterprises of the
parties were sold or disposed of". From the time he started living separately in Mandalagan up to the filing of the complaint,
the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his laundry. This latter declaration was not rebutted by the plaintiff.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for
a single month, to give them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission in her original and amended
complaints as well as in open court that during the entire period of their estrangement, he was giving her around P500 a
month for support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office of a total ranging from
P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He financed the education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the time of
the trial and were not living with the plaintiff. While in Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the
children. His wife was always in bad need of money because she played mahjong, an accusation which she did not traverse,
explaining that she played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the infidelities of her husband.

Issue: Whether there has been abandonment on the part of the husband? Whether the husband abused his authority as
administrator of the conjugal partnership
Held:
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return
to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. In People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after
leaving his wife, continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child, he was not
guilty of their "abandonment", which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their
support negatived such intent. In re Hoss' Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family where the
evidence disclosed that he almost always did give his wife part of his earnings during the period of their separation and that
he gradually paid some old rental and grocery bills.
SCheldthatlowercourterredinholdingthatmererefusalorfailureofthehusbandasadministratoroftheconjugal
partnershiptoinformthewifeoftheprogressofthebusinessconstitutesabuseofadministration.Inorderforabusetoexist,
theremustbeawillfulandutterdisregardoftheinterestofthepartnershipevidencedbyarepetitionofdeliberateactsor
omissionsprejudicialtothelatter.

Valdez vs. RTC


Facts:
Antonio Valdes (petitioner) and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Petition for nullity was granted. Three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay
with. Two younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing their desire to remain with their father.
Petitioner argues that art. 147 does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated
Issue: Whether Art. 147 applies to void marriages.
Held:
Inavoidmarriage,regardlessofthecausethereof,thepropertyrelationsofthepartiesduringtheperiodofcohabitation
isgovernedbytheprovisionsofArticle147orArticle148,suchasthecasemaybe,oftheFamilyCode.
Underthispropertyregime,propertyacquiredbybothspousesthroughtheirworkandindustryshallbegovernedbythe
rulesonequalcoownership.Anypropertyacquiredduringtheunionisprimafaciepresumedtohavebeenobtainedthrough
theirjointefforts.Apartywhodidnotparticipateintheacquisitionofthepropertyshallstillbeconsideredashaving
contributedtheretojointlyifsaidparty's"effortsconsistedinthecareandmaintenanceofthefamilyhousehold."