PIMENTEL VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No.

158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive
Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations,
He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3
required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.
----Facts
This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute
which established the International Criminal Court for the Senates concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the
executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties.
Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed
the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the
petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to
transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
Issue
Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute (or any treaty) to the Senate for concurrence.
Ruling
The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be
submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are
provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the
parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may
be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under
consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternate, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first
on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of
ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical
to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which
negotiated them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different
date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective
upon its signature.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the
ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the
instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on
the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its
behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via
a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.

AGUSTIN VS. EDU

88 SCRA 195
Facts:Petitioner Agustin in this prohibition proceeding assailed the validity and constitutionality of the Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended by Letter of
Instruction No. 479, providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles. He contended that the said Letter of Instructions and its implementing rules and
regulations are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."
Issue: Whether or not assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional.
Held:The Court decided the petition against the petitioner.
The assailed Letter of Instruction quoted important clauses that the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); and, that the said Vienna
Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices.
It is undisputable therefore that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this

country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at
war with the principle of international morality.
TAADA VS. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18
Facts:On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry and a representative of the Philippine government, signed in the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. Bys signing the Final Act, the Philippines agreed to submit the agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization that require the Philippines, among others, to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and
local products. To that effect, the President ratified and submitted the same to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section21, Article VII of the Constitution.
Hence the petitioner assailed the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.
Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Art. II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Art.
XII, all of the 1987 Philippines Constitution.
Held:The court ruled the petition in favor of the respondents.
Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.
The provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regard to
the grants or rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. While the Constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words,
the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.On the other hand, there is no basis on the contention that under WTO, local industries will all be wiped
out and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy, in fact, WTO recognizes need to protect weak economies like the Philippines.
KURODA VS. JALANDONI
83 Phil. 171 (1949) Court of the Philippines
Facts:Kuroda, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army, was prosecuted for war crimes before the Military Commission set up by Executive Order No. 68
of the President of the Philippines. Kuroda challenged the legality and constitutionality of the Military Commission and contended that it lacked jurisdiction to try him
for violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, since the Philippines was not a signatory to these conventions.
Issue: Whether or not the established Military Commission is legal and constitutional.
Held:The court ruled that the Military Commission was legal and constitutional base on the citation of Article II, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution declaring that
the Philippine adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.The court ruled that in accordance with the generally
accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who had been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and
of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, were held
accountable therefore. Although the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines had acted in conformity
with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code, assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING: The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared
NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments

pointed out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary international law means a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding
on all states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products.
Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and
approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This
may constitute soft law or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that
the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in
nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need
of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court
sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk
Code.