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No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The right is available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings,
including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations that possess a criminal or penal
aspectbut not to private investigations done by private individual (BPI vs. CASA, 430 SCRA 261). It
may be claimed not only by the accused but also by any witness to whom a question calling for an
incriminating answer is addressed.
A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or the witness would establish a fact
which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the
accused or the witness.
The privilege against selfincrimination can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory
in character, is actually addressed to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed. The privilege against selfincrimination is not selfexecuting or automatically operational. It
must be claimed. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to
claim it at the appropriate time.
*United States v. Navarro - 3 PHIL. 143 (rationale)
FACTS: The defendants are charged with the crime of illegal detention. In the course of the trial
HELD: Right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of (1) public policy, because if
the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit
the crime of perjury, and of (2) humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by
*United States v. Tan Teng - 23 PHIL.145
FACTS: The accused was charged and convicted for raping a 7 year old girl. The lower court based its
decision on the ground that the girl was found to have a gonorrhea that allegedly has been transmitted
by the accused. During the investigation, Policemen took semen from the accused and referred to
Bureau of Science for examination and the result was positive of gonorrhea. The accused assails that
the substance that was taken from his body was inadmissible as evidence since it would amount to a
violation against self-incrimination.
HELD: The prohibition is simply against legal process to extract from the defendants own lips, against
his will, an admission of guilt. It prohibits compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, for the
purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a
*United States v. Ong Siu Hong - 36 PHIL. 73 (discharge)
FACTS: The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine
from his mouth. Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was
compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: WON petitioners right for self incrimination was violated
HELD: YES. in U. S. vs. Tan, Tan taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving
his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question
to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in
evidence. In the present case to force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the
same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other
articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; The main purpose of this constitutional
provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling
confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.

*Villaflor v. Summers - 41 PHIL. 62 (pregnancy test)

FACTS: Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case
coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the
city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.
ISSUE: whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights
HELD: NO. In the late case of Holt vs. United States: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."
the protection to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the constitutional
limitation was said to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's
own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.". the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection
of the body of the accused is permissible. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass
the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. no objection to the physical examination being
made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. Although the
order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person
of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood
as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal.
*Beltran v. Samson - 53 PHIL. 570 (writing)
FACTS: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order
would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination
would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place.
He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of
comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to
be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
HELD: The privilege under the constitution against self incrimination is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. Whenever the defendant, at the trial of
his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he
may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court in order that the jury maybe able to
compare his handwriting with the one in question, but the cases at bar is different, it does not appear
that any information was filed against the petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less as it a
question of the defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an investigation
prior to the information and with a view to filing it. Writing is something more than moving the body,
or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application
of intelligence and attention. But in the present case is similar to that of producing documents or
chattels in one's possession, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against
himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance
that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a
personal right guaranteed by the constitution.

Bermudez v. Castillo - 64 PHIL. 483

FACTS: In the course of the investigation against the respondent, in connection with this administrative
case, said respondent filed the six letters which he then contended that said six letters are the
complainants, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. She admitted,
however, that 3 of the letters were in her own handwriting.
As the respondent believed that the
admission by the complainant to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with those
questioned in this case and as he was determined to required her to copy them in her own handwriting
in the presence of the investigator. The complainant refused to submit to the trial invoking her right
not to incriminate herself and alleging that the letters already in the respondents possession, were
more than sufficient for what he proposed to do.
ISSUE: WON petitioners right against self incrimination was violated
HELD: YES. the complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, contained in Article
III, section 1, No. 18, of the Constitution of the Philippines, and stated in the following terms: "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," which is understood to be applicable to all
cases, be they criminal, civil or administrative, because were she compelled to write and were it
proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written by her, it
would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury. The person making the disclosure is in
the position of a witness called by the State, and is subject to the rule permitting the impeachment of
such a witness. It is no invasion of the constitutional guaranty against self-crimination to compel the
witness to answer questions relating to the truthfulness of his previous testimony, however, in the case
at bar, the petitioner has made no disclosure; she confined herself to denying that the letters in
question were hers when the respondent. The reason for the privilege evident. The purpose thereof is
positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and
if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at
least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to
furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition.
Chavez v. CA L- 29169, Aug.19, 1968
FACTS: Petitioner was charged for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car. In the
proceedings, the petitioner was made to be a witness, he was called by the prosecution as the first
witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement thathe will not
testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right
of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and
that defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." and the court
say that "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for
the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." ,thus, the trial court branded him "a
self-confessed culprit".
ISSUE: WON petitioners right against self incrimination was violated
HELD: YES. The court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of
his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts
usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of
a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will. Compulsion as it is
understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free
and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is
moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." accusedpetitioner forcedly had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against
himself. Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different level of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as
each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends

to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing
evidence necessary for his conviction." . petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived
him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his
oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay
submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent. Prejudice to the
accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is at once
apparent. The petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional
right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take
the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the
right upon being called to testify. There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a
waiver must be certain and unequivocal, andintelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such
waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded.
FACTS: Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging
petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained
wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to
investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the
witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of
his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee,
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take
the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be
incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take
the witness stand. The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may
deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for
failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the
sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was
denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his
constitutional right against self- incrimination.
HELD: YES. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of
unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However,
such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for
forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in
criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. No
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against
compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal,
and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the
commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in
nature. The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the
witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a
prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate
but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to
whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness
is improper. The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position
of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege
in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. A person may not be compelled to
testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any question as a witness which would
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the
public justice of the state. In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against
compulsory self-incrimination, a person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness
which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty. The
privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the public
justice the state as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal
ordinance, even though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal court

but is prosecuted through the modes of procedure applicable to ordinary civil remedy. Note: It is not
disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions,
but, also, to take the witness stand.
FACTS: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio
Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbontons counsel announced that he
would present Pascual as his first witness. Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The
Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled
hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on
1 February 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. On 9 February 1965, the lower court
ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from
hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the
matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the amount of P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as
intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by them on 23
March 1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take
the stand, to be distinguished from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A decision
was rendered by the lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board and the
Gatbontons appealed.
ISSUE: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.
HELD: The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to allowing a witness to
object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently incurred. It
is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of another American decision, is the
protection against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a
criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all
there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As
far back as 1905, the Court had occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent
and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free
genuine will." The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due
weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is
the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self- incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded
against to take the witness stand without his consent.
Cabal v. Kapunan,where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the AntiGraft Law cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it must
be in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be
compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an
administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; The Court affirm it on appeal.
PEOPLE V. GAMBOA 194 SCRA 372 (paraffin test)
FACTS: The defendant-appellant John Gabriel Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together
with Miguel Celdran in the RTC of Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran
was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder
Cristina Soledad, common-law wife of Rene Impas, was conversing with the latter inside a bedroom in
Rene's house. Suddenly someone kicked open the door and Soledad saw the appellant and Celdran.

From a standing position the appellant fired his shotgun at Rene. Rene was hit on the right side of the
chest so he slid slightly, his head leaning on the wall the appellant fired a second shot hitting the
victim on the abdomen. The victim fell face upward on the bed and died immediately.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not rejecting the paraffin test results as inadmissible
HELD: NO. It was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken
unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of
his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of
the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that
he just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
PEOPLE V. CANCERAN 229 SCRA 581 (paraffin test)
FACTS: Romeo Canceran was charged with murder for the killing of Pripert Doroja on February 14,
1989. It was established during the trial, through the testimonies of Arnold Bautista, Edralin Melindez
and the mother of the victim Francisca Doroja, that Canceran, Bautista, Melindez and the victim were
all seated and having a drinking session when Canceran accidentally shot the victim while playing with
a revolver. He was found guilty by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving undue evidentiary weight to the results of the
paraffin test considering the crude manner by which it was administered and the extreme likelihood
that the paraffin casts of accused canceran and prosecution witness bautista have been interchanged.
HELD: NO. The defense failed to show even the slight possibility that the paraffin casts were
interchanged. The Solicitor General correctly points out that "there is no possibility of interchange
since the casts, when submitted to the NBI Manila for examination, were embedded or glued to the
paper with proper identification." The paraffin tests conducted without the presence of counsel did not
violate the right against self-incrimination nor the right to counsel.
PEOPLE V. TRANCA 235 SCRA 455 (x-ray, not a violation)
FACTS: Accused Carlos Tranca y Arellano was charged with the violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. SPO1 Matundan
requested Teresita Alberto, the Chief Chemist of the Physical Identification Division of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, to examine the person of the accused and a P100 bill with serial
number SN886097. She exposed the P100 bill to ultraviolet radiation and found the presence of
fluorescent powder thereon. She likewise exposed the person of the accused to ultraviolet radiation
and discovered fluorescent powder on his hands, face, and on the opening of the left-side pocket of the
white shorts that he was then wearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subjection of Trancas body to ultraviolet powder violates Trancas right
against self-incrimination.
HELD: NO. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to export communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of
the accused's body to ultraviolet radiation, in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be
considered a custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.
Almonte v. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286
FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for
the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the
investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally
disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office.
They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the

ISSUE:Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
HELD:Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. In the case at bar, there
is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining
to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and
information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.
People v. Go 237 SCRA 73
FACTS:Regional Trial Court convicted appellant Benny Go guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00.The said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug,
unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) knot tied transparent
plastic bag containing 204 grams Shabu containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription.The records show that the accused- appellant
was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was she informed of her right to the
assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of constitutional right.
HELD:YES. It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that
marijuana was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled
PAGPATUNAY previously prepared by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accusedappellant for having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation
for the commission of an offense. Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him
sign these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the
offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him.
It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this
is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the
commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of
the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 122
FACTS: PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO
LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well
as other information regarding Cojuangco.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?
Held: NO.As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The
general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights
available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal
representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his
secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the
judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to
self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right
practically nugatory.
People v. Malimit 264 SCRA 167
FACTS: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In appeal,
appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE

ISSUE: WON there is a violation in the right against self-incrimination.

HELD: NONE. The right against self-incrimination is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the accuseds own lips, against his ill, admission of his guilt. It does NOT apply when the evidence
sought is NOT an incriminating statement but an object evidence; Miranda rights covers only
inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation; other
evidence (like IDs, wallet, keys, etc) is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
Galman v. Pamaran (supra, Custodial Investigation)
FACTS:: On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was gunned down to death inside
the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. To determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all
aspects of the tragedy, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later
became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not
guilty. In the course of the joint trial, the prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan,
marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies before the Agrava
Board. Through their respective counsel accused objected to the admission of said exhibits. Gen. Ver
filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as
Evidence against him in the above-cases" contending that its admission will be in derogation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by PD 1886,and
thus prayed that his testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether the right against self-incrimination or to not to witness against oneself applies also in
the proceeding before the Agrava Board.
HELD: YES. The right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to accused
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal
case. No doubt, Accused (Ver, et. al.) were not merely denied the said sacred constitutional rights, but
also the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. The review of the pleadings and their
annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to
reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were
taken from Ver, et. al. fall short of the constitutional standards both under the "due process clause"
and under the "exclusionary rule" in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional
infirmities, the individual testimonies of Ver, et. al. cannot be admitted against them in any criminal
proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of
a grant of immunity by law.
People v. Banihit, GR 132045, August 25, 2000 (relate to Tan Teng)
Facts: The accused was convicted of rape committed against his own niece. At the hearing the
prosecution moved that accused-appellant be medically examined to determine whether he was
likewise afflicted with the venereal disease. The trial court ruled that the examination would not violate
accused-appellants right against self-incrimination, and directed the Warden of the Davao City Jail to
cause the examination of accused-appellant at the Davao Medical Center.
Held: Parenthetically, it is true that the constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included
in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self- incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has
been held that an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from
gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim. Accordingly, a urethral smear was performed on
accused diagnosed the presence of gonorrhea.
People v. Besonia, 422 SCRA 210

Facts: Accused was charged with two counts of murder with the use of unlicensed firearm and with the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Besonia argues that the finding of guilt by the trial
court was based mainly on his confession, which is inadmissible for having been obtained in gross
violation of his constitutional right against self- incrimination. Moreover, the prosecution endeavored
to prove the charges for murder by evidence other than the testimonies of the proclaimed
eyewitnesses. In the absence of evidence proving his guilt, he should be acquitted.
Held: We cannot subscribe to Besonias claim that his confession and admissions during the searching
inquiry were elicited in violation of his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against
himself. The right against self- incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive
powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person
subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection. It does not apply where, as in
these cases, the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself without any
compulsion from the agents of the State. There is nothing in the records that would indicate that
Besonia was forced, intimidated, or compelled by the trial court or by anybody into admitting the
crimes. At any rate, his plea of guilty and confession or admissions during the searching inquiry
cannot be the sole basis for his conviction. It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting
evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented
by the prosecution to prove the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged
with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no
such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence.
The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or
the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in
the imposition of the prescribed penalties. In these cases, the trial court did not comply with the
second requisite mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
is to order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. It
only required the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt or degree of culpability of the
accused for the use of [an] unlicensed firearm. Thus, the evidence presented by the prosecution were
merely the testimonies of the police officers on the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime, apart from those of the doctors on the injuries sustained by the
victims. Doubtless, they are insufficient to establish the guilt of Besonia.
Sabio v. Gordon 504 SCRA 704
Facts: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance. In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the
issues raised in the petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction;
second, Section 4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are
vested with contempt power; fourth, Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation have been duly published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the
individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right against self-incrimination; and
sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into justiciable controversies. Issue: Held:
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the
said directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is
being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be
asked of them." That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent
Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such
issue may be presented before the courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate
Committees have sufficient Rules to guide them when the right against self- incrimination is invoked.
Sec. 19 reads: Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination A witness can invoke his right against self-

incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to
him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive session. No person can refuse to
testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is
asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give testimony. In
such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall
determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall
resume its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be
repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may
punish him for contempt for contumacious conduct. The same directors and officers contend that the
Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action
should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. Let it be stressed at this point
that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will
be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to
obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is
to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully
with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio
and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal
and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and
officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees
directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.
Benares v. Lim 511 SCRA 100
Facts: Petitioner Oscar Beares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale executed in
1976 where he sold two parcels of land to respondent. Records show that after respondent had fully
paid the amortizations and after the deed of absolute sale was issued, petitioner mortgaged the same
parcels of land to the Bank of Philippine Islands. Thus, when respondent demanded delivery of the
properties, petitioner failed to comply, thus respondent was compelled to file a case for estafa against
Held: Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine that when a judge dismisses a case for failure to
prosecute, the termination amounts to an acquittal as the prosecution will fail to prove the case when
the time therefor comes. In the instant case, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner.
Thus, even without documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be proven. Second, petitioner
appears to have admitted the genuineness and due execution of respondents documentary evidence,
thus the prosecution need not even present such documents in view of his admission. With or without
these documents, therefore, the prosecution has enough evidence left for the trial courts
determination of his guilt. Thus
We agree with the OSGs contention that the trial court exceeded
its authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there
was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a
ground to dismiss the case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove
its case through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered
its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
Standard Chartered v. Senate 541 SCRA 546
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other
compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources
Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

Held: Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to
appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.
21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizesthe
importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally
incriminating questions are expected to be asked: Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must
be emphasized that [this right may be] invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x
only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance
the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated or
abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The
consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the courts. x x x x
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to
obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is
to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully
with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
As a
matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality
except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota of the controversy. So it must be here. Indeed,
the matter of the constitutionality of the assailed Committee invitations and subpoenas issued vis--vis
the investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable
controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore indicated. In
short, there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more
investigation the constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
It is the condition where one is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to
labor for another, whether he is paid or not.
GR: No involuntary servitude shall exist.
1. Punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly convicted
2. Personal military or civil service in the interest of national defense
3. In naval enlistment, a person who enlists in a merchant ship may be compelled to remain in service
until the end of a voyage
4. Posse comitatus or the conscription of ablebodied men for the apprehension of criminals
5. Return to work order issued by the DOLE Secretary or the President
6. Minors under patria potestas are obliged to obey their parents
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
FACTS: This is a consolidated case assailing the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law (RH
LAW). One of the contentions of the petitioners, the RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight ( 48) hours of pro bono services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. The petitioners explain that since a
majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the
majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.

HELD: NO. As some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
orce, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. The requirement under
Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours
of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice
of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion,force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will.