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213-232
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be
applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.
respectively
Art. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special
provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code.
Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death,
injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing
damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code.
Art. 2197.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Art. 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby
adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code.
CHAPTER 2
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
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invoices containeing the details of the order to MCC and the latter conforms
to it through its representative by affixing the latters signature on the faxed
copy and sending it again by fax.
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Mla Office sent a letter through fax
addressed to MCCs manager (who is also Sanyo Seiki Corps president) to
confirm Sanyo Seikis order of 220 metric tons of hot rolled stainless steel.
Mr. Chan assented and affixed his signature in the letter.
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC a pro forma invoice
that contained the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC agains sent
back by fax the invoice to Ssangyong with Chans conformity signature.
Stated in the invoice was that payment for the ordered steel products would
be made through an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Ssangyong. The
goods would be delivered after the L/C had been opened.
Pursuant to MCCs order, Ssangyong placed the said order with its
steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron Corp in S. Korea and paid in full.
MCC could only open a partial L/C so the 220 metric tons of steel
order was split in 2. (2 orders of 110 tons each) On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong
informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan through fax that it was ready to ship 193 tons
of steel to the Phil. It requested for the opening of the L/C.
Despite several letters of requests to open the L/C, MCC failed to so.
Even though it was granted an extension of time, it still failed to set up the
L/C. So on Aug 15, 2000, Ssangyong wrote Sanyo Seike that if the L/C's were
not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and hold
MCC liable for damages for breach, inclusive of warehouse expenses, related
interests and charges.
On Aug 17, MCC was able to open an L/C with PCIBank for payment
of half of the stainless steel order. As to the other half, MCC requested
through fax letter, for a price adjustment. Ssangyong rejected this request.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on
September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract and demanding payment
of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and
charges.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due
to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory
Chan. Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the L/C for the remaining 100 tons of steel.
RTC ruled in favor of Ssangyong and ordered MCC too pay actual
damages amounting to $93,493.87 representing the outstanding principal
claim plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from March 30, 2001, and
attys fees.
CA affirmed but absolved Chan of liability.
ISSUE: W/N the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in
favor of Ssangyong is proper and justified.
HELD/RATIO: No.
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(1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be
computed
Trial Court: based upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr., which
was placed at 33-1/3 years he being over 29 years of age (or around 30
years for purposes of computation) at the time of his demise by applying
the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life expectancy).
Petitioner: damages were computed on a four (4) year as held in the
Alcantara case.
(2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents
should be fixed.
Held
(1)The Alcantara case cited is not controlling in the one at bar. In the
Alcantara case, none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the fouryear basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. Both
parties appealed, but only as regards the amount thereof. On the contrary, it
declared:
"(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human
life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the
deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor.'
Other factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff or
beneficiary; (2) loss of support; (3) loss of service; (4) loss of society; (5)
mental suffering of beneficiaries; and (6) medical and funeral expenses."
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important element in
fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. The Court of
Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon
the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
(2) In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary
expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings.
Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of
damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net
earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary
expense for his own living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not
loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings
which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings,
not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less
living and other incidental expenses.
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to
fix the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of
P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the
loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or
P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of
P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts.
104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil
Code, as construed and applied by this Court; (b) P1,727.95, actually spent
by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's
fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the
appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later to
this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the
amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the
aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from
December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial
court.
218. DAVILA VS. PAL
Facts: The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of PAL
which took the lives of all its crew and passengers. The plane took off from
the Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people on board,
including the plane's complement. It did not reach its destination, but
crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after take-off.
The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr., who was one of the passengers,
had no definite news of what had happened to their son, getting what
information they could only from conflicting newspaper reports, until they
received a letter of condolence from PALs president, informing them that
their son had died in the crash.
Issue: WON PAL is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if so, for
how much. -YES!
Ratio: It was undisputed that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for
his flight, at least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over
Romblon, the weather was clear, the most reasonable conclusion is that his
failure to do so was intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a
straight line to Manila. It was a violation of air-craft traffic rules to which,
under the circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable. In any
case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to
how and why the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault,
under Article 1756 of the Civil Code.
The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded
to the plaintiffs, parents of the deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity
for his death in the amount of P6,000.00. Pursuant to current jurisprudence
on the point it should be increased to P12,000.00.
The deceased was employed as manager of a radio station, from which he
was earning P8,400.00 a year, consisting of a monthly salary of P600.00 and
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allowance of P100.00. As a lawyer and junior partner of his father in the law
office, he had an annual income of P3,600.00. From farming he was getting
an average of P3,000.00. All in all therefore the deceased had gross earnings
of P15,000.00 a year.
but the RTC rejected this and declared that the crime of murder was
established beyond reasonable doubt. RTC sentenced Baguio to reclusior
perpetua OR life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Paulino
in the amount of P12K. Baguio appealed to the SC.
According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, "the defendant
shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." This Article, while referring
to "damages for death caused by crime or quasi-delict," is expressly made
applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach
of contract by a common carrier."
Issue:
Held:
Reclusion perpetua!
The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he
died. At that age one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to
the formula (2/3 x [80-30]) adopted in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However,
although the deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history
shows that he had complained of and been treated for such ailments as
backaches, chest pains and occasional feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable
to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider, for purposes of
this case, a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years.
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3)
different sources, namely from managing a radio station, from law practice
and from farming, the expenses incidental to the generation of such income
were necessarily more than if he had only one source. Together with his
living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a
year, seems reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00.
This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount
which should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular respect.
Parents were also entitled to actual damages, moral damages, and attorneys
fees but the award of exemplary damages was eliminated.
219. PEOPLE VS BAGUIO
Facts: Alfredo Paulino as barangay tanod had unpleasant dealings with
Rodolfo Baguio, aka Bebot. So when a group of people passed by Alfredo and
his wife Lidovina, the wife recognized Baguio. Lidovina went inside the house
to get money when she suddenly heard her husband scream, aray ko po!.
She rushed out and found her husband sprawled and being stabbed by
Baguio and his companions. The assailants then fled. Alfredo later died on
the operating room.
Baguio was arraigned and tried before the RTC for murder with
treachery and abuse of superior strength. Baguio put up the defense of alibi
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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oil leak, clutch disc, release bearing hub and trunion bolt,
propeller shaftLEMON! LEMON! LEMON!
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conspired with their co-defendant, Guballa to defraud the Bautista when they
executed the deed of sale.
The Maxinos filed counterclaims for sums of money but it was
dismissed. The Court ruled in favor of Bautista and ordered Guballa (the
judgment did not include Maxino) to pay.
One of the contentions of Maxino in his counterclaim was that he
should be entitled to moral damages because they had suffered great mental
anguish serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation and were compelled to litigate and contract
legal services based on the malicious filing of a completely groundless and
defamatory complaint.
Issue:Is Maxino entitled to damages?
Decision:No.
Guballa and his wife still owed Bautista the amount of P30,000.00. It
is not far-fetched that Bautista was disappointed and disturbed, and laid part
of the blame upon Maxino who negotiated the sale and transfer of the
property to Guballa and his wife and even suspected that there was a
conspiracy to defraud her.
Thus, the filing of the complaint by Bautista against Maxino was not
baseless. It cannot be said to have been motivated by, malice or spite to
warrant the payment of the damages claimed by the Maxino spouses.
225. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS. CA
Facts:
The deceased Jose Bernardo, a meat shop vendor, was 33 years old at the
time of his death and was survived by his spouse and 3 minor children.
When he was about to board a jeepney loaded with slaughtered pigs in order
to select the meat he would sell for that day, upon grasping the handlebars
he was electrocuted because the antenna of the jeepney was entangled with
an open electric wire. He died as a result of the incident.
His wife filed a complaint for damages against Benguet Electric Cooperative.
Issue: W/N damages awarded are appropriate?
Held/Ratio:
2 factors to be considered in determining loss of earning capacity: (1)
number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed (life
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expectancy); and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the widow and
her children should be fixed (net income).
Re: 1st factor
Held: YES. Taking into the facts and circumstances that the petitioner is
corporation vested with public interest. That respondents would have had to
incur living and sundry expenses, thereby reducing the net earnings which
they would have received, and that responded wife succeeded in securing
another better-paying job approximately 6 months afterwards, the judgment
should be modified reducing the awards to the following:
1. 1.actual damages - $2,703
2. moral damage P5,000
3. Exemplary damages P5,000
4. Attorneys fees P8,000
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formula with the net earnings computed at 50% of the gross earnings, a
detailed computation is as follows:
NET EARNING
CAPACITY (X)
= LIFE EXPECTANCY
[2/3 (80-age at the time
of death)]
x GROSS
ANNUAL
INCOME (GAI)
- LIVING
EXPENSES (50%
of GAI)
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1)
was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw
jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing
a protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the
proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and
determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence,
pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall
be paid by the petitioner.
= [2/3 (80-35)]
x [P31,876.00
-50% x
P31,876.00]
= [2/3 (45)]
x [P31,876.00
- P15,938.00]
= 30
x 15,938.00
= P478,140.00
Earning Capacity
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages,
the following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount
of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would
otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the
deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is
computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined
Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by
multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the
total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is
ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings.
Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross
annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)].
It was established that Ray was 35 at the time of his death and was earning
a gross annual income of P31,876.00 as a driver at the Mindanao State
University. In arriving at the net earnings, the trial court deducted from the
gross annual income the annual living expenses in the amount of P9,672.00,
broken down as follows: P20.00 a day for travel or P520.00 per month;
P60.00 a month for cigarettes; P26.00 for drinks; and other personal
expenses like clothing, toiletries, etc. estimated at P200.00 per month. The
amount of P9,672.00, however, appears unrealistic, and constitutes only
30.34% of the gross earnings. It even includes expenses for cigarettes which
by no means can be classified as a necessary expense. Using the cited
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Side Note: During the pendency of this appeal, Maria D. de Evangelista died
and was ordered substituted by her son, petitioner Sergio. Also, FLOREZA
had since died and that his heirs had voluntarily vacated the residential lot in
question. Thus, only the issue of the payment of rent was disposed of by the
SC.
ISSUE: W/N FLOREZA MUST PAY RENT BECAUSE OF HIS REFUSAL TO VACATE
W/N FLOREZA IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND THEREFORE HAS A
RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
HELD: YES, FLOREZA MUST PAY RENT. NO, HE DOESNT HAVE THE RIGHT TO
REIMBURSEMENT.
RATIO:
As regards the issue of rentals, it is clear that from the date that the
redemption price had been paid by the EVANGELISTAS on January 2, 1955,
petitioner's right to the use of the residential lot without charge had ceased.
Having retained the property although a redemption had been made, he
should be held liable for damages in the form of rentals for the continued use
of the subject residential lot at the rate of P10.00 monthly from January 3,
1955 until the house was removed and the property vacated by petitioner or
his heirs.
As regards the issue of reimbursement, Article 448 applies only when
the builder, planter, or sower believes he had the right so to build, plant or
sow because he thinks he owns the land or believes himself to have a claim
of title. Here, petitioner makes no pretensions of ownership whatsoever.
Petitioner contends that as vendee a retro he is entitled to the rights
granted under Article 1616 of the Civil Code. This is incorrect. It should be
noted that petitioner did not construct his house as a vendee a retro. The
house had already been constructed even before the pacto de retro sale.
Petitioner incurred no useful expense, therefore, after that sale. The
house was already there at the tolerance of the EVANGELISTAS in
consideration of the several loans extended to them. Since petitioner cannot
be classified as a builder in good faith within the purview of Article 448 of the
Civil Code, nor as a vendee a retro, who made useful improvements during
the lifetime of the pacto de retro, petitioner has no right to reimbursement of
the value of the house which he had erected on the residential lot of the
EVANGELISTAS, much less to retention of the premises until he is reimbursed.
The rights of petitioner are more akin to those of a usufructuary who,
under Article 579 of the Code, may make on the property useful
improvements but with no right to be indemnified therefor. He may,
however, remove such improvements should it be possible to do so without
damage to the property.
Private respondent Juliana, a public school teacher, was appointed poll clerk
by the COMELEC during the 1965 Elections. Petitioner Perfecto, a
Congressional candidate, filed with the COMELEC an administrative
complaint against the members of the BEI and Juliana, charging them of
nonfeasance, malfeasance and misfeasance for willful failure to comply with
the orders and instructions of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of the
elections. Juliana then filed with the RTC an action for damages alleging that
the charges against her were false and without basis and instituted
maliciously to expose her to public ridicule, for which she suffered mental
torture, anguish, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
mental shock and social humiliation which may be assessed as moral
damages in the amount of P120K. Further, she claims the sum of P15K as
exemplary damages and P10K for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
The RTC ruled that there was no sufficient proof to sustain the administrative
charge against Juliana, who was awarded compensatory damages amounting
to P2K.
ISSUE: W/N the awarding of compensatory damages by the RTC was
proper.
NO. Respondent judge found no basis for actual or compensatory damages
and exemplary damages. Compensatory damages are those recoverable
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or
occupation, and the same must be provided, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy
and non-substantial, no damages will be given. Well settled is the rule that
even if the complaint filed by one against the other is clearly unfounded, this
does not necessarily mean, in the absence of specific facts proving damages,
that said defendant really suffered actual damage over and above, attorneys
fees and costs. The Court cannot rely on its speculations as to the fact and
the amount of damages. It must depend on actual proof of the damages
alleged to have been suffered.
231. RODRIGUEZ LUNA V. IAC
Facts: The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a
vehicular collision at a go-kart practice. Those involved were the go-kart
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PVE crew arrived at the residence of the bride. They recorded the predeparture activities of the bride before leaving for the church and the Manila
Hotel where the wedding reception followed. 2 days after the wedding
however, studio manager of PVE, informed the petitioners that the videotape
coverage of their wedding celebration was damaged due to mechanical
defect in their equipment.
Petitioners alleged that said failure on the part of PVE to perform its
obligation caused deep disappointment, anxiety and an irreparable break in
the continuity of an established family tradition of recording by film or slide
historical and momentous family events especially wedding celebrations and
for which they were entitled to be paid actual, moral and exemplary
damages including attorneys fees.
RTC rendered a decision ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs actual,
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, P10,000.00 for
attorneys fees and to pay the costs of these proceedings.
Issues: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to award of damages
arising from breach of contract of service.
Held: PVE liable for damages.
Ratio:
PVE disclaimed any liability for the damaged videotape by invoking
force majeure or fortuitous event and asserted that a defective transistor
caused the breakdown in its video tape recorder, but failed to substantiate
its bare allegation by presenting in evidence the alleged defective transistor
before the trial court.
At any rate, in order that fortuitous event may exempt PVE from liability,
it is necessary that it be free from negligence. The PVE crew miserably failed
to detect the defect in the video tape recorder and this could have been
avoided by a timely exercise of minimum prudence by the crew of PVE.
The failure to record on videotape the wedding celebration of the
petitioners constitutes malicious breach of contract as well as gross
negligence on the part of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc.
However, the award of damages to the petitioners cannot be lumped
together as was done by the trial court. It is basic that the claim for actual,
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees must each be
independently identified and justified. Article 1170 of the New Civil Code
provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages. For failure of PVE, to comply with its
obligation under the video tape coverage contract, petitioners are entitled to
actual damages at least in the amount of (P1,423.00) representing their
downpayment in that contract.
Ordinarily, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach
of contract because such an action is not among those expressly mentioned
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