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Representation
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THE SUBJECT OF REPRESENTATION

Michael Saward
Published online: 17 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Michael Saward (2008) THE SUBJECT OF REPRESENTATION, Representation,
44:2, 93-97, DOI: 10.1080/00344890802079433
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INTRODUCTION

THE SUBJECT OF REPRESENTATION

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Michael Saward
Who does, and who can, represent women? How and where do they do it? What are
we to make of competing claims to represent women? Is a higher number of women in
parliaments the key to better representing womens interests? These are some of the key
questions tackled by the articles in this special issue of Representation on the substantive
representation of women. And it quickly becomes evident that to tackle these questions
one must also confront in turn the fundamental questions that lie behind them, above all
What does it mean for one person or group to represent another?.
The idea and practice of political representation has, of course, long been subject of
debate, in the UK and well beyond. This journal has played its role in charting and
contributing to these debates, not least in the area of electoral systems and the styles of
representation they produce. In recent years, a new set of controversies has arisen around
representation. Varied aspects of globalisation have led commentators to question how
representation can or should work on regional or global levels (Held 1995; Dryzek 2006).
Environmentalists have questioned the ability of our existing representative systems to
encompass the interests of nature, future generations of people, and non-human animals
(Dobson 1996). And political parties, supposedly the key vehicles of representation, have
lost members and support, as large numbers of people in many countries and regions turn
to social movements, or away from mainstream politics, in seeking to have their views
represented (van Biezen 2003; Mair 2006). Among academic observers and political actors
there is a widespread sense that we are facing a crisis of representation.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a sense of crisis, or at least renewed concern, about the
adequacy of our existing machinery of political representation is also proving to be a time
of creative thinking about what representation may mean, and where we can find it. This
special issue both shows how that creative thinking has occurred with respect to the
critical issue of the representation of women, and seeks to make its own original
contribution to the analysis of representation in general, and of women in particular. The
emphasis in the articles that follow is on the idea of representation, but the discussion is
rooted in cases and examples from the European Union in particular, but also from other
regions such as Latin America. Indeed, one message arising from these articles is that we
need to look at the theory and the practice of representation as part of a single process, if
we are to capture what is going on in political representation (a phrase that guided
contributions to the European Consortium for Political Research workshop in Helsinki in
2007, directed by Karen Celis and Sarah Childs, on the substantive representation of
women which gave rise to this special issue).
At the heart of each of these contributions is questioning and argument about the
subject of representation, in two senses(1) what is it about? and (2) who does it? Take
the first of these. What political and indeed other (e.g. artistic or cultural) phenomena
should we look at when we think about political representation? Commonly, we think of
Representation, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2008
ISSN 0034-4893 print/1749-4001 online/08/020093-5
2008 McDougall Trust, London DOI: 10.1080/00344890802079433

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INTRODUCTION

representation at a quite general level to be about cases where one thing stands for
another. So for example, an elected MP can stand for (represent) her or his constituency
(or, since even that can be controversial, those who voted for her or him), Greenpeace or
Friends of the Earth can stand for their environmentalist memberships and green ideals
generally, a flag can stand for a country, or a landscape painting can stand for a particular
place or even an ideal of rural bliss.
Each of these examples can be seen as political representation, in a very broad
sense. But notice that in these sorts of examples, what is going on is not so much a fixed
relationshipthis flag just does stand for this countrybut rather one thing is taken to, or
is widely believed to, stand for another. This flag, because of varied historical and cultural
factors, is understood, and perhaps widely accepted, as standing for this country; or these
MPs are understood as being the proper representatives of the people of this country. It is
not a fixed, timeless or inevitable fact that one thing stands for another; there is always a
context, a history, a set of cultural understandings, through which these ideas of
representation are filtered, and through which they come to be accepted (or contested, as
the case may be). This is the case with the most common, and clearly vital, sense of
political representation: the representation of a constituency by an elected member of a
legislature.
There is one further step we can take in thinking about the subject of representation
in this more abstract way. Certainly, for various reasons, we understand one thing or
person to represent another. But there is an active side to this relationship as well: one
thing or person is presented as standing for another. Representing is not just a matter of
facts; it is also importantly a matter of claims and presentations, and whether those claims
and presentations are accepted or not.
These comments lead on to a second sense of the subject of representation: who
represents, and who can represent? Who is the subject in that sense? In politics, we are
accustomed to thinking of elected representatives, in parliaments or provincial or local
councils, as being the subjects of representation. And clearly, they are. But it is noticeable
that other subjects claim (or are claimed) to be representatives (Saward 2006, 2008).
Interest group leaders, religious leaders, professional group spokespeople, champions of
various informal constituencies (the poor, indigenous peoples, fathers, rail passengers, and
so on) also claim to be representatives. And sometimes their would-be constituencies,
along with governments, treat them as representatives by taking their claims seriously. We
can look within the broad machinery of government too; within state structures today we
often find agencies that represent (among others) consumers, women, and so on.
Sometimes, these would-be representatives, in and outside the state, are elected in some
way. In some cases they are appointed, and in others they simply assert their
representative status. Further, it is not unusual to find elected MPs who explicitly claim
to speak for constituencies that are not part of the geographical electoral constituency
that put them into parliament; for example, some national legislators in Australia and the
USA claim to speak for women, lesbians and gay men, and indigenous peoples (Sawer
2001; Mansbridge 2003).
In short, political representation can, and does, feature a wide range of actors, who
base their claims on mixtures of election, appointment and self-assertion. In many
contextsin debates on representation in the UK, or in the European Union, and in
conventional political science approaches, for examplediscussions of political representation start and end with elected legislatures. But if we start from the wider, more

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INTRODUCTION

critical view outlined here, and exemplified in the articles which make up this special issue,
we can see that representation need not, and arguably should not, be confined to these
institutions.
So, the job of speaking for is not necessarily constrained by the fact of being
elected by. And interestingly, the job of speaking for is also one of speaking about. If
representation is about someone presenting themselves, or being presented, as
representing others, who are those others? The contributions of Celis et al., Celis,
Stoffel, Squires and Meier in this special issue all interrogate this question in some depth. A
key point that these authors make, in different ways and with different examples, is that
the character and interests of women are not just given and obvious. Womens interests
need to be argued and interpreted. There will invariably be more than one version of what
womens interests consist of (feminist and other views, for instance). This is part of what
Squires, for example, is getting at when she writes here about the constitutive
representation of gender. The interests of women are, in varied and important ways,
created or constituted in the very process of representation. Would-be representatives of
womenbe they elected figures, members of womens agencies within government, or
members of civil society pressure groupshave to read in the interests they claim to
represent, since there is rarely a universally-agreed set of interests that can simply be read
off. This constitutive dimension is one more part of the widening and deepening of the
idea of representation which the following articles exemplify, one more part of how they
get at the dynamics of representation, an idea and practice too long seen in rather static
terms.
It follows that one thing that is going on in representation is that interests are
being argued, contested, and sometimes negotiated. To make the substantive
representation of womens interests achievable, there needs to be a conception of
womens interests that is shared and demonstrable (even if it changes over time). One can
be stipulative about the substantive representation of women interests, by declaring
these interests to consist in X and Y and defending that choice. But no matter how
compelling this stipulation may be, it will never be beyond dispute or reasonable
questioning. Sometimes, making such stipulations can be necessary to the conduct of
empirical research. Thus for example Lovenduski and Norris (2003) examine the politics of
womens parliamentary presence in the UK on the basis of a conception of womens
interests built on an idea of the autonomy of women, on the one hand, and by a concern
for an idea of interests that allows for investigation by researchers (operationalisability, in
the jargon), on the other. These are reasonable moves. Confining definitions of interest on
grounds of operationalisability has the virtue of transparencyit is easier to replicate the
research to check the validity of its resultsand in a broadly liberal society we might
expect a concern for individual autonomy for women and men to be high on the policy
agenda. But these moves are, inevitably, as partial and contestable as they are compelling.
Part of their contestability rests in their (implicit) use of the perspective of the feminist
substantive representation of women from within the menu of possibilities regarding the
substantive representation of women. This issue is discussed in detail in the contributions
by Celis et al. and Celis.
In short, a clear (though never incontestable) idea of womens interests, and
therefore of what the substantive representation of women involves in a case, requires a
particular frame or perspective to be adopted. Particular conceptions of the substantive
representation of women can only be as compelling as the frames that are used to give

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INTRODUCTION

rise to them; any such framing of necessity excludes relevant alternatives. In this context,
Meiers account of the usefulness of critical frame analysis in this special issue is of
particular interest in helping us to understand how policy actors frame womens interests,
though each of the contributors is sensitive to the presence, and the contestability, of the
frames through which womens representation has been and can be viewed (by academic
researchers as well as by political actors).
What makes it possible for someone successfully to claim to represent another? All
of the authors in this issue take up this question. If a core component of representation is
the making of convincing claims to be representative, then clearly the power and the
resources available for claim-making are critical. The contributions to the special issue
discuss a wide array of resources, including institutional, symbolic, and descriptive likeness.
So, for example, one could claim to represent women by virtue of descriptive similarity
(being a woman), substantive capability and orientation (knowing womens interests and
being motivated to act upon them), claiming to be mandated by women to act in a certain
way, or claiming to be a trustee for the interests of women, possibly regardless of what
many women might themselves have to say on the matter. Legitimacy is discussed, for
example by Stoffel, both as a product of the deployment of resources and a resource in
itself. Issues of power and resources, of course, bear closely on questions of democratic
legitimacy. It is notable that all contributions discuss contexts (countries, institutions) that
are broadly democratic, at least in a minimal electoral sense (though Stoffels discussion of
Chile features also pressures linked to representation in transitions to electoral
democracy). There is no final resolution of who might count as a legitimate democratic
representative for women in any particular contextmuch may depend, according to
Mackays argument, on detailed or thick understandings of an array of actors, institutions
and claims. Note also how Hollis contribution involves adopting an open mind on the
issue of which actors within womens co-operative constellations aim to achieve the
substantive representation of women.
A core idea driving these articles, as we have seen, is that of the substantive
representation of women. To represent women substantively is to act for women, and
not merely to stand for women (a distinction built on the work of Pitkin 1967). This idea is
normally contrasted to descriptive representation, where the issue is the likeness of
representatives (MPs, for example) to their constituents. Women remain badly underrepresented in most of the worlds national legislatures. It is hardly surprising therefore
that charting this state of affairs and exploring methods for increasing the numbers of
women in national legislaturesenhancing descriptive representationhas been a key
focus of research into womens political representation. The idea of a critical mass of
women legislators being necessary to promote the substantive representation of women
is spelt out by Celis et al. in particular. A key feature of the articles here is the critical but
sympathetic appraisal they offer of the critical mass approach, and how they move
beyond this focus to look at a broader array of critical actors, in legislative but also in a
range of other institutions and contexts (Hollis analysis additionally points out the links
and interaction between the two).
If substantive representation of women cannot be achieved by numbers of women
in the legislature alone, and if there are good reasons for us to see representation as a
dynamic process that encompasses but goes beyond claims made in parliamentary
settings, then there are good reasons to explore other actors and institutions and claims.
Thus Meier explores EU policy through detailed documentary analysis, Stoffel examines

INTRODUCTION

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the key womens policy agency in Chile, and Squires interrogates constructions of gender
in the work of womens policy agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Celis
et al. make it clear that further work on critical actors in the representation of women must
attend to varied levels, forums and contexts in which such representation can be claimed.
This task, as Celis contends, also requires careful operationalisation of the key concept of
the substantive representation of women.
Research into the (under-)representation of women has, for some years, been one of
the most progressive and innovative sources of fresh thinking about political
representationwhat it is, where it can happen, and how we ought to study it. This
special issue is a timely appraisal of the field so far, offering a well-grounded and
compelling agenda for future work. And it demonstrates Representations continuing
engagement with a wide range of challenging questions about the political practice from
which it derives its name.

REFERENCES
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Environment, edited by W.M. Lafferty and J. Meadowcroft. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
DRYZEK, JOHN S. 2006. Deliberative Global Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
HELD, DAVID. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.
LOVENDUSKI, JONI and PIPPA NORRIS. 2003. Westminster women: the politics of presence. Political
Studies 51: 84102.
MAIR, PETER. 2006. Ruling the void? The hollowing of western democracy. New Left Review 42:
2251.
MANSBRIDGE, JANE. 2003. Rethinking representation. American Political Science Review 97(4):
515528.
PITKIN, HANNA F. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
SAWARD, MICHAEL. 2006. The representative claim. Contemporary Political Theory 5(3): 297318.
. 2008. Authorisation and authenticity: representation and the unelected. The Journal of
Political Philosophy, forthcoming.
SAWER, MARIAN. 2001. Representing trees, acres, voters and non-voters: concepts of parliamentary
representation in Australia. In Speaking for the People, edited by M. Sawer and G. Zappala.
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, pp. 3663.
VAN BIEZEN, INGRID. 2003. The place of parties in contemporary democracies. West European Politics
26(3): 171184.
Michael Saward is Professor of Politics at the Open University, UK. E-mail:
m.j.saward@open.ac.uk

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