World Development, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, pp. 225-243, 1991.

Printed in Great Britain.

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Classical Political Economists and Marx on

Colonialism and "Backward" Nations
JORGE LARRAIN*

Universityof Birmingham
Summary. - - The article provides a comparative and analytical discussion of the conceptions
about colonialism and "backward" countries elaborated by classical political economists, and
Marx and Engels. It shows that, contrary to the consistently optimistic view of classical political
economy, Marx and Engels changed their position from a positive assessment of colonialism
toward a more pessimistic view after 1860. Their analyses of Latin American nations, however,
follow a different pattern throughout. The reason for that is sought in the influence of the
Hegelian notion of "'peoples without history" and in the presence of a form of "Eurocentrism" in
their thought. The article concludes that, in spite of important differences, Marx and Engels
share some basic premises with the 19th century's mentality present in Hegel and classical
political economy.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
This article is both an attempt critically to
ascertain the views of classical political economy
and Marx on the questions of colonialism and
"backward" nations, and an exploration of their
relationship. This entails an elucidation of their
ideas to establish the differences and similarities
which stem from their respective theoretical
views. Although Marx developed his analysis of
the capitalist mode of production as a critique of
classical political economy, he started from many
premises first elaborated within that tradition
(e.g., the labor theory of value). But the relationship between Marx and the classical economists is
more complex than it first appears because after
1858 it was mediated by Marx's rereading of
Hegel's Logic. n In effect, Marx's critique of
political economy used, and was very much
influenced by, Hegelian categories and distinctions (e.g., the distinction between phenomenal
forms and inner relations which Marx transposed
into the spheres of the market and of production
respectively).
I argue that in the more specific analyses of
colonialism and "backward nations," there are
similar complexities, continuities and discontinuities between the two traditions, which are
necessary to elucidate. This is a much less
explored, and yet highly relevant area of the
relationships between Marx and the political
economists. It will be shown that here, too,

Hegel plays an important, if often unacknowledged, role. The discussion focuses first on
classical political economy and Marx's theoretical
views on colonialism in order to show that,
contrary to the consistently optimistic view of the
former which emphasizes the civilizing mission of
capitalist expansion and colonialism throughout
the world, Marx and Engels changed their
position after 1860. They moved from a positive
assessment of colonialism (for instance, in the
case of India) toward a more pessimistic and
critical view (for instance, their views on Ireland).
This crucial change of perspective, however, is
further discussed in the context of Marx and
Engels's references to Latin American nations
which seem to follow a different pattern. Marx
and Engels did not extend to Latin America the
new thoughts they developed on Ireland and
Asia after 1860, and abstained from any class
analysis of its social and political processes. The
reason for this is discovered not so much in the
inspiration coming from classical political economy as in the influence of the Hegelian notion
of "peoples without history." There are, however, alternative analyses of this influence which
*I wish to thank the reviewers of the first version of this
article for their detailed and helpful comments. They
have certainly contributed to making this final version
an altogether better piece, although ! suspect they may
still disagree with its conclusions.
225

226

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

entail different versions of what is vaguely

denominated "Eurocentrism.'" This term is discussed to emphasize a dimension of it which
some of these alternatives neglect and which, I
contend, affects the thought of Marx and Engels.
Furthermore, I try to show that this dimension of
Eurocentrism is also present in classical political
economy and Hegel. This means that through
different intellectual routes, classical political
economists, and Marx and Engels share some
difficulties in understanding the specificity of
Latin America and other "'backward" societies.
The central issues of this discussion are clearly
relevant today from a double point of view. First,
there is an important question about the conditions of applicability of theories developed in the
main industrial centers to the situation of Third
World countries. Can the historical and
sociological specificity of Third World countries
be understood by theories whose basic categories
and analytical tools were constructed in the study
of the European reality? Of course, colonialism
has now practically disappeared and the labeling
of an underdeveloped country as "backward"
is clearly no longer acceptable or in use. The
conceptualization of colonialism and backwardness, however, clearly emerged from a conception of capitalism primarily developed from the
European case. Hence it is not surprising that the
question one can raise in that context remains
apposite in more modern discussions.
Second, the arguments made in the 19thcentury discussion about colonialism and backwardness are in themselves pregnant with
meaning for the understanding of today's processes of underdevelopment and dependence.
Implicit in that discussion was a confrontation
between a unilinear interpretation of history
which saw the future of "'backward" societies
already anticipated in the European processes of
capitalist industrialization, and a multilinear interpretation which clearly favored only some
countries and left others aside. While classical
political economy participated of the first version, Marx and Engels seemed to evolve from the
first to the second. Both positions have important
problems and are represented today by the
discussion between those who believe that industrial development is inevitable for all countries in the transition to modernity and those who
believe that underdeveloped countries are structurally condemned to lag behind.
2. CLASSICAL POLITICAL E C O N O M Y
AND B A C K W A R D NATIONS
Although the situation of less developed, non-

European nations is not the main focus of

attention of classical political economy, one can
find plenty of references to them in the writings
of its main representativesfl They are usually
called "backward countries" or "unimproving
nations." Classical political economists were far
from carrying out a systematic analysis of, let
alone constructing a fully-fledged theory about,
the nations they considered to be backward and
unimproving. They certainly sought, however, to
explain the causes of their backwardness, and
were especially interested in evaluating the impact of the European colonial expansion on these
countries. For most political economists, the fact
that backward nations were put under the tutelage of Europe through colonialism was a natural
and indispensable precondition for those countries to be able to break away from their old
patterns of stagnation and to be initiated into the
road to progress. A few political economists,
however, also saw and denounced some of the
problems created by the way in which European
countries organized the economic and political
control of their colonies. Adam Smith was the
most important of them.
In effect, Smith not only denounced the
mercantilist policies followed by the European
nations which only valued the exportation of gold
and silver to the metropoles, but he also consistently and forcefully criticized the trade monopoly established by European nations in the
commerce with their colonies. His concern
stemmed mainly from his resolute opposition to
all obstacles to free trade. Referring to the
discovery of America, he maintained that "the
savage injustice of the Europeans rendered an
event, which ought to have been beneficial to all,
ruinous and destructive to several of those
unfortunate countries. ''3 Monopolistic colonial
trade pushed up the prices of imports and
brought down the prices of exports in the
colonies, thus discouraging consumption and
industrial development. According to Smith, the
colonial monopoly of trade was not necessarily
beneficial to the colonial powers. It promoted an
unnaturally high price system and determined an
artificially high rate of profit for the monopolistic
sector. This structure of trade led to a distorted
and inefficient allocation of national resources.
Monopolies prevented the more rational and
advantageous utilization of capital and therefore,
they were bound to negatively affect the rate of
growth of the whole economy. As Smith put it,
the monopoly of colonial trade "depresses the
industry of all other countries, but chiefly that of
the colonies, without in the least increasing, but
on the contrary diminishing, that of the country
in whose favour it is established. ''4

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

Still, Smith did not oppose colonialism in
general. He distinguished between its economic
and the political aspects. For instance, in opposing the monopolistic control of trade by the East
India Company, he nevertheless accepted that
the company should continue to govern India for
the British crown to guarantee free trade. For
Smith, colonial trade could be most advantageous for both the colonies and the colonial
powers so long as there was no monopolistic
control of it. His assumption was that provided
free trade was assured, the colonies would have
no problem in developing normally. Smith did
not question British rule in America and India,
he only challenged its monopolistic economic
policies and the specific way in which they were
enforced. The advantages of trade nonetheless
outweighed the disadvantages of monopoly.
We must carefully distinguish between the effects of
the colony trade and those of the monopoly of that
trade. The former are always and necessarily
beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful.
But the former are so beneficial, that the colony
trade, though subject to a monopoly, and notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still
upon the whole beneficial, and greatly beneficial;
though a good deal less so than it otherwise would
be. 5
Adam Smith did not blame colonialism or
colonial trade for the backwardness of nonEuropean countries. Even if the colonial monopoly of trade hurt the colonies more than
Europe, it was still true that colonial countries
were backward and stationary before they were
colonized just as China was backward without
having been colonized. Backwardness for Smith
had to do with internal factors which favored
agriculture over industry and internal trade over
foreign trade:
As the political economy of the nations of modern
Europe has been more favourable to manufactures
and foreign trade, the industry of the towns, than to
agriculture, the industry of the country, so that of
other nations has followed a different plan, and has
been more favourable to agriculture than to manufactures and foreign trade. ~'
The consequence of this was spelled out clearly:
"When a landed n a t i o n . . , oppresses, either by
high duties or by prohibitions, the trade of
foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its own
i n t e r e s t . . . " Perfect freedom of trade, the lack of
barriers against foreign industry was for backward nations "the most effectual expedient for
supplying them in due time with all the artificers,
manufacturers, and merchants whom they
wanted at home. ''7
As Platteau has pointed out, Smith was excep-

227

tional among other classical political economists

in that he did not propound as a justification for
colonialism the paternalist conception that European countries had a civilizing mission to accomplish in the rest of the world. ~ Smith conceived of
the British Empire as a vast commercial enterprise to which both Great Britain and the
colonies should contribute and which should
benefit both on equal terms. On the other hand,
there was among many classical political economists a clear perception about some of the
excesses committed by colonial powers and about
some fundamental differences in the prosperity
of various colonies which were related to the way
in which they were administered. Smith, for
instance, tried to explain the relatively successful
development of the British North American
colonies in comparison with the sluggishness of
the British colonies in Asia and the Spanish and
Portuguese colonies in South America. He
compared the more liberal policies pursued in the
British North American colonies which facilitated greater autonomy and trade with the more
restrictive and monopolistic commercial practices
imposed on the Spanish and Portuguese colonies
of South America and British colonial Asia.
Malthus used similar arguments. Yet they never
questioned colonialism in itself and there was a
tendency to overemphasize the critique of the
Spanish and Portuguese forms of colonization in
contrast with the supposedly more enlightened
British approach.
The contrast between the British and other
colonizers was very noticeable in the work of
Malthus, who concentrated on the differences
between North and South American colonies. In
the latter, he accused Spain and Portugal of
cruelty, violence, maladministration and other
vices which made the colonizers worse than the
colonized: "Whatever may be the character of
the Spanish inhabitants of Mexico and Peru at
the present moment, we cannot read the
accounts of these countries without feeling
strongly that the race destroyed was, in moral
worth as well as numbers, superior to the race of
their destroyers. "'9 The British North American
colonies, on the contrary, "'far outstripped all the
others in the progress of their population" and
added to vast and rich territories "a greater
degree of liberty and equality. ''l That Malthus's
point was not so much to praise the moral value
of the South American natives as to attack the
character of the Spanish colonizers (in contrast
with the talents and tact of the British colonizers)
was shown by his multiple remarks about the
indolence, ignorance and improvidence of the
American Indians. These bad habits were fostered by the natural richness and fertility of the

228

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

soil in those countries. The easier it was to make

a living, the greater the tendency to leisure.l~ In
order to break this propensity to leisure, new
needs should be stimulated, especially through
international trade. As Malthus put it,
The greatest of all difficulties in converting uncivilized and thinly peopled countries into civilized and
populous ones, is to inspire them with the wants
best calculated to excite their exertions in the
production of wealth. One of the greatest benefits
which foreign commerce confers, and the reason
why it has always appeared an almost necessary
ingredient in the progress of wealth, is, its tendency
to inspire new wants, to form new tastes, and to
furnish fresh motives for industry,t-"
At the opposite extreme of Smith, Say distinguished between "enlightened nations" possessing a "superior civilization" and "savage
nations" possessing an "'inferior civilization."
The individuals of the latter were rather passive
and resigned, had a marked preference for
leisure and were incapable of any rational reflection and scientific activity. As all nations must go
through the same stages of progress, the enlightened European countries had the duty and the
right to help the savage nations to become
civilized:
It is "'in the interest of the human species" that the
advanced European nations must keep and even
increase their influence in A s i a . . . it is evident that
"with its despots and superstitions, Asia has no
good institutions to lose'" but "she could receive
many good ones from the Europeans. "~3
Unlike Smith, Say believed that colonies were
a burden rather than a positive factor to the
development and prosperity of the metropolitan
countries For Say, however, in principle all
peoples had the natural right to govern themselves. So he thought that ideally, in the interest
of both parties, colonized countries should become independent. Yet colonialism was justified
as a temporary measure for as long as backward
countries remained immature and were being
educated in the European values and customs.
Similarly, James Mill took the view that India
was uncivilized by comparison with Britain and,
in arguing against the fictional accounts of the
first travelers which described a fabulous ancient
Indian civilization, he averred that "every thing
. . bears clear, concurring, and undeniable
testimony to the ignorance of the Hindus, and
the low state of civilization in which they
remain. ''t4 The same applied to China and other
Asiatic societies. In describing the moral character of Indians and Chinese. he maintained that
"both nations are to nearly an equal degree
tainted with the vices of insincerity; dissembling,

treacherous, mendacious, to an excess which

surpasses even the usual measure of uncultivated
society. ''ls Ricardo, impressed by Mill's account,
wrote to him exclaiming: "What a frightful
obstruction to improvement does the immoral
character of the people of India present! ''t6 For
Mill, the main cause of this situation was
political, especially bad laws and the despotic
character of government which destroyed the
population's morality and their motivation to
work. Mill shared with Say the view that the only
possibility of changing this picture was the benign
and enlightened tutelage of Europeans, even if
they had to resort to some forms of authoritarianism. Again, Mill did not believe that the colonial
powers would derive any economic benefit from
their civilizing task. Colonies were a burden
rather than a means for European nations to
become rich.
The concern with the motivation of the inhabitants of backward countries was also shown by
J. S. Mill. According to him, backward societies
had a very weak "effective desire" to accumulate,
to work harder and to save. Like Malthus, he
attributed this lack of motivation to the favorable
natural conditions in backward countries which
generated the development of only limited needs
in the population. But he also followed his
father's belief that oppressive political institutions were partly responsible for discouraging the
right attitudes. This was, in J. S. Mill's view, the
main problem in India before the British conquest. Unlike James Mill and Say, J. S. Mill saw
colonization as advantageous for European
nations, because it allowed the possibility of
investing capital abroad and of getting cheap
foodstuffs, thus helping to counteract the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Yet he
resolutely rejected the idea that British existence
and prosperity simply depended on getting new
markets abroad or that colonial countries suffered economic damage under European rule.
Colonialism for J S. Mill was not only n o t
antagonistic to the interests of non-European
nations but also benefited the colonies more than
the metropolitan countries. Although he criticized the most blatant errors committed by the
British in Ireland and India, he saw colonial rule
as necessary, especially for immature nonEuropean countries. As he put it,
Independence and nationality, so essential to the
due growth and development of a people further
advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs. The sacred duties which civilized
nations owe to the independence and nationality of
each other, are not binding towards those to whom
nationality and independence are either a certain
evil, or at best a questionable good . . .t7

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

Most classical political economists, even those
who were critical of some colonial practices,
justified colonialism on the grounds of its civilizing role and as the only way of stimulating the
needs and material aspirations of the backward
peoples. Backward nations had to be put under
the benign and enlightened tutelage of Europe in
order to initiate their road to progress. On their
own, the economies of backward nations were
stagnant and could not develop their productive
forces. This was mainly due to the wrong
attitudes most of the people in these nations had:
their preference for leisure, and their lack of
interest in working harder and saving for the
future. Ricardo once said that if for any reason
the wages of Irish workers were raised, they
would work less because with less effort they
would satisfy their meager needs. This applied in
general to all backward nations. The lack of
motivation was not innate but the result of a
variety of reasons such as hot climates, natural
fertility of the land and, above all, oppressive
despotisms which did not reward effort and
discouraged trade and industry. All this could
only be changed, insofar as it was changeable,
with the diffusion of values, international trade
and in general, the civilizing mission which
colonialism secured.
This conception of colonialism must be understood in the context of the more general views
which classical political economy held about the
process of capitalist development in Europe.
Adam Smith, for instance, saw in the productive
and accumulative character of capitalism a solution to the profound historical crisis of feudalism
which originated in the fact that the surplus
created by the feudal society was squandered by
unproductive workers and the aristocracy, thus
condemning society to be stationary. ~8Smith was
particularly concerned with struggling against all
narrowing of competition or encroachment on
free trade. For him, development meant the
extension of the division of labor and the
application of machinery to the productive process so that an increase in the productivity of
labor could be achieved. Insofar as the objective
of economic development is concerned, Adam
Smith proposed that "the great object of the
political economy of every country is to increase
the riches and power of that country, ''~9 and
those riches are a function of the national
product.
Smith defined economic activity in material
terms, the physical production of material goods.
So, in his view, one of the factors which promotes
development is an increasing proportion of the
work force dedicated to productive work, which
is precisely the reverse to the situation in feudal-

229

ism. But in addition, there must be an increase in

productivity by the division of labor which is
achieved through the expansion of the market
and international trade. 2 Ricardo, in his turn,
understood development as a process of selfsustained accumulation of capital and growth
which could only be arrested by the limitations of
available land. This is why he conceded a central
place to the free import of corn as the essential
counterbalancing force to diminishing agricultural returns. As Ricardo put it, referring to food
and raw materials, "let these be supplied from
abroad in exchange for manufactured goods, and
it is difficult to say where the limit is at which you
would cease to accumulate wealth and to derive
profit from its employment. ''2t
The fact that both Adam Smith and David
Ricardo conceived of, and wanted to fight
against, a possible "stationary state" of society,
clearly corresponds to the situation of the early
European bourgeoisie which was still struggling
to impose its rule and which was unsure of the
eventual results of its struggles. Their perception
of other, more backward societies and their
stationary character was certainly influenced by
their own struggles against the remnants of
feudalism in Europe. For the reasons already
stated, however, they assumed that those nations
could not carry out their own transition to
capitalism without European colonial tutelage.
Such idea was clearly strengthened by the perception that international trade and expansion
abroad were also a necessity for the development
of capitalism at home. Hence colonialism could
even be justified as a way of establishing,
enforcing and maintaining free trade in other
parts of the world, thus securing development for
both advanced and backward nations.

3. MARX A N D ENGELS ON
COLONIALISM

It is rather surprising to find that Marx's

systematic critique of many aspects of classical
political economy did not include a specific
critique of the political economists' views about
backward societies. On the contrary, it is possible
to argue that Marx and Engels shared with the
political economists the belief in the world
mission of European capitalism, and that, in the
course of their historical analyses, they occasionally showed similar prejudices as well. The
general perspective of Marx and Engels, however, was very different in that they did not
accept that the process of development could be
exhausted within the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism was an historically necessary

2~

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

stage but it had to be surpassed. All their

analyses, including those of backward societies,
were carried out with a view to ascertain the
possibilities of socialism in the world.
Marx clearly saw the crucial importance of the
formation of a world market, through colonialism and foreign trade, for the development of
capitalism in Europe. On the one hand, the
colonial expansion of European nations contributed to the process of "primitive accumulation"
which preceded capitalist production proper. The
discovery and conquest of America led to the
massive importation of precious metals into
Europe which facilitated the accumulation of
capital necessary for the formation of manufacturing industry. 22 This far from enlightened
process is forcefully described by Marx at the end
of the first volume of Capital:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines
of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the
conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning
of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting
of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of
capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are
the chief momenta of primitive accumulation, 23
On the other hand, after "'real" capitalist relations were established in England, the continued
expansion of colonization became crucial for
getting cheap raw materials, 24 finding new
markets for industrial commodities and counteracting the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.
It is important to ascertain Marx's evaluation
of the results and potentialities of this colonial
expansion, not only for European capitalism but
also for the process of development in the
colonized countries. Most commentators focus
on some key texts about British colonialism
written before the 1860s in which Marx, while
denouncing the greedy motives and cruel excesses of colonialism, justified its historical
necessity as the only means of liberating backward societies from their ancient patterns of
stagnation and initiating them on the path of
capitalist industrialization and development. The
most frequently referred to texts are concerned
with the British rule in India and state that
England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in
Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests,
and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them.
But that is not the question. The question is, can
mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental
revolution in the social state of Asia?zs
England has to fulfil a double mission in India:
one destructive, the other regenerating - - the
annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of
the material foundations of Western society in
Asia. 2~

I know that the English millocracy intends to

endow India with railways with the exclusive view of
extracting at diminishing expenses the cotton and

other raw materials for their manufacturers, But

when you have once introduced machinery into the
locomotion of a country which possesses iron and
coals, you are unable to withhold it from its
fabrication . . . The railway system will therefore
become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern
industry.27
On the one hand Marx criticized the misery and
destruction, the arbitrariness and sufferings
imposed on India by the East India Company.
But on the other hand, he refused to idealize
Indian village life before the British arrived and
reminded us that these supposedly "idyllic"
village communities suffered from degrading
poverty and stagnation, were burdened with
caste distinctions and slavery, and constituted the
solid foundation of the barbarism and unspeakable cruelties of oriental despotism. Sickening as
it was to witness the destruction of a patriarchal
mode of life and greedy as the British motives
were in bringing that destruction about, the
process was still a necessary precondition of the
capitalist regeneration which would inevitably
lead to India's industrialization. Even though
Marx acknowledged that the Indians "will not
reap the fruits of the new elements of society
scattered among them by the British" until there
was a proletarian revolution in Britain or the
Hindus became independent, he was still confident that "at all events, we may safely expect to
see, at a more or less remote period, the
regeneration of that great and interesting
country."2~
1 have argued elsewhere 2u that there are in
Marx's writings some tensions which allow different interpretations of historical materialism.
One of them has to do with the conception of
history. On the one hand, in certain statements
Marx describes historical evolution as a necessary
and natural process, regulated by universal laws,
which imposes itself on human beings and which
inexorably leads to a known end. ~ On the other
hand, there are a number of passages which deal
with history in a context which underlines above
all human practice and its capacity for modifying
circumstances. The emphasis is Rut on the fact
that human beings make history. i I have argued
that it is necessary to reconstruct historical
materialism in the latter sense and abandon a
deterministic conception. There is little doubt,
however, that behind Marx's approach to India
and China at this stage, Marx shows his belief in a
superior historical logic which imposes itself, in
spite of terrible sufferings and whatever the
motivations of the human actors involved.

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

Although one must not forget the existence of
other texts which redress the balance, one must
accept that these texts on India and China
emphasize only one side of the tension.
Marx appears to argue that the British
bourgeoisie "cannot fail . . . to lay down the
material premises ''32 for the emancipation of the
Indian people and "bourgeois industry and commerce create these material conditions of a new
world in the same way as geological revolutions
have created the surface of the earth.' 33 If one
follows that logic, it is possible to argue that
when in Capital Marx says that "the country that
is more developed industrially only shows, to the
less developed, the image of its own future "34
this could be interpreted to mean that colonial
domination is the best way in which the country
which is more developed can directly show to the
less developed the image of its own future.
It is within the logic of this historical perspective that one can understand why Marx at this
stage dislikes protectionism: free-trade contributes to the destruction and disarticulation of the
old modes of production which keep backward
countries stagnant. Thus, in a letter to Engels,
Marx argues that
Carey . . . . our ultra-free-trader finally recommends
protective tariffs. In order to escape the effects of

bourgeois industry, for which he makes England

responsible, he resorts like a true Yankee to
hastening this development in America itself by
artificial means... The Tribune is of course hard at
it trumpeting Carey's book . . . Your article on
Switzerland was of course an indirect smack at the
leading articles in the Tribune . . . . and its Carey. I
have continued this hidden warfare in my first
article on India in which the destruction of the
native industry by England is described as
revolutionary. ~

In the same direction, one can also mention those

texts where Marx and Engels condone the forcible subjection of backward nations for the sake
of progress. Thus for Engels, the conquest of
Algeria by the French is "an important and
fortunate fact for the progress of civilization" and
in the case of the American conquest of Mexican
land he comments that
In America we have witnessed the conquest of
Mexico, which has pleased us. It constitutes progress too that a country until the present day
exclusively occupied with itself, torn apart by
perpetual civil wars and prevented from all developm e n t . . , that such a country be thrown by means of
violence into the historical movement. It is in the
interest of its own development that Mexico will be
in the future under the tutelage of the United
States. ~

231

In general, Marx and Engels at this time did not

believe in the right of self-determination of
backward nations and thought that the national
struggles for liberation and independence had to
be subordinated to the needs of the stronger and
more progressive nations. Small states were an
obstacle to progress and could be absorbed by
large ones. Thus Marx at this time thought that
Ireland's independence from England was
impossible37 and expected "to overthrow the
Irish regime by English working-class ascendancy. ''3s In a speech commemorating the 1830
Polish revolution which had been crushed by the
Russians, he warned the Chartists that they
"should not express pious wishes for the liberation of nations" and that it was really the victory
of the proletariat in England that was of "decisive
importance for the victory of all oppressed
peoples over their oppressors. Poland, therefore,
must be freed, not in Poland, but in England. ''39
Most of the development specialists who maintain that these early views on India and colonialism truly represent Marx and Engels's definitive
thought are also critical of them, especially
because they assume that capitalism cannot but
industrialize the whole world after conquering
backward nations and destroying their traditional
modes of production. Sutcliffe, for instance,
argues that the British destruction of the Indian
indigenous textile industry allowed the expansion
of the British modern textile industry, but that by
this very fact, it made less possible the future
industrialization of India. By destroying capital
stock, it weakened accumulation and also deprived a future Indian national industry of its
market. 4 Amin too criticizes Marx's erroneous
optimism about the future industrialization of
India for similar reasons. He argues that Marx,
however, could not have known that the new
monopolistic phase of capitalism would emerge
in which "monopolies would prevent any local
capitalism that might arise from competing with
them."41
Similarly, Barrat Brown contends that
although Marx was right in believing that capitalism would expand worldwide, he was mistaken
in assuming that industrialization would ensue
everywhere apart from a few European
countries. 42 Equally, from a more general perspective, Hinkelammert argues that Marx did not
conceive of a qualitative difference between
development and underdeveiopment, and consequently tended to identify the latter with backwardness. This presupposes a homogeneous
world capitalist system where there can only exist
quantitative differences which are due to nations
being at different stages of the same necessary
process. 43

232

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

An important exception to this critical trend is

Warren's book, provocatively entitled Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism, which extensively
quotes from Marx's articles on India and strongly
argues in favor of going back to the original
Marxian idea that capitalism is an inherently
industrializing force and that imperialism is the
vehicle through which it can achieve its developing and civilizing mission in the backward
regions. 44 Whether critical or not, however, all of
these authors have one thing in common: by
exclusively focusing on writings before 1860, they
believe that the true position of Marx and Engels
is to maintain that colonialism necessarily leads
to the industrialization of backward countries.
They do not seem to see any major shift in Marx
and Engels's position vis-i~-vis colonialism
throughout their intellectual evolution.
This kind of interpretation of Marx and
Engels's position fails to recognize significant
changes in their approach to the colonial question in their writings after 1860. In this, I side
with authors like Davis, Mori and Scaron who
distinguish some evolutionary stages in Marx and
Engels's thought which are indicative of a progressive change of attitude. Scaron draws the
most sophisticated outline by distinguishing four
stages. From 1847 to 1856, Marx and Engels
adopt a dual approach which both criticizes the
excesses of colonialism and theoretically justifies
its historical mission. Developed nations have a
civilizing role to play and therefore, have the
right to establish their hegemony over backward
areas, sometimes called nations or peoples "'without history." From 1856 to 1864, there is a
transitional period where denunciation is stepped
up without any change in the basic theory. From
1864 to 1883, the Irish question comes to the fore
and the evaluation of colonialism seems to be
radically altered. Colonialism is now presented as
a hindrance to the industrialization of the colonies, even in the case of India. Still the existence
of peoples or nations "without history" continues
to be upheld. Finally, from Marx's death in 1883
to Engels's death in 1895 there is a period
characterized by the marked Eurocentrism of
Engels's final years. 45
Davis and Mori propose simpler dichotomous
outlines which locate a turning point somewhere
around the 1860s under the influence of the Irish
and Polish questions. 46 According to Mori, the
thesis of the "double mission," of colonialism is
altered after 1860 when Marx realizes that the
destructive and regenerating aspects of colonialism are not necessarily two inseparable aspects of
the same process: the destruction of old societies
by colonialism may not give rise to the material
conditions for regeneration. Details apart, Davis,

Mori and Scaron agree on the substantive thesis

that there is a significant shift both in Marx's
attitude in relation to national struggles and in
Marx's assessment of the impact of colonialism in
the so-called backward countries. A brief review
of Marx's writings shows that their interpretation
is basically correct although insufficient.
Insofar as national struggles are concerned, we
have already seen how Marx thought in his early
years that because the conflict between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat was most developed in England, the national struggles of other
countries had to be subordinated to, and could
succeed only through, the English class struggle.
Thus he declared that Poland had to be liberated
in England and regretted the idea of Ireland's
independence by arguing that Ireland was to be
liberated by English working class ascendancy. In
1869, however, he argued that "the English
working class will never accomplish anything until
it has got rid of Ireland. The lever must be
applied in Ireland. ''47 As regards to Poland, he
also changed his position in 1875: it is no longer
the English class struggle that can liberate
Poland,
On the contrary; only after Poland has won its
independence again, only after it is able to govern
itself again as a free people, only then can its inner
development begin again and can it cooperate as an
independent force in the social transformation of
Europe. 4X
Insofar as the impact of colonialism is concerned,
a good number of crucial changes are also
noticeable. While in 1853 Marx enthusiastically
argued that the railway system would ineluctably
lead to the industrialization of India, by 1879 his
evaluation of the impact of railways on backward
countries was more cautious:
the railway system . . . allowed, and even forced,
states where capitalism was confined to a few
summits of society, to suddenly create and enlarge
their capitalistic superstructure in dimensions altogether disproportionate to the bulk of the social
body, carrying on the great work of production in
the traditional modes . . . the railways gave of
course an immense impulse to the development of
Foreign Commerce, but the commerce in countries
which export principally raw produce increased the
misery of the masses... All the changes were very
useful indeed for the great landed proprietor, the
usurer, the merchant, the railways, the bankers and
so forth, but very dismal for the real producer! 4~
In 1853, Marx had argued that the zemindari and
the ryotwari systems, imposed by the British in
India as a substitute for communal land rights,
were progressive in spite of their cruel features
because they were forms of private property,

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

"the great desideratum of Asiatic Society. ' ' ~ In
1881, on the contrary, in the process of drafting a
reply to a letter from Vera Zazulich, Marx
affirmed that the abolition of the communal land
ownership in India "was only an act of English
vandalism which pushed the indigenous people
not forward but backward. "51 While in 1853
Marx had been absolutely opposed to protectionism and had criticized Carey for recommending
protective tariffs to the United States, in 1867 he
seems to advocate the opposite in the case of
Ireland:
What the Irish need is 1) Self-government... 2) An
agrarian revolution . . . 3) Protective tariffs against
England. Between 1783 and 1801 all branches of
Irish industry flourished. The Union, by abolishing
the protective tariffs established by the Irish Parliament, destroyed all industrial life in Ireland . . .
Once the Irish are independent, necessity will turn
them into protectionists, as it did Canada, Australia, etc. -~"
Marx's early optimistic vision that colonial capitalism, even against his avowed intentions, could
not but "create the material basis of the new
world, ''53 gives way to a more cautious approach
which is aware of the possibility that imperialist
countries may succeed in keeping colonies in
their rural backwardness. As early as 1856,
Engels maintained that "how often have the Irish
started out to achieve something, and every time
they have been crushed, politically and industrially. By consistent oppression they have been
artificially converted into an utterly impoverished nation. ''54 Marx was to reiterate this point
in 1867: "every time Ireland was about to
develop industrially, she was crushed and reconverted into a purely agricultural land. "'55 The
same idea was extended to other European states
which "also forcibly rooted out, in their dependent countries, all industry, as e.g., England did
with the Irish woollen manufacture. "'56
When Marx in Capital deals with the relationships between industrial and backward countries
within the world market at a more general level,
be does not even mention the "regenerating"
mission he had spoken about before. On the
contrary, his description can be said to anticipate
the idea of a division between center and
periphery:
By ruining handicraft production in other countries, machinery forcibly converts them into fields
for the supply of its raw material. In this way East
India was compelled to produce cotton, wool,
hemp, jute, and indigo for Great Britain... foreign
lands.., are thereby converted into settlements for
growing the raw material of the mother country;
just as Australia, for example was converted into a
colony for growing wool. A new and international

233

division of labour, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern industry
springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a
chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly
industrial field.57
By coupling the results of this new international
division of labor to the operation of the law of
value Marx is able to postulate the possibility of
unequal exchange among nations and, more
specifically, the exploitation of agricultural
nations. In principle, because profit and surplus
value are not necessarily identical, it follows that
individual capitalists as well as nations may trade
with each other, even on an expanding scale,
without necessarily gaining in equal degrees. This
means that "one of the nations may continually
appropriate for itself a part of the surplus labour
of the other, ''58 When this is the result of
international differences in the technological
base and the productivity of labor, Marx goes so
far as to treat this process of unequal exchange as
a form of exploitation:
The relationship between labour days of different
countries may be similar to that existing between
skilled, complex labour and unskilled, simple
labour within a country, in this case the richer
country exploits the poorer one, even where the
latter gains by the exchange . . .59
Agricultural countries tend to be exploited in this
way because in international exchange they are
forced "to sell their product below its value."
Whereas with respect to industrial goods, the
developed nation produces greater value than the
backward nation, despite the fact that individual
commodities are cheaper, the contrary happens
with agricultural products. "The product of the
more backward nation is cheaper than that of the
capitalistically developed n a t i o n . . , and yet the
product of the developed nation appears to be
produced by much less (annual) labour than that
of the backward one. ''e~ Insofar as the modern
theories of unequal exchange share the view that
unequal exchange entails a transfer of value from
underdeveloped countries which sell their products below their value to developed countries
which sell their products above their value - - and
I believe that in spite of their many differences
and use of different theoretical paradigms the
Economic Commission for Latin America and
Marxist authors like Emmanuel and Amin agree
on that - - they are indebted to Marx's work. An
important difference between all of them and
Marx, however, is that his analysis did not
necessarily entail the permanent underdevelopment of the backward nations.
Both Scaron and Mori suggest that Marx's

234

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

analysis does amount to a de facto discovery of,

and approximation to the notion of "underdevelopment" or "'development of underdevelopment. "'6~ I do not think that such a
conclusion is defensible. First, in the 19th century
these concepts did not and could not arise. The
reality alluded by them did not yet exist. It is
important to remember that the concept of
underdevelopment was coined after WWII to
refer to countries which, within the capitalist
mode of production, are dependent upon, and
lag systematically behind, the main industrial
centers of the world. Marx, on the contrary,
referred mainly to backward countries whose
predominant modes of production were not
capitalist. Second, Marx never accepted that
capitalist countries could become permanently
underdeveloped, which is the sense of Andre
Gunder Frank's expression "development of
underdevelopment.'" Third, Marx's post-1860
thought entails only a different assessment of
colonialism in certain, and by no means all,
cases.
In his later years. Marx seemed to accept the
fact that colonialism, instead of always being
conducive to the successful spread of capitalist
industrialization, could delay it and thereby
interrupt the process of capitalist development in
the periphery. But he seemed to have little doubt
that once the colonized countries became independent, a combination of self-government,
protective tariffs and agrarian reform could
successfully put things right again. He did not
explain, however, why this program, which
Canada and Australia were "forced by necessity"
to follow and which Ireland would eventually be
forced to adopt, was not being pursued by the
already independent Latin American nationstates. Nor did he provide any class analysis
which might have explained the policies followed
by the ruling classes of the new republics which,
by espousing the British idea of free trade,
delayed industrialization and were oriented to
the export of raw materials. This requires an
explanation.

4. MARX AND ENGELS ON

LATIN A M E R I C A
A review of Marx and Engels's writings on
Latin America immediately shows the striking
absence of any consideration of its possible
industrial future and of any class analysis which
goes beyond some isolated remarks. The newly
independent Latin American nations are not
treated as specific entities, worth investigating in
themselves. The bulk of the writings on Latin

America are scattered references in letters and

articles. The few more substantial pieces tend to
be journalistic or biographical accounts of Latin
American political events and personalities for
European or North American consumption. The
context is frequently rather negative in that it
tends to portray the character of Latin Americans as inherently flawed and their political
processes as lacking all rationality and historical
direction.
Engels was pleased with the North American
invasion of Mexico because a country perpetually
ravaged by civil war and unable to develop was
"'thrown by violence into the historical movement." It is as if Mexico was outside history and
its only chance to be incorporated into it was
through the agency of the "energetic" North
Americans, an historical people with a mission to
accomplish in the rest of America. For Engels, it
was rather fortunate that
magnificent California was snatched from the lazy
Mexicans, who did not know what to do with i t . . .
The "independence" of a few Spanish Californians
and Texans may suffer by this, "justice" and other
moral principles may be infringed here and there;
but what does that matter against such worldhistorical events?"-"
True, years later Marx and Engels strongly
opposed the joint intervention of England,
France and Spain in Mexico as "one of the most
monstrous enterprises ever rej~istered in the
annals of international history,' .... but their main
concern was to condemn the policies of Painterston because they suspected that such an adventure. while the US civil war was taking place, was
only a pretext to attack the United States. The
fate of Mexico itself seemed to be a secondary
consideration, although they did say that it could
slip back into anarchy. Marx's biography of
Bolivar, the Venezuelan hero of Latin American
independence, written for The New American
Cyclopaedia in 1858, depicts him as cowardly,
brutal and miserable. 64 This kind of abuse, which
is excessive although it has more basis than Latin
Americans historians normally recognize, is not
in itself so regrettable as the fact that the Latin
American independence process is reduced, by
default, to a story of personal betrayal, envy and
cowardice without any mention or analysis of the
social forces behind the process.
In 1891, years after Marx's death, Engels
seems to develop second thoughts and in a letter
to Schliiter maintains that "the articles in the
Cyclopaedia are a purely professional work,
nothing more, they can continue to rest in
peace. ''65 Yet at the time Marx, in a letter to
Engels, emphatically defended his biography of

MARX ON ~BACKWARD'" NATIONS

Bolivar y Ponte against the accusation of partiality leveled against him by Charles Dana, coeditor
of the Cyclopaedia:
Dana objects to a longer articlc on Bolivar because
it would be written in a partisan style, and demands
my authorities. These I can provide, naturally,
although the demand is strange. As for the partisan
style, i have certainly gone somehow beyond the
encyclopaedic tone. It would have been too much to
want to present a most miserable, brutal and
cowardly ,scoundrel as Napoleon 1. Bolivar is the
true Soulouque. ~
To this treatment of Bolivar one should add the
more disturbing references to the Latin American character. Thus the Mexicans are said to be
"lazy.'" and to share "'the vices, arrogance,
thuggery and quixotism'" of the Spaniards. Even
after 1860, when Marx and Engels strongly
opposed the French invasion of Mexico and
celebrated the Mexican victory over General
Lorencez in May 1862, they still could not refrain
from referring to the victorious Mexicans as "les
derniers des hommes."67 It is true that this type of
abusive remark was also used by Marx and
Engels to refer to other "backward" nationalities
and countries: the Montenegrins were labeled as
"cattle robbers," the Bedouins were branded as a
"'nation of robbers," and there was a reference to
the "'hereditary stupidity" of the Chinese. 68 But,
of course, the fact that the Latin Americans were
not singled out for attack does not justify the use
of this kind of language.

5. THE I N F L U E N C E O F C L A S S I C A L
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND HEGEL
Given the importance which Marx and Engels
conceded to the work of classical political economists, it is obviously very interesting to compare the way in which these political economists
dealt with "backward" nations. Let us first
consider the similarities. At different points in
time there are similarities between Marx and
Engels and the classical political economists in
their belief that capitalism is a necessary stage for
all countries, their dislike of protectionism, and
their positive evaluation of the civilizing mission
of colonialism. There are also many disquieting
points of contact between Marx and Engels's
abusive remarks and the prejudices of the classical political economists: Ricardo's comments on
the lazy Irish are matched by Engels's remark
about the lazy Mexicans, whom Marx, in his
turn, labels as "the last of men." James Mill's
description of the moral character of Indians and
Chinese as tainted with the vices of falsity and

235

slyness can be compared with Marx's remarks

about the stupidity of the Chinese, and about the
vices of Spaniards and Mexicans.
The question arises as to whether Marx and
Engels were simply following in the tracks of
classical economists of whether the relationship
was more complex. I do not think that the
unfortunate use of abusive expressions, regrettable as it is, constitutes the central issue. Nor do
I think that a superficial similarity between some
remarks of these authors suffices to conclude that
they all thought the same with respect to nonEuropean countries. Marx and Engels's objective, unlike classical political economy's, was
always the overcoming of capitalism and the
socialist liberation of backward societies.
It should also be quite clear that whereas
classical political economists never ceased to
justify colonialism and were adamant that, for a
number of reasons (including a deficiency of
character), backward nations could not develop
without European tutelage, Marx and Engels
changed their position after 1860, realized that
colonialism hindered development in many
areas, became protectionist, and started to doubt
the necessity of the capitalist stage everywhere.
A sign of the evolution of their thoughts is their
restrained language - - a remarkable diminution
of their abusive expressions with respect to
backward nations, including the Latin American
ones, after 1860. While the classical economists'
approach to backward societies emphasized
almost exclusively either the flaws in the character of non-European peoples or climatic factors,
Marx and Engels's analyses went far beyond
some passing abusive remarks and considered the
role of these countries in the process of expansion of socialism.
The issue which remains controversial is not
then a supposedly common universal contempt
for non-European peoples, but the fact that even
after Marx and Engels changed their approach
with respect to nonindustrial societies in the
1860s, Latin America continued to be neglected
and its basic social processes regarded as arbitrary and irrational occurrences. How can this be
explained? An answer may be found by focusing
on the Hegelian influence on Marx, which was
particularly strong after 1858. There are two
aspects of Hegel's thought which seem relevant
to this particular analysis.
On the one hand, one can find in Hegel a series
of remarks about South America which can also
be considered as contemptuous and abusive.
According to Hegel, South America was "physically and spiritually impotent," a place where
"even the animals show the same inferiority as
the human beings," who, in their turn, are

2~

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

considered to be "obviously unintelligent individuals with little capacity for education." "Their
inferiority in all respects, even in stature, can be
seen in every particular," so that, for instance, in
Paraguay "a clergyman used to ring a bell at
midnight to remind them to perform their matrimonial duties, for it would otherwise never have
occurred to them to do so." The natives are
compared to "unenlightened children, living
from one day to the next, and untouched by
higher thoughts or aspirations"; they inhabit a
world where events "are but an echo of the Old
World and the expression of an alien life. ''69
The Latin American Creoles descended from
the Spanish conquerors did not fare any better in
Hegel's description. Their character was linked
to that of the Spanish:
Living far away from the mother country on which
they depended, they had more scope to indulge
their arbitrary inclinations . . . The noble and
magnanimous aspects of the Spanish character did
not accompany them to America. The Creoles, who
are descended from the Spanish immigrants, lived
on in the presumptuous ways they had inherited,
and behaved in an arrogant manner towards the
natives.7o
Marx seemed to have closely followed these
Hegelian views when comparing the Mexicans
with the Spaniards:
the Spaniards are completely degenerated. But in
the presence of a Mexican. a degenerated Spaniard
constitutes an ideal. They have all the vices,
arrogance, thuggery and quixotism of the Spaniards
to the third degree, but by no means all the solid
things that they possess.7~
Just as in the case of classical political economy,
however, these abusive remarks do not seem to
be the central issue, and in any case, as 1 said
above, Marx and Engels adopted more cautious
language after 1860. Still, the issues involved in
Hegel's description of South America are much
more complex than the appearances suggest.
What for classical political economists was a
mere pragmatic argument about the flaws of
character and the necessary dependence of nonEuropean nations, in Hegel became an important
distinction which underpinned his philosophy of
history. This is the other aspect of his thought
which is relevant in our discussion.
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of World
History, Hegel distinguished between worldhistorical peoples, which were culturally developed, capable of building a strong state and thus
of contributing to the progress of world history,
and peoples without history, which were spiritually weak, unable to build a strong state, and
thus having no civilizing mission to carry out in

history. The latter had to submit to the former.

Thus, for instance, China represented for Hegel
a stationary nation which did not contribute to
the progress of world history. His description of
South America clearly shows that for him it had
no autonomous role to play in the development
of the human spirit either, and that, on the
contrary, it constituted a world where events
were a mere echo of Europe.

6. PEOPLES W I T H O U T HISTORY AND

THE QUESTION OF E U R O C E N T R I S M
The question arises as to whether the influence
of this Hegelian approach explains why Marx and
Engels did not care to analyze the situation of
Latin American countries in the same way as
they tried to understand Ireland. I shall focus on
three related answers to this question which,
while accepting the explanatory importance of
the Hegelian influence, entail different positions
regarding what has been loosely called Eurocentrism. First, the work of Aric6, 72 which probably
constitutes the most important contribution in
the field, must be considered. For Aric6, the
Hegelian influence, - - and especially the distinction between historical peoples and peoples
without history - - plays a crucial explanatory
role.
Aric6's thesis is that the notion of Eurocentrism must be rejected as an explanation of Marx
and Engels's neglect of Latin America. Aric6
conceives of "Eurocentrism" as expressing two
related ideas. First, it implies that Marx and
Engels were ignorant of, or at least disinterested
in non-European realities; the noncapitalist
world would have remained outside the main
focus of their concern and study. Second, to the
extent that they marginally referred to the
noncapitalist world, Eurocentrism implies that
they would have tried to understand it upon the
basis of a theoretical framework and categories
which were developed for the analysis of European reality. Consequently, Marx and Engels
would have understood the noncapitalist world as
a mere mirror image of Europe, incapable of any
autonomy.
Aric6 argues that this notion of Eurocentrism
cannot be sustained. First, although it is true that
in the context of the totality of Marx and Engels's
writings, Latin America occupies a marginal
place, one cannot say that they did not know
enough about or were not interested in Latin
America. In fact, they had an encyclopedic
knowledge of the world, they had easy access to
all the documentation they wanted in the British
Museum, and read and wrote a great deal about

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

Latin America. Second, the Eurocentrism thesis
ignores Marx and Engels's change of position in
the 1860s when they reassessed the impact of
worldwide capitalist expansion on backward and
colonized nations. From that time, Aric6 argues,
Marx and Engels "displaced the centre of revolution from Western European countries to
.73
colonial and dependent countries
and
accepted the possibility of backward societies
becoming socialist without going through a capitalist stage.
Having rejected an explanation based on the
notion of Eurocentrism, Aric6 argues that the
Hegelian conception of peoples without history,
which Marx and Engels would have appropriated
without analysis or elaboration as an "unsurpassed cultural substratum, "'74 was responsible
for their neglect of Latin America. Aric6 does
not think that Marx and Engels doubted the
ability of Latin American peoples to become
historical nations as a matter of principle, as if
those peoples were inherently inferior. In their
historical analyses, however, they did not detect
that ability in practice. If Marx's account of the
events in which Bolivar participated truly represents his view of Latin America, then it is clear
that he regarded most processes and struggles in
Latin America not as the necessary subject of
class analysis but as somewhat arbitrary and
irrational occurrences, at best forms of Bonapartism supported by the absence of a clear
class project. Aric6 suggests that for Marx,
Latin America seems to have been
a puzzling collection of extremely weak states,
governed by restricted oligarchies lacking in
national spirit, or by caudillos, usually from the
military, unable to prevent territorial fragmentation
and secure the presence of a national power except
by means of ferocious dictatorships, almost always
ephemeral; weak countries subject to economic
domination by and political subordination to capitalist imperialism. National formations seemed to
him mere state constructions erected upon an
institutional vacuum and the absence of a popular
will, unable to constitute themselves because of the
jelly-like quality of their social fabric. 75
A second, slightly different answer to the problem is provided by Franco in a thoughtful preface
to Aric6's book. He accepts with modifications
Arico's arguments about the importance of
Hegel's influence and agrees with him that Marx
and Engeis's change of mind in the 1860s calls
into question the concept of Eurocentrism.
However, Franco argues that the charge of
Eurocentrism against Marx and Engels can only
be lifted with respect to dominated European
nations and colonial Asiatic societies. It was only
in the cases of Russia, Turkey, India, Ireland and

237

Poland that Marx carried out class analysis and

considered the possibility of a revolutionary
movement. The new categories and theoretical
instruments that Marx and Engels developed to
understand the specific situations of these countries could be applied to Latin America only if its
reality was similar. But it was not, because the
Latin American countries were no longer
colonies.
The historical specificity of Latin America at
that time consisted of the processes of construction of the nation and the state, and Marx did not
develop a theory of these processes. Whenever
he referred to them, it was in the context of
either precapitalist formations or European reality. Hence, in analyzing Latin America, Marx
was tempted to believe that the construction of
the state would follow the European model. For
Franco. this is a different version of Eurocentrism, and not a problem which could be imputed to the Hegelian influence. This does not
mean, however, that Franco eliminates Hegel's
importance.
Franco argues that the very influence of the
Hegelian distinction between historical nations
and peoples without history on Marx confirms his
thesis of a different kind of Eurocentrism, because, "'after all, the 'historicity' or 'vitality' must
be proven in the capacity of a nation to become a
'state'. ''76 In the case of the Asiatic or Eastern
European nations, Marx anticipated the formation of national states such as those in Western
Europe. but he was unable to do the same with
Latin America because there the process seemed
to be inverted: they were not solid civil societies
culminating in stable states. They were weak,
Bonapartist states trying to construct civil
societies. Latin American reality was different
from the European pattern, and Marx and
Engels only had the European categories to
understand it. Hence the inability of Marx and
Engels's theoretical approach to apprehend the
specificity of the Latin American reality would
stem from their Eurocentric vision.
The third answer is my own attempt to deal
with the problem. I claim no originality, but I
stress a different aspect. On the one hand, I
accept Aric6's emphasis on the impact of the
Hegelian cultural legacy. There is no doubt that
even before 1860, Marx understood Asia through
Hegelian spectacles, and that what in Hegel was
a stationary phenomenon outside history, in
Marx became the Asiatic mode of production
that had to be broken by the penetration of
capitalism from the outside. It is also clear that
Marx and Engels used the Hegelian distinction
and in particular the notion of "peoples without
history" or "counterrevolutionary nations" to

238

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

refer to certain small nations of central Europe

which stood in the way of progress and which
could be rightly swept aside for the sake of the
proletariat of historical nations. Thus, for
instance, Engels referred to the Slavs which
lack the primary historical, geographical, political
and industrial condition for a viable independence.
Peoples which have never had a history of their
own, which come under foreign domination the
moment they have achieved the first, crudest level
of civilization, or are forced onto the first level of
civilization by the yoke of the foreigner, have no
capacity for survival and will never be able to attain
any kind of independence. 77
When Marx and Engels referred to Latin
America, they most probably had a similar idea
in mind. That this is more than an implicit
conclusion inferred from the general drift of their
writings is shown by the fact that Engels specifically applied such criteria in his analysis of the
conquest of Mexico and California. He maintained that it was in the interest of all America,
and of the development of Mexico itself, that the
United States should gain predominance over the
Pacific Ocean and that in the face of such worldhistorical events it did not matter whether
"justice" and "'moral principles" were infringed.
Moreover, Marx and Engels explicitly identified
the situation of the Spanish criollos in the
territory occupied by the United States with the
situation of Slavic peoples:
Thus were finished, for now and very probably for
ever. the tentatives by the German Slavs to recover
an independent national existence. Disperse relics
of many nations whose nationality and political
vitality were exhausted long ago, which because of
that had been forced, for almost a millennium, to
follow in the tracks of a more powerful nation that
had conquered them - - just as the Welsh in
England, the Basque in Spain. the low-Bretons in
France and, more recently, the Spanish and French
creoles in parts of the United States occupied by the
Anglo-American race.TM
I share Franco's idea, however, that Aric6's
arguments about the Hegelian influence do not
dispose of the charge of Eurocentrism. But I do
not want to restrict the definition and discussion
of Eurocentrism to Franco's analysis either.
There is still another possible sense of this
concept which, on the one hand, moves the
discussion about backward societies beyond the
Latin American context and, on the other, leads
to a discussion of a common element among
Marx, classical political economy and Hegel,
notwithstanding their many differences. In
general terms, I refer to the belief that the
progress brought about by the new humanistic
and scientific rationality in capitalist Western

Europe is inherently superior and must finally

prevail in the world against opposing forces. This
means that Eurocentrism is not just ignorance
about non-European nations, or the attempt to
explain their reality by means of conceptual
categories developed in a European context, but
also the affirmation of the superior relevance, the
more advanced stage and historical priority of the
social processes occurring in Europe.
If we focus on Marx and Engels, we can see
that they did not conceive of a rigid classification
of nations and of their prospects for independence as given once and for all. Their concern with
the fate of certain nations was always political
and related to the advance of socialism. This is
why they could change their views about a nation
depending on new circumstances and political
conjunctures. Their analysis of the rights of
peoples and nations was always carried out
according to whether they were in the interests of
social progress. More often than not, social
progress was defined in terms of the most
advanced European capitalist nations and their
politically mature proletariats. Aric6's belief that
after 1860 Marx and Engels displaced the center
of revolution from Western European countries
to colonial and dependent countries is not
accurate. In 1870, Marx still thought that the
independence of Ireland was a precondition for
the emancipation of the British proletariat. Aric6
mistakes Marx and Engels's new interest in the
impact which social and political upheavals in
backward societies had on the possibilities of
revolution in England and Europe for a displacement of the center of revolution out of Europe.
As Haupt and Weill have argued, for Marx and
Engels "the national state is not an objective in
itself, nor is it a supreme value, just as the right
that nations have to manage themselves is not an
absolute principle. They are all variables subordinated to a constant: the interest of the
working class and of the socialist revolution. ''79
This is compounded by what Rosdolsky has
called "an error of rhythm," that is to say, Marx
and Engels's belief that the collapse of capitalism
was imminent and that, therefore, the socialist
revolution had to be considered as the immediate
practical task of their time. ~ All other considerations had to be subordinated to the requirements
of this task. Thus more developed nations would
have to prevail over backward nations if that
would promote the advance of socialism in the
world.
If in the case of Ireland Marx and Engels took
the opposite view, it was not so much because
they saw important differences between the Irish
and the Latin American nations p e r se (for
instance, in Franco's terms, the idea that the Irish

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

could develop a state whereas the Latin Americans could not), as because they saw these
countries playing different roles in relation to the
prospects of revolution in the most developed
countries. Whereas they saw the defeat of
Mexico as crucial for strengthening of North
American capitalism and hence for the development of the proletariat in that area, they saw
Irish independence as crucial for the development of the English proletariat:
England. the metropolis of capital, the power which
has up to now ruled the world market, is at pre~nt
the most important country for the workers' revolution, and moreover it is the only country in which
the material conditions for this revolution have
reached a certain degree of maturity. It is consequently the most important object of the International Working Men's Association to hasten the
social revolution in England. The sole means of
hastening it is to make Ireland independent.., the
national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of
abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the
.first condition of their own social emancipation, st
In either case, it is the emancipation of the
proletariat of the more developed nation that
matters. Marx's change of heart about colonialism must therefore be qualified in that it does not
necessarily mean that all former colonies have
the chance to constitute themselves as viable and
developing nations. Marx recognized that
colonialism might become an obstacle to
development and industrialization, but he also
continued to accept the possibility that, even
after independence, some small countries might
not be able to sustain a national project that
makes industrialization feasible. For that reason,
these small countries might be rightly subordinated to the needs and wishes of historical nations.
Marx did not blame other, more subtle forms of
imperialism (neocolonialism or dependency) for
this situation, but rather identified the lack of
popular will and a strong civil society as the
factors which put these nations outside history.
Moreover, Marx did not see self-government and
independence as absolute principles, the inalienable rights of all peoples, but rather as objectives
that must be subordinated to the needs of the
struggle for socialism.

7. CONCLUSION
Is there a common thread between the positions of classical political economy, Marx and
Hegel? I certainly do not want to collapse the
thought of these authors into a single view on
progress, colonialism and backward societies. I
have already marked some important differences

239

and there are many others which I have no space

to discuss. But any elementary sociology of
knowledge approach would surely make something of the fact that they all lived in the 19th
century, at the time when the capitalist system
was becoming well established in Britain, shared
similar rationalistic influences and were affected
by similar social and political forms. 82 True,
Marx critiqued classical political economy and
Hegel, and developed a new, distinct conception
of history. He was nonetheless deeply influenced
by their vision and shared with them a typical
19th-century problematique, namely the question
of the emancipation of humankind.
Not surprisingly, the three approaches proposed different actors which could accomplish
that emancipating mission. For Hegel, the actor
was historical but still abstract: the idea or
universal spirit which through successive alienations would finally find its identity. For classical
political economy, the actor was the bourgeoisie
as the new agent of the progress represented by
the capitalist system. Such a system was supposedly natural and absolute, but had been
hindered by the artificial institutions of traditional societies which the bourgeoisie had to dismantle everywhere. Marx, after criticizing the
abstraction of Hegel's universal spirit and the
historical limitations of the bourgeoisie and the
capitalist system, gave the proletariat the mission
of emancipating humankind by abolishing the
class system.
What is common in all these perspectives is the
desire for emancipation and the search for an
agent which could accomplish the mission. But
crucially, it is possible to detect another common
element: these agents are all historically and
geographically located in 19th-century Western
Europe. For Hegel, it is the spirit as it manifests
itself through the primacy of historical nations,
among which the Prussian state has pride of
place; for classical political economy, it is the
British bourgeoisie as the representative of the
first European capitalist nation; for Marx and
Engels, it is the proletariat of the most advanced
European capitalist nations.
The emancipating agents may be different, but
they all represent the highest stage of historical
reason given in Western Europe, and it is from
there that they should carry out their mission.
This is the particular aspect I identify with a kind
of Eurocentrism: the belief that the progress
brought about by these historical actors in capitalist Western Europe is inherently superior and
has a historical mission which must finally prevail
in the world. This common missionary conception is at the root of some of the problems these
theories have in understanding "backward"

240

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

societies. The historical process could be synthesized to an antagonism between historical reason
and "backwardness." Backward countries or
nations have, of course, the prospect of development and progress, but only through the agency
of, following the path of, and insofar as they do
not interfere with, the main E u r o p e a n historical
agents and their needs.
True, none of the political economists or Hegel
showed the degree of awareness of colonialism,
nor c o n d e m n e d its cruelty and arbitrariness as
forcefully as did Marx and Engels, nor did they
have any inkling of the possibility that colonialism might hinder the development of colonies, an
idea which Marx and Engels developed after
1860. But on the whole, even when Marx and
Engels advocated the independence and selfg o v e r n m e n t of some colonies, their point of

reference and their main objectives were the

liberation of the British proletariat and the
advance of socialism in the most d e v e l o p e d
countries of the world as a precondition for the
liberation of the rest of humankind. This strand
of Eurocentrism does not totally impair Marx
and Engels's thought. Eurocentrism certainly
hindered their ability to capture the specificity of
"backward" societies. In my view, however, the
basic categories for understanding society, the
ideas about the structure of the world capitalist
system and the sometimes perceptive remarks
about non-European peoples provided by Marx
and Engels, as long as they are reconstructed and
reworked, still constitute an important basis for
understanding the specific circumstances of
underdeveloped societies.

NOTES
1. The importance of the Hegelian influence was
acknowledged by Marx himself in a letter to Engels:
"For instance, I have overthrown the whole doctrine of
profit as it has existed up to now. The fact that by mere
accident I again glanced through Hegel's Logic... has
been a great service to me as regards the method of
dealing with the material." (Marx, 1975g). The influence of Hegel during the period of Marx's intellectual
development starting in 1858 has been well established
by Schmidt (1971), Lefevbre (1974) and Echeverria
(1978).
2. See Platteau (1978). Although I disagree with his
general conclusion that there is a theory of underdevelopment in classical political economy, his detailed
analysis and compilation of references to backward
societies by classical economists is immensely useful
and constitutes a definitive work.
3.

Smith (1863), Book IV, chapter 1, p. 196.

4. Smith (1863), Book IV. chapter VII, part Ill,

p. 275.
5. Smith (1863), Book IV, chapter VII, part III,
p. 273.

12. Malthus (1936), Book II, Section IX, p. 403.

13. Say (1968), Part 4, chapter XXVI, p. 311. Quoted
in Platteau (1978), Vol. I, p. 192.
14.

Mill (1820), Vol. II, Book II, chapter IX, p. 88.

15.

Mill (1820), Vol. If, Book II, chapter X, p. 195.

16.

Ricardo (1951), Vol. VII. p. 243.

17.

Mill (1875), Vol. III, pp. 167-168.

18.

Napoleoni (1975), p. 46.

19. Smith (1976), p. 472.

20. Smith (1976), p. 121: "'As it is the power of
exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour,
so the extent of this division must always be limited by
the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the
extent of the market."
21.

Ricardo (1951), Vol. IV, p. 179.

22.

Marx (1976), p. 126.

Marx (1974a), Vol. I, p. 703.

6.

Smith (1863), Book IV, chapter IX, p. 307.

23.

7.

Smith (1863), Book IV, chapter IX, p. 303.

8.

See Platteau (1978), Vol. 1, p. 103.

24. This marks another difference with the classical

economists. Ricardo had proclaimed the benefits of
foreign trade mainly because cheaper food would lower
the value of labor. Marx points out that: "Ricardo
misunderstands entirely the influence of foreign trade,
when it does not directly lower the price of the
labourers" food. He does not see how enormously
important it is for England, for example, to secure
cheaper raw materials for industry." Marx (1969), Vol.
1I, p. 437.

9. Malthus (1952), Vol. 2, Book III, chapter IV,

p. 30.
10. Malthus (1952), Vol. 1, Book II, chapter XIII,
p. 305.
11. Malthus (1936), Book If. Section IV, pp. 337341.

25.

Marx (1973b), pp. 306-7.

MARX ON "BACKWARD" NATIONS

241

26.

Marx (1973c), p. 320.

57.

Marx (1974a), pp. 424--425.

27.

Marx (1973c), p. 322.

58.

Marx (1973a), p. 872.

28.

Marx (1973c), p. 323.

59.

Marx (1969), Vol. III, pp. 105-106.

29.

Larrain (1986).

60.

Marx (1969), Vol. II, pp. 474--475.

61.

See Mori (1978), p. 46 and Scaron (1980), p. 8.

30. See, for instance, Marx (1974a), Vol. I, pp. 19, 21

and 715.

62.

Engels (1973), p. 230.

31. See, for instance, Marx and Engels (1976) p. 50;

Marx and Engels (1975), p. 110; Marx (1970), p. 96.

63.

Marx (1980b), p. 256.

32,

Marx (1973c), p. 323.

64.

Marx (1980c), pp. 76-93.

33.

Marx (1973c), pp. 324-325.

65.

Engels (1980b), p. 99.

34.

Marx (1974a). Vol. I, p. 19.

66.

Marx (1980d), p. 94.

35.

Marx (1975a), pp. 78-79.

67.

Marx (1980a), p. 286.

36.

Engels (1980), p. 183.

68. For a good and balanced account of this kind of

abuse see Davis (1967), especially chapter III.

37.

Marx (1975b), p. 182.

38.

Marx (1975c), p. 218.

39.

Marx (1973d), p. 100.

40.

Sutcliffe (1972), p. 181.

41.

Amin (1974), p. 148.

42.

Barrat Brown (1972), p. 47.

43.

Hinkelammert (1972), pp. i l and 76-77.

44.

Warren (1980).

45.

See Scaron (1980), pp. 5-19.

46.

See Mori (1978) and Davis (1967).

47.

Marx (1975c), p. 218.

48.

Marx (1974b), p. 391.

49.

Marx (1975d), pp. 298-299.

50.

Marx (1973c), p. 320.

51.

Marx (1978), p. 50.

52.

Marx (1975e), pp. 184-185.

53.

Marx (1973c), pp. 324.

54.

Engels (1975), p. 87.

55.

Marx (1978b), p. 142.

56.

Marx (1974a), Vol. I, p. 708.

69.

Hegel (1986), pp. 162-171.

70.

Hegel (1986), p. 167.

71.

Marx (1980e), pp. 203-204.

72.

See on this the excellent book by Aric6 (1980).

73.

Aric6 (1980), p. 69.

74.

Aric6 (1980), p. 107.

75.

Aric6 (1980), p. 105.

76.

Franco (1980), p. 29.

77.

Engels (1973), p. 231.

78.

Marx and Engels (1980), p. 199.

79.

Haupt and Weill (1982), p. 152.

80.

Rosdolsky (1981), p. 160.

81.

Marx (1975f), p. 223.

82. One possible formulation of this idea has been

given by Mannheim in the case of the same generation: "the fact of belonging to the same class, and
that of belonging to the same generation or age
group, have this in common, that both endow the
individuals sharing in them with a common location in
the social and historical process, and thereby limit
them to a specific range of potential experience,
predisposing them to a certain characteristic mode of
thought and experience." Mannheim (1968), p. 291. Of
course, one can only apply this to our ease mutatis
mutandi.

242

WORLD DEVELOPMENT
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