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L-16513
February
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
38.
The
role
of
telecommunication companies is not
limited to merely providing the medium (i.e.
the electric current) through which the
human voice/voice signal of the caller is
transmitted. Before the human voice/voice
signal can be so transmitted, a
telecommunication company, using its
facilities, must first break down or decode
the human voice/voice signal into electronic
impulses and subject the same to further
augmentation and enhancements. Only
after such process of conversion will the
resulting electronic impulses be transmitted
by a telecommunication company, again,
through the use of its facilities. Upon
reaching the destination of the call, the
telecommunication company will again
break down or decode the electronic
impulses back to human voice/voice signal
before the called party receives the
same. In
other
words,
a
telecommunication
company
both
converts/reconverts the human voice/voice
signal and provides the medium for
transmitting the same.
39.
Moreover, in the case of an
international telephone call, once the
electronic impulses originating from a
foreign
telecommunication
company
country (i.e. Japan) reaches the Philippines
through
a
local
telecommunication
xxx
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x x x"
August 7, 1935
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PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
November 13, 1978 Decision * of the then Court of
First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City in Civil
Case No. 2443-0 entitled "Spouses Fernando A.
Magcale and Teodula Baluyut-Magcale vs. Hon.
Ramon Y. Pardo and Prudential Bank" declaring that
the deeds of real estate mortgage executed by
respondent spouses in favor of petitioner bank are null
and void.
The undisputed facts of this case by stipulation of the
parties are as follows:
... on November 19, 1971, plaintiffsspouses Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula
Baluyut Magcale secured a loan in the sum
of P70,000.00 from the defendant
Prudential Bank. To secure payment of this
loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of
defendant on the aforesaid date a deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over the following
described properties:
l. A 2-STOREY, SEMI-CONCRETE,
residential building with warehouse spaces
containing a total floor area of 263 sq.
meters, more or less, generally constructed
of mixed hard wood and concrete
Ardoin
Street
SOUTH:
By No.
2,
Ardoin
Street
EAST:
By 37
Canda
Street,
and
WEST:
By
Ardoin
Street.
All corners of the lot
marked by conc.
cylindrical
monuments of the
Bureau of Lands as
visible limits.
( Exhibit "A, " also
Exhibit "1" for
defendant).
Apart from the stipulations in
the printed portion of the
Agriculture and
Natural Resources,
which title with
annotation, shall be
released in favor of
the herein
Mortgage.
From the aforequoted
stipulation, it is obvious that the
mortgagee (defendant
Prudential Bank) was at the
outset aware of the fact that the
mortgagors (plaintiffs) have
already filed a Miscellaneous
Sales Application over the lot,
possessory rights over which,
were mortgaged to it.
Exhibit "A" (Real Estate
Mortgage) was registered
under the Provisions of Act
3344 with the Registry of
Deeds of Zambales on
November 23, 1971.
On May 2, 1973, plaintiffs
secured an additional loan from
defendant Prudential Bank in
the sum of P20,000.00. To
secure payment of this
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and
equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its
gas stations located on leased land.
CRUZ, J.:
The realty tax assessment involved in this case
amounts to P11,319,304.00. It has been imposed on
the petitioner's tailings dam and the land thereunder
over its protest.
The controversy arose in 1985 when the Provincial
Assessor of Zambales assessed the said properties as
taxable improvements. The assessment was appealed
to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the Province of
Zambales. On August 24, 1988, the appeal was
dismissed mainly on the ground of the petitioner's
"failure to pay the realty taxes that fell due during the
pendency of the appeal."
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court)
promulgated on August 27, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. SP12731, setting aside certain Orders later specified
herein, of Judge Ricardo J. Francisco, as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First instance of Rizal Branch VI,
issued in Civil Case No. 36040, as wen as the
resolution dated September 22, 1981 of the said
appellate court, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
It appears that in order to obtain financial
accommodations from herein petitioner Makati Leasing
and Finance Corporation, the private respondent
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted and assigned
several receivables with the former under a Receivable
Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the
receivables assigned, private respondent executed a
Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory
as well as a machinery described as an Artos Aero
Dryer Stentering Range.
Upon private respondent's default, petitioner filed a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
mortgage to it. However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned
to implement the foreclosure failed to gain entry into
private respondent's premises and was not able to
October 2, 2001
x---------------------------------------------------------x
xxx
PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EVER TEXTILE MILLS
and MAMERTO R VILLALUZ, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
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SCHEDULE "A"
I. TCT # 372097 - RIZAL
xxx
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xxx3
I.
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY DECREE
THE MACHINERIES LISTED UNDER PARAGRAPH 9
OF THE COMPLAINT BELOW AS PERSONAL
PROPERTY OUTSIDE OF THE 1975 DEED OF REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE AND EXCLUDED THEM FROM
THE REAL PROPERTY EXTRAJUDICIALLY
FORECLOSED BY PBCOM DESPITE THE
PROVISION IN THE 1975 DEED THAT ALL AFTERACQUIRED PROPERTIES DURING THE LIFETIME
OF THE MORTGAGE SHALL FORM PART THEREOF,
AND DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT SAID
MACHINERIES ARE BIG AND HEAVY, BOLTED OR
CEMENTED ON THE REAL PROPERTY
MORTGAGED BY EVER TEXTILE MILLS TO
PBCOM, AND WERE ASSESSED FOR REAL
ESTATE TAX PURPOSES?
II
CAN PBCOM, WHO TOOK POSSESSION OF THE
MACHINERIES IN QUESTION IN GOOD FAITH,
EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITIES TO EVER TEXTILE
MILLS WHICH AS OF 1982 TOTALLED
P9,547,095.28, WHO HAD SPENT FOR
MAINTENANCE AND SECURITY ON THE DISPUTED
MACHINERIES AND HAD TO PAY ALL THE BACK
TAXES OF EVER TEXTILE MILLS BE LEGALLY
COMPELLED TO RETURN TO EVER THE SAID
MACHINERIES OR IN LIEU THEREOF BE
xxx
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ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
or publication that speaks with "the voice of nonconformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to
state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the
business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to
express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where
a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the
political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the
printing machines on the ground that they have been
sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the
sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in
accordance with implementing rules and regulations as
may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense."
It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
NARVASA, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari at bar involves two
(2) Orders of respondent Judge Taada 1 in Civil Case
No. 10984. The first, dated September 16, 1970,
denied petitioner Yap's motion to set aside execution
sale and to quash alias writ of execution. The second,
dated November 21, 1970, denied Yap's motion for
reconsideration. The issues concerned the propriety of
execution of a judgment claimed to be "incomplete,
vague and non-final," and the denial of petitioner's
application to prove and recover damages resulting
from alleged irregularities in the process of execution.
The antecedents will take some time in the telling. The
case began in the City Court of Cebu with the filing by
Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. of a
complaint 2 against Yap and his wife 3 seeking recovery
of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and
installation cost of a water pump in the latter's
premises. 4 The case resulted in a judgment by the
City Court on November 25, 1968, reading as follows:
When this case was called for trial today,
Atty. Paterno Natinga appeared for the
plaintiff Goulds and informed the court that
he is ready for trial. However, none of the
defendants appeared despite notices
having been served upon them.
him, he should have appeared in the pretrial to achieve the same purpose.
Judge Taada thereafter promulgated another Order
dated September 21, 1970 granting a motion of Goulds
for completion of execution of the judgment of August
29, 1969 to be undertaken by the City Sheriff of Cebu.
Once more, Yap sought reconsideration. He submitted
a "Motion for Reconsideration of Two Orders" dated
October 13, 1970, 28 seeking the setting aside not only
of this Order of September 21, 1970 but also that
dated September 16, 1970, denying his motion to set
aside execution dated June 23, 1970. He contended
that the Order of September 21, 1970 (authorizing
execution by the City Sheriff) was premature, since the
30-day period to appeal from the earlier order of
September 16, 1970 (denying his motion to set aside)
had not yet expired. He also reiterated his view that his
motion for reconsideration dated September 15, 1969
did not require that it be accompanied by an affidavit of
merits. This last motion was also denied for "lack of
merits," by Order dated November 21, 1970. 29
On December 3, 1970, Yap filed a "Notice of Appeal"
manifesting his intention to appeal to the Supreme
Court on certiorari only on questions of law, "from the
Order ... of September 16, 1970 ... and from the
Order ... of November 21, 1970, ... pursuant to
sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 5440." He filed his
petition for review with this Court on January 5, 1971,
after obtaining an extension therefor. 30
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner
Machinery and Engineering Supplies Inc., from a
decision of the Court of Appeals denying an original
petition for certiorari filed by said petitioner against
Hon. Potenciano Pecson, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., and
Antonio Villarama, the respondents herein.
The pertinent facts are set forth in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, from which we quote:
On March 13, 1953, the herein petitioner filed a
complaint for replevin in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 19067, entitled
"Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc.,
Plaintiff, vs. Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., and Dr.
Antonio Villarama, defendants", for the recovery
of the machinery and equipment sold and
delivered to said defendants at their factory in
barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Upon
application ex-parte of the petitioner company,
and upon approval of petitioner's bond in the
sum of P15,769.00, on March 13,1953,
respondent judge issued an order, commanding
the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to seize and
take immediate possession of the properties
specified in the order (Appendix I, Answer). On
March 19, 1953, two deputy sheriffs of Bulacan,
the said Ramon S. Roco, and a crew of technical
men and laborers proceeded to Bigti, for the
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-inFact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and
PRESCILLA,
all
surnamed
HILARIO, petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN
T.
SALVADOR, respondent.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra,
Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private
respondent Allan T. Salvador.
They alleged
therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance
from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of
land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part,
located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which
property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share
of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their
father was still single, and which adjudication
was known by the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed
his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the
property of the plaintiffs father without the
knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their
predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the
defendant to vacate the premises but the latter
manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior
consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo
Salvador;
(1)
the complaint failed to state the assessed
value of the land in dispute;
(2)
the complaint does not sufficiently identify
and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the
subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining
the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In
this case, however, the assessed value of the land in
question is totally absent in the allegations of the
complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for
which can be picked-up for determining the Courts
jurisdiction as provided by law.
CESAR
SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs.
The
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA
VASQUEZ GILSANO,respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this verified petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Cesar
Sampayan seeks the annulment and setting aside of
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 43557, to wit:
1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his petition
for review and affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Agusan del Sur, Branch VII,
which in turn reversed on appeal a favorable judgment
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan
and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a forcible entry case
thereat commenced against him by herein private
respondents, the brother-and-sister Crispulo Vasquez
and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano; and
2. Resolution dated November 7, 2002, which denied
his motion for reconsideration.
[11]
(underscoring ours)
RENE
2.
3.
SO ORDERED.[13]
- versus -
CHICONAZARIO, JJ.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and
ELIZABETH ONG,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
August 16,
2005
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DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In a Decision[1] dated 6 January 1998, the Former
First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned the
decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling
instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition
for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court
of Appeals Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for
ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of
Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners
alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise
acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership
(3)
On 8 May 1997,
respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC.
(4)
On 9 May 1997,
respondents filed likewise with the RTC
a Motion
for
Reconsideration of
the
aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5)
On 23 June 1997,
the
RTC
of
Mandaue
issued
an Order denying respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
(6)
On 9 July 1997,
respondents received a copy of the
aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.
(7)
On 24 July 1997,
respondents filed with the Court of Appeals
their motion for an additional period of ten
(10) days within which to file their Petition
for Review.
(8)
On 30 July 1997,
respondents filed with the Court of Appeals
their Petition for Review.
Petitioners
assert
that
the Petition
for
Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for
appeal. They theorize that the period started running
on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC
decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to
them, this reglementary period could not have been
interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion
for Reconsideration because of the filing one day
earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of
Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of
appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a
over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction
to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before
it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity
of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case
and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance,
the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the
same.[24]
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court held
that the fact that respondents had previously filed a
separate action for the reformation of a deed of
absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or
equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance
is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy
of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment
proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the
only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v.
Gutierrez[26] when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before
us is only the initial determination of
ownership over the lot in dispute, for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession,
although the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked thereto. As such, the
lower court's adjudication of ownership in
LILIA V. PERALTA-LABRADOR,
165177
Petitioner,
G.R. No.
Present:
his
widow,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari
is the March 12, 2004 decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57475, which affirmed with
G.R. No.
ENRIQUETA SERIA
(deceased), represented by
DR. JESUS SERIA, JR.,
ANTONIO SERIA, VIOLETA
Present:
PUNO,
Petitioners,
RIA-MARTINEZ,
AUST
CALLE
JO, SR.,
versus
TINGA, a
nd
CHIC
O-NAZARIO, JJ.
VICTOR CABALLERO,
TEODORO DONELA, OLIVER
Promulgated:
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
August
as evidence to prejudice her and her successors-ininterest or place her in estoppel as to her claims over
the property. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet. A transaction between two parties ought not to
operate to the prejudice of a third person or stranger. 11
4. In the fourth assignment of error, petitioners claim
that the appellate court should have rendered a
decision in their favor. That both the trial court and
respondent appellate court have correctly evaluated
the evidence, has been clearly demonstrated by Us.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS,
We find no reversible error in the decision under
review and We AFFIRM the same with costs against
petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
PARAS, J.:p
defendant on the tractor, which may be offsetted (sic) from the remaining purchase
price of P80,000.00, if the defendant
exercises his option to buy, plus
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, with costs against the plaintiff.
(Rollo, pp. 37-A-38).
Not satisfied with the modified decision, petitioner Alim
appealed, claiming damages because of the wrongful
seizure of the tractor, but the same was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals which denied said petitioner's claim
for compensation and concurred with the following
findings of the trial court:
However, since the fifteen (15) month lease
period provided in the contract had already
expired ... the plaintiff may not be judicially
compelled to deliver the tractor to
defendant since after the expiration of the
lease period, it is legally entitled to its
possession, as the owner thereof. (Rollo, P.
62)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated April 30,
1990 (Rollo, p. 65). Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this case are: (1) whether or not
the fifteen (15) month lease period had commenced
from August 1977 and expired in October 1978; (2)
TRENT, J.:
The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually
restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies
from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and
their property the annual tax mentioned and described
in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339,
effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing
any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the
plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard,
or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and
decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the
plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary
injunction granted soon after the commencement of
this action.
This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to
two main questions; (1) that relating to the power of the
court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax
complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of
those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act
No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of
Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to
the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of
vital importance to the Government. The sections of
Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon the subject, are
139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an
injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue
tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong in
connection with such taxes, and this remedy was
intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the
remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be
constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right
of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional
remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine
any other question connected therewith, and the
question whether the remedy by injunction is
exceptional.
Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary
and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history
of the writ of injunction show that it has always been
regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as
distinguished from the common course of the law to
The origin and history of these provisions are wellknown. They are found in substance in the Constitution
of the United States and in that of ever state in the
Union.
Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, effective since 1867, provides that: "No suit for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads:
"No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to
restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax."
A comparison of these two sections show that they are
essentially the same. Both expressly prohibit the
restraining of taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court
of the United States has clearly and definitely held that
the provisions of section 3224 do not violate the "due
process of law" and "equal protection of the law"
clauses in the Constitution, we would be going too far
to hold that section 139 violates those same provisions
in the Philippine Bill. That the Supreme Court of the
United States has so held, cannot be doubted.
In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which
involved the validity of an income tax levied by an act
of Congress prior to the one in issue in the case of
Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U.S., 429)
the court, through Mr. Justice Miller, said: "If there
existed in the courts, state or National, any general
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Automati
c PhaseOut Year
1980
1974
1981
1975
1982
1976
1983
1977
etc.
etc.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an
expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines,
(hereinafter referred to as the Republic) filed, on June
26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against
defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi,
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso
de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over
a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose,
Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of
Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded on the
NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the
SE by national road; on the SW by AFP
reservation, and on the NW by AFP
reservation. Containing an area of 759,299
square meters, more or less, and
registered in the name of Alfonso Castellvi
under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of
Pampanga ...;
and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo
Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-Gozun over
two parcels of land described as follows:
A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau
of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. Bounded on the
dated May 27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the
lands sought to be expropriated was at the rate of
P15.00 per square meter.
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant
Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional
value of her lands. 2 On May 16, 1960 the trial Court
authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to
pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as
provisional value of the land under her administration,
and ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with
the Philippine National Bank under the supervision of
the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16,
1960 the trial Court entered an order of
condemnation.3
The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty.
Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for
the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of
the Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca,
for the plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan,
Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base, for the
defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified
themselves, proceeded to the performance of their
duties.
On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their
report and recommendation, wherein, after having
determined that the lands sought to be expropriated
were residential lands, they recommended
in 1949 and which are now the site of the Basa Air
Base. In the Narciso case this Court fixed the fair
market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands that
are sought to be expropriated in the present case
being contiguous to the lands involved in the Narciso
case, it is the stand of the Republic that the price that
should be fixed for the lands now in question should
also be at P.20 per square meter.
We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find
that the price of P.20 per square meter, as fixed by this
Court in the Narciso case, was based on the allegation
of the defendants (owners) in their answer to the
complaint for eminent domain in that case that the
price of their lands was P2,000.00 per hectare and that
was the price that they asked the court to pay them.
This Court said, then, that the owners of the land could
not be given more than what they had asked,
notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of
the Commission on Appraisal which was adopted by
the trial court that the fair market value of the lands
was P3,000.00 per hectare. We also find that the price
of P.20 per square meter in the Narciso case was
considered the fair market value of the lands as of the
year 1949 when the expropriation proceedings were
instituted, and at that time the lands were classified as
sugar lands, and assessed for taxation purposes at
around P400.00 per hectare, or P.04 per square meter.
22 While the lands involved in the present case, like
the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have a
fair market value of P.20 per square meter in 1949, it
pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin crossarm for telegraphic purposes.
from the future expansion of its services under its nonexclusive franchise.
used about four per cent of the time in taking off and
about seven per cent of the time in landing. Since the
United States began operations in May, 1942, its fourmotored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier
type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed
over respondents' land buildings in considerable
numbers and rather close together. They come close
enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of
the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees
as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And
at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the
place. As a result of the noise, respondents had to give
up their chicken business. As many as six to ten of
their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the
walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner
was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was
the destruction of the use of the property as a
commercial chicken farm. Respondents are frequently
deprived of their sleep and the family has become
nervous and frightened. Although there have been no
airplane accidents on respondents' property, there
have been several accidents near the airport and close
to respondents' place. These are the essential facts
found by the Court of Claims. On the basis of these
facts, it found that respondents' property had
depreciated in value. It held that the United States had
taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942,
and that the value of the property destroyed and the
easement taken was $2,000.
OZAETA, J.:
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to
the usufructuary, or is it capital or part of the corpus of
the estate, which pertains to the remainderman? That
is the question raised in the appeal.
The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir
except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last
will and testament made various legacies in cash and
willed the remainder of his estate as follows:
Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and
devise to my beloved wife Mary McDonald
Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the
remainder of all my estate after payment of the
legacies, bequests, and gifts provided for above;
and she may enjoy said usufruct and use or
spend such fruits as she may in any manner
wish.
LAUREL, J.:
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for
the same. But this is not the case before us.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad
compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their
buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffsrespondents only because the latter chose neither to
pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and
void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to
be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles
361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
There is, however, in the decision of Judge Felix a
question of procedure which calls for the clarification,
to avoid uncertainty and delay in the disposition of
cases. In that decision, the rights of both parties are
well defined under articles 361 and 453 of the Civil
Code, but it fails to determine the value of the buildings
and of the lot where they are erected as well as the
periods of time within which the option may be
exercised and payment should be made, these
particulars having been left for determination
apparently after the judgment has become final. This
procedure is erroneous, for after the judgment has
become final, no additions can be made thereto and
nothing can be done therewith except its execution.
And execution cannot be had, the sheriff being
ignorant as to how, for how much, and within what time
may the option be exercised, and certainly no authority
is vested in him to settle these matters which involve
exercise of judicial discretion. Thus the judgment
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
This Petition for certiorari questions a March 29, 1979
Decision rendered by the then Court of First Instance
of Pasay City. The Decision was one made on
memoranda, pursuant to the provisions of RA 6031,
and it modified, on October 17, 1977, a judgment of
the then Municipal Court of Paranaque, Rizal, in an
Ejectment suit instituted by herein petitioner Leonila
SARMIENTO against private respondents, the
spouses ERNESTO Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo.
For the facts, therefore, we have to look to the
evidence presented by the parties at the original level.
It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his
wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple could
build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on a lot of 145 sq. ms.,
being Lot D of a subdivision in Paranaque (the LAND,
for short). In 1967, ERNESTO did construct a
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND at a cost of
P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. It was probably assumed
that the wife's mother was the owner of the LAND and
that, eventually, it would somehow be transferred to
the spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been
titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who,
on September 7 , 1974, sold the same to petitioner
SARMIENTO. The following January 6, 1975,
SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate
and, on April 21, 1975, filed an Ejectment suit against
them. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal
Court, SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the
LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be
P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified
that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would
be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The figures were
not questioned by SARMIENTO.
The Municipal Court found that private respondents
had built the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE in good faith, and,
disregarding the testimony of ERNESTO, that it had a
value of P20,000.00. It then ordered ERNESTO and
wife to vacate the LAND after SARMIENTO has paid
them the mentioned sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Pasay where, after the submission of
memoranda, said Court rendered a modifying Decision
under Article 448 of the Civil Code. SARMIENTO was
required, within 60 days, to exercise the option to
reimburse ERNESTO and wife the sum of 40,000.00
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Order of the former Court of
First Instance of Iloilo to the then Court of Appeals,
which the latter certified to this instance as involving
pure questions of law
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a
parcel of land registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the
municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, with an area of
approximately 8,870 square meters. Agustin Dumlao,
defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot, designated
as Lot No. 683, with an approximate area of 231 sq.
ms.
Sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his
house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached
on an area of thirty four (34) square meters of
DEPRA's property, After the encroachment was
discovered in a relocation survey of DEPRA's lot made
on November 2,1972, his mother, Beatriz Depra after
writing a demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back
from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful
Detainer on February 6,1973 against DUMLAO in the
Municipal Court of of Dumangas, docketed as Civil
Case No 1, Said complaint was later amended to
include DEPRA as a party plain. plaintiff.
After trial, the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO
was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of
After the case had been set for pre-trial, the parties
submitted a Joint Motion for Judgment based on the
Stipulation of Facts attached thereto. Premised
thereon, the Trial Court on October 31, 1974, issued
the assailed Order, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so
holds that the thirty four (34) square meters
subject of this litigation is part and parcel of
Lot 685 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dumangas of which the plaintiff is owner as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3087 and such plaintiff is entitled to
possess the same.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by
DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the Decision of the
Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its
jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession,
whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an
encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered
by Courts of First Instance.
Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the
Decision of the Municipal Court, we hold the same to
be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case is
effective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule
70, Rules of Court). 1 The Municipal Court over-
TECNOGAS
PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
(FORMER
SPECIAL
SEVENTEENTH DIVISION) and EDUARDO
UY, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
is
also
The Facts
The facts are not disputed. Respondent Court
merely reproduced the factual findings of the trial court,
as follows:[5]
(B)
(C)
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred
in ordering the removal of the structures and
surrounding walls on the encroached area and in
withdrawing its earlier ruling in its August 28, 1992
decision for the petitioner to pay for the value of the
land occupied by the building, only because the
private respondent has manifested its choice to
demolish it despite the absence of compulsory sale
where the builder fails to pay for the land, and which
choice private respondent deliberately deleted from its
September 1, 1980 answer to the supple-mental
complaint in the Regional Trial Court.
[30]
xxx
xxx
c)
the fair market value of the encroaching
portion of the building; and
d)
ANTONIO, J.:1wph1.t
SO ORDERED. 7
III
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that
in having issued the Order and Writ of Execution,
respondent Court "acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion,
because the said order and writ in effect vary the terms
of the judgment they purportedly seek to enforce." He
argued that since said judgment declared the petitioner
a possessor in good faith, he is entitled to the payment
of the value of the improvements introduced by him on
the whole property, with right to retain the land until he
has been fully paid such value. He likewise averred
that no payment for improvements has been made
and, instead, a bond therefor had been filed by
defendants (private respondents), which, according to
petitioner, is not the payment envisaged in the decision
which would entitle private respondents to the
possession of the property. Furthermore, with respect
to portion "B", petitioner alleges that, under the
decision, he has the right to retain the same until after
he has participated and lost in the public bidding of the
land to be conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It is
claimed that it is only in the event that he loses in the
bidding that he can be legally dispossessed thereof.
It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the
property, including the tolls collected by him from the
passing vehicles, which according to the trial court
xxx
PLEASANTVILLE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T. TORRES
ENTERPRISES,
INC.
and
ELDRED
JARDINICO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the
wrong property erroneously delivered by the owners
agent, a builder in good faith? This is the main issue
resolved in this petition for review on certiorari to
reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CAG.R. SP No. 11040, promulgated on August 20, 1987.
By resolution dated November 13, 1995, the First
Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case
(along with several others) to the Third Division. After
due deliberation and consultation, the Court assigned
the
writing
of
this
Decision
to
the
undersigned ponente.
The Facts
The facts, as found by respondent Court, are as
follows:
b.
3. Third-party
defendants
C.T.
Torres
Enterprises,
Inc.
and
Pleasantville
Development Corporation are ordered to
pay in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to
Jardinico as attorneys fees, as well as
litigation expenses.
4. The award of
dispensed with.
rentals
to
Jardinico
is
xxx
xxx
(1)
(2)
Petitioner
Pleasantville Development
Corporation and respondent C.T. Tones
Enterprises, Inc. are declared solidarily
liable for damages due to negligence;
however, since the amount and/or extent of
such damages was not proven during the
trial, the same cannot now be quantified
and awarded;
(3)
Petitioner
Pleasantville
Develpment
Corporation and respondent C.T. Torres
Enterprises, Inc. are ordered to pay
in solidum the amount of P3,000.00 to
Jardinico as attorneys fees, as well as
litigation expenses; and
(4)
The award of rentals to Jardinico is
dispensed with.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 dated May 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64295, which modified the Order
dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Civil Case No. Q-41470.
The trial court ordered the defendants, among them
petitioner herein Juan Nuguid, to pay respondent
herein Pedro P. Pecson, the sum of P1,344,000 as
reimbursement of unrealized income for the period
beginning November 22, 1993 to December 1997. The
appellate court, however, reduced the trial courts
award in favor of Pecson from the said P1,344,000
to P280,000. Equally assailed by the petitioners is the
appellate courts Resolution2 dated January 10, 2002,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
It may be recalled that relatedly in our Decision dated
May 26, 1995, in G.R. No. 115814, entitled Pecson v.
Court of Appeals, we set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the
Order dated November 15, 1993, of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 101 and remanded the case to
the trial court for the determination of the current
market value of the four-door two-storey apartment
building on the 256-square meter commercial lot.
The antecedent facts in this case are as follows:
HEIRS
OF
EMILIANO
NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
HEIRS
OF
SINFOROSO
PASCUAL,
respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim
of an applicant in a Land Registration case by
oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government
lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed
by alluvium.
CRUZ, J.:
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in
totothe ruling of the trial court in Civil Case No. 0460-P,
the dispositive portion of which read thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring null and void TCT Nos.
14405, 29592, 29593, 29594, 29595, and
TCT No. 29593's derivative titles TCT Nos.
124725, 124726, 124727 and 124729, and
ordering the Register of Deeds for Pasay
City to cancel them and issue new ones in
We agree.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural
causes, there is all the more reason to compensate
him when the change in the course of the river is
effected through artificial means. The loss to the
petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the
result of a deliberate act on the part of the government
when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de
Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to
compensate the Baeses for their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already
been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the
FELICIANO, J.:p
The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of
land situated in Tumauini, Isabela having an estimated
area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of
this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an
elevation lower than that of the eastern portion which
borders on the national road. Through the years, the
western portion would periodically go under the waters
of the Cagayan River as those waters swelled with the
coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however,
would re-appear during the dry season from January to
August. It would remain under water for the rest of the
year, that is, from September to December during the
rainy season.
The ownership of the landholding eventually moved
from one person to another. On 9 May 1959,
respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares
thereof from Faustina Taccad, daughter of Judge Juan
Taccad. The land sold was described in the Deed of
Absolute Sale 1 as follows:
BENGZON, J.:
This is an offshoot of our decision in G.R. No. L-7046,
Siari Valley Estate Inc, vs. Filemon Lucasan,1 wherein
we affirmed, on appeal, the judgment of Hon. Patricio
Ceniza, of the Zamboanga court of first instance in its
Civil Case No. 134. The dispositive part of such
affirmed judgment read as follows:
Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in
the cattle ranch ". . . judgment is hereby
rendered adjudicating to the Siari of Filemon
Lucasan specially the 321 heads that had been
entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this
Court and ordering the defendant to deliver to the
plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to
P40,000 to pay damages to the Siari Valley
Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold
since 1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of
P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the
rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this
case in January, 1951 and to pay the cost of the
proceeding.In addition, the defendant is hereby
ordered to allow the Siari Valley Estate to round
up all the buffaloes that may be found in his
cattle ranch after the Siari Valley Estate shall
have posted a bond in the amount of P5,000 to
answer for whatever damages the operation may
cause to him.