We first resolve the procedural issue raised by petitioner.

Lotte
asserts that 7J is an indispensable party and should have been
impleaded in respondents petition in the Court of Appeals. It claims
that the petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissible for
failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 5 of
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[13]

[14]

Petitioners contention is tenable.

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to
hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus,
without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in
interest because it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the
employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered
Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was not impleaded by
holding that the former is the real employer of respondents. Plainly,
its decision directly affected 7J.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to
comply therefor.
[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter

and the NLRC, respondents failed to include it in their petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No final ruling on this matter can be
had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion is necessary for the
effective and complete resolution of the case and in order to accord
all parties with due process and fair play.

In light of the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss the

second issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the July 9, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72732 and the November 26, 2004 resolution, are
SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals to
include 7J Maintenance and Janitorial Services as an indispensable
party to the case for further proceedings.

De La Cruz vs Joaquin
De La Cruz vs Joaquin : 162788 : July 28, 2005
FACTS: The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against
petitioners in the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent ordering herein petitioners
to reconvey the property upon his payment. Petitioners assert that the RTCs Decision
was invalid for lack of jurisdiction claiming that respondent died during the pendency of
the case and there being no substitution by the heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked
jurisdiction over the litigation.
ISSUE: WON the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro
Joaquin?
HELD: NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically
governed by Section 16 of Rule 3. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to
protect every partys right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue
to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. A
formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when as in the present case, they
themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of
the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
The records of the present case contain a Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff filed
before the CA. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere
failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
courts decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of
due process.

ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE

L. ESCOBIDO
Posted on March 28, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard
FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money
with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of
replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro
alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen
Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease
agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. RTC dismissed the
case but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos (husband) leasing business is a
conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff
as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one
with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
HELD: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the
registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured
by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest,
and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name
did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Therefore, only one
of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of
the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4,
Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder of
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3, Section 11 of
the Rules of Court.