China perceives the US as a great power in the status quo

NathanandScobell,12(AndrewJ.NathanandAndrewScobell,ProfessorofPoliticalScienceat
ColumbiaUniversityAndrewScobellisSeniorPoliticalScientistattheRANDCorporation.Passage
adaptedfromtheirforthcomingbook,ChinasSearchforSecurity(ColumbiaUniversityPress,2012)
ForeignAffairs,HowChinaSeesAmerica,TheSumofBeijingsFears,October2012,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138009/andrewjnathanandandrewscobell/howchinasees
america)

ButwidespreadperceptionsofChinaasanaggressive,expansionistpowerareoffbase.AlthoughChina's
relativepowerhasgrownsignificantlyinrecentdecades,themaintasksofChineseforeignpolicyare
defensiveandhavenotchangedmuchsincetheColdWarera:tobluntdestabilizinginfluencesfrom
abroad,toavoidterritoriallosses,toreduceitsneighbors'suspicions,andtosustaineconomicgrowth.
WhathaschangedinthepasttwodecadesisthatChinaisnowsodeeplyintegratedintotheworld
economicsystemthatitsinternalandregionalprioritieshavebecomepartofalargerquest:todefinea
globalrolethatservesChineseinterestsbutalsowinsacceptancefromotherpowers. Chiefamongthose
powers,ofcourse,istheUnitedStates,andmanagingthefraughtU.S.ChineserelationshipisBeijing's
foremostforeignpolicychallenge.AndjustasAmericanswonderwhetherChina'sriseisgoodforU.S.
interestsorrepresentsaloomingthreat,ChinesepolicymakerspuzzleoverwhethertheUnitedStates
intendstouseitspowertohelporhurtChina.

A weak US will cause China to become aggressive

Fisher,13(RichardDFisherJr.,SeniorFellowonAsianMilitaryAffairs,authorityonthePRCmilitary
andtheAsianmilitarybalanceandtheirimplicationsforAsiaandtheUnitedStates,TheWashington
Times,WeakeningU.S.presenceencouragesChineseaggressionsatellitemonitoringcouldnotifyalliesof
Beijingsregionalforays,May28,2013,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/28/weakening
uspresenceencourageschineseaggressio/)

SuchassuranceofoverwhelmingU.S.navalandnuclearpowerhasmeantthatJapanneednotbuild
offensivemilitarypowerandthatSouthKoreacouldforgoitsownnuclearforcetodeteraNorthKoreathat
wasbuildingnuclearweapons.AmericanmilitarydominanceontheTaiwanStraitmadeworkablethe
morallyandstrategicallydeficientOneChinaPolicyinwhichcommerceisallowed,butsovereign
recognitionisdeniedtothedemocracyonTaiwanwhilemoststatesotherthantheUnitedStates
maintaintimorousneutralityregardingChinaslongstandingthreattodestroyTaiwan.Furthermore,most
AsianstatescouldforgoindividualmeanssufficienttodeterChinafromenforcingitsexpansiveclaimsto
territoryintheEastandSouthChinaseasaslongastheU.S.wasthereinstrength.Overwhelming
AmericanpoweralsocompensatedforthelackofAsiancollectivesecuritymechanisms,akintoNATO.
ThisisnowagrowingproblemforWashington,however,asChinaspursuitofregionalmilitary
dominanceincreasinglyrequiresbetterregionalmilitarycoordinationamongU.S.alliesandfriendsthat
couldallowforgreaterefficienciesandevenencouragemechanismsforAmericasfriendstobuild
confidenceandbetterresolvetheirowndifferences.Onecasewherethisrequirementhascometoforewas
inaMay9incidentinwhichaPhilippinecoastguardshipfiredonaTaiwanesefishingshipinadisputed
area,anoverlappingEconomicExclusionZone,killingoneTaiwanesefisherman.Thissparkedarealcrisis
inrelationsbetweentwodemocraciesthatotherwiseshouldlonghavehadinplacecooperative
mechanismstopreventsuchtragedies.TaiwaneseoutrageiscompoundedbyrealsecurityfearsofChina,
plusitslongstandingdiplomaticisolationillustratedbyManilasrefusaltopursueajointincident
investigation,justifiedinpartasaviolationofitsOneChinaPolicy.Insteadofencouragingahumane
resolution,Chinaseekstomanipulateanddivide.ChinesestatemediacheeronTaiwaneseoutrage,while
ChinesenavyshipsarenowintimidatingPhilippineislandsintheSouthChinaSeathatManilacannot
defend,asBeijingbalksatlongstandingproposalsforaSouthChinaSeaCodeofConduct.Because

WashingtonandTaipeiconcealfromtheirpublicstheextentofmilitarycooperationundertheaegisofthe
1979TaiwanRelationsAct(aU.S.deferencetoitsOneChinaPolicy),thiscurrentcrisiswithManila
ironicallyhascausedsomeriseinTaiwaneseperceptionsthatChinaistheirprotector.Chinacanbe
expectedtofurtherexploitAsianfearsanddivisionstoburnishanimageofAmericanweakness.Chinacan
nowmanagemultiplesmallmilitaryengagementsintheEastChinaSeatargetingJapansSenkakuIslands,
plusPhilippineandVietnameseislandsintheSouthChinaSea.Evenasmallscaleactioncouldundermine
thecredibilityofAmericanalliancecommitmentstoJapanandthePhilippines,especiallyifWashington
limiteditsresponsetoavoidalargerChineseaction.However,recentsuggestionsbyChineseacademics
andmilitaryofficersthatBeijingshouldreexamineJapanssovereigntyoverOkinawathelocationof
strategicJapanesefacilitiesforU.S.militaryforcespointtoevengreaterfutureAsianinstabilityas
ChinabuildsnuclearandpowerprojectioncapabilitiesthatcouldrivalorexceedU.S.powerinEastAsia
bythe2020s.DespitetheadministrationsnecessarystrategicrebalancetowardAsiain2011and2012,
insufficientmilitaryinvestmentsanddiplomaticcreativitycouldstillallowthedevelopmentoftwin
strategicnightmaresforWashington:aChinathatisnotdeterredfrommilitarilyintimidatingU.S.allies
andfriends,whointurnwouldbeforcedintoseekingnewdeterrentcapabilities,possiblynuclearweapons,
whichthenwouldexacerbatehistoricinterAsiantensionslargelyheldincheckbyAmericasmilitary
commitmentssince1945.

Cyber war with China is on the brink now, any aggression

will trigger
Yi,13(Dr.XiaoxiongYi,AssociateProfessorofPoliticalScience,DirectorofChinaInstitute,Ph.D.

AmericanUniversity,LancasterEagleGazette,ThecomingofChinaU.S.cyberwar,Jun.20,2013,
http://www.lancastereaglegazette.com/article/20130619/OPINION02/306190009/ThecomingChinaUS
cyberwar)

ThecyberwarfarebetweenWashingtonandBeijingisbecomingmoreintense,asEdwardSnowdenthe
WhistleblowertakesrefugeinHongKong,aSpecialAdministrativeRegionoftheMiddleKingdom.
Chinahasbeenidentifiedasthe"mostactivesource"ofnationalandindustrialcyberespionageinthe
worldtoday,accordingtoarecentreportbyU.S.telecommunicationsgiantVerizon.Verizon's2013Data
BreachInvestigationsReportstudiedmorethan47,000cybersecurityincidentsin2012andfoundthat"96
percentofespionagecaseswereattributedtothreatactorsinChina."Speakingonthefindingsofthe
report,WadeBaker,themanagingprincipalofRISKIntelligenceforVerizon,added,"Stateaffiliated
actorstiedtoChinaarethebiggestmoverin2012weusedthewordstateaffiliatedthatweabsolutely
knowarepartoftheChinesegovernmentorsponsoredbytheChinesegovernmentdirectly."Internet
censorshipinChinaisalreadyarealityandallflowofinformationinChinaiscontrolled.Whilemorethan
700millionChinesepeopleapproximately30percentoftotalInternetusersworldwidearenetizens,
Beijing'sGreatFirewallisblockingmanymajorsocialnetworkingandWesternnewswebsites,including
Facebook,YouTubeandGooglesearch.Chinesegovernment'sInternetcensorshiphaslongbeenthetarget
ofAmericancriticismandcondemnation.Now,however,theleakofhundredsofclassifiedU.S.National
SecurityAgency(NSA)documentsbyaformerNSAcontractordisclosedawiderrangeofU.S.
governmentsurveillanceandroutinecollectionofdataonallphonecallshandledbythemajorAmerican
telephonecompanies,andNSA'sPRISMprogram,aclandestinenationalsecurityelectronicsurveillance
program,iscollectingtheemailsandotherwebactivityofforeignersusingmajorInternetservices,
includingMicrosoft,Apple,Yahoo,Google,AOL,YouTube,FacebookandSkype.Andaccordingtothe
WashingtonPost,theU.S.intelligenceanalystssearchPRISMdatausingtermsintendedtoidentify
suspiciouscommunicationsoftargetswhomtheanalystssuspectwith51percentconfidencetonotbe
UnitedStatescitizens.

Cyber conflict escalation goes nuclear

Cimbala,12(StephenJ.Cimbala,DistinguishedProfessorofPoliticalScienceatPennState

Brandywine,Ph.D.inPoliticalScience,|ONNUCLEARWAR:DETERRENCE,ESCALATION,AND
CONTROL,Pg.4041MilitaryandStrategicAffairs|Volume4|No.3|December2012
http://cdn.www.inss.org.il.reblazecdn.net/upload/(FILE)1362308901.pdf)
Theprecedingillustrations...andcon?icttermination.
Theprecedingillustrationsdonotconstituteaprediction,butatemplateforconsideringsomeaspectsof
theproblemofnuclearconflicttermination.AmericanandRussianforceswereusedforillustrations
becauseweknowsomethingabouthoweachstateoperateditsnuclearforcesduringpeacetimeandin
crisesandbecausetheyhavecommittedthemselvestostructuralandoperationalarmscontrolthrough
theyear2018.Finally,thediversityofUSandRussianlaunchplatforms,evenatlowerlevelsofforce
size,holdsimplicationsforsmallernuclearpowersandfornuclearaspiring,butcurrentlynonnuclear
states.Themanagementorpreventionofnuclearproliferationismadeharderbytheuncertaintyabout
relationshipsbetweenpoliticiansandtheirmilitariesincountriesthatareonlytokendemocraciesorless.
Howwouldarrangementsfordelegationofauthorityandnuclearenablementfordeterrenceorwar
fightingbehandledinanucleararmedIranorEgyptor,forthatmatter,incurrentlynuclearcapableNorth
KoreaandPakistan?Opacityinthesemattersisnotreassuring,anddictatorshipshaveawayofappearing
solidontheoutsidebutbrittleontheinside,onceadiplomaticcrisishasbeguntoslideintoawar.In
addition,futuredeterrenceandwarterminationstrategieswillhavetotakeintoaccountthepossible
conjunctionofweaponsofmassdestruction,includingnuclearones,withstrategiesforcyberconflict.Itis
areasonableexpectationthatfutureinterstateconflictswillincludesomemeasureofcyberwar;sotoo,
willnuclearcrisismanagement,escalationcontrol,andconflicttermination.